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National Bank Note

National Bank Notes were banknotes issued as legal tender by federally chartered national banks in the United States from 1863 to 1935, backed by U.S. government bonds deposited with the Treasury to ensure redeemability. Authorized under the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864, these notes aimed to establish a uniform national currency, replacing the patchwork of state banknotes that had contributed to financial instability, while simultaneously financing the Civil War through bond purchases required for note issuance. Over 12,000 national banks participated, issuing notes in denominations from $1 to $1,000, with designs featuring patriotic vignettes and local bank identifiers to foster public trust and deter counterfeiting. Though successful in standardizing currency and promoting banking uniformity under the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's oversight, the system's inelastic money supply exacerbated periodic panics, such as those in 1873 and 1907, ultimately contributing to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, which phased out National Bank Notes in favor of more flexible Federal Reserve Notes.

Origins and Establishment

Antebellum Banking Landscape

The expiration of the Second Bank of the United States' charter on March 3, 1836, led to a decentralized banking system dominated by state-chartered institutions, each authorized to issue its own paper currency without federal oversight. This shift, accelerated by the , prompted many states to enact "" laws starting with in 1838, which permitted relatively easy entry for new banks provided they backed notes with specified securities like state bonds. By the early 1850s, the number of state banks had expanded significantly, reaching approximately 1,000 institutions by 1857, circulating diverse notes that varied in design, denomination, and reliability. The proliferation of state bank notes resulted in thousands of distinct varieties, complicating commerce and fostering widespread counterfeiting due to inconsistent designs and lack of uniformity. Notes often traded at discounts reflecting the issuing bank's perceived solvency and geographic distance from the point of redemption, with rural or "" banks—named for remote locations like Michigan's areas in the where specie redemption was impractical—exacerbating the problem by issuing currency backed by minimal reserves. from bank note reporters and showed discounts ranging from 1-2% for notes redeemable locally to 10-60% or more for those from distant or suspect issuers, undermining public confidence and efficient exchange. The illustrated these vulnerabilities when the failure of Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company on triggered a cascade of bank suspensions and note depreciations amid overextended railroad speculation and declining grain exports. Banks in and other centers halted specie payments, causing note values to plummet variably—some depreciating 20-30%—as creditors and holders rushed to redeem, revealing the system's reliance on localized trust rather than standardized safeguards. Failure rates spiked, with hundreds of state banks suspending operations or collapsing entirely by 1858, highlighting the risks of uncollateralized issuance and interstate disparities in regulation.

Enactment of the National Banking Acts

The National Currency Act of February 25, 1863, enacted under President Abraham Lincoln at the urging of Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase, initiated the national banking system to address Civil War financing imperatives and the fragmentation of state-issued currencies that had exacerbated economic instability. The legislation authorized federally chartered banks to issue uniform notes backed by U.S. Treasury bonds deposited with the government, thereby creating a mechanism for national banks to absorb federal debt through mandatory bond purchases while establishing a more reliable currency redeemable in coin. This bond-collateralized issuance directly linked bank operations to war funding, as banks could circulate notes up to 90 percent of their bond holdings, incentivizing purchases of government securities amid surging deficits exceeding $500 million annually by 1863. The 1863 act's restrictive provisions—limiting initial bank capital to $50,000 minimum and capping note issuance—hindered widespread adoption, prompting Congress to amend it substantially via the National Bank Act of June 3, 1864. The revised framework expanded eligible bank capitalization to $50,000–$1,000,000 based on location, permitted notes up to $500,000 per bank secured by bonds, and institutionalized the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for supervisory authority, thereby broadening implementation to achieve a nationwide uniform currency insulated from state-level variations. These changes causally reinforced federal fiscal capacity by channeling private capital into bond markets, with national bank holdings of government securities reaching $200 million by late 1864. To compel convergence from the prevailing state banking system and eliminate dual currencies that had fueled prewar panics through uneven redeemability, Congress enacted a 10 percent tax on outstanding state bank notes on March 3, 1865, effective July 1, 1866. This punitive levy, applied per annum on circulated notes, rendered state issues uncompetitive by design, driving conversions and aligning the money supply with federally backed obligations. Uptake accelerated accordingly, with over 500 national banks chartered by the end of 1865, collectively issuing approximately $200 million in notes secured against U.S. bonds to guarantee public confidence in redeemability.

Operational Framework

Bank Organization and Regulation

National banks were chartered by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), established under the , which required associations to submit applications demonstrating compliance with organizational criteria, including a minimum paid-in capital stock of $50,000 for banks in towns with populations under 6,000, $100,000 for those in cities of 6,000 to 50,000 residents, and $200,000 for larger cities. The Comptroller evaluated factors such as shareholder subscriptions, managerial fitness, and alignment with public interest before approval, imposing federal uniformity absent in state banking systems. Ongoing emphasized through mandatory examinations conducted by OCC-appointed examiners, who verified sheets, portfolios, and internal controls at least annually, with authority to recommend corrective actions or revocation for deficiencies. Banks also maintained specified reserves of lawful —15 percent of deposits for country banks (with up to 60 percent countable as deposits in reserve cities), 25 percent for reserve city banks, and 25 percent entirely in specie or for central reserve city banks like —to buffer against withdrawals and support . These measures, rooted in federal authority, contrasted with state banks' variable local rules, fostering greater discipline despite constraining lending flexibility. The system expanded to approximately 7,500 chartered national banks by , peaking amid pre-Federal Reserve growth. National banks demonstrated empirically lower failure rates than state-chartered counterparts before , with data from 1864–1930 showing consistent outperformance in suspensions per active bank, linked to rigorous OCC scrutiny over laxer .

Note Issuance and Bond Collateral System

Under the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864, chartered national banks deposited U.S. government bonds with the Comptroller of the Currency at the Treasury Department, which served as collateral for note issuance. The volume of circulating notes authorized for each bank equaled up to 90% of the of the deposited bonds, with the Treasury holding the securities to guarantee redemption. This mechanism directly linked supply to federal debt holdings, compelling banks to purchase government obligations and thereby financing wartime and postwar borrowing needs. Banks initiated issuance by surrendering bonds to the , receiving in return an equivalent amount of engraved notes prepared by the . The collateral system provided security such that, in the event of bank insolvency, the could liquidate the bonds to reimburse noteholders, minimizing default risk and fostering nationwide confidence in the . Limits on issuance scaled with bank capital: associations with $50,000 to $500,000 in capital could issue up to $45,000 in notes per $50,000 of bonds deposited, while larger banks faced proportional caps, ensuring prudent leverage. Redemption proceeded through a structured process to enforce circulation across regions. Noteholders presented bills at the for payment in lawful , typically or ; if refused, they could redeem via designated redemption agents in major cities or directly at the in Washington, D.C. These agents, functioning as clearinghouses, aggregated notes from multiple banks, exchanged them for specie from depositors' redemption funds (maintained at 5% of outstanding circulation), and returned depleted notes to issuers for replenishment, thereby curtailing local discounts and promoting uniform value. The oversaw final settlements, selling bonds if necessary to cover shortfalls. In practice, banks underutilized their issuance authority, circulating notes equivalent to only about 50% of the statutorily permitted maximum during much of the system's operation. This underissuance stemmed from yield arbitrage: bonds yielded semiannual (often 6%), while issued notes bore no return to the , faced a 1% annual circulation tax after , and entailed , distribution, and costs that eroded profitability unless demand for loans justified the expansion. Banks thus retained bonds in portfolios for , issuing notes selectively when reserve positions or local credit needs aligned with marginal gains.

