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Small power

A small power, also referred to as a small state, is a sovereign country with objectively limited resources, including small territory, population, military strength, and economic output, which constrain its capacity to independently shape global or regional outcomes in the international system.^[1]^[2] Small powers comprise the vast majority of states worldwide and often prioritize survival and security through adaptive foreign policies rather than power projection.^[3]^[4] Despite their inherent vulnerabilities to great power coercion, they frequently leverage diplomacy, multilateral institutions, and alliances to amplify influence, as evidenced by their roles in buffering conflicts or upholding international norms like the liberal economic order.^[5]^[6]^[7] Defining characteristics include heightened dependence on rules-based cooperation for protection against aggression and economic shocks, with strategies emphasizing pragmatism, niche expertise, and coalition-building over unilateral action.^[8]^[9] Debates persist on measurement, blending objective metrics like GDP or troop numbers with subjective perceptions of vulnerability, underscoring that small power status is not merely a function of size but of relational dynamics in an anarchic global order.^[10]^[11]

Definitions and Classification

Core Definitions and Theoretical Foundations

A small power, in the context of international relations, refers to a sovereign state that exhibits a substantial disparity in capabilities relative to great powers, limiting its ability to independently project influence or alter systemic outcomes. This definition emphasizes relational power dynamics rather than absolute metrics like population or territory alone; for instance, small powers are those with insufficient resources to act unilaterally in global security affairs, often requiring coalitions or external support to pursue interests.^[4] Scholars such as Robert Keohane describe them as states whose actions have negligible systemic impact when undertaken in isolation.^[4] Theoretical foundations for understanding small powers originate in realist thought, which posits an anarchic international system where power asymmetries compel weaker actors to prioritize survival over dominance. David Vital characterizes small powers as inherently vulnerable entities with constrained strategic choices, reliant on the goodwill or rivalries of stronger states to safeguard sovereignty, as their limited intrinsic capabilities—such as population or economic base—expose them to absorption or coercion.^[4]^[5] Robert Rothstein extends this by highlighting dependence on alliances for security, arguing that small powers cannot contend on equal terms in conflicts with great powers and must navigate diplomacy to avoid subsumption.^[5] These views underscore causal mechanisms rooted in material constraints: without robust military projection or economic leverage, small powers face heightened risks from great power maneuvers, prompting adaptive behaviors like hedging or neutrality. Realist frameworks further illuminate small powers' roles within balance-of-power dynamics, where they often serve as buffers, stepping stones, or catalysts in great power competitions. Hans Morgenthau's analysis positions them as integral to systemic equilibrium, capable of stabilizing hierarchies through fluid alignments but risking escalation in rigid, polarized alliances.^[4] Empirical extensions, such as those examining buffer states, reveal how small powers can transform zero-sum rivalries into cooperative equilibria by exploiting great power divisions, thereby gaining leverage despite asymmetry.^[5] This contrasts with earlier ideal-type distinctions, like those from Theodore Vanden Bosch, which tie smallness to inability to wage symmetric warfare, evolving into dynamic assessments incorporating geopolitical contingencies.^[5] Overall, these foundations reject notions of parity through institutions alone, emphasizing that small powers' agency derives from great power interstices rather than inherent equality.

Quantitative and Qualitative Criteria

Quantitative criteria for classifying small powers emphasize measurable attributes of state capacity, including population size, territorial extent, gross national product (GNP), and military personnel numbers.^[5] Population thresholds vary across definitions, with the World Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat employing a cutoff of under 1.5 million inhabitants to identify small states, encompassing roughly 40-50 countries.^[11] Other analyses propose broader limits, such as under 10-15 million for economically advanced states or 20-30 million for less developed ones, while some combine population with economic indicators like GDP per capita below $2,000.^[11] These metrics aim to capture inherent resource constraints but face criticism for arbitrary boundaries and failure to account for disparities in resource utilization or per capita wealth.^[5] Qualitative criteria shift focus to relational and behavioral attributes, assessing a state's position within the international hierarchy rather than absolute metrics. Small powers are defined by their limited capacity to independently affect systemic outcomes, necessitating reliance on coalitions or great powers for security and influence. This manifests in vulnerability during asymmetric interactions, defensive orientations in foreign policy, and dependence on international institutions or norms to amplify voice, as opposed to unilateral power projection.^[11] Scholars like Robert Keohane highlight that small powers perceive themselves as unable to act effectively in isolation, prioritizing adaptation to great power dynamics over systemic leadership.^[5] Such approaches reveal inconsistencies in purely quantitative classifications, as resource-poor microstates may wield niche influence through diplomacy, while larger entities falter due to internal fragilities.^[11]

Distinctions from Great, Middle, and Superpowers

Small powers differ from superpowers, great powers, and middle powers in their constrained ability to exert independent influence on international affairs, stemming from inferior material resources, geographic vulnerabilities, and strategic dependencies. Superpowers, such as the United States in the post-World War II era, command global hegemony through unmatched military projection—evidenced by over 700 overseas bases and a defense budget exceeding $800 billion in 2023—enabling unilateral interventions like the 1991 Gulf War without reliance on coalitions for core interests.^[12] In contrast, small powers, often defined by leaders' recognition of their inability to significantly affect outcomes alone or in minimal alliances, prioritize accommodation and multilateralism to mitigate existential risks.^[1] Great powers, including Russia and China as of 2025, possess sufficient capabilities for autonomous revisionism, such as Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine or China's militarization of the South China Sea, backed by large standing armies (over 1 million active personnel each) and nuclear triads that deter peer aggression. Small powers lack this threshold of power, typically exhibiting limited territorial control, modest economies (e.g., GDPs under $200 billion for states like Estonia or Latvia), and defensive militaries incapable of offensive operations beyond immediate borders, rendering them reactive actors in great power competitions.^[12]^[13]

Power Category	Core Capabilities	Strategic Behavior	Examples (as of 2025)
Superpower	Global military reach, economic dominance (>20% world GDP share), ideological export	Unilateral dominance, system-shaping interventions	United States^[12]
Great Power	Regional hegemony, peer deterrence (e.g., nuclear forces, blue-water navies)	Autonomous expansion, balancing rivals	China, Russia^[12]
Middle Power	Niche strengths (e.g., diplomatic mediation, economic leverage in alliances)	Hedging, coalition-building, bridging divides	Australia, Germany^[12]
Small Power	Limited resources, high interdependence (e.g., trade >100% GDP)	Alignment with patrons, rule-based multilateralism	Singapore, Iceland^[13]^[11]

Middle powers bridge the gap with intermediate assets—such as Japan's $4 trillion GDP and advanced submarine fleet—allowing pursuits of independent policies like non-alignment or regional stabilization, unlike small powers' enforced bandwagoning due to vulnerabilities like import dependence (often >50% of GDP) and exposure to external shocks. This relational hierarchy, while partly objective (e.g., population under 10-50 million in many classifications), incorporates intersubjective elements where small powers leverage perceived moral authority or agility in forums like the UN to amplify influence absent raw power.^[12]^[11]^[13]

Historical Development

Origins in the European Concert of Powers

The European Concert of Powers, formalized at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, marked the initial structured distinction between great powers—Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and later France—and lesser entities whose sovereignty and territorial integrity were subordinated to the balance-of-power imperatives of the former.^[14] This post-Napoleonic arrangement arose from the Quadruple Alliance's treaties, including the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1814) and the Final Act of Vienna (June 1815), which prioritized great-power consensus to prevent unilateral aggression and maintain a territorial status quo, often at the expense of smaller states' agency.^[14] Small states, such as Saxony or the German principalities, were treated as diplomatic objects: Saxony's absorption into Prussia was averted only through collective great-power intervention, while Poland faced partition among Russia, Prussia, and Austria, illustrating how minor powers' fates hinged on elite negotiations rather than intrinsic capabilities.^[15] Under the Concert's principles, small states functioned primarily as buffers or clients to mitigate great-power rivalries, with their independence contingent on external guarantees rather than self-reliance. The creation of entities like the German Confederation (1815) and Swiss Confederation exemplified this, bundling minor states into zones insulated from direct conquest but under great-power oversight to avert escalation.^[14] Belgium's 1830 revolt against Dutch rule led to its recognition as a neutral buffer state via the Treaty of London (1839), enforced by Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, yet this autonomy was illusory—Dutch resistance was quelled by great-power naval action, and Belgium's borders were redrawn without full local input.^[16] Similarly, Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire (1830 Treaty of London) imposed a Bavarian monarchy under Otto, balancing British, Russian, and French influences while curtailing Greek self-determination.^[16] These cases underscored small powers' structural vulnerabilities: opportunities for maneuver arose during great-power discord, but consensus—evident in low interstate conflict incidence from 1815 to 1853—routinely marginalized them.^[14]^[15] The Concert's framework thus originated the diplomatic categorization of small powers as entities with limited intrinsic security, reliant on great-power restraint or alliances for survival, a dynamic persisting through interventions in Naples (1821 Austrian suppression) and Cracow (1846 partition).^[16]^[15] While providing relative stability—no small-state extinctions until 1859—this system entrenched power asymmetries, where minor actors like Denmark (losing Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 due to Concert inaction) or Balkan principalities (reconfigured at the 1878 Congress of Berlin) navigated constraints by bandwagoning or exploiting rivalries, yet rarely transcending subordination.^[16]^[14] This era's practices laid empirical foundations for later analyses of small-power diplomacy, emphasizing causal dependencies on systemic equilibrium over autonomous capabilities.^[15]

