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Union security agreement

A union security agreement is a provision within a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor union stipulating that employees must join the union, maintain membership, or pay equivalent fees to retain employment.^[1]^[2] These agreements aim to counteract "free-rider" problems where non-members benefit from union-negotiated wages and conditions without contributing financially, thereby sustaining union operations and bargaining power.^[3] Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, as amended, union security clauses are generally permissible except in their most stringent forms, with the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibiting closed-shop arrangements—where only pre-existing union members could be hired—and requiring a 30-day grace period for new hires to join or pay fees in union shops.^[4] Common variants include the union shop (non-members may be hired but must join within a period), agency shop (fees required without mandatory membership), and maintenance-of-membership clauses (existing members must remain unless they opt out timely).^[3]^[4] Section 14(b) of the NLRA preserves states' rights to enact "right-to-work" laws banning all such compulsory features, which 27 states have done as of 2023, often citing individual freedom from coerced payments that may fund political activities.^[5]^[3] These agreements have bolstered union density in non-right-to-work jurisdictions by ensuring revenue stability, enabling stronger wage negotiations and workplace protections, though empirical analyses show mixed outcomes on overall employment and growth compared to right-to-work states.^[5] Controversies persist over their coercive nature, exemplified by the 2018 Supreme Court ruling in Janus v. AFSCME, which invalidated agency fees for public-sector workers as violations of First Amendment rights against compelled speech, extending protections against non-consensual union support.^[3] Proponents argue they promote collective equity, while critics highlight risks of abuse, such as unions expending fees on unrelated advocacy, and note that right-to-work policies correlate with higher worker mobility and business attraction without proportionally eroding union influence in voluntary settings.^[6]^[5]

Historical Development

Origins in Early U.S. Labor Law

In the early 20th century, union security practices emerged primarily through informal arrangements and strikes in craft-oriented industries such as printing and construction, where unions sought to limit employment to members to maintain wage standards and control labor supply.^[7] These closed shop tactics, dating back to at least the late 19th century, were enforced coercively via work stoppages rather than formal contracts, as employers often resisted yielding hiring authority.^[8] Prior to the New Deal era, such practices contrasted with broader voluntary membership models in industrial unions, where coercion was limited by legal vulnerabilities and employer opposition, including yellow-dog contracts prohibiting union affiliation.^[9] The National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935, marked a pivotal shift by safeguarding employees' rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining, thereby implicitly facilitating union security arrangements without explicitly authorizing coercive membership ties to employment.^[10] This protection countered prior employer dominance, enabling unions to negotiate terms conditioning continued employment on membership during a period of surging organizing activity.^[11] Union membership, which had bottomed at approximately 2.7 million in 1932 amid the Great Depression, began rebounding as these bargaining gains reduced reliance on purely voluntary recruitment and introduced conditional elements to sustain density amid competitive pressures.^[11] This evolution reflected causal dynamics of power imbalances: unions leveraged strikes and newfound legal shields to transition from ad hoc coercion to structured bargaining leverage, prioritizing financial stability through dues over open recruitment, though empirical data from the era shows varied enforcement success tied to industry-specific militancy rather than uniform adoption.^[12]

Taft-Hartley Act and Section 14(b)

The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, was enacted on June 23, 1947, over President Harry S. Truman's veto, amending the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.^[13] While Section 8(a)(3) authorized limited forms of union security agreements—prohibiting closed shops but permitting union shops, maintenance-of-membership clauses, and agency fees after a probationary period—Section 14(b) explicitly preserved state authority to forbid any requirement of union membership or financial support as a condition of employment. This federal deference to state law marked a deliberate counterbalance to national union empowerment, enabling opt-outs from compulsory unionism provisions. The amendments arose amid acute postwar labor unrest, exemplified by the 1945–1946 strike wave that encompassed 4,985 work stoppages in 1946 alone, involving 4.6 million workers and 116 million idle man-days, surpassing prior records and disrupting key industries like steel, coal, automobiles, and railroads.^[14] Sponsors, including Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative Fred A. Hartley Jr., argued that unchecked union leverage created monopolistic control over labor supply, enabling unions to extract dues from non-members who benefited from collective bargaining without consent, thereby exacerbating economic instability and coercive practices.^[15] Section 14(b) addressed these issues by devolving regulatory power to states, mitigating perceived federal overreach in mandating union security and fostering localized checks on union dominance in a recovering economy strained by wartime wage controls and inflation.^[16] By empowering states to enact prohibitions, the provision facilitated early right-to-work legislation as a tool for economic competitiveness, particularly in the South where industrial development lagged union-dense regions. Texas, for instance, passed its right-to-work statute on September 5, 1947, alongside measures curbing mass picketing and closed-shop enforcement, aiming to draw non-union investments and avert strikes that deterred manufacturing relocation.^[17]^[18] This rapid adoption underscored Section 14(b)'s role in decentralizing labor policy, allowing states to prioritize voluntary employment terms over federally tolerated compulsions, though it drew union opposition as an erosion of bargaining leverage.^[19]

Evolution in Public vs. Private Sectors

In the private sector, union security agreements solidified as a core element of collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of July 5, 1935, which empowered unions and employers to negotiate provisions requiring employees to join or financially support the union after a 30-day grace period, thereby addressing free-rider issues while safeguarding individual rights against coercion.^[20] This framework enabled widespread adoption of union shops and maintenance-of-membership clauses in private industry contracts by the late 1930s and 1940s, fostering union density peaks exceeding 30% among non-agricultural workers by 1945. In marked contrast, public sector employees were explicitly excluded from NLRA coverage, leaving them without federal statutory backing for such agreements and reliant on ad hoc employer policies or state initiatives that rarely extended beyond informal recognition until the mid-20th century.^[21] Federal public sector advancements began with President John F. Kennedy's Executive Order 10988, issued on January 17, 1962, which for the first time affirmed federal civilian employees' rights to form, join, or assist labor organizations and outlined a tiered system for union recognition based on petitions from at least 30% of workers in a unit.^[22] Although the order permitted negotiations over personnel policies and working conditions, it prohibited discussions on wages, hours, or matters of management prerogative, and it did not authorize compulsory union security mechanisms like dues checkoff or agency fees, limiting unions to voluntary financial support from members.^[23] This represented a cautious initial parity with private sector practices, prioritizing employee choice amid concerns over government employees' inherent bargaining leverage as taxpayers' agents. At the state and local levels, public employee union security evolved unevenly due to fragmented legislation, with early adopters like New York City's 1958 "Little Wagner Act" under Mayor Robert Wagner Jr. granting limited bargaining rights to municipal workers, including some union shop provisions, while other states such as Wisconsin (1959) and Michigan (1965) enacted broader statutes mirroring NLRA-like protections for agency fees in teacher and municipal contracts.^[24] By contrast, numerous Southern and Midwestern states maintained stricter limits, often prohibiting any form of compulsory dues or membership to preserve managerial flexibility and avert strikes, resulting in a patchwork where roughly half of states lacked comprehensive public bargaining laws as late as 1970.^[25] These variations reflected policymakers' wariness of public unions' potential to inflate budgets without market discipline, unlike private sector counterparts constrained by competition. Public sector unionization accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s amid this legal proliferation, with membership rising from about 10% of government workers in 1960 to 36% by 1980, propelled by state laws in over 30 jurisdictions that increasingly tolerated agency fee arrangements to sustain union operations amid growing non-member free-riding.^[26] This surge narrowed some gaps with private sector norms, as public contracts incorporated maintenance-of-membership and fair-share fees in sectors like education and sanitation, though persistent exemptions from federal labor standards and strike bans underscored enduring distinctions in enforceability and scope.^[27]

Types of Union Security Agreements

Closed Shop

A closed shop is a union security agreement under which an employer agrees to hire only individuals who are already members of the union, thereby excluding non-members from employment opportunities from the outset.^[28] This arrangement enforces union membership as a precondition for initial hiring, distinguishing it from less restrictive forms by directly conditioning access to jobs on prior union affiliation.^[29] Prior to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, closed shops were common in skilled crafts such as maritime work, where unions operated hiring halls to control the dispatch of workers exclusively from their membership rolls.^[30] These hiring halls served as centralized mechanisms for employers to recruit labor, ensuring that only union members—vetted for skills, dues payment, and compliance with union rules—were referred for positions, which effectively barred non-union labor from entering the industry.^[31] In maritime sectors, this system stabilized employment by mid-1930s standards but reinforced union monopolies over job access in pre-NLRA environments.^[30] The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act and enacted on June 23, 1947, explicitly prohibited closed shops under federal law by amending Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA to authorize certain union security clauses while barring those requiring pre-employment union membership.^[29]^[32] This federal ban led to the expiration or conversion of many closed shop agreements into union shops, rendering the practice largely illegal nationwide and shifting reliance to post-hire membership requirements where permitted.^[16]

Union Shop

In a union shop, an employer may hire workers without regard to prior union membership, but all employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement must join the union as full members—including tendering periodic dues and initiation fees—and maintain that status to retain employment.^[33]^[34] This form of union security clause, authorized under the National Labor Relations Act, applies only after voluntary inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement and distinguishes itself by permitting initial non-union hires while enforcing subsequent membership obligations.^[35] The required period for joining typically ranges from 30 to 60 days after the date of hire or completion of any probationary period, with federal law stipulating a minimum grace period of 30 days before an employer may discharge a non-compliant employee.^[34]^[36] During this interval, new hires benefit from union-negotiated terms without immediate membership duties, after which failure to join and pay dues constitutes grounds for termination at the union's request.^[37] Union shop provisions appear frequently in collective bargaining agreements within manufacturing and automotive sectors, where they support unions like the United Auto Workers in maintaining membership density amid competitive pressures. For instance, UAW contracts with major automakers have historically incorporated such clauses to align workforce participation with bargaining representation.^[38] Federal law provides exemptions for employees with sincerely held religious beliefs conflicting with union membership, allowing them to request accommodation—such as rebate of dues or alternative payment to charity—under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, provided it does not impose undue hardship on the employer or union.^[39]^[40]

Agency Shop and Maintenance of Membership

An agency shop is a union security arrangement in which employees in the bargaining unit are not required to join the union but must pay a service fee equivalent to union dues to cover the costs of collective bargaining and representation.^[41] This fee applies to all unit members, including non-union employees who benefit from the union's activities, but non-members are exempt from full union obligations such as attending meetings or participating in internal union governance, including voting on union matters.^[42] Unlike a union shop, which mandates actual union membership after a probationary period (typically 30 days), an agency shop permits employers to hire non-union workers indefinitely, provided they contribute financially, thereby avoiding compulsory association while securing revenue for the union's representational role.^[43]^[37] Maintenance of membership clauses represent another moderated form of union security, under which employees are not obligated to join the union initially, but those who voluntarily become members must maintain their membership and pay dues throughout the duration of the collective bargaining agreement.^[44] This provision typically includes a narrow "escape period" near the contract's end or renewal, allowing members to resign without penalty, but prohibits withdrawal during the agreement's term to ensure stability in union finances.^[45] Employers retain freedom to hire without regard to union status, distinguishing it from more stringent models; once joined, however, members face potential discharge for non-payment of dues, enforced via the contract's grievance procedures.^[3] Following the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), which banned closed shops requiring pre-employment union membership but authorized "membership" in any form except closed shops under National Labor Relations Act Section 8(a)(3), both agency shops and maintenance of membership adapted as less coercive mechanisms to sustain union operations without universal compulsion.^[46] These variants complied with federal limits by linking job retention to financial contributions or sustained voluntary membership rather than mandatory enrollment, facilitating their inclusion in contracts across industries. In the public sector, agency shops gained traction in negotiations for educators and municipal workers, where full union shops faced additional statutory hurdles, enabling unions to recoup representation costs from non-members without imposing associational duties.^[42] Maintenance clauses similarly supported existing member retention in government bargaining units, promoting fiscal predictability amid prohibitions on closed arrangements.^[44]

Legal Framework

Federal Authorization under NLRA Section 8(a)(3)

Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), establishes a statutory exception to the Act's general prohibition on employer discrimination in hiring, tenure, or employment conditions to encourage or discourage union membership.^[47] This provision authorizes private-sector employers and labor organizations to include union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), requiring employees to become or remain union members—or, in practice, to tender uniform periodic dues and fees—as a condition of continued employment, provided the requirement takes effect no sooner than the 30th day following the start of employment or the CBA's effective date, whichever is later.^[47]^[48] The clause protects employees from discharge solely for failing to maintain "membership" if they have previously held valid membership but object to dues covering non-representational activities, as clarified in subsequent interpretations limiting "membership" to financial obligations rather than full union participation.^[49] Such agreements derive from employees' Section 7 right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, enabling unions certified as exclusive bargaining agents—typically via majority support in a unit—to negotiate terms that allocate representation costs among beneficiaries.^[10] For validity, the union must not have been established, assisted, or supported by the employer, and the CBA must result from arm's-length bargaining without coercion.^[50] Closed-shop arrangements, which condition initial hiring on prior union membership, remain unlawful under the NLRA, distinguishing permissible post-hire requirements from pre-employment mandates.^[51] The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) administers and enforces Section 8(a)(3) by investigating unfair labor practice charges related to union security clauses, such as discriminatory enforcement that exceeds statutory limits or fails to provide the required grace period.^[52] Violations occur if an employer discharges an employee under a clause without verifying the employee's awareness of dues obligations or allowing reasonable opportunity to comply, or if the union demands expulsion for non-dues reasons like internal political dissent.^[50] NLRB remedies typically include reinstatement, backpay, and orders to cease improper application, ensuring clauses serve representational rather than punitive purposes.^[53]

Prohibition via Right-to-Work Laws

Right-to-work laws, authorized by Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, empower states to ban union security agreements by nullifying any collective bargaining agreement (CBA) provision that conditions employment on union membership, payment of dues, or other financial support to the union.^[54] These statutes declare such clauses contrary to public policy, ensuring employees cannot be compelled to join or fund a union to secure or retain jobs.^[55] As of 2025, 26 states maintain active right-to-work laws, which apply primarily to private-sector workers under the National Labor Relations Act but often extend to public-sector employees unless a state's constitution explicitly permits union security arrangements.^[56]^[57] The scope of these prohibitions encompasses all forms of compulsory union support, including union shops, agency shops, and maintenance-of-membership requirements, rendering them void and unenforceable in covered jurisdictions.^[54] In practice, this means employers in right-to-work states cannot discriminate against non-union employees or require union authorization for hiring, while unions retain representation duties for all workers in bargaining units without mandatory fees.^[58] Federal law does not preempt these state measures, as Section 14(b) explicitly preserves state authority to outlaw agreements otherwise permissible under federal labor statutes.^[54] States like Florida and Tennessee promote their right-to-work status to attract businesses by emphasizing reduced labor costs and workforce flexibility, positioning these laws as competitive advantages in economic development.^[59] For instance, Tennessee has integrated labor freedom protections into incentives for companies receiving state funds, aiming to foster environments resistant to compulsory unionization tactics.^[60] This approach underscores how right-to-work enactments serve as tools for state-level policy to enhance job growth and investment without conflicting with national labor frameworks.^[59]

Distinctions Between Private and Public Sectors

In the private sector, union security agreements are authorized under Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which permits employers and certified unions to negotiate clauses requiring employees to become union members or pay equivalent fees as a condition of continued employment after a probationary period, typically 30 days.^[20] Such arrangements remain enforceable in states without right-to-work laws, which number 15 as of 2023, as these state statutes override federal permission by banning compulsory union support.^[61] Absent constitutional challenges tied to state action, private sector agreements face no First Amendment barriers, as they involve consensual contracts between private parties rather than government compulsion.^[62] Public sector arrangements diverge sharply due to the sovereign immunity of government employers and First Amendment protections against compelled speech. Before 2018, numerous states enacted laws mirroring NLRA provisions to allow agency fees from non-members for bargaining-related costs, affecting millions of teachers, firefighters, and other government workers under union shop or agency shop models.^[25] The 2018 ruling in Janus v. AFSCME rendered such mandatory fees unconstitutional for public employees, prohibiting states from enforcing agency shop requirements that extract payments from non-consenting workers for any union activities, including political ones.^[63] This applies uniformly to state and local public workers, curtailing union revenue streams previously sustained by state statutes in non-right-to-work jurisdictions. Federal employees operate under a separate regime via the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which authorizes collective bargaining but expressly bars union security clauses, ensuring dues and membership remain strictly voluntary with no payroll deductions conditioned on employment.^[64] State-level public sector laws continue to vary, with some permitting voluntary maintenance-of-membership clauses post-Janus, while right-to-work expansions in states like Wisconsin and Michigan extend prohibitions to public workers, further limiting compulsory elements.^[65]

Arguments Supporting Union Security

Addressing Free Riders Through Shared Costs

Proponents of union security agreements contend that these mechanisms resolve the free-rider dilemma in collective bargaining, whereby non-contributing workers within a represented bargaining unit receive identical benefits—such as elevated wages, improved working conditions, and grievance representation—without sharing the costs of negotiation and administration.^[66] This problem arises because unions, as exclusive representatives under laws like the National Labor Relations Act, must extend gains to all unit employees regardless of membership or payment status, potentially leading to insufficient funding for ongoing advocacy and erosion of bargaining leverage.^[5] Historically, this rationale underpinned the inclusion of union security provisions in the Wagner Act of 1935, which authorized agreements requiring employee contributions to counter free-riding amid intense employer opposition that threatened nascent union stability.^[66] Legislative debates emphasized that without such measures, non-payers could undermine unions by benefiting from collective efforts funded solely by dues-payers, justifying safeguards to ensure equitable cost-sharing for shared representation expenses.^[66] Empirical analyses by labor economists link sustained union density—facilitated by security agreements—to measurable wage advantages, with union-represented workers earning 10-15% more than comparable non-union peers, a premium proponents attribute to robust funding for effective bargaining that avoids free-rider dilution.^[67] For instance, research from the Economic Policy Institute indicates that higher union density in states permitting security clauses correlates with broader wage gains, including spillover effects raising non-union wages by countering employer monopsony power, as declining density from free-riding has historically suppressed overall compensation growth since the late 1970s.^[68] These outcomes underscore advocates' view that mandatory contributions prevent under-resourcing of collective goods like contract enforcement and organizing, preserving the scale needed for industry-wide leverage.^[69]

Enhanced Bargaining Power and Wage Outcomes

Union security agreements enable labor organizations to maintain stable financial resources, thereby strengthening their capacity to engage in protracted negotiations and secure favorable contract terms. By mitigating the free-rider problem—where non-contributing workers benefit from union efforts without sharing costs—these agreements bolster collective leverage against employers, facilitating agreements on higher compensation and improved conditions. Empirical analyses of collective bargaining outcomes indicate that environments permitting union security correlate with elevated wage premiums for represented workers, often ranging from 10 to 15 percent above non-union equivalents in comparable roles.^[67]^[70] Beyond monetary gains, fortified bargaining positions under union security provisions have yielded advancements in non-wage benefits, including enhanced workplace safety protocols and reduced injury rates. Unionized settings with security mechanisms report lower incidences of traumatic injuries and fatalities, attributed to negotiated standards exceeding regulatory minimums, such as comprehensive hazard training and equipment provisions.^[71] These outcomes stem from unions' ability to invest in expertise for safety advocacy, leading to grievance procedures that enforce compliance and deter violations.^[72] Evidence further links union security to operational stability, with lower employee turnover rates observed in secured workplaces due to grievance arbitration processes that resolve disputes efficiently and preserve job tenure.^[73] This stability reduces recruitment costs for employers while allowing unions to focus resources on strategic bargaining rather than constant organizing. In cases of impasse, security-backed unions more readily access arbitration, minimizing disruptive strikes and enabling quicker resolution of labor conflicts through binding decisions.^[74] Internationally, systems incorporating mandatory contribution equivalents—such as extension of agreements to non-members—sustain higher bargaining coverage and union density, associating with wage uplifts for covered employees, though aggregate economic growth exhibits variability across contexts like Nordic models versus others.^[75] These patterns underscore how security mechanisms amplify unions' negotiating clout, yielding measurable gains in worker remuneration and protections absent in purely voluntary frameworks.^[76]

Criticisms and Opposing Views

Coercion of Association and Speech

Union security agreements compel employees to financially support unions as a condition of employment, thereby infringing on freedom of association by forcing affiliation with an organization whose values, bargaining strategies, or political activities may conflict with individual beliefs.^[77] This requirement treats non-members as involuntary contributors to collective endeavors, undermining the voluntary nature of association protected under principles of individual liberty.^[78] Legal scholars have characterized such mandates as coercive, arguing they extract resources from dissenters to sustain union operations, including ideological advocacy, without affirmative consent.^[79] The coercion extends to compelled speech, as union expenditures frequently include political lobbying, campaign contributions, and public messaging that employees may oppose, effectively subsidizing expression at odds with personal convictions.^[80] Critics contend this violates core tenets of expressive freedom, where financial support equates to endorsement, particularly when unions allocate dues to partisan causes—such as 90% of AFL-CIO political spending favoring one major party in recent election cycles.^[78] Philosophical objections emphasize that authentic association arises from mutual agreement, not state-enforced extraction, rendering compelled dues a form of indirect conscription into group speech.^[81] Empirical evidence underscores latent resistance to such arrangements: following the elimination of mandatory fees in the public sector, opt-out rates ranged from 20% to 71% among eligible workers in jurisdictions previously requiring payments, with over one million total opt-outs estimated across non-right-to-work states by 2023.^[82]^[83] These figures, derived from union-reported data and state-level analyses, indicate that a substantial portion of workers—potentially up to 70% in high-opt-out units—harbored opposition but complied under duress, revealing the suppressive effect of coercion on revealed preferences.^[84] From foundational economic reasoning, labor operates as a voluntary exchange between workers and employers; union security clauses introduce artificial barriers, distorting market incentives by penalizing non-participation and reducing worker mobility to non-union opportunities.^[78] This interference prioritizes collective uniformity over individual autonomy, potentially leading to suboptimal employment matches where workers tolerate disliked associations solely to retain jobs, rather than pursuing alignments based on personal ideology or efficiency.^[85] Such distortions contravene causal mechanisms of free markets, where uncoerced choices aggregate to efficient outcomes, as evidenced by higher voluntary unionization in open-shop environments compared to compelled systems.^[86]

Economic Inefficiencies and Reduced Worker Autonomy

Union security agreements, by mandating dues or fees from all workers in a bargaining unit regardless of membership, impose fixed labor costs that deter employer hiring and expansion, particularly in competitive sectors. Research indicates that such arrangements correlate with reduced employment opportunities, as unions often negotiate rigid job protections and seniority rules that prioritize incumbents over new hires, effectively raising barriers to entry for job seekers. For instance, analyses of collective bargaining agreements show that monopolistic union provisions, including security clauses, restrict hiring by disadvantaging younger and entry-level workers through inflexible work rules.^[87]^[88] In jurisdictions without right-to-work laws permitting opt-outs from union fees, these agreements trap workers in unions that may underperform or pursue agendas misaligned with individual interests, eroding personal autonomy in labor decisions. Workers face coerced financial support for unions they cannot easily exit, limiting their ability to negotiate independently or switch to alternative representations, which stifles intra-union competition and innovation in worker advocacy. Empirical evidence from right-to-work states demonstrates higher job creation rates without corresponding wage declines, as evidenced by private sector employment growth of 27% in right-to-work states from 2001 to 2016, compared to 15% in non-right-to-work states, suggesting that fee compulsion hinders labor market dynamism rather than enhancing it.^[89]^[90] Secured revenue streams from mandatory fees exacerbate risks of corruption and diversion to non-representational activities, such as political spending, diverting resources from core member services. High-profile cases, including the United Auto Workers scandal uncovered in 2017, involved embezzlement and fraud by officials using union funds for personal gain, enabled by stable dues inflows that reduced accountability pressures. Such patterns illustrate how guaranteed payments insulate union leadership from member oversight, fostering inefficiencies where political expenditures—totaling billions annually from union treasuries—often prioritize ideological goals over workplace bargaining efficacy.^[91]^[92]

Key Legal Controversies

Pre-Janus Agency Fee Challenges

In the mid-20th century, early legal disputes over union security provisions, including requirements for non-members to pay fees for representation, centered on First Amendment claims of compelled speech and association. Under the Railway Labor Act, which governed certain private-sector transportation workers, the Supreme Court addressed such challenges in Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson (1956), upholding a union shop agreement that mandated non-union employees to pay full union dues as a condition of employment. The Court reasoned that congressional authorization of such agreements served the governmental interest in promoting industrial peace and collective bargaining stability, outweighing any incidental burden on individual speech rights, though it observed in dicta that using fees for political activities unrelated to bargaining might implicate different constitutional concerns. Building on Hanson, the Court in International Association of Machinists v. Street (1961) refined the analysis by prohibiting unions from expending compulsory dues on political or ideological causes opposed by objecting employees, holding that such uses violated First Amendment protections against compelled expression.^[93] The decision distinguished between fees allocable to core representational activities—like negotiating wages and working conditions—and those funding partisan efforts, requiring unions to establish refund mechanisms for the latter to mitigate free-rider problems while respecting dissenters' rights.^[93] Unions countered that full fee requirements were essential to finance the exclusive representation duties imposed by law, arguing that partial exemptions would undermine bargaining efficacy and encourage non-participation among beneficiaries.^[94] As public-sector collective bargaining expanded in the 1960s through state legislation—such as Wisconsin's 1959 Municipal Employment Relations Act and similar laws in over a dozen states by 1970—agency fee arrangements emerged as a variant of union security, allowing non-members to pay proportional shares for bargaining services without full membership.^[95] These provisions faced scrutiny in state courts, where rulings diverged: some invalidated agency shops as coercive infringements on free speech or association under state constitutions, emphasizing individual autonomy over collective mandates; others deferred to statutory goals of labor stability, analogizing to federal private-sector precedents like Hanson and Street to justify fees limited to representational costs.^[96] Federal courts similarly showed deference to legislative schemes promoting unified bargaining units, viewing agency fees as a pragmatic tool to internalize the costs of representation borne by all employees, though persistent objections highlighted tensions between avoiding free riders and preserving voluntary expression.^[95] This patchwork of decisions underscored ongoing constitutional friction, with unions defending fees as causally necessary for effective negotiation and opponents decrying them as involuntary subsidies for union operations.

Political Spending and Compelled Subsidies

Unions under union security agreements collect full dues from members and, prior to the 2018 Janus decision, agency fees from non-members in non-right-to-work jurisdictions, with these funds supporting a range of activities including political expenditures.^[97] Labor organizations reported $1,616,575,642 in spending on political activities and lobbying during the 2021-2022 period via Labor Department LM-2 filings, representing a 12% increase from the prior cycle and comprising a substantial share of total budgets.^[98] Membership dues directly or indirectly financed nearly 60% of this political outlay, enabling unions to engage in electioneering, issue advocacy, and lobbying efforts often detached from core collective bargaining.^[99] These expenditures disproportionately favor left-leaning causes and Democratic candidates, with public-sector unions directing over 95% of their political action committee contributions to Democrats in recent cycles.^[100] For instance, the National Education Association allocated 18% of its budget to political activities in the 2020-2021 fiscal year, while representational spending—directly benefiting members—accounted for a smaller fraction of overall dues revenue.^[101] Critics contend this creates compelled subsidies for ideological positions misaligned with many workers' preferences, as union households exhibit voting patterns more evenly split than spending allocations suggest, with substantial support for Republican candidates in national elections.^[102] In the private sector, the 1988 Supreme Court ruling in Communications Workers v. Beck mandated that non-members could object to subsidizing non-bargaining expenses, including politics, reducing their fees accordingly; public-sector equivalents existed pre-Janus.^[97] However, exercise of these opt-out provisions remains rare, hampered by unions' opaque notification processes, complex objection requirements, and limited worker awareness, resulting in minimal rebates despite potential eligibility for millions of represented employees.^[103] This low utilization perpetuates funding for political activities—totaling billions across cycles—that influence policy on issues like labor regulations and taxation, often prioritizing union leadership agendas over individual member majorities.^[104] Such dynamics have intensified advocacy for right-to-work laws, which eliminate mandatory payments altogether and thereby curtail involuntary political subsidies.^[105]

Landmark Supreme Court Decisions

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977)

In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a challenge by non-union public school teachers in Detroit who objected to paying agency fees under a union security agreement in their collective bargaining contract with the Detroit Board of Education. The teachers argued that the requirement to pay fees equivalent to union dues violated their First Amendment rights by compelling support for union activities they opposed, including political advocacy. The case arose after Michigan law authorized such agency shop arrangements for public employees, and the union had used fees for both bargaining-related expenses and unrelated ideological causes.^[106]^[107] On May 23, 1977, the Court ruled unanimously that states could constitutionally require non-union public employees to pay agency fees to fund collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance processing, as these activities provided benefits to all employees regardless of union membership and prevented free-rider problems without infringing core speech rights. However, the Court held that such fees could not be used to subsidize political or ideological expenditures unrelated to those representational functions, such as lobbying for partisan causes or supporting candidates, as this would compel non-members to endorse views they rejected, violating the First Amendment. This distinction permitted states to enact mandatory fee systems but mandated procedures for objectors to verify and rebate non-chargeable portions, often through arbitration or audits.^[106]^[107]^[108] The Abood decision established a framework for public sector union security by validating agency fees as a tool for labor stability while imposing limits on their scope, influencing subsequent state laws and union practices that calculated "fair share" fees by excluding ideological costs. It affirmed that the government's interest in efficient bargaining outweighed minor compelled speech burdens for chargeable activities, drawing analogies to private sector precedents under the National Labor Relations Act.^[106]^[109] Critics of the ruling highlighted the inherent ambiguity in demarcating chargeable bargaining expenses from non-chargeable ideological ones, such as union publications or conferences blending operational and advocacy elements, which fostered protracted disputes and administrative burdens. This vagueness prompted extensive litigation over fee apportionment, with unions and objectors frequently contesting classifications in court, as the line proved challenging to enforce precisely without subjective judgments. Empirical reviews of post-Abood challenges indicated that such ambiguities inflated legal costs and eroded the intended efficiency of agency fee systems.^[110]

Janus v. AFSCME (2018)

Mark Janus, a child support specialist employed by the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, served as the petitioner in the case, challenging provisions of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act that required non-union public-sector employees to pay agency fees to AFSCME Council 31 for collective bargaining services.^[110] ^[111] Janus objected to these fees, approximately $44.58 monthly from his paycheck, arguing they compelled him to subsidize speech with which he disagreed, including union positions on pensions and other policies.^[110] ^[112] On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision ruling in favor of Janus, holding that the extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment.^[110] ^[111] Justice Samuel Alito delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch, explicitly overruling Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977).^[110] ^[113] The Court determined that neither states nor public-sector unions may condition employment on payment of fees that subsidize union speech, as such compulsion infringes on employees' rights not to associate or express views they oppose.^[110] The majority reasoned that public-sector unions' speech, encompassing collective bargaining over wages, benefits, and policy, constitutes private expression rather than government speech, triggering strict First Amendment scrutiny.^[110] It rejected Abood's distinction between chargeable fees for representational activities and non-chargeable political spending, concluding that no sufficiently compelling government interest—such as avoiding free riders—justified the compelled subsidy, given the availability of less restrictive alternatives like voluntary contributions.^[110] ^[112] Justice Elena Kagan authored the dissent, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, contending that Abood had struck a permissible balance for labor peace and that overturning it disrupted settled expectations without adequate justification.^[110] The ruling took immediate effect, prohibiting public-sector unions nationwide from collecting agency fees from non-members and prompting rapid implementation, including directives to cease deductions and notifications to affected employees about opting out of prior arrangements.^[113] ^[111] This led to swift opt-outs among fee payers as of June 27, 2018, altering union revenue streams in the short term.^[110]

Post-Janus Landscape

Declines in Union Revenue and Membership

Following the 2018 Janus v. AFSCME decision, public-sector unions experienced significant initial declines in revenue and membership as non-members ceased paying agency fees, which had previously accounted for a substantial portion of funding. The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), the respondent in the case, saw its national revenue from dues drop by approximately 20 percent in the immediate aftermath, falling from $186 million to lower levels as local affiliates passed up reduced collections. Membership losses were pronounced, with AFSCME shedding over 200,000 members and former fee-payers nationwide by 2023, including an 18.5 percent drop at AFSCME Council 31 in Illinois, resulting in about $25 million in foregone annual revenue for that affiliate alone.^[114]^[115]^[116] Broader public-sector union density, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), declined from around 35 percent pre-Janus to 32.2 percent by 2024, reflecting a roughly 8 percent relative drop amid opt-outs by over one in five public workers in some estimates. Internal union disclosures and analyses indicate even steeper losses than BLS aggregates, which may understate impacts due to definitional differences in membership reporting, with total dues revenue across major public unions falling by hundreds of millions annually.^[117]^[118]^[119] To mitigate these losses, unions shifted to voluntary dues authorization campaigns, requiring affirmative opt-ins from workers and emphasizing member retention drives, while some affiliates issued refunds for pre-Janus agency fees collected without explicit consent. In states like Illinois, unions pursued litigation to challenge opt-out processes and retain deductions, though such efforts faced legal setbacks affirming Janus's voluntariness requirement. By 2025, these adaptations had stabilized but not reversed the declines, leaving public unions with smaller financial bases; however, observers note a pivot toward heightened militancy, evidenced by a surge in strikes—such as the 2018-2019 teacher walkouts in multiple states—as a means to demonstrate value and pressure for concessions despite reduced resources.^[120]^[116]^[121]

State Responses and Federal Policy Shifts

In response to the Janus decision, several Democratic-controlled states enacted legislation to facilitate union organizing and mitigate revenue losses by enhancing access to employee data and new hires. For instance, New York's 2019 state budget included provisions requiring public employers to notify unions within 30 days of hiring new employees and to provide updated workforce information, including home addresses and emails, to support voluntary membership drives.^[122] Similar measures in Illinois, effective from 2019, mandated public employers to furnish exclusive bargaining representatives with regular updates on employee contact details to aid recruitment efforts.^[123] New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington followed suit with laws allowing unions to withhold certain negotiated benefits—such as release time for union activities or legal representation in grievances—from non-dues-paying employees, thereby incentivizing membership without direct fee compulsion.^[124] These maneuvers aimed to counteract opt-outs by streamlining unions' ability to solicit voluntary dues, though their effectiveness has been mixed amid ongoing membership declines.^[125] Conversely, right-to-work (RTW) proponents in non-RTW states pursued expansions to extend opt-out protections to private-sector workers, building on Janus's public-sector implications, though successes were limited. Efforts in Midwestern states like Missouri, which upheld its 2017 RTW law via voter referendum in 2018 shortly after Janus, reinforced barriers to compulsory unionism without new enactments.^[55] Proposed RTW bills in states such as Minnesota and Pennsylvania gained traction in Republican-led legislatures post-2018 but faced vetoes or legislative defeats, preventing further territorial gains by 2025.^[126] No additional states adopted RTW laws between 2018 and 2025, leaving the count at 28, with Janus effectively imposing RTW-like rules on public-sector unions nationwide.^[55] At the federal level, no legislation successfully overrode Janus, as the ruling rested on First Amendment grounds beyond statutory reach. The Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act, introduced in 2021 to bolster private-sector union formation through measures like faster elections and penalties for employer interference, passed the House of Representatives but stalled repeatedly in the Senate, remaining unpassed as of October 2025.^[127] Biden administration initiatives, including National Labor Relations Board appointments favoring union positions and executive orders promoting collective bargaining, focused on private-sector enhancements and avoided direct confrontation with Janus's public-sector mandate.^[128] Ongoing litigation centers on recoupment of agency fees collected pre-Janus under the overruled Abood precedent, with plaintiffs seeking refunds for compelled payments deemed unconstitutional in retrospect. Federal and state courts have largely rejected retroactive claims, citing reliance interests and the absence of Janus's explicit retroactivity guidance, resulting in minimal repayments by 2025.^[129] Cases persist, including challenges to post-Janus state laws facilitating union access, but the Supreme Court has not revisited core Janus holdings, with lower courts occasionally enforcing stricter consent requirements amid accusations of evasion.^[130]^[131]

Empirical and Economic Impacts

Comparative Data on RTW vs. Non-RTW States

As of October 2025, 26 states have enacted right-to-work (RTW) laws that prohibit union security agreements requiring non-union employees to pay fees, compared to 24 non-RTW states.^[132] Empirical analyses from federal sources show RTW states outperforming non-RTW counterparts in key economic metrics, including employment growth and gross state product (GSP) expansion, suggesting that the absence of compulsory dues correlates with enhanced labor market dynamism.^[133]^[134] From 1977 to 1999, RTW states recorded an average annual GSP growth rate 0.5 percentage points higher than non-RTW states, driven by factors such as increased business investment and job creation.^[134] Between 1990 and 2011, employment in RTW states expanded more rapidly than in non-RTW states, alongside faster nominal income growth, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data analyzed by the Federal Reserve.^[133] More recent patterns from 2014 to 2024 indicate RTW states achieved superior overall employment gains, with total jobs rising at rates exceeding those in compulsory-dues states.^[132] Unemployment rates in RTW states have consistently trended lower, reflecting higher labor force participation and reduced structural barriers to hiring.^[133] Federal Reserve examinations link this to RTW's role in fostering flexible labor markets, where firms report increased investment and hiring post-adoption, offsetting any localized wage pressures from union density.^[135] Net migration flows favor RTW states, with workers relocating for greater employment opportunities and flexibility; a spatial analysis of border counties found RTW adoption associated with higher population growth, up to 19.1% in affected areas from 1940 to 2010 relative to non-RTW neighbors.^[90] This pattern is evident in manufacturing, where Southern RTW states like South Carolina, Georgia, and Texas have captured disproportionate job gains—South Carolina alone added over 24,000 reshored positions by mid-2025—attributed in part to RTW's appeal for capital-intensive industries avoiding union security constraints.^[136]^[137] While union security agreements in non-RTW states correlate with wage premiums for organized labor, econometric evidence indicates these are counterbalanced by diminished job creation and firm relocation, as mandatory fees elevate labor costs and deter expansion.^[135] RTW's prohibition on such clauses thus promotes broader employment access without suppressing overall economic output, challenging assertions that compulsory systems uniquely sustain worker prosperity.^[138]

Evidence on Wages, Employment, and Union Effectiveness

Empirical analyses consistently estimate a union wage premium of 10-20% for workers covered by collective bargaining agreements with security provisions, after adjusting for observables like education and experience.^[139]^[140] This premium arises from negotiated contracts that set above-market wages, but it varies by sector and has compressed over time, with recent studies showing averages around 10-15% in private-sector contexts.^[141] However, disaggregated data reveal sector-specific trade-offs: in industries like automobiles, unionized plants in non-right-to-work (RTW) states in the Midwest have experienced stagnant or declining employment, while non-union facilities in RTW Southern states have driven job growth, with the South accounting for 30% of U.S. auto jobs by 2023 compared to 15% in 1990.^[142]^[143] Union security mechanisms, by enabling higher wages without full worker consent, correlate with reduced employment levels in covered units, as firms respond to elevated labor costs with automation, relocation, or hiring restraint.^[90] Meta-analyses of RTW laws, which prohibit compulsory fees, indicate that their adoption boosts state-level employment by 1-3% over the long run, alongside higher labor force participation and manufacturing shares, without commensurate wage losses for non-union workers.^[138]^[133] These effects stem from increased labor market flexibility, as security agreements can deter firm entry and suppress job creation in high-union-density areas, evidenced by slower post-recession recovery in non-RTW states.^[135] Regarding union effectiveness, security provisions may reduce accountability to dues-payers, as revenue streams insulated from opt-outs incentivize broader political activities over member-specific services; post-Janus data from 2018-2023 shows public-sector unions lost hundreds of thousands of agency fee contributors but retained core membership rates among ideological supporters, with overall density stabilizing at 10% nationally.^[144]^[145] Voluntary funding models have not precipitated organizational collapse, suggesting sustained effectiveness for committed bases while prompting efficiency gains, such as targeted outreach to high-value members.^[146] Longitudinally, U.S. union density has fallen from approximately 35% in 1947 to 10% by 2024, coinciding with the erosion of mandatory security post-Taft-Hartley and accelerated by Janus.^[147] This decline parallels rising labor market dynamism, including higher job turnover, entrepreneurship, and overall employment growth, without evidence of union extinction or widespread wage erosion; instead, non-union sectors have absorbed expansions, yielding net prosperity gains despite localized disruptions in secured industries.^[67]^[148]

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Abood v. Detroit Board of Education | 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
The Court ruled, therefore, that the use of compulsory union dues for political purposes violated the Act itself. Nonetheless, it found that an injunction ...
[107]
D. Louis ABOOD et al., Appellants, v. DETROIT BOARD OF ...
The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the injunction on the ground that employees who disagreed with the objectives promoted by union expenditures were deprived of ...
[108]
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) | The First Amendment ...
Feb 6, 2025 · On First Amendment grounds, however, the Court prohibited the union from using the service fees for political and ideological purposes opposed ...
[109]
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education - Oyez
Appellant. Abood ; Appellee. Detroit Board of Education ; Docket no. 75-1153 ; Decided by. Burger Court ; Lower court. State appellate court ...Missing: ruling | Show results with:ruling
[110]
[PDF] 16-1466 Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees (06/27 ...
Jun 27, 2018 · Janus then sought review in this Court, asking us to overrule Abood and hold that public-sector agency-fee arrangements are unconstitutional.Missing: pre- | Show results with:pre-
[111]
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal ...
The Janus case questioned if non-union public employees could be forced to pay union fees. The court ruled that such fees violated the First Amendment, ...Missing: key | Show results with:key
[112]
JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
Jun 27, 2018 · Petitioner was undisputedly injured in fact by Illinois' agency-fee scheme and his injuries can be redressed by a favorable court decision. For ...Missing: background | Show results with:background
[113]
Opinion analysis: Court strikes down public-sector union fees ...
Jun 27, 2018 · In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the 1977 decision upholding agency fees, Alito explained, the Supreme Court pointed to the state's ...
[114]
Janus v. AFSCME at five: Government union membership at record ...
Unlike the two teachers' unions, AFSCME's revenue from dues, passed up the food chain by its local affiliates, declined 20 percent from $186 million in Dec.
[115]
AFSCME has lost 200K-plus members and fee-payers nationwide ...
May 10, 2023 · The union has shed members since it lost a 2018 US Supreme Court case, Janus v. AFSCME, which extended right-to-work to government workers nationwide.
[116]
5 years after Janus v. AFSCME, unions are smaller but more militant
Jun 26, 2023 · And AFSCME Council 31 – the union Janus sued – saw an 18.5% drop in membership. This membership loss means about $25 million stayed in ...
[117]
Union Members Summary - 2024 A01 Results
Jan 28, 2025 · The public-sector union membership rate, at 32.2 percent, also changed little over the year. The union membership rate continued to be highest ...
[118]
[PDF] The Janus Effect - Mackinac Center
The 2018 decision led to over one in five public sector workers resigning from unions, and a $740.4 million annual decrease in dues revenue.
[119]
[PDF] Public Unions' Money and Members Since Janus v. AFSCME
AFSCME—which ruled that nonunion government employees could not be compelled to pay “agency fees” to unions—would severely erode public-sector union membership ...
[120]
Janus Holding Does Not Relieve Public Sector Employees of ...
Mar 13, 2024 · After Janus, Unions have worked hard to reduce the number of free riders, and to lock employees into voluntarily paying union dues. One ...
[121]
Teacher Strikes Are Heating Up in More States - Education Week
Sep 7, 2018 · In June, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to teachers' unions with a decision that some warned could lead to an increase in labor unrest. The ...
[122]
New York is a union state
It serves to blunt Janus. Specifically, Part RRR requires public employers to: Notify the relevant union within 30 days of a new employee being hired, rehired, ...
[123]
Post-Janus Law Obliges Public Employers to Assist Unions
The new law requires Illinois public employers to regularly provide updated information about their workforce to any exclusive bargaining representative.Missing: state bolster
[124]
[PDF] Public-Sector Unions After Janus: An Update | Manhattan Institute
New state laws allow unions to withhold employment benefits—such as life insurance or legal representation in grievance proceedings—from nonunion members, ...
[125]
https://www.manhattan.institute/article/the-legal-aftermath-of-janus-v-afscme
[126]
Right-to-work laws - Ballotpedia
The state's right-to-work statute was enacted in 1947. On March 24, 2023, Michigan Gov. Gretchen Whitmer (D) signed Senate Bill 34, a bill repealing the state's ...
[127]
Janus v. AFSCME - The Federalist Society
In a 5-4 vote, the Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State of Illinois' extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees ...
[128]
AFSCME's Saunders on SCOTUS decision: We remain undeterred ...
Jun 27, 2025 · AFSCME President Lee Saunders released the following statement after the Supreme Court ruled to curtail federal judges' ability to issue nationwide injunctions.
[129]
The Legal Aftermath of Janus v. AFSCME - Manhattan Institute
Dec 21, 2021 · The unions have lost members and money—but the impact of the decision has been blunted by new state laws to boost their fortunes.
[130]
Lower courts ignore Supreme Court precedent to force union ...
Aug 1, 2025 · AFSCME decision: that no money may be taken from a public employee's paycheck for a union without the employee's clear and affirmative consent.Missing: bolster | Show results with:bolster
[131]
It's Time to End Government Unions' Post-Janus Coercion
Jul 6, 2025 · The Supreme Court has a chance to put some teeth on its ruling that workers can't be compelled to pay dues.
[132]
Right to Work Winning by More Than 2:1 - NRTWC
May 6, 2025 · Today, 26 states have Right to Work protections for employees. While federal law has authorized forced union financial support as a job ...
[133]
Understanding Workers' Financial Wellbeing in States with Right-to ...
Sep 8, 2023 · Proponents of RTW laws argue that passage of such laws support business investments and long-term economic growth. These arguments find support ...
[134]
The Economic Effects of Right-to-Work Laws | Richmond Fed
What's more, from 1977 through 1999, gross state product increased 0.5 percent faster on an average annual basis in right-to-work states. Wilson concludes that ...Missing: GDP comparison non-
[135]
The economic impact of right-to-work laws: Evidence from collective ...
Using data from collective bargaining agreements, we show that there is a decrease in wages for unionized workers after RTW laws. Firms increase investment and ...
[136]
Map Shows States Gaining Most Jobs Due to Reshoring Efforts
Jul 29, 2025 · South Carolina ranks second, claiming 24,800 reshored jobs, with Mississippi (12,100), New Mexico (9,800), and Michigan (8,700) rounding out the ...
[137]
Manufacturing is thriving in the South. Here's why neither party can ...
May 14, 2025 · Acknowledging that right-to-work laws have helped Southern manufacturing success cuts against Democratic commitments to organized labor.
[138]
Workers, Wages, and Economic Mobility: The Long-Run Effects of ...
Sep 28, 2023 · Our findings suggest that, contrary to union claims, RTW laws benefit workers by creating stronger labor markets and yielding higher employment without ...
[139]
Unpacking the Union Wage Premium | NBER
Aug 1, 2025 · There is broad agreement that the wages of unionized workers are higher than those of workers who are not union members.Missing: mandatory dues
[140]
Union 'effects' on hourly and weekly wages: A half-century perspective
Jun 25, 2024 · By 2023 the unadjusted weekly wage differential between union members and non-members was 31%, nearly half what it was 50 years previously.
[141]
Unions, Wages and Hours - Blanchflower - 2025 - Wiley Online Library
Jan 14, 2025 · We present the regression-adjusted union log weekly wage premium together with the t-statistic. In the 1980s, the differential was 17 log points ...
[142]
Auto jobs are booming in the union-hostile South | CNN Business
Sep 20, 2023 · Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the auto industry began shifting South, a region long characterized by hostility to labor unions and by low ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[143]
Auto jobs are surging in notoriously anti-union South - CBT News
Sep 21, 2023 · According to S&P Global Market Intelligence, the South now accounts for 30% of all automotive jobs, up from 15% in 1990. At the same time, the ...Missing: empirical data
[144]
[PDF] Measuring Public-Sector Union Membership After Janus
An AFT spokesman confirmed as much in April 2019, telling Bloomberg Law that the union “lost 84,600 agency fee-payers” after Janus. 26 The spokesman also ...
[145]
The Impact of Janus on the Labor Movement, Five Years Later
Oct 31, 2023 · The Janus v. AFSCME Council 31 case was the third and final act in a trilogy of cases aimed at eliminating "fair share fees" or "agency ...
[146]
By the Numbers: Public Unions' Money and Members Since Janus v ...
Apr 14, 2022 · AFSCME—which ruled that nonunion government employees could not be compelled to pay “agency fees” to unions—would severely erode public-sector ...
[147]
https://www.statista.com/topics/10789/labor-unions-in-the-us/
[148]
Workers want unions, but the latest data point to obstacles in their path
Jan 23, 2024 · The overall unionization numbers mask large differences between the private sector and the public sector. Unionization is much lower in the ...