Rhetoric
![Aristotle_Altemps_Inv8575.jpg][float-right]Rhetoric is the faculty of observing, in any given case, the available means of persuasion available to speakers or writers.[1] This ancient discipline, systematized by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in his treatise Rhetoric around 350 BCE, focuses on effective communication to influence audiences in civic, deliberative, and forensic contexts where certainty is often absent, distinguishing it from dialectical reasoning suited to philosophy.[2] Aristotle identified three primary modes of persuasion—ethos, establishing the speaker's credibility; pathos, evoking audience emotions; and logos, appealing to logical arguments—forming the core framework that has endured in rhetorical theory.[2] Emerging amid the democratic assemblies of fifth-century BCE Athens, rhetoric initially developed through the Sophists, itinerant teachers who offered practical training in persuasion for public life, though criticized by Plato for prioritizing victory over truth.[3] Aristotle countered such views by positioning rhetoric as a counterpart to logic, essential for applying knowledge in practical affairs involving human judgment and probability rather than absolute proof.[2] In Rome, Cicero and Quintilian further refined it into a structured art of oratory, emphasizing ethical use and comprehensive education in invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—the five canons of rhetoric.[4] These principles have influenced Western education, law, politics, and preaching, underscoring rhetoric's role in shaping public opinion and decision-making, though its potential for demagoguery highlights the need for substantive truth alongside persuasive form./01:_Rhetoric/1.01:_The_History_of_Rhetoric)
Definition and Fundamentals
Core Concepts and Definition
Rhetoric is the faculty of discovering, in any given case, the available means of persuasion. This definition originates from Aristotle's treatise Rhetoric, composed in the 4th century BCE, where he positions rhetoric as a counterpart to dialectic, applicable to matters of probability rather than certainty.[2] Unlike dialectic, which seeks truth through logical demonstration in private inquiry, rhetoric addresses public audiences on uncertain issues, employing persuasive techniques to influence beliefs and actions.[2] Aristotle emphasized that effective rhetoric relies on three primary modes of persuasion, or pisteis: ethos, pathos, and logos.[2] This classical definition has been extended in contemporary rhetorical studies; for example, Kuypers and King describe rhetoric as "the strategic use of communication, oral or written, to achieve specifiable goals," applying Aristotelian principles pragmatically to modern goal-oriented discourse.[5] Ethos pertains to the speaker's credibility and character, establishing trust by demonstrating virtue, practical wisdom, and goodwill toward the audience; Aristotle argued that persuasion through ethos arises when the audience perceives the speaker as reliable, as good character lends weight to arguments even without explicit proof.[2] Pathos involves arousing emotions in the audience to sway judgment, recognizing that people decide differently under emotional influence—such as anger or fear—than in a neutral state; Aristotle detailed how speakers must understand and evoke specific passions to align with persuasive goals.[2] Logos consists of logical arguments, including enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms with unstated premises adapted to audience knowledge) and examples, providing apparent proof through reasoning from probabilities or signs.[2] These core concepts underscore rhetoric's focus on adaptation to the rhetorical situation, encompassing the speaker, audience, topic, and context, rather than mere ornamentation or deception. While rhetoric can facilitate truth-seeking by clarifying probable truths in civic discourse, its techniques are neutral tools, susceptible to misuse for false persuasion if not grounded in ethical judgment. Aristotle warned against over-reliance on emotional manipulation without substantive argument, advocating rhetoric's role in amplifying reasoned deliberation.[2] Modern scholarly interpretations affirm this framework's enduring relevance, extending rhetorical analysis beyond oratory to written and visual communication, though emphasizing empirical testing of persuasive efficacy over prescriptive ideals.[6]
The Five Canons of Rhetoric
