Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Council for National Security

The Council for National Security (CNS) was a that seized power in on 19 2006 through a , ousting elected Thaksin Shinawatra and abrogating the 1997 constitution. Initially named the Council for Democratic Reform under the , it adopted the CNS title on 1 October 2006 while declaring , dissolving parliament and the , and assuming supreme executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Led by General , the first Muslim commander of the Royal Thai Army, the CNS appointed retired General as interim and tasked him with combating and reforming amid allegations of Thaksin's and electoral irregularities. The junta's tenure, lasting until its effective dissolution following the December 2007 elections, focused on restoring institutional stability, drafting a new via , and addressing southern and economic grievances exacerbated under Thaksin's populist rule, though it drew criticism for suspending democratic processes and enabling military oversight of civilian affairs. Key actions included establishing an Assets Examination Committee to probe Thaksin's wealth and enacting an interim that curtailed certain , reflecting the military's prioritization of monarchical loyalty and national unity over immediate electoral restoration. Controversies persisted over of , lèse-majesté enforcement, and the junta's retention of powers over appointments, underscoring tensions between short-term and long-term democratic erosion.

Historical Context

Political Instability and Corruption under Thaksin Shinawatra

, serving as from February 2001 to September 2006, implemented populist policies that boosted economic growth and rural support but increasingly drew accusations of and authoritarian governance. His administration faced allegations of , including favoritism toward family-owned Shin Corporation, which expanded significantly during his tenure through government contracts and regulatory leniency. In January 2006, Thaksin's family sold a 49.6% stake in Shin Corporation to Singapore's for approximately $1.9 billion in a tax-exempt deal under a special provision, sparking widespread controversy over conflicts of interest and evasion of capital gains taxes estimated at $1.8 billion. Corruption probes intensified post-ouster, with courts convicting Thaksin for abusing power, such as in a 2003 land purchase where his wife participated in bidding for state-owned property at a discounted rate, violating conflict-of-interest laws. In 2010, Thailand's ruled Thaksin guilty in four of five " corruption" cases, ordering the seizure of nearly $1.6 billion in assets for directing state policies to benefit his interests. These rulings highlighted systemic , including appointments of relatives to key positions and alleged in Shin Corporation shares ahead of regulatory approvals. Thaksin's 2003 "" exacerbated perceptions of instability through extrajudicial violence, with official figures reporting 2,274 deaths by May 2003, many attributed to or vigilante actions without ; human rights groups estimated over 2,500 killings, including innocents blacklisted as suspects. Thaksin defended the campaign, denying state involvement in summary executions and claiming most deaths were from criminal infighting, though parliamentary inquiries later confirmed widespread abuses. censorship and lese-majeste prosecutions further alienated urban elites and intellectuals, fostering accusations of eroding democratic checks. By late 2005, opposition coalesced into mass protests led by the (PAD), drawing tens of thousands to streets against Thaksin's perceived dictatorship and electoral dominance via the , which secured supermajorities in 2001 and 2005 elections amid vote-buying claims. PAD rallies peaked in February 2006 following the Shin sale revelation, with demonstrators occupying government sites and demanding Thaksin's resignation; a snap April 2006 election, boycotted by opponents, was annulled by the courts for irregularities, deepening the deadlock. This polarization, combining elite backlash against populist centralization with institutional erosion, culminated in acute governance paralysis by mid-2006.

The September 2006 Coup d'État

On September 19, 2006, the Royal Thai Army executed a bloodless coup d'état against the caretaker government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. The operation, commanded by Army Chief of Staff General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, involved deploying approximately 300 tanks and armored vehicles to surround key government sites in Bangkok, including the Government House, Parliament, and Supreme Court, without reported casualties or resistance. The coup leaders immediately declared martial law across the country, dissolved both houses of Parliament, abrogated the 1997 Constitution, and dismissed the Cabinet, citing Thaksin's alleged corruption, abuse of power, and erosion of democratic institutions as justifications for intervention. General Sonthi announced the formation of the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDR) as the provisional ruling authority, pledging to safeguard the monarchy, restore order, and prepare for future elections under a revised constitution. The CDR sought and received tacit endorsement from King Bhumibol Adulyadej, as evidenced by a televised ceremony where General Sonthi paid respects before a royal shrine. Thaksin responded by declaring a and attempting to dismiss General Sonthi, but these orders were ignored as military units secured communication centers and airports to prevent counteractions. Within days, the appointed retired General as interim prime minister and began censoring media outlets critical of the coup while assuring international observers of a swift return to civilian rule. On October 1, , the was restructured and renamed the Council for National Security (CNS), which promulgated an interim granting it , legislative, and oversight powers until a new charter could be drafted. The CNS committed to reforms and military restructuring, though critics, including organizations, highlighted risks to democratic norms and potential suppression of dissent.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Composition and Key Members

The Council for National Security (CNS) was primarily composed of high-ranking officers from the Royal Thai and the Royal Thai , reflecting its origins as a following the September 19, 2006, . Initially announced as the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) on the day of the coup, its core structure featured a president and three deputy chiefs drawn from the , , , and command. This composition ensured unified control over Thailand's security apparatus during the transitional period. Key leadership positions were as follows:
PositionNameBranch/Service
PresidentRoyal Thai Army
First Deputy ChiefAdmiral Sathiraphan Keyanon
Second Deputy ChiefAir Chief Marshal Chalit Pukbhasuk
Third Deputy ChiefGeneral Ruangroj Mahathanin
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the army and coup leader, served as from the coup until his resignation on October 1, 2007, after which Chalit Pukbhasuk acted in the role. The secretary-general position was held by Mongkol Ampornpisit, an assistant army , who coordinated administrative functions. This military-dominated structure prioritized operational command over civilian input, with no formal civilian members in the core .

