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Popular Force

Popular Force (Spanish: Fuerza Popular), formerly known as Force 2011, is a conservative political party in Peru rooted in Fujimorism, founded in 2010 by Keiko Fujimori to advance the political legacy of her father, former President Alberto Fujimori. The party promotes policies centered on economic liberalization, robust national security measures against organized crime and remnants of leftist insurgencies, and social programs aimed at inclusion, drawing from Alberto Fujimori's record of stabilizing the economy and defeating the Shining Path terrorist group in the 1990s. Under Keiko Fujimori's leadership, Popular Force achieved significant electoral success, securing a congressional majority with 73 of 130 seats in the 2016 general elections, which allowed it to wield substantial influence over legislative agendas including anti-corruption initiatives and fiscal reforms. However, the party faced a sharp reversal in the 2020 snap parliamentary elections, winning only 15 seats amid voter backlash against perceived congressional overreach during the presidency of Martín Vizcarra. Keiko Fujimori has been the party's presidential candidate in 2011, 2016, and 2021, coming closest to victory in the latter runoff against Pedro Castillo by a margin of less than 1%, reflecting persistent public divisions over Fujimorism's authoritarian undertones and economic achievements. The party has been embroiled in controversies, particularly allegations of corruption involving illicit campaign financing from the Brazilian firm Odebrecht, leading to ongoing trials against Keiko Fujimori for charges including money laundering and heading a criminal organization, though she maintains her innocence and denies the accusations. These probes, pursued by Peruvian authorities since 2018, have tested the party's resilience but have not resulted in definitive convictions as of late 2025, amid critiques of judicial politicization in Peru's fragmented political landscape. Popular Force continues to position itself as a bulwark against leftist policies and institutional instability, maintaining a core support base in urban centers and among those valuing security and growth over past governance flaws.

Origins and Formation

Roots in Fujimorism

Popular Force emerged as the primary political vehicle for Fujimorism following the collapse of Alberto Fujimori's regime in 2000, when the former president fled Peru amid corruption scandals and was later convicted for human rights abuses and authoritarian overreach. Fujimorism, originating from Alberto Fujimori's unexpected 1990 election victory as an outsider against established parties, emphasized pragmatic neoliberal economic policies—such as the "Fujishock" reforms that curbed hyperinflation from over 7,000% annually in 1990 to single digits by 1992—and aggressive counterinsurgency measures that dismantled the Shining Path terrorist group, capturing its leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992 and reducing violence that had claimed over 69,000 lives. These actions, while empirically effective in restoring stability and enabling GDP growth averaging 7% annually from 1993 to 1997, were marred by the 1992 self-coup dissolving Congress, extrajudicial killings by state-linked death squads, and systemic corruption under intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos. Keiko Fujimori, Alberto's daughter and a former first lady during his tenure, founded the party on March 9, 2010, initially as Fuerza 2011, to contest the 2011 presidential election and rehabilitate her father's legacy among supporters who credited Fujimorism with Peru's transition from economic chaos and internal war to relative prosperity. The party's platform inherited Fujimorism's core tenets: market-oriented economics favoring private investment and small businesses, robust security policies prioritizing law and order, and defense of the 1993 Constitution drafted under Alberto Fujimori, which expanded executive powers and enabled his 1995 reelection. Despite mainstream critiques often amplified in academic and media narratives—potentially influenced by ideological opposition to Fujimorism's anti-leftist stance—polling data from the era showed sustained popular support for its outcomes, with Alberto Fujimori maintaining approval ratings above 50% into the late 1990s before scandals eroded them. In 2012, Fuerza 2011 rebranded as Fuerza Popular to consolidate Fujimorist factions, excluding rival "albertista" elements loyal directly to Alberto and centralizing control under Keiko, who positioned the party as a defender of uncorrupted governance against perceived elite betrayals post-2000. This organizational shift reflected Fujimorism's adaptive populism, blending authoritarian efficiency with appeals to underserved sectors, though it faced internal tensions between modernization efforts and nostalgic adherence to Alberto's methods. The party's enduring roots in Fujimorism are evident in its advocacy for policies echoing the 1990s reforms, such as economic liberalization that contributed to poverty reduction from 58% in 1991 to 37% by 1997, albeit with ongoing debates over the sustainability and ethical costs of those gains.

Party Establishment in 2010

Popular Force, initially registered as Fuerza 2011, was founded on March 9, 2010, by Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, as a national political party to serve as her electoral vehicle for the 2011 presidential elections. The party emerged from the remnants of prior Fujimorist groups, including support from the Alianza por el Futuro alliance, which had previously backed Fujimori's unsuccessful congressional bids in 2006. This formation addressed the need for a unified structure compliant with the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones (JNE) requirements for national party inscription, involving the collection of necessary affidavits to achieve legal recognition ahead of the general elections. Keiko Fujimori assumed leadership of the party from its inception, positioning it as a continuation of her father's political legacy while adapting to contemporary electoral demands. The establishment reflected strategic efforts to consolidate Fujimorist supporters under a new banner, distancing from the scandals that had plagued earlier iterations like Cambio 90 and Nueva Mayoría, yet retaining core ideological commitments to economic stability and anti-terrorism policies associated with Alberto Fujimori's tenure. By late 2010, Fuerza 2011 had successfully inscribed with the JNE, enabling participation in the 2011 polls where Fujimori secured second place in the first round. In 2012, the party rebranded to Fuerza Popular, signaling a shift toward broader appeal and permanence beyond the immediate electoral cycle. This renaming occurred amid ongoing efforts to strengthen organizational foundations, including the adoption of formal statutes emphasizing democratic principles, state of law preservation, and national sovereignty. The party's early structure prioritized rapid mobilization of grassroots support, drawing on familial networks and regional affiliates to build a base capable of national contention.

