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Irrationality

Irrationality denotes the disposition or process wherein cognition, judgment, or action diverges from adherence to logic, empirical evidence, or coherent self-interest, often yielding systematic errors in belief formation or decision-making.^[1] In psychological research, it manifests prominently through cognitive biases—innate mental shortcuts or heuristics that, while efficient for rapid processing in ancestral environments, frequently produce deviations from probabilistic reasoning or optimal outcomes in complex modern contexts.^[2] Empirical demonstrations, such as violations of expected utility theory in choice experiments or the conjunction fallacy wherein individuals deem a specific conjunction of events more probable than one of its components, underscore the ubiquity of these lapses across diverse populations.^[3] Evolutionarily, such tendencies may stem from adaptations favoring quick, energy-conserving responses over exhaustive deliberation, as precise rationality proved selectively neutral or costly in environments demanding immediate survival decisions rather than abstract optimization.^[4] Defining characteristics include resistance to counterevidence (as in motivated reasoning) and akrasia, or acting against one's better judgment, with controversies arising over whether apparent irrationalities reflect flawed human architecture or overly stringent normative standards misapplied to bounded cognition.^[5] Despite philosophical ideals of rationality, pervasive irrationality influences domains from personal finance to policy formation, highlighting the tension between human intelligence and its inherent frailties.

Definitions and Conceptual Frameworks

Philosophical Foundations

In ancient Greek philosophy, the concept of akrasia, or weakness of will, emerged as a foundational inquiry into irrational action, denoting the state in which an individual knowingly acts against their better judgment due to overpowering desires or emotions. Socrates, as portrayed in Plato's dialogues such as the Protagoras, rejected the possibility of true akrasia, arguing that all voluntary wrongdoing stems from ignorance of the good, implying that genuine knowledge precludes irrational behavior.^[6] Aristotle, however, affirmed akrasia's reality in Nicomachean Ethics (Book VII), distinguishing it from vice by positing that the akratic person possesses correct practical knowledge but fails to apply it uniformly owing to the temporary dominance of sensory appetites over rational deliberation, thus highlighting a causal tension between intellect and non-rational impulses.^[7] Hellenistic Stoicism advanced this foundation by framing irrationality as arising from erroneous judgments rather than an inherent dualism in the soul. Stoic thinkers like Chrysippus viewed the soul as a unified rational entity, where pathê (passions) constitute irrational contractions or expansions of the soul triggered by hasty assent to false impressions about indifferents, leading to disturbances that impair clear reasoning.^[8] Epictetus echoed this in his Discourses, urging discernment between what is under rational control (judgments) and what is not (external events), positing that irrational fears and impulses stem from misclassifying indifferents as goods or evils, thereby subordinating virtue to transient affects.^[9] This causal realism emphasized training in rational assent to extirpate such irrationality, viewing it not as inevitable but as a correctable failure of cognitive governance. David Hume's empiricism in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740) further delineated irrationality's roots by subordinating reason to affective drives, famously declaring that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions," serving merely to calculate means toward desired ends without originating motivation.^[10] For Hume, passions provide the inertial force of action, while reason's instrumental role falters into irrationality when passions engender contradictory beliefs or habitual propensities unchecked by reflective scrutiny, as in superstitious customs persisting despite evidential disconfirmation.^[11] Immanuel Kant's deontology in works like the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) reconceived irrationality as a violation of rational autonomy, where acting on mere inclination rather than the categorical imperative constitutes practical unreason, as the maxim of such action cannot consistently universalize without contradiction.^[12] Kant denied akrasia in the strict sense for moral agents, attributing apparent weakness to insufficient purification of the will from sensible impulses, which obscure duty's supremacy; true irrationality thus lies in heteronomy, yielding causality to empirical determinants over self-legislated reason.^[13] This framework underscores irrationality's opposition to the noumenal freedom essential for moral accountability, prioritizing rational consistency as the antidote to pathological influences.

Psychological and Behavioral Perspectives

Psychological perspectives define irrationality as systematic deviations from normative models of rational decision-making, where individuals fail to maximize expected utility or adhere to logical consistency in judgments.^[14] In behavioral economics, pioneered by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, irrationality manifests predictably through heuristics—mental shortcuts that enable quick decisions but introduce biases, such as the availability heuristic, where people overestimate probabilities based on readily recalled examples rather than base rates.^[15] Their prospect theory, developed in 1979, demonstrated loss aversion, wherein losses loom larger than equivalent gains, leading to risk-averse choices in gains and risk-seeking in losses, contradicting expected utility theory.^[16] Dual-process theory, formalized by Kahneman in his 2011 book Thinking, Fast and Slow, posits two cognitive systems: System 1 operates automatically and intuitively, prone to errors like overconfidence and anchoring, while System 2 requires effortful deliberation but is often overridden by the former under cognitive load or time pressure.^[17] Experimental evidence shows System 1 dominance explains phenomena like the conjunction fallacy, where participants irrationally judge a specific event as more probable than a general one, as in Tversky and Kahneman's 1983 study on Linda the bank teller.^[18] This framework highlights how evolutionary pressures favored rapid, adaptive heuristics over precise rationality in ancestral environments, rendering modern humans ecologically rational yet logically flawed.^[19] From a behavioral viewpoint, irrationality arises from emotional influences and self-control failures, as seen in hyperbolic discounting, where individuals prefer smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed ones, a pattern replicated in intertemporal choice experiments since the 1990s.^[14] Evolutionary psychology attributes such tendencies to adaptations for immediate survival threats, where delaying gratification was less adaptive than seizing scarce resources, though this maladapts to contemporary abundance.^[20] Peer-reviewed studies confirm these mechanisms persist across cultures, with neuroimaging revealing amygdala activation in emotional overrides of prefrontal rationality.^[21] Interventions like debiasing techniques, which prompt System 2 engagement, reduce but do not eliminate these errors, underscoring the deep-seated nature of behavioral irrationality.^[22]

Historical Evolution

Ancient and Pre-Modern Views

In ancient Greece, Socrates maintained that wrongdoing stems from ignorance rather than deliberate choice, positing that true knowledge of the good necessarily leads to virtuous action, thereby framing irrational behavior as a failure of understanding rather than an independent force.^[23] Plato extended this intellectualist view in works like the Republic, conceiving the human soul as tripartite—comprising rational, spirited, and appetitive elements—where irrationality arises from the lower parts' rebellion against reason's governance, as seen in the allegory of the charioteer controlling unruly horses.^[24] He acknowledged an "irrational" surd in human experience, including divine inspiration (mania), but subordinated it to philosophical dialectic for ethical order.^[24] Aristotle departed from strict Socratic intellectualism by introducing akrasia (incontinence) in the Nicomachean Ethics, describing cases where individuals recognize the good yet act irrationally due to overpowering appetites or emotions, distinguishing this practical irrationality from mere ignorance or vice.^[25] In the Hellenistic period, Stoic philosophers such as Chrysippus and Seneca characterized emotions (pathē) as cognitive errors—false judgments yielding irrational impulses—and advocated their eradication through rational assent to achieve apatheia, a state of equanimity free from passion's distortion.^[26] Epictetus emphasized that external events are neutral, with irrationality ensuing solely from misguided internal evaluations.^[27] Pre-modern medieval thinkers, synthesizing Aristotelian psychology with Christian theology, viewed irrationality as a disorder where sensitive appetites (passions) overwhelm intellect and will, leading to sin. Thomas Aquinas, in the Summa Theologica, classified passions as movements of the concupiscible and irascible powers, neutral in themselves but irrational when unchecked by reason, which directs the will toward the ultimate good of God; he thus saw virtuous action as rational integration rather than suppression.^[28] Aquinas rejected frequent appeals to weakness of will, attributing most moral failure to habitual vice or deficient judgment rather than acute irrational conflict.^[29] This framework influenced scholastic views on folly and madness as privations of rational order, often tied to original sin's corruption of human nature.^[30]

