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Megatons to Megawatts Program

The Megatons to Megawatts Program, officially the United States-Russian Federation Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement, was a 20-year bilateral commercial initiative launched in 1993 under which Russia downblended 500 metric tons of weapons-grade HEU—equivalent to the fissile cores of roughly 20,000 nuclear warheads—into low-enriched uranium (LEU) for sale to the United States as fuel for civilian nuclear power plants. This process, executed through a government-industry partnership involving Russia's Rosatom and U.S. firm USEC (later Centrus Energy), transformed surplus material from Russia's dismantled Soviet-era arsenal into a verifiable energy resource, with the U.S. Department of Energy overseeing transparency and verification to ensure nonproliferation compliance. The program's core mechanism involved Russia diluting HEU (typically 90%+ enriched in ) to LEU (around 4.95% enrichment) at facilities like , then shipping it to U.S. enrichment sites for final processing into reactor fuel assemblies. By its completion in December , it had delivered LEU derived from 475 metric tons of HEU, generating enough to over 10 million homes annually and accounting for approximately 10% of total U.S. production each year since 2000. Economically, the U.S. purchased the LEU at a fixed price tied to market values, providing with over $17 billion in revenue while supporting domestic jobs in enrichment and fabrication; the deal also advanced U.S. by diversifying fuel supplies amid limited domestic enrichment capacity. As a landmark nonproliferation effort, the program demonstrably reduced global stocks of weapons-usable material by verifiably eliminating excess HEU under international monitoring, including material accountability by the and U.S. inspections, thereby diminishing proliferation risks without relying on new dismantlement mandates. It exemplified causal linkages between arms reduction and peaceful energy use, as the revenue incentivized to prioritize warhead disassembly over retention, though some analysts questioned the extent of direct warhead linkages given 's ability to produce fresh HEU from stocks. Early implementation faced minor disputes over contract interpretations and blending methods, but these were resolved through amendments, ensuring the program's full execution without significant derailment. Post-2013, its legacy influenced subsequent U.S.- nuclear fuel talks, though geopolitical tensions have since curtailed similar cooperation.

Historical Background

Origins in Post-Cold War Arms Reduction

The on December 25, 1991, transferred control of its massive nuclear arsenal to , including an estimated 1,250 metric tons of highly (HEU) produced for weapons, much of which was stored in deteriorating facilities across the former Soviet republics. This transition occurred amid acute economic collapse, with , unpaid wages for nuclear custodians, and weakened command structures heightening risks of theft or unauthorized diversion of bomb-grade materials to proliferators or black-market buyers. U.S. intelligence assessments underscored these vulnerabilities, warning of potential "loose nukes" scenarios where fissile stockpiles could fuel terrorist devices or state-sponsored proliferation. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (), signed July 31, 1991, and entering into force December 5, 1994, mandated reductions to 6,000 accountable strategic per side, requiring to dismantle roughly 5,000 and generating hundreds of tons of surplus HEU from warhead pits. Dismantlement rates accelerated post-ratification, with processing thousands of strategic delivery vehicles and associated by the mid-1990s, though challenges and resource constraints slowed full implementation. These reductions, while advancing post-Cold War de-escalation, intensified the imperative for secure disposition of the resulting HEU, as retention in weapons-usable form posed ongoing hazards without adequate safeguards. U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts began with the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of November 1991, evolving into the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program in 1992, which delivered over $400 million annually in aid for securing fissile materials, destroying and , and funding warhead disassembly in . CTR initiatives, such as upgrading storage vaults and transporting warheads to central facilities, mitigated immediate risks but highlighted the limitations of grant-based assistance amid Russia's fiscal woes, paving the way for market-driven solutions to incentivize verifiable HEU drawdown. This blend of security-focused aid and strategic commerce addressed the dual needs of non-proliferation and economic stabilization, distinct from purely diplomatic .

