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May Days

The May Days (Catalan: Els fets de maig), also known as the Barcelona May Days, were a brief but intense episode of intra-Republican violence during the , consisting of street fighting in from 3 to 8 May 1937 primarily between anarchist confederations like the CNT-FAI and the anti-Stalinist on one side, and communist-led PSUC forces alongside government-controlled Assault Guards and on the other. The clashes arose from deepening fissures within the anti-Franco coalition, where Soviet-backed communists sought to centralize authority, dismantle anarchist collectivizations, and eliminate rivals perceived as threats to wartime discipline and Stalinist foreign policy priorities. The immediate trigger occurred on 3 May when Assault Guards, acting under orders from the Generalitat's Public Order Councilor, attempted to reassert government control over the CNT-dominated telephone exchange in central , a facility that anarchists had seized and operated jointly since the July 1936 uprising against the military revolt. This action, amid broader grievances over food shortages, communist incursions into anarchist-controlled industries, and the militarization of militias that eroded revolutionary gains, prompted anarchists and militants to erect barricades across the city, declare a , and arm an estimated 7,000 workers in defense committees. Fighting intensified over the following days, with government reinforcements—including 5,000 troops and naval units—deployed to suppress the uprising, while anarchist leaders like and Juan García Oliver ultimately urged demobilization via radio appeals to avert total collapse of the Republican front. The May Days concluded on 8 May with Republican forces regaining control, but at the cost of significant bloodshed—estimates ranging from at least 100 to as many as 500 deaths and over 1,000 wounded, though figures remain contested due to partisan reporting and incomplete records. In the aftermath, Largo Caballero resigned under communist pressure, paving the way for Negrín's government, which accelerated the marginalization of anarchist influence, the dissolution of the (later leading to the arrest and execution of leaders like ), and a shift toward conventional military structures that prioritized anti-fascist unity over . These events underscored the internal contradictions of the Republican camp, where ideological commitments to clashed with pragmatic—or opportunistic—efforts to secure Soviet aid, ultimately contributing to the erosion of popular support in revolutionary strongholds like .

Historical Context

The Spanish Civil War and Republican Divisions

The began on July 17, 1936, with a uprising led by nationalist officers against the government, starting in Spanish Morocco and spreading to the mainland. The loyalists, supporting the elected administration, initially suppressed the revolt in key urban centers like and but faced rapid Nationalist gains in rural areas and the south, where rebel forces secured control over significant territory by late 1936. Lacking a unified professional , the Republicans depended on ad hoc militias organized by labor unions and leftist parties, which proved effective in local defenses but hampered coordinated counteroffensives against the more disciplined Nationalist troops bolstered by and aid. The coalition, victorious in the February 1936 elections, included socialists, communists, republicans, and regional nationalists, forming a fragile government that restored autonomy under Generalitat President via the 1932 . This empowered local authorities in to manage regional affairs, including forming militias and implementing reforms, but it fostered disparities in authority between the central Republican leadership—relocated to amid Nationalist pressures—and autonomous bodies where revolutionary committees wielded power alongside official structures. Such decentralization contributed to fragmented command chains, as regional forces often resisted integration into national units, prioritizing local initiatives over centralized strategy. By early 1937, mounting military defeats intensified these fissures; the Battle of from February 3 to 8 saw Nationalist and corps overrun defenses, capturing the city and triggering a disorganized retreat along the coastal road to , with estimates of thousands of civilian and military casualties from aerial bombings and executions. This loss, alongside ongoing sieges like , exposed the Republicans' vulnerabilities from internal discord, as competing factions vied for control over scarce resources and armaments, undermining efforts to establish a unified high command under the War Ministry. The urgency for military centralization clashed with entrenched regional autonomies and ideological commitments to organization, setting the stage for escalated intra-Republican conflicts.