Stated Mandate and Objectives

The Council for National Security (CNS), formerly known as the Council for Democratic Reform, declared its intervention on September 19, 2006, to address a profound characterized by widespread , abuse of power, societal division, and threats to democratic institutions and the under Thaksin Shinawatra's government. , the CNS leader, emphasized that the coup aimed to unite the polarized nation and avert impending violence from escalating protests and institutional deadlock. Under the Interim Constitution promulgated on October 1, 2006, the CNS was mandated to supervise state administration temporarily, maintain , reform political structures, and prevent disruptions to societal, economic, and administrative stability until a new could be drafted and elections held, targeted within one year. The council explicitly disavowed intentions of permanent rule, pledging instead to appoint a civilian interim government led by retired General , who aligned with CNS goals by prioritizing among Thais, economic recovery, and restoration of public confidence through balanced executive, legislative, and judicial functions. Key objectives included eradicating systemic and in government and ranks, restructuring the armed forces to enhance loyalty and efficiency, fostering national reconciliation, and safeguarding core institutions such as the , which the portrayed as under implicit threat from Thaksin's policies. These aims were framed as prerequisites for genuine democratic restoration, with the CNS retaining oversight powers, including authority over key appointments and legislative actions, to ensure reforms' implementation.

Major Actions and Reforms

Transitional Timeline to Civilian Government

Following the September 19, 2006, , the Council for National Security (CNS) promulgated an interim on October 1, 2006, and appointed retired General as of the interim civilian government, tasked with overseeing reforms, drafting a new , and preparing for elections. The interim framework dissolved the previous parliament, established a 250-member National appointed by on CNS recommendation, and created a Constitution Drafting Assembly to produce a permanent within one year. In March 2007, Surayud announced plans for general elections by December, contingent on constitutional approval, while the Constitutional Tribunal dissolved Thaksin Shinawatra's on May 30, 2007, for electoral violations, banning 111 executives from politics for five years. The draft 2007 , emphasizing monarchical oversight and military-appointed influence, was submitted for on August 19, 2007, where it passed with 57.81% approval on a 59% turnout. Elections were scheduled for December 23, 2007, by the , with the CNS lifting some emergency decrees but retaining influence through the appointed . The vote saw Thaksin-aligned People's Power Party secure 233 of 480 House seats, followed by the Democrat Party's 165; the interim government yielded power as , a PPP nominee, was elected on January 28, 2008, and sworn in February 6, 2008, restoring elected civilian rule under the new constitution. The CNS effectively dissolved its governing role thereafter, though military elements persisted via appointments and mandates.

Anti-Corruption Investigations and Purges

The Council for National Security (CNS), following the September 19, 2006, coup d'état, prioritized anti-corruption efforts as a core justification for its intervention, targeting alleged irregularities in state contracts and asset accumulation under the prior Thaksin Shinawatra administration. On September 24, 2006, the CNS established the Assets Examination Committee (AEC), an ad hoc body empowered to probe public officials' actions deemed to have caused undue damage to state interests, including improper asset gains through policy decisions or contracts. The AEC focused on high-profile cases, such as the 2003 purchase of land by Thaksin's wife for a DTAC bidding process and potential overpricing in the Suvarnabhumi Airport construction project, compiling evidence for potential asset seizures and referrals to courts. By June 11, 2007, the AEC ordered the freezing of 21 bank accounts held by Thaksin, his wife, and family members, totaling approximately $1.6 billion, citing unexplained wealth accumulation linked to public office abuses. These measures extended to broader scrutiny of Thaksin-era policies, with the committee recommending criminal referrals for ministers involved in decisions that allegedly enriched private interests, such as concessions and deals. Outcomes included asset forfeitures and ongoing litigation, though Thaksin contested the freezes as politically motivated, arguing insufficient evidence of direct . Complementing investigations, the CNS conducted purges to remove officials perceived as complicit in systemic or loyal to the ousted regime. On September 22, 2006, it sacked multiple senior officials implicated in graft or viewed as risks, initiating transfers of military officers to inactive posts to neutralize potential opposition. These actions, framed as reforms to restore institutional , affected at least 18 high-ranking commanders and extended to executives questioned over biased coverage. While the purges aimed to dismantle crony networks, critics noted their selective nature, primarily targeting Thaksin allies rather than uniformly addressing entrenched military graft. Subsequent audits under CNS oversight, including empowerment of the Auditor-General for probes, facilitated further dismissals in state enterprises, though verifiable convictions remained limited during the transitional period.

Military Restructuring and Security Enhancements

The Council for National Security (CNS), following the September 19, 2006 coup, prioritized depoliticizing the Royal Thai Army by reshuffling senior command positions to favor arch-royalist factions, such as the "Eastern Tigers" group, over officers aligned with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. This restructuring aimed to restore professional autonomy and loyalty to the monarchy, reversing perceived encroachments by Thaksin's administration on military promotions and deployments. Defense expenditures saw substantial growth under CNS oversight, with the 2007 military budget increasing 33% to 115 billion baht from 2006 levels, facilitating enhanced operational capacities and procurement. By 2007, the overall defense allocation stood at approximately $3.3 billion, supporting expanded roles. The interim government appointed by the CNS further approved 556 million baht in late December 2006 to establish a 14,000-strong force dedicated to maintaining civic order and countering anti-junta protests. These enhancements extended to institutional frameworks, including the transformation of the initial Council for Democratic Reform into a permanent CNS advisory body under the 2006 interim constitution, granting it ongoing authority over policy. The subsequent Internal Security Act of 2008, influenced by post-coup dynamics, bolstered the military's role through the (ISOC), emphasizing proactive measures against domestic threats like the southern . Such steps insulated the armed forces from direct civilian oversight, prioritizing stability over broader security sector reforms.