Enlightenment Rationalism and Its Challenges

The Enlightenment, spanning roughly from the late 17th to the late 18th century, advanced rationalism as a corrective to perceived irrationality rooted in superstition, religious dogma, and unexamined tradition. Thinkers such as René Descartes, with his 1637 Discourse on the Method emphasizing methodical doubt and the self-evident "cogito ergo sum," and John Locke, whose 1690 Essay Concerning Human Understanding grounded knowledge in sensory experience and reason, argued that human faculties could reliably discern truth independent of divine revelation or authority.^[31] This framework viewed irrationality not as an inherent human trait but as a remediable defect arising from inadequate education or environmental influences, positing that systematic application of logic and empirical inquiry would progressively illuminate and dispel errors like credulity in miracles or feudal hierarchies.^[32] David Hume's empiricism posed a foundational philosophical challenge by undermining the rationalist confidence in inductive reasoning and causation. In his 1748 Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume contended that no logical necessity links cause and effect beyond observed constant conjunctions, attributing the belief in causation to custom and psychological habit rather than demonstrable reason, thus exposing reason's inability to furnish certain knowledge of the world's uniformity.^[33] This skepticism disrupted Enlightenment optimism, suggesting that core assumptions sustaining rational inquiry—such as the predictability of nature—rested on non-rational foundations, rendering pure rationalism vulnerable to solipsism or fideism without empirical anchors. Immanuel Kant's 1781 Critique of Pure Reason further delineated rationalism's boundaries while attempting synthesis. Awakened from "dogmatic slumber" by Hume, Kant argued that reason operates within synthetic a priori judgments structuring experience (e.g., space and time as intuitions), but pure speculative reason generates irresolvable antinomies when probing metaphysics, such as the universe's finitude versus infinity.^[34] He maintained reason's regulative role in science and morality yet conceded its limits in accessing "things-in-themselves," implying that irrational elements like faith or practical postulates (e.g., immortality) fill gaps where theoretical reason falters, challenging the Enlightenment ideal of reason's unassailable sovereignty.^[31] The Romantic movement, emerging around 1798 with William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Lyrical Ballads, mounted a cultural and aesthetic critique, prioritizing emotion, intuition, and the sublime over mechanistic rationalism. Romantics like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe decried Enlightenment reason as reductive, alienating humans from nature's organic vitality and individual genius, asserting that irrational faculties—imagination and passion—access truths inaccessible to calculation, as in the valorization of medieval mysticism or untamed wilderness against neoclassical order.^[35] This reaction highlighted rationalism's failure to account for human motivations beyond utility, evidenced in the French Revolution's 1789 descent from rational constitutionalism into the 1793-1794 Reign of Terror, where ideological fervor exposed the fragility of reason amid unchecked passions.^[36] Collectively, these challenges revealed irrationality's persistence not merely as error but as intertwined with reason's operations, necessitating a more nuanced appraisal of human cognition.

20th-Century Behavioral and Cognitive Shifts

The early 20th century saw initial psychological challenges to the presumption of unfettered rationality through Sigmund Freud's theories of the unconscious, which posited that human behavior is driven by irrational instincts and repressed desires beyond conscious control, influencing views on decision-making as conflict-ridden rather than purely logical.^[37] However, substantive shifts in behavioral and cognitive sciences emerged mid-century, particularly in economics and psychology, as researchers documented systematic deviations from the rational actor model assuming individuals maximize utility under full information.^[38] A pivotal development occurred in the 1950s with Herbert Simon's formulation of bounded rationality, arguing that decision-makers operate under constraints of limited information, cognitive capacity, and time, leading them to "satisfice"—select satisfactory rather than optimal options—rather than compute perfect solutions.^[39] Simon's 1955 paper and subsequent works critiqued classical economic models for ignoring these real-world limits, proposing instead a procedural view of rationality focused on adaptive heuristics amid complexity.^[40] This framework, formalized by the mid-1950s, laid groundwork for integrating psychological realism into organizational and economic theory, earning Simon the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978.^[39] The 1970s marked a cognitive turn with Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's heuristics-and-biases program, which experimentally demonstrated predictable errors in judgment under uncertainty, such as availability, representativeness, and anchoring heuristics that lead to overreliance on intuitive shortcuts rather than Bayesian updating.^[41] Their 1979 prospect theory further challenged expected utility theory by showing that people evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point, exhibiting loss aversion—where losses loom larger than equivalent gains—and probability weighting that distorts risk assessment, as evidenced in lab choices under risk.^[42] These findings, rooted in empirical data from controlled experiments, highlighted irrational patterns like the endowment effect and framing effects, shifting paradigms toward viewing deviations from rationality as systematic rather than random noise.^[42] By the late 20th century, these insights coalesced into behavioral economics, incorporating cognitive psychology to explain market anomalies and policy failures unattributable to perfect rationality, such as overconfidence in financial decisions or status quo bias in choices.^[38] Kahneman's work, culminating in recognition via the 2002 Nobel Prize, underscored how dual-process thinking—fast, intuitive System 1 versus slow, deliberative System 2—underpins much irrationality, with empirical violations of rational choice axioms persisting across domains despite incentives for correction. This era's evidence-based critiques, drawn from replicable experiments, compelled a reevaluation of human cognition as ecologically adaptive yet prone to exploitable flaws, influencing fields from public policy to artificial intelligence design.^[43]