The five canons of rhetoric—invention (inventio), arrangement (dispositio), style (elocutio), memory (memoria), and delivery (pronuntiatio)—constitute the core stages of classical rhetorical composition and performance, as systematized by the Roman statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero in his treatise De Inventione, composed around 84 BCE during his youth.[7] [8] This framework, drawing on earlier Greek precedents from figures like Aristotle and the Sophists, delineates a methodical approach to persuasion, emphasizing logical structure over mere emotional appeal. Cicero's articulation in De Inventione marks the first comprehensive Roman codification, later elaborated by Quintilian in Institutio Oratoria (circa 95 CE), which reinforces their utility in forensic, deliberative, and epideictic oratory.[9] Invention (Inventio) refers to the discovery of persuasive content, including arguments, evidence, and appeals tailored to the audience and occasion. Cicero described it as the initial step of identifying topoi (commonplaces or loci), such as genus, species, antecedents, consequences, similarities, and testimony, to generate substantive material grounded in probability and precedent rather than unfounded assertion.[8] [10] This canon prioritizes causal reasoning and empirical analogies, enabling orators to construct cases that withstand dialectical scrutiny, as evidenced in Cicero's own forensic speeches like the Pro Milone (52 BCE), where historical testimonies and logical inferences form the backbone of defense.[9] Arrangement (Dispositio) entails organizing the invented material into a coherent structure to maximize persuasive impact. Cicero outlined a standard progression: exordium (introduction to capture attention), narratio (statement of facts), partitio (division of issues), confirmatio (proof), refutatio (rebuttal), and peroratio (conclusion with emotional reinforcement).[7] [10] This sequence reflects a causal logic, building from establishment of ethos to climax in pathos, as seen in Cicero's In Catilinam orations (63 BCE), where the narratio exposes conspiracy facts before refuting denials.[11] Style (Elocutio) concerns the linguistic expression of ideas, balancing clarity, ornament, and propriety to suit the subject and audience. Cicero advocated virtues of style—correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and propriety—drawing from Greek models like Demosthenes, while warning against excess that obscures meaning, as in his critique of Asianist floridity in favor of the Attic plainness moderated by Roman vigor.[8] [12] Figures of speech, such as metaphor and antithesis, enhance memorability without sacrificing truth, exemplified in Quintilian's endorsement of Cicero's balanced diction for judicial persuasion.[13] Memory (Memoria) involves the internalization and recall of the speech to enable fluid delivery without reliance on notes, cultivated through techniques like the method of loci (associating content with imagined spatial markers). Cicero, trained in Greek mnemonics, viewed it as essential for maintaining audience engagement and adapting to interruptions, a skill demonstrated in his extemporaneous responses during trials.[10] [11] Quintilian supplemented this with repetition and visualization exercises, underscoring its role in preserving rhetorical integrity under real-time pressures.[9] Delivery (Pronuntiatio) encompasses vocal modulation, gesture, and facial expression to convey conviction and emotion. Cicero stressed that even superior content fails without apt actio, integrating voice pitch, pace, and pauses—drawn from theatrical training—to align form with substance, as in his analysis of Demosthenes' thunderous perorations.[8] [10] This canon acknowledges the physiological impact of nonverbal cues on perception, with Quintilian cautioning against effeminacy or rigidity to ensure authenticity in public address.[11]Relationship to Dialectic, Logic, and Truth-Seeking
In Aristotle's framework, rhetoric serves as the counterpart to dialectic, both disciplines addressing matters of opinion rather than demonstrative knowledge from first principles.[2] Dialectic involves interactive argumentation in small groups or one-on-one settings, employing questions and syllogistic reasoning to probe general theses and refine understanding through opposition.[2] Rhetoric, by contrast, adapts these dialectical tools—such as topoi (commonplaces) and enthymemes (rhetorical syllogisms with suppressed premises based on audience assumptions)—for persuasive discourse before large, non-expert audiences in deliberative, forensic, or epideictic contexts.[2] This adaptation acknowledges the limitations of teaching exact knowledge to crowds, focusing instead on what appears probable or endoxa (reputable opinions) to facilitate judgment.[1] Rhetoric intersects with logic through its employment of informal deductive and inductive forms, yet diverges by prioritizing persuasion over strict validity. Logical syllogisms aim at necessary conclusions from true premises, as outlined in Aristotle's Prior Analytics, whereas rhetorical enthymemes rely on probable premises tailored to the audience's beliefs, allowing for emotional and ethical appeals (pathos and ethos) alongside logical ones (logos).[14] This integration positions rhetoric as an extension of dialectical logic into practical, probabilistic domains, where full rigor yields to effectiveness in influencing decisions under uncertainty.