Drafting of the 2007 Constitution

Following the 2006 coup d'état, the Council for National Security (CNS) issued 's interim on October 1, 2006 (B.E. 2549), which abrogated the 1997 and outlined a framework for drafting a permanent replacement, including the establishment of a () to produce a new draft within one year. This interim document vested significant authority in the CNS, including the power to appoint key bodies and retain control if the draft failed a required . On October 27, 2006, a royal decree established the , comprising 100 members appointed by King on the 's recommendation, and a smaller Drafting of 35 experts tasked with preparing the initial text. The process incorporated limited public input through provincial hearings and opinion surveys, but the appointed nature of the bodies ensured CNS oversight, with no provisions for direct elected or for ousted political factions. The committee finalized a by April 2007, emphasizing , monarchical prerogatives, and checks on executive power, which was then debated and approved by the CDA before submission to the CNS-appointed National Legislative Assembly (NLA) in July 2007. The interim mandated a national for validation, with rejection empowering the CNS to select and amend any prior constitution without further consultation. On August 19, 2007, voters approved the draft by 57.99% (with 42.01% against and a 59% turnout), though support was regionally polarized, exceeding 70% in royalist strongholds like the central and northern provinces but falling below 40% in Thaksin Shinawatra's rural northeastern base. Critics, including international observers, highlighted irregularities such as dominance and restrictions on no-vote campaigning, arguing the process prioritized military consolidation over democratic legitimacy. King Bhumibol promulgated the on August 24, 2007 (B.E. 2550), effective immediately, marking the CNS's transition toward civilian rule while embedding provisions like an appointed to balance elected lower houses and enhanced judicial oversight of elections. The document's enabled elections in December 2007 but preserved CNS influence through ongoing ties and security mandates, reflecting the council's strategic embedding of and stability mechanisms amid post-coup instability.

Management of State Enterprises and Economy

The Council for National Security (CNS) exercised direct influence over state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by appointing its military leaders to boards of directors, aiming to depoliticize management and align operations with priorities amid allegations of under the prior administration. These appointments targeted entities, ensuring oversight by coup-aligned figures to curb perceived and favoritism in , contracts, and policy decisions. In 2006, Thailand's 59 SOEs generated combined revenues exceeding those of many private firms, underscoring their economic significance, which the CNS sought to stabilize post-coup. Under the interim government appointed by the CNS, economic policy pivoted to the philosophy espoused by King , prioritizing moderation, resilience, and self-immunity over aggressive expansion to mitigate risks from speculative growth and external vulnerabilities. , installed on October 1, 2006, emphasized this framework in public statements, rejecting GDP-centric metrics in favor of that incorporated ethical and environmental considerations. This shift contrasted with Thaksin-era policies, which had accelerated SOE involvement in populist initiatives but were criticized for inflating debt and distorting markets through state interventions. The CNS-backed administration also enacted measures to retain public control over strategic SOEs, approving draft legislation in late 2006 to prohibit of entities like the (EGAT), reversing prior momentum toward to safeguard national from foreign or influence. Such policies aimed to foster long-term but contributed to , exemplified by a 5% drop in shares of the state media firm after directives shifted its focus from to objectives. Overall, these efforts yielded mixed results: while probes targeted SOE executives linked to Thaksin, the emphasis on caution slowed recovery from post-coup market jitters, with GDP growth dipping to 4.8% in 2007 from 4.6% in 2006 amid tightened capital controls imposed in December 2006.

Security Measures and Controversies

Emergency Powers and Protest Controls

Following the 19 September coup, the Council for National Security (CNS), led by General , immediately declared across , conferring extensive emergency powers on the to restore order amid the precipitated by anti-Thaksin Shinawatra protests. These powers enabled to conduct warrantless searches, seize , and detain suspects for up to seven days without formal charges, while prohibiting public assemblies that could incite unrest. The declaration was justified by CNS leaders as essential to avert escalation of the divisions that had fueled months of demonstrations in , where tens of thousands had gathered against Shinawatra's government since early . Protest controls were enforced stringently to dismantle the momentum of existing movements and prevent counter-demonstrations against the coup. Political gatherings were outright banned, with military checkpoints established in and troop deployments to monitor potential flashpoints, effectively dispersing residual pro-Thaksin rallies within days of the takeover. By October 2006, the CNS had cancelled scheduled snap elections—intended for 15 October—and dissolved parliament, framing these steps as safeguards against electoral violence that organizers like had warned could mirror past unrest. General Sonthi publicly expressed concerns that unchecked protests risked derailing the promised , prompting calls for stricter enforcement if demonstrations reignited. These measures stabilized the capital in the short term, with no large-scale clashes reported during the initial months, but they curtailed freedoms of assembly and expression, as documented in contemporaneous assessments. The CNS retained oversight of emergency decree applications, extending similar powers from the pre-coup southern context to urban areas when needed, allowing indefinite extensions in high-risk zones. Critics, including international observers, noted that while the controls averted immediate chaos, they entrenched military authority over civilian dissent, setting precedents for future operations.