Historical Trajectory

Rise to Prominence (2011–2016)

Fuerza 2011, founded in 2010 under the leadership of Keiko Fujimori to contest the general elections, marked the initial vehicle for reviving Fujimorist influence in Peruvian politics. On April 10, 2011, Fujimori obtained 23.5% of the valid votes in the presidential first round, placing second behind Ollanta Humala's 31.7% and advancing to the runoff. In the June 5 runoff, she received 48.55% against Humala's 51.45%, a narrow defeat that nonetheless demonstrated substantial support amid economic stability and nostalgia for her father's security-focused governance. Simultaneously, Fuerza 2011 secured 37 of 130 seats in Congress, forming a key opposition bloc capable of influencing legislation during Humala's term. The party rebranded as Popular Force in 2012, retaining Fujimori as its standard-bearer and emphasizing continuity with Alberto Fujimori's legacy of economic liberalization and anti-insurgency measures while distancing from his authoritarian excesses. This period saw Popular Force consolidate as the principal right-wing alternative, capitalizing on voter dissatisfaction with Humala's leftist policies and corruption scandals, which eroded his coalition's congressional strength from 47 to fewer effective allies by mid-term. In the April 10, 2016, general elections, Popular Force surged to prominence. Keiko Fujimori won 39.86% in the presidential first round, far ahead of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's 21.05%, setting up a June 5 runoff that she lost by a razor-thin margin of 49.88% to 50.12%. The congressional outcome was decisive: Popular Force captured 73 of 130 seats with 36.3% of the vote, achieving an absolute majority due to proportional representation dynamics favoring its broad regional appeal. This legislative dominance positioned the party to block executive initiatives and shape policy on security, infrastructure, and anti-corruption, underscoring its transformation from marginal opposition to Peru's preeminent conservative force by 2016.

Dominant Period and Setbacks (2016–2021)

In the 2016 general elections held on April 10, Popular Force secured a congressional majority with 73 seats out of 130, enabling the party to exert substantial control over Peru's legislative agenda despite Keiko Fujimori's narrow defeat in the presidential runoff on June 5 against Pedro Pablo Kuczynski. This dominance allowed Popular Force to block executive initiatives, including budget approvals and anti-corruption measures, while attempting multiple impeachments against Kuczynski amid Odebrecht scandal revelations linking him to bribery. The party's leverage contributed to Kuczynski's resignation on March 21, 2018, paving the way for Vice President Martín Vizcarra's ascension, yet Popular Force continued to oppose Vizcarra's administration through legislative obstruction and failed impeachment votes in 2018 and 2019. Setbacks intensified with Keiko Fujimori's preventive detention on October 10, 2018, ordered by a judge investigating allegations of money laundering and illicit campaign financing tied to Odebrecht contributions for her 2011 presidential bid, which prosecutors claimed exceeded $1 million in undeclared funds funneled through falsified receipts. Popular Force denounced the arrest as political persecution aimed at weakening Congress, but it eroded public support, with polls showing declining approval for the party's congressional bloc amid perceptions of corruption protectionism. Internal fractures emerged, including defections and criticism of leadership, further hamstrung by Fujimori's house arrest extension in 2019 and ongoing probes. Tensions peaked when Vizcarra dissolved Congress on September 30, 2019, invoking constitutional powers after Popular Force-led lawmakers denied confidence to his cabinet over stalled anti-corruption reforms, a move upheld by Peru's Constitutional Tribunal despite the party's supermajority enabling prior legislative gridlock. In the ensuing snap legislative elections on January 26, 2020, Popular Force suffered a severe reversal, capturing only 12 seats in the 130-member Congress, a loss of over 60 seats attributed to voter backlash against perceived obstructionism and Fujimori family scandals. This diminished influence persisted into the 2021 general elections, where Keiko Fujimori advanced to the presidential runoff on June 6 but lost to Pedro Castillo by 50.1% to 49.9%, with unsubstantiated fraud claims from her campaign failing to alter certified results. The period underscored Popular Force's transition from legislative powerhouse to marginalized opposition, hampered by judicial scrutiny and electoral repudiation.

Post-2021 Realignment

Following Keiko Fujimori's narrow defeat in the 2021 presidential runoff against Pedro Castillo, where she received 49.87% of the vote, Popular Force accepted the results after initially challenging them on grounds of alleged irregularities, though without success in altering the outcome. The party secured 24 seats in the 130-member Congress, positioning it as a leading opposition force amid Peru's fragmented legislature. This congressional foothold enabled Popular Force to play a pivotal role in scrutinizing the Castillo administration, contributing to multiple failed impeachment attempts before successfully backing his removal on December 7, 2022, for attempting a self-coup. Under President Dina Boluarte, who assumed office after Castillo's ouster, Popular Force initially aligned with other conservative blocs to provide legislative support, including backing an amnesty law enacted on August 13, 2025, aimed at pardoning military personnel involved in past internal conflicts. This cooperation reflected a pragmatic strategy to counter leftist remnants and address security concerns, as evidenced by the party's endorsement of measures against organized crime. However, amid rising public discontent over escalating violence and governance failures, Popular Force reversed course in early October 2025, announcing support for impeachment motions against Boluarte on grounds of moral incapacity. This shift, described by party spokespeople as a response to Boluarte's detachment from citizen suffering, facilitated her unanimous congressional removal on October 10, 2025, paving the way for Congress President José Jerí's ascension. Internally, the period saw consolidation around Fujimori family leadership, with Keiko Fujimori's acquittal by the Constitutional Tribunal on October 25, 2025, in a money-laundering case clearing obstacles for her potential 2026 presidential bid. The party also strengthened its congressional influence by securing presidencies of key commissions in August 2025, enhancing oversight on economic and security portfolios. Strategically, Popular Force began evaluating a refreshed government platform for the 2026 elections, emphasizing anti-crime initiatives while distancing from prior alliances perceived as stabilizing an unpopular regime. This realignment underscores a pivot toward aggressive opposition tactics and electoral renewal, leveraging Peru's ongoing instability to rebuild voter support eroded by the 2021 loss.

