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Reinhard Scheer

Reinhard Scheer (30 September 1863 – 26 November 1928) was a German admiral in the Imperial Navy who commanded the High Seas Fleet from January 1916 to August 1918 during the First World War. A torpedo specialist who rose through the ranks to become a battleship squadron commander by 1913, Scheer is best known for leading the German fleet at the Battle of Jutland on 31 May–1 June 1916, where his aggressive tactics and repeated battle turns inflicted heavier losses on the British Grand Fleet while extricating his outnumbered force from potential annihilation, though the engagement ended in a tactical draw with strategic advantages for Britain in maintaining naval supremacy. Following Jutland, Scheer advocated resuming unrestricted submarine warfare to compensate for the fleet's inability to challenge British dominance decisively, a policy shift that contributed to America's entry into the war. In August 1918, he briefly served as Chief of the Naval Staff before retiring in December amid Germany's defeat, later authoring memoirs that defended his command decisions and received the Pour le Mérite for his service.

Early Life and Entry into the Navy

Family Background and Childhood

Carl Friedrich Heinrich Reinhard Scheer was born on 30 September 1863 in Obernkirchen, a small town in the Kingdom of (present-day , , ), to Jeremias Franz Julius Scheer, a schoolteacher who had trained as a Protestant cleric, and his wife Marie Katharine Scheer. The family belonged to the , with the father's profession reflecting modest circumstances typical of provincial educators in mid-19th-century . In his early years, Scheer grew up in Obernkirchen before the family relocated to , a larger city near am Main, where they resided at Grimmestrasse 12 during the 1880s. Details of his siblings, if any, and specific childhood experiences remain sparsely documented, though the provincial setting and familial emphasis on likely influenced his path toward . At age 15, Scheer joined the as a on 22 1879, marking the end of his civilian childhood and the beginning of formal naval training amid the service's evolving requirements for officer candidates from non-aristocratic backgrounds.

Naval Training and Initial Service

Scheer entered the as a on 22 1879, at the age of 15. He received his initial commission as a Seekadett soon after entry. In September 1879, he proceeded to the Naval School in for foundational instruction in naval sciences, seamanship, and related disciplines. Cadet training in the Kaiserliche Marine emphasized a blend of theoretical education and practical sea experience, reflecting the navy's expansion under Bismarck's policies despite its limited global footprint compared to major powers. Scheer's early progression involved onboard duties aboard training vessels, building proficiency in navigation, gunnery basics, and ship handling amid the service's resource constraints. By November 1882, Scheer had advanced to the rank of Leutnant zur See and was designated for specialized artillery officer training, undertaking courses focused on naval ordnance and fire control. His initial active deployment followed, serving in the East Africa Squadron on the frigate SMS Bismarck, where he conducted patrols and operations in colonial waters, honing skills in extended overseas service. This posting marked his transition from cadet to operational officer in a squadron tasked with protecting German interests in Africa.

Pre-War Naval Career

Key Commands and Promotions

Scheer joined the Imperial German Navy as a Seekadett (sea cadet) on 19 April 1879, undergoing initial training aboard the training ship SMS Niobe and later serving in various junior roles, including on the frigate SMS Bismarck in East Asian waters during the early 1880s. By the 1890s, he had established expertise in torpedo warfare, commanding torpedo boats and contributing to naval tactics development, which led to his appointment as an instructor at the Naval Academy in Kiel around 1895–1897. Promoted to and later , Scheer commanded several cruisers, including SMS Gazelle during its 1901–1903 world cruise, where he oversaw operations in colonial waters and demonstrated administrative competence. By March 1907, as Kapitän zur See, he took command of the SMS Elsass, focusing on gunnery and fleet maneuvers amid the ongoing naval with . In late 1909 or early 1910, Scheer was appointed chief of staff to Admiral , commander of the , a position he held until 1911, during which he influenced fleet organization, reconnaissance strategies, and integration into battle line tactics. Promoted to (rear admiral) on 2 February 1911, he briefly served in administrative roles before returning to operational command. On 9 December 1913, Scheer advanced to Vizeadmiral (vice admiral) and assumed command of the II Battle Squadron, comprising older but refitted battleships; he soon transferred to the III Battle Squadron in early 1914, leading eight of the fleet's newest dreadnoughts, including Kaiser-class vessels, emphasizing aggressive training and readiness exercises.