Enforcement of Lèse-Majesté and Media Regulations

Following the 19 September 2006 coup, the Council for National Security intensified enforcement of Thailand's lèse-majesté law under Article 112 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes , , or against the , , heir-apparent, or with penalties of up to 15 years per offense. Prior to the coup, prosecutions averaged about five cases annually, but the subsequent five years saw over 400 cases, marking a sharp escalation attributed to the junta's efforts to safeguard monarchical institutions amid political turmoil. The CNS encouraged public reporting of violations and targeted content perceived as undermining royal authority, including online materials and public statements by coup opponents, framing such actions as essential for national stability. In parallel, the CNS imposed stringent media regulations to control information flow and prevent dissemination of content deemed destabilizing or violative of lèse-majesté. On the night of the coup, military forces secured all major television stations with tanks and troops, directing broadcasters to air images of the and barring footage of protests or coup resistance. By military decree, approximately 400 stations, many aligned with ousted Thaksin Shinawatra's support base in northern and northeastern regions, were shuttered to curb pro-Thaksin advocacy. These measures extended to digital media, with the junta monitoring broadcasts for "constructive" coverage promoting unity and introducing a draft law on 15 November 2006 to criminalize the creation, possession, or dissemination of online content threatening , including lèse-majesté violations. Print media faced no reported direct but operated under induced , while websites like the activist-run 19sep were ordered closed. The CNS justified these controls as necessary to mitigate unrest and protect sensitive institutions, though they fostered widespread media compliance and limited critical discourse on the coup.

Allegations of Human Rights Abuses and Responses

Following the 19 September 2006 coup, the Council for National Security (CNS) declared nationwide, enabling security forces to individuals without immediate judicial oversight and restrict public gatherings of more than five people, punishable by up to six months' imprisonment. This measure was applied to suppress potential anti-coup protests, with at least one reported of a government official, Mingkwan Saengsuwan, who was held briefly and pressured to resign from his position. Restrictions on freedom of expression intensified, as the CNS stationed soldiers in newsrooms to monitor content until 1 October 2006, shut down over 300 stations perceived as sympathetic to the ousted government, and blocked access to at least 10 websites critical of the coup. The interim promulgated on 1 October 2006 further diminished safeguards present in the 1997 , granting the CNS authority to appoint and dismiss the and control the . documented these actions as creating a climate conducive to intimidation of journalists and academics, though no large-scale arbitrary arrests or extrajudicial killings were reported during the CNS's direct tenure. In the , the CNS maintained the emergency decree originally imposed under Prime Minister , which granted broad powers and contributed to ongoing allegations of , enforced disappearances, and arbitrary detentions amid the Malay-Muslim ; between 2004 and 2006, over 1,700 extrajudicial killings and numerous abuse cases were linked to counter-insurgency operations, with impunity persisting post-coup. The CNS responded by asserting that such measures were essential to prevent civil unrest, corruption, and threats to the monarchy, framing the coup as a restorative action to safeguard long-term democratic processes rather than an endorsement of permanent military rule. Officials pledged elections by October 2007 and the drafting of a new constitution via public referendum, while the appointed interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont initiated dialogues with southern insurgents and established reconciliation committees, though these yielded limited accountability for prior abuses. The Thai government rejected claims of systematic violations, attributing southern issues to insurgent violence—including bombings and beheadings—and emphasizing operational necessities over individual rights in security contexts. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International, urged the lifting of bans on assemblies and media self-censorship guidelines, but the CNS maintained that transitional stability precluded full rights restoration until civilian handover.

Reactions and Impacts

Domestic Public and Political Responses

Initial public reception to the Council for National Security's (CNS) establishment following the September 19, 2006, coup was largely favorable, particularly among urban and middle-class demographics weary of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's alleged corruption and authoritarian tendencies. A Suan Dusit University poll conducted shortly after the coup found that 83.98% of 1,000 respondents agreed with the military's power seizure, with 81.60% of urban respondents expressing support, reflecting relief over the bloodless ouster of a leader accused of electoral manipulation and conflicts of interest. This sentiment aligned with broader middle-class activism, including groups like the (PAD), who had protested Thaksin's governance prior to the coup and viewed the CNS as a necessary intervention to restore order and combat . Politically, conservative and royalist factions, including elements within the Democrat Party and privy councilors, tacitly endorsed the CNS, emphasizing its commitment to and anti-corruption reforms amid Thaksin's dissolution of opposition voices. The coup's leaders, under General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin, secured implicit royal approval by pledging loyalty to King , which bolstered legitimacy among establishment elites who perceived Thaksin as eroding traditional institutions. However, Thaksin loyalists and rural-based supporters, concentrated in the north and northeast, expressed opposition, decrying the suspension of the 1997 Constitution and parliament as antidemocratic, though immediate organized resistance was muted due to and protest bans imposed on September 20, 2006. By late 2006, as the CNS appointed as interim prime minister on October 1, criticism mounted from academics, organizations, and pro-Thaksin elements over media censorship and emergency decrees, yet no large-scale protests materialized until the political activity ban lifted in December. Public approval waned gradually in rural areas, where Thaksin's populist policies had strong backing, foreshadowing the emergence of for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD, or red shirts) rallies in 2007 against CNS-drafted constitutional changes. Overall, the CNS enjoyed provisional domestic stability, with urban-rural divides underscoring polarized views: metropolitan support for elite-led stability versus peripheral grievances over lost democratic representation.