[2] Regarding truth-seeking, rhetoric aids in public arenas where dialectic cannot, by equipping speakers to defend true positions against falsehoods using available persuasive means, provided the orator possesses practical wisdom (phronesis) and virtue to align appeals with reality.[2] Aristotle contends that genuine persuasion occurs when audiences believe a claim proven, fostering conditions for truth-oriented deliberation in politics and law, though he warns of its potential for misuse in promoting specious arguments.[2] Plato, however, critiques rhetoric as a mere knack of flattery, inferior to dialectic's rigorous pursuit of eternal truths via the Forms, arguing in Gorgias that it manipulates ignorant masses without genuine knowledge.[2] In Phaedrus, Plato concedes a dialectical rhetoric informed by philosophy could elevate it toward truth, but subordinates it to dialectic's method of division and collection for accessing higher realities.[15] Thus, while rhetoric facilitates collective truth-seeking in empirical, contingent matters, its success hinges on the speaker's commitment to logical integrity over mere conviction, distinguishing ethical application from demagogic abuse.[2]Historical Development
Ancient Near East and Mesopotamia
In ancient Mesopotamia, early manifestations of persuasive speech and oratory appear in Sumerian and Akkadian texts from the third millennium BCE, predating formalized rhetorical theory in Greece but lacking systematic treatises. Literary works and proverbs emphasize the power and perils of language, with advisory collections like the Instructions of Šuruppag (c. 2600–2500 BCE) offering pragmatic counsel on discourse ethics, such as "Don’t speak fraudulently; in the end it will bind you like a trap" and warnings against arrogant speech that "is like fire, an herb that makes the stomach sick."[16] These reflect an awareness of speech's capacity to bind or harm socially and morally, akin to proto-rhetorical concerns with ethos and credibility, though embedded in wisdom literature rather than independent arts of persuasion.[16] Public oratory served practical functions, particularly in military and ritual contexts, where speeches aimed to motivate human actors and petition deities. Kings like Sargon of Akkad (r. c. 2334–2279 BCE) employed pre-battle addresses to instill valor and unity among troops, portraying combat as divinely sanctioned to overcome fear.[17] Such discourses, prevalent in epic narratives, combined exhortation with appeals to tradition and supernatural aid, demonstrating persuasive strategies to align earthly and divine wills, though scholarly analysis notes their role has been undervalued relative to classical traditions.[18] Sumerian epics further illustrate rhetorical devices like analogical reasoning and debate. In Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta (composed c. 2100 BCE, with older roots), envoys engage in verbal contests using similes and parables to argue cultural superiority, highlighting tensions between oral and written rhetoric as tools for influence.[19] Educational practices, including Sumerian "proverb-games," trained scribes in dialogic exchange and rhetorical performance, fostering skills in argumentation through memorized exchanges.[20] These elements suggest proto-rhetorical traditions oriented toward efficacy in governance, warfare, and cultic justification, without the canons or dialectic integration seen later in Greece.[19]Classical Greece
Rhetoric emerged in Classical Greece during the fifth century BCE, initially in Sicily as a practical skill for resolving legal disputes following the overthrow of tyrannies around 466 BCE. Corax of Syracuse and his pupil Tisias are credited by Aristotle as the earliest systematic teachers of rhetoric, developing techniques for forensic oratory to aid citizens in reclaiming property through persuasive speeches in courts lacking professional advocates.[21][22] Their work included early handbooks emphasizing probability arguments and stylistic elements, marking the shift toward formalized persuasive discourse.[23] The art spread to mainland Greece, particularly Athens, where the development of democracy after Cleisthenes' reforms in 508 BCE necessitated public speaking in the assembly (ekklesia) and law courts, involving up to 6,000 jurors in popular tribunals. Sophists such as Gorgias of Leontini, who arrived in Athens in 427 BCE, and Protagoras of Abdera professionalized rhetoric as a teachable skill for civic success, focusing on performative delivery, antithesis, and emotional appeal to influence audiences in democratic deliberations.[24][25] Gorgias theorized language's psychological power, arguing in his Encomium of Helen (c. 400 BCE) that speech could enchant and deceive like a drug, prioritizing persuasion over truth.[26][25] Plato (c. 428–348 BCE) critiqued sophistic rhetoric in dialogues like Gorgias (c. 380 BCE), portraying it as a mere knack (tribē) akin to cookery—flattering the masses without regard for justice or knowledge—contrasting it with dialectic's pursuit of truth through reasoned inquiry.[15] In Gorgias, Socrates equates rhetoric with pandering, asserting it produces belief rather than understanding and serves power rather than virtue.[27] Plato advocated philosophy over rhetoric, though in Phaedrus he allowed a reformed rhetoric informed by knowledge of the soul.[15] Aristotle (384–322 BCE) countered Plato by systematizing rhetoric in his treatise Rhetoric (c. 350 BCE), defining it as "the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" and positioning it as a counterpart to dialectic, applicable to uncertain matters in public life.[2] He outlined three persuasive appeals—ethos (speaker credibility), pathos (audience emotion), and logos (logical argument via enthymemes)—and five canons: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery, integrating rhetoric with logic while acknowledging its probabilistic nature.[2][28] Isocrates (436–338 BCE) further emphasized rhetoric's role in paideia (education), promoting it as essential for ethical citizenship and pan-Hellenic unity against Persia.[26] These developments established rhetoric as a cornerstone of Greek intellectual and political culture, influencing education and governance in democratic Athens.[29]Ancient India and China
In ancient India, rhetorical practices emphasized logical argumentation and debate as means to ascertain truth, particularly within the Nyāya school of philosophy. The Nyāya Sūtras, attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama and composed between the 2nd century BCE and 2nd century CE, systematized debate (vāda) into a structured framework comprising sixteen categories, including pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge such as perception and inference), prameya (objects of knowledge), saṃśaya (doubt), and prayojana (purpose).[30][31] This approach prioritized empirical validation and analogical reasoning over mere persuasion, fostering egalitarian discourse where participants aimed at shared understanding rather than dominance.[32] Nyāya distinguished three debate forms: vāda, a charitable, truth-oriented exchange resolving doubts through evidence; jalpa, competitive wrangling employing fallacies (hetvābhāsa) to refute opponents without commitment to truth; and vitandā, purely destructive caviling focused on negation.[33] These categories underscored a causal realism in rhetoric, where arguments succeeded or failed based on their alignment with observable realities and logical coherence, influencing later Indian traditions in logic and disputation across Buddhist and Jaina schools.[34] In ancient China, rhetoric during the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) centered on persuasive speech (shuo) for diplomatic, political, and moral ends, often amid interstate rivalries requiring alliance-building and counsel. Strategists like those in the Guiguzi, a text from circa 300 BCE attributed to Wang Xu, outlined persuasion tactics attuned to speaker-audience power dynamics, advocating adaptability, simulation, and psychological insight to sway rulers.[35][36] Confucian thinkers, including Confucius (551–479 BCE), integrated rhetoric with ethical cultivation, emphasizing zhengming (rectification of names) to ensure language reflected social roles and moral order, thereby promoting harmony through truthful discourse rather than manipulation.[37] Mohist and Legalist traditions further developed argumentation: Mohists stressed verifiable definitions and consequentialist appeals to utility, critiquing empty eloquence in favor of evidence-based disputation, while Legalists like Han Feizi (circa 280–233 BCE) favored pragmatic rhetoric to enforce state power, viewing persuasion as a tool for compliance over abstract truth.[35][38] Unlike Indian systems' focus on epistemological rigor, Chinese rhetoric prioritized contextual efficacy and moral ethos, with success measured by influence on policy and behavior amid feudal fragmentation.[39] This pragmatic orientation persisted, shaping imperial oratory and counsel traditions.[40]Roman Rhetoric
Roman rhetoric emerged from Greek foundations following Rome's conquests in the eastern Mediterranean during the third century BCE, with systematic instruction introduced by Greek teachers in the second century BCE.[41] The first rhetorical schools in Rome opened around this period, despite intermittent senatorial edicts expelling foreign rhetoricians, such as in 161 BCE and 92 BCE, reflecting tensions over cultural importation.[42] Roman orators adapted Greek techniques—emphasizing the five canons of invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery—to the demands of forensic advocacy in courts and deliberative speeches in the Senate and assemblies, prioritizing legal argumentation over pure philosophy.[43] Early exemplars included Marcus Porcius Cato (234–149 BCE), whose plain, forceful style embodied Roman virtus, as seen in his speeches against Carthage and luxury, influencing the ideal of the vir bonus dicendi peritus, or good man skilled in speaking.