Forms and Manifestations

Individual Cognitive Biases

Individual cognitive biases constitute systematic deviations from logical reasoning in personal judgment and decision-making, often resulting from reliance on heuristics—mental shortcuts evolved for efficiency but prone to error under uncertainty. Pioneering empirical work by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s identified key heuristics such as availability, representativeness, and anchoring, which produce predictable biases in probability assessment and choice, as evidenced by controlled experiments where participants consistently misjudged risks and frequencies despite full information.^[41] These patterns persist across domains, from everyday choices to professional forecasts, underscoring how cognitive architecture favors speed over accuracy, thereby fostering irrational outcomes like over- or underestimation of threats.^[44] Confirmation bias exemplifies this by driving individuals to selectively seek, interpret, and favor evidence aligning with prior beliefs, while discounting disconfirming data—a tendency rooted in motivated reasoning rather than deliberate deception. Classic demonstrations, such as Peter Wason's 1960 selection task experiments, revealed that participants verified hypotheses by testing confirming instances over falsifying ones, with success rates as low as 10-20% in logical puzzles solvable by disconfirmation strategies.^[45] Further studies, including meta-analyses of belief perseverance, confirm this bias amplifies across political and scientific contexts, where people rate congenial arguments higher even when logically equivalent to opposing views, contributing to polarized thinking and resistance to evidence-based revision.^[46] The availability heuristic leads to probability judgments skewed by the memorability or recency of examples, causing overestimation of salient events like plane crashes after media coverage, despite statistical rarity. Tversky and Kahneman's 1973 experiments showed subjects estimating category frequencies from word lists based on retrieval ease, yielding errors correlated with recency rather than base rates; for instance, recent items were judged up to 2-3 times more frequent than earlier ones.^[47] Real-world applications include heightened public fear of terrorism post-9/11, where vivid imagery inflated perceived risks beyond actuarial data, illustrating how media amplification exploits this shortcut to distort risk perception.^[48] Anchoring bias manifests when an initial numerical anchor—irrespective of relevance—influences subsequent estimates, with insufficient adjustment yielding final judgments biased toward it. In Tversky and Kahneman's seminal 1974 study, participants spun a roulette wheel (unknowingly rigged) to an anchor before estimating U.N. figures, such as Afghanistan's population percentage, resulting in estimates hugging the anchor by 20-50% even when implausible.^[49] Subsequent research, including negotiation simulations, confirms anchors shift offers and concessions; for example, high initial demands in bargaining experiments increased final settlements by 10-15% compared to low anchors, highlighting exploitation in economic and legal contexts.^[50] Overconfidence bias involves excessive faith in one's judgments, predictions, or abilities, often measured by calibration tests where stated confidence intervals capture true values less than claimed—typically 70-80% intervals containing outcomes only 40-50% of the time. Lichtenstein and Fischhoff's 1977 studies across trivia and forecasting tasks found overconfidence rising with task difficulty, with experts in fields like medicine showing pronounced miscalibration, such as surgeons estimating 90% accuracy in diagnoses that proved 70% correct.^[51] This bias correlates with poor outcomes, including investment losses where overconfident traders underdiversify portfolios, as evidenced by brokerage data linking high self-attributed performance to 1-2% annual underperformance relative to benchmarks.^[52] While adaptive in low-uncertainty ancestral environments, it undermines rationality in complex modern settings by promoting undue risk-taking and neglect of probabilistic nuance.

Emotional and Instinctual Drivers

Emotions often override deliberate reasoning, leading individuals to prioritize immediate affective states over evidence-based assessments. In decision-making scenarios, negative emotions such as fear and anger trigger rapid, automatic responses that bypass higher cortical processing, resulting in choices that deviate from probabilistic rationality. For instance, fear activates the amygdala, prompting avoidance behaviors even when threats are statistically improbable, as seen in phobias where irrational dread persists despite low actual risk.^[53] This mechanism, while adaptive for survival in ancestral environments, manifests as overgeneralization in contemporary settings, such as exaggerated risk aversion in financial investments during market downturns.^[54] Instinctual drives, rooted in evolutionary pressures, further propel irrationality by favoring heuristics that conserved energy and ensured reproduction but falter under modern complexities. Tribal instincts foster in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, skewing judgments toward conformity rather than impartial analysis; experimental evidence shows individuals conform to group opinions on factual matters, even when contradicted by personal observation, to maintain social bonds.^[55] Status-seeking impulses, another hardwired bias, drive risk-taking or deference to authority figures irrespective of merit, as these behaviors historically enhanced mating opportunities and resource access.^[4] Such instincts integrate with emotions, amplifying deviations: disgust, an innate response to potential contaminants, extends irrationally to moral or ideological domains, eliciting visceral rejection of differing views without evidential scrutiny.^[56] Neurobiological underpinnings reveal how these drivers entrench irrational patterns. The amygdala's hyperactivation during stress induces a "hijack" of prefrontal executive functions, curtailing impulse control and fostering impulsive actions like aggression or panic.^[57] Positive emotions, conversely, promote optimism biases, where euphoria inflates self-assessment and underestimates obstacles, as documented in studies linking dopamine surges to overconfident risk-taking in gambling tasks.^[3] Empirical interventions, such as mindfulness training, demonstrate partial mitigation by enhancing awareness of these automatic triggers, yet instincts persist due to their deep phylogenetic embedding, underscoring the limits of purely rational correction.^[58] In social groups, individuals often subordinate personal judgment to collective pressures, yielding outcomes that deviate from rational assessment. Solomon Asch's 1951 conformity experiments demonstrated this, where participants matched line lengths incorrectly to align with a majority of confederates, with 74% conforming on at least one trial and an average error rate of 32% across critical trials, despite unambiguous perceptual evidence.^[59]^[60] Similarly, Stanley Milgram's 1961 obedience studies revealed that 65% of participants administered what they believed to be lethal electric shocks (up to 450 volts) to a learner under authority instructions, illustrating how hierarchical dynamics suppress ethical reasoning.^[61] These findings underscore conformity's role in propagating errors, as even one dissenting confederate in Asch's setup reduced conformity by up to 80%.^[59] Groupthink, as conceptualized by Irving Janis in 1972, emerges when cohesive groups prioritize consensus over critical evaluation, fostering symptoms like illusions of unanimity and moral superiority.^[62] Empirical analyses of decision failures, such as the U.S. Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, attribute flawed judgments to suppressed dissent and collective rationalization among advisors.^[62] Group polarization further intensifies this, where discussions among like-minded members shift average opinions toward extremes; meta-analyses of studies from 1974–1982 confirm this effect persists across persuasive arguments and social comparison mechanisms.^[63] In controlled settings, initial mild preferences for risk or caution amplify post-discussion, as individuals adjust to perceived group norms.^[64] Herding behavior manifests in crowds under uncertainty, where individuals mimic others, leading to inefficient or dangerous patterns. Experimental evacuations show moderate herding alters crowd distribution and egress times, with decision-makers irrationally clustering rather than optimizing exits.^[65] In financial markets, herding correlates with bubbles, as evidenced by synchronized irrational exuberance in asset valuations.^[66] Social media exacerbates these dynamics through echo chambers, where algorithmic feeds reinforce selective exposure, accelerating the spread of unsubstantiated beliefs; studies indicate users conform to dominant trends in uncertain environments, amplifying misinformation via repeated confirmation.^[67] Collectively, these processes reveal how social interdependence can cascade individual bounded rationality into systemic irrationality, overriding evidence-based choices.

Causal Mechanisms

Evolutionary Adaptations

From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, many cognitive biases classified as irrational under standards of logical consistency or probabilistic reasoning served adaptive functions by enhancing survival and reproductive success in ancestral environments characterized by uncertainty, resource scarcity, and immediate threats. These mechanisms prioritized fitness-relevant outcomes over abstract accuracy, favoring quick, energy-efficient decisions that minimized lethal errors or maximized opportunities for mating and alliance formation. For example, heuristics such as the availability bias, which leads individuals to judge event likelihood based on ease of recall rather than base rates, likely evolved to expedite responses to salient dangers like predators, where overestimating rare but catastrophic risks proved more beneficial than underestimation.^[68]^[69] Error management theory further elucidates this adaptation, proposing that directional biases emerge from asymmetric cost-benefit structures in decision-making, where the penalty for false negatives (e.g., failing to detect a potential mate's infidelity or a hidden threat) outweighs that of false positives. This "smoke detector principle" explains phenomena like heightened vigilance toward ambiguous social cues of deception or danger, as the evolutionary cost of missed detections—such as injury or cuckoldry—far exceeded the minor costs of occasional overreactions, fostering mechanisms tuned for conservatism in high-stakes domains. Empirical support comes from studies showing robust error asymmetries in mate retention and pathogen avoidance, consistent with Pleistocene-era pressures rather than modern laboratory norms.^[69]^[70] Heuristics also manifest as "fast and frugal" tools for navigating complex social and ecological challenges, such as the recognition heuristic, which biases choices toward familiar options under time constraints; in ancestral foraging or alliance selection, familiarity often signaled reliability or safety, yielding higher fitness payoffs than exhaustive computation. Similarly, overconfidence and optimism biases, while leading to miscalibrated self-assessments, promoted bold actions in competitive contexts like resource acquisition or status contests, where underconfidence might result in missed opportunities; evolutionary models indicate these traits stabilize in populations by boosting persistence and coalition-building, even if they occasionally precipitate failures.^[68]^[71] Certain social irrationalities, including conformity and in-group favoritism, likely adapted to facilitate cooperation in small hunter-gatherer bands, where aligning with group norms reduced conflict and enhanced collective defense against out-groups, outweighing the occasional adoption of suboptimal beliefs. Kin altruism biases, rooted in inclusive fitness theory, further exemplify this by irrationally prioritizing relatives' welfare beyond strict reciprocity, a mechanism honed by gene-level selection to propagate shared alleles despite apparent individual costs. However, not all observed biases qualify as direct adaptations; some represent frequency-dependent strategies or byproducts of domain-general systems, with modern environments amplifying mismatches that were neutral or advantageous in ancestral ones.^[4]^[72]

Neurobiological Underpinnings

The neurobiological foundations of irrationality lie in the interplay between evolutionarily older limbic structures, which prioritize rapid, emotion-driven responses, and newer cortical regions responsible for deliberate reasoning. The amygdala, a key component of the limbic system, rapidly processes threats and rewards, often triggering heuristic-based judgments that deviate from probabilistic rationality; for instance, heightened amygdala activation can amplify loss aversion, leading individuals to irrationally avoid risks despite favorable expected values.^[73] Similarly, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and anterior insula detect conflicts and aversive states, contributing to biases such as inequity aversion, where people reject fair but unequal outcomes due to emotional discomfort rather than utility maximization.^[74] These subcortical-limbic circuits operate via fast neural pathways, bypassing slower prefrontal oversight and fostering automatic irrationality under stress or uncertainty.^[75] Prefrontal cortical areas, particularly the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), integrate emotional inputs with logical evaluation to enable adaptive decisions, but lesions here disrupt this balance, resulting in persistent irrational choices, such as insensitivity to future consequences in economic tasks.^[76] Functional neuroimaging reveals that vmPFC hypoactivation during decision-making correlates with overreliance on immediate rewards, underscoring its role in suppressing impulsive biases. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), by contrast, supports working memory and inhibitory control, yet its limited capacity—often overwhelmed by emotional salience—permits confirmation bias and anchoring effects to persist, as evidenced by reduced dlPFC engagement in tasks requiring bias override.^[77] Dopaminergic signaling in the striatum further modulates these dynamics; lower striatal D2 receptor availability predicts greater irrationality under uncertainty, as individuals default to probabilistic fallacies rather than Bayesian updating.^[78] Neurotransmitter systems amplify these regional vulnerabilities: dopamine drives reinforcement learning but can entrench irrational habits through prediction errors that favor salient over veridical patterns, while serotonin influences risk aversion via orbitofrontal projections.^[79] Recent studies highlight biased neural replay in hippocampal and striatal circuits, where aversive or uncertain outcomes are disproportionately revisited, perpetuating maladaptive choices.^[80] This substrate explains why irrationality manifests reliably across contexts, from gambling fallacies to social prejudices, as limbic-prefrontal imbalances prioritize survival heuristics over empirical accuracy.^[81] Interventions targeting these pathways, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation to enhance dlPFC activity, show promise in mitigating biases, affirming the causal role of these circuits.^[82]

Key Debates and Controversies

Bounded vs. Perfect Rationality

Perfect rationality, a foundational assumption in neoclassical economics and rational choice theory, posits that decision-makers operate with unlimited access to information, boundless cognitive processing power, and infinite time, enabling them to compute and select the utility-maximizing option from all feasible alternatives.^[39] This idealized model implies error-free Bayesian updating of beliefs and consistent preference maximization, treating deviations as anomalies rather than inherent features of human cognition.^[83] In contrast, bounded rationality, formalized by Herbert A. Simon in his 1957 work Models of Man, recognizes that real-world agents face severe constraints: incomplete and costly information, finite computational capacity (limited by brain processing speed and memory), and time pressures that preclude exhaustive search. Under these bounds, individuals employ heuristics and satisficing strategies—settling for the first acceptable option that meets aspiration levels rather than pursuing global optima—to achieve viable outcomes efficiently.^[84] Simon's framework, for which he received the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics, reframes apparent decision-making "errors" as adaptive responses to environmental complexity, not failures of logic.^[39] The debate pits perfect rationality's normative appeal—its mathematical elegance for modeling aggregate behavior and policy prediction—against bounded rationality's descriptive accuracy, backed by empirical observations of systematic shortcuts like representativeness heuristics or anchoring biases that deviate from optimization.^[85] Laboratory experiments, such as those demonstrating overweighting of low-probability events in lotteries, reveal that subjects rarely approximate perfect Bayesian reasoning, instead relying on rule-of-thumb approximations that suffice in uncertain environments.^[86] Critics of perfect rationality argue it overstates human capabilities, leading to flawed predictions in fields like finance (e.g., market bubbles unexplained by rational expectations) and public policy, where bounded models better capture inertia and status quo bias.^[87] Proponents of bounded rationality counter that it preserves rationality's core—goal-directed adaptation—while acknowledging causal limits from neurobiology and ecology, though some economists maintain perfect models as useful approximations when bounds are aggregated away in large populations.^[84] This tension underscores whether "irrationality" reflects model mismatch or genuine suboptimal choices, with bounded approaches gaining traction in behavioral economics since the 1980s.^[88]

The Adaptive Role of Irrationality

Cognitive biases and heuristics, which deviate from norms of perfect rationality, often exhibit adaptive value by enabling rapid, effective decision-making in environments with limited time, information, and computational resources. According to the framework of ecological rationality, these mental shortcuts—such as the recognition heuristic, where individuals infer superiority based on familiarity alone—exploit stable structures in natural and social ecologies to achieve outcomes superior to or comparable with more deliberative processes.^[89] Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd's analysis demonstrates that such heuristics, far from being mere errors, evolved to fit specific task environments, yielding higher accuracy in probabilistic inference tasks like stock selection or city population estimation when data is noisy or incomplete.^[90] From an evolutionary psychology standpoint, irrationality manifests as adaptations shaped by selection pressures favoring error minimization over accuracy maximization. Error management theory explains biases like the sexual overperception bias—where men overestimate women's sexual interest—as safeguards against high-cost misses in mating opportunities, prioritizing false alarms over omissions that could forfeit reproductive chances.^[21] Similarly, overconfidence and positive illusions persist because they bolster persistence in competitive endeavors, resource defense, and coalition formation, correlating with elevated status and mating success in ancestral hunter-gatherer contexts.^[69] Empirical simulations and cross-cultural studies confirm these traits enhance fitness by promoting bold actions in scenarios where hesitation incurs greater risks than occasional overreach. At the social level, collective irrationalities, including confirmation bias and in-group favoritism, foster cohesion and motivation within groups, aiding coordination and defense against rivals. Confirmation bias, by reinforcing commitment to shared beliefs, reduces internal conflict and sustains long-term projects like tribal warfare or cooperative foraging, where unwavering resolve outperforms detached analysis.^[91] Evolutionary models further indicate that such distortions evolve under learning dynamics, as biased individuals investing in joint ventures outcompete purely rational actors by avoiding paralysis in ambiguous payoff landscapes.^[92] While these mechanisms can misfire in modern, low-uncertainty settings, their persistence underscores a causal lineage tied to ancestral fitness gains rather than inherent flaws.^[93]

Critiques of Rationalist Overreach

Herbert Simon's theory of bounded rationality challenges the assumption of perfect rationality underlying many rationalist frameworks, arguing that human decision-makers face severe constraints including incomplete information, limited computational capacity, and finite time, rendering exhaustive optimization infeasible. Instead, individuals typically "satisfice," choosing options that meet adequacy thresholds rather than seeking global optima, as Simon detailed in his seminal 1957 paper "Models of Man" and subsequent works critiquing neoclassical economics' idealized agent. This critique underscores how rationalist overreach—insisting on probabilistic or utility-maximizing models—ignores empirical realities of cognition, leading to prescriptions disconnected from how decisions actually occur under resource scarcity.^[94]^[40] Gerd Gigerenzer extends this by promoting "ecological rationality," contending that fast, frugal heuristics often outperform complex Bayesian inference in uncertain, real-world settings where probabilities are ill-defined or data sparse. In analyses of the heuristics-and-biases research tradition, Gigerenzer argues that deeming intuitive judgments as irrational errors overlooks their frequent accuracy when matched to environmental structures, as evidenced by studies showing heuristics like the recognition principle succeeding in medical diagnosis or stock prediction without full probabilistic computation. His 2008 book Rationality for Mortals illustrates this through experiments where simple rules, such as "take the best" cue, match or exceed deliberate rational models' predictive power, critiquing overreach as an imposition of abstract norms alien to adaptive human psychology.^[95]^[96] Philosophical critiques, such as Michael Oakeshott's in Rationalism in Politics (1962), portray rationalist overreach as a hubristic drive to reconstruct society via abstract reason, disregarding accreted traditions and tacit knowledge that sustain practical conduct. Oakeshott observed that rationalists, by prioritizing technical expertise over experiential wisdom, foster disruptive interventions, as seen historically in utopian planning failures where theoretical blueprints supplanted evolved norms. Empirical parallels appear in rationalist communities' documented overconfidence, with surveys indicating members assign improbably high probabilities to speculative forecasts like near-term AI singularity, amplifying risks of misallocated efforts on low-probability/high-impact scenarios over verifiable interventions.^[97]^[98] Such overreach can induce decision paralysis or social dysfunction, as excessive deliberation crowds out effective intuition honed by expertise, per findings in naturalist decision-making research where firefighters and chess masters rely on pattern recognition over step-by-step analysis for superior outcomes. Critics attribute this to a bias toward "mindless" rationalism, where formal tools eclipse context-specific adaptations, potentially eroding the very heuristics that enable robust performance amid complexity.^[99]

Empirical Evidence and Illustrations

Laboratory Experiments and Findings

In controlled laboratory settings, experiments on decision-making under uncertainty have revealed systematic deviations from expected utility theory, where individuals weigh probabilities and outcomes rationally. Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 prospect theory experiments presented participants with paired hypothetical choices between sure gains/losses and risky lotteries, such as preferring a certain $3,000 over an 80% chance of $4,000 (risk aversion for gains) but favoring a 20% chance of losing $4,000 over a certain $3,000 loss (risk seeking for losses).^[42] These findings demonstrated loss aversion, with losses impacting utility approximately twice as much as equivalent gains, challenging the symmetry assumed in rational models.^[42] The anchoring effect, another bias uncovered in Kahneman and Tversky's earlier work, shows how initial arbitrary information influences subsequent judgments. In one 1974 experiment, participants estimated the percentage of African countries in the United Nations after spinning a wheel of fortune rigged to show 10 or 65; those seeing 10 averaged 25% estimates, while those seeing 65 averaged 45%, despite knowing the spin was random.^[100] Subsequent adjustments from anchors insufficiently correct for their undue weight, persisting even with incentives for accuracy.^[100] Confirmation bias manifests in the Wason selection task, where participants must identify cards to falsify a conditional rule like "if a card shows a vowel on one side, it has an even number on the other." Across studies, only 10-20% correctly select the vowel and odd-number cards to test potential violations, with most erroneously focusing on confirming instances (vowel and even-number cards).^[101] This low performance rate holds in abstract logical contexts but improves to 70-90% for concrete social contracts, suggesting evolved mechanisms prioritize rule enforcement over pure logic.^[101] The ultimatum game highlights preferences for fairness over narrow self-interest. In this paradigm, one player proposes a split of a fixed sum (e.g., $10), and the responder accepts (split as proposed) or rejects (both receive nothing); rational theory predicts acceptance of any positive offer, yet responders reject unfair splits (e.g., $2/$8) about 40-50% of the time, punishing proposers and forgoing personal gain.^[102] Proposers anticipate this, offering fairer divisions (typically 40-50%), indicating that apparent irrationality enforces reciprocity norms.^[102] These experiments, often using student samples and hypothetical or low-stakes incentives, have faced critiques for external validity, with some replications showing smaller effect sizes outside Western contexts.^[103] Nonetheless, meta-analyses confirm robustness of biases like loss aversion across cultures and incentives, underscoring innate heuristics over deliberate computation in human cognition.^[103]

Historical and Contemporary Case Studies

In the South Sea Bubble of 1720, shares of the South Sea Company in Britain surged from £128 in early January to a peak of £950 by late July, fueled by speculative trading and promises of monopoly profits from South American trade that lacked substantiation, before plummeting to £185 by December.^[104] Analysis of contemporary trading records reveals investors persistently bought at escalating prices despite accumulating evidence of the company's weak fundamentals, including stalled debt conversion schemes and insider manipulations, indicating herding behavior and disregard for probabilistic risks.^[105] This episode, involving widespread participation from aristocrats to small investors, resulted in bankruptcies and parliamentary inquiries that exposed fraudulent promotions, underscoring how social proof overrode individual rational assessment.^[106] The Dutch Tulip Mania of 1636–1637 saw prices for rare tulip bulbs escalate dramatically, with some contracts for single bulbs equivalent to the annual wage of a skilled craftsman—up to 2,500 guilders—before a collapse in February 1637 left many contracts unenforced.^[107] Contemporary accounts describe futures trading in taverns where speculators bid irrationally high based on scarcity hype, ignoring the perishable nature of bulbs and lack of intrinsic value beyond novelty.^[108] While some economic analyses attribute peaks to predictable cycles in bulb breeding and rarity premiums rather than mania, the rapid contract notarialization surge—over 1,000 in weeks—and subsequent defaults highlight deviations from equilibrium pricing driven by contagion.^[109] In the lead-up to the 2008 global financial crisis, U.S. housing prices rose 85% from 2000 to 2006, detached from income growth and rental yields, propelled by lax lending standards and investor overconfidence in perpetual appreciation.^[110] Behavioral economics frameworks identify this as irrational exuberance, where herding amplified subprime mortgage securitization, with originators ignoring default risks that reached 25% for adjustable-rate loans by 2007.^[111] Robert Shiller's metrics, including price-to-rent ratios exceeding historical norms by 50%, evidenced systematic bias toward optimism, contributing to $8 trillion in lost household wealth post-crash.^[112] Contemporary illustrations include the 2021 GameStop stock surge, where retail investors on platforms like Reddit drove shares from $17 to $483 in January, valuing the firm at $140 billion despite $185 million in 2020 revenue and ongoing losses, exemplifying coordinated defiance of fundamentals via short squeezes. This crowd-driven volatility, with trading volumes spiking 50-fold, reflected availability bias from social media narratives over earnings data, leading to regulatory scrutiny and losses for late entrants.^[113] Such events demonstrate persistent susceptibility to echo chambers amplifying non-evidence-based enthusiasm in digital markets.