Revolutionary Catalonia and Collectivization

Following the defeat of the military rebellion in Barcelona on 19–20 July 1936, CNT-FAI militants rapidly collectivized much of Catalonia's economy, seizing control of factories, utilities, transportation, and agricultural lands to eliminate capitalist structures and implement worker self-management. In industrial Barcelona, this encompassed approximately 3,000 enterprises, representing the bulk of the region's manufacturing, textiles, metalworking, and services, where workers' committees assumed decision-making via assemblies that set production quotas and wages without private ownership or profit motives. A key instance was the CNT's occupation of the Telefónica exchange on 20 July 1936, which initially streamlined communications by prioritizing revolutionary needs over commercial hierarchies. Agricultural collectivization extended to rural , where CNT-FAI groups expropriated estates and organized production through egalitarian councils, often increasing cultivated land use through communal labor in the war's early months. CNT documentation claimed productivity surges in various sectors, such as 20–50% output rises in certain factories and enhanced yields from abolished absentee landlordism, driven by militant enthusiasm and simplified operations. These self-reported advances, however, masked broader inefficiencies: aggregate industrial production in fell by roughly 30% in the year following collectivization, attributable to disrupted supply lines, lack of specialized incentives, and fragmented coordination among autonomous units. Decentralized control exacerbated causal vulnerabilities during wartime, as collectives resisted external directives, leading to barter-based exchanges that faltered without signals, of resources, and mismatches in distribution. Anarchist opposition to centralized further compounded issues, with irregular militias prioritizing ideological over disciplined , resulting in frontline disarray and shortages that undermined defenses. Such structural rigidities—prioritizing horizontal equality over hierarchical scalability—fostered mounting demands for reintegration, exemplified by the Generalitat's 24 October 1936 decree formalizing collectivizations under state supervision to enforce unified economic mobilization for combat efficacy. This tension highlighted the experiments' unsustainability, as local self-rule clashed with the imperatives of coordinated against Francoist forces.

Political Factions and Ideological Conflicts

Anarcho-Syndicalist and POUM Elements

The Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), an anarcho-syndicalist trade union federation, and the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI), its ideological affinity group, formed the backbone of non-Stalinist revolutionary forces in Catalonia, drawing mass support from industrial workers and rural laborers through decentralized union structures emphasizing direct action and mutual aid. By mid-1936, CNT membership in Catalonia had expanded from approximately 150,000-175,000 to nearly one million, reflecting rapid mobilization amid economic unrest and anti-fascist agitation. These organizations prioritized worker self-management via industry collectives and agrarian communes, rejecting state mediation in favor of federated councils, which enabled swift expropriation of factories and land following the July 1936 military uprising but exposed vulnerabilities in coordinating large-scale defense without hierarchical oversight. The Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (), a smaller but ideologically distinct faction, advocated a Marxist-Leninist framework purified of Stalinist distortions, critiquing both the Comintern's strategy as a capitulation to bourgeois and anarcho-syndicalist spontaneity as insufficient for establishing proletarian . POUM leaders like emphasized the need for armed workers' committees to transcend CNT-FAI federalism, arguing that decentralized militias alone could not sustain revolution against fascist coordination or internal counter-revolutionary pressures. With a membership of around 30,000-40,000 by 1937, primarily urban intellectuals and militants, POUM maintained independent militias and published theoretical journals exposing Soviet bureaucratism's role in undermining Spanish socialists. Internal debates within these groups centered on balancing with pragmatic warfare; CNT-FAI radicals opposed central decrees for unified army integration, viewing them as preludes to reimposing state control over proletarian patrols that guarded Barcelona's key infrastructure, including transport hubs and utilities. The Friends of Durruti Group, emerging in March 1937 from dissident CNT-FAI militians of the , represented a radical critique of mainstream leadership's concessions, insisting on immediate libertarian communism through expropriation and armed defense committees rather than coalition governance. Numbering a few hundred core activists, they rejected militarization reforms that subordinated column-based militias—estimated at 100,000-150,000 CNT fighters across and —to Republican command structures, arguing such hierarchies replicated the state oppression sought to dismantle. This decentralized ethos, while fostering grassroots innovation in collectivized production, manifested strategic hesitancy: in July 1936, despite controlling after repelling the garrison coup, CNT plenums dismissed proposals to dissolve the regional government and proclaim federated communes, opting instead for an Anti-Fascist Militias Committee that preserved bourgeois institutions. Such restraint, rooted in anti-statist principles prioritizing anti-fascist unity over immediate power seizure, causally weakened long-term position by allowing centralized factions to consolidate resources and , highlighting decentralization's trade-off between local autonomy and unified strategic resolve.

Stalinist Communists and Soviet Influence

![Soviet Union](./assets/Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_1936_%E2%80%93_1955 The Partido Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC) and its affiliated Partido Comunista de España (PCE) maintained strict alignment with Soviet policies under , receiving military aid that began arriving in significant quantities by October 1936. This assistance, including aircraft, tanks, and advisors, enabled the communists to expand their organizational strength; PCE membership grew from approximately 30,000 in mid-1936 to over 250,000 by mid-1937, while the PSUC similarly surged to around 40,000 members in , transforming it from a minor fused entity into the dominant political force in the region. Soviet leverage through aid distribution conditioned this growth on adherence to Comintern directives for discipline, subordinating revolutionary impulses to centralized authority. Declassified Soviet archives document Stalin's explicit directives prioritizing the elimination of perceived internal threats over unqualified anti-fascist unity, targeting "Trotskyists" such as the and "uncontrollables" among anarchists to avert a full socialist transformation that might alienate potential bourgeois allies and Western powers like and . This calculus, rooted in Stalin's geopolitical maneuvering to secure anti-German alliances, exported the logic of the ongoing to , framing revolutionary factions as fascist collaborators to justify purges and power consolidation. Aid flows were explicitly tied to such , with operatives in , under figures like Alexander Orlov, tasked with surveillance and liquidation of dissidents to enforce Moscow's vision of a disciplined, non-revolutionary front. Verifiable Stalinist provocations preceding the May Days included PSUC-led pushes for centralization, such as the April 7, 1937, "victory plan" demanding submission of all workers' to government control, which heightened tensions by undermining anarchist-collectivized structures. These maneuvers, backed by Soviet-supplied units, involved incremental seizures of strategic positions and efforts against rival patrols, mirroring tactics to preempt autonomous revolutionary power and align with central Republican—and ultimately Soviet—influence.