[44] By the late Republic, rhetoric intertwined with politics, with figures like the Gracchi brothers employing it for popular reforms, but Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) elevated it to an art form uniting eloquence with ethical wisdom. In De Oratore (55 BCE), Cicero dialogues on the ideal orator as broadly educated in philosophy and history, critiquing overly technical Greek handbooks like those of Hermagoras for neglecting holistic judgment. His other works, including Brutus (46 BCE), a history of Roman orators from origins to contemporaries, and Orator (46 BCE), further systematized stylistic virtues like rhythm and clarity suited to Latin.[45] Under the Empire, rhetoric formalized in education, with Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35–100 CE) authoring Institutio Oratoria (c. 95 CE), a 12-book treatise on training orators from childhood, insisting on moral character alongside technical proficiency to combat sophistic decadence.[46] Sponsored by Emperor Vespasian, Quintilian headed Rome's first public chair of rhetoric, established in 70 CE, emphasizing imitation of Cicero while adapting to imperial constraints on free speech.[46] Rhetorical training permeated elite Roman society, shaping legal codes, senatorial debates, and even epistolary style, with treatises like Rhetorica ad Herennium (attributed pseudonymously, c. 86–82 BCE) providing anonymous handbooks on memory and figures of speech. This evolution marked rhetoric's shift from republican contention to imperial pedagogy, preserving Greek legacy while imprinting Roman pragmatism.[47]
Medieval Islamic and European Traditions
In the medieval Islamic world, rhetoric, termed balāgha, evolved as a discipline emphasizing eloquence, persuasion, and stylistic refinement, drawing from pre-Islamic poetic traditions, Quranic exegesis, and translations of Aristotle's works into Arabic by the 9th century. Al-Jāḥiẓ (c. 776–868/869 CE), a Basran scholar, laid foundational contributions through treatises like Kitāb al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, which systematized ilm al-bayān (the science of eloquence), analyzing rhetorical devices such as metaphor, analogy, and vivid description to enhance persuasive prose and counter Mu'tazilite theological debates. His emphasis on clarity, rhythm, and logical argumentation influenced Arabic literary criticism, establishing rhetoric as essential for religious disputation and literary production.[48][49] Building on this, Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (c. 870–950 CE) integrated Aristotelian rhetoric into Islamic philosophy via his commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, reinterpreting it as a tool for civic discourse and ethical persuasion subordinate to demonstrative logic, while adapting concepts like ethos and pathos to monotheistic contexts of prophecy and governance. Later, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 1078 CE) advanced balāgha with Dalāʾil al-Iʿjāz, arguing the Quran's rhetorical inimitability through naẓm (syntactic arrangement) and semantic depth, influencing subsequent works on poetics and preaching (khiṭāba). These developments prioritized rhetoric's role in interpreting sacred texts and public oratory, with less emphasis on forensic debate compared to classical models.[50][51] In medieval Europe, rhetoric persisted amid the trivium's curriculum but was often eclipsed by dialectic in scholastic universities from the 12th century onward, serving primarily religious ends like sermon composition. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (c. 480–524 CE) preserved classical foundations through partial translations and commentaries on Cicero's De topicis differentiis and Aristotle's logical works, framing rhetoric as inventive argumentation allied with dialectic, which informed Carolingian reforms and monastic education. By the High Middle Ages, the ars praedicandi emerged as specialized handbooks—over 250 surviving from 1200–1500 CE—for structuring sermons with rhetorical figures, biblical themes, and logical proofs, as seen in works by Geoffrey of Vinsauf (fl. 1200 CE), adapting Ciceronian amplification for moral persuasion and lay instruction.[52][53] Cross-cultural transmission revitalized European rhetoric in the 13th century via Latin translations from Arabic sources, including Hermannus Alemannus's rendering of al-Fārābī's Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotilis (c. 1243 CE) and Averroes's middle commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric, which emphasized demonstrative syllogisms over emotional appeals and influenced Dominican preachers like Thomas Aquinas in integrating rhetoric with theology. This synthesis subordinated rhetoric to truth-seeking dialectic but enhanced its utility in disputations and papal bulls, reflecting causal priorities of faith over mere persuasion amid institutional church dominance.[54][55]Renaissance to Enlightenment