Ideology and Policy Stances

Fujimorist Foundations

Popular Force draws its ideological core from Fujimorism, a political doctrine centered on the pragmatic governance model of former President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000), emphasizing decisive state intervention to address acute crises in economy, security, and governance. This foundation prioritizes national stability over ideological purity, rooted in responses to Peru's hyperinflation exceeding 7,000% annually in 1990 and the insurgency of groups like Shining Path, which controlled significant rural territories. Fujimorism posits that effective leadership requires flexibility, including temporary authoritarian measures to restore order, as exemplified by the April 5, 1992, dissolution of Congress and judiciary to combat institutional paralysis amid terrorism. Economically, Fujimorism advocates a social market economy blending neoliberal reforms with targeted social inclusion, crediting the "Fujishock" liberalization package of August 1990—encompassing price deregulation, subsidy cuts, and fiscal austerity—for halting hyperinflation and fostering sustained growth, with GDP tripling and averaging 5% annual expansion from 1993 to 2019. Popular Force upholds this legacy through commitments to private investment, formal job creation, and poverty alleviation via programs like FONCODES (rural infrastructure) and PRONAA (food assistance), which contributed to reducing poverty from 55% in 1990 to 20.2% by 2019 by empowering marginalized sectors, particularly micro-entrepreneurs and women. On security, the doctrine stresses a "strong hand" approach, prioritizing military and intelligence operations to dismantle threats, as demonstrated by the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán on September 12, 1992, which fragmented the group's command structure and restored state presence in affected areas through infrastructure and services rather than negotiation. Popular Force extends this to contemporary policies combating narcoterrorism and delinquency via enhanced police training, new penitentiaries, and alternative development in vulnerable regions, viewing security as foundational to economic and social progress. Socially conservative tenets form another pillar, defending traditional family structures, the right to life from conception, and opposition to expansive state welfare that fosters dependency, aligned with the 1993 Constitution's emphasis on individual rights, equality of opportunity, and rule of law—approved by referendum on October 31, 1993. The party's decálogo explicitly protects marriage, family, and unborn life while promoting merit-based inclusion for historically neglected groups, rejecting demagogic redistribution in favor of technical aid that builds self-reliance. Fujimorism's personalist orientation, tied to the Fujimori lineage, reinforces loyalty to these principles as a bulwark against leftist ideologies perceived as sources of prior chaos.

Economic and Anti-Corruption Positions

Popular Force's economic positions align with neoliberal principles, emphasizing free-market reforms, private sector-led growth, and attraction of foreign direct investment to sustain Peru's export-oriented economy, particularly in mining and agriculture. The party advocates maintaining macroeconomic stability through fiscal discipline and incentives for investment, building on the liberalization policies implemented during Alberto Fujimori's presidency in the 1990s, which reduced hyperinflation from over 7,000% in 1990 to single digits by 1997 via privatization and deregulation. In its 2021 government plan presented by Keiko Fujimori, the party proposed temporary tax exemptions—three years for tourism and two years for small and medium enterprises (SMEs)—to spur post-pandemic recovery, alongside $921 million in state-guaranteed loans for businesses and increased public-private partnerships aimed at reducing poverty to 15% by 2026. Specific to mining, which accounts for over 60% of Peru's exports, Popular Force pledged to allocate 40% of mining and natural gas taxes directly to affected local communities and introduce a "solidarity contribution" levy on mining firms during periods of high metal prices to finance agricultural development. The plan also included raising the minimum wage and prioritizing industry reactivation to generate employment, positioning the economy as centrist with pro-business leanings rather than radical deregulation. On anti-corruption, Popular Force publicly endorses institutional reforms to combat graft, including laws enhancing transparency in public procurement and prohibiting individuals convicted of corruption from holding office, as enacted in October 2016 shortly after the party's congressional majority was secured with 73 of 130 seats. The party's platform has historically emphasized strengthening judicial independence and prosecutorial powers to prosecute high-level officials, framing such measures as essential for investor confidence and economic stability. However, these positions have been undermined by internal scandals, including ongoing investigations since 2016 into Keiko Fujimori and party operatives for alleged money laundering of over $1 million in undeclared campaign funds from 2011 and 2016, linked to Brazilian firm Odebrecht, leading to her pretrial detention orders in 2018 and 2020 before partial releases on appeal. During its control of Congress from 2016 to 2019, Popular Force approved some anti-corruption bills but repeatedly denied votes of confidence to President Martín Vizcarra's administration over proposed judicial purges and anti-immunity reforms, culminating in Congress's dissolution by Vizcarra in September 2019 on grounds of obstructing anti-corruption progress, a move upheld by Peru's Constitutional Tribunal. This record has drawn criticism from transparency watchdogs for selective enforcement, as the party prioritized blocking probes into allies while prosecuting opponents, contrasting with its campaign rhetoric of "zero tolerance" for corruption. Despite these controversies, Popular Force maintains that robust anti-corruption requires balanced legislative oversight to prevent executive overreach, as articulated in Keiko Fujimori's 2021 proposals for merit-based judicial appointments.