Negotiations and Initial Agreements

In the aftermath of the and amid bilateral agreements reducing arsenals, the initiated discussions in 1992 to purchase highly (HEU) extracted from dismantled warheads, aiming to verifiably eliminate excess weapons-grade material while creating a commercial market for its downblended form as reactor fuel. President announced on August 18, 1992, the U.S. intent to acquire approximately 500 metric tons of HEU—equivalent to the in roughly 20,000 warheads—through a process that would dilute it to low-enriched uranium (LEU) suitable for civilian power plants, thereby advancing nonproliferation by tying irreversible to economically viable disposition. This approach addressed U.S. concerns over unsecured stockpiles potentially fueling proliferation or black-market sales, while circumventing domestic restrictions on low-cost foreign uranium imports that had been imposed via the 1992 Suspension Agreement limiting LEU exports. Russian participation was motivated by acute post-Soviet , where revenues from HEU sales—projected to generate billions over two decades—provided essential to sustain the industry's operations, fund warhead dismantlement costs estimated in the hundreds of millions annually, and avert risks of or diversion from underpaid scientists and facilities. viewed the initiative as a pragmatic bridge between security imperatives and commercial opportunities, leveraging its vast HEU surplus from START treaty reductions to inject stability into a sector employing over 300,000 workers amid and budget shortfalls. Negotiations, formally commencing in late August 1992 between U.S. Department of Energy officials and Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) representatives, reconciled divergent priorities by structuring the deal as a government-to-government framework that ensured transparency through verifiable downblending in Russia before export. These talks built on a preliminary HEU Purchase Agreement outlined in 1992, culminating in the signing of the formal HEU-LEU contract on February 18, 1993, which committed both sides to the phased transfer and conversion of the 500-ton stockpile over 20 years without immediate specification of pricing or volumes that would later define implementation. The process highlighted mutual incentives: U.S. utilities gained access to reliable, proliferation-secure fuel supplies amid global uranium shortages, while Russia secured upfront payments to support its fissile material safeguards during economic vulnerability.

Program Agreement and Terms

Key Provisions of the 1993 Deal

The 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement, signed on February 18 between the and the , required to downblend 500 metric tons of excess weapons-grade HEU—equivalent to the fissile cores of approximately 20,000 warheads—into low-enriched (LEU) for use in reactors. This process was structured as a 20-year contract commencing with initial HEU transfers in 1993 and LEU deliveries to the starting in 1995, at an annual rate of roughly 25 metric tons of HEU. The designated the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC, later ) as its executive agent to purchase and distribute the LEU to U.S. utilities, ensuring the material entered the civilian fuel cycle while supporting nonproliferation goals. Pricing under the agreement was established via a fixed formula tied to prevailing market indicators for and separative work units (SWU), designed to make the LEU competitively priced for U.S. buyers without direct subsidies, though it effectively undercut rates in some periods due to the volume and guaranteed supply. The deal stipulated that payments to would fund the downblending and related dismantlement activities, with the total commercial value estimated at around $8 billion over the program's life. Verification mechanisms emphasized bilateral transparency to confirm the HEU's weapons origin and prevent diversion, including U.S. on-site inspections at Russian facilities to measure material attributes (such as isotopic composition confirming >90% U-235 enrichment) and track chain-of-custody from warhead dismantlement sites to downblending plants. Joint U.S.-Russian audits supplemented these efforts, with protocols for sampling and non-destructive assay to verify compliance. The agreement included safeguard clauses permitting suspension of transfers if proliferation risks materialized, such as failure to meet arms control commitments or evidence of re-weaponization intent, ensuring the program's alignment with broader strategic stability objectives.

Involved Entities and Financial Structure

The Enrichment Corporation (USEC Inc.), designated by the U.S. Department of Energy as the executive agent, handled procurement of the low-enriched uranium (LEU) on the American side and resold it to domestic nuclear utilities such as via commercial arrangements. On the Russian side, Techsnabexport (TENEX), a of the state-owned corporation, served as the executive agent responsible for LEU sales and coordination of the downblending process, which occurred at facilities including . The program's financial structure relied on a commercial contract between USEC and TENEX, funded through long-term purchase commitments by U.S. utilities rather than direct subsidies, thereby avoiding U.S. taxpayer costs while delivering approximately $8 billion in revenue to for the converted material at discounted rates compared to market enrichment services. This private-sector driven model underscored a market-based approach to arms reduction, distinguishing it from aid-dependent initiatives.