During the Renaissance, humanism spurred a renewed focus on classical rhetoric as a tool for eloquence, moral refinement, and civic engagement, with scholars translating and imitating works by Cicero and Quintilian to foster persuasive discourse in education and politics.[56] Desiderius Erasmus (1466–1536), a key figure, advanced rhetorical training through texts like De Copia (1512), which taught abundance of expression via synonyms and varied phrasing to enhance copia or verbal richness, influencing pedagogical methods across Europe.[57] This emphasis on stylistic versatility aimed to equip individuals for social and intellectual discourse, aligning rhetoric with humanist ideals of personal and civic virtue.[58] Petrus Ramus (1515–1572) challenged traditional frameworks by bifurcating rhetoric from dialectic, reassigning invention (finding arguments) and arrangement to logic while confining rhetoric to style and delivery, as outlined in his Arguments in Rhetoric Against Quintilian (1549).[59] This reform, rooted in Ramus's view of innate human reasoning, simplified curricula and gained traction in Protestant institutions, promoting dialectical rigor over ornate persuasion but reducing rhetoric's scope to elocutionary arts.[60] By the late 16th century, Ramist methods influenced educational reforms in England and colonial America, prioritizing utility in teaching over comprehensive classical emulation.[61] Transitioning into the Enlightenment (roughly 1680–1800), rhetoric evolved amid empiricism and rationalism, shifting toward psychological analysis of persuasion and belletristic emphasis on taste and clarity rather than invention.[62] Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples from 1699, reframed rhetoric as foundational to historical and juridical understanding, arguing in The New Science (1725) that human institutions arise from poetic and rhetorical origins rather than pure reason, countering Cartesian rationalism.[63] Vico's topical method, drawing from classical topoi, applied rhetorical tactics to philosophy, positing cycles of cultural development driven by imagination and language.[64] Scottish Enlightenment thinkers further psychologized rhetoric; George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1776) dissected persuasion through mental faculties like wit, judgment, and passion, integrating empirical observation with Ciceronian principles to advocate evidence-based eloquence for public discourse.[65] This approach, echoed in Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783), prioritized natural language and moral sentiment, influencing 18th-century education and oratory amid expanding print culture and democratic debates.[62] Overall, Enlightenment rhetoric adapted classical tools to scientific and political ends, emphasizing probabilistic reasoning over absolute demonstration, though it faced critiques for diluting logical precision in favor of stylistic appeal.[66]Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
In the nineteenth century, rhetorical instruction largely shifted toward belletristic approaches, emphasizing aesthetic taste, literary criticism, and eloquence over classical invention and argumentation. Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, first published in 1783 but widely adopted in American and British education throughout the 1800s, promoted rhetoric as a means to cultivate refined judgment and stylistic beauty in discourse, influencing curricula at institutions like the University of Edinburgh and Harvard.[67] This belletristic paradigm aligned with Romantic emphases on emotion and individual expression, reducing rhetoric to an adjunct of literary appreciation rather than systematic persuasion. Concurrently, the elocution movement gained prominence, particularly in the United States, where lyceums and private academies trained speakers in vocal modulation, gesture, and pronunciation to achieve dramatic effect.[68] Figures like François Delsarte and Steele MacKaye systematized delivery techniques, reflecting a cultural premium on performative oratory amid expanding public lectures and political speeches, though this often prioritized superficial mechanics over substantive content.[68] A logical countercurrent emerged in works like Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric (1828), which framed rhetoric as an extension of logic focused on moral evidence and probabilistic argumentation, reviving Aristotelian invention for practical debates while critiquing ornamental excesses.[69] Whately's text, drawn from encyclopedia articles and aimed at clergy and educators, stressed rules for composing arguments that secure belief through enthymemes and presumptions, influencing Anglican apologetics and early composition pedagogy.[69] By mid-century, rhetoric in higher education often merged with English studies, fostering the current-traditional paradigm that prioritized grammatical correctness, thematic modes, and mechanical writing exercises, as seen in Adams Sherman Hill's Harvard reports of the 1890s. This evolution reflected broader Enlightenment faith in reason but diluted rhetoric's civic role, subordinating it to scientific empiricism and textual analysis. The twentieth century marked a revival of rhetorical theory, spurred by World War I propaganda analysis and the institutionalization of speech communication departments in U.S. universities from the 1920s onward, which rediscovered ancient texts like Aristotle's Rhetoric to address modern mass media and interpersonal dynamics.