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Cheget

Cheget (Russian: Чегет) is a specialized nuclear briefcase integral to Russia's command and control apparatus for its strategic nuclear forces, facilitating the transmission of presidential authorization codes for nuclear weapon launches to the General Staff.^[1] Named after Mount Cheget in the Caucasus Mountains, the device connects to secure communication networks such as Kazbek and does not house a direct launch mechanism but relays encrypted orders through dedicated channels.^[2] Typically carried by a naval officer shadowing the Russian president, defense minister, or chief of the general staff, Cheget ensures rapid dissemination of nuclear directives amid potential crises, with the system designed for activation within minutes of an executive decision.^[3] Developed during the Soviet era as part of broader nuclear command redundancies, it parallels similar devices in other nuclear powers and has been publicly visible during leadership transitions and high-profile international engagements.^[4]

Overview and Purpose

System Description

The Cheget is a secure communication device housed in a briefcase, serving as the primary interface for Russia's top civilian and military leaders to authorize the use of strategic nuclear forces.^[5] Named after Mount Cheget in the Caucasus Mountains, it functions as part of the broader Kazbek command-and-control system, enabling the transmission of launch orders through the dedicated Kavkaz communication network.^[6] Three such terminals exist: one assigned to the President of Russia, one to the Minister of Defense, and one to the Chief of the General Staff, reflecting a distributed authority structure inherited from Soviet practices.^[5]^[6] Operationally, the Cheget requires coordinated input from all three holders via a "triple key" mechanism, where launch codes must be entered collectively to initiate nuclear strike procedures, preventing unilateral action by any single individual.^[6] The system links these portable terminals to a central command post, with the presidential unit essential for full activation, ensuring that orders are relayed securely to missile forces and other strategic assets.^[5] While exact hardware details remain classified, the briefcase contains authentication tools, codebooks, and interfaces for real-time verification, distinct from mere symbolic "buttons" in popular depictions.^[5] Safeguards include provisions for manual overrides and the ability to remotely deactivate compromised terminals, addressing risks of unauthorized access or political instability, as demonstrated in historical contingencies like the 1991 Soviet coup attempt.^[5] The system's design emphasizes redundancy and mutual consent among key figures, contrasting with more centralized models in other nuclear powers, and it has been publicly activated at least once, during the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident misinterpreted as a potential attack.^[6] Carried by designated aides—often naval officers—the Cheget symbolizes ultimate command authority and is ceremonially transferred during leadership transitions, such as Vladimir Putin's inaugurations in 1999 and 2012.^[2]^[6]

Role in Nuclear Command and Control

The Cheget functions as a secure communication terminal within Russia's Kazbek nuclear command-and-control system, enabling the President, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, to authenticate and transmit orders for the launch of strategic nuclear forces.^[3] It integrates with the broader automated network that links top civilian and military leadership to missile, bomber, and submarine units, ensuring rapid dissemination of directives during crises.^[5] In the authorization process, the Cheget does not feature a direct launch button; instead, it relays encoded signals to the General Staff headquarters, which verifies and executes the command across nuclear assets.^[7] Launch decisions require concurrence from multiple holders: the President, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff, each equipped with a dedicated Cheget briefcase to prevent unilateral action and incorporate military assessment.^[8] This tripartite synchronization ensures that orders are validated against pre-established codes before propagation to forces, with the system capable of alerting units within minutes of presidential input.^[9] The device's role extends to maintaining continuous readiness, as it remains in the President's possession at all times, guarded by specialized officers from the Federal Protective Service, facilitating immediate access during alerts or transitions of power.^[7] In practice, it supports heightened alert states short of full launch, allowing the leadership to monitor strategic situations and issue preparatory commands without irreversible escalation.^[3] This setup underscores Russia's emphasis on centralized executive control tempered by institutional checks, distinct from more decentralized models in other nuclear powers.^[5]