Experiences in Colonial and European Waters

Scheer's initial exposure to colonial waters occurred in 1884, when, shortly after his commissioning as a , he was assigned to the East Africa Squadron aboard the frigate SMS Bismarck, supporting German colonial administration in regions including present-day and . In May 1888, following service on , he rejoined the East Africa Squadron as a officer on the corvette , where he gained practical experience in overseas patrols amid tensions with local forces and rival European powers during the . By the late 1890s, Scheer had established himself as a torpedo specialist within the , a role that informed his subsequent commands. Promoted to , he took command of the light cruiser around 1901, deploying her with the to safeguard German concessions in , including Kiaochow Bay, and to conduct surveys and diplomatic missions across the Pacific amid the Boxer Rebellion's aftermath and rising Sino-Japanese rivalries. Gazelle's operations under Scheer emphasized , coastal patrols, and protection of trade routes, reflecting the navy's expanding imperial footprint without direct combat engagements during his tenure, which lasted until approximately 1904. Promoted to Kapitän zur See in 1905, Scheer transitioned to European waters, commanding battleships in the by 1907 and participating in maneuvers that honed fleet tactics against potential British threats. In 1910, he served as Chief of Staff to the under Vice Admiral , overseeing strategic planning, exercises, and squadron drills in the and , where he advocated for aggressive tactics informed by his earlier expertise. By August 1912, Scheer assumed command of the II Battle Squadron, leading pre-war cruises and fleet concentrations that tested the 's readiness for decisive engagements in European waters, including joint operations with destroyer flotillas amid escalating Anglo-German naval rivalry. These assignments solidified his reputation for operational efficiency in contested European theaters.

World War I Service

Command of the High Seas Fleet

On 18 January 1916, Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer was promoted to the rank of admiral and appointed Commander-in-Chief of the , replacing Admiral Hugo von Pohl, who had been sidelined by . Scheer, who had commanded the fleet's Second Battle Squadron since 1913, inherited a force of 16 battleships, six battlecruisers, and supporting light forces, but one constrained by the British Grand Fleet's numerical superiority of approximately 28 dreadnoughts and nine battlecruisers. Scheer immediately outlined an aggressive operational doctrine, diverging from Pohl's more cautious "fleet in being" approach that prioritized preserving the fleet to support unrestricted submarine warfare. He sought decisive surface actions against isolated detachments, leveraging attacks, ambushes, and minefields to offset Germany's qualitative parity in gunnery and armor but quantitative disadvantage. To prepare, Scheer emphasized intensive training in fleet maneuvers, long-range gunnery, and night combat tactics, conducting exercises in the and to improve cohesion among the battle squadrons. These efforts aimed to exploit tactical opportunities for attrition, potentially forcing to dilute its or commit to a full fleet engagement on German terms. In implementation, Scheer authorized reconnaissance sweeps and coastal raids to probe British responses and erode their confidence. A notable operation occurred from 24 to 25 April 1916, when the sortied toward the English coast; Franz von Hipper's battlecruisers bombarded , firing over 300 shells that damaged coastal defenses, sank a patrol vessel, and caused about 12 deaths alongside military casualties, while attempting but aborting a strike on Yarmouth due to poor visibility. Reginald Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force mounted a brief with destroyers and light cruisers, sinking the German G 194 and damaging several vessels, but the Grand Fleet's main body remained unresponsive, allowing Scheer's battleships to withdraw unscathed after minimal engagement. This raid yielded limited material gains but provided intelligence on dispositions and validated Scheer's tactics, informing his subsequent large-scale maneuvers in May. By late spring, Scheer's preparations had elevated fleet morale and readiness, setting the stage for bolder challenges to naval dominance.