[70] Ivor A. Richards' The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) redefined the field as the study of misunderstandings in discourse, examining how words generate multiple interpretations through context and tenor-vehicle relations, thus bridging literary criticism and practical communication.[71] Kenneth Burke's dramatism, elaborated in A Grammar of Motives (1945), analyzed motives via a pentad of act, scene, agent, agency, and purpose, treating rhetoric as symbolic action for identification in social dramas and critiquing ideological conflicts through terministic screens.[72] This renewal culminated in Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation (1958), which reconstructed non-formal reasoning for democratic deliberation, emphasizing techniques like presence, dissociation, and universal audience adherence to expand beyond deductive logic.[73] Drawing on juridical and philosophical traditions, their work countered positivist dismissals of rhetoric, advocating its role in value-laden arguments where premises are not universally compelling. The Cornell School, active in the 1910s–1930s under scholars like Lane Cooper, further integrated Aristotelian ethos, pathos, and logos into pedagogy, fostering rhetorical criticism as a method for dissecting public address.[74] By mid-century, rhetoric permeated communication studies, influencing analyses of advertising, political campaigns, and scientific discourse, though often fragmented across disciplines amid skepticism toward persuasion's ethical risks.[75]Major Theorists and Traditions
Sophists and Early Practitioners
The systematic study and teaching of rhetoric emerged in Sicily during the mid-5th century BCE, pioneered by Corax and Tisias in Syracuse after the expulsion of the tyrant Thrasybulus around 465 BCE, when widespread property disputes necessitated persuasive advocacy in courts lacking formal evidence rules.[29] These practitioners formalized the use of eikos (probability or likelihood) as a core argumentative strategy, enabling speakers to construct plausible narratives from circumstantial details rather than verifiable facts, thus laying groundwork for rhetoric as a techne adaptable to democratic litigation.[76] In mainland Greece, the Sophists—professional, fee-charging educators active from approximately 450 to 400 BCE—expanded rhetoric into a comprehensive skill for civic excellence (arete), teaching it to young elites for success in assemblies, law courts, and social discourse amid Athens' expanding democracy.[77] Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–420 BCE), the earliest prominent Sophist, relocated to Athens around 443 BCE and instructed that virtue, including persuasive ability, could be systematically taught, positing "man the measure of all things" to emphasize perceptual relativity over universal truths, which justified rhetoric's focus on adapting arguments to audience beliefs for practical efficacy.[78] Gorgias of Leontini (c. 483–375 BCE), arriving in Athens as an ambassador in 427 BCE, demonstrated rhetoric's potency by swaying the assembly through stylistic and emotive language, theorizing speech as a psychagogic force akin to physical enchantment and advancing skeptical ontology in On Nature or What Is Not (c. 5th century BCE), which dismissed certain knowledge or communication, thereby prioritizing rhetorical effect and ornamentation (logos with rhythm and figures) over factual correspondence.[79] Prodicus of Ceos (active c. 465–395 BCE) contributed by refining rhetorical precision through semantic analysis, distinguishing fine shades among synonyms (e.g., in his Choice of Heracles) to eliminate ambiguity and enhance argumentative clarity, reflecting an empirical attention to language's causal role in persuasion.[80] Hippias of Elis (active late 5th century BCE), a polymath who lectured on diverse topics from astronomy to history, integrated rhetoric into displays of universal knowledge, promoting self-sufficiency in improvisation and ethical relativism tied to cultural conventions.[78] Figures like Antiphon (c. 480–411 BCE) applied rhetoric forensically, inventing techniques for self-defense speeches that dissociated public personas from private actions, while Thrasymachus (fl. 5th century BCE) stressed power dynamics in justice, viewing stronger parties as definers of right.[23] These Sophists' innovations responded causally to the demands of participatory governance, where numerical majorities and oral contests determined outcomes, fostering techniques like antithesis, amplification, and audience adaptation that influenced later theorists despite Plato's contemporaneous portrayals of them as venal manipulators indifferent to truth (e.g., in Protagoras and Gorgias, c. 390–380 BCE).[81] Their empirical orientation—drawing from observed variations in human judgment—contrasted with emerging philosophical quests for invariant principles, yet empirically enabled broader civic engagement by equipping non-aristocrats with verbal tools for influence.[3]Plato and Aristotle