Precipitating Tensions

Pre-May Incidents and Power Struggles

In late April 1937, escalating violence highlighted the deepening rift between anarchist and communist factions in . On , PSUC activist Roldán Cortada was assassinated near Molins de Llobregat by unknown gunmen firing on his vehicle, an incident communists attributed to anarchists despite CNT denials and calls for investigation. The killing prompted immediate PSUC-led reprisals, including arrests of CNT members and raids that resulted in at least eight CNT militants killed in subsequent clashes. Concurrent disputes erupted in , where on April 25 government attempted to wrest control of the customs house from CNT patrols, sparking armed resistance and retaliatory actions by CNT forces against PSUC positions. These events, part of broader April 27–28 armed confrontations between anarchists and Generalitat , underscored contests over local authority and resources, with mutual accusations of provocation fueling . Control of infrastructure intensified grievances, particularly at Barcelona's central , seized by CNT militants in July 1936 and staffed by armed women operators who resisted government oversight. authorities, citing security risks and inefficiency, repeatedly demanded installation of loyal supervisors—a move CNT viewed as prelude to dismantling revolutionary committees—leading to standoffs and partial concessions that bred resentment on both sides. Central government initiatives to dissolve uncontrolled militias and enforce their integration into the Popular Army, building on October 1936 decrees, amplified these tensions by threatening anarchist autonomy over columns and collectives. Anarchists perceived the measures as , while PSUC forces conducted assaults on CNT-FAI agricultural collectives to reassert state control, often under pretexts of inefficiency or . This dynamic of resource disputes and authority challenges, absent unified arbitration, primed factions for direct confrontation.

Course of the Events

Spark and Initial Clashes on 3 May

On 3 May 1937, at around 3:00 p.m., Assault Guards under the command of Eusebio Rodríguez Salas, the in , moved to seize the central , known as the on Via Laietana, which had been controlled and collectivized by CNT workers since the outbreak of the revolution in July 1936. The operation involved approximately 200 guards transported in trucks, acting on orders from the Catalan Generalitat influenced by the PSUC and communist elements seeking to reassert centralized state authority over key infrastructure amid ongoing power struggles. This action triggered immediate armed resistance from CNT-FAI and militants, who viewed the incursion as a provocative bid to dismantle their control, resulting in initial gunfire exchanges that killed several anarchists near the Via Laietana. The clashes rapidly escalated as word spread through anarchist networks, prompting the erection of barricades using paving stones, sandbags, and vehicles across central , particularly concentrating defenses around the Via Laietana and adjacent streets to protect CNT-FAI headquarters. CNT-FAI and forces mobilized militias spontaneously, coordinating joint defenses despite ideological differences, while the CNT leadership declared a to paralyze the city and rally workers against what they perceived as a Stalinist-orchestrated coup attempt. , president of the Generalitat, issued radio appeals for calm and urged cessation of hostilities to preserve anti-fascist unity, but these broadcasts failed to de-escalate due to deep-seated mutual distrust, disrupted communications in the collectivized telephone system, and the rapid spread of rumors amplifying fears of broader assaults on revolutionary gains. Initial casualty figures for 3 May remain imprecise, with reports confirming at least a dozen deaths from the confrontation and subsequent skirmishes, primarily among CNT defenders, as Assault Guards fired on resisters while anarchists returned fire from rooftops and . The spontaneous nature of the , fueled by months of accumulating grievances over communist encroachments, transformed the localized into widespread street-level mobilization by evening, setting the stage for intensified conflict without immediate resolution.