Historical Development

Soviet-Era Origins

The Cheget system originated in the Soviet Union during the early 1980s, amid heightened Cold War nuclear tensions and concerns over the vulnerability of centralized command structures to a U.S. decapitation strike. Developed as a portable component of the broader Kazbek automated command-and-control framework for strategic nuclear forces, it consisted of briefcase-mounted terminals enabling rapid authentication and transmission of launch orders.^[10] This innovation addressed the limitations of fixed command posts by providing mobile access for top leaders, reflecting Soviet efforts to ensure retaliatory capability even under surprise attack conditions.^[6] Named after Mount Cheget in the Caucasus Mountains, the device entered operational service in 1983, with terminals assigned to the General Secretary of the Communist Party (or equivalent head of state), the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff.^[11] ^[10] These units connected via secure channels—such as the Kavkaz communication network—to the central military command, allowing synchronized decision-making without reliance on vulnerable infrastructure.^[5] The system's design prioritized redundancy and speed, drawing from lessons of prior crises like the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, where communication delays had underscored risks to nuclear deterrence.^[6] Development occurred under Yuri Andropov's leadership (1982–1984), a period marked by intensified paranoia over NATO exercises and U.S. advancements in precision-guided munitions, which threatened Soviet leadership survival.^[6] By Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension in 1985, Cheget was fully integrated, symbolizing the Politburo's commitment to "dead hand" reliability in nuclear posture.^[12] Unlike earlier manual protocols, it incorporated electronic verification codes to prevent unauthorized use while enabling near-instantaneous order dissemination to intercontinental ballistic missile silos, submarine fleets, and bomber wings.^[5] Archival analyses indicate three identical briefcases were maintained in constant readiness, guarded by specialized officers from the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.^[5]

Post-Soviet Adaptations and Modernization

Following the Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991, the Cheget system transitioned to Russian Federation control without fundamental alterations to its core command structure, retaining the Soviet-era model of centralized presidential authority over nuclear forces.^[13] This continuity ensured operational stability amid the political fragmentation of former Soviet republics, with nuclear assets consolidated under Moscow's oversight.^[13] In the 1990s, economic crises and military degradation posed risks to nuclear command reliability, including potential disruptions to communication links and early warning systems, yet the Cheget-enabled chain of command remained intact through redundant protocols and Perimeter dead-hand safeguards.^[14] Then-Acting President Vladimir Putin assumed custody of the briefcase on 31 December 1999 following Boris Yeltsin's resignation, marking a key leadership handover that reaffirmed the system's role in executive power transitions.^[15] Under Putin's tenure, modernization initiatives targeted the broader nuclear command, control, and communications infrastructure to address post-Soviet vulnerabilities and integrate with updated strategic delivery systems.^[14] By 2016, Russia's Strategic Missile Forces implemented a new-generation automated command and control system, enhancing the speed and security of launch authorizations transmitted from Cheget terminals.^[15] Communication upgrades, including the Kavkaz-7 network, bolstered secure data links between the presidential briefcase, defense ministry equivalents, and field units, adapting the system for contemporary operational demands.^[9] Ongoing enhancements in the 2010s and 2020s focused on early warning radar reconstitution and NC3 resilience against cyber and electronic warfare threats, reflecting Russia's emphasis on nuclear deterrence amid geopolitical tensions.^[14] These adaptations prioritize retaliatory capability preservation over radical redesign, with Cheget serving as the enduring interface for highest-level decision-making.^[13]

Operational Mechanics

Chain of Command and Authorization

The Cheget briefcase serves as the primary interface for the President of Russia to authorize nuclear weapon use within the country's strategic nuclear forces command structure. Upon deciding to initiate a launch, the President activates the device, which transmits encrypted signals through the Kavkaz secure communication network to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff.^[7] These top military leaders, each equipped with analogous briefcases, receive and authenticate the presidential directive in real-time coordination.^[3] Execution authority resides with the General Staff, which holds the launch codes and disseminates them to individual commanders of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers. The system enables release of authority within approximately 10 minutes from the point of presidential decision, emphasizing speed in crisis scenarios.^[15] This delegation ensures operational continuity, as the General Staff maintains two independent methods for code transmission to field units, bypassing potential single points of failure.^[7] In cases of presidential incapacity or communication disruption, statutory provisions allow the Minister of Defense or Chief of the General Staff to assume interim launch authority, reflecting a hierarchical redundancy built into Russian nuclear doctrine.^[3] The Kazbek system functions as a backup to Cheget, mirroring the authorization pathway through alternative channels to the same command echelons.^[7] All steps incorporate mutual verification protocols to prevent erroneous or unauthorized actions, with the President's order requiring affirmative concurrence from the defense leadership before codes propagate to tactical levels.^[16]