Note Designs and Evolution

Large-Size National Bank Notes

Large-size National Bank Notes, measuring approximately 7 3/8 by 3 1/8 inches, were issued by chartered national banks from 1865 until 1928 under the authority of the National Banking Acts. These notes featured uniform federal designs printed by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, overlaid with bank-specific details including the issuing institution's name, city, charter number, and serial numbers. Denominations ranged from $5 to $100 for most series, with higher values up to $1,000 issued sparingly. The Original Series, commencing in 1865, consisted of hand-signed notes bearing the signatures of the bank's cashier and president. Obverses displayed engraved portraits of historical figures, such as for lower denominations, while reverses incorporated elaborate vignettes reproducing historical paintings from the U.S. Capitol Rotunda, including allegorical and thematic scenes to evoke national heritage. Security features encompassed intricate lathe work—fine geometric patterns produced by ruling machines—and detailed to complicate counterfeiting efforts. The Series of 1875 maintained the face and back designs of the Original Series but added a distinctive red "Series 1875" to denote the updated issuance, prepared in anticipation of the resumption of specie payments. Notes in this series continued the hand-signing practice and security elements, with production spanning denominations from $1 to $500, though lower values predominated. The Series of marked a design overhaul, introducing allegorical motifs tailored to denominations, such as "The Landing of the Pilgrims" vignette on the $5 reverse and industrial symbols like trains on the $50 back alongside portraits like . Variants included Red Seal, Date Back, and Plain Back subtypes, issued primarily in $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 denominations with enhanced guilloche patterns and borders for anti-counterfeiting. These evolutions reflected ongoing refinements in aesthetic and protective elements while preserving the large format until the transition to small-size notes.

Small-Size National Bank Notes

Small-size National Bank Notes were introduced in July 1929, adopting uniform dimensions of 6.14 inches by 2.61 inches to align with the contemporaneous small-size Notes and other U.S. types. This redesign standardized note production and facilitated intaglio printing by the , replacing the larger formats used previously. The Series of 1929 Type 1 notes featured distinctive brown seals and serial numbers, with the issuing national bank's name and charter number printed in black on the face. Denominations ranged from $5 to $100, secured by U.S. government bonds held by the issuing banks as required under the National Banking Acts. A subsequent Type 2 variant incorporated the charter number twice in brown ink aligned with the serial numbers, reflecting minor design adjustments for consistency with evolving small-size standards. Issuance occurred primarily through qualified national banks, with production continuing until 1935, marking the effective end of significant National Bank Note output. Circulation peaked at approximately $893 million in early May 1933, driven by heightened demand amid economic pressures, though total volumes remained limited compared to Notes due to the bond-collateral system's constraints. Not all banks issued every , resulting in varying rarity across types and charters.

Economic Role and Effects

Contributions to Currency Uniformity

The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 established a system of federally chartered banks authorized to issue notes backed by U.S. government bonds deposited with the Treasury, creating a uniform national currency redeemable at par value through designated clearinghouses and subtreasuries. This framework, reinforced by a 10% federal tax on state bank notes imposed in 1865, rapidly supplanted diverse state-issued currencies, which had circulated at varying discounts reflecting local bank solvency and redemption uncertainties. By the mid-1870s, national bank notes achieved near-universal par circulation nationwide, as evidenced by the decline in domestic exchange rate premia and the predominance of these notes in interregional trade. Prior to the Acts, state bank notes typically traded at discounts averaging 1-2% in major markets like , , , and , stemming from asymmetric information on issuer and inconsistent practices. The shift to national notes eliminated these inefficiencies, with uniform designs, federal oversight of issuing banks, and mandatory ensuring acceptance at without geographic . Empirical analyses of rates confirm that the of notes reduced deviations from par in domestic clearings, fostering efficient flows across state lines. National bank note circulation expanded steadily under this regime, reaching approximately $300 million outstanding by the late —near the statutory cap set by the 1870 amendment—and climbing to $340 million by , constituting a backbone of the money supply amid fluctuating greenback and specie holdings. This growth reflected robust demand for a reliable medium, with notes comprising up to 28% of authorized issuance limits by and serving as a hedge against the inelasticity of other forms. Redemption efficiency further bolstered uniformity, as the Treasury's role in holding bonds and facilitating withdrawals minimized or regional disparities in note quality. The bond-backing mechanism causally underpinned this uniformity by rendering national notes effectively default-proof, with the government pledging to redeem them using deposited securities in the event of issuer failure—a provision that prevented any recorded defaults on circulating national notes from 1865 onward. In contrast, pre-1863 state bank notes suffered frequent suspensions and losses, with hundreds of institutions failing annually during panics like 1837 and 1857, eroding public trust and perpetuating discounts. Federal chartering and Comptroller supervision enforced capital adequacy and reserve requirements, channeling private issuance into a standardized, low-risk asset that integrated disparate regional economies through par acceptability.

Involvement in Banking Panics and Crises

The inelastic supply of national bank notes, tied rigidly to U.S. holdings, intensified strains during banking panics by preventing rapid expansion to meet surges in currency demand, often resulting in elevated interest rates and reserve drains from rural to reserve city banks. In the , which erupted on September 18 following the collapse of & Company—a major financier of railroad bonds—the pyramidical reserve structure under the National Banking Acts funneled toward New York, leaving interior national banks vulnerable to withdrawals and contributing to over 100 bank suspensions nationwide by October. Public hoarding of circulating notes further contracted effective , prolonging contraction through 1879. The saw similar exacerbation, with national bank note rigidity failing to accommodate harvest-season demands; by mid-1893, 158 national banks had failed amid 340 total suspensions from July to August, though national institutions suspended at lower rates than unregulated state banks due to federal oversight. reduced note circulation velocity, amplifying credit contraction despite gold inflows stabilizing reserves by late 1894. During the , originating from failed attempts to corner the copper market in October, national bank suspensions stayed below 1% of approximately 7,300 institutions, reflecting regulatory resilience, yet inelastic notes fueled hoarding and call loan rates exceeding 100% annually, necessitating ad hoc clearinghouse certificates until orchestrated private liquidity provision. These episodes prompted the Aldrich-Vreeland Act, signed May 30, 1908, empowering national banking associations to issue emergency notes backed by and certified assets during declared crises, with issuance peaking at $208 million in 1914 to avert panic without permanent intervention.

Criticisms and Debates

Underissuance and Economic Inefficiencies

Despite the National Banking Acts authorizing national banks to issue notes secured by U.S. government bonds, aggregate note issuance persistently fell short of permissible limits throughout the system's operation from 1863 to the early . For instance, while bond holdings theoretically supported over $700 million in circulation by the late 1870s, actual outstanding notes rarely exceeded $350-400 million, creating an "underissuance puzzle" as banks held substantial eligible bonds without fully depositing them for note privileges. This gap arose primarily from opportunity costs: banks could earn higher returns (typically 2-3 percentage points more) by allocating capital to loans rather than tying it to lower-yielding bonds required for note backing, especially in regions with strong loan demand. The Act of June 20, 1874, aimed to address this by raising the note issuance limit from 80% to 90% of deposited s' and offering a 1% annual on inactive circulation capacity, intending to boost profitability and encourage fuller utilization. However, econometric analyses of bank-level data reveal these incentives only marginally increased issuance, as the effective spread between yields (around 4-5%) and alternative lending rates (7-10%) remained uncompetitive for banks with viable lending opportunities. Banks in areas with weaker prospects or higher yields relative to local rates issued closer to limits, while others prioritized deposits for higher-margin activities, underscoring profitability barriers over regulatory defects. Free-market economists interpret this underissuance as evidence of rational bank behavior, reflecting accurate assessment of risks like note redemption demands and issuance costs (e.g., printing and transportation fees), which further eroded net returns compared to deposit-based lending. In contrast, advocates for greater intervention, including contemporaries like officials, attributed it to inadequate compulsion, arguing that without stronger mandates or centralized issuance, the system failed to expand elastically during seasonal demands, contributing to inelastic and elevated volatility. Empirical disaggregation resolves the apparent , showing no systemic but rather heterogeneous incentives across banks, with underissuance concentrated among those facing superior alternatives to note production.

Centralization Versus Market Alternatives

The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 established a federally chartered banking system that achieved lower bank failure rates compared to the preceding era of state-chartered free banking, where annual failure rates in many states exceeded 2 percent due to lax regulation and note overissuance. From 1865 to 1913, national banks experienced fewer failures relative to their numbers than contemporaneous state banks, with raw data showing national institutions comprising a similar count to state banks but incurring substantially fewer insolvencies, attributable to mandatory bond collateralization and federal oversight that constrained risky lending. However, this stability came at the expense of market competition, as a 10 percent federal tax imposed on state bank notes in 1865 effectively suppressed their circulation, driving many state banks to convert or exit note issuance and creating a de facto monopoly for national bank currency. Critics, particularly from perspectives, contend that the system fostered an oligopolistic structure favoring large bondholders and federal interests, akin to a that prioritized monetization over broader economic dynamism. Economists like argued that the bond-backed note issuance entrenched inflationary privileges for s while stifling decentralized alternatives, with the tax on state notes serving not merely to uniformize but to entrench federal control amid financing needs. Mainstream academic assessments, often aligned with institutionalist views, tend to emphasize stability gains while downplaying persistent shortages and inelastic supply that exacerbated panics, though shows national bank failures clustered during crises despite overall lower rates. Debates persist on whether centralized regulation was causally superior to market-driven mechanisms, with proponents highlighting the System's success in from 1825 to 1858 as evidence of viable private alternatives. Under the Bank-led clearinghouse, only 6.8 percent of participating banks failed over the period, compared to 14.5 percent in non-participating states, achieved through voluntary specie reserves and note redemption without federal mandates. Advocates for the system counter that pre-1863 state banking chaos, marked by diverse note discounts and frequent suspensions, necessitated intervention for a growing economy, with post-war data demonstrating enhanced uniformity and reduced regional disparities in note values. Empirical comparisons reveal trade-offs: while national failures averaged below 1 percent annually outside panics, the system's rigidity limited responsive credit expansion, contrasting with potentially more adaptive but riskier market arrangements.

Termination and Aftermath

Shift to Federal Reserve Dominance

The Federal Reserve Act of December 23, 1913, established a central banking system that authorized the issuance of Federal Reserve notes, redeemable in gold but backed primarily by eligible commercial paper and discounts, enabling a more elastic supply responsive to business demands rather than strictly limited by government bond holdings. This supplanted the inelastic nature of national bank notes, which required banks to deposit U.S. bonds as collateral for issuance up to 90-100% of bond value, constraining expansion during economic upturns. National banks were eligible to join the Federal Reserve as members, gaining access to rediscounting privileges and the ability to distribute Federal Reserve notes directly, which incentivized a pivot away from their own note issuance; by mid-1917, over 7,500 national banks had subscribed to Federal Reserve stock, comprising nearly all eligible institutions. During , Treasury issuance of Liberty Bonds—totaling over $21 billion across five loans from 1917 to 1919—temporarily bolstered note circulation, as these securities qualified as collateral, allowing banks to issue notes against them and pushing outstanding notes to a peak of approximately $1.037 billion by 1920. However, notes expanded far more rapidly to finance war efforts, rising from negligible amounts in 1914 to over $2.3 billion in circulation by 1919, reflecting the system's capacity for coordinated discounting and reserve management that notes lacked. This wartime dynamic accelerated the relative marginalization of notes, as member banks preferred the liquidity and lower reserve requirements associated with distribution channels. In the , Treasury policies under Secretary emphasized debt reduction and retirement of low-yield , including the redemption of 2% consols that underpinned much of the remaining note , compelling banks to retire notes upon bond maturity or conversion without reissuance. Strains on the gold standard, including outflows and speculative pressures, further diminished notes' role, as banks hoarded reserves amid tighter credit policies and shifted to notes for their broader acceptability and lower issuance costs. Empirical data show notes' share of total contracting from roughly 30% in 1913 to under 5% by the late , with absolute outstanding amounts stabilizing around $700-800 million while notes surpassed $4 billion.

Phasing Out and Final Notes

The abrogation of gold clauses in public and private obligations through the of on June 5, 1933, eliminated requirements for payment in or its equivalent, rendering National Bank Notes redeemable solely in lawful money and aligning them with the broader shift away from gold redeemability. This change, enacted amid the banking crisis, facilitated the Treasury's control over currency circulation but did not immediately halt note issuance. The Banking Act of 1935, signed August 23, prohibited from issuing additional notes beyond those secured by existing deposited bonds, as the ceased providing new low-yield government bonds necessary for backing under the National Banking Acts. No new national bank charters permitting note issuance were approved after 1933, reflecting the system's full transition to Notes and marking the effective end of expansion. The final small-size National Bank Note series, dated 1934, was restricted to conversions by existing note-issuing banks and replacements for worn currency, with production ceasing shortly thereafter. Outstanding notes, approximately $300 million in the mid-1930s, were redeemed via the Treasury's 5 percent redemption fund as they circulated back for payment, completing the process by 1945.