Consequences and Implications

Individual-Level Effects

Irrationality at the individual level, primarily through cognitive biases and irrational beliefs, systematically distorts judgment and choice, yielding measurable decrements in financial wealth, physical health, and psychological well-being. Overconfidence, for instance, prompts individuals to overestimate their knowledge and control, fostering decisions that deviate from evidence-based optima.^[114] In financial decision-making, overconfidence manifests as excessive trading volume, eroding returns via transaction costs and opportunity losses. An analysis of over 66,000 U.S. household accounts from 1991 to 1996 showed that the most active traders—those in the highest turnover quartile—underperformed a value-weighted market index by 6.5 percentage points annually after fees, with overconfidence explaining the propensity to trade despite inferior net outcomes.^[115] Complementing this, the disposition effect, rooted in prospect theory's loss aversion, causes investors to realize gains 1.5 times more often than losses relative to purchase prices, forgoing potential gains and amplifying losses; Odean's examination of 10,000 accounts confirmed this pattern persists across investor demographics, reducing long-term portfolio efficiency.^[116] Health behaviors suffer from present bias, where hyperbolic discounting prioritizes immediate gratification over future benefits, leading to procrastination in preventive actions. Dynamic choice models applied to Medicare claims data estimate that present-biased individuals exhibit 10-20% lower adherence to chronic disease management, correlating with elevated hospitalization risks and costs exceeding $1,000 annually per patient in avoidable expenses.^[117]^[118] Naive perceivers of their bias—unaware of time inconsistency—engage in riskier habits like smoking or sedentary lifestyles at rates 15-25% higher than sophisticated counterparts, per surveys of over 1,000 adults.^[119] Irrational beliefs, as conceptualized in rational emotive behavior therapy, underpin emotional disorders by generating dysfunctional inferences from events. A meta-analysis aggregating 85 studies (N=12,592) reported moderate-to-strong positive correlations between irrational beliefs and anxiety (r=0.50), depression (r=0.52), anger (r=0.48), and general distress (r=0.44), with longitudinal data indicating these beliefs predict symptom escalation independent of baseline severity.^[120]^[121] Such beliefs foster maladaptive responses, including avoidance and rumination, which reinforce cycles of regret; regret aversion, in turn, entrenches status quo biases, as fMRI studies show heightened anterior insula activation during anticipated post-decision remorse, deterring adaptive changes.^[122] Overall, these effects compound to lower subjective well-being, with biased individuals reporting 10-15% reduced life satisfaction scores in cohort studies tracking decision patterns over time.^[123]

Societal and Cultural Ramifications

Irrationality manifests societally through amplified individual biases, such as herding and confirmation bias, which propagate collective errors via social influence and information cascades, resulting in inefficient resource allocation and policy distortions.^[124] In economic domains, herd behavior drives market volatility; for example, sequential decision-making under uncertainty leads to informational cascades where agents ignore private information, causing asset mispricings and bubbles, as modeled by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch in 1992.^[125] Empirical studies confirm herding intensifies during crises, contributing to the 2008 global financial meltdown through panic selling and overleveraged speculation, exacerbating downturns beyond fundamental values.^[126] ^[127] Politically, voter irrationality—characterized by motivated reasoning and low personal stakes in accuracy—yields policies disconnected from evidence, as individuals prioritize expressive benefits over truth-seeking.^[128] Surveys reveal widespread factual errors, such as 41% of Americans in 2013 mistakenly viewing foreign aid as a major budget item despite it comprising under 1% of federal spending, sustaining inefficient allocations and hindering poverty alleviation.^[128] This "rational irrationality" clusters unrelated beliefs ideologically, fostering partisan gridlock; for instance, support for gun control correlates with welfare expansion preferences independent of causal links, impeding evidence-based reforms.^[128] Culturally, cognitive biases like confirmation bias entrench polarization by reinforcing selective exposure on digital platforms, forming echo chambers that erode shared factual baselines.^[129] Experimental and observational data show social media algorithms amplify divisive content, with users exhibiting reduced openness to counter-evidence, as seen in Brexit and U.S. election discourses where biased curation deepened tribal divides.^[129] ^[130] Such dynamics undermine institutional trust and rational discourse, perpetuating irrational narratives over empirical scrutiny, with longitudinal studies linking bias-driven polarization to heightened social conflict and diminished cultural cohesion.^[130]

Approaches to Mitigation

Cognitive and Personal Strategies

Individuals can mitigate irrationality through deliberate cognitive techniques that promote reflection and counteract common biases, such as overconfidence and confirmation-seeking. Empirical studies demonstrate that training in bias awareness, combined with practice and feedback, reduces susceptibility to errors like anchoring and the fundamental attribution error, with effects persisting up to 12 weeks in controlled settings.^[131] Such interventions often involve warning individuals about specific biases, teaching their mechanisms, providing immediate feedback on decisions, and offering coaching to reinforce alternative reasoning paths.^[131] One effective personal strategy is the "consider-the-opposite" technique, where individuals actively generate arguments against their initial judgments to counter anchoring and overconfidence. This method has been shown to improve diagnostic accuracy in reflective practice sessions, as participants who reviewed cases twice—first intuitively, then by considering alternatives—outperformed those relying solely on initial impressions.^[132] Similarly, prospective hindsight or "pre-mortems" involve imagining a plan's failure in advance and enumerating reasons why it might occur, which quantitative evaluations confirm generates more potential risks and reduces overconfidence in both laboratory and field planning tasks.^[133] To enhance judgmental accuracy, individuals can average multiple self-generated estimates or unpack problems into components before forecasting, yielding accuracy gains comparable to group wisdom—up to 50% improvement over single judgments in uncertainty assessments.^[134] Calibration training, where people predict outcomes and receive probabilistic feedback, further tempers excessive certainty; repeated exposure adjusts confidence intervals closer to reality, as evidenced in decision-making simulations.^[134] Promoting cognitive reflection through exercises like the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which encourages overriding intuitive responses, also fosters rationality; interventions targeting thinking dispositions have empirically increased CRT performance by strengthening deliberative overrides.^[135] Personal checklists serve as forcing functions to enforce structured reasoning, bypassing heuristic shortcuts; in high-stakes domains, their use has reduced procedural errors by standardizing steps, with analogous benefits for everyday decisions prone to omission biases.^[132] Cognitive restructuring, drawn from cognitive-behavioral principles, involves challenging irrational beliefs by examining evidence and generating balanced alternatives, which studies link to diminished dysfunctional decision-making tied to self-downing or approval-seeking irrationality.^[136] While these strategies show promise in isolation, their efficacy depends on consistent application, as one-time exposures often yield limited transfer to novel contexts, underscoring the need for habitual integration into routines.^[131]