Small Powers in the World Wars and Interwar Period

Small powers during World War I often found themselves entangled in great power rivalries despite efforts to maintain neutrality or limited involvement. Serbia, a small Balkan state with a population of about 4.5 million in 1914, triggered the conflict through the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, by Gavrilo Princip, leading to Austria-Hungary's ultimatum and mobilization chains that engulfed Europe.^[17] Belgium, guaranteed neutrality by the 1839 Treaty of London signed by major European powers, was invaded by Germany on August 4, 1914, to execute the Schlieffen Plan, resulting in atrocities like the Rape of Belgium and drawing Britain into the war due to treaty obligations.^[18] Neutral small states such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland preserved independence through armed neutrality, geographic buffers, and strict enforcement of blockades, though they faced economic pressures from Allied and Central Powers' naval strategies; Switzerland, for instance, mobilized up to 250,000 troops to guard its alpine borders.^[18] In the interwar period (1918–1939), small powers grappled with the collapse of empires and the rise of the League of Nations, where they theoretically gained influence via equal voting but practically depended on great power enforcement of collective security. The Treaty of Versailles redrew maps, creating or recognizing small states like Poland (population ~27 million), Czechoslovakia (~15 million), and the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, each under 3 million), which pursued defensive alliances such as the Little Entente (1920–1938) among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania to counter revisionist threats from Germany, Hungary, and the Soviet Union.^[19] However, widespread demilitarization and economic fragility—exacerbated by the Great Depression, which shrank global trade by 66% from 1929 to 1932—left them vulnerable; Poland signed non-aggression pacts with the USSR (1932) and Germany (1934) to buy time, but these failed to prevent encirclement.^[19] The League's impotence, evident in its non-intervention during Japan's 1931 Manchurian invasion and Italy's 1935–1936 conquest of Ethiopia (despite sanctions on 90% of Italian imports), underscored small powers' reliance on unenforceable guarantees, prompting shifts toward bilateral diplomacy or isolationism.^[20] During World War II (1939–1945), small powers exhibited acute vulnerabilities to blitzkrieg tactics and great power imperatives, with most European examples rapidly occupied due to inferior military capacities—Poland, for instance, fielded 1 million troops but fell to Germany and the USSR in 35 days in September 1939, losing 66,000 killed and 420,000 captured.^[21] Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were overrun in 1940 within weeks, their combined armies totaling under 1 million against Germany's 3.7 million invaders, highlighting dependencies on alliances like the unfulfilled Anglo-French guarantees.^[21] Surviving neutrals leveraged economic utility and deterrence: Switzerland (population 4 million) mobilized 450,000 reservists and its fortified terrain to repel potential Axis incursions, while trading gold and precision instruments worth billions in today's terms; Sweden (7 million) exported 40% of Germany's iron ore (10 million tons annually) until 1944, balancing concessions to secure non-aggression.^[21] Ireland (3 million) enforced strict neutrality amid British pleas, aiding Allies covertly with weather data and ports but refusing belligerency, rooted in post-1921 partition resentments. Finland (3.7 million) mounted fierce resistance in the Winter War (November 1939–March 1940), with 250,000 troops inflicting 300,000–400,000 Soviet casualties through ski troops and scorched-earth tactics before ceding 11% of territory under the Moscow Peace Treaty.^[21] These cases reveal small powers' strategies—diplomatic hedging, economic bargaining, and asymmetric defense—but ultimate subjugation or compromise when strategic interests of Germany, the USSR, or Allies prevailed.^[22]

Cold War Dynamics and Decolonization

The decolonization wave following World War II, intensified by the weakening of European empires and superpower rivalries, produced over 80 independent states by the mid-1970s, many qualifying as small powers due to their modest demographic bases, economic dependencies, and nascent military structures.^[23] ^[24] From 1945 to 1960, at least 36 Asian and African territories transitioned to sovereignty, often leveraging U.S. anti-colonial rhetoric against European allies or Soviet backing for nationalist insurgencies to accelerate liberation.^[23] ^[25] These emergent small powers confronted a bipolar system where alignment risked subordination, prompting strategies centered on multilateral diplomacy and selective engagement to extract aid while minimizing coercion. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), rooted in the 1955 Bandung Conference of 29 Afro-Asian nations, crystallized as a vehicle for small powers' autonomy when 25 states convened at the 1961 Belgrade Summit under leaders including Yugoslavia's Josip Broz Tito, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah.^[26] ^[27] Founding members such as Algeria, Cambodia, and Guinea exemplified decolonized small states prioritizing "active neutrality" to avoid proxy entrapment, using NAM forums to advocate disarmament, economic cooperation, and UN voting blocs that amplified their influence despite individual military limitations.^[28] ^[29] This approach capitalized on bipolar tensions, as both superpowers courted non-aligned nations with development assistance—Yugoslavia, for example, secured Western loans post its 1948 schism with Stalin while maintaining socialist policies.^[15] ^[27] Yet, structural vulnerabilities persisted; small powers' reliance on external patronage often devolved into interventions, as seen in the Congo Crisis (1960–1965), where U.S.-backed forces ousted Soviet-leaning Patrice Lumumba, or Angola's 1975 independence, which ignited a 27-year civil war with Cuban-Soviet troops supporting the MPLA against U.S.-aided UNITA factions.^[25] ^[15] Such dynamics underscored causal realities: geographic proximity to ideological flashpoints or resource wealth (e.g., Congo's minerals) heightened exposure to great-power instrumentalization, compelling survivors like Kenya (independent 1963) to hedge via regional alliances such as the Organization of African Unity while accepting Western aid to counter Soviet incursions.^[25] Multilateralism via the UN General Assembly provided partial insulation, enabling small powers to challenge veto-wielding Security Council dominance, though empirical outcomes varied—non-alignment preserved nominal independence for states like Tanzania but failed to avert debt traps or internal coups in others.^[30] ^[31]

Post-1991 Shifts and Recent Geopolitical Changes

The dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, resulted in the emergence of numerous new small states, including the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, significantly increasing the global count of such entities.^[32] These states prioritized integration into Western security and economic institutions to mitigate vulnerabilities exposed during the Cold War era. For instance, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania acceded to NATO on March 29, 2004, alongside Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, thereby gaining collective defense guarantees under Article 5.^[33] In the ensuing unipolar moment dominated by the United States, small states in Central and Eastern Europe benefited from expanded multilateral frameworks, with ten countries—including several small powers like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia—joining the European Union on May 1, 2004.^[34] This period facilitated a strategic pivot from rigid territorial defense postures to niche specialization in military contributions, such as rapid reaction forces and cybersecurity, allowing small states to enhance influence within alliances despite limited resources.^[35] Stability prevailed for many, with reduced invasion risks enabling focus on economic development and soft power projection.^[36] Recent geopolitical shifts, including Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, have heightened security dilemmas for proximate small states, prompting reevaluations of neutrality and increased defense expenditures.^[37] The transition toward multipolarity, marked by China's economic expansion and Russia's assertiveness, has compelled small powers to adopt hedging strategies, balancing alignment with major powers through diversified partnerships and regional blocs.^[38] In response, Baltic small states have bolstered NATO commitments and pursued technological niches like digital defense, while others in the Global South leverage non-alignment to navigate great power rivalries without direct confrontation.^[39] These adaptations underscore small states' reliance on institutional umbrellas and intrinsic assets amid eroding post-Cold War certainties.^[5]

Intrinsic Characteristics and Constraints

Demographic and Territorial Limitations

Small powers are characterized by limited demographic resources, often defined in international relations literature as states with populations of 1.5 million or fewer, which constrains their capacity to mobilize human capital for economic production, military defense, and diplomatic staffing.^[40]^[41] This demographic scale inherently restricts aggregate structural power, as smaller populations yield narrower tax bases and reduced pools for skilled labor, innovation, and sustained armed forces.^[42] For instance, states like Iceland, with a population of approximately 387,000 as of 2023, depend heavily on alliance partnerships such as NATO for security, as domestic recruitment alone cannot support independent large-scale military operations.^[9] These demographic constraints exacerbate vulnerabilities to external shocks, including pandemics and labor shortages, where small states exhibit heightened economic volatility due to limited internal diversification.^[43] Brain drain poses an additional risk, as high-skilled emigration to larger economies depletes scarce talent, further hampering technological advancement and policy expertise.^[13] Empirical analyses indicate that such states often prioritize multilateral institutions to compensate, leveraging collective mechanisms for resource pooling that individual demographics cannot provide.^[44] Territorially, small powers typically possess land areas under 100,000 square kilometers, which curtails access to natural resources, arable land, and strategic depth, fostering dependence on imports for essentials like food and energy.^[13] This spatial limitation heightens exposure to geopolitical pressures, as minimal buffering zones against neighboring aggressors reduce defensive maneuverability; for example, Baltic states like Estonia (45,227 km²) face amplified invasion risks from proximate larger powers due to compressed geography.^[45] Such constraints compel reliance on international norms and alliances for territorial integrity, as self-sufficient fortification or resource extraction proves infeasible without external support.^[46] Resource scarcity tied to small territory also amplifies economic openness, with many small powers exhibiting trade-to-GDP ratios exceeding 100%, rendering them susceptible to global supply disruptions.^[13] Island microstates, comprising a subset of small powers, face compounded risks from climate-induced territorial erosion, as limited landmasses offer scant adaptation margins against rising sea levels projected to affect low-lying areas by 2050.^[47] These factors underscore a causal linkage wherein territorial confines not only delimit material bases of power but also necessitate adaptive foreign policies centered on hedging and institutional embedding to mitigate inherent fragilities.^[7]

Economic Structures and Dependencies

Small powers generally exhibit economic structures marked by constrained domestic markets, necessitating high integration into global trade networks to sustain growth and access essential resources. Due to limited population and territorial size, these states often lack the scale for robust internal demand, leading to export-oriented economies with trade-to-GDP ratios substantially exceeding those of larger economies—frequently surpassing 100% in many cases.^[48] ^[49] This openness facilitates specialization in niche sectors such as tourism, agriculture, fisheries, or extractive industries, but it also results in concentrated export baskets, heightening susceptibility to commodity price swings and external demand fluctuations.^[50] For instance, small island developing states import over 80% of their food and energy needs, underscoring structural reliance on stable international supply chains.^[49] Such configurations engender pronounced dependencies on foreign economic actors, including great powers and multilateral institutions, for market access, investment, and development finance. Small powers frequently depend on official development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) to bridge fiscal gaps, with aid constituting up to 10-20% of GDP in vulnerable cases, often tied to donor priorities that influence policy autonomy.^[51] Trade imbalances arise from asymmetrical bargaining power, as these states confront larger partners' tariffs, subsidies, or non-tariff barriers, exacerbating terms-of-trade volatility—evident in per capita GDP growth fluctuations twice as severe as in larger states.^[52] Remittances from diasporas and tourism revenues further entwine economies with global mobility and sentiment, rendering them prone to disruptions like pandemics or geopolitical tensions.^[53] These dependencies amplify security-economic linkages, as small powers leverage alliances or neutrality for economic safeguards, yet risk coercion through sanctions or market exclusion by dominant actors. Empirical analyses indicate that while institutional quality can mitigate vulnerabilities—enabling some small states to achieve higher long-term growth via diversification—systemic exposure persists, with economic resilience hinging on adaptive policies rather than inherent scale advantages.^[54] Reports from institutions like the IMF highlight that without diversified buffers, such as sovereign wealth funds in resource-dependent cases, small powers remain structurally beholden to external stability, limiting independent maneuvering in international affairs.^[48] ^[55]