International Reactions and Diplomatic Fallout

The condemned the September 19, 2006, coup establishing the Council for National Security, viewing it as a setback for democratic progress in . stated on September 20, 2006, that the administration was "deeply concerned" and called for the protection of and a prompt return to democratic elections. In response, the U.S. suspended approximately $15 million in military assistance and reviewed bilateral security cooperation, though full normalization resumed after the 2007 elections due to 's strategic importance as a treaty ally. The European Union issued a strong rebuke on September 20, 2006, with the EU Presidency condemning the military's seizure of power from the democratically elected government and demanding that the armed forces "stand back and give way to the democratically elected political government." Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, holding the EU presidency, described the events as "highly regrettable" and urged an immediate reversion to democratic order. The EU temporarily halted some development aid and high-level dialogues, but these measures were short-lived, with engagement resuming as the interim regime committed to constitutional reforms. Australia expressed "grave concern," with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer decrying the destruction of democracy, and issued travel warnings for its citizens. In contrast, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) maintained silence on the coup, adhering to its principle of non-interference in member states' internal affairs, and issued no statements of condemnation or concern. Individual ASEAN members, such as , viewed the takeover pragmatically as resolving a domestic political impasse without broader regional instability. Secretary-General criticized the coup on September 19, 2006, stating it was "not a practice to be encouraged" and advocating a return to governance via elections. Overall diplomatic fallout was limited, with no sanctions from major powers and quick stabilization of trade and security ties, reflecting Thailand's geopolitical leverage amid counterterrorism cooperation and regional balances against .

Dissolution and Legacy

Transition to Interim Government and Dissolution

Following the September 19, 2006 coup, the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), which later renamed itself the Council for (CNS), initially assumed executive authority, with General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin acting as head of . On September 28, 2006, the CNS announced the appointment of retired General , former army commander and privy councilor, as of an interim , pending endorsement. Surayud was formally sworn in on October 1, 2006, after receiving approval from King , marking the transition from direct military rule to a nominally interim administration tasked with restoring democratic institutions. Under the interim constitution promulgated by the CNS on October 1, 2006, Surayud's operated subject to CNS oversight, with the council retaining powers over decisions related to and the authority to appoint key officials, including members of the National Legislative Assembly. The interim government's mandate focused on a new constitution, economic stabilization, and preparing for elections, while the CNS continued to exercise influence through decrees, such as those restructuring state enterprises and enforcing in . A Constitutional Assembly, selected by the CNS, produced the draft 2007 Constitution, which was approved by national referendum on August 19, 2007, with 58% voter support, thereby replacing the interim framework. This paved the way for general elections scheduled for December 23, 2007, the first since the coup, intended to restore elected . The elections saw the People's Power Party, a successor to Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai (dissolved by the CNS-appointed Constitutional Tribunal on May 30, 2007), secure a plurality of seats. With the convening of the new and the election of as on January 28, 2008, the CNS's interim authority concluded, effectively dissolving the council as transitioned to a fully elected government under the 2007 Constitution. The CNS had previously decreed that its members would step down from active roles upon the enactment of the new constitution and completion of elections, aligning with its stated objective of non-permanent intervention to prevent national crisis. This dissolution ended 15 months of -led rule, though critics noted lingering influence via appointees in the and .

Long-Term Effects on Thai Governance and Stability

The 2006 establishment of the (CNS) following the military coup against marked a pivotal reinforcement of the armed forces' role as political arbiters in , perpetuating a historical cycle of interventions that has undermined civilian governance. Rather than resolving underlying tensions such as networks and rural-urban divides, the CNS's interim rule—ending with elections in December 2007 under a military-drafted interim constitution—exacerbated polarization between Thaksin's populist supporters (red shirts) and royalist-urban elites (yellow shirts), setting the stage for subsequent unrest including deadly clashes in from April to May 2010 that killed 90 people and injured over 2,000. This pattern of coup-induced transitions failed to institutionalize stable democratic mechanisms, as evidenced by the recurrence of judicial interventions and party dissolutions, such as the 2008 ruling disbanding the Thaksin-aligned People's Power Party. Over the longer term, the CNS precedent facilitated the 2014 coup by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which imposed a 2017 constitution embedding military influence through mechanisms like a 250-member appointed senate empowered to select prime ministers, thereby diluting electoral mandates and fostering hybrid authoritarianism. This structural entrenchment has correlated with sustained instability, including youth-led protests from 2020 to 2023 demanding monarchy reform and abolition of Article 112 (lèse-majesté laws), alongside court-ordered dissolutions of anti-military parties like Future Forward in 2020 and Move Forward in August 2024. Empirical analyses indicate that such interventions have not diminished coup risks; instead, they reflect a "coup cycle" where military regimes promise stability but revert to elections that revive pre-coup conflicts, as seen in the ousting of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin by the Constitutional Court in August 2024 amid ongoing elite-mass confrontations. Critics, including political scientists, contend that the CNS's includes normalized authoritarian justifying to "protect institutions," hindering reforms to address and inequality that fuel populist backlashes, though military proponents argue interventions safeguard monarchical stability against electoral excesses. Quantitatively, post-2006 governance has seen elevated military spending—rising from 1.4% of GDP in 2005 to peaks above 1.5% post-coup—diverting resources from civilian development and correlating with persistent low rankings in , such as Thailand's score of 6.35/10 on the 2023 Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, classifying it as a "." Overall, the CNS era contributed to a deinstitutionalized where coups serve as short-term resets but exacerbate long-term fragility, evident in the failure to prevent 18 years of intermittent crises despite averaging 3-4% annually from 2007-2023.