The Battle of Jutland

Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer assumed command of the German on January 18, 1916, replacing Hugo von Pohl, who was incapacitated by illness. Scheer advocated an aggressive posture to challenge British naval superiority, which he viewed as numerically dominant from the war's outset, by conducting frequent sorties to lure portions of the into battle near German bases where and craft could provide support. His strategy for the operation on May 31, 1916, involved deploying Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper's Scouting Group of battlecruisers to bombard the English coast and draw out British battlecruisers under Vice Admiral David Beatty, allowing the main —comprising 16 battleships, six pre-dreadnoughts, and five battlecruisers—to intervene and annihilate the isolated enemy force. Scheer departed on with the fleet, supported by forces and U-boats positioned to pursuers, though poor weather limited effectiveness. The engagement escalated when Hipper's group clashed with Beatty's at approximately 2:00 p.m. on May 31, prompting Scheer to advance the main fleet northward into the . By 6:00 p.m., Scheer's battleships encountered Beatty's retreating force, which was reinforced by John Jellicoe's of 24 deploying into a battle line that temporarily crossed the German T, exposing Scheer's van to concentrated fire. To evade this disadvantageous position, Scheer ordered a "battle turn away"—a simultaneous 180-degree reversal of his entire battle line at 6:30 p.m., covered by torpedo attacks and smoke screens, allowing temporary disengagement. Scheer then reversed course again toward the British, seeking to exploit perceived disarray, but upon resighting Jellicoe's full formation at around 8:00 p.m., executed a second battle turn at 8:35 p.m., followed by a third at 9:15 p.m., maneuvers that preserved the fleet's cohesion amid inferior speed and gun caliber compared to the British. During the night actions, Scheer directed destroyer flotillas, including Flotilla IX at 6:30 p.m., for torpedo strikes against lines, contributing to the sinking of armored cruisers and damage to battleships like . The withdrew southward under cover of darkness, turning southeast to evade pursuit and avoiding a potential dawn confrontation on June 1, as forces were scattered. German losses totaled 11 ships— including the , the pre-dreadnought , four light cruisers, and five boats—amounting to 60,730 tons displaced and 2,551 personnel killed. Scheer assessed the battle as a tactical success, with German forces inflicting approximately twice the material damage (estimated losses: three battlecruisers, three armored cruisers, eight destroyers, totaling over 100,000 tons) and three times the personnel casualties (6,094 dead) while returning intact to challenge the . In his July 4, 1916, report to Kaiser Wilhelm II, Scheer praised the fleet's "eminently warlike spirit" and leadership, arguing the action demonstrated the Royal Navy's vulnerability despite its advantages, though he concluded that breaking the required shifting to unrestricted warfare, a policy he urged resuming on June 5. The battle reinforced Scheer's view of the surface fleet as a deterrent "" supporting submarine "blades" for economic , influencing subsequent German .

Post-Jutland Operations and Strategic Shifts

Following the on May 31–June 1, 1916, Admiral Reinhard Scheer maintained command of the and pursued limited offensive operations aimed at wearing down detached forces while avoiding a full confrontation with the numerically superior . The fleet's primary post-Jutland occurred on –19, 1916, when Scheer deployed the from the Jade estuary at 10:00 p.m. on , with battle squadrons I and III advancing to support a of by the First Group under . U-boats were positioned along flanks for reconnaissance and attack, and airships provided scouting; the objective was to lure and destroy isolated elements, potentially forcing the into a disadvantageous position. During the operation, the SMS was torpedoed at 7:05 a.m. on by the submarine E23, sustaining damage but remaining operational after temporary repairs. German U-boats achieved successes, with U-66 sinking the light cruisers Nottingham and Falmouth, while U-65 reportedly damaged a (possibly Inflexible, though unconfirmed). Scheer altered course southward based on an erroneous report of , but no contact occurred with the main , which had sortied under Jellicoe; the Germans withdrew by late afternoon, abandoning the bombardment due to minefield risks and lack of enemy sightings. This action resulted in minimal losses but highlighted reconnaissance vulnerabilities and codebreaking advantages, which had alerted the Royal Navy. Subsequent sorties were smaller and less ambitious. On October 10 and 19, 1916, the fleet conducted brief advances into the , yielding no engagements; a German cruiser was torpedoed by a British submarine during the latter. In early November 1916, detachments rescued stranded U-boats but suffered torpedo damage to the battleships Grosser Kurfürst and Kronprinz from British submarine HMS J1. These operations underscored the High Seas Fleet's growing defensive posture, with Scheer prioritizing the preservation of capital ships amid repair backlogs and British superiority—approximately 28 dreadnoughts to Germany's 22 post-Jutland. Scheer increasingly advocated a strategic pivot, viewing major surface actions as untenable and repositioning the fleet as a "fleet in being" to pin down British forces while enabling U-boat offensives. In a July 4, 1916, report to Kaiser Wilhelm II, he emphasized Jutland's tactical successes but stressed economic strangulation via unrestricted submarine warfare over fleet risks. By November 22, 1916, Scheer conferred with the Kaiser, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, and General Erich Ludendorff to press for the U-boat campaign, approved on January 9, 1917, and launched February 1 with over 130 submarines targeting Allied shipping. This shift reduced surface fleet sorties, redirecting resources to U-boat support, minefields, and Baltic operations like Operation Albion in October 1917, though morale declined, culminating in 1918 mutinies. Scheer later reflected that the fleet's role evolved to safeguard U-boat exits, accepting a subordinate position to commerce destruction as the path to victory.

Role as Chief of the Admiralty Staff

On 8 August 1918, Reinhard Scheer was appointed Chief of the Admiralty Staff, succeeding as head of the Imperial German Navy's supreme command, known as the Seekriegsleitung. In this position, Scheer effectively directed overall naval operations amid Germany's deteriorating position on the Western Front and the onset of armistice negotiations. Admiral assumed command of the in Scheer's place, but Scheer retained authority over strategic decisions. Scheer resisted concessions in the armistice terms, particularly the suspension of , which the ordered halted on 21 October 1918 despite Scheer's objections. To avoid the fleet's potential surrender to the Allies or seizure by revolutionary forces, Scheer and Hipper devised a final to provoke a decisive engagement with the British , aiming to inflict damage or scuttle the ships in battle. On 24 October 1918, Scheer issued the naval order directing the to concentrate at Schillig Roads near for this operation, framing it as a last act of defiance. The order triggered widespread unrest among the fleet's crews, exhausted by years of blockade and skeptical of the war's purpose. Mutiny erupted on 29 October 1918 in Wilhelmshaven, with sailors refusing to board ships and arresting officers, rapidly spreading to Kiel by 3 November and igniting the broader German Revolution that contributed to the Kaiser's abdication. The failed sortie plan undermined naval discipline and morale, preventing any final action and leading to Scheer's retirement following the armistice on 11 November 1918.

Post-War Role and Activities

Position in the Weimar Naval Cabinet

Following the , Scheer retired from the on 17 December 1918, amid the revolutionary upheaval and the dissolution of the Kaiserliche Marine. He held no formal position in the Republic's naval structures, which reorganized surviving naval assets into the provisional under the direction of Admiral von Trotha as chief of the admiralty from late 1918. The former Imperial Marinekabinett's personnel functions were integrated into the new Reich Naval Personnel Office, but Scheer was not appointed to this or any equivalent advisory or administrative role within the cabinet-like apparatus overseeing officer appointments and naval policy. As a retired grand admiral, Scheer maintained influence among conservative naval circles disillusioned with the Versailles Treaty's naval restrictions, which limited to 15,000 personnel and obsolete vessels, but he eschewed active involvement in the Reichsmarine's constrained operations or the government's defense ministry. His post-retirement residence in the city of —provisional seat of the —afforded proximity to early republican politics, yet he avoided entanglement in the factional struggles between Ebert's socialists and right-wing elements seeking to preserve military traditions.

Publications and Defense of the Imperial Navy

Following the , Scheer authored Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkrieg (Germany's in the ), published in 1920 by E.S. Mittler & Sohn in . This 524-page volume, including maps and illustrations, provided his detailed personal account of the Imperial Navy's operations from 1914 to 1918, emphasizing strategic decisions, fleet readiness, and engagements such as the on May 31–June 1, 1916. Scheer contended that the had achieved tactical successes, inflicting disproportionate losses on the Royal Navy—14 British battleships and battlecruisers sunk or damaged versus 1 German battlecruiser lost—while maintaining operational integrity despite numerical inferiority and logistical constraints like shortages. In the publication, Scheer defended the navy's risk fleet doctrine, inherited from Admiral , arguing it had successfully deterred British invasion threats and forced the Grand Fleet to remain in home waters, thereby aiding operations on land. He attributed the failure to break the not to naval incompetence but to high-level political interference, including the suspension of in 1915–1916 to prioritize surface raids, and the overall resource diversion to the Western Front. Scheer rejected claims of fleet passivity, asserting that aggressive sorties under his command from January 1916 onward maximized pressure on British maritime supremacy without risking annihilation, a validated by the fleet's survival into 1918. Scheer's work countered Allied narratives portraying the Imperial Navy as strategically impotent, insisting represented a moral and material victory that preserved German naval power longer than expected. He highlighted quantitative data, such as the fleet's completion of 25 major operations covering over 100,000 nautical miles, to underscore its endurance amid matériel limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty precursors. This defense extended to rebuttals against internal Weimar-era critiques blaming the navy for revolutionary mutinies in on October 29–November 3, 1918, which Scheer framed as exogenous socialist agitation rather than inherent disciplinary failures. Beyond the book, Scheer contributed to naval advocacy through public statements opposing post-war disarmament. In a January 1921 reported in the New York Times, he criticized proposals for a "naval holiday"—a temporary halt in construction—as disproportionately benefiting by allowing recovery from wartime strain while hamstringing German reconstitution under restrictions. Such interventions reinforced his broader effort to safeguard the Imperial Navy's legacy against politicized diminishment in the era.

Death and Legacy

Final Years and Death

After retiring from active naval service on 2 December 1918, Scheer resided primarily in , where he focused on personal matters amid the Weimar Republic's political turbulence. On 10 October 1920, a deranged painter intruded into his home, murdering Scheer's wife, , and their maid in the cellar before wounding his daughter and then committing ; Scheer himself was absent during the attack. In June 1928, Scheer traveled to , visiting the Minoan ruins at accompanied by German archaeologist Wilhelm Dörpfeld. Later that year, on 26 November, he died of at age 65 while visiting a friend in Marktredwitz, . Scheer was buried in Weimar's municipal cemetery, with his tombstone inscribed in German: "Hier ruht Admiral Reinhard Scheer."

Historical Assessments of Command and Impact

Historians evaluate Reinhard Scheer's command of the , assumed on 1 January 1916, as a shift toward aggressive operations aimed at damaging the British sufficiently to undermine the blockade and support German land campaigns. Scheer rejected the prior defensive "" doctrine, conducting multiple sorties to provoke partial engagements with British forces, which contrasted with the caution under Friedrich von Ingenohl and demonstrated his preference for calculated risks despite numerical inferiority (99 German versus Britain's 156 by mid-1916). This approach is credited with restoring fleet morale and activity, though limited by reconnaissance failures and the Royal Navy's code-breaking advantages. At the on 31 May–1 June 1916, Scheer's tactical decisions—deploying Franz von Hipper's battlecruisers as bait to draw out David Beatty's squadron, followed by rapid battle turns (Gefechtskehrtwendung) to evade Jellicoe's —enabled the Germans to sink 14 British ships (including 3 battlecruisers) while losing 11 (6 battlecruisers and 5 others), marking a tactical success in gunnery and damage control. Naval analysts praise these maneuvers for preserving the fleet from potential annihilation, as Scheer withdrew under cover of destroyers and despite risks of , narrowly avoiding a "crushing defeat" noted in contemporary German press. Critics, however, argue the decisions exposed vulnerabilities in the inferior fleet, with the failure to press for a knockout blow reflecting realistic assessment of odds rather than bold strategy, and subsequent night actions yielding minimal gains due to signaling issues. Scheer's overall impact is seen as preserving German naval assets for potential leverage while constraining British operations, with the High Seas Fleet's presence requiring the Royal to allocate 407,000 personnel by 1918 (versus Germany's 114,000), diverting resources from other theaters and securing Baltic dominance for army support. boosted German confidence but entrenched strategic stalemate, prompting Scheer's post-battle advocacy for unrestricted warfare over surface actions, a pivot formalized during his August 1918 stint as Chief of the Naval Staff that intensified pressures but accelerated U.S. intervention without breaking the war. Modern assessments view him as a capable, aggressive leader whose command maximized limited capabilities amid material disparities, though ultimate failure to contest sea control underscores the Imperial Navy's structural constraints rather than personal shortcomings.