Escalation and Street Fighting 4-5 May

On 4 May 1937, clashes intensified across as fighting expanded from the city center to outer districts including Sarrià, Sants, and Hostafrancs, where workers erected barricades overnight and disarmed isolated civil guards. Anarchist militants from the CNT-FAI launched assaults on PSUC-held positions, such as the Hotel Colón and barracks, using captured vehicles and small arms to press advances against perceived Stalinist strongholds. In response, PSUC-aligned Assault Guards and counterattacked CNT headquarters, including the Via Durruti building around 5 p.m., while snipers positioned in PSUC-controlled areas fired on unarmed workers near anarchist sites, escalating urban chaos. By 5 May, the violence peaked with CNT-FAI deploying armored cars to defend union buildings against renewed police assaults, including a 9:30 a.m. attack on the Medical Union and Libertarian Youth headquarters that killed at least six defenders. Reinforcements from , comprising Stalinist-backed troops, began arriving to bolster forces, enabling pushes to reclaim key points amid mutual barrages of rifle fire and machine-gun volleys. The coordinated worker defenses, proposing a revolutionary to unify anti-Stalinist resistance, while the of Durruti group distributed posters calling for insurrection and the execution of provocateurs, explicitly urging overthrow of the counter-revolutionary elements. In contrast, CNT leadership exercised restraint, issuing appeals for ceasefires and a return to work despite ongoing provocations, prioritizing avoidance of broader within the Republican zone. The scale of urban warfare disrupted daily life profoundly: trams ceased operation citywide due to damaged overhead wires and active zones, halting transport until partial repairs on 6 May; factories shut down as workers manned , amplifying pre-existing food scarcities that left besieged positions reliant on sporadic supplies. Snipers—active on both sides, with some reports attributing rooftop fire to possible fascist infiltrators—prolonged the standoff, turning streets into kill zones and underscoring the tactical parity despite anarchists' numerical superiority in Barcelona's working-class districts. This phase highlighted reciprocal aggressions, as anarchist offensives sought to neutralize PSUC threats while forces aimed to dismantle control points.

Standoff, Negotiations, and Resolution 6-8 May

By 6 May 1937, street fighting in had subsided into a tense standoff, with anarchist and militias holding barricades across the city amid an ongoing general strike, while PSUC and government forces controlled key points like the . The CNT-FAI leadership, including figures like Juan García Oliver, engaged in negotiations mediated by Catalan President , emphasizing the need to prioritize the war against over internal conflict. These talks highlighted internal divisions within the anarchist movement, where mid-level defense committee leaders like Julián Merino pushed for an offensive to seize PSUC headquarters, but regional CNT delegates intervened to prevent escalation, citing risks to the Republican . On 7 May, the CNT Regional Committee decided to end the general strike, broadcasting appeals for workers to dismantle and return to their posts, despite an estimated 7,000 armed maintaining control over much of the city. This demobilization stemmed from leadership assessments of fighter fatigue after four days of clashes, absence of solidarity strikes in rural or other regions, and overestimation of unified proletarian support for —grassroots elements like the Friends of Durruti called for a , but broader CNT-FAI adherence to anti-fascist unity prevailed without forcing concessions. The decision reflected causal pressures: numerical anarchist advantages eroded without coordinated advance orders, as delegates prioritized avoiding a split that could aid Franco's forces. The ceasefire took hold on 8 May following the arrival of approximately 5,000 Republican Assault Guards dispatched from by the under Largo Caballero, who deployed them to enforce order despite his reluctance to intervene decisively. These troops occupied strategic positions, tipping the balance toward PSUC-aligned forces and entrenching their control over disputed assets like the , as anarchists voluntarily stood down without regaining ground or extracting guarantees. This resolution underscored the revolutionaries' strategic restraint, driven by external mediation and internal prioritization of wartime cohesion over immediate power seizure, despite initial tactical superiority.

Casualties and Victims

Estimated Losses and Breakdown

Estimates of fatalities from the May Days in Barcelona range from to 500, with wounded figures between 750 and 1,500, based on cross-referenced reports from contemporary observers and factional records. These numbers reflect the intensity of five days of intermittent street fighting, primarily concentrated in central districts like the Paral·lel and Raval areas. Attribution of specific losses remains challenging owing to disorganized medical evacuations, overlapping jurisdictions among militia groups, and partisan underreporting by involved factions such as the CNT-FAI and PSUC. Breakdown by affiliation indicates disproportionately higher casualties among anarcho-syndicalist and elements, who defended barricades and key buildings like the against offensives by Assault Guards and communist militias equipped with armored vehicles and machine guns. Anarchist sources claim around 300 of the deaths occurred on their side, compared to fewer than 100 for communist forces, a disparity attributed to the defenders' exposure in static urban positions versus attackers' mobility and firepower advantages. Hospital admissions in , totaling over 1,000 by , corroborate the imbalance, with many fatalities from sustained sniper and artillery fire in anarchist-held zones. The overall toll was comparable in scale to the July fighting in against the initial military uprising, which saw roughly 500 deaths amid similar urban combat between workers' militias and rebel garrisons. This equivalence underscores the May Days as a significant intra-Republican , though confined to a shorter duration and smaller geographic area than the 1936 clashes.