Military and Technological Capacities

Small powers possess limited military capacities, primarily structured for defensive postures rather than offensive projection or sustained combat operations. Their armed forces typically feature small active-duty personnel, constrained by modest populations and budgets, with many maintaining standing armies of under 10,000 troops supplemented by reserves.^[56] ^[57] This design reflects strategic choices prioritizing credible deterrence through mobility, territorial denial, and integration with alliances, as larger-scale forces exceed fiscal and demographic feasibility. For instance, smaller NATO members like the Baltic states emphasize rapid-response units and interoperability with larger allies over independent mass mobilization.^[58] Military expenditures among small powers remain low in absolute terms, often below $2 billion annually, despite occasional high percentages of GDP—such as 2-3% in vulnerable frontline states—to meet alliance commitments or counter regional threats.^[59] This spending supports procurement of off-the-shelf equipment rather than expansive inventories, with navies and air forces particularly underdeveloped unless geography demands otherwise, like island nations investing in coastal patrol vessels. Constraints arise from economic dependencies, where defense allocations compete with development needs, leading to underfunded maintenance and training.^[60] ^[57] Technologically, small powers exhibit heavy reliance on foreign arms imports, with limited indigenous production capabilities due to insufficient R&D investment and industrial bases. Data from SIPRI indicate that many small states, including European NATO allies, derive over 70% of major weapons systems from external suppliers, particularly the United States for combat aircraft and munitions, fostering dependencies that can influence foreign policy autonomy.^[61] ^[62] This import orientation limits innovation to adaptations of imported systems, though emerging low-cost technologies—such as drones, cyber tools, and precision-guided munitions—enable asymmetric enhancements, allowing credible deterrence without matching adversaries' scale.^[63] Exceptions exist in select cases, like Israel and Singapore, where strategic imperatives drive domestic advancements in electronics and missiles, but these remain outliers amid broader patterns of technological lag.^[64] Overall, such capacities underscore vulnerabilities to supply disruptions and the imperative for alliance-embedded modernization.^[65]

Security Vulnerabilities

Exposure to Aggression and Coercion

Small powers, due to their limited military capabilities and strategic value to larger actors, face heightened risks of direct aggression, including territorial incursions and occupations. Historical data indicates that between 1816 and 2007, small states—defined as those with populations under 10 million and GDPs below global medians—experienced invasion rates approximately three times higher than larger states when adjusted for geopolitical exposure, primarily because their modest deterrence forces fail to impose prohibitive costs on aggressors.^[66] For instance, the United States invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983, deploying over 7,000 troops against a defending force of fewer than 2,000, citing the need to protect American citizens and restore order after a coup; the operation lasted 72 hours and resulted in the ouster of the New Jewel Movement government.^[67] Such cases underscore how small powers' inability to project power or maintain robust defenses amplifies their susceptibility to rapid, decisive assaults by great powers seeking to secure bases, resources, or ideological footholds. Coercion extends beyond kinetic aggression to encompass economic and hybrid tactics that exploit small powers' dependencies. Empirical analyses show that small states suffer disproportionate impacts from sanctions and trade disruptions, with GDP contractions averaging 2-5% in targeted economies versus under 1% for larger peers, as their export concentrations and limited diversification heighten vulnerability.^[68] In the South China Sea, China has employed maritime militia and fishing fleet blockades against claimants like the Philippines and Vietnam since the 2010s, coercing concessions on disputed reefs without full-scale invasion; for example, Vietnam reported over 100 incidents of Chinese vessel incursions in 2014 alone, leading to temporary halts in oil exploration activities.^[69] These gray-zone actions evade traditional thresholds for aggression under international law, such as Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, while imposing asymmetric costs on small powers lacking naval parity.^[70] Internal and external coercion often intersect, as aggressors leverage small powers' ethnic divisions or economic frailties for subversion. Robert Keohane's 1969 study highlighted how small states' reliance on great power goodwill exposes them to diplomatic arm-twisting, a pattern evident in Russia's 2008 intervention in Georgia, where Moscow justified incursions into South Ossetia and Abkhazia—regions comprising about 15% of Georgia's territory—on protecting Russian passport holders, resulting in de facto control despite Georgia's NATO aspirations.^[66] Similarly, economic coercion via energy cutoffs has targeted small states like Moldova, where Gazprom reduced supplies by 30% in 2014, pressuring alignment shifts amid Ukraine's crisis.^[71] These mechanisms persist because small powers' bargaining leverage diminishes against actors wielding "weaponized interdependence," where global networks amplify coercive precision against the weak. Overall, such exposures compel small powers toward alliance-seeking, though guarantees prove unreliable when great power interests diverge, as seen in repeated violations of post-World War I neutrality pledges toward states like Belgium.^[72]

Reliance on External Guarantees

Small powers, constrained by limited military capabilities and territorial vulnerabilities, often depend on external security guarantees from great powers or multilateral alliances to deter aggression and preserve sovereignty. These guarantees, typically formalized through treaties, extend the deterrent power of stronger actors to smaller ones, compensating for the latter's inability to independently project force or withstand prolonged conflicts. Empirical analyses indicate that such reliance stems from structural asymmetries in international relations, where small states prioritize survival by aligning with protectors capable of imposing high costs on adversaries.^[73]^[36] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization exemplifies this dynamic, with its Article 5 collective defense clause providing small members assurance against invasion. The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—pursued NATO membership post-Soviet dissolution to secure these guarantees amid proximity to Russia, achieving accession on March 29, 2004, which integrated their defenses into the alliance's framework and prompted enhanced forward presence deployments. Iceland, a NATO founder in 1949 lacking a standing army, relies on a 1951 U.S. defense agreement and alliance contributions like hosting air policing rotations, leveraging its strategic North Atlantic location without independent military forces.^[74]^[75]^[76]^[77] While these arrangements enhance deterrence—as evidenced by NATO's expansion stabilizing Eastern Europe post-1991—they introduce dependencies that can erode autonomy. Small states risk abandonment if guarantors prioritize domestic interests, as debated in cases like potential U.S. retrenchment, or entrapment in great power rivalries, where alliance obligations compel involvement in unrelated disputes. In Southeast Asia, Singapore illustrates partial reliance, granting U.S. forces base access and conducting joint training to bolster capabilities against threats like territorial disputes, without full treaty commitments.^[73]^[78]^[79]

Internal Stability Challenges

Small powers often grapple with internal stability challenges exacerbated by their limited scale, which constrains the development of robust institutions capable of mediating domestic disputes or absorbing shocks. Ethnic, sectarian, or tribal divisions frequently intensify in such contexts, as historical legacies of arbitrary borders or colonial partitioning concentrate diverse groups within confined territories, fostering grievances over resource allocation and political representation. These tensions can erupt into violence when state capacity for coercion or accommodation is insufficient, as seen in cases where internal contradictions threaten the state's very existence.^[80] Economic vulnerabilities compound these issues; heavy reliance on narrow sectors like tourism or remittances leaves populations exposed to external disruptions, such as pandemics or commodity price fluctuations, triggering unemployment, inequality, and protests that strain fragile governance structures.^[81] Political fragility manifests through weak institutions prone to corruption, elite factionalism, and military interventions. In many small states, underdeveloped bureaucracies enable patronage networks and erode public trust, creating cycles of instability where leaders prioritize short-term survival over long-term cohesion. This environment facilitates coups d'état, particularly in regions with strong militaries and histories of intervention, as domestic economic decline and ineffective governance provide pretexts for power seizures. For example, Guinea-Bissau, a small West African state with a population under 2 million, has endured multiple coups since independence in 1974, driven by ethnic rivalries among military factions and narcotics-fueled corruption undermining civilian rule. Similarly, Fiji experienced coups in 1987, 2000, and 2006, rooted in Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian communal divides intertwined with economic discontent and political polarization.^[82] ^[83] In multi-ethnic small powers, post-conflict arrangements often prove brittle, requiring constant external mediation to avert relapse. Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrates this, where the 1995 Dayton Accords established a decentralized federation to balance Bosniak, Serb, and Croat interests following a war that killed approximately 100,000 and displaced over 2 million; yet, persistent veto powers and separatist rhetoric from Republika Srpska entities continue to challenge central authority as of 2023. Institutional underdevelopment also heightens susceptibility to non-state threats like organized crime or insurgencies, which exploit governance gaps in states with thin security apparatuses. Overall, these challenges underscore how small powers' intrinsic constraints—limited fiscal resources, small security forces, and narrow elite pools—amplify domestic fissures, often necessitating reliance on external alliances for internal pacification.^[84]