References

  1. [1]
    Freedom in the World 2007 - Thailand | Refworld
    Apr 16, 2007 · ... Council for National Security (CNS), staged a coup. It ousted Thaksin from office, installed a military-led government, and declared martial ...
  2. [2]
    Thailand - State.gov
    On October 1, the military coup leaders, taking the name the Council for National Security ... dissolution and that the positioning of the voting booths at ...
  3. [3]
    MFA Spokesman's Comments on Council for National Security Chief ...
    "Singapore is surprised at what Council for National Security Chief Sonthi Boonyaratglin was reported to have said about getting back Thai national assets which ...Missing: leader | Show results with:leader
  4. [4]
    The Downfall of Thaksin Shinawatra's CEO-state - Nautilus Institute
    Nov 9, 2006 · ... Council for National Security, and this was the body which had the power to dismiss them. New elections would be held once the parliament ...
  5. [5]
    [PDF] thailand since the coup - PBS
    Oct 4, 2008 · But the generals, who called their junta the. Council for National Security (CNS), kept their pledge. They oversaw the formulation and ...
  6. [6]
    Thaksin cashes in his chips - The Economist
    Jan 24, 2006 · Shin Corp, a telecoms and media giant, to Singapore's Temasek for almost $2 billion. Mr Thaksin hopes this will end the constant accusations ...Missing: controversy | Show results with:controversy
  7. [7]
    Temasek Sells Down Thai Telecom Asset At Loss - Forbes
    Aug 19, 2011 · The sale of Shin Corp's controlling stake by Thaksin's family in 2006 triggered the events that led to his overthrow by the military in ...
  8. [8]
    Former Thai PM Thaksin found guilty of corruption - The Guardian
    Oct 21, 2008 · The judges said that Thaksin had violated Thailand's corruption laws by allowing his wife to take part in the bidding process for the land.
  9. [9]
    Thaksin Shinawatra stripped of almost £1bn for abuse of power
    Feb 26, 2010 · The court addressed five cases of alleged "policy corruption" and ruled that in four of the five Thaksin was guilty of abusing his authority ...<|separator|>
  10. [10]
    Thaksin Shinawatra: Who is Thailand's former prime minister ...
    Aug 21, 2023 · Thailand's deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra went into self-imposed exile in 2008 facing a raft of corruption charges following his ouster in a ...
  11. [11]
    2274 dead in Thai drugs crackdown - May. 7, 2003 - CNN
    May 7, 2003 · Speaking to journalists in Bangkok Wednesday Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra denied accusations of extra-judicial killings and said the ...
  12. [12]
    Thailand: New fear of illegal killings coincides with Thaksin's return
    Feb 27, 2008 · ... killings in the 'war on drugs'. At least 2500 people were killed ... extrajudicial killings of drug trafficking suspects by state security forces.
  13. [13]
    Thai leader justifies 1100 drug war deaths - The Guardian
    Mar 2, 2003 · ... war on drugs that has claimed more than 1140 lives ... extra-judicial killings by the police. "It's normal that we have ...Missing: numbers | Show results with:numbers
  14. [14]
    The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: An analysis
    Nov 23, 2007 · This article examines the mass protests against Thailand's billionaire Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006.
  15. [15]
    Urban Thais overthrow Prime Minister Thaksin, Thailand, 2005-2006
    To remove the Prime Minister from office and dismantle the Thaksin regime through a new round of constitutional reform by petitioning King Bhumibol.
  16. [16]
    Explainer: Thailand's political crisis - CNN.com
    Thailand's political crisis dates back to protests against Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006; Thaksin was ousted by military coup but his allies remain in governmentMissing: instability | Show results with:instability
  17. [17]
    Thai military launches coup against PM - NBC News
    Sep 19, 2006 · Thailand's army commander staged a coup Tuesday night and ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra while he was in New York, circling his ...
  18. [18]
    Thailand since 2006 coup ousted Thaksin - Reuters
    Feb 28, 2008 · * September 19: The military stages a coup as Thaksin prepares to address the United Nations. Thaksin, winner of two landslide elections and in ...
  19. [19]
    Coup as army seizes power in Thailand | World news - The Guardian
    Sep 19, 2006 · Thailand was thrown into turmoil and martial law yesterday when the army sent tanks and troops into the capital to wrest power from the prime minister.
  20. [20]
    Thai military claims control after coup | World news - The Guardian
    Sep 19, 2006 · The prime minister had responded to the first coup reports by declaring a state of emergency and dismissing Lt General Sonthi. However, an ...
  21. [21]
    september 2006 coup in thailand - Facts and Details
    The leaders of the coup accused Thaksin of corruption, insulting the monarchy and abuse of power, and promised to restore order and unity to Thailand.
  22. [22]
    Thailand: Coup Threatens Human Rights
    Sep 19, 2006 · Thai army officers opposing the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took over government institutions in Bangkok today, pledging ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  23. [23]
    Army takes power while Thaksin is at UN - Asia - Pacific
    Sep 19, 2006 · The coup, led by the commander in chief of the army, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, also "terminated" both houses of Parliament, the cabinet and ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  24. [24]
    [PDF] Thailand's “Well-Intentioned” Coup of September 19, 2006
    In a ceremony broadcast on TV pool, Army Commander in Chief. Gen Sonthi Boonyaratglin stood before a shrine to HM the King while Adjutant Generals Department's ...<|separator|>
  25. [25]
    Thailand: Coup Remains Big Setback for Rights | Human Rights Watch
    Sep 18, 2007 · The military junta – now called the Council for National Security – then established a caretaker government to oversee what they promised to be ...
  26. [26]
    Announcement of the Council for Democratic Reform No 11 ...
    Admiral Sathiraphan Keyanon, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Navy, as First Deputy Chief of the Council for Democratic Reform;; Air Chief Marshal Chalit ...