Debates on Tactical Decisions and Strategic Outcomes

Historians have debated Reinhard Scheer's tactical plan for the on May 31, 1916, which aimed to lure and destroy portions of the British using Franz von Hipper's battlecruisers as bait, supported by the main , while exploiting and destroyer ambushes to offset British numerical superiority of approximately 28 battleships and 9 battlecruisers against Germany's 16 and 5 battlecruisers. Scheer justified the as an aggressive test of British dispositions to weaken their fleet incrementally, drawing enemies toward German bases for favorable night attacks, rather than risking a full decisive engagement. Critics, however, contend that including six slow pre-dreadnought battleships limited the fleet's mobility to 16 knots, constituting a major avoidable error that hampered rapid maneuvers and exposed vulnerabilities when the full appeared. Central to tactical debates are Scheer's two Gefechtskehrtwendung (battle turns away) maneuvers, executed under fire to reverse course and evade the T-crossed line, which exposed damaged battlecruisers to prolonged gunnery but ultimately preserved the fleet from potential annihilation given the unfavorable odds. Scheer defended these as necessary disengagements to avoid , reposition for opportunities, and draw pursuers southeast toward Horns Reef for safer withdrawal, emphasizing tactical flexibility in the face of interposition. While some assessments praise the skillful execution as enabling escape despite risks, others argue Scheer underestimated intelligence and signaling failures, missing chances to fully exploit Vice Admiral David Beatty's isolated battlecruisers before the Grand Fleet's arrival. In the night phase, Scheer's orders for torpedo-boat flotillas to launch attacks deterred pursuit and inflicted further damage amid confusion, contributing to the fleet's successful return without a dawn engagement that could have proven disastrous. Scheer claimed a , citing German sinking of tonnage exceeding their own losses (approximately double in material and triple in personnel) and superior gunnery performance, which broke the myth of invincibility and boosted opinion. Yet debates persist over whether these gains justified the risks, as losses included heavier units like three battlecruisers, but could ill afford even favorable exchanges given Britain's shipbuilding edge and three-to-two ratio. Strategically, Scheer's post-Jutland shift to limited operations—avoiding further major fleet actions in favor of supporting U-boat campaigns—has drawn criticism from figures like Admiral , who argued that idleness squandered the fleet's potential, as enemy losses might match German ones in battle, and prolonged caution risked total attrition without challenge to the . Scheer countered that maintaining a "fleet in being" tied down resources (up to 32 and 407,000 personnel by war's end), secured dominance against , and diverted enemy destroyers to bolster , which sank over 1 million tons monthly by April 1917. Reappraisals affirm this preservation prevented a Cannae-like defeat, enabling indirect contributions to Germany's near-victory via economic strangulation, though the unchanged underscored the High Seas Fleet's ultimate inability to force open seas lanes despite tactical prowess at .

Military Honors

Principal Awards and Decorations

Reinhard Scheer received the , the Kingdom of Prussia's highest military decoration, on 5 June 1916 in recognition of his command of the during the . This award was enhanced with oak leaves on 1 February 1918 for his continued leadership in naval operations. Other principal Prussian honors bestowed upon Scheer included the of 1914, both first and second classes, for gallantry in action; the Knight's Cross of the with Swords; and the Grand Cross of the . These decorations reflected his progression through the ranks and contributions to fleet tactics and engagements. Scheer also held allied awards, such as the Grand Cross of the Austrian , underscoring international recognition of his service.

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