2 June Movement
The 2 June Movement (German: Bewegung 2. Juni) was a West German anarchist militant group based in West Berlin, active from late 1971 until its dissolution in 1980.[1][2][3] Named for the date on which student protester Benno Ohnesorg was fatally shot by police during a demonstration in Berlin on 2 June 1967, the group originated among working-class youth radicalized in the city's underground counterculture, drawing from collectives like Kommune 1, the Blues scene, and proto-guerrilla formations such as the Tupamaros West-Berlin and the Hash Rebels.[1][2][3] The movement espoused an antiauthoritarian ideology focused on anti-imperialism and opposition to capitalist state structures, viewing prisons and urban policing as extensions of global exploitation and seeking solidarity with Third World liberation struggles.[2][3] It carried out armed actions including bombings of symbolic targets like the British Yacht Club in 1972, the assassination of Berlin Judge Günter von Drenkmann in 1974, and approximately ten bank robberies to fund operations.[2][1] Its most prominent operation was the February 1975 kidnapping of Christian Democratic politician Peter Lorenz, in which the group successfully demanded the release of five imprisoned members and a ransom, with the freed militants flown to South Yemen.[2][1] Distinguishing itself from the contemporaneous Marxist-Leninist Red Army Faction through its anarchist orientation, the 2 June Movement maintained a fractious relationship with the RAF, marked by ideological disputes despite occasional tactical overlaps; some members later joined the RAF network.[1][3] Prominent figures included Fritz Teufel, Ralf Reinders, Ronald Fritzsch, Gerald Klöpper, Till Meyer, Andreas Vogel, and Michael "Bommi" Baumann, many of whom faced trials for actions like the Lorenz abduction, resulting in sentences of 10 to 15 years.[2] The group's evolution from cultural rebellion to urban guerrilla tactics reflected broader tensions in West Germany's radical left, influencing subsequent autonomist and revolutionary cells even as its violent methods drew widespread condemnation and contributed to heightened state security measures.[3][2]
Origins and Formation
Historical Context of the 1960s Protests
The student protests in West Germany during the 1960s, spearheaded by the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), arose amid opposition to the Vietnam War, with demonstrations drawing thousands to university campuses and streets starting as early as 1965, reflecting broader disillusionment with West Germany's alignment with U.S. foreign policy.[4] These actions intertwined with campaigns against the Axel Springer publishing empire, which controlled major outlets like Bild-Zeitung and was accused by protesters of monopolistic influence that stifled dissent and promoted conservative narratives, culminating in large-scale rallies such as the 1967-1968 efforts to block newspaper distribution.[5] Underlying these was a generational critique of post-World War II institutions, where activists highlighted continuities in authoritarian policing and societal norms from the Nazi period, fostering a narrative of incomplete denazification despite empirical evidence of West Germany's democratic consolidation under the Basic Law.[6] A critical escalation occurred on June 2, 1967, when 26-year-old student Benno Ohnesorg was shot dead by West Berlin police officer Karl-Heinz Kurras during a protest against the state visit of Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi near the Deutsche Oper.[7][8] The demonstration, involving around 5,000 participants, turned chaotic after plainclothes officers, some disguised as protesters, initiated violence, leading to Ohnesorg's fatal wounding in a courtyard; Kurras was acquitted in November 1967, claiming self-defense.[9] Radicals framed the incident as emblematic of state-sponsored brutality against unarmed civilians, amplifying distrust in authorities and serving as a rallying point for the extraparliamentary opposition (APO), though subsequent 2009 disclosures revealed Kurras as a Stasi informant since 1955 with no established link between his espionage and the shooting.[10][11] This event, compounded by perceived police excesses in subsequent clashes, catalyzed a shift from SDS-led non-violent tactics—such as teach-ins and occupations—to ideological fragmentation post-1968, as the group's membership, peaking at approximately 25,000, dissolved amid internal divisions by 1970.[12] Experiences of institutional resistance, including university administrations labeling SDS actions as disruptive and authorities enacting emergency laws in May 1968, reinforced causal perceptions among activists that legal channels were futile, paving the way for splinter groups to justify extralegal militancy as a response to systemic repression rather than isolated incidents.[4][5]Establishment in Early 1972
The 2 June Movement formally coalesced in January 1972 through a meeting of approximately 20 ideologically diverse militants in West Berlin, uniting disparate radical elements into a cohesive anarchist entity distinct from Marxist-Leninist groups like the Red Army Faction.[13] [14] This formation drew from the remnants of earlier scenes, including the "hash rebels"—a subculture blending cannabis use, petty crime, and anti-authoritarian agitation—and veterans of the Tupamaros West-Berlin and Kommune 1, whose members had grown disillusioned with the limitations of non-violent protest following events like the 1967 shooting of Benno Ohnesorg.[15] [2] Key figures such as Michael "Bommi" Baumann, radicalized by Ohnesorg's death, helped bridge the gap from cultural rebellion to organized militancy, emphasizing direct action against perceived state and imperialist structures.[16] The group's name explicitly referenced the June 2, 1967, incident, framing it as a foundational symbol of police brutality and resistance to authoritarianism, which motivated the shift toward armed operations.[2] Early cells operated loosely in West Berlin's underground, experimenting with rudimentary explosives like pipe bombs, as participants sought to transcend the perceived futility of street demonstrations.[14] This establishment phase culminated in the group's first publicly claimed action on February 2, 1972, a bombing at the Deutsch-Britischer Yacht Club in Berlin, targeting a site associated with British presence and timed in solidarity with events like Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland; the explosion inadvertently killed night watchman Erwin Beelitz, underscoring the operational risks and unintended consequences of their nascent tactics.[13] [2] These initial steps established patterns of symbolic attacks on institutional targets without broader manifestos, setting the Movement apart through its anarchist roots and aversion to hierarchical structures.[14]Ideology and Motivations
Anarchist Foundations and Anti-State Rationale
The 2 June Movement espoused anarchist principles that prioritized spontaneous, leaderless action over the hierarchical structures associated with Marxist-Leninist organizations like the Red Army Faction.[17] This rejection of vanguardist models stemmed from a commitment to anti-authoritarian decentralization, viewing centralized leadership as a reproduction of state oppression.[1] Influenced by broader anarchist traditions, the group advocated for direct, mass-based resistance rather than reliance on an elite revolutionary cadre.[17] Central to their anti-state rationale was the concept of "propaganda of the deed," wherein violent actions served to expose the illegitimacy of state power and inspire broader revolt.[18] Adhering to a causal view that peaceful protests, such as those following the 1967 killing of Benno Ohnesorg, had failed to dismantle entrenched power structures, the Movement deemed armed urban guerrilla tactics necessary to reveal the state's repressive core.[1] They critiqued West Germany's democratic institutions as a mere facade masking continuities with fascist authoritarianism, justifying attacks on symbols of state authority to undermine public acquiescence.[17] This ideology empirically dismissed the Federal Republic's social market economy as perpetuating capitalist exploitation under liberal democratic guise, rendering electoral participation futile.[1] Direct action was thus elevated over reformist politics, with the group asserting that only confrontational violence could rupture the system's stability and catalyze anti-imperialist struggle.[17] However, this equivalence of democratic governance with fascism overlooks verifiable distinctions, including the FRG's constitutional protections, independent judiciary, and absence of totalitarian control, which empirical data on civil liberties post-1949 substantiates as departures from Nazi-era mechanisms.[17]Specific Grievances and Justifications for Violence
The 2 June Movement articulated grievances centered on the perceived monopolistic influence of Axel Springer's media empire, which controlled outlets like Bild and was accused of propagating conservative biases that stifled leftist dissent and inflamed public opinion against protesters. Activists claimed Springer's coverage, particularly following the 1967 shooting of student Benno Ohnesorg, portrayed demonstrators as aggressors while downplaying police overreach, thereby justifying state repression. This criticism echoed broader 1960s student protests, where Springer's pro-government stance was seen as undermining democratic discourse.[19][20] Another focal point was the U.S. military presence in West Germany, framed as a remnant of postwar occupation and enabler of imperialist policies, including support for the Vietnam War. The group viewed NATO bases as symbols of foreign domination that perpetuated Cold War alignments against socialist aspirations, with protests targeting them as legitimate sites of resistance to global capitalism. This perspective aligned with anti-imperialist sentiments prevalent in the extraparliamentary opposition, interpreting U.S. installations as extensions of exploitative power rather than defensive alliances.[17] Domestically, the Movement perceived the West German state as a de facto continuation of Nazi authoritarianism, citing the 1968 emergency laws (Notstandsgesetze)—which empowered the government to suspend civil liberties during crises—as a mechanism for reimposing fascist control. Police tactics, exemplified by the fatal shooting of Ohnesorg during a 1967 protest against the Shah of Iran, were denounced as evidence of unchecked brutality inherited from the Third Reich, with many officials allegedly former Nazis evading denazification. Grievances extended to persistent authoritarian structures in universities and bureaucracy, where radicals argued unaddressed Nazi legacies suppressed radical change.[21][22] These complaints justified violence as preemptive self-defense against an allegedly proto-fascist state apparatus poised to crush dissent, with militants positing armed actions as necessary to disrupt repressive cycles before escalation. Radical left sympathizers regarded such grievances as authentic spurs to revolutionary praxis, validating militancy amid perceived systemic threats. However, conservative analyses and empirical realities countered that claims of Nazi continuity overstated remnants—West Germany had undergone extensive denazification, boasted the Wirtschaftswunder economic miracle lifting millions from poverty by the 1960s, and enacted democratic reforms like expanded civil rights—while police responses often reacted to protester-initiated violence rather than initiating fascist reversion. No concentration camps or systematic torture existed, rendering the fascist label a hyperbolic projection that ignored the state's constitutional safeguards and prosperity.[23][17]Organizational Structure
Internal Dynamics and Loose Hierarchy
The 2 June Movement maintained a decentralized, non-hierarchical structure composed of autonomous affinity groups, predominantly operating in West Berlin, which reflected its anarchist rejection of centralized authority.[24] This cell-based model prioritized small, self-organizing units over formal command chains, enabling rapid, spontaneous actions but frequently resulting in coordination challenges across groups.[25] The absence of rigid leadership embodied the group's commitment to proletarian self-activity, yet it fostered operational inconsistencies, as decisions emerged ad hoc from individual initiatives rather than unified strategy.[2] Logistical support depended on communal living in shared safe houses, production of forged documents for mobility and evasion, and reliance on informal underground networks for resources and intelligence.[26] Funding was secured through expropriatory acts such as bank robberies, aligning with the anarchist ethos of direct action against capitalist institutions, though this approach demanded constant improvisation amid police pressure.[3] These elements sustained clandestinity but amplified vulnerabilities, as disruptions in one cell could isolate others without fallback hierarchies. In contrast to the Red Army Faction's (RAF) more ideologically disciplined Marxist-Leninist cells, which enforced stricter cadre selection and theoretical conformity, the 2 June Movement imposed fewer purity tests, emphasizing personal motivation and anti-authoritarian spontaneity.[27] This permissiveness encouraged diverse participation from subcultural backgrounds but yielded variable action quality, with some operations marked by tactical errors attributable to uncoordinated efforts.[25] Over time, such internal fragmentation, exacerbated by arrests and ideological drifts, undermined cohesion, culminating in the group's self-dissolution in 1980 as a reflection of its foundational contradictions.[25]Key Members and Roles
Fritz Teufel emerged as a prominent ideologue and spokesperson for the 2 June Movement, drawing from his background in the Kommune 1 commune where he employed satirical and provocative tactics often described as "fun guerrilla" actions to challenge authority.[28] His role involved issuing communiques and framing the group's anarchist stance against state power, though he maintained a degree of separation from direct operational violence in public narratives. Teufel evaded full accountability for group activities until his arrest on June 4, 1975, when authorities charged him with leadership involvement in the kidnapping of CDU politician Peter Lorenz earlier that year.[28] Following conviction, he served prison time but was released in the late 1970s, later distancing himself from militancy and living quietly until his death in 2010.[29] Michael "Bommi" Baumann, alongside Georg von Rauch, initiated the group's formation in the wake of Rauch's fatal shooting by police on December 4, 1971, focusing initially on hashish-related rebellion and anti-police actions.[16] Baumann contributed to early bombings and arson but grew critical of the movement's escalating violence and ideological rigidity, authoring the 1975 memoir Wie alles anfing (How It All Began), which detailed internal fractures and renounced armed struggle as counterproductive.[30] While in hiding, he rejected further participation, highlighting personal disillusionment with the shift from spontaneous revolt to structured terrorism, and avoided arrest through the group's active period, later integrating into civilian life without further militancy.[31] Inge Viett played operational roles in logistics and support, including multiple prison escapes that sustained group continuity; arrested initially in October 1972, she escaped in late 1973, and after rearrest in 1976, fled again in February 1977 with other female prisoners using smuggled tools.[32] Her activities extended to communique preparation and evasion tactics, reflecting the group's emphasis on prisoner solidarity. Following the 2 June Movement's disbandment on June 2, 1980, Viett joined the Red Army Faction briefly before fleeing to East Germany in 1980, where she received protection until German reunification led to her 1990 arrest and conviction for prior attacks.[33] Till Meyer managed logistical aspects such as safehouses and material procurement, and participated in the February 27, 1975, kidnapping of Peter Lorenz, for which he received a prison sentence as part of the Moabit trials.[34] Meyer escaped custody in late 1973 but was recaptured, later cooperating with authorities post-dissolution due to shared anti-extremist views, providing intelligence that aided RAF investigations.[35] His trajectory underscores internal divergences, transitioning from active membership to informant role after the group's 1980 end.[36] Ralf Reinders, a core operative, contributed to planning attacks and authored post-group reflections in Die Bewegung 2. Juni (1995) with Ronald Fritzsch, detailing hash rebels' evolution into militants while critiquing state repression.[37] Imprisoned as one of the Moabit six for involvement in murders and the Lorenz kidnapping, Reinders served extended terms until release in the 1980s, advocating for prisoner rights internationally during incarceration but ceasing violence thereafter.[2]