Communication and Redundancy Features

The Cheget briefcases interface with Russia's Kazbek nuclear command-and-control system through the dedicated Kavkaz communication network, which incorporates redundant channels such as radio, radio relay, cable, and satellite links to maintain connectivity amid potential disruptions like electromagnetic interference or physical attack.^[17]^[18] This multi-modal setup ensures that authorization codes can be transmitted from the briefcases to central Kazbek headquarters in the Kremlin and onward to strategic nuclear force command posts, such as those designated Baksan for rocket, naval, and air forces.^[17]^[14] Redundancy is inherent in the distribution of three identical Cheget terminals—one carried by the President, one by the Minister of Defense, and one by the Chief of the General Staff—allowing for geographically dispersed operation and mitigation of single-point failures, such as the incapacitation of a single carrier.^[14]^[17] Launch authorization typically requires synchronized codes from at least two terminals to confirm consensus among civilian and military leadership, preventing unilateral action while enabling rapid response if one link fails.^[14] Further safeguards include independent power supplies and hardened transmission protocols within the Kavkaz network, designed to withstand nuclear effects or cyber threats, alongside integration with backup systems like Perimeter, which monitors for loss of primary command signals and can relay automated retaliatory orders via dedicated command missiles if Cheget-Kazbek communications are severed.^[14]^[17] These features collectively prioritize operational reliability over speed, reflecting doctrinal emphasis on assured retaliation rather than preemptive strike capability.^[14]

Technical and Security Aspects

Hardware and Software Components

The Cheget consists of portable terminals encased in briefcases, assigned to the Russian President, Minister of Defense, and Chief of the General Staff, functioning as user interfaces to the Kazbek automated command and control system for Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF).^[14]^[5] These terminals enable secure transmission of authentication codes and orders without incorporating a direct launch mechanism, instead relaying commands to the General Staff for execution.^[1] Hardware elements include specialized communication devices supporting high-frequency radio, dedicated telephone lines, and integration with the Kavkaz network for elite communications, ensuring connectivity even from remote locations like presidential retreats.^[5] The system features redundant channels to maintain operational integrity amid potential disruptions, with terminals designed for rapid activation and code entry.^[14] Software is embedded in the Kazbek Combat Management Automated System (CMAS), an evolving digital framework at its fourth generation with fifth-generation upgrades implemented after 2016, capable of issuing direct combat directives to missile launchers including Topol-M, Yars, and Bulava systems, along with in-flight retargeting.^[14] Authorization protocols require synchronized codes from at least two terminals, incorporating algorithmic checks to verify legitimacy and prevent unilateral actions.^[14] Detailed specifications remain classified, reflecting the system's emphasis on security over public disclosure.^[5]

Safeguards Against Unauthorized Use

The Cheget system incorporates a distributed command structure requiring coordination among three separate briefcases held by the Russian President, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff, ensuring no single individual can authorize a nuclear launch unilaterally.^[3]^[5] These devices connect via the Kazbek automated command-and-control network, which facilitates encrypted teleconferences for real-time verification of orders before transmission to strategic forces.^[3] Launch authorization demands synchronized confirmation from all three holders, with the central command post serving as a verification hub to authenticate signals and prevent isolated activations.^[5] Technical safeguards embedded in the Soviet-era design include fail-safe mechanisms that disable unauthorized terminals; for instance, the system can remotely deactivate Chegets if a holder's device is compromised or disconnected from the network.^[5] Authentication relies on unique codes and encrypted protocols managed by the General Staff, which must validate presidential directives against pre-established launch templates within the Kazbek framework, reducing risks of forged or erroneous commands.^[3] This multi-layered approach, inherited from the USSR, imposes robust barriers against seizure by rogue elements, as demonstrated during the 1991 August Coup when military operators deactivated the briefcases of the Defense Minister and General Staff Chief, denying access to coup participants like Vice President Gennady Yanayev.^[5] Operational protocols further mitigate unauthorized use through subordinate-level checks: strategic rocket forces, naval, and air commanders retain authority to reject unverified orders, as occurred in 1991 when they blocked coup attempts to issue strikes.^[5] Redundancy features, such as backup communication channels and the ability to isolate suspect nodes, ensure continuity while blocking single-point failures or insider threats.^[3] Despite these measures, analyses note potential vulnerabilities from aging infrastructure, though the core design prioritizes collective decision-making over sole authority.^[3]