Systemic and Institutional Reforms

Systemic reforms to mitigate irrationality involve structural modifications to institutions, incentives, and processes that systematically counteract cognitive biases and promote evidence-based decision-making. These include mandatory analytical frameworks in policy, revised educational standards emphasizing probabilistic reasoning, and forecasting tools like prediction markets that aggregate dispersed information more accurately than expert consensus alone.^[137] Such reforms address the limitations of individual rationality by designing environments where irrational tendencies, such as overconfidence or confirmation bias, are diluted through institutional checks.^[138] In education, integrating explicit critical thinking curricula has shown measurable improvements in students' analytical skills. For instance, collaborative problem-solving approaches in K-12 and higher education settings enhance critical thinking dispositions, with meta-analyses indicating moderate to large effect sizes on reasoning abilities and academic performance.^[139] Programs focusing on evidence evaluation and bias awareness, such as those tested in randomized trials, yield gains in decision-making under uncertainty, though long-term retention requires sustained reinforcement beyond isolated modules.^[140] Institutional adoption, like embedding these in national standards, aims to scale rationality training from personal habit to societal norm, countering intuitive heuristics that dominate unguided learning.^[141] Scientific institutions have implemented open science practices to curb publication bias and selective reporting, which exacerbate irrational overreliance on positive results. Registered Reports, involving pre-study peer review and commitment to publish regardless of outcomes, reduce questionable research practices by up to 50% in participating journals, as evidenced by adoption in fields like psychology since 2013.^[142] Pre-registration of hypotheses and data-sharing mandates further mitigate p-hacking and file-drawer effects, with studies showing improved reproducibility rates in compliant workflows.^[143] These reforms institutionalize causal rigor, prioritizing empirical validity over narrative appeal, though challenges persist in enforcement across disciplines.^[144] In government policy, mandates for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) compel quantification of regulatory impacts, fostering rational trade-offs over ideological impulses. Executive orders since 1981 require U.S. agencies to conduct CBAs for major rules, estimating net benefits like $48-79 billion in fiscal year 2023 from federal regulations, though critics note inconsistencies in valuation methods.^[145] Complementary tools, such as prediction markets, have been piloted for forecasting policy outcomes; internal markets in organizations like Google improved project accuracy by incentivizing information revelation, outperforming traditional committees.^[146] The Good Judgment Project's superforecaster teams, trained in probabilistic updating, achieved 30% higher accuracy than intelligence analysts in geopolitical predictions from 2011-2015, suggesting scalable institutional adoption for reducing overconfidence in official assessments.^[147]^[148] Evidence-based management practices extend these principles to broader institutions, requiring decisions to integrate rigorous data over anecdote. In healthcare policy, for example, systematic reviews inform guidelines, yielding better outcomes than intuition-driven protocols, as seen in reduced variability post-adoption.^[149] However, implementation faces hurdles like political resistance and metric gaming, underscoring the need for ongoing empirical validation of reforms themselves.^[150]

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We are finally beginning to understand that irrationality is the real invisible hand that drives human decision making. It's been a painful lesson, but the ...Summary · The Revenge Motive: When... · Experimenting With Behavior
[88]
Bounded rationality is rare - ScienceDirect
Most bounded rationality properties in the literature are inherited by subchoices, but are not satisfied by at least one subchoice of most choice functions.Bounded Rationality Is... · 3. Asymptotic Rarity Of... · 4. Rarity Of Bounded...Missing: evidence | Show results with:evidence<|control11|><|separator|>
[89]
Ecological Rationality - Peter M. Todd; Gerd Gigerenzer
In this book, we argue that in an uncertain world, more information and computation are not always better, and we ask when, and why, less can be more.
[90]
Ecological Rationality: A Framework for Understanding and Aiding ...
Feb 14, 2012 · The notion of ecological rationality sees human rationality as the result of the adaptive fit between the human mind and the environment.
[91]
The evolved basis and adaptive functions of cognitive distortions
This paper explores common cognitive distortions from the perspective of evolutionary psychology ... irrationality. The evolved nature of cognitive distortions ...
[92]
Learning leads to bounded rationality and the evolution of cognitive ...
Nov 8, 2019 · Here we investigate the evolution of cognitive bias by individuals investing into a project that delivers joint benefits.
[93]
Using an evolutionary approach to improve predictive ability in the ...
This could explain not only the existence and persistence of the bias, but why, when people behave 'irrationally', their irrational behavior is typically ...1. Introduction · 2. Cognitive Biases Meet... · Acknowledgements<|separator|>
[94]
[PDF] Bounded rationality and perfect rationality:psychology into economics
Jan 30, 2018 · Moreover, the concept of bounded rationality, as formulated by Herbert Simon, has been proposed and confronted with the classical notion of ...
[95]
Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky
Gigerenzer has argued that it may be inappropriate to characterize some of the biases identified by Kahneman and Tversky as “errors” or “fallacies,” for three ...
[96]
Gerd Gigerenzer's Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with ...
Aug 15, 2018 · Gigerenzer's faith in heuristics is often taken to be based on the idea that people have limited processing capacity and are unable to solve the ...
[97]
The Tyranny of Rationalism and Michael Oakeshott
Sep 3, 2024 · Oakeshott worried that the modern obsession with rationalism was blinding people to the role that traditions can play in improving society. By ...
[98]
On Overconfidence - Slate Star Codex
Aug 20, 2015 · Overconfidence means people are often much more confident than they should be; for example, those claiming 99% confidence are wrong about 20% ...
[99]
When rational decision-making becomes irrational: a critical ...
Mar 7, 2019 · This article first critically assesses dominant conceptions on intuition effectiveness and then offers a re-conceptualization that builds on current findings.
[100]
Anchoring Bias - The Decision Lab
Anchoring bias occurs when we rely heavily on the first piece of information we receive - called "the anchor" even when subsequent info becomes available.
[101]
Wason selection task - APA Dictionary of Psychology
Apr 19, 2018 · Most participants demonstrate a confirmation bias, failing to check those instances in which the rule could have been breached (e.g., by turning ...
[102]
Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven ...
The “irrational” rejections of unfair offers by people playing the Ultimatum Game (UG), a widely used laboratory model of economical decision-making, ...
[103]
Global Study Confirms Influential Theory Behind Loss Aversion
May 18, 2020 · The researchers found that Kahneman and Tversky's 1979 empirical foundation for proposing prospect theory broadly replicates in all the ...
[104]
The Crash | The South Sea Bubble, 1720
The Bubble finally burst with stock values plummeting from £950 a share in July to £400 a share in September to £185 share in December 1720. [49] Many British ...Missing: irrational analysis
[105]
[PDF] evidence of irrational behaviour during the South Sea Bubble
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOUR DURING THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE. 257. © Economic History Society 2005. Before concluding that irrationality overtook investors in 1720, it is.
[106]
[PDF] New Evidence on the First Financial Bubble
Most early writers treat the bubbles of 1720 as evidence of investor irrationality. ... Financial markets can go mad: evidence f irrational behaviour during the ...
[107]
Tulipmania: About the Dutch Tulip Bulb Market Bubble - Investopedia
The bubble had burst by the end of 1637. Buyers declared they couldn't pay the previously agreed high prices for bulbs, causing the market to collapse. It wasn' ...
[108]
[PDF] Tulipmania - Peter M. Garber
May 13, 2006 · cannot be interpreted as evidence of market irrationality. Never- theless, a less emphasized aspect of the mania, the speculation in common ...<|separator|>
[109]
[PDF] Tulipmania Author(s): Peter M. Garber Source - McMaster University
Thus the crash of February 1637 for rare bulbs was not of extraordinary mag- nitude and did not greatly affect the normal time-series pattern of rare bulb ...
[110]
Irrational Exuberance
This site offers updated information relating to the book Irrational Exuberance by Robert J. Shiller. Available February 2015 from Princeton University ...
[111]
https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691173122/irrational-exuberance
[112]
Irrational Exuberance: An Evolutionary Perspective on the ...
Irrational Exuberance: An Evolutionary Perspective on the Underlying Causes of the Financial Crisis ... Economic Behaviour, New York 2008, Cambridge ...
[113]
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20210430
[114]
Overconfidence, financial literacy and excessive trading
This paper examines how overconfidence in financial literacy, as measured by MiFID test scores, impacts investors' trading behavior.
[115]
Do Investors Trade Too Much? - jstor
Benos (1998) and Odean. (1998a) propose that, due to their overconfi- dence, investors will trade too much. This paper tests that hypothesis. The trading of ...
[116]
[PDF] Disposed to Be Overconfident - American Economic Association
Aug 1, 2024 · Third, investor overconfidence, generated by the biased learning process, leads to both excessive trading and lower trading profits. Why is it ...
[117]
Present bias and health - PMC - NIH
This study uses a dynamic discrete choice model to examine the degree of present bias and naivete about present bias in individuals' health care decisions.
[118]
Time discounting, present biases, and health-related behaviors
Second, present bias, which is measured by the degree of declining impatience, is positively associated with unhealthy behaviors for naïve respondents, who are ...
[119]
Association between time preference, present-bias and physical ...
Dec 19, 2018 · Results demonstrated that those who were more present-biased were less likely to continue in an intervention and dropped out of the study ...
[120]
Irrational Beliefs and Psychological Distress: A Meta-Analysis
Irrational beliefs were positively associated with various types of distress, such as general distress, anxiety, depression, anger, and guilt.
[121]
Irrational thinking and psychological distress: A cross-racial/ethnic ...
Oct 1, 2020 · Irrational beliefs (i.e., cognitive distortions) are believed, in CBT, to be a source of anxiety and depression (Ellis, 1962). Beck (1976) ...
[122]
A Regret-Induced Status Quo Bias - Journal of Neuroscience
Mar 2, 2011 · Behaviorally, experienced regret was higher after an erroneous status quo rejection compared with acceptance. Anterior insula and medial ...
[123]
Link Between Irrational Beliefs and Important Markers of Mental ...
Jul 21, 2022 · In this article, we conducted the first meaningful study of irrational beliefs (IBs) in a German sample of athletes.
[124]
Herding, social influence and economic decision-making - NIH
Emotional factors may precipitate herding in financial markets when acting with a group moderates a fear response but has the unintended consequence of ...
[125]
[PDF] Herd Behavior in Financial Markets
There are several potential reasons for rational herd behavior in financial markets. The most important of these are imperfect information, concern for ...
[126]
How did herd behaviour contribute to the Global Financial Crisis?
Jan 28, 2021 · Behavioural economist Robert Shiller identifies the phenomenon of 'irrational exuberance', which can explain herding in the housing market ...
[127]
Herding in the bad times: The 2008 and COVID-19 crises
The results indicate that herding appears with greater intensity in periods prior to the crisis, disappearing during the financial crisis and reappearing, ...
[128]
Why People Are Irrational about Politics
The Irrationality Theory: People disagree about political issues mainly because most people are irrational when it comes to politics. Political disagreement ...
[129]
A Confirmation Bias View on Social Media Induced Polarisation ...
This paper addresses this knowledge deficit by exploring how manifestations of confirmation bias contributed to the development of 'echo chambers' at the ...
[130]
Cognitive–motivational mechanisms of political polarization in social ...
Aug 1, 2022 · In this Review, we provide a conceptual framework to integrate scientific knowledge about cognitive–motivational mechanisms that influence political ...
[131]
Retention and Transfer of Cognitive Bias Mitigation Interventions
The game incorporated four debiasing strategies: warning about bias, teaching its directionality, providing feedback, and extensive coaching and training. The ...
[132]
Cognitive debiasing 2: impediments to and strategies for change - NIH
Cognitive debiasing involves changes that rarely come about through a discrete, single event but instead through a succession of stages—from a state of lack of ...<|separator|>
[133]
[PDF] Improving Planning: Quantitative Evaluation of the Premortem ...
spikes; there are several methods for debiasing that can reduce overconfidence (Brenner. & Koehler, 1996). Premortem reduces overconfidence by utilizing a ...
[134]
[PDF] A User's Guide to Debiasing - Katy Milkman
Jul 31, 2015 · And, of course, debiasing strategies can improve personal decisions as well. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a guide to these.
[135]
Thinking disposition education improves cognitive reflection
A thinking disposition intervention (TDI) can increase cognitive reflection. This relationship is not mediated by need for cognition and intellectual humility.
[136]
Cognitive Restructuring Techniques for Reframing Thoughts
Feb 12, 2018 · In CBT, cognitive restructuring helps clients discover, challenge, & modify/replace negative, irrational thoughts (or cognitive ...
[137]
Prediction Markets as institutional forecasting support systems
An attractive feature of Prediction Markets (PMs) is that they provide economic incentives for informants to share unique information.
[138]
Improving decision making in key institutions - 80,000 Hours
Prediction markets use market mechanisms to aggregate many people's views on whether some or another event will come about. For example, the prediction markets ...
[139]
The effectiveness of collaborative problem solving in promoting ...
Jan 11, 2023 · The findings show that (1) collaborative problem solving is an effective teaching approach to foster students' critical thinking, with a significant overall ...
[140]
https://bera-journals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/rev3.70001
[141]
[PDF] Using Critical Thinking Teaching Methods to Increase Student ...
Day found that working in groups with presentations to the class for further questioning to be effective in developing critical thinking skills. Shim and ...
[142]
What is open science?
Registered Reports is a two-stage peer review process that improves research rigor and reproducibility by reducing publication bias and prioritizing ...
[143]
Improving Access and Reducing Bias in Science - PMC
This talk will provide an overview of the key challenges that reduce the credibility and reproducibility of research and will discuss how open science practices ...
[144]
Implementing open science and reproducible research practices in ...
Sep 2, 2024 · Meta-scientific evidence suggests that Registered Reports are effective in reducing publication bias and such questionable research practices.
[145]
Digesting the Federal Government's Annual Report on the Benefits ...
Jan 6, 2025 · OMB's draft annual report shows that federal regulations measured in FY2023 brought the nation an estimated $48 to $79 billion in benefits at an estimated cost ...
[146]
Better Project Planning With Prediction Markets - Stephen Malina
Internal project prediction markets are a promising approach for incentivizing better estimation. As Robin Hanson's discussed extensively (more), prediction ...
[147]
The Science Of Superforecasting - Good Judgment
Good Judgment research discovered four keys to accurate forecasting: talent-spotting, training, teaming, and aggregation.
[148]
Evidence on good forecasting practices from the Good Judgment ...
The Good Judgment Project (GJP) was the winning team in IARPA's 2011-2015 forecasting tournament. In the tournament, six teams assigned probabilistic answers to ...
[149]
Decision Making - Evidence Based Practice - NCBI Bookshelf - NIH
Evidence Based Practice (EBP) has proven to be an enduring and effective process for making informed decisions, firmly supported by a wealth of evidence in the ...Evidence Based Practice: A... · 5.1 Cognitive Biases · 5.4 Heuristics
[150]
Rationality versus reality: the challenges of evidence-based ...
May 26, 2010 · We contend that health policy decision makers are generally unable to attain the basic goals of evidence-based decision making (EBDM) and evidence-based policy ...Ebdm: The Challenges Of... · Decision Maker Utility · Conclusions