Enduring Impact

Historical Assessment of Stability and Innovation

The National Banking System, established by the Acts of 1863 and 1864, introduced oversight via the Comptroller of the Currency, which mandated uniform reserve requirements, regular examinations, and bond-backed note issuance, thereby curtailing the fraudulent practices endemic to the prior era of state-chartered "" banks that often issued notes without adequate specie reserves or operated from temporary locations to evade redemption demands. This regulatory framework enhanced systemic stability by standardizing banking operations and linking currency issuance to U.S. government bonds, which imposed fiscal discipline on issuing banks and simultaneously created a for debt, facilitating the absorption of obligations that exceeded $2.6 billion by 1865. However, the system's design inherently constrained monetary elasticity, as note issuance was strictly proportional to holdings of designated securities—typically limited to 90% of bond value—preventing the money supply from expanding responsively to seasonal agricultural demands or economic booms, which exacerbated shortages and contributed causally to recurrent panics in , , , and 1907. Economists and attributed these episodes to the national banking era's "inelastic currency," where high call loan rates and of reserves amplified contractions, as banks could not issue additional notes without acquiring more bonds, a process slowed by Treasury policies and market conditions. Empirical data from the period show notes outstanding grew modestly from $150 million in 1865 to about $700 million by 1900, averaging under 2% annual expansion in high-circulation notes, lagging behind real GDP growth rates of 3-4% and failing to accommodate credit demands during harvest seasons or expansions. In synthesis, while the system innovated by pioneering a federally regulated, uniform currency that reduced counterfeiting risks and supported public debt management—outcomes rooted in centralized enforcement rather than market incentives—it fell short in adaptive stability, as its bond tether prioritized government financing over commercial elasticity, rendering it vulnerable to shocks absent a . This rigidity underscored causal limits of legislated note constraints, prompting the Federal Reserve's creation in as a corrective for elastic reserves, though private innovations like New York Clearing House certificates—temporarily substituting for notes during panics—demonstrate that decentralized responses could mitigate crises without full centralization, a point often underexplored in narratives favoring institutional reform over market-based alternatives. The era's record thus reveals a : enhanced uniformity and mitigation at the expense of dynamic responsiveness, positioning the national banks as a transitional structure rather than an optimal equilibrium for monetary stability.

Numismatic Value and Contemporary Interest

National Bank Notes have sustained significant interest among numismatists since their phase-out in 1935, primarily due to their historical ties to specific issuing banks and regional economies, which create pronounced rarity variations. Collectors prioritize notes from "obsolete" or defunct charters—particularly those from small towns, early national banks, or territorial issuers like Hawaii, Montana, or New Mexico—where issuance was limited and survival rates are minimal. For instance, territorial notes, numbering fewer than 100 distinct types across all denominations and series, routinely command premiums exceeding $10,000 even in lower grades, with exceptional examples from banks such as the First National Bank of Wailuku, Hawaii Territory, representing one of only four known specimens and fetching auction prices in the six-figure range due to their scarcity and first-market appearances in decades. The market for these notes is bolstered by third-party grading services like Paper Money Guaranty (PMG), which standardize condition assessments on a 1-70 scale, incorporating factors such as exceptional paper quality (EPQ) to enhance buyer confidence and liquidity. Graded notes, especially those achieving PMG 65 or higher, often realize 20-50% premiums over ungraded equivalents, as evidenced by auction archives showing sales from $26 to over $231,000 for National Bank Notes in recent years, with high-grade rarities driving the upper end. Survival estimates, derived from ongoing census efforts by organizations like the Society of Paper Money Collectors, suggest that only about 1-2% of the approximately 640 million notes issued by over 12,000 banks endure in collectible condition, fueling discoveries of "new" types and sustained price appreciation amid a finite supply. Contemporary scholarly engagement intersects with through analyses of issuance patterns, where studies on underissuance—attributable to requirements and regulatory constraints rather than inherent efficiencies—inform collectors' appreciation of the notes' design flaws and historical contingencies. This perspective counters idealized views of pre-Federal systems by highlighting empirical on suboptimal circulation, as detailed in economic research examining disaggregated bank-level and redemption costs. Auction houses like and Stack's Bowers continue to feature these notes in specialized sales, with 2020s results reflecting robust demand despite broader fluctuations, underscoring their role in preserving tangible records of decentralized banking experiments.