Key Figures Affected

Andreu Nin, general secretary of the , was arrested on June 16, 1937, during the post-May Days crackdown on the party, and subsequently disappeared after being held in a secret prison where he was tortured; Soviet agents operating under communist influence in the Republican zone are widely held responsible for his execution, though his body was never recovered. Nin's detention stemmed from accusations by communist authorities of POUM involvement in provoking the May clashes and alleged Trotskyist espionage, charges unsubstantiated by independent evidence but used to justify . Italian anarchist Camillo Berneri, a prominent anti-fascist intellectual who had fled to to support the Republican cause, was abducted from his apartment on May 5, 1937, during the height of the street fighting and found dead the next day with multiple gunshot wounds; circumstantial evidence points to by communist paramilitaries, possibly in retaliation for his criticism of Stalinist policies. His brother-in-law, Francesco Barbieri, an anarchist militant, was killed in the same incident, their bodies discovered bearing signs of execution-style murder amid the chaos of anarchist-communist confrontations. Several other POUM leaders, including Julián Gorkin and Juan Andrade, faced arrest in the June raids following the May events, with many imprisoned in Republican jails on charges of tied to the unrest; these detentions dismantled POUM command structures and led to trials where defendants were denied . On the opposing side, reprisal killings during the clashes claimed lives such as those of unnamed PSUC officials targeted by anarchist patrols, though specific high-profile communist casualties remain undocumented in primary accounts from the period. CNT militants, including rank-and-file fighters, saw dozens arrested post-ceasefire, with at least twelve young men pulled from a CNT vehicle on May 4 later found mutilated and dead, indicative of targeted reprisals by loyal to the .

Immediate Aftermath

Ceasefire Enforcement and Arrests

Following the informal ceasefire negotiations on 7 May 1937, the central Republican government under deployed approximately 6,000 Assault Guards from to , supplemented by Catalan security forces, to enforce order and prioritize disarming non-communist militias. These units systematically cleared barricades in anarchist strongholds, such as the areas and headquarters vicinity, often meeting minimal resistance after CNT leadership urged compliance to avoid further escalation. The operation disproportionately targeted CNT-FAI and positions, reflecting the central government's alignment with Soviet-influenced PSUC priorities over revolutionary collectives. Mass arrests accompanied the disarmament, with Assault Guards and Catalan police detaining hundreds of CNT, FAI, and militants in and surrounding areas like between 8 and 10 May. Specific actions included raids on union locals and militia barracks, netting over 200 suspects initially, many charged with "provocation" or arms hoarding under provisional decrees. , president of the , endorsed these measures through a mediated truce agreement that bound the CNT to evacuate key sites like patrol stations in exchange for nominal guarantees against reprisals, effectively sidelining anarchist influence in Catalan security apparatus. Government-aligned propaganda, disseminated via PSUC outlets like Treball and official bulletins, framed the detainees as "Trotskyist provocateurs" or fascist agents disrupting unity, justifying the arrests as essential for frontline stability despite evidence of mutual clashes. This narrative, echoed in statements, minimized communist-initiated actions like the initial assault while amplifying anarchist "disorder," setting precedents for subsequent legal proceedings against figures like leaders.

Dissolution of Revolutionary Structures

Following the May Days, the Republican government, under increasing Communist influence, issued decrees aimed at reversing anarchist-led collectivizations and centralizing authority. On 16 June 1937, the was declared illegal and its leadership targeted for arrest, with the party branded as "Trotskyist" and fascist-aligned by Stalinist factions within the government. This move dismantled a key anti-Stalinist revolutionary structure, facilitating the purge of its militias and integration into state-controlled forces. Subsequent government actions targeted regional anarchist bodies, exemplified by the dissolution of the anarcho-syndicalist on 11 August 1937. The council, which had overseen collectivized and across eastern since late 1936, was replaced by a centrally appointed with broad powers to enforce . This rollback extended to agrarian collectives, where a June 1937 decree legalized some operations but empowered owners to reclaim property, leading to the forced dissolution of many by PCE-led Popular Army units in and elsewhere. By late 1937, estimates indicated hundreds of collectives—previously numbering over 900 in alone—faced liquidation or subordination, shifting economic control from worker committees to state oversight. Stalinist elements, bolstered by Soviet NKVD operatives, consolidated grip over militias and police through purges of "unreliable" elements, including anarchists and affiliates. Soviet agents directed the elimination of perceived threats, as seen in the abduction and murder of leader in June 1937, amid broader efforts to "cleanse" Barcelona's security apparatus post-May clashes. These actions, documented in records of targeted operations, ensured communist loyalty in restructured forces like the Assault Guards and , previously influenced by CNT-FAI militants. Anarchist organizations, primarily the CNT-FAI, protested these measures but ultimately complied, prioritizing anti-fascist unity over resistance. CNT leaders endorsed militia militarization into the Popular Army by mid-1937, despite internal dissent from groups like the Friends of Durruti, exposing organizational fractures: decentralized structures lacked the cohesion for sustained opposition, as regional committees deferred to national directives to avoid fracturing the Republican front. This acquiescence accelerated the erosion of revolutionary gains, with CNT membership in government roles diminishing as centralization prevailed.