Implementation and Operations

Downblending Process and Technical Execution

The downblending process converted highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russian nuclear warheads, typically enriched to approximately 90% uranium-235 (U-235), into low-enriched uranium (LEU) with no more than 5% U-235, suitable for use in commercial light-water reactors. HEU metal components were first machined into shavings at disassembly sites, then oxidized to uranium oxide and fluorinated into HEU uranium hexafluoride (UF6) at facilities such as the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk or PA Mayak in Ozersk. This HEU UF6 was then blended in a continuous gaseous mixing process with a blendstock of UF6 enriched to about 1.5% U-235, typically re-enriched depleted uranium tails, at sites including the Urals Electrochemical Combine in Novouralsk, Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine, or Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk, yielding LEU UF6 at standard enrichments of 3.6%, 4.0%, 4.4%, or 4.95% U-235 (most commonly 4.4%). The LEU UF6 was filled into shipping cylinders, transported to a collection point in St. Petersburg, Russia, and then shipped by sea to the United States, where it underwent conversion to uranium dioxide powder, pressing into pellets, and assembly into fuel rods and bundles by domestic fabricators for use in nuclear power plants. The process targeted annual downblending equivalent to 30 metric tons of HEU, supporting the overall goal of processing 500 metric tons over 20 years. Technical execution incorporated stringent verification under the HEU Transparency Program, with joint U.S.-Russian monitoring teams granted access to four primary Russian downblending sites (Seversk, Ozersk, Novouralsk, and Zelenogorsk). Nondestructive assay equipment, including portable gamma-ray spectrometers, measured U-235 enrichment via the 186-keV gamma emission line, while the Blend-Down Monitoring System provided real-time tracking of gas flow rates, enrichment levels, and total uranium mass to confirm irreversible dilution from ≥90% to ≤5% U-235. Isotopic adjustments ensured compliance with Western fuel specifications by limiting impurities such as U-234 and U-236, and pre-shipment assays verified LEU met commercial quality standards. Deliveries began after initial certification of the process and material origins, with the first shipments of LEU arriving in 1995 despite early logistical delays related to verification protocols; subsequent annual quotas were consistently achieved thereafter.

Timeline of Major Milestones

  • June 1995: The first commercial shipment of low-enriched uranium (LEU) derived from Russian highly enriched uranium (HEU) arrived at USEC facilities in Paducah, Kentucky, marking the transition from the initial government-to-government phase to commercial implementation under the 1993 agreement.
  • 2000–2005: Deliveries proceeded steadily, with annual downblending of approximately 10 metric tons of HEU, enabling the program to supply up to 10% of the low-enriched uranium used in U.S. nuclear power plants by the mid-decade amid fluctuating global uranium market prices.
  • 2007–2008: Rising uranium spot prices led to disputes over the fixed pricing formula, prompting Russia to temporarily suspend new HEU blend-down contracts and threaten program delays, which risked U.S. nuclear fuel supply stability.
  • February 2009: An amendment to the commercial contract introduced a revised pricing mechanism linking payments more closely to market conditions, resolving the disputes and averting suspension to ensure continued deliveries.
  • June 2013: The program reached 95% completion, with 475 metric tons of the targeted 500 metric tons of HEU downblended into LEU, on track to meet the original 20-year schedule despite earlier challenges.
  • November–December 2013: Final deliveries fulfilled the 500-metric-ton commitment, equivalent to the HEU from 20,000 nuclear warheads, confirming adherence to the 2013 projection without requiring extensions.