Notable Deployments and Incidents

Key Historical Events

The most documented activation of the Cheget occurred on January 25, 1995, during the Norwegian rocket incident. Russian early-warning radars detected the launch of a Black Brant XII sounding rocket from Norway's Andøya Rocket Range as a potential U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile attack, prompting President Boris Yeltsin to open the briefcase and convene the nuclear command team.^[19]^[20] Russian forces were placed on high alert, but confirmation that the trajectory posed no threat to Moscow averted escalation.^[19] This remains the only known instance of the Cheget being activated in response to a perceived nuclear threat.^[19] On December 31, 1999, following Boris Yeltsin's resignation, the Cheget was formally transferred to Acting President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin, marking the seamless handover of nuclear launch authority amid the transition to a new leadership era.^[6]^[11] This event underscored the system's role in ensuring continuity of command during political changes.^[6] During Vladimir Putin's third inauguration on May 7, 2012, the Cheget was presented in a ceremonial transfer, symbolizing the reaffirmation of presidential control over Russia's strategic nuclear forces.^[6] Such rituals highlight the briefcase's integral status in Russian state protocol for executive transitions.^[11]

Contemporary Uses and Visibility

In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin ordered the elevation of nuclear forces to a special regime of combat duty on February 27, 2022, activating protocols within the Kazbek system that interface with the Cheget to ensure rapid authorization capabilities amid perceived threats from NATO expansion and Western arms supplies.^[7] This directive, conveyed through the General Staff, underscored the Cheget's operational role in maintaining deterrence during conventional conflicts with escalation risks, though no launch orders were issued.^[21] Public visibility of the Cheget has increased as a signaling tool in state media and international appearances. On October 16-17, 2023, during Putin's state visit to Beijing, Russian state television footage depicted him flanked by aides carrying the briefcases, a deliberate display interpreted by analysts as reassurance to China of Russia's nuclear posture while projecting strength toward the West.^[2] Similarly, at the May 9, 2024, Victory Day Parade in Moscow, Putin appeared with the device in official proceedings, emphasizing its symbolic integration into national military rituals.^[22] The system's contemporary prominence extends to routine exercises reinforcing nuclear readiness. On October 22, 2025, Putin personally supervised drills for Russia's strategic nuclear forces, involving simulated command transmissions via Kazbek-linked assets like the Cheget to verify chain-of-command integrity under wartime conditions.^[23] Such events, broadcast selectively on Russian state channels, highlight the Cheget's dual function as both a secure tool and a visible emblem of sovereignty, though its full operational details remain classified to deter unauthorized scrutiny or emulation.^[24]

Strategic Implications

Integration with Russian Nuclear Doctrine

The Cheget briefcase functions as a critical component in Russia's nuclear command-and-control architecture, enabling the President—as Supreme Commander-in-Chief—to authorize nuclear weapon employment in alignment with the state's declaratory nuclear policy. Under Russia's Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence, last revised and signed by President Vladimir Putin on November 19, 2024, nuclear weapons are permissible in response to nuclear or conventional attacks threatening the state's existence, aggression by non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers, or attacks on critical infrastructure like early-warning systems.^[25]^[26] The system ensures that doctrinal thresholds for escalation are operationalized through a secure, redundant transmission process, where the President's decision via Cheget is corroborated by signals from the Defense Minister's and Chief of the General Staff's equivalent briefcases before orders propagate to Strategic Nuclear Forces units.^[7] This integration underscores a centralized, executive-driven model that prioritizes rapid retaliation or preemption under doctrinal conditions, such as "launch under attack" scenarios informed by early-warning data. The Cheget connects to the broader Kazbek automated control system, which interfaces with strategic missile, submarine, and bomber commands, facilitating doctrinal objectives of deterrence through assured second-strike capability and escalation dominance.^[8] Unlike distributed authority models, Russia's approach vests sole launch prerogative in the President, excluding figures like the Prime Minister from Cheget access or doctrinal decision-making, thereby minimizing internal veto points during crises.^[8] Doctrinal updates, including the 2024 expansion to treat conventional strikes supported by nuclear states as joint nuclear threats, heighten the Cheget's role in signaling resolve, as transmission of authorization codes can occur within minutes to counter perceived existential risks. However, the system's efficacy relies on unbroken communication chains, with redundancies like the Kavkaz-7 network linking Cheget to naval and ground-based assets to prevent doctrinal paralysis from disruptions. Analysts note that while the doctrine emphasizes restraint absent direct threats, the Cheget's design supports flexible response options, potentially blurring lines between conventional and nuclear operations in hybrid conflicts.^[27]^[16]

Comparative Analysis with Western Equivalents

The Cheget system, integral to Russia's Kazbek nuclear command network, serves a function analogous to the United States' Nuclear Football, enabling top leadership to authenticate and transmit nuclear launch orders via secure communications and codes. Both devices are portable, hardened briefcases containing encrypted terminals linked to national command infrastructures, designed for rapid decision-making amid potential decapitation strikes. However, the U.S. Football, carried by a designated military aide accompanying the President, emphasizes singular executive control, with pre-planned strike options outlined in a "black book" and authentication via a separate "biscuit" card holding personal codes. In contrast, Russia deploys three synchronized Cheget briefcases—one each for the President, Defense Minister, and Chief of the General Staff—to distribute authority and enhance redundancy against single-point failures.^[28]^[6] A core procedural divergence lies in authorization thresholds: the U.S. system vests unilateral launch authority in the President, who can issue an Emergency Action Message (EAM) to Strategic Command without requiring concurrence from other officials, though consultation with advisors like the Secretary of Defense typically precedes execution to align with operational realities. Russian doctrine, per the Kazbek framework, mandates coordinated input from the President and at least one other Cheget holder (Defense Minister or General Staff Chief) for order validation, with launch signals relayed only upon mutual affirmation to mitigate risks of isolated erroneous commands. This distributed model, formalized post-Soviet reforms, contrasts with U.S. emphasis on swift, centralized decisiveness, potentially slowing Russian response times to under 10 minutes while introducing checks absent in American protocols.^[28]^[15]^[7] Technologically, both rely on resilient, jam-resistant communication links—Russia's via Kavkaz-7 satellite and cable networks integrated with Cheget terminals, and the U.S. via the Millennium network and airborne relays—but Russia's system uniquely interfaces with the semi-automated Perimeter ("Dead Hand") safeguard, which can trigger retaliatory strikes if leadership silence is detected amid verified attack indicators. The U.S. lacks a publicly acknowledged equivalent, prioritizing human-in-the-loop oversight through National Military Command Center validation. Public visibility also differs: Russian Cheget handovers have been televised during presidential inaugurations, such as on May 7, 2012, signaling continuity, whereas U.S. Football details remain classified to preserve deterrence ambiguity.^[15]^[28] Among other Western nuclear powers, equivalents are less briefcase-centric. The United Kingdom employs "letters of last resort" drafted by the Prime Minister for Trident submarine commanders, outlining responses to national destruction without real-time portable devices akin to Cheget. France maintains a presidential authorization system with a secure "habilitation" briefcase, granting the President sole discretion similar to the U.S. model, though integrated with the Forces Aériennes Stratégiques command chain. These variations reflect doctrinal priorities: U.S. and French individualism for agility versus Russian collegial safeguards.^[28]