Foreign Policy Strategies

Balancing, Bandwagoning, and Hedging

Small powers, constrained by limited military and economic resources, often select alignment strategies such as balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging in response to threats from larger actors, with choices influenced by the perceived intensity of the threat, power asymmetries, and geopolitical uncertainty. Balancing entails opposing a threatening power through alliances or internal military enhancements to restore equilibrium, while bandwagoning involves accommodation with the stronger actor to minimize costs or extract gains. Hedging, distinct from both, combines limited balancing measures with appeasement elements, such as diversified partnerships and economic interdependence, to preserve flexibility amid ambiguous threats.^[85]^[86] Balancing remains a core strategy for small powers when facing revisionist neighbors, though their capabilities typically necessitate external alliances rather than unilateral hard balancing via arms buildups. For example, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—balanced against Russian influence by pursuing NATO membership, achieving accession on March 29, 2004, which provided collective defense guarantees under Article 5, deterring potential aggression despite their small populations (under 3 million each) and territorial vulnerabilities. This approach aligns with neoclassical realist predictions that small states prioritize alliances when internal mobilization is infeasible, as evidenced by increased NATO deployments in the region following Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea. Soft balancing, involving diplomatic isolation or multilateral sanctions, supplements these efforts, as seen in small European states' coordinated responses to Russian actions in Ukraine starting February 24, 2022. Empirical studies indicate small states balance more frequently than larger ones when threats are ideological or expansionist, countering earlier theories emphasizing bandwagoning under asymmetry.^[36]^[5] Bandwagoning occurs when small powers perceive overwhelming coercion or opportunities for profit, aligning with the aggressor to avoid destruction, though it risks subordination and is empirically rarer than balancing due to distrust of dominant powers' intentions. Historical cases include several Balkan small states accommodating Axis powers during World War II, such as Bulgaria's 1941 alignment with Germany for territorial gains amid fears of Soviet or Allied intervention. In contemporary settings, pure bandwagoning is uncommon among small powers, as it invites exploitation; instead, partial accommodation appears in resource-dependent contexts, like some Gulf states' initial deference to Iraq before the 1990 invasion, driven by military disparities where Iraq's forces outnumbered Kuwait's by over 10:1 in personnel. Theorists note bandwagoning prevails under "predatory" threats focused on conquest rather than ideological conversion, but small powers often hedge to mitigate post-alignment vulnerabilities.^[87] Hedging has emerged as a prevalent adaptive strategy for small powers in multipolar or uncertain environments, enabling risk diversification without full commitment to either balancing or bandwagoning, particularly when great-power outcomes are unpredictable. Southeast Asian small states like Malaysia and Vietnam exemplify this, fostering economic ties with China—evident in Vietnam's $111 billion trade surplus with China in 2023—while deepening security pacts with the US, such as enhanced military exercises under the 2018 Comprehensive Partnership upgraded in 2023. Kuwait employs hedging post-1990 liberation, relying on US defense agreements (including the 2001 Defense Cooperation Agreement) for deterrence while maintaining diplomatic and investment links with regional powers like Iran to buffer against overdependence. Oman's neutral hedging, balancing US bases (hosting 1,500 troops as of 2016) with non-aggression pacts toward Iran, preserves autonomy amid Persian Gulf tensions. This strategy succeeds for small powers by reducing entrapment risks and exploiting great-power competition, though it demands diplomatic agility and can falter if threats clarify, prompting shifts toward balancing. Studies operationalize hedging via mixed alignment indices, showing its prevalence in 70% of small states facing rising powers since 1991, outperforming rigid strategies in survival terms.^[86]^[88]^[89]^[90]

Diplomatic Maneuvering and Alliances

Small powers, constrained by limited military and economic resources, often employ diplomatic maneuvering to preserve autonomy while forming alliances that provide security guarantees and amplify their influence. These strategies typically involve hedging between major powers, leveraging multilateral institutions, and selectively aligning with stronger partners to deter aggression without full subordination. For instance, alliances enable small states to access collective defense mechanisms, as evidenced by the Baltic republics' integration into NATO, where Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania deposited instruments of accession on March 29, 2004, securing Article 5 protections against potential Russian revanchism following their 1991 independence from the Soviet Union.^[33]^[74] This move reflected a calculated bandwagoning with Western powers to counterbalance regional threats, transforming their vulnerability into institutionalized deterrence.^[91] In Asia, Singapore exemplifies pragmatic maneuvering through non-binding yet robust partnerships, maintaining a strategic defense cooperation agreement with the United States renewed in 2015, which facilitates U.S. military access and joint exercises while avoiding formal treaty obligations that could provoke neighbors.^[92] This approach allows Singapore to hedge against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, balancing economic ties with Beijing—evidenced by renewed cooperation agreements in 2025 marking 35 years of diplomatic relations—with security alignments that enhance its role as a regional hub.^[93] Similarly, states like Kazakhstan pursue multi-vector diplomacy, cultivating ties with Russia, China, and the West since the 1990s to safeguard energy exports and territorial integrity amid great-power competition, thereby preserving maneuverability without exclusive dependence.^[1] Within Europe, small EU members leverage alliances for normative influence, as seen in Serbia's post-2000s strategy of attracting EU investments—positioning the bloc as its largest trading partner—while sustaining military and energy links with Russia and infrastructure deals with China, enabling Belgrade to navigate Kosovo disputes and sanctions without isolation.^[1] Such hedging reduces coercion risks, though it demands constant diplomatic agility to avoid entrapment in great-power rivalries. Central and Baltic EU states further demonstrate this by coalescing to shape EU responses to external threats, such as driving sanctions against Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, thereby punching above their weight through bloc solidarity.^[94] Overall, these alliances mitigate small powers' exposure by pooling resources, but success hinges on credible commitments from patrons and the small state's ability to offer niche contributions, like basing rights or diplomatic mediation.^[95]

Neutrality and Non-Alignment Tactics

Small powers often employ neutrality as a core tactic to safeguard sovereignty amid great power rivalries, declaring a legal status of non-participation in armed conflicts and abstention from military alliances. This approach, rooted in realist international relations theory, enables these states to avoid entanglement in wars beyond their capacity to influence or defend against, preserving territorial integrity through diplomatic recognition rather than military might. For instance, Switzerland's perpetual neutrality, formalized at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, has been upheld via constitutional provisions and a policy of armed self-defense, allowing the country to maintain independence despite geographic encirclement by major powers.^[96]^[97] Similarly, Austria embedded neutrality in its 1955 State Treaty, committing to non-alignment with military blocs while investing in domestic defense capabilities to deter aggression.^[98] Non-alignment extends neutrality into broader geopolitical contexts, particularly for small developing states, by rejecting exclusive ties to either superpower bloc during bipolar eras like the Cold War. Tactics include symmetric strategic independence, such as diversified trade relations and multilateral diplomacy to hedge risks without formal commitments. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1961 by leaders from countries like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, exemplified this for smaller postcolonial powers, enabling collective bargaining in forums like the United Nations without endorsing either NATO or Warsaw Pact ideologies.^[99]^[36] Participants pursued "active and peaceful coexistence," leveraging economic concessions and neutral mediation to extract guarantees from belligerents, as seen in Sweden's WWII policy of exporting iron ore to both Axis and Allies while fortifying borders.^[21] This non-alignment often pairs with internal stability measures, like conscription for credible deterrence, to signal resolve against coercion.^[96] Effectiveness hinges on great power acquiescence and the small power's ability to enforce impartiality through verifiable actions, though violations occur when strategic value overrides neutral status. Malta's 1974 constitutional neutrality, for example, prohibits foreign military bases and has facilitated EU membership without NATO obligations, enhancing Mediterranean security bargaining.^[98] However, empirical cases reveal limits: Finland's Cold War "Finlandization" balanced Soviet proximity with Western economic ties, yielding autonomy but at the cost of policy concessions.^[86] Post-Cold War, many small neutrals like Sweden (NATO accession March 2024) and Finland (April 2023) abandoned strict non-alignment amid Russian aggression, underscoring that neutrality tactics succeed primarily in low-threat multipolar environments but falter against existential pressures without external buffers.^[78]^[8]

Mechanisms of Influence

Intrinsic and Situational Power Sources

Small powers possess intrinsic power sources rooted in their unique, self-generated attributes that enable influence disproportionate to their material capabilities. These include specialized expertise, reputational authority, and institutional competencies developed through deliberate national strategies. For instance, particular-intrinsic power, as defined in international relations scholarship, draws on non-material bases like diplomatic skill and domain-specific knowledge, where small states invest resources to build comparative advantages.^[46] Switzerland exemplifies this through its long-standing neutrality policy, codified in the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which has fostered a global reputation for impartial mediation and secure financial services, attracting over $2 trillion in foreign deposits as of 2023 despite lacking natural resources or military might. Similarly, Singapore leverages its geographic position and governance efficiency—ranking first in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index until its discontinuation in 2021—to dominate global maritime trade, handling 37.2 million TEUs at its port in 2023, which amplifies its voice in trade negotiations. Such intrinsic sources contrast with traditional metrics of power like population or GDP, as small states compensate via niche specialization; Norway, for example, derives leverage from its sovereign wealth fund, valued at $1.5 trillion in 2024 from oil revenues since the 1990 Fund establishment, enabling ethical investment influence and climate diplomacy leadership, including the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to its committee for fostering Franco-German reconciliation post-World War II. Empirical analyses confirm that these assets allow small powers to shape outcomes in targeted arenas, such as Estonia's cybersecurity expertise post-2007 cyber attacks, which positioned it as a NATO hub and exporter of digital governance models adopted by over 50 countries via e-Estonia initiatives.^[46] Situational power sources for small powers arise from contextual dependencies of larger actors, creating episodic leverage rather than enduring capabilities. These often manifest as derivative power, where great powers' strategic needs—such as access to resources, locations, or votes—grant small states bargaining advantages during specific crises or alignments.^[46] Qatar illustrates this through its natural gas reserves, comprising 13% of global proven supplies as of 2023, which provided outsized influence during the 2022 European energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine; LNG exports surged 66% year-over-year, enabling Doha to secure defense pacts and host U.S. Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American facility abroad with 11,000 personnel. In multilateral settings, situational power emerges from pivotal positions, such as swing votes in divided bodies; Cyprus, with its divided status since the 1974 Turkish invasion, has blocked EU-Turkey accession talks 14 times since 2004, leveraging its veto to extract concessions on reunification despite a population of 1.2 million and GDP per capita reliant on tourism. This form of power is transient, hinging on great power rivalries or shortages—Bahrain, for example, parlayed its hosting of the U.S. Fifth Fleet since 1971 into $2.5 billion in annual aid and arms sales by 2023, amid Gulf tensions, though such leverage wanes without ongoing dependencies. Analyses emphasize that situational sources demand agile diplomacy to exploit windows, as seen in Panama's canal control post-1999 treaty handover, which generated $2.4 billion in tolls in 2023 and influenced U.S. trade policy during supply chain disruptions. Unlike intrinsic assets, these evaporate with resolved crises, underscoring small powers' need for diversification.^[46]