Technical and Scientific Details

Uranium Enrichment and Conversion Mechanics

The downblending of highly enriched uranium (HEU), typically at assays exceeding 90% U-235, to low-enriched uranium (LEU) at approximately 4.95% U-235 for commercial involves initial deconversion of the HEU from its weapons-derived forms—such as metal pits or —into (UF6) gas. This begins with the HEU metal into shavings, followed by oxidation to and fluorination to produce UF6, enabling gaseous handling suitable for isotopic blending. In Russian facilities, such as the Siberian Chemical Combine at , the HEU is dissolved in to form , calcined to (U3O8), and then converted to UF6 via a series of chemical reactions involving and gas. The core blending mechanic entails mixing the HEU-derived UF6 gas with UF6 from lower-assay sources, such as tails (around 0.2-0.3% U-235) or slightly (up to 1.5% U-235 derived from reprocessed or natural feed), in a controlled gaseous stream to achieve the target LEU enrichment level. This dilution occurs primarily at the Electrolysis and Chemical Complex, utilizing modern cascades phased in after decommissioned gaseous diffusion plants by 1992. s offer superior efficiency over , requiring fewer separative work units (SWU)—a measure of enrichment effort—with Russian facilities achieving up to 24 million kg SWU per year across centrifuge operations, minimizing input for precise isotopic adjustment during blending. The resulting LEU UF6 is then suitable for further conversion to (UO2) powder for fuel fabrication. Irreversibility of the downblending is ensured by the extreme dilution ratios, typically converting 1 metric ton of 90%+ HEU into approximately 25-30 metric tons of 4-5% LEU, dispersing the U-235 such that re-enrichment to weapons-grade levels would demand separative efforts comparable to initial production from natural uranium (0.7% U-235), rendering it economically and technically prohibitive without massive infrastructure. For instance, blending 500 metric tons of HEU yielded over 14,000 metric tons of LEU, with the isotopic homogeneity preventing selective recovery without full-scale re-separation. Handling weapons-grade HEU poses acute criticality risks due to its low —potentially as little as 50 kg in optimal —necessitating stringent safety protocols including geometric controls (e.g., thin slabs or cylinders to increase neutron leakage), incorporation of neutron-absorbing materials like , mass limits per container, and real-time monitoring with counters. These measures maintain subcritical multiplication factors (keff < 0.95) during transport, storage, and blending, with IAEA verification ensuring compliance and mitigating accidental chain reactions from or .

Integration into Nuclear Fuel Cycle

The low-enriched (LEU) supplied through the Megatons to Megawatts Program was delivered to the in the form of (UF6) and processed at domestic facilities such as the . There, it entered the standard fabrication chain: the UF6 was converted to (UO2) powder, which was then pressed into cylindrical pellets, sintered for durability, and stacked into fuel rods clad in zirconium alloy. These rods were assembled into fuel bundles designed for compatibility with pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs), which constituted the majority of the U.S. commercial reactor fleet. The fabricated fuel assemblies were distributed by utilities and fuel vendors to over 104 operating U.S. nuclear s nationwide, enabling the loading of the material directly into reactor cores for fission-based . This integration supported operations at plants across multiple states, contributing to the fueling of approximately one-tenth of U.S. annual electricity production during the program's active years from 1995 to 2013. By augmenting the domestic LEU inventory with recycled material, the program diminished short-term reliance on primary enrichment services, which are subject to capacity constraints and market-driven price swings. This supply infusion provided a predictable feedstock that buffered the U.S. fuel cycle against disruptions in enrichment availability, such as those stemming from geopolitical tensions or production halts. Material accountability throughout the chain—from Russian downblending facilities to U.S. reactor cores—was maintained under U.S. Department of Energy oversight, incorporating safeguards like isotopic verification and serial tracking of UF6 cylinders to ensure the LEU's origin and non-diversion for weapons use. This process adhered to international nonproliferation standards, confirming the fuel's integration into civilian operations without compromising security protocols.

Achievements and Positive Impacts

Nonproliferation and Security Gains

The Megatons to Megawatts Program downblended 500 metric tons of highly (HEU) derived from dismantled Russian warheads into low- (LEU) suitable for commercial , thereby eliminating equivalent to the explosive yield of approximately 20,000 warheads. This initiative, operational from 1995 to 2013, directly addressed post-Cold War vulnerabilities by verifiably destroying excess weapons-grade material that could otherwise have been vulnerable to diversion on black markets or acquisition by proliferant states such as or . Bilateral verification protocols, including on-site inspections by U.S. and personnel as well as independent assessments, fostered and mutual confidence, ensuring the HEU's weapons-origin and the integrity of the downblending process at facilities. No verified instances of misuse or diversion of program-related material occurred over its duration, contrasting with risks from unsecured stockpiles in less monitored environments. By integrating commercial contracts—where received payment for downblended LEU delivered to U.S. utilities—the program created economic incentives for sustained material security, outperforming traditional coercive approaches that often faltered due to lack of ongoing enforcement mechanisms.