Security and Social Policies

Popular Force emphasizes stringent security policies rooted in the Fujimorist tradition of decisive action against internal threats, crediting Alberto Fujimori's administration with dismantling terrorist groups like Shining Path and restoring national order in the 1990s. The party advocates for enhanced law enforcement capabilities and military involvement in public safety, including proposals for a national emergency plan against urban terrorism structured around seven key measures, such as intelligence reinforcement and rapid response protocols, following the October 9, 2025, attack in Chorrillos that highlighted rising extortion and gang violence. In line with this approach, party leaders have publicly backed police use of force to quell protests and maintain order, criticizing local officials for inadequate support during unrest. Keiko Fujimori, the party's perennial presidential candidate, has campaigned on aggressive anti-crime platforms, including hiring former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani in 2011 as an advisor to import "broken windows" policing tactics aimed at preventing minor offenses from escalating into major disorder. This stance reflects a broader commitment to "mano dura" (iron fist) policies, prioritizing citizen safety through expanded surveillance, stricter penalties for organized crime, and opposition to perceived leniency in judicial handling of delinquents, amid Peru's homicide rate of approximately 7.7 per 100,000 in 2024—elevated by urban gang activities despite being lower than regional averages. On social policies, Popular Force supports targeted, data-driven welfare initiatives to combat poverty and promote inclusion, as outlined in their 2016 government plan, which calls for refining existing programs using empirical diagnostics to allocate resources efficiently rather than expanding entitlements indiscriminately. The party aligns with conservative social values, defending traditional family structures and resisting legislative advances in gender ideology, such as comprehensive sex education reforms perceived as undermining parental authority and cultural norms—a position shared with Peru's religious right coalitions that have blocked bills on gender equality since the 2010s. This framework ties social stability to economic discipline and moral order, echoing Fujimori-era reforms that correlated stability with reduced social unrest through poverty alleviation via market-oriented growth, though critics attribute persistent inequalities to insufficient redistributive focus.

Leadership and Internal Structure

Successive Party Presidents

Keiko Fujimori established Popular Force, originally registered as Fuerza 2011, on March 9, 2010, and has held the position of party president continuously since its founding. Under her leadership, the party rebranded to Fuerza Popular in advance of the 2016 elections and maintained a centralized structure with Fujimori as the primary decision-maker, supported by roles such as secretary-general. Party statutes outline the president's election by national congress, but no documented transitions or competitive elections altering this role have occurred, reflecting Fujimori's foundational and enduring authority amid the party's electoral campaigns in 2011, 2016, and 2021. This stability has enabled consistent advocacy for Fujimorist policies, despite internal factional tensions and external legal challenges facing the leadership.

Key Influential Figures

Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, founded Popular Force (then Fuerza 2011) on March 9, 2010, and has served as its enduring leader, directing its electoral strategies and ideological orientation toward Fujimorism. She led the party to congressional dominance in 2016, securing 73 of 130 seats, though presidential bids in 2011, 2016, and 2021 fell short. Her influence stems from mobilizing support around economic stability and anti-corruption rhetoric inherited from her father's administration, despite ongoing legal challenges related to campaign financing. Alberto Fujimori, president from July 28, 1990, to November 21, 2000, provides the ideological bedrock for Popular Force through Fujimorism, emphasizing neoliberal reforms, security crackdowns against leftist insurgents, and centralized authority that stabilized Peru amid hyperinflation and violence. Though imprisoned from 2007 until a 2023 humanitarian pardon and deceased on September 11, 2024, his legacy shapes the party's voter base, with Popular Force explicitly continuing policies like the 1993 Constitution's market-oriented framework. Luis Galarreta, serving as national secretary general since at least 2021, coordinates internal structure and parliamentary tactics, including alliances and opposition maneuvers. As former congressman (2006–2020) and president of Congress (2018–2019), he advanced Popular Force's legislative priorities, such as budget oversight and impeachment efforts against executives perceived as unstable. Martha Chávez, a Fujimorist stalwart and lawyer, held congressional seats from 1995–2000 and 2011–2016, presiding over Congress in 1995 and influencing human rights committee roles despite controversies over self-amnesty laws. Reintegrated into active party roles in October 2025, she bolsters campaigns by defending Fujimori-era achievements like defeating Shining Path terrorism. Luz Salgado, journalist-turned-politician, represented Popular Force in Congress from 2011–2019 and presided over it from July 2015 to July 2016, steering debates on security and economic bills during the party's peak influence. Her departure in June 2019 highlighted internal tensions but underscored her prior role in sustaining Fujimorist cohesion amid executive conflicts.

Electoral Record

Presidential Campaigns

Popular Force has primarily advanced Keiko Fujimori as its presidential candidate in Peru's general elections since the party's founding. In the 2011 election, Fujimori, running under an alliance incorporating the nascent Popular Force, placed second in the first round on April 10 with substantial urban support, advancing to the June 5 runoff against Ollanta Humala. Humala secured victory with 51.5% of the vote. The 2016 campaign marked Popular Force's strongest presidential showing, with Fujimori winning the April 10 first round amid promises of economic continuity and anti-crime measures. She faced Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in the June 5 runoff, where final tallies showed Kuczynski prevailing by 50.1% to Fujimori's 49.9%, prompting her concession on June 10. The narrow defeat highlighted polarized voter preferences between Fujimorism and establishment alternatives. In 2021, amid a crowded field of 18 candidates, Fujimori advanced from the April 11 first round to contest the June 6 runoff against Pedro Castillo, despite securing only around 13% initially. With over 94% of votes counted, Castillo led 50.07% to Fujimori's 49.92%. Fujimori alleged voting irregularities and demanded recounts, but Peru's National Jury of Elections certified Castillo's win on July 19, after which she conceded while criticizing her opponent's platform. These campaigns underscored Popular Force's consistent appeal in urban and conservative demographics, though repeated runoff losses reflected anti-Fujimori sentiment tied to her father's authoritarian legacy.