Plato (c. 428–348 BCE), through dialogues such as Gorgias and Phaedrus, critiqued sophistic rhetoric as a form of flattery rather than genuine knowledge. In Gorgias, Socrates equates rhetoric with cookery, a mere knack (empeiria) lacking the precision of true arts (technai) like medicine, arguing it produces gratification without benefiting the soul or pursuing justice.[15] Gorgias defends rhetoric as neutral, capable of persuading on any subject, but Socrates counters that its misuse promotes injustice, as seen in the trial of Archelaus.[15] Plato viewed sophists' rhetoric as prioritizing persuasion over truth, undermining philosophical dialectic.[15] In Phaedrus, Plato offers a more constructive view, positing that effective rhetoric requires understanding the soul's divisions and employing dialectic to discern truths, rather than mere imitation of successful speeches.[15] He insists philosophical rhetoric, grounded in knowledge of forms and ethical aims, surpasses sophistic manipulation, with the ideal orator as a dialectician who collects and divides ideas systematically.[15] This dialogue reconciles rhetoric with philosophy when subordinated to truth-seeking, emphasizing collection (sunagoge) and division (diairesis) as essential methods.[15] Aristotle (384–322 BCE), Plato's student, systematized rhetoric in his treatise Rhetoric, composed around the mid-4th century BCE, defining it as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in any given case.[2] Unlike Plato's skepticism, Aristotle treated rhetoric as an antistrophos (counterpart) to dialectic, valuable for civic discourse despite its potential for abuse, focusing on its role in probable matters where certain knowledge is absent.[2] He outlined three primary modes of persuasion: ethos (speaker's credibility), pathos (audience emotion), and logos (logical argument via enthymemes and examples).[2] Aristotle classified rhetorical speeches into deliberative (future-oriented policy), forensic (past justice), and epideictic (present praise or blame) genres, analyzing common and special topics (topoi) for each.[2] His work emphasized style (lexis), arrangement (taxis), and delivery, advocating clear, appropriate language to enhance persuasion without obscuring meaning.[2] By integrating rhetoric with logic and psychology, Aristotle elevated it as a practical counterpart to philosophy, influencing subsequent Western traditions.[2]
Cicero and Quintilian
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) advanced Roman rhetoric by synthesizing Greek traditions with practical Roman needs, emphasizing the orator's role in civic discourse.[82] In his mature works, including De Oratore (55 BCE), Brutus (46 BCE), and Orator (46 BCE), Cicero outlined the ideal orator as one versed in philosophy, law, and history to achieve persuasive eloquence beyond mere technique.[83] [84] De Oratore, presented as a dialogue set in 91 BCE, critiques rigid Greek handbooks like those of Hermagoras, advocating instead for a holistic education that integrates wisdom (sapientia) with verbal artistry to move audiences in judicial, deliberative, and epideictic settings. Cicero's framework elevated rhetoric as a moral instrument, where the orator's character and knowledge ensure truthful persuasion, influencing Roman education and oratory for centuries.[45] Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (c. 35–c. 100 CE), a teacher of rhetoric in Rome under emperors from Nero to Domitian, produced Institutio Oratoria (c. 95 CE), a 12-book manual on training the complete orator from infancy through mastery.[85] [86] Drawing extensively from Cicero, whom he regarded as the supreme model of style and substance, Quintilian stressed progressive education: early literacy and moral formation in Books 1–2, advanced exercises (progymnasmata) in Books 3–11, and the pinnacle of ethical eloquence in Book 12. [87] He defined the ideal orator as a vir bonus dicendi peritus—a good man skilled in speaking—insisting rhetoric serves virtue, not vice, and requires innate talent refined by rigorous practice in imitation of masters like Cicero and Demosthenes.[88] Quintilian's work standardized rhetorical pedagogy, prioritizing delivery, memory, and style while warning against overly artificial techniques, thus preserving and adapting Ciceronian ideals for imperial Rome.[41] Together, Cicero and Quintilian shifted rhetoric from abstract theory to embodied practice, embedding it in Roman elite formation where oratory sustained republican virtues amid empire./01:_Rhetoric/1.03:_Roman_Rhetorics) Their emphasis on moral integration distinguished Roman rhetoric from perceived Greek excesses, influencing later Western traditions despite biases in sources favoring their conservative civic focus.[89] [90]