Criticisms and Debates

Reliability and False Alarm Risks

The Cheget terminals, integral to the Kazbek automated combat management system, incorporate redundancies such as requiring authentication codes from at least two of the three designated devices—held by the President, Defense Minister, and Chief of the General Staff—to authorize nuclear launches, thereby reducing the risk of unilateral erroneous activation.^[14] This multi-node verification process aims to ensure deliberate decision-making amid potential disruptions, including communication failures or decapitation attempts, with backup systems like Perimeter providing semi-automated retaliation safeguards if primary command links are severed.^[14] No publicly documented incidents exist of Cheget itself triggering a false nuclear alert or launch, reflecting its role as a secure communication conduit rather than a primary sensor.^[15] False alarm risks in Russia's nuclear command chain, including inputs to Cheget users, stem primarily from upstream early warning systems rather than the briefcase hardware. Historical precedents include the September 26, 1983, malfunction of the Oko satellite network, which falsely indicated multiple U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile launches toward the Soviet Union; the alert was correctly discounted by duty officer Stanislav Petrov due to inconsistencies with ground radar data, averting potential escalation.^[29] Similarly, on January 25, 1995, Russia's early warning radars detected a Norwegian scientific rocket as a possible submarine-launched ballistic missile, prompting a temporary readiness spike, though rapid verification prevented further action and demonstrated system functionality despite the error.^[30] These events highlight vulnerabilities in satellite and radar interpretation, such as atmospheric anomalies or misidentified objects, which could propagate ambiguous data to Cheget operators during crises.^[31] Broader reliability concerns for Kazbek-Cheget integration include potential degradation from 1990s-era underfunding, cyber vulnerabilities targeting command links, and human factors like operator misjudgment under stress or insufficient corroborating intelligence.^[14] Russian sources emphasize ongoing modernizations, such as upgraded Voronezh radars and Tundra satellites to replace aging Oko components, claiming enhanced detection accuracy and reduced false positives through automation and cross-verification.^[14] Independent analyses, however, caution that opacity in testing and maintenance—coupled with geopolitical distrust—amplifies inadvertent escalation risks, as incomplete early warning coverage (e.g., gaps in southern trajectories until recent upgrades) could foster hasty interpretations feeding into presidential-level decisions.^[31] While U.S.-Russian dialogues in the 1990s affirmed confidence in post-Soviet command safeguards, contemporary expert assessments underscore persistent challenges from technological obsolescence and non-state threats like nuclear terrorism mimicking attacks.^[32]^[31]

Geopolitical Perceptions and Deterrence Efficacy

The Cheget, as the primary interface for presidential authorization of nuclear strikes within Russia's command-and-control system, is perceived in Western geopolitical discourse as emblematic of Moscow's centralized and potentially impulsive nuclear decision-making structure, contrasting with more distributed U.S. equivalents and fostering concerns over escalation risks in crises.^[33] Analysts from institutions like the Brookings Institution note that this perception intensified following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where public allusions to nuclear readiness—implicitly tied to Cheget activation—amplified fears of rapid threshold-crossing, even as doctrinal thresholds remained high.^[34] Russian state messaging, however, frames the device as a guarantor of sovereign deterrence, underscoring its role in maintaining continuous combat readiness across conflict phases as outlined in the December 2024 update to nuclear policy.^[35] In terms of deterrence efficacy, the Cheget integrates into Russia's broader nuclear posture, which extends deterrence to counter conventional threats endangering state survival—a shift formalized since 1993 and tested amid the Ukraine conflict, where threats deterred direct NATO combat involvement despite proxy support.^[36] Empirical assessments, such as those examining compellent threats from 2014–2024, indicate partial success: Russian signaling via nuclear rhetoric and exercises correlated with restrained Western escalation, avoiding scenarios like no-fly zones over Ukraine that could invoke Article 5.^[37] Yet, efficacy remains contested; while the system's linkage to strategic forces ensures second-strike credibility, historical near-misses—like Boris Yeltsin's erroneous activation in 1995—highlight vulnerabilities to false alarms that could undermine perceived reliability.^[38] The 2024 doctrinal revisions, lowering the bar for nuclear response to attacks by nuclear-armed states or allies using conventional means, aim to bolster Cheget-enabled deterrence by clarifying red lines, potentially enhancing its dissuasive effect against perceived encirclement.^[39] Comparative analyses suggest this posture reinforces mutual assured destruction dynamics but risks norm erosion, as U.S. low-yield options may inadvertently validate Russian fears of limited strikes, perpetuating a cycle where deterrence efficacy hinges on mutual doubt over resolve rather than unambiguous restraint.^[40] Overall, while no nuclear exchange has occurred post-Cold War, the Cheget's role in signaling operational readiness has arguably preserved strategic stability by imposing costs on adversaries, though at the expense of heightened global anxiety over miscalculation.^[27]

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The Implications of Russia's New Nuclear Doctrine - nipp.org
Feb 5, 2025 · In 2024, Russia published a new version of its nuclear doctrine entitled “Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence.”Missing: Cheget | Show results with:Cheget
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Deterring Russian Nuclear Threats with Low-Yield Nukes May ...
This article highlights how these new US nuclear policies may be reinforcing Russian perceptions and fears of Western aggression.