Congressional Contests

In the 2011 general elections, Popular Force, then competing as Fuerza 2011, secured 37 seats in the 130-member Congress, establishing itself as a significant opposition force following Keiko Fujimori's narrow presidential defeat. This result reflected voter support for Fujimorist policies amid dissatisfaction with the incumbent government. The party's strongest performance came in the 2016 general elections, where it won 71 seats—over half of the Congress—translating to effective control of the legislature despite Fujimori's presidential loss in the runoff. This majority enabled Popular Force to block executive initiatives and shape anti-corruption probes, though internal divisions and corruption allegations eroded its cohesion by 2019, contributing to President Martín Vizcarra's dissolution of Congress in October of that year. The 2020 extraordinary congressional election, held on January 26 after the dissolution, marked a severe setback, with Popular Force obtaining only 15 seats amid widespread voter backlash against perceived obstructionism and scandals. The fragmented results fragmented power further, as no party gained a majority.
Election YearVote Share (%)Seats Won (out of 130)
201123.037
201636.871
20207.715
202111.724
In the 2021 general elections, Popular Force rebounded modestly to 24 seats, positioning it as the second-largest bloc behind Perú Libre, though still far from majority control in a highly fragmented Congress. This outcome sustained its role in opposition coalitions, leveraging Fujimorist voter loyalty despite ongoing legal scrutiny of leadership.

Regional and Municipal Results

In the 2014 regional and municipal elections, operating as its predecessor organization Fuerza 2011, the party secured governorships in four regions: Amazonas, Pasco, San Martín, and Ica. Specific municipal gains included various district-level victories, though comprehensive provincial tallies emphasized localized fujimorista strongholds rather than broad dominance. By the 2018 elections, amid national congressional strength, Popular Force experienced significant setbacks at subnational levels, winning no regional governorships despite presenting candidates across all 25 regions. It secured three provincial mayoral positions and 47 district mayoral positions, concentrated in areas like La Libertad's sierra districts (Bambamarca, Longotea, Sarín, and Sartibamba). This outcome reflected voter rejection of fujimorismo in executive local roles, contrasting with its legislative influence. The 2022 regional and municipal contests marked further decline, with Popular Force failing to elect any regional governors or provincial mayors nationwide, attributing to fragmented opposition and regional movement dominance. District-level successes, if any, remained marginal and unhighlighted in aggregated results, underscoring the party's reliance on national rather than subnational electoral machinery. Overall, these results illustrate Popular Force's challenges in translating congressional majorities into regional executive control, often overshadowed by independent regional lists.

Governmental and Legislative Influence

Coalition Dynamics

In the fragmented 2021-2026 Congress of Peru, where no single party holds a majority, Popular Force has pursued coalition dynamics centered on informal alignments with other right-wing and conservative groups to amplify its legislative leverage. With approximately 24 seats, the party coordinates primarily within a loose "far-right bloc" that includes Renovación Popular and elements of other conservative factions, enabling joint control over roughly one-third of congressional seats for strategic voting on security reforms and institutional matters. This bloc facilitates ad hoc majorities, as seen in coordinated support for executive confidence votes and opposition to left-leaning initiatives, reflecting pragmatic alliances driven by shared opposition to perceived instability from progressive policies. A key mechanism of these dynamics is the "Bloque Democrático," an coordination framework involving Popular Force, Alianza para el Progreso (APP), and Renovación Popular, which has been invoked by FP congresswoman Martha Moyano to describe joint efforts in maintaining congressional presidencies and blocking vacancia motions against aligned executives. This bloc underpinned FP's retention of influence in the Mesa Directiva and commission presidencies into late 2025, despite internal congressional shifts. For instance, FP and APP secured the most important commissions—such as Economy, Constitution, and Agrarian—through negotiated distributions announced by Keiko Fujimori on August 7, 2025, ensuring oversight on fiscal and constitutional reforms. These alliances remain fluid, with Popular Force occasionally extending tactical pacts to centrist parties like Acción Popular or Somos Perú for plenary votes, such as the multipartisan list supporting José Jerí for Congress presidency in July 2025, though ideological divergences limit long-term cohesion. Critics attribute this fragmentation to Peru's weak party institutionalization, where personalist ties and short-term gains often supersede formal coalitions, leading to volatility in support for governments like that of Dina Boluarte prior to her October 2025 ouster. Nonetheless, FP's coalition strategy has sustained its role in vetoing radical proposals and advancing conservative priorities, including enhanced security measures, amid ongoing congressional instability.