Energy Production and Economic Benefits

The Megatons to Megawatts Program supplied low-enriched uranium equivalent to the needs of about 10% of U.S. annual between 1995 and 2013, powering one in every ten American homes, businesses, schools, and hospitals on average. This output, derived from downblending 500 metric tons of Russian highly from dismantled warheads, generated with an energy value displacing the equivalent of over 200 million tons of fossil fuels. The program's fixed-price commercial contract, valued at roughly $8 billion over 20 years, delivered to U.S. utilities at rates below prevailing market levels, enabling cost efficiencies amid volatile global uranium pricing and supporting stable rates for consumers. For Russia, the initiative yielded approximately $17 billion in revenue from LEU sales, providing economic incentives that aligned with warhead reductions by converting surplus weapons material into a marketable during the post-Soviet economic transition. Environmentally, the enabled by the program avoided emissions tied to alternatives for the same electricity output, bolstering U.S. through reliable, low-emission baseload power independent of imported hydrocarbons.

Criticisms and Controversies

Economic Impacts on Domestic Industries

The Megatons to Megawatts Program's fixed-price delivery of low-enriched uranium (LEU) from downblended highly enriched uranium (HEU) created market distortions that disadvantaged U.S. domestic enrichment firms, as the pricing—capped at levels equivalent to approximately 92% of the prevailing separative () market price plus a component—often undercut variable-cost domestic production during periods of low global demand. This influx, supplying up to 15,259 metric tons of LEU by the program's completion, captured significant share from U.S. producers reliant on technology, which had higher operating costs than emerging alternatives. USEC Inc., the primary U.S. enricher and executive agent for the program, faced direct competitive pressure, contributing to the 2001 closure of the after it lost to LEU imports amid the HEU agreement's . The sustained supply of lower-cost material exacerbated revenue declines for domestic operations, delaying investments in next-generation centrifuge facilities like USEC's American Centrifuge Plant, whose development stalled due to insufficient returns in a price-suppressed environment. USEC's subsequent Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing in March 2014, following the program's end, reflected cumulative losses from oversupplied markets, with the firm emerging restructured as Corp. but without operational enrichment capacity. The program's emphasis on nonproliferation objectives over domestic industrial safeguards resulted in diminished U.S. enrichment self-sufficiency, as global LEU prices remained depressed—averaging below historical norms through the —discouraging Western investments in efficient technologies and leaving the U.S. import-dependent for much of its commercial fuel needs. This vulnerability prompted post-program policy responses, including the Department of Energy's HALEU Availability Program, funded at $2.72 billion in 2024 to develop domestic high-assay LEU production for advanced reactors, aiming to restore absent during the Megatons era.

Proliferation Risks and Operational Flaws

Critics, including physicist Pavel Podvig, have described the Megatons to Megawatts program as a nonproliferation "fallacy" due to its structure delaying the complete elimination of nuclear warheads. In the process, highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from dismantled warheads—totaling 500 metric tons equivalent to material from approximately 20,000 warheads—was stored and downblended into low-enriched uranium (LEU) over an extended period, rather than requiring immediate full warhead dismantlement. Podvig argued this interim handling of separated weapon-grade HEU in Russian facilities heightened theft risks, as the material remained vulnerable longer than under alternative disposition methods prioritizing rapid warhead destruction. Downblending operations at Russian sites, such as those managed by , faced scrutiny for inadequate international safeguards. The (IAEA) played no direct role in verifying the HEU's weapons origin or the downblending integrity, relying instead on bilateral U.S.-Russian attestation that delivered LEU matched downblended HEU equivalents. Nonproliferation analysts highlighted potential for diversion or undeclared parallel enrichment in these dual-use facilities, where commercial processes could mask retention of despite transparency measures like U.S. sampling of LEU batches. Operational vulnerabilities were exposed during a 2007-2008 dispute, when suspended LEU shipments to the U.S. amid tensions over uranium pricing formulas and U.S. enrichment technology transfers, nearly derailing deliveries equivalent to 24 million pounds of annually. This halt, tied to broader trade frictions including WTO accession issues, underscored the program's dependence on geopolitical stability and susceptibility to unilateral export restrictions by . Proponents countered that empirical outcomes validated the approach, with zero verified diversions over the program's 20-year span from to and the irreversible chemical transformation of HEU to LEU ensuring material usability only for civilian fuel. These factors, they maintained, delivered tangible security gains by verifiably disposing excess stockpiles under monitored commercial channels, mitigating theoretical risks through proven execution rather than ideal but unimplemented alternatives.