  27. [27]
    'I Did What I Had to,' 2006 Coup Maker Says 10 Years Later
    Sep 18, 2016 · Former army chief and 2006 coup leader Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratglin, retired, during a Thursday interview on an army base in Bangkok.
  28. [28]
  29. [29]
    Thailand coup junta | Freepress.org
    Security ... Ruangroj Mahasaranon, Navy Commander-in-Chief Adm. Sathiraphan Keyanon ... Kowit Wattana, and National Security Council secretary-general Gen.
  30. [30]
    Coup necessary for Thai unity, General says - ABC News
    Sep 19, 2006 · Thailand's coup leader, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, says the military needed to seize power in order to unite the nation after months of political turmoil.Missing: stated goals
  31. [31]
    Thailand - State.gov
    In 2005 the National Security Council adopted a policy that allows for individuals who reside in the country for 10 years to be eligible to apply for ...
  32. [32]
    Mission Statement and Policies of the Head of the National Council ...
    To end the conflict among the Thai people, to drive the economy forward and to restore confidence under the executive, legislative and judicial frameworks.
  33. [33]
    Timeline: Political Turbulence In Thailand - NPR
    Apr 13, 2009 · Oct. 1, 2006: In an apparent effort to legitimize the coup, former army chief Surayud Chulanont installs himself as interim prime minister with ...
  34. [34]
    Timeline: Thailand's political turmoil - ABC News
    October 1, 2006: Former army commander-in-chief Surayud Chulanont is sworn in as interim prime minister. May 30, 2007: Mr Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party is ...
  35. [35]
    CHRONOLOGY-Political crisis in Thailand - Reuters
    Mar 29, 2007 · 1: Former army commander-in-chief Surayud Chulanont is sworn in as interim prime minister. Thaksin, exiled in London, steps down as Thai Rak ...
  36. [36]
    Constitutional history of Thailand | ConstitutionNet
    Mar 14, 2021 · ... Thai elections for the next five years.[21] On 1 October 2006, The Council for Democratic Reform, renamed the Council for National Security ...
  37. [37]
    Thai ruling junta calls December elections - ABC News
    Aug 27, 2007 · Thailand's military junta has set December 23 as the date for national elections which are aimed at restoring democracy to the country after ...
  38. [38]
    Timeline: Thailand crisis | News | Al Jazeera
    Apr 11, 2009 · Feb 2008 – civilian rule. The country is returned to civilian rule and Samak Sundaravej, the then leader of the PPP, is sworn in as prime ...
  39. [39]
    Thailand profile - timeline - BBC News
    Mar 7, 2019 · 2007 August - Voters approve a new, military-drafted constitution in a referendum. 2008 February - Return to civilian rule after December ...
  40. [40]
    FACTBOX - The assets of Thailand's ex-first family, the Thaksins
    Jul 31, 2008 · -- The Asset Examination Committee (AEC), set up after Thaksin was ousted in a September 2006 coup to probe allegations of corruption during ...
  41. [41]
    $$1.6 billion in ousted Thai leader's assets frozen - NBC News
    Jun 11, 2007 · The Assets Examination Committee, set up after Thaksin Shinawatra was deposed in a bloodless coup in September, said money in bank accounts ...
  42. [42]
    Shinawatras in spotlight: Two PMs, billions in assets seized
    May 25, 2025 · The Council for National Security established the Asset Examination Committee (AEC) to investigate alleged corruption tied to Thaksin's policies ...
  43. [43]
    Purges under way in Thailand - China Daily
    Sep 23, 2006 · Thailand's military coup leaders began on Friday probing alleged corruption under ousted billionaire leader Thaksin Shinawatra and sacked police officials.
  44. [44]
    Attacks on the Press 2006: Thailand - Committee to Protect Journalists
    Feb 5, 2007 · The station's managing director, Mingkwan Sangsuwan, was taken into army custody for questioning and later removed from his position. The coup ...Missing: dismissal | Show results with:dismissal
  45. [45]
    Thai junta bans political meetings, restricts media - Taipei Times
    Sep 22, 2006 · The junta empowered Auditor-General Jaruvan Maintaka to investigative government corruption, which could lead to the confiscation of Thaksin's ...
  46. [46]
    [PDF] Military Power and Security Sector Reform Efforts in Thailand
    Third, the 2006 coup which ousted Prime. Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and the military has, since then, enhanced its powers and privileges while beefing up its ...
  47. [47]
    The Rhetoric and the Reality of the Thai Coup | Prachatai English
    Jun 6, 2014 · In 2007 the government allocated Bt115 billion to the military, a 33% increase from 2006, and in 2008 its budget furthered burgeoned 24% to 143 ...
  48. [48]
    Bombings in Bangkok Kill 2 and Injure at Least 28
    Dec 31, 2006 · The civilian government it appointed approved funds last week for a 14,000 member special operations force to maintain civic order.
  49. [49]
    Freedom in the World 2008 - Thailand | Refworld
    Jul 2, 2008 · The coup leaders' Council for National Security (CNS) established an interim civilian government within weeks, with former army commander ...
  50. [50]
    Thailand 2007 Constitution
    The referendum result is that the majority of the eligible voters who have come to vote approved for the enactment of this newly draft constitution. President ...
  51. [51]
    Thai constitutional referendum reveals deep social divide
    Aug 20, 2007 · While nearly 58 percent of voters approved the new Thai Constitution on Sunday, 63 percent voted against it in the poor, rural northeast, the ...Missing: CNS | Show results with:CNS
  52. [52]
    Thailand - State.gov
    In 2006, Thailand's 59 state-owned enterprises had total revenues of ... The coup leaders created a “Council for National Security” naming themselves ...
  53. [53]
    CHRONOLOGY-Thailand's post-coup economic policy steps | Reuters
    Feb 29, 2008 · He says the government remains committed to the market economy, economic expansion and attracting foreign investment.Missing: enterprises | Show results with:enterprises
  54. [54]
  55. [55]
    Thailand (06/07) - State.gov
    Military leaders constitute a Council for National Security. Constitution ... The first ruler of the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, King Rama Thibodi, made two important ...