Major Initiatives and Votes

During its congressional majority from 2016 to 2019, Popular Force prioritized legislative initiatives aimed at economic reactivation and public sector efficiency, including the approval of Law 30710 on December 21, 2018, which established tax incentives and simplified procedures to stimulate investment amid post-Odebrecht slowdowns. Critics from anti-corruption watchdogs argued these measures diluted fiscal oversight, though proponents cited data showing a 4.8% GDP growth recovery in 2018 partly attributable to such deregulation. The party also spearheaded the passage of Law 2133 on June 14, 2018, prohibiting state advertising expenditures in private media outlets, framed as a cost-saving reform but decried by press freedom advocates as retaliation against investigative reporting on Fujimorista figures. A pivotal vote occurred on September 18, 2019, when Popular Force lawmakers, holding 53 seats at the time, denied a confidence vote to President Martín Vizcarra's cabinet over stalled anti-corruption reforms, prompting the executive's dissolution of Congress under Article 134 of the Constitution. This followed repeated obstructions to Vizcarra's proposals for judicial restructuring and campaign finance transparency, with FP arguing the reforms encroached on legislative autonomy; the move led to snap elections where Popular Force seats dropped to 15. Empirical analyses from Peruvian think tanks noted that pre-dissolution gridlock had delayed over 20 key bills, exacerbating public distrust in institutions. In the 2021–2026 term as the largest opposition bloc with 24 seats, Popular Force has focused on security and economic relief initiatives, sponsoring multiple bills for AFP pension fund withdrawals—such as Project 4525/2022-CR for up to 4 UIT amid inflation spikes—and generic drug promotion to lower healthcare costs. Key votes include support for the July 9, 2025, passage of an amnesty bill (Law 32123) shielding military and police from prosecutions for pre-2002 human rights abuses during counterinsurgency, justified by party leaders like Fernando Rospigliosi as ending "endless persecution" but condemned by UN experts for violating international obligations. On December 12, 2024, FP failed to secure a two-thirds majority for constitutional amendments expanding congressional powers over judicial appointments, highlighting alliance fractures. These efforts reflect a consistent emphasis on institutional stability and security apparatus bolstering, amid data showing Peru's homicide rate rising 25% year-over-year in 2024.

Role in Executive Impeachments

Popular Force, as a major opposition force in Peru's Congress, has frequently participated in or supported motions to declare presidential "permanent moral incapacity," a constitutional mechanism enabling impeachment and removal without judicial process. This role intensified during periods of executive-legislative friction, particularly against administrations perceived as corrupt or ineffective in addressing security and economic challenges. The party's bloc discipline—typically voting en masse—has amplified its influence in securing supermajorities required for success (87 of 130 votes). During Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's term (2016–2018), Fuerza Popular, commanding 73 seats post-2016 elections, spearheaded the first impeachment attempt on December 21, 2017, citing "moral incapacity" tied to Odebrecht bribery allegations. The motion advanced to plenary but failed 57–72 after 10 party dissidents abstained, preserving Kuczynski's position amid internal schisms led by Kenji Fujimori's faction. A second push in March 2018 similarly faltered when the same group abstained, blocking the required threshold despite initial party unity. These efforts highlighted Fuerza Popular's leverage as congressional majority but also exposed vulnerabilities to defections. In the post-2019 Congress (2020–2021), with reduced representation (15 seats after dissolution and snap elections), the party backed the November 9, 2020, ouster of Martín Vizcarra over corruption probes into his pre-presidential contracts, contributing to the 105–19 vote that installed Manuel Merino as interim president. Though not the lead instigator—dominated by Acción Popular and Alianza para el Progreso—Fuerza Popular's support aligned with broader anti-Vizcarra sentiment, framing the removal as accountability for ethical lapses amid COVID-19 mismanagement. Fuerza Popular's 24 seats in the 2021–2026 Congress positioned it centrally in subsequent impeachments. Following Pedro Castillo's December 7, 2022, failed self-coup and congressional dissolution decree, the party unanimously endorsed the emergency session's vacancy motion, voting as a bloc in the 101–6 approval that elevated Dina Boluarte. This rapid response underscored their opposition to Castillo's leftist agenda and perceived authoritarian overreach. Most recently, amid escalating organized crime and homicide rates exceeding 1,200 annually by mid-2025, Fuerza Popular shifted from prior support for Boluarte—initially sustaining her against earlier motions—to backing her October 10, 2025, impeachment. Citing governmental inaction on insecurity, the party announced favorable votes on October 9, enabling the unanimous 122–0 passage that installed José Jerí as interim president. This pivot reflected strategic realignment toward electoral gains in 2026, prioritizing public demands for executive efficacy over alliance loyalty.

Controversies and Debates

Allegations of Corruption and Influence-Peddling

Prosecutors in Peru have accused Popular Force of operating as a criminal organization to launder illegal campaign contributions, primarily through funds linked to the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht as part of the Lava Jato investigations. The allegations center on contributions totaling approximately $17 million irregularly received by the party between 2009 and 2010, including $1.2 million from Odebrecht, which were purportedly laundered via false donations from party militants and used to finance Keiko Fujimori's unsuccessful 2011 presidential campaign. Investigations expanded to include similar practices for the 2016 campaign, leading to formal charges of money laundering, criminal association, and false reporting against Fujimori and over a dozen party officials in 2018. Fujimori, the party's longtime leader, was placed in preventive detention in October 2018 on these charges but released in November 2019 after a court ruled the detention excessive; her trial commenced on July 1, 2024. Co-defendants include former party secretary general Jaime Yoshiyama and treasurer Augusto Bedoya, accused of coordinating the laundering scheme, while evidence presented by prosecutors includes witness testimonies from Odebrecht executives confirming illicit payments. The party has denied the charges, with Fujimori asserting they constitute political persecution aimed at sidelining her influence ahead of elections. Separate probes have targeted individual Popular Force figures for related misconduct, such as party congressman Joaquín Ramírez, investigated by Peruvian authorities in 2016 for allegedly laundering $15 million in campaign funds potentially benefiting Fujimori's 2011 bid, with U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration reports linking suspicious wire transfers to his accounts. Additional allegations involve influence-peddling, including claims that party lawmakers obstructed anti-corruption reforms during their congressional majority from 2016 to 2019, such as voting against immunity lifts for implicated officials, though these have been framed by critics as defensive maneuvers rather than direct quid pro quo. No convictions have resulted from these probes as of October 2025, and Popular Force maintains that the accusations lack concrete evidence beyond prosecutorial narratives. Keiko Fujimori, leader of Popular Force, has been the subject of prolonged investigations into alleged money laundering and illicit association stemming from purported illegal financing of her 2011 and 2016 presidential campaigns. Prosecutors from Peru's Lava Jato task force accused her of heading a criminal network that laundered approximately $17 million, including funds from Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht, which admitted to paying bribes in Peru as part of a regional scandal. Fujimori has denied the charges, describing them as politically motivated persecution aimed at sidelining her opposition role. The probe intensified after Odebrecht's 2016 guilty plea in the U.S., revealing notebook entries linking the company to contributions for Fujimori's campaigns despite her public denials of receiving such funds. In October 2018, Fujimori was arrested and held in preventive detention for 10 months on suspicion of money laundering, obstruction of justice, and false testimony, with authorities citing flight risk and evidence tampering concerns. She was transferred to house arrest in February 2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic, and in November 2020, a judge granted her release on $1 million bail with restrictions including a travel ban and asset freeze. A formal trial commenced on July 1, 2024, before Peru's National Superior Court, involving over 1,500 witnesses and charges of leading a criminal enterprise; prosecutors initially sought 30 years' imprisonment and dissolution of Popular Force as a party. However, on January 13, 2025, the presiding judge annulled the proceedings due to formal errors in the indictment, including improper aggregation of charges. In response, special prosecutor José Domingo Pérez filed a revised accusation on July 3, 2025, elevating the requested sentence to 35 years and implicating 13 associates, including former Popular Force secretary-general Pier Figari. As of October 2025, the refiled case remains pending, with Fujimori free on bail but facing ongoing restrictions; her legal team has appealed aspects of the prosecution's evidence, arguing reliance on unverified witness testimonies and lack of direct proof tying her to laundering activities. Separate probes into related matters, such as alleged influence peddling, have not advanced to trial. Critics of the investigations, including Fujimori allies, contend they reflect selective prosecution amid Peru's polarized politics, while supporters cite collaborative evidence from Odebrecht executives and co-defendants as corroborative.

Criticisms of Authoritarian Tendencies vs. Defenses of Stability

Critics of Popular Force, including human rights organizations such as the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), have accused the party of perpetuating authoritarian tendencies inherited from Alberto Fujimori's 1990–2000 presidency, pointing to the 1992 autogolpe—in which Fujimori dissolved Congress and the judiciary to consolidate power—as a foundational model for institutional capture. These critics argue that Popular Force's congressional maneuvers, such as proposed reforms to the judiciary and electoral bodies since 2021, aim to erode checks and balances, enabling dominance over state branches amid Peru's fragmented politics. Keiko Fujimori's post-2021 election claims of widespread fraud, without substantiating evidence and echoing tactics to delegitimize democratic outcomes, further fueled allegations of undermining electoral integrity, reminiscent of her father's suppression of opposition. Such positions, opponents contend, reflect a broader Fujimorista preference for executive overreach, as evidenced by the party's historical obstructionism against presidents like Martín Vizcarra, contributing to cycles of instability rather than resolving them. Defenders of Popular Force counter that accusations of authoritarianism overlook the causal necessity of decisive action in Peru's context of chronic institutional fragility, where weak governance has enabled insurgencies, economic collapse, and serial presidential impeachments—five leaders ousted or resigned between 2016 and 2023 alone. They highlight Alberto Fujimori's empirical achievements, including the capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992, which dismantled the Maoist insurgency responsible for over 30,000 deaths, and neoliberal reforms that curbed hyperinflation from 7,482% in 1990 to 6% by 1997, fostering sustained GDP growth averaging 7% annually through the 1990s. In this view, Popular Force's advocacy for robust security policies and congressional oversight—such as backing anti-crime legislation amid rising homicides (from 4.8 per 100,000 in 2014 to 7.9 in 2023)—prioritizes stability over procedural purity, arguing that Peru's history of leftist populism and elite corruption demands a "strong hand" to prevent state failure, as echoed by figures like Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa who framed Keiko Fujimori as a bulwark against radical alternatives in 2021. Supporters note that public opinion polls, such as those post-Fujimori's 2024 death, reveal persistent approval for his tenure's order amid ongoing chaos, with many viewing human rights costs as regrettable but secondary to averting civil war or economic ruin. This debate underscores tensions between procedural democracy and substantive governance in Peru, where Popular Force's critics—often from NGOs and academic circles with documented ideological leanings toward progressive causes—emphasize rights erosion, while proponents stress verifiable outcomes like reduced violence (insurgency deaths plummeting 95% post-1992) against a backdrop of alternative failures, such as the unchecked unrest under subsequent administrations. Empirical data supports defenses of stability's priority: Peru's homicide rate, while elevated, stabilized under Fujimorista-influenced security pushes, contrasting with spikes during periods of executive weakness.