Legacy and Post-Program Developments

Completion and Immediate Aftermath

The Megatons to Megawatts program concluded on December 10, 2013, with the arrival in the United States of the final shipment of low-enriched uranium derived from the downblending of 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium. This material, verified by joint US-Russian teams under International Atomic Energy Agency protocols and bilateral oversight, represented the equivalent of the fissile cores from approximately 20,000 nuclear warheads. Over the program's 20-year duration, more than 250 shipments had been safely transported, with the final delivery certified as completing all contracted obligations. In the immediate aftermath, nuclear fuel suppliers and utilities shifted procurement to open-market purchases of low- from global commercial sources, ending reliance on the program's structured government sales. discontinued downblending and exporting weapons-derived highly enriched uranium under the bilateral , with subsequent uranium transactions governed by commercial contracts rather than nonproliferation-specific arrangements. The Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the program's executive agent responsible for receiving and distributing the fuel, reported annual purchases valued at nearly $500 million under the deal but faced mounting losses from its expiration amid falling market prices for enriched uranium. USEC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in June 2014, citing the program's end and related revenue shortfalls as key factors, and restructured to emerge as in September 2014 with a reduced debt load of over $530 million retired. Concurrent nonproliferation reviews by officials confirmed the program's success in verifiably eliminating the targeted highly enriched uranium stockpile, thereby reducing proliferation risks without evidence of material diversion.

Long-Term Geopolitical and Market Implications

The Megatons to Megawatts program established a for converting weapons-grade highly (HEU) into low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian use, irreversibly eliminating material from roughly 20,000 Russian warheads and thereby diminishing immediate risks through verifiable downblending processes completed by 2013. This bilateral framework influenced subsequent U.S.- engagements, including extensions, by demonstrating the feasibility of linking nonproliferation to commercial energy supply chains. However, the 2014 crisis eroded this cooperative model, leading to U.S. sanctions that severed Russian LEU deliveries under follow-on contracts and culminated in a 2024 law banning Russian imports effective 2028, thereby exposing how initial interdependence had inadvertently amplified geopolitical vulnerabilities rather than sustainably reducing Russian leverage over global dynamics. On the market front, the program's delivery of over 500 metric tons of downblended HEU as LEU flooded the U.S. enrichment sector with low-cost supply from 1995 to 2013, suppressing spot prices and contributing to the shuttering of domestic facilities like the Paducah and Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plants, which eroded U.S. self-sufficiency in separative work units (SWU). This prolonged price depression, averaging below historical norms, deterred private investment in enrichment technology until post-program realizations spurred revival initiatives, exemplified by Centrus Energy's American Centrifuge program, which by 2024 resumed centrifuge manufacturing in Tennessee to produce high-assay LEU for advanced reactors and restore national capacity amid uranium demand surges. In the broader geopolitical context, the initiative reduced Russia's excess military HEU stockpiles, mitigating risks of rapid weapons reconstitution, though it simultaneously bolstered Rosatom's commercial enrichment dominance, supplying up to 25% of U.S. reactor fuel needs into the and complicating diversification efforts. The program's legacy underscores causal limits in bilateral nonproliferation—effective against Soviet-era arsenals but insufficient against multipolar challenges, such as China's buildup of over 500 warheads by and parallel enrichment expansions, which demand multilateral safeguards over recycled . Amid the nuclear renaissance, driven by decarbonization imperatives, policymakers reference the program's mechanics in advocating HEU downblending for excess stockpiles, yet emphasize diversified supply chains to avert renewed dependencies.

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