Collective Action and Coalitions

Small powers frequently engage in collective action to mitigate their inherent limitations in military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities, pooling resources with like-minded states to amplify their influence in global affairs. By forming coalitions, these states can aggregate bargaining power, distribute the costs of advocacy, and leverage numerical advantages in multilateral forums, where small states comprise roughly two-thirds of United Nations membership.^[13] This strategy draws on the principle that unified voices from numerically dominant but individually weak actors can shape outcomes in institutions like the UN General Assembly or regional bodies, as existential vulnerabilities—such as territorial disputes or climate risks—often incentivize cooperation over defection.^[6] Coalitions provide small powers with derivative influence, where their leverage stems from association with larger partners or peer groups rather than standalone strength, enabling contributions to collective security or policy agendas without overextending limited capacities.^[100] In alliances such as NATO, small members like Estonia and Latvia have integrated into broader defense frameworks, enhancing deterrence against regional threats through shared intelligence and troop commitments, as demonstrated by their participation in NATO's enhanced forward presence battlegroups since 2017.^[101] Similarly, in the European Union, small states employ coalition-building to navigate decision-making, relying on argumentative persuasion and norm advocacy to influence legislation, particularly during crises where high-stakes issues align interests.^[102] Specific examples illustrate the efficacy of these tactics. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), established in 1990 with 39 members and observers, has exerted disproportionate sway in climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, advocating for ambitious targets like the 1.5°C goal and securing dedicated funding mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund in 2010.^[6] In another case, the Marshall Islands spearheaded the High Ambition Coalition in 2015, uniting over 100 countries to drive the Paris Agreement's adoption by bridging divides between developed and developing nations.^[6] These efforts underscore how small powers overcome collective action dilemmas—such as coordination costs and free-riding risks—through targeted diplomacy, often yielding policy concessions unattainable individually.^[103] Despite successes, coalitions pose challenges for small powers, including autonomy concessions to dominant allies and internal divergences that dilute unity, as seen in varying commitments within ASEAN where smaller members like Laos balance against larger neighbors like Indonesia.^[104] Empirical analyses indicate that while alliances bolster minor powers' security, their involvement in conflicts correlates with higher escalation risks if misaligned with core interests, prompting hedging strategies alongside full commitment.^[101] Overall, collective action remains a cornerstone mechanism, transforming numerical plurality into substantive leverage while necessitating vigilant management of intra-coalition dynamics.

Negotiation Techniques and Soft Power Leverage

Small powers frequently rely on multilateral forums where formal equality among states allows them to counterbalance material asymmetries through collective action and specialized input. In these settings, they form ad hoc coalitions, such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) on climate issues or the High Ambition Coalition for Trade, often partnering with non-governmental organizations to pool resources and enhance bargaining positions.^[6] This approach enables small powers to influence outcomes disproportionate to their size, as evidenced by their majority representation—over two-thirds of UN members—shaping customary international law through persistent advocacy.^[13] Negotiation techniques emphasize argumentative persuasion over coercion, including leveraging niche expertise, moral framing, and issue upgrading to higher-level institutions. For example, Switzerland has used its specialized knowledge in biodiversity to steer global environmental talks, while Costa Rica advanced small arms control discussions by positioning itself as a neutral convener.^[6] Small delegations compensate for limited resources by chairing sessions, as Seychelles did in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia from 2015 to 2017, exploiting perceived impartiality to guide consensus. Legal maneuvers, like Liechtenstein's 2022 push for UN veto transparency or Vanuatu's 2023 initiation of an ICJ advisory opinion on climate obligations, further amplify voice by invoking international norms.^[6] Soft power leverage for small powers centers on attraction through reputation, cultural projection, and impartial mediation, converting perceived vulnerabilities into assets. Norway exemplifies this by facilitating the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, drawing on its neutral image to build trust absent in larger powers.^[6] Qatar has similarly employed media outlets like Al Jazeera since 1996 to shape narratives and host talks, including 2023 Israel-Hamas negotiations, enhancing its regional influence without military dominance.^[105] Liechtenstein projects soft power via economic stability and cultural diplomacy, maintaining sovereignty through informational and diplomatic networks despite lacking an army.^[106] These strategies succeed by fostering goodwill and co-optation, as small powers' credibility in niche roles—rooted in non-threatening postures—encourages larger actors' cooperation.^[6]

Engagement with International Institutions

Participation in Multilateral Organizations

Small powers, which form the numerical majority of United Nations membership with over 100 states qualifying as small based on population, GDP, and military capacity metrics, engage extensively in multilateral organizations to amplify their limited unilateral capabilities. In the UN General Assembly, where voting equality prevails irrespective of state size, small powers have historically influenced outcomes on global norms, such as the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, where coalitions of smaller states pressured major powers for concessions on disarmament verification.^[6] This participation sustains rules-based order, as small states' dependence on international law for security—lacking robust domestic resources—drives consistent attendance at sessions, with data showing their representation in UN committees exceeding proportional expectations relative to great powers.^[107] Strategies include forming ad hoc coalitions, such as the Forum of Small States established in 1992 to coordinate positions on trade and security, enabling collective bargaining in venues like the World Trade Organization (WTO). There, small states leverage agility and specialized knowledge—e.g., Pacific island nations advocating for fisheries subsidies reforms in the 2022 WTO Ministerial Conference—to secure exemptions or aid provisions that bilateral negotiations rarely yield.^[108] Empirical analyses confirm that such engagement yields tangible influence, with small states authoring or co-sponsoring 40% of General Assembly resolutions on development issues between 2010 and 2020, often countering great power vetoes in subsidiary bodies.^[109] Challenges persist, including resource strains from great power agenda dominance, yet small powers mitigate this through niche diplomacy, such as hosting dialogues—Bahrain's Manama process on Gulf security since 2004—or aligning with like-minded groups in the International Court of Justice for sovereignty disputes. This approach underscores causal reliance on multilateralism for survival, as isolated actors face heightened vulnerability to coercion.^[110] Overall, participation fosters legitimacy and reciprocity, with small states contributing disproportionately to peacekeeping operations relative to GDP, comprising 15% of troop contributors despite representing under 10% of global economy.^[111]

Regional Groupings and Forums

Small powers frequently engage in regional groupings and forums to pool resources, amplify their voices in diplomacy, and counterbalance the dominance of larger states within geographically proximate contexts. These platforms enable collective action on issues like trade, security, and environmental management, where individual small states lack sufficient leverage. Participation often emphasizes consensus-driven processes, allowing small members to veto or shape outcomes that protect their sovereignty and economic interests. For example, in consensus-based organizations, small states can block initiatives unfavorable to them, thereby exerting disproportionate influence relative to their material capabilities.^[112] In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, serves as a key forum where small powers such as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar collaborate with larger neighbors on economic integration and non-traditional security threats. These states benefit from ASEAN's principle of non-interference and equal representation, which has facilitated agreements like the 2015 ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, where smaller members' input ensured provisions addressed cross-border vulnerabilities specific to their porous borders. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, further allows small powers to mediate great-power tensions, such as U.S.-China rivalries in the South China Sea, by hosting dialogues that prevent escalation into direct confrontations affecting regional stability.^[112]^[113] European small powers, including the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland), utilize the European Union (EU) and sub-regional forums like the Nordic Council (established 1952) to advance security and economic objectives. Within the EU, small states advocate for policies enhancing multilateralism, such as the 2022 Strategic Compass on defense cooperation, where their emphasis on hybrid threats—drawing from experiences like Estonia's 2007 cyberattacks—shaped collective responses. The Baltic Assembly, formed in 1990, coordinates positions on energy security and Russian influence, enabling these states to negotiate as a unit in broader EU forums despite comprising less than 1% of the EU's GDP collectively.^[114]^[7] In Africa, small powers engage the African Union (AU), created in 2002, and sub-regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 1975) to address instability and resource governance. States such as Cape Verde and Gambia leverage AU forums for peacekeeping contributions, with small contingents participating in missions like the 2013 AU-led intervention in Mali, where their involvement bolstered legitimacy without requiring dominant military roles. ECOWAS has seen small members influence sanctions regimes, as in the 2017 suspension of Mali following its coup, demonstrating how regional forums institutionalize small states' roles in enforcing democratic norms across the continent.^[113]^[108] Caribbean and Pacific small island developing states (SIDS) form tight-knit groupings like the Caribbean Community (CARICOM, 1973) and Pacific Islands Forum (PIF, 1971) to prioritize climate resilience and trade preferences. In CARICOM, small states like Antigua and Barbuda have driven the 2001 Revised Treaty provisions for functional cooperation in disaster response, reflecting their vulnerability to hurricanes—evidenced by the 2017 Irma and Maria storms affecting multiple members. The PIF enables coordination on ocean governance, with small powers like Kiribati and Tuvalu leading advocacy for the 2019 Boe Declaration on regional security, which emphasizes blue economy protections amid rising sea levels threatening their existence. These forums underscore small powers' strategic use of niche expertise to influence global agendas through regional amplification.^[108]^[110]

Influence Tactics and Outcomes

Small powers within international institutions often rely on coalition-building to amplify their voices, forming alliances with like-minded states to counterbalance larger actors and advance shared agendas. For instance, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), comprising 39 members, has coordinated negotiating positions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), pushing for stringent emission reductions despite representing less than 1% of global CO2 emissions. This tactic proved pivotal in advocating for a "below 1.5°C" temperature goal during the 2015 Paris Agreement negotiations, which was incorporated as a benchmark for global ambition.^[115]^[116] Another key tactic is niche diplomacy, where small powers specialize in technical or moral authority domains to exert disproportionate influence. Costa Rica, leveraging its historical commitment to disarmament, led efforts on the Arms Trade Treaty, culminating in its adoption by the UN General Assembly on April 2, 2013, with 158 votes in favor. The country continued this role by chairing the treaty's Fourth Review Conference in 2024, demonstrating sustained impact through expertise rather than material power. Similarly, the Marshall Islands initiated the High Ambition Coalition in 2015, uniting over 100 countries to secure the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C limit and enhanced transparency mechanisms, outcomes that elevated small states' role in climate governance.^[6] In regional institutions like the European Union, small powers employ strategies such as exploiting qualified majority voting and bureaucratic positioning to shape outcomes. Latvia, for example, influenced EU security governance on Eastern flank threats by building ad hoc coalitions and providing specialized intelligence, contributing to stronger sanctions against Russia following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, outcomes remain constrained; while small states can broker niche successes, such as Seychelles' 2015-2017 chairmanship of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which reformed anti-piracy operations and reduced incidents in the Indian Ocean, broader influence often depends on alignment with great powers and faces dilution in consensus-driven processes. Empirical assessments indicate that small states' tactics yield asymmetric gains in issue-specific areas like human rights or environmental norms but rarely alter core power distributions.^[6]^[117]

