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Chisholm v. Georgia

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), was a landmark decision holding that Article III, Section 2 of the extended federal judicial power to suits brought by citizens of one state against another state, thereby rejecting claims of state in such cases. The case originated when Alexander Chisholm, as executor of the estate of merchant Robert Farquhar, sued in federal court to recover payment for goods supplied to troops during the , which had refused to honor amid post-war financial distress. In a 4–1 ruling delivered on February 18, 1793, and Justices James Wilson, , and John Blair affirmed jurisdiction and liability, emphasizing that sovereignty resided in the people rather than states, while Justice dissented, arguing for retained state immunity under principles. The decision provoked widespread alarm among advocates, who viewed it as an overreach of federal authority that threatened autonomy and fiscal , prompting rapid political backlash including resolutions from state legislatures denouncing the ruling. This controversy directly catalyzed the proposal and ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in 1795, which explicitly barred federal courts from entertaining suits against states by out-of-state citizens or foreigners, effectively overruling Chisholm and reinforcing . Despite its reversal, the case underscored early tensions between federal judicial supremacy and sovereignty under the , influencing subsequent doctrines on the limits of Article III jurisdiction and the structural balance of powers.

Constitutional and Historical Context

Founding Debates on and

During the Constitutional Convention of , delegates debated the allocation of between the federal government and the states, emphasizing a federal structure where states retained significant autonomy while ceding specific powers to the national authority. The , introduced by on May 29, proposed a national judiciary with broad , including cases arising under federal laws and treaties, but discussions focused primarily on the judiciary's role in enforcing federal supremacy without explicitly addressing whether states could be sued by private citizens. Madison's notes record that on June 13, moved to extend national judicial to controversies between states and citizens of other states, a provision adopted without direct debate on state suability, reflecting an assumption that states' pre-existing from private suits would persist unless clearly abrogated. This omission stemmed from the framers' intent to create a "compound republic" balancing state with union necessities, as articulated in by , where he described the as partly national and partly federal, with states holding not delegated to the center. Ratification debates intensified concerns over judicial encroachment on , with arguing that Article III's extension of judicial power to suits "between a and Citizens of another " threatened to subordinate states to tribunals. Writers like Brutus warned in 1788 that the , lacking dependence on legislatures, could " the judicatories useless" and actions to override, portraying it as a consolidation of power eroding independence. , in Virginia's ratification convention, questioned whether "the of the [is] to be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender," highlighting fears that courts would treat states as litigants amenable to individual claims, potentially for debts or contracts. countered by affirming 's resilience; in Federalist No. 81 (May 28, 1788) asserted that "it is inherent in the nature of not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent," interpreting Article III as authorizing only interstate suits or those by the , not private actions against unconsenting states, to assuage fears of overreach. These debates underscored a tension between popular sovereignty—rooted in the people as the ultimate source of authority, as in the Preamble's "We the People"—and state sovereignty, with viewing the as deriving from collective popular consent that limited but did not eliminate state immunities. , emphasizing states as sovereign entities under the , demanded explicit protections, contributing to the Bill of Rights' adoption but leaving judicial immunity unresolved. The absence of clear textual prohibition on state suability in federal courts created interpretive ambiguity, later tested in Chisholm, where the majority invoked to affirm federal jurisdiction, contrasting Hamilton's assurances and prompting swift backlash via the Eleventh Amendment's proposal on January 31, 1793. This reflected foundational causal realities: states' wartime debts and interstate disputes necessitated federal adjudication, yet unchecked federal power risked inverting the bargain by making states subordinate debtors rather than co-sovereigns.

Article III Jurisdiction and State Immunity Precedents

Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution extends the judicial power of the to "Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States." This provision, ratified on September 17, 1787, explicitly authorized federal courts to hear cases pitting a state against out-of-state individuals, diverging from the , which had omitted any mechanism for private suits against states. At the Constitutional Convention, delegates did not explicitly debate state sovereign immunity in relation to this jurisdictional grant, focusing instead on broader concerns. Prior to ratification, states drew on English precedents, where sovereigns enjoyed immunity from unconsented suits by private parties, a principle inherited from the "the King can do no wrong" and applied in colonial and early American contexts to bar actions against state governments without legislative waiver. This immunity stemmed from the inherent nature of sovereignty, positing that public entities could not be haled into court by individuals absent explicit consent, a reinforced in treatises like William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of (1765–1769), which influenced American jurists. During state ratification debates from 1787 to 1788, such as Brutus in warned that Article III's language could erode state by enabling federal courts to entertain suits against states by foreign creditors, potentially subjecting treasuries to individual claims arising from wartime debts. , including in Federalist No. 81 (May 28, 1788), countered by emphasizing retained state and arguing that the clause primarily envisioned suits by states against out-of-state citizens rather than vice versa, while invoking immunity to assure that federal courts would not compel states without consent. Hamilton contended that "a that the State tribunals will be partial in favor of their own citizens" justified the grant, but maintained that sovereignty precluded routine suits against states, interpreting the phrasing "between a State and Citizens of another State" as directional. No precedents existed on under Article III prior to 1793, as the judiciary, established by the (signed September 24, 1789), had not yet adjudicated such disputes; early cases focused on rather than constitutional jurisdiction over sovereigns. This textual extension of federal power, untested against immunity doctrines, set the stage for interpreting whether constitutional language abrogated barriers to suits against non-consenting states.

Facts and Initiation of the Case

The Revolutionary War Contract Dispute

In October 1777, amid the , the State of urgently required supplies to support operations in the southern theater, particularly following advances that disrupted local provisioning. 's executive council appointed commissioners, including Joseph Habersham and others, to procure goods from neutral or allied sources; these officials contracted with Robert Farquhar, a 33-year-old trading from , who was en route from the neutral with a of essential items such as , , and other commodities suitable for military and civilian needs. The stipulated payment on from Georgia's public treasury, with the supplied totaling approximately $170,000 in value, reflecting the inflated wartime currency and scarcity-driven prices. delivered the materials as promised, aiding Georgia's war efforts against forces, but the state issued certificates of indebtedness rather than immediate specie, deferring settlement until postwar fiscal stabilization. Postwar, repudiated the debt through legislative acts, including a 1784 nullifying claims against the state for wartime transactions and later statutes loyalist properties; , suspected of sympathies due to his trading activities in neutral ports, faced asset seizures under Georgia's 1778-1782 abatement and laws, exacerbating non-payment as officials argued the contract's invalidity on grounds. Despite 's persistent petitions to 's assembly in the and appeals under the 1787 provisions for creditor recovery, no funds were forthcoming by his death around 1790, leaving the unresolved claim—undisputed in its factual basis but entangled in sovereign and political reprisals—to his estate's .

Filing Suit and Assertion of Federal Jurisdiction

In July 1792, a summons was served on the State of Georgia by the U.S. Marshal for the District of Georgia, initiating the suit Chisholm ex dem. Farquhar v. Georgia in the Supreme Court during its August Term. Alexander Chisholm, identified as a citizen of South Carolina and executor of the estate of Robert Farquhar—a deceased merchant from the same state—sought recovery of debts owed for supplies Farquhar had provided on credit to Georgia's commissaries during the Revolutionary War. The claim totaled approximately $170,000, stemming from contracts executed between 1777 and 1778 that Georgia had failed to honor, despite legislative repudiation of such wartime obligations in the post-war period. Chisholm asserted the 's under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. , which extends federal judicial power to "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State." This provision, Chisholm's counsel argued, plainly authorized suits by out-of-state citizens against states as defendants, vesting the with exclusive absent congressional limitation under Clause 2. The filing treated Chisholm, in his capacity as executor, as effectively a citizen of for jurisdictional purposes, bypassing state courts where had already denied payment via legislative resolution in 1789 and 1790. Georgia, upon service, entered no appearance to contest the merits but filed a formal remonstrance in the February 1793 Term, denying the federal court's authority on grounds of state and immunity from private suits, which it deemed incompatible with the Union's federal structure and the states' retained prerogatives under the . This jurisdictional challenge framed the core issue, testing whether Article III's grant overrode common-law principles of inviolability that had shielded crowns and, by extension, republican states from involuntary litigation. The Court's acceptance of the case proceeded to oral arguments on February 5, 1793, without 's participation on the underlying claim.

Supreme Court Arguments

Plaintiff's Case for Federal Judicial Power

Edmund Randolph, serving as of the , presented the primary oral arguments for plaintiff Alexander Chisholm on February 1-5, 1793, asserting that the possessed over suits against states by citizens of other states under Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. He contended that the clause extending federal judicial power "to controversies between a State and citizens of another State" plainly encompassed cases where the state appeared as defendant, as the term "between" implied no restriction on the roles of the parties involved. Randolph emphasized that a subsequent provision granting the "original jurisdiction" in "cases in which a State shall be a party" further confirmed this scope, defining a "party" to include defendants, as evidenced by precedents in chancery practice and the , which treated absent or refusing parties symmetrically without exempting sovereigns from liability. Randolph argued that the reinforced this constitutional grant by vesting the Supreme Court with original but not exclusive jurisdiction over controversies between states and citizens of other states or aliens, explicitly recognizing states as potential defendants without qualification. He rejected any implied , noting that the Constitution's framers consciously omitted language confining suits to states as plaintiffs, despite opportunities to do so, and that the document's prohibitions on state actions—such as emitting bills of credit, impairing contracts, or passing ex post facto laws—necessitated judicial remedies enforceable against states to prevent unredressed harms to individuals, as partial protections like could not address confiscations or debt repudiations deposited in state treasuries. On sovereignty, Randolph maintained that states derived no absolute immunity from federal suits, as true sovereignty resided in "the people of the " rather than in states as artificial corporate entities subordinate to the compact. He distinguished American states from feudal monarchs, asserting that states, like corporations or merchants, were bound by their contracts and amenable to judicial compulsion for breaches, with no general principle of or of nations exempting them from accountability in a republican system designed "to establish ." Historical analogies supported this: city-states and English courts had entertained suits against sovereigns or their agents, as in cases involving Columbus's heirs or parliamentary accountability, underscoring that no execution difficulties justified denying , as the Court's power to issue process against state officials sufficed. Randolph framed the absence of as essential to federalism's balance, preventing states from acting "eminently wrong" without control and ensuring the Constitution's vindicatory mechanisms against infractions.

Georgia's Defense of State Sovereign Immunity

Georgia refused to appear or defend the suit on the merits, instead submitting a written remonstrance and protestation challenging the Court's jurisdiction on grounds of state . The state's representatives, and Alexander Dallas, presented this document but, per explicit instructions from Georgia authorities, declined to argue further, maintaining that compelling a sovereign state's appearance would violate foundational principles of . Georgia's core contention was that, as one of the original sovereign entities predating the federal union, it retained immunity from private lawsuits absent its own consent—a doctrine rooted in English common law, where the king could not be sued without prerogative. Governor Edward Telfair and the state legislature emphasized that Article III's extension of federal judicial power to controversies between states and citizens of other states did not abrogate this immunity, as the Constitution delegated only enumerated powers and preserved residual state sovereignty. They argued that interpreting the clause to permit involuntary suits would erode state independence, potentially opening floodgates to Revolutionary War-era debt claims and invalidating state land grants, thus subordinating states to federal coercion in a manner inconsistent with the compact theory of the Union. This defense aligned with broader Anti-Federalist concerns during ratification debates, where delegates like those in warned that courts could encroach on prerogatives without explicit constitutional waiver of immunity. 's legislature formally protested the suit as unconstitutional, asserting that sovereignty entailed exemption from being named defendant by an individual, a position later echoed in Justice James Iredell's , which held that undelegated sovereignty included immunity unless positively relinquished. By defaulting rather than engaging, framed the case as a test of overreach, prioritizing preservation of dignity over litigating the underlying dispute from 1777 involving supplies for use.

The Court's Opinions

Seriatim Majority Opinions Affirming Jurisdiction

Chief Justice John Jay delivered the first opinion, framing the core issue as whether a state could be sued without its consent by a citizen of another state under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which extends federal judicial power to controversies between a state and citizens of another state. Jay rejected Georgia's claim of sovereign immunity as incompatible with the Union's principles, asserting that true sovereignty resides in the people rather than states, and that the Constitution created a national government where states are subordinate in federal matters. He argued that allowing states immunity would undermine the federal judiciary's role in ensuring justice across state lines, emphasizing that the people, as sovereign, ratified the Constitution to form a more perfect union without reserving such exemptions. Justice concurred, maintaining that the Constitution's explicit grant of over suits against states by out-of-state citizens abrogated any common-law states might have claimed post-ratification. Cushing reasoned from first principles that the federal courts' authority derived directly from the constitutional text, which made no distinction barring states as defendants, and that historical practice under the did not preclude this extension. He dismissed objections based on enforcement practicalities, noting that judgments against states could be executed through legislative processes without violating sovereignty, as states had consented to such accountability by joining the . Justice James , a key Framer, advanced a nationalist interpretation, positing that the people of the constituted a single sovereign nation whose authority superseded state sovereignty in federal jurisdictions. Wilson contended that Article III's diversity clause intentionally included states as potential defendants to prevent parochial biases in state courts and to secure impartial justice, reflecting the Preamble's aims of establishing justice and ensuring domestic tranquility. He critiqued state sovereignty claims as relics of colonial thinking, arguing that transferred ultimate power to the national level, rendering states amenable to suit as artificial entities rather than absolute monarchs. Justice John Blair reinforced the majority by focusing on the judiciary's inherent power: if Article III granted cognizance of controversies involving states, it implied authority to render and enforce judgments, analogous to state courts' powers over individuals. Blair rejected the notion that constitutional silence on execution against states negated , observing that remedies could be fashioned through or legislative compliance, as states lacked the inviolability of foreign sovereigns. Collectively, these opinions, delivered on February 18, 1793, affirmed federal by interpreting Article III as a deliberate override of , prioritizing textual mandate and unionist logic over common-law presumptions.

Justice Iredell's Dissent on State Sovereignty

In his dissent, Justice maintained that the lacked to entertain a suit by a citizen of against , emphasizing the retention of state sovereignty under the . He argued that "every State in the in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the ... [is] as completely , as the are in respect to the powers surrendered." This view positioned states as possessing full sovereign authority absent explicit delegation, precluding compulsory judicial process against them without their consent. Iredell grounded his reasoning in English , which he deemed applicable to the American context prior to any constitutional alteration. Under that tradition, the sole remedy against the —such as —was a petition of right, a procedural mechanism requiring royal consent and distinct from ordinary actions like for debt. He found no precedent for private litigants compelling a 's appearance in court without legislative authorization, noting that or similar writs could not lie against a absent enabling statutes. This immunity extended to states as successors to colonial , differentiated from suits against subordinate entities like corporations, which lacked analogous protections. Constitutionally, Iredell contended that Article III's extension of federal judicial power to controversies "between a State and the Citizens of another State" did not suffice to override without implementing . While the clause vested potential jurisdiction, he insisted that "judicial power is of a passive nature," requiring positive acts by or states to enforce process against a non-consenting . Absent such laws—none of which Georgia had enacted for this form of suit—the could not assume authority to hale a state into federal court, as this would infringe on undelegated prerogatives. He distinguished this from suits by a state's own citizens, potentially allowable under state , but rejected extraterritorial claims by out-of-state individuals as incompatible with retained . Iredell's position underscored a federalist balance where states, as principal polities under the pre-constitutional compact, yielded only enumerated powers, preserving immunity from unconsented federal suits to maintain accountability through political rather than coercive judicial means. This dissent, rendered on February 18, 1793, anticipated the Eleventh Amendment's ratification by framing state sovereignty not as an implied relic but as an affirmative retention essential to the Union's structure.

Immediate Aftermath and Constitutional Response

Political and Public Outrage Against the Decision

The Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia on , 1793, elicited immediate and intense backlash, particularly in , where state officials viewed the ruling as a direct threat to . Governor Edward Telfair addressed the General Assembly, warning that allowing such suits by out-of-state citizens could lead to "an annihilation of [the state's] political existence." In response, the passed a resolution imposing the death penalty on any individual attempting to enforce a court judgment against the , reflecting profound anger over the perceived assault on ; the took no action on the measure. This outrage extended beyond Georgia to other states and federal politicians, who saw the decision as incompatible with the framers' intent to preserve state independence following the Revolutionary War. Massachusetts Governor John Hancock denounced the ruling as a danger to state rights and the principles of republican government, encapsulating fears of federal judicial overreach that could subordinate states to private litigants. Proponents of states' rights, including former Anti-Federalists and even some Federalists, mobilized against the precedent, arguing it inverted the constitutional balance by exposing states to involuntary suits without consent. Public sentiment amplified the political furor through protests and resolutions in multiple state legislatures, which petitioned to curtail federal jurisdiction over unconsenting states. Newspapers and public discourse highlighted the ruling's potential to erode the sovereignty retained by states under the , fostering a that swift corrective action was essential to reaffirm immunity principles embedded in and the ratification debates. The non-enforcement of the Chisholm judgment itself underscored the depth of resistance, as officials defied federal authority pending legislative remedy.

Proposal, Debate, and Ratification of the Eleventh Amendment

The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia on February 18, 1793, provoked widespread condemnation among state legislatures and political leaders, who viewed it as an affront to state sovereignty under the new . Georgia's legislature led the charge by passing a resolution on November 19, 1793, urging Congress to propose an amendment to bar federal jurisdiction over suits against states by out-of-state citizens or foreigners. Similar resolutions followed from other states, including , , and , reflecting a bipartisan consensus—spanning Federalists and —that the ruling undermined the compact between states and the federal government. In response, the Third Congress moved swiftly to propose the Eleventh Amendment. On January 14, 1794, the approved the resolution without recorded debate, limiting federal judicial power to exclude suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the by Citizens of another , or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The measure reached the , where Representative of introduced it amid minimal opposition; it passed on March 4, 1794, by a vote of 81 to 9, signaling broad agreement that the Chisholm interpretation of Article III had exceeded constitutional bounds. Debate in both chambers was cursory, focusing less on the amendment's text than on rejecting the Court's expansive view of federal authority over unconsenting states, though future Treasury Secretary unsuccessfully proposed in the to carve out exceptions for or violations. Ratification proceeded rapidly, underscoring the urgency felt across the . The required approval by three-fourths of the states (ten of thirteen at the time, though fifteen existed by 1795); ratified first on March 27, 1794, followed by on March 31, 1794, and on May 8, 1794. By February 7, 1795, twelve states had ratified, including (June 25, 1794), (December 26, 1794), (December 4, 1797, retroactively counted), (December 23, 1794), and (November 18, 1794), meeting the threshold and rendering the effective. , admitted in 1791, and , admitted in 1796, later ratified on November 3, 1797, and October 16, 1797, respectively, but were not needed for initial validity; itself never formally ratified, having initiated the backlash. certified the 's adoption on January 8, 1798, prompting the to dismiss pending suits like Chisholm under its new constraints.

Enduring Significance and Scholarly Analysis

Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine

The Eleventh Amendment, ratified on February 7, 1795, explicitly barred federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over suits against one state by citizens of another state or by foreign citizens or subjects, directly overturning the Chisholm holding and restoring a baseline of in interstate diversity cases. This textual limit, however, was soon interpreted by the as embodying a broader, pre-existing constitutional principle of rooted in the tradition and the Framers' intent to preserve states as sovereign entities within the federal structure. The Amendment did not create immunity anew but affirmed it against the Chisholm majority's rejection, signaling that states retained immunity from unconsented private suits absent explicit constitutional abrogation. In Hans v. Louisiana (1890), the extended this immunity to federal-question suits brought by a state's own citizens against it, holding that the Eleventh Amendment reflected a fundamental postulate of the constitutional design: states could not be compelled to appear as defendants in federal without their consent. Justice Bradley's opinion for the emphasized that allowing such suits would undermine state sovereignty, drawing on historical practice and rejecting the Chisholm view as an aberration; this decision effectively constitutionalized a presumption of immunity beyond the Amendment's literal text. Subsequent rulings reinforced this scope, as in Ex parte New York No. 1 (1921), which applied immunity to original jurisdiction suits in the absent state waiver. The doctrine's modern contours emerged in the late 20th century amid congressional attempts to abrogate immunity through legislation. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996), a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that Congress lacks power under Article I (including the Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses) to strip states of immunity, confining abrogation authority to the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement clause. This overruled prior precedents like Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989) and entrenched Hans as the governing framework, with Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion arguing that such abrogation would erode the dual-sovereignty balance. Alden v. Maine (1999) further expanded the principle, holding states immune from private federal-law suits in their own courts unless they consent, rejecting arguments that the Amendment applied only to federal forums. Exceptions temper the doctrine's breadth, preserving federal oversight in targeted areas. Under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), Congress may abrogate immunity via Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy state violations of enumerated rights, as this reflects the Amendment's explicit subordination of states to federal remedial power. Ex parte Young (1908) permits suits for prospective injunctive relief against state officials to halt ongoing constitutional violations, bypassing immunity by targeting individuals rather than the state treasury. In rem proceedings, such as eminent domain under federal law, may also proceed against state property interests, as affirmed in PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey (2021). Waiver remains possible through explicit state action, but the presumption favors immunity, with the burden on plaintiffs to prove consent or exception. Scholarly debate persists over whether this evolution aligns with originalist readings of Article III or overextends common-law relics into constitutional mandates, yet the Court's jurisprudence consistently upholds immunity as essential to federalism.

Debates on Original Constitutional Meaning and Federalism

Scholars debate whether the original public meaning of Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution extended federal judicial power to suits against non-consenting states, as interpreted in the Chisholm majority opinion, or whether longstanding principles of sovereign immunity implicitly limited such jurisdiction to preserve state autonomy within the federal structure. The clause granting jurisdiction over "controversies... between a State and Citizens of another State" was read literally by Justices Jay, Blair, Wilson, and Cushing to abrogate state immunity, viewing states as subordinate to the people's sovereignty rather than possessing king-like prerogatives immune from private suit. Justice Iredell's dissent countered that common-law sovereign immunity survived ratification absent explicit waiver, requiring state consent for accountability in federal courts, a position rooted in pre-constitutional practice where suits against sovereigns demanded legislative remedy over judicial compulsion. This division reflected foundational tensions in federalism: a national judiciary empowered to enforce uniform obligations versus states' retained sovereignty to avoid coerced payments without political processes. Originalist analyses diverge on whether Chisholm's literalism captured the framers' intent or overlooked structural cues implying immunity as a background norm. Proponents of the Chisholm view, such as Akhil Reed Amar, argue that the Constitution's text and ratification-era emphasis on popular sovereignty—where "We the People" ordained a system elevating national authority over state pretensions—meant Article III deliberately stripped states of immunity to ensure accountability for Revolutionary-era debts and interstate compacts, with Chisholm as the contemporaneous gloss. Amar contends the Eleventh Amendment's swift ratification in 1795 represented a substantive alteration, driven by Anti-Federalist fears of federal overreach, rather than a clarification of original meaning, as evidenced by the amendment's narrow textual override of Chisholm's outcome without broader retroactive intent. Conversely, scholars like John C. Yoo and Jesse H. Choper maintain that sovereign immunity was an entrenched common-law axiom presumed retained by states under the Tenth Amendment, with Article III's silence on abrogation signaling no intent to expose treasuries to out-of-state litigants, aligning federalism's balance by confining federal courts to disputes where states appeared as plaintiffs or consented. They cite Federalist assurances during ratification, such as Hamilton's Federalist No. 81, downplaying compulsory state suits, and the absence of explicit immunity abolition in convention debates as evidence that Chisholm deviated from the framers' federal bargain. These interpretations bear on federalism's core allocation of power, with Chisholm's affirmative potentially enabling federal courts to override state fiscal priorities and compel compliance with national standards, risking erosion of dual sovereignty. Critics of the majority's approach, including modern originalists, argue it underestimated states' role as co-sovereigns, where immunity safeguards republican governance by channeling disputes through elected legislatures rather than unelected judges, a reinforced by the Eleventh Amendment's restoration of pre-Chisholm equilibrium. Amar counters that such immunity elevates states artificially above the people, inverting the 's democratic foundations and permitting evasion of just debts, as in Georgia's 1792 repudiation of contracts, thus favoring federalism's national dimension over parochial defenses. Empirical patterns support neither side conclusively: while five states ratified the Constitution with immunity concerns unraised, the rapid post-Chisholm backlash—evident in congressional proposals by February 1793 and by January 1798—suggests the decision clashed with widespread understandings of state dignity, prompting a federalism-correcting amendment without negating Article III's textual breadth in other contexts. Ongoing debates thus probe whether original meaning prioritized textual command or implied limits, influencing doctrines like (1908), which carve exceptions for prospective relief against officials to reconcile federal supremacy with immunity.

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    for Chisholm, presented his argument to the Court without rebuttal. °3. 3. Randolph's Argument. Randolph's oral argument in Chisholm hewed closely to the text.
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    This two-tiered understanding of Article III and sovereign immunity appears, moreover, to be both “safe for the States, and safe for the Union.”