Broader Consequences

Weakening of the Republican Side

The internal clashes during the May Days diverted significant military resources from active fronts, as anarchist and POUM-affiliated militias, including units originally stationed in , were compelled to redeploy to to defend barricades and key positions like the . This redeployment occurred amid ongoing Nationalist pressures elsewhere, such as the Biscay Campaign, where the diversion of approximately 5,000-6,000 Assault Guards from to suppress the unrest further strained Republican logistics and prevented timely reinforcements to northern and eastern sectors. The resulting casualties—estimated at 400 to 500 deaths and up to 1,000 wounded among factions—represented a direct loss of experienced combatants who might otherwise have contributed to frontline stability, empirically weakening the overall defensive posture against Franco's forces. The events eroded morale across Republican ranks, particularly among volunteer militias and international contingents, as eyewitness accounts documented a shift from revolutionary fervor to disillusionment with intra-left infighting. George Orwell, serving in a POUM militia on the Aragon front before witnessing the Barcelona clashes, described in his memoir how the May Days transformed the atmosphere: "One had to get out of it quickly, for the feeling of the whole atmosphere had changed," noting increased desertions and a pervasive sense of betrayal that sapped enthusiasm for continued fighting. This demoralization extended to elements of the International Brigades, where non-communist volunteers, exposed to the Stalinist suppression of anarchist and POUM forces, reported growing distrust of centralized command structures, prompting some to withdraw or question their commitment amid revelations of political purges. The May Days exacerbated underlying disunity, creating fissures that Nationalists exploited through sustained offensives, as the focus on internal reconciliation delayed unified strategic responses. This fragmentation contributed causally to vulnerabilities evident in subsequent operations, such as the July 1937 Brunete offensive, where forces, still reeling from the Barcelona losses and command disputes, advanced initially but incurred disproportionate casualties—over 20,000 killed or wounded compared to fewer than 6,000 for the Nationalists—due to poor coordination and depleted reserves. Historians attribute this to the May events' role in prioritizing factional control over military efficacy, allowing Franco's unified command to regain initiative in key theaters like by late 1937.

Stalinist Purges and Counter-Revolution

Following the May Days clashes, the Stalinist faction within the government accelerated purges targeting perceived internal enemies, particularly the and elements of the CNT. On June 16, 1937, the POUM was declared illegal by the Negrín government, leading to the arrest of hundreds of its members on charges of espionage and collaboration with Franco's forces, orchestrated by the in coordination with Spanish communist security apparatus. The NKVD, under chief Alexander Orlov, framed the as a Trotskyist conspiracy undermining the war effort, using fabricated evidence to justify mass detentions and eliminate anti-Stalinist leftists. A pivotal case was the abduction and murder of POUM leader Andreu Nin on June 16, 1937, seized from a prison by communist-controlled police and interrogated by agents including Vladimir Antonov-Ovseyenko's operatives. Nin was tortured during questioning but refused to confess to fabricated ties with or ; he was subsequently executed, with his death covered up by staging an aided by fascists, as admitted later by defected communist Jesús Hernández, who detailed Orlov's direct role. This assassination, corroborated by declassified accounts of Soviet operations in , exemplified the 's extraterritorial purges extending Stalin's Great Terror abroad. POUM prisoners faced further repression, with at least ten members executed between late 1937 and 1938 without formal trials, including militants shot in prisons amid accusations of . CNT activists arrested post-May Days, numbering in the thousands, endured similar fates; dozens were summarily executed in and by communist patrols, targeting those resisting the dissolution of anarchist militias and collectives. These actions, tied to directives prioritizing elimination of independents, suppressed heterodox in favor of Moscow-aligned orthodoxy. The purges facilitated a shift, enforcing "official" that dismantled worker-managed enterprises and agrarian collectives established in 1936-1937, restoring centralized state and bourgeois property norms to appeal for non-intervention . Stalin's policy, evident in Comintern instructions, subordinated anti-fascist to geopolitical caution, demanding loyalty to Soviet foreign policy over broad leftist mobilization, which eroded morale among anarchist and ranks crucial to early gains like the front. This prioritization causally fragmented the coalition, as empirical records from Soviet archives reveal directives to neutralize "uncontrollable" revolutionaries, ultimately weakening the against Nationalist forces.