Theoretical Frameworks

Realist Perspectives on Small Power Behavior

In realist international relations theory, small powers operate within an anarchic system characterized by power disparities, where survival demands pragmatic responses to great power dynamics rather than autonomous agency. Classical realists like Hans Morgenthau emphasize that small states, constrained by limited military and economic capabilities, must navigate threats through calculated self-preservation, often subordinating ideals to the imperatives of power politics.^[96] Neorealists, such as Kenneth Waltz, extend this by arguing that systemic structure—particularly polarity—shapes behavior, compelling small powers in bipolar configurations to align with dominant poles for security, as misalignment risks absorption or irrelevance.^[32] This perspective posits small powers as rational actors focused on relative gains, prioritizing avoidance of conquest over expansion, with their influence derived indirectly from exploiting great power rivalries rather than intrinsic strength.^[5] A central prediction is the prevalence of bandwagoning over balancing among small powers, as the former offers protection against overwhelming threats at lower cost. Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory refines this, suggesting small states align with the least threatening great power or the rising hegemon to avert domination, evidenced by historical tendencies where weaker actors accommodated aggressors during power transitions.^[96] Robert Rothstein's examination of alliances underscores that small powers form coalitions not for equality but to compensate for vulnerabilities, often accepting patron-client dynamics that enhance short-term security but limit long-term independence, as seen in interwar Europe's small states seeking great power guarantees amid rising instability.^[32] John Mearsheimer's offensive realism further contends that small powers' strategies are reactive, with their survival hinging on great power decisions; attempts at equidistance fail when offensive capabilities enable conquest, rendering buck-passing or hiding viable only in multipolar diffusion.^[96] Neutrality emerges as a contingent strategy in realist thought, viable primarily as a byproduct of great power equilibrium rather than deliberate small power volition. Morgenthau viewed neutrality among small European states as functionally tied to balanced rivalries, allowing abstention from conflicts without immediate penalty, yet Thucydides' Melian Dialogue illustrates the peril: "The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must," highlighting how neutrality dissolves under existential pressure from unappeased powers.^[96] Buffer small states may leverage geography for hedging—balancing neutrality with selective alignments—to influence outcomes, transforming zero-sum great power games into cooperative equilibria, but this agency remains subordinate to structural forces.^[5] During the Cold War, for instance, small states like Finland practiced "Finlandization"—accommodating Soviet proximity while preserving nominal autonomy—demonstrating realism's emphasis on adaptive concession over defiant isolation.^[32] Empirically, realist frameworks predict small powers' over-reliance on alliances yields mixed security gains, with bipolar stability (e.g., NATO/Warsaw Pact expansions post-1949) outperforming multipolar volatility, yet exposing them to proxy exploitation.^[96] Critiques within realism note that small powers occasionally defy predictions by sustaining neutrality through collective buffering, as in ASEAN's small state coalitions deterring hegemony, affirming their role as subjects influencing great power restraint via strategic positioning.^[5] Overall, these perspectives underscore causal primacy of power asymmetries in dictating small power conduct, where deviations from alignment invite vulnerability in an enduringly competitive order.^[32]

Liberal and Constructivist Interpretations

In liberal international relations theory, small powers are viewed as beneficiaries of institutional frameworks and economic interdependence that mitigate the constraints of limited material resources. Liberals argue that states, regardless of size, operate within dense networks of domestic and transnational civil society, where cooperation through international organizations enables small powers to constrain larger actors and pursue mutual gains.^[118] For instance, small states can leverage multilateral institutions to promote rule-based orders, as evidenced by their active participation in bodies like the World Trade Organization, where they advocate for open markets that amplify their trade-dependent economies.^[32] This perspective posits that democratic small powers, embedded in liberal norms, gain influence by aligning with great powers on shared interests such as human rights and free trade, thereby preserving a stable international order during power transitions.^[7] Empirical cases, such as Baltic states' integration into NATO and the EU post-1991, illustrate how institutional membership provides security guarantees and economic leverage, countering realist predictions of vulnerability.^[119] Liberal interpretations further emphasize small powers' role in sustaining the liberal international order through niche diplomacy and norm diffusion, rather than balancing or bandwagoning. Scholars note that small states often specialize in agenda-setting on transnational issues like climate change or development aid, using their perceived neutrality to broker compromises among great powers.^[120] This agency stems from domestic preferences shaped by open societies, where public opinion and interest groups push for cooperative foreign policies that enhance bargaining power in interdependent systems.^[121] However, critics within liberalism acknowledge that such influence depends on the order's resilience; erosion of U.S.-led institutions could diminish small powers' gains, as seen in challenges to WTO dispute resolution since 2017.^[122] Constructivist approaches reinterpret small powers' behavior by emphasizing the socially constructed nature of state identities, interests, and power asymmetries, rather than fixed material hierarchies. Constructivists contend that "smallness" is not an objective trait but an intersubjective perception shaped through interactions, allowing small states to redefine their roles as norm entrepreneurs or ethical leaders.^[11] For example, identities of vulnerability can evolve into strengths via discursive practices, as Nordic small powers have constructed narratives of "smart power" through multilateralism, influencing EU environmental policies despite modest capabilities.^[123] This view highlights how ideas and norms enable agency; small powers may challenge dominant discourses by promoting alternative interpretations of security, such as human security over territorial defense.^[32] In constructivist analysis, small powers' influence arises from their ability to alter shared understandings in international society, often by embedding domestic identities into global norms. States like Iceland have exerted outsized impact on whaling bans by framing themselves as stewards of international public goods, reshaping regime complexes through ideational entrepreneurship.^[124] Unlike liberalism's focus on institutions as given, constructivism stresses contingency: interests are not preordained but emerge from ongoing social processes, enabling small powers to resist great power dominance by contesting meanings of sovereignty or intervention.^[125] Empirical reassessments, however, reveal limits; constructed identities may falter against entrenched material realities, as in small developing states' struggles to redefine climate norms amid great power vetoes at COP conferences since 2015.^[126] This theoretical lens thus underscores small powers' potential for transformative agency while recognizing the embeddedness of ideas in power structures.

Critiques and Empirical Reassessments

Realist perspectives on small powers, which emphasize vulnerability to great power dominance and strategies like balancing or bandwagoning, have been critiqued for underestimating small states' agency in non-material domains. Empirical studies indicate that small states often resist great power pressure through niche diplomacy, coalition-building, and normative influence rather than purely material balancing, as seen in cases where developing small states pursue autonomous policies despite limited capabilities.^[5]^[32] This challenges the realist assumption that anarchy compels small powers into passive survivalism, revealing instead adaptive behaviors not predicted by power asymmetry alone.^[125] Liberal interpretations, positing that institutions and interdependence amplify small powers' influence, face criticism for overlooking power imbalances within multilateral forums where larger states dominate agenda-setting. Data from small states' participation in organizations like the UN or EU show that while access provides voice, outcomes often favor great powers' interests, with small states achieving marginal gains in specialized areas like environmental norms but limited sway on security issues.^[127] Empirical reassessments, including analyses of voting alignments, demonstrate that interdependence benefits small powers unevenly, as economic vulnerabilities expose them to coercion rather than equalizing leverage.^[32] Constructivist views, highlighting identity and norm entrepreneurship, are faulted for insufficiently integrating material constraints, leading to overemphasis on ideational factors at the expense of causal power dynamics. Critiques note that while small states like Nordic countries shape human rights discourses, such successes depend on alignment with great power interests, not independent norm creation; deviations, as in illiberal small states resisting Western norms, underscore realism's enduring role in explaining behavioral limits.^[11] Reassessments through comparative case studies reveal hybrid behaviors where constructivist identity plays out only within realist structural bounds, prompting calls for integrated frameworks over siloed theories.^[128] Broader empirical reevaluations of small power theory across IR paradigms highlight a systemic marginalization in mainstream scholarship, with post-Cold War data showing small states comprising over 70% of UN members yet underrepresented in power-centric models. Quantitative analyses of foreign policy initiatives from 1990–2020 indicate higher rates of multilateral engagement and soft power projection than predicted, suggesting theories undervalue situational adaptability and overstate determinism by size.^[125] These findings advocate for context-specific metrics, such as diplomatic network density over GDP, to better capture small powers' causal efficacy in a multipolar era.^[129]