Contemporary Role (2022–2025)

Congressional Opposition and Maneuvering

In the aftermath of President Pedro Castillo's attempted self-coup on December 7, 2022, Popular Force congressmen joined a broad congressional coalition to impeach and remove him for rebellion and conspiracy, facilitating Vice President Dina Boluarte's assumption of the presidency amid widespread protests. As the largest single bloc in the 130-seat unicameral Congress with 21 members, the party leveraged its influence to position itself as the primary opposition force, demanding accountability on security and governance while conditionally supporting Boluarte's early administration to counter perceived leftist threats. Popular Force employed tactical alliances with right-leaning groups such as Alianza para el Progreso and Renovación Popular to control the legislative agenda, frequently blocking executive-backed bills on fiscal spending and protest management that they deemed insufficiently tough on disorder. By retaining presidency of pivotal commissions—including Economy under Arturo Alegría, Defense, and Justice as of August 2025—the party maneuvered to scrutinize and amend executive proposals, prioritizing anti-crime measures and congressional oversight amid rising homicides, which reached record levels in 2024. Tensions escalated in 2025 as crime waves intensified, with Popular Force initially opposing vacancy motions against Boluarte to preserve stability but reversing course on October 9, announcing support for her impeachment on grounds of "permanent moral incapacity" due to governance failures. This shift, echoed across multiple blocs, culminated in Boluarte's unanimous congressional ouster on October 10, 2025, elevating Congress President José Jerí (Somos Perú) to the interim presidency, where Popular Force's first vice president, Fernando Rospigliosi Capurro, assumed a key advisory role. Such maneuvers underscored the party's strategic use of its plurality to extract concessions and redirect power toward legislative dominance ahead of the 2026 elections.

Backing for Security Reforms

In response to escalating urban crime and organized violence in Peru, including extortion rackets and gang-related attacks, Popular Force has advocated for structural reforms to bolster state security apparatus, emphasizing military involvement and judicial adjustments to reduce impunity. These positions align with the party's emphasis on "mano dura" policies inherited from the Fujimori era, positioning security enhancements as essential for public order amid a reported 35.9% rise in homicides linked to organized crime. A key proposal emerged in October 2024, when Popular Force lawmakers introduced measures to expand Armed Forces roles, including temporary military administration of prisons for at least 120 days—citing evidence that many crimes originate from incarceration facilities—and deployment of troops for citizen security in districts under emergency declarations, supplemented by specialized training. The initiative also called for declaring a national penitentiary emergency to enable rapid construction of remote facilities, partial denunciation of the Pacto de San José to permit stricter penalties without human rights treaty constraints, and congressional clarification of judicial raid laws alongside executive-led justice reforms within 20 days. Proponents argued these steps would shift from reactive policing to proactive control, addressing institutional weaknesses exposed by prison-orchestrated violence. Following an armed assault at the Agua Marina concert in Chorrillos on October 9, 2025, which underscored "urban terrorism" trends, Popular Force escalated demands for a comprehensive National Emergency Plan comprising seven targeted actions. These included reactivating the Comando de Frente Interno (COFI) for integrated military-police-intelligence operations, restructuring the National Police (PNP) into specialized units for investigation and order maintenance, and authorizing 120-day Armed Forces patrols alongside temporary prison oversight. Further elements encompassed expedited justice reforms to combat impunity, a penitentiary system overhaul with new isolated prisons, reevaluation of the Pacto de San José for enhanced sentencing flexibility, and enforcement of Ley 32446 (enacted 2023) to impose life imprisonment for terrorism-linked offenses. The party simultaneously summoned the Interior Minister to Congress for accountability on governmental delays. Popular Force has integrated police restructuring into its prospective 2026 government platform, prioritizing operational modernization to counter criminal adaptability, where perpetrators reportedly possess triple the state's action capacity and budget in some areas. Such reforms reflect the party's critique of insufficient executive responses to insecurity, advocating unified command structures and resource reallocation as causal levers for restoring deterrence.

Positioning Ahead of 2026 Elections

As of October 2025, Fuerza Popular has centered its electoral strategy for the April 12, 2026, general elections on advancing Keiko Fujimori as its presidential candidate, marking her potential fourth consecutive bid for the office. Party congresswoman Martha Moyano announced on October 20 that the organization unanimously backed Fujimori's candidacy, positioning her as the "natural" leader to continue the party's emphasis on economic stability and security reforms inherited from her father, former President Alberto Fujimori. Secretary General Luis Galarreta reinforced this by confirming Fujimori as the sole presidential contender, amid internal deliberations that Fujimori herself described as a family decision to be finalized shortly thereafter. The party's preparatory efforts include drafting a new government plan, with Subsecretary General Miguel Torres stating on October 20 that Fuerza Popular is actively evaluating proposals tailored to address Peru's ongoing challenges, such as crime surges and institutional instability. Priorities highlighted by spokesperson Luis Galarreta encompass reforming the justice system to enhance efficiency and impartiality, drawing from the party's critique of perceived judicial overreach in prior cases against its leadership. This aligns with Fuerza Popular's broader platform of restoring order, promoting fiscal discipline, and countering insecurity—core tenets evidenced by their congressional support for security-focused legislation in recent years—while navigating a fragmented right-wing field that includes potential alliances or rivalries with groups like Alianza para el Progreso. Fuerza Popular's internal candidate selection process, ongoing as of late October 2025, led the party to decline participation in the CADE Ejecutivos 2025 forum, citing scheduling conflicts and focus on primaries scheduled per the National Jury of Elections' timeline. However, this positioning faces headwinds, including a September 2025 prosecutorial request to the Supreme Court to deem the party illegal over alleged illicit financing—a challenge the organization has contested as politically motivated, bolstered by the recent annulment of related charges against Fujimori by the Constitutional Tribunal. Analysts note that Fuerza Popular's strategy leverages its congressional bloc of approximately 24 seats to portray itself as a stabilizing force amid Peru's political volatility, including the October 10 ouster of President Dina Boluarte, though without direct executive control.

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