Interpretations and Controversies

Anarchist and Anti-Stalinist Views

Anarchists of the CNT-FAI and anti-Stalinist Marxists of the portrayed the May Days as a defensive response to a deliberate provocation by Stalinist-controlled forces within the government. On , 1937, Assault Guards loyal to the United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC), backed by Catalan President , attempted to seize the building, long controlled by CNT-FAI unions since the July 1936 revolution. This action, defended by anarchist and militias who erected barricades across , escalated into four days of urban combat, resulting in approximately 100 deaths and hundreds wounded, as workers resisted what they viewed as an assault on revolutionary gains like collectivized industries and armed popular militias. The 's manifesto on urged workers to cease intra-proletarian fighting provoked by "Trotskyist-Fascist agents" but emphasized unity against while denouncing the centralizing maneuvers of PSUC and (PCE) elements aiming to dismantle autonomous worker control. George Orwell, serving in a POUM militia unit, provided an eyewitness account in Homage to Catalonia, depicting the clashes as spontaneous worker against Stalinist aggression, followed by a media campaign falsely attributing the unrest to POUM instigation to justify its suppression. Orwell observed that PSUC-aligned forces initiated the Telefonica assault under pretext of restoring order, triggering barricade fighting where anarchist and POUM supporters held key positions until CNT leaders negotiated a ceasefire on May 7, allowing government troops to reassert control. He argued this reflected broader Stalinist strategy to prioritize bourgeois alliances over , purging rivals to align with Soviet foreign policy interests. Leon analyzed the events in "The Lessons of Spain – Last Warning" as a spontaneous proletarian uprising against Stalinist counter-revolution, where workers briefly rekindled July 1936 revolutionary fervor but faltered due to the absence of a resolute Bolshevik-style party. contended that the PSUC-PCE provocation exploited prior concessions by anarchists and —such as militia integration into the Popular Army—to impose bureaucratic centralization, deforming the anti-fascist struggle into a conventional bourgeois . He criticized the hesitation to seize state power during the barricade phase, attributing it to opportunistic illusions in unity. Within anarchist ranks, the Friends of Durruti group offered pointed , faulting CNT-FAI leadership for tactical capitulation by broadcasting orders to dismantle barricades on , thus squandering a potential juncture for establishing a of workers' organizations. This faction, emerging from veterans, admitted broader errors like premature demobilization of irregular militias post-July 1936 and collaboration in and governments, which eroded defensive capacities against Stalinist encroachments. Their publication The Friends of Durruti (1938) argued these compromises reflected theoretical deficiencies in sustaining libertarian communism amid , enabling counter-revolutionary consolidation despite mass worker support during the May clashes.

Communist Justifications and Denials

The Partido Socialista Unificado de Catalunya (PSUC) and Partido Comunista de España (PCE) portrayed the May Days clashes in , from May 3 to 8, 1937, as a deliberate "anarcho-Trotskyist putsch" orchestrated by elements of the CNT-FAI and to undermine the against Franco's forces. PSUC leaders, including Joan Comorera, argued that the unrest constituted an attempted coup by "uncontrollable" anarchist militias and militants, who allegedly sought to seize power from the Generalitat and divert resources from the front lines, thereby aiding the Nationalist advance. This narrative emphasized the need for centralized discipline under the Popular Army, justifying the deployment of Assault Guards and communist-controlled units to suppress the "insurrection" and restore order essential for antifascist unity. PCE publications and spokesmen, such as those in Frente Rojo, denied any premeditated orchestration by Soviet advisors or the Comintern, framing the intervention instead as a spontaneous Republican response to proven "fascist agents" infiltrating the . They accused POUM leader Andrés Nin and his followers of collaborating with Franco's , citing fabricated evidence of Trotskyist sabotage plots linked to operatives, which purportedly triggered the Barcelona violence. This denial served to insulate the PCE from charges of counter-revolutionary intent, positioning their actions as defensive measures against internal betrayal rather than an externally directed . Despite these claims, empirical data on —estimated at 100 to 500 deaths, with disproportionate losses among CNT and fighters—and the sequence of provocations, including the initial assault on the CNT-controlled by carbineros loyal to the communist-influenced on , undermine the putsch narrative. Communist forces, bolstered by Soviet-supplied arms, held key advantages in firepower and coordination, suggesting the clashes arose from escalating tensions over rather than a coordinated anarchist overthrow. Nonetheless, the PCE-PSUC framing effectively consolidated their influence within the by rallying loyalists around the imperative of war unity, marginalizing rivals as disloyal and facilitating subsequent control over institutions.