  56. [56]
    Thai coup leaders press for emergency crackdown | Reuters
    Led by army chief General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who says he is worried the protests will get out of hand and derail the return to democracy he promised by ...
  57. [57]
    [PDF] Thailand-Emergency-Decree-on-Public-Administration-in ...
    (1) to issue a Notification that a competent official shall have the power of arrest and detention over persons suspected of having a role in causing the.
  58. [58]
    The long and controversial history of Thailand's law against royal ...
    Dec 16, 2020 · The period from 1990 and 2005 brought just four to five cases per year, but the five years after the 2006 coup saw more than 400 cases. The ...
  59. [59]
    Repression, Civil Conflict and Leadership Tenure; the Thai Case S
    Even before the 2006 coup, the Thai government used the lese majeste law (the law requiring citizens to respect and protect the monarchy) to repress political ...
  60. [60]
    Thailand: Military-Backed Government Censors Internet
    May 24, 2007 · On November 15, 2006, the government introduced a draft law to criminalize the generation, possession, storage, dissemination of and access ...Missing: regulations | Show results with:regulations
  61. [61]
    Thailand: Coup Leaders Must Restore Fundamental Rights
    Oct 2, 2006 · “To keep its promises for a quick restoration of democracy, the junta must first remove the nationwide enforcement of martial law and lift all ...Missing: enhancements | Show results with:enhancements
  62. [62]
    [PDF] Thailand: Torture in the southern counter-insurgency
    On 15 January 2008, the Asian Human Rights Commission issued a statement about complaints of torture by detainees at Wat Changhai Battalion Army Camp in Pattani ...
  63. [63]
    [PDF] Thailand: Human rights protections must be upheld
    Political gatherings of more than five people have been banned, with a penalty of six months imprisonment. Coup council leaders have also called on the ...Missing: rule | Show results with:rule
  64. [64]
    Majority of Thais support coup: Poll - Times of India
    Sep 21, 2006 · The Suan Dusit Poll survey said 83.98 per cent agreed with the power seizure. Of the people supporting the coup, 81. 60 per cent came from urban ...
  65. [65]
    Thai coup uproots a thin democracy - CSMonitor.com
    Sep 21, 2006 · A bloodless coup in Thailand has upended the country's fragile democracy, to the delight of many middle-class activists who had campaigned ...<|separator|>
  66. [66]
    Worsening Schisms in Thai Domestic Politics
    Abstract. The September 2006 military coup against the Thaksin government in Thailand has had a profound impact on Thai politics.
  67. [67]
    Statement by the Press Secretary on Thai Coup Developments | The ...
    We call for clear and unambiguous protection for civil liberties by the interim authorities and the military, and a quick return to democratic elections.
  68. [68]
    [PDF] Explaining the United States Response to Thailand's 2006 and 2014 ...
    To explain the United States' relatively mild response to Thailand's 2006 and 2014 coups d'état, this research analyzed the economic, security, and diplomatic ...
  69. [69]
    EU Presidency statement on the military coup in Thailand
    Sep 20, 2006 · The Presidency of the European Union condemns the take-over of power from the democratic government of Thailand by the Thai military forces.Missing: response | Show results with:response
  70. [70]
    World reacts to news of Thai coup - Al Jazeera
    Sep 20, 2006 · International reaction​​ Other leaders at the UN have voiced their concern over the coup but stopped short of calling on the Thai army to return ...Missing: état | Show results with:état
  71. [71]
    Crisis in Thailand-IV: Analysing ASEAN, US, UN and EU Responses
    ASEAN during 2006 neither issued any statements of concern nor condemned the overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra.
  72. [72]
    Thai army names former commander PM - NBC News
    Sep 28, 2006 · Surayud Chulanont, a former army commander and a close adviser to Thailand's powerful monarch, has been chosen as the country's interim prime minister.
  73. [73]
    New Thai PM sworn in | News - Al Jazeera
    Oct 1, 2006 · Surayud will run the country until elections are held under a new constitution. In his first news conference as prime minister, Surayud said ...
  74. [74]
    Thailand (07/08) - State.gov
    The economy is essentially a free-enterprise system. Certain services--such as power generation, transportation, and communications--are state-owned and ...
  75. [75]
    Election 2007: Thailand Prepares for Return to Democracy as ...
    Published: 21 December 2007 Thailand will be holding parliamentary elections on 23 December 2007; the first since the military coup overthrew the government ...
  76. [76]
    2007 Marks the Key Year in Thailand's Southern Insurgency
    Feb 21, 2007 · Post-coup, the armed forces established the Council for National Security (CNS) and appointed retired General Surayud Chulanont as interim ...Missing: enhancements reforms
  77. [77]
    Thailand: Military Interference Undermines Upcoming Elections
    Dec 20, 2007 · In May 2007, a Constitutional Tribunal dissolved Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai Party, and all 111 party executives (including Thaksin) ...
  78. [78]
    Thailand's Coup, Three Years On | Council on Foreign Relations
    May 24, 2017 · The coup has indeed cemented the army's grip on power, and the Thaksinite political parties who ruled Thailand for most of the years between ...
  79. [79]
    [PDF] The 2006 Coup in Thailand: Lessons for Emerging Democracies
    Jul 10, 2023 · On September 19, 2006, a previously unknown group calling itself the “Council of Political Reform” went on Thai television and claimed to have ...Missing: objectives | Show results with:objectives
  80. [80]
    [PDF] The Thai Coup Cycle : Why the National Council for Peace and ...
    When the. NCPO promulgated a new constitution in 2017, it was the twentieth such document to govern Thailand, due in large part to the cycle of military coups ...
  81. [81]
    Consequences of Thailand's 2006 military coup: Evidence from the ...
    Under Thaksin Shinawatra's government, the budget for military expenditure decreased from 5.6 percent of government expenditure in 2001 to 2.2 percent in 2005.