Case Studies and Examples

Nordic Small Powers

The Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—exemplify small powers that leverage diplomatic agility, multilateral engagement, and soft power to amplify influence disproportionate to their size and military capabilities. With populations ranging from Iceland's 380,000 to Sweden's 10.5 million as of 2023, these states prioritize consensus-building, international law adherence, and niche expertise in areas like peacekeeping and human rights, enabling them to shape global norms despite limited hard power.^[130] Their foreign policies emphasize shelter-seeking through alliances like NATO (for Denmark, Iceland, and Norway since 1949) and the European Union (for Denmark and Sweden since 1995), while Finland maintained non-alignment until 2023.^[131] This approach has allowed them to navigate great-power dynamics, particularly Russia's proximity, by fostering regional cooperation and contributing to UN initiatives.^[132] Norway illustrates small-power mediation efficacy through its facilitation of the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, conducted via secret back-channel talks hosted in Oslo. As a neutral actor outside the conflict, Norway's diplomats, led by Foreign Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, bridged gaps by providing a discreet venue and logistical support, resulting in mutual recognition and interim self-governance frameworks for Palestinians.^[133] This success stemmed from Norway's reputation for impartiality and its oil-funded development aid, which positioned it as a credible broker without territorial ambitions.^[134] Similarly, Norway has mediated in Sri Lanka and Sudan, underscoring a strategy of "niche diplomacy" that exploits perceived moral authority to influence outcomes beyond its geopolitical weight.^[135] Sweden's historical policy of non-alignment in peacetime, maintained since 1814, enabled active internationalism, including UN mediation efforts and a leading role in arms control during the Cold War. This flexibility allowed Sweden to avoid entanglement in conflicts while promoting disarmament treaties like the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, where it advocated for verification mechanisms.^[136] However, Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine prompted Sweden to abandon non-alignment, applying for NATO membership in May 2022 and acceding in March 2024, reflecting a pragmatic shift toward collective defense amid eroded rules-based order.^[137] Finland, sharing a 1,340-kilometer border with Russia, pursued a parallel balancing act: post-Winter War (1939–1940) "Finlandization" involved pragmatic accommodation of Soviet demands while preserving sovereignty, evolving into military non-alignment until NATO accession in April 2023 following the Ukraine crisis.^[45] This transition doubled NATO's border with Russia and highlighted Finland's deterrence strategy, backed by universal conscription and a reserve force exceeding 280,000.^[138] Denmark, a NATO founder, exerts influence through transatlantic loyalty and EU integration, contributing disproportionately to alliance missions—such as leading the 2003 Iraq coalition's ground forces—and recent Ukraine aid exceeding 2% of GDP by 2024. Its "total defense" model, updated in 2024, emphasizes hybrid threats and Nordic-Baltic cooperation. Iceland, lacking a standing army, relies on NATO's Article 5 via U.S. basing until 2006, channeling influence into human rights advocacy and Arctic governance, securing a UN Security Council seat in 2009 despite financial crisis.^[139] Collectively, these states demonstrate small-power resilience by adapting to geopolitical shifts, prioritizing interoperability in forums like the Nordic Council, and exporting welfare-state models as soft power assets, though recent NATO expansions signal wariness of unilateral great-power assertiveness.^[140]

Baltic and Central European States

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—regained independence in 1991 amid the Soviet Union's collapse and immediately prioritized integration into Euro-Atlantic structures to secure sovereignty against Russian revanchism. With populations of approximately 1.3 million, 1.8 million, and 2.8 million respectively, these nations lacked the military or economic capacity for independent deterrence, leading to a foreign policy centered on NATO and EU accession achieved simultaneously on March 29, 2004. This strategy reflected realist imperatives for small states: aligning with great powers to amplify security through collective mechanisms like NATO's Article 5.^[141]^[142] Post-accession, the Baltics have demonstrated heightened alliance loyalty, consistently surpassing NATO's 2% GDP defense spending guideline—Estonia reached 2.73% in 2023—while investing in asymmetric capabilities such as Estonia's cyber defense forces, bolstered by the 2007 Russian cyberattacks that underscored vulnerabilities. They have punched above their weight in supporting Ukraine against Russia's 2022 invasion, with Lithuania providing military aid equivalent to over 1% of its GDP and advocating for EU enlargement to include Ukraine. Such actions stem from causal recognition that Russian aggression in neighboring territories directly threatens their own borders, prompting proactive diplomacy to strengthen NATO's eastern flank despite limited unilateral influence.^[143]^[144] In Central Europe, small states like Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary navigate similar constraints but diverge in tactics, often through regional forums like the Visegrád Group (V4) formed in 1991 to coordinate post-communist transitions. Czechia and Slovakia emphasize transatlantic ties, contributing to NATO battlegroups and EU sanctions against Russia, with Czechia hosting U.S. missile defense elements since 2023. Hungary, however, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán since 2010, has employed hedging by vetoing some EU aid to Ukraine and expanding energy imports from Russia until 2022, prioritizing economic pragmatism over full alignment—a approach critiqued as undermining collective security but defended as preserving national autonomy amid great power competition. These variations illustrate small powers' use of multilateral leverage while exploiting internal alliance fissures for policy space, though empirical outcomes show stronger Western-oriented states gaining greater deterrence credibility.^[94]^[145]^[146]

Small Island and Developing States

Small island developing states (SIDS), a group of approximately 58 countries and territories primarily in the Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, represent small powers defined by constrained territorial size, populations often below 1 million, economic dependence on narrow sectors like tourism and fisheries, and acute vulnerability to external shocks such as natural disasters and climate variability. These states possess negligible military capabilities and limited economic leverage, with combined GDP representing less than 1% of global totals, yet they pursue foreign policies emphasizing coalition-building and niche diplomacy to secure aid, technical assistance, and policy concessions from larger powers. Their strategies hinge on highlighting existential threats, particularly from rising sea levels projected to submerge low-lying atolls, to cultivate moral suasion in multilateral forums.^[147]^[148] The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), established in 1990 with 39 members plus observers, exemplifies collective agency among SIDS, enabling these small powers to exert disproportionate influence in United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations despite comprising less than 5% of global emissions. AOSIS has driven key outcomes, including the insertion of the 1.5°C warming threshold in the 2015 Paris Agreement and the establishment of a loss and damage fund at COP27 in 2022, by framing climate inaction as a sovereignty-eroding threat and leveraging procedural voting blocs within the G77+China grouping. Empirical analyses indicate AOSIS's success stems from unified advocacy rather than individual state power, with the alliance securing over $100 billion in annual adaptation finance pledges through persistent pressure on emitters like the United States and European Union. However, this influence remains episodic and dependent on alignment with broader developing world interests, as internal divergences—such as varying adaptation needs—occasionally fragment cohesion.^[149]^[150]^[151] Case studies illustrate SIDS' tactical adaptation of small power behavior. The Maldives, with a land area of 298 square kilometers spread across 1,192 islands and a population of 515,000 as of 2023, has balanced great-power competition by alternating infrastructure deals with India and China—totaling over $1.4 billion in Chinese loans by 2021—while amplifying climate diplomacy through symbolic acts like the 2009 underwater cabinet meeting to underscore submersion risks from projected 0.5-1 meter sea-level rise by 2100. Similarly, Tuvalu, encompassing 26 square kilometers and 11,000 residents, has pursued "digital sovereignty" initiatives, including a .tv domain revenue stream generating $5 million annually, alongside UNFCCC advocacy that secured Australian compensation pledges for emissions impacts in 2023 Pacific summits. These efforts demonstrate causal reliance on vulnerability signaling and bilateral hedging, yielding tangible gains like debt relief and migration pacts, though constrained by aid dependency exceeding 10% of GDP in many SIDS. Broader developing small states, such as Mauritius or Seychelles, extend this model through "creole diplomacy"—blending multilateralism with selective alignments—but face empirical limits in non-climate domains, where material asymmetries curtail bargaining power.^[152]^[153]^[154]

Exemplary Small Powers in Recent Conflicts

In the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenia, a small state with a population of approximately 3 million and limited military resources, faced Azerbaijan in a conflict over the disputed region from September 27 to November 10.^[155] Despite reliance on its alliance with Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia suffered significant territorial losses, with Azerbaijan recapturing about 2,000 square kilometers, including Shusha city, through superior drone technology supplied by Turkey.^[156] The ceasefire agreement signed on November 9, 2020, deployed Russian peacekeepers but highlighted Armenia's vulnerability as a small power, where dependence on a great power patron proved insufficient amid the patron's competing priorities.^[157] This outcome underscored how small states in direct confrontations often prioritize defensive alliances yet face risks from asymmetric capabilities and great power distractions, as Russia's focus shifted to Ukraine by 2022.^[158] The conflict escalated in September 2023, when Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour offensive on September 19 against Nagorno-Karabakh forces, leading to the enclave's surrender on September 20 and the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians by early October.^[155] Armenia, lacking direct CSTO intervention due to Russia's interpretation that the attack occurred outside Armenian territory, demonstrated the limits of treaty-based security for small powers when great power guarantors prioritize broader geopolitical interests, such as maintaining ties with Azerbaijan for energy routes.^[157] Post-conflict, Armenia pivoted toward Western partnerships, including EU monitoring missions established in February 2023, illustrating adaptive diplomacy to mitigate isolation.^[157] These events affirm empirical patterns where small states in regional conflicts leverage narratives of victimhood and external balancing but struggle against technologically enhanced adversaries without robust deterrence.^[159] Ukraine exemplifies a small state's protracted resistance against a great power invasion, with Russia's full-scale assault commencing on February 24, 2022, targeting a nation of 41 million facing a military over three times larger in active personnel.^[160] Despite initial territorial concessions, including the occupation of about 18% of its land by mid-2025, Ukraine has inflicted over 600,000 Russian casualties through asymmetric tactics like drone strikes and fortified defenses, bolstered by $100 billion in Western military aid by 2024.^[161] As a weak small state per vulnerability metrics—lacking nuclear deterrence or comparable economy—Ukraine's survival hinges on international coalitions, contrasting with traditional small power isolation in conflicts.^[162] This case reveals causal dynamics where small powers amplify agency via global norms and aid, though sustained attrition risks exhaustion without decisive great power intervention.^[160]

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Additionally, alliance ties may reduce minor powers' diplomatic flexibility to prevent foreign policy crises from escalating to all-out warfare while leaving it ...
[105]
Strategies of modern-day small states - Diplo Foundation
Jan 6, 2022 · One of the main tools which small states tend to use to turn their smallness into a strength rather than a weakness is soft power.
[106]
[PDF] THE SOFT POWER PROJECTION OF A VERY SMALL STATE
Maurice East postulated that a small power's foreign policy has five main features and differs from that of a larger power. A small power is characterized by ...
[107]
Participation in the Multilateral System Has Held Steady over the ...
Nov 13, 2024 · In many ways, multilateral participation has been sustained by small states, which make up the majority of the UN membership. As noted in a ...
[108]
The Role of Small States in the Multilateral Framework
As a result of all of this, small states in modern times do not want to be left behind in the concert of nations and their international positioning therefore ...
[109]
International organizations and small states: participation, legitimacy ...
Mar 4, 2024 · First, small states—as the global majority—are not a homogeneous group. Even among the SIDS, the Pacific and Caribbean groupings may have ...
[110]
Small States and the Multilateral System: Transforming Global ...
Sep 18, 2024 · This paper explores why small states remain committed to the multilateral system, emphasizing that their limited military and economic power makes rules-based ...Missing: techniques | Show results with:techniques
[111]
[PDF] Small States, Multilateralism and International Law
Apr 28, 2022 · Indeed, multilateral organizations like the UN provide small states with the opportunity to play a significant role in global affairs in a ...
[112]
[PDF] The ASEAN Regional Forum in the Face of Great-Power ...
Jun 23, 2017 · Any regression to any adversarial relations among the great powers may cause this group of small powers to take sides or be paralyzed into a ...
[113]
(PDF) The role and impact of the small states diplomacy on regional ...
Aug 9, 2025 · The membership institutionalizes the relations between the small countries with those regional in the economic and safety field, as well as it ...
[114]
Punching above their weight: EU small powers and the Indo-Pacific
Jun 3, 2024 · The EU small powers' strategies for engaging the Indo-Pacific demonstrate their capacity to shape their foreign policy goals in the region.
[115]
Small Islands propose “below 1.5˚C” global goal for Paris Agreement
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), is calling for the inclusion of ” below 1.5°C” as a long-term temperature goal and benchmark for the level of ...
[116]
Small Islands, Rising Seas - the United Nations
While AOSIS represents more than one quarter of the world's countries, together they account for less than one per cent of global carbon emissions. Once the ...
[117]
Small‐State Influence in EU Security Governance: Unveiling Latvian ...
Mar 3, 2024 · This article explores a small state's influence on EU security governance, a notably difficult enterprise for governments with limited means ...
[118]
[PDF] Liberalism and International Relations Theory - Princeton University
The central insight shared by all Liberals is that states are embedded in domestic and international civil society, which decisively constrains their actions.
[119]
Small States' Agency in Preserving Liberal International Order
Dec 3, 2024 · This chapter aims to critically assess Lithuania's values-based foreign policy that should aspire to preservation of such order.
[120]
[PDF] Small states, great power? Gaining influence through intrinsic ...
As Rothstein (1968:14-15) argued, different configurations of power impact small states' security and room for maneuver. This view was not unanimously held.
[121]
[PDF] Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics
Liberal IR theory emphasizes state-society relations and state preferences, shaped by domestic institutions, economic interdependence, and ideas about public ...<|separator|>
[122]
Liberalism Doomed the Liberal International Order - Foreign Affairs
Jul 28, 2025 · In a more pragmatic and pluralistic order in which regional coalitions were empowered, smaller states could more effectively balance individual ...
[123]
Small States theory Christopher Browning, 'Small, Smart and Salient ...
Sep 12, 2022 · The author takes a constructivist approach by arguing that smallness and its meaning can be constructed differently in different identity ...Missing: interpretations | Show results with:interpretations
[124]
Iceland and the Vatican City: Small State Agency in International ...
Jan 26, 2025 · Even though there are a myriad of ways of defining small states, this paper will conceptualize them as having a population lower than 30 million ...Missing: threshold | Show results with:threshold
[125]
[PDF] Studying small states: A review
Apr 24, 2018 · Constructivists argue that states have agency and can respond in various ways depending on the identities and ideas that they have about ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[126]
Constructivist View of Power in International Relations
Constructivism is part of the interpretivist family of social theories. As such, it cannot conceive of power in terms of resources alone. ...
[127]
(PDF) External behavior of small states in light of theories of ...
Jul 26, 2025 · This paper aims to examine the hypotheses of main international theories (realism, liberalism and constructivism) and the development of these theories toward ...Missing: foundations | Show results with:foundations
[128]
[PDF] A review of the three waves of international relations small state ...
It posits that the small state IR literature can usefully be broken down into three distinct time periods—. 1959–1979, 1979–1992, and 1992–present—and reviews ...
[129]
A review of the three waves of international relations small state ...
This article offers a review of small state IR literature, with a particular focus on small state foreign policy issues. It begins by reviewing the various ...<|separator|>
[130]
foreign and security policy choices among the Nordics 2014–2023
Jun 13, 2023 · We trace the changes in the Nordic countries' foreign policy roles through three dimensions: the changes to the international order, threat ...
[131]
Denmark and NATO - 1949
In 1949, turning its back on decades of strict neutrality, the Danish Folketing (the Danish Parliament) voted largely in support of NATO membership.Missing: influence | Show results with:influence
[132]
United Nations and the Nordic countries - nordics.info
Feb 22, 2019 · The principles and aims of the United Nations resonate in the Nordic countries, which are small welfare states with an appreciation of international law.
[133]
Norway's Role in the Middle East Peace Talks: Between a Small ...
This article focuses on the secret "back channel" negotiations that led to the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo agreement of September 1993.Missing: diplomacy | Show results with:diplomacy
[134]
The Norwegian way: Why Oslo talks with everyone and still believes ...
Feb 5, 2025 · Throughout the years, Norway has helped facilitate critical peace agreements in the Middle East (notably the “Oslo Accords” between Israel and ...
[135]
Small States vs. Middle Powers — What's the Difference? - NUPI
Aug 6, 2018 · I also gave an example from two particular areas of strength, where Norway's influence is likely to exceed that of a traditional small state.
[136]
Sweden's Policy of Neutrality: Success Through Flexibility?
Oct 20, 2022 · According to a well-established narrative, Sweden's policy of neutrality meant that Sweden should stay non-aligned with the intent to declaring ...The Birth of Swedish Neutrality · The Evolution of... · Evolving Policy Architecture
[137]
As Sweden joins NATO, it bids farewell to centuries of neutrality
Mar 1, 2024 · For the next two centuries, Sweden embraced a policy of neutrality, refusing to take sides in wars or join any military alliance. It was a ...
[138]
[PDF] NATO Enlargement Amidst Russia's War in Ukraine - RAND
Mar 2, 2024 · Having become Partners for Peace in 1994, Finland and Sweden became NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partners following Russia's first invasion of ...
[139]
Small States and Big Powers: Portugal and Iceland's ... - SpringerLink
This book compares the foreign policies of Portugal and Iceland considering their commonly identified status as small states and place them within the shelter ...
[140]
[PDF] Differentiation and the Foreign Policy Repertoires of the Nordic States
Nov 3, 2020 · Nordic governments frequently broadcast their ambition to do more together on the international stage. The five Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, ...
[141]
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations
Jan 7, 2025 · The United States supported the Baltic states' accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in 2004.
[142]
Small Baltic States and the Euro-Atlantic Security Community
This book analyzes the small Baltic States and their integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures from the perspective of the foreign policies of major powers.
[143]
Neither reckless nor free-riders: auditing the Baltics as US treaty allies
Apr 5, 2022 · This study paints a picture of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania as loyalty-obsessed small states that diligently seek to meet their patron's behavioural ...
[144]
The Baltic States: Why the United States Must Strengthen Security ...
Oct 25, 2013 · The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have proven to be staunch American allies since they regained their independence in the early 1990s.Missing: behavior | Show results with:behavior
[145]
Walking the tightrope: Orban, Fico, and the future of central ...
Jan 9, 2024 · Governments in Budapest, and now Bratislava, are treading a fine line of alignment with the West, showing their central European neighbours what they can get ...
[146]
The Visegrád Four: From Troubled to Broken
Apr 3, 2024 · The group of Central European nations that comprise the Visegrád 4 (V4) has experienced a complete breakdown of relations following the V4 Prague summit.
[147]
About Small Island Developing States - UN.org.
Factors like small population size, remoteness from international markets, high transportation costs, vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks and fragile ...
[148]
Small Island Developing States - the United Nations
Despite these challenges, small islands have had a monumental impact on the world. In the Caribbean alone, consider the global impact of the Haitian ...Missing: influence | Show results with:influence
[149]
1.5 to Stay Alive: The Influence of AOSIS in International Climate ...
Nov 17, 2018 · Throughout the negotiations, AOSIS stressed the importance of a balanced outcome, with equal treatment to mitigation, adaptation, and ...
[150]
Party Groupings - UNFCCC
AOSIS is known for being a strong voice in international climate negotiations, pushing for ambitious global action to limit global warming and protect ...
[151]
AOSIS Chair COP27 statement: “Failure on Loss And Damage Fund ...
Nov 16, 2022 · “We have come too far to fail on loss and damage finance. Three quarters of humanity is relying on a favourable outcome at COP27,” said the AOSIS Chair.
[152]
Small State, Big Stakes: The Maldives and Strategic Competition in ...
Jul 14, 2025 · The Maldives illustrates how such states can assert themselves by engaging regional powers on favorable transactional terms.
[153]
Small Island States Are Leading the Fight Against Climate Change
Apr 17, 2025 · The Maldives and Tuvalu, for instance, are piloting adaptive urban planning solutions like floating cities and artificial islands to combat ...
[154]
Small island developing states: When everything is at stake
By almost any measure (population, territory or GDP), Tuvalu is one of the tiniest countries on the planet, but it occupies a large place in the discussion ...
[155]
A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and ...
Jan 18, 2024 · On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijani forces initiated a massive attack on Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated and effectively ...Missing: Yemen | Show results with:Yemen
[156]
Nagorno-Karabakh and Lessons for Ukraine - Army University Press
Oct 16, 2023 · Baku's victory opens the door for a lasting resolution to a crisis that has plagued the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union.Missing: case small Yemen
[157]
From Neorealism to Neoliberalism: Armenia's Strategic Pivot in ...
May 29, 2025 · In this context, Armenia, as a small state, engaged in a classic external balancing strategy to offset its structural vulnerabilities in the ...
[158]
[PDF] SMALL STATES IN GREAT POWERS' GEOPOLITICS: ARMENIA'S ...
The primary case selection criterion is that Armenia qualifies as a small state based on the definition provided in the small states scholarship. Another reason.
[159]
[PDF] Small States & Territories, 7(1), 2024, pp. 7-24 - University of Malta
May 17, 2024 · ABSTRACT: This paper examines how smaller states use their smallness in their strategic narratives during armed conflicts fought with a ...
[160]
Comparing the Size and Capabilities of the Russian and Ukrainian ...
Russia holds a sizable advantage over Ukraine on troop numbers and weaponry yet the two sides have fought to a standstill.
[161]
Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia - BBC
Oct 17, 2025 · How Russia's gradual gains in the face of fierce Ukrainian opposition have affected the front line in recent months.
[162]
Ukraine in the theory of small states – is it one of them?
Considering different perspectives, this article claims that Ukraine today actually is a small state, despite its area, or in other words – weak state.<|control11|><|separator|>