Critiques of Anarchist Strategy and Organization

Critiques of the CNT-FAI's decentralized during the May Days centered on its vulnerability to coordinated counteraction by centralized opponents. Anarchist aversion to hierarchical command prevented the consolidation of unified direction, allowing disparate groups and local committees to operate without overarching , which exposed them to divide-and-conquer tactics by PSUC and government forces. A key failure manifested in the rapid demobilization despite initial tactical advantages. On May 7, 1937, CNT-FAI leadership broadcast orders to dismantle barricades and cease fighting, reversing gains where anarchist-aligned forces had seized control of much of , including the , and outnumbered assailants in street engagements. This decision, prioritizing "anti-fascist unity" over pressing superiority—estimated at several thousand CNT militants against fewer thousand PSUC guards—facilitated the subsequent repression and dissolution of revolutionary organs. Internal divisions exacerbated these shortcomings, as documented by Agustín Guillamón. CNT national committee leaders, embedded in republican coalitions, enforced caution and collaboration, clashing with rank-and-file militants organized in groups like the Friends of Durruti, who issued leaflets on May 11 calling for a revolutionary junta, economic socialization, and disbanding political parties. Yet the Friends, numbering in the hundreds and lacking broad CNT backing, could not translate agitation into coordinated action, illustrating the paralyzing gap between leadership pragmatism and militant purism. Such fractures stemmed from anarchism's rejection of mechanisms or , fostering ideological rigidity over adaptive wartime organization. Guillamón's archival reveals how CNT superiors dismissed radical critiques as "Trotskyist" or divisive, suppressing debate and preventing evolution toward more resilient structures, ultimately costing the anarchists their stronghold.

and Modern Assessments

Eyewitness Accounts and Early Narratives

George Orwell, a volunteer in the POUM militia, provided one of the most detailed eyewitness accounts in his 1938 memoir Homage to Catalonia, describing the clashes beginning on May 3, 1937, when government Assault Guards attempted to seize the CNT-controlled Telephone Exchange in Barcelona, sparking widespread street fighting that lasted until May 8. Orwell noted a marked shift in Barcelona's atmosphere post-May, from revolutionary camaraderie to pervasive suspicion, censorship, and arbitrary arrests targeting POUM members and anarchists, which he attributed to growing Communist influence under Soviet direction. His narrative, informed by direct observation during leave from the front, emphasized the spontaneous worker response against perceived counter-revolutionary moves, though his POUM affiliation introduced a bias against Stalinist factions, potentially overstating their role in provoking the unrest. Other foreign observers, including journalists and militiamen, corroborated the sudden eruption of violence but varied in emphasis; for instance, reports from volunteers highlighted confusion over the trigger, with some attributing initial shots to anarchist patrols firing on Assault Guards, while others stressed government provocation via troop deployments from . CNT-FAI bulletins portrayed the events as a defensive stand against Communist-led assaults on worker-controlled institutions, urging construction on May 4 but calling for ceasefires by May 7 to prioritize anti-fascist , reflecting the union's strategic restraint amid internal debates. In contrast, the Communist press, including Treball and PSUC outlets, framed the fighting as a "putsch" orchestrated by "Trotskyists" and "uncontrollables" to undermine the government, systematically blaming anarchists for instigating chaos and downplaying government forces' role, a shaped by Moscow's directives to consolidate centralized control. These accounts reveal credibility issues: CNT sources prioritized worker self-defense but risked exaggeration of threats to justify mobilization, while Communist publications exhibited propagandistic tendencies, aligning with broader Stalinist efforts to discredit rivals through unsubstantiated accusations of . Casualty estimates diverged sharply, with contemporary reports citing around 500 deaths and 1,000 injuries, though anarchist claims reached higher figures emphasizing civilian tolls from government assaults, while official tallies minimized losses to portray the events as limited provocations. Cross-verification remains challenging due to incomplete records and destroyed evidence post-ceasefire, as Orwell observed, with blame attributions hinging on unreliable partisan testimonies rather than neutral forensics; for example, initial CNT reports accused Communists of fire from rooftops, contradicted by some eyewitnesses attributing such actions to anarchist militants. These inconsistencies underscore the need for skepticism toward self-serving narratives, favoring convergence among independent foreigners over factional bulletins. The May Days immediately shaped international views of Republican disunity, with British and American press coverage—drawing from dispatches by observers like Orwell—highlighting fratricidal strife as evidence of ideological fractures weakening the anti-Franco effort, eroding sympathy among liberals and socialists who prioritized unified resistance. French outlets echoed this, reporting the clashes as a "civil war within the civil war," amplifying perceptions of anarchist "adventurism" versus Communist "discipline," though often filtered through anti-anarchist biases in establishment media favoring Soviet-aligned narratives. This early reportage established a baseline historiography of infighting as self-inflicted damage, influencing aid debates in democracies wary of supporting a divided front.

Archival Revelations and Recent Scholarship

Declassification of Soviet archives in the post-Cold War era has provided documentary evidence of Joseph Stalin's direct orchestration of purges against non-Stalinist leftists in Republican Spain, including explicit orders to suppress the POUM and anarchist groups following the May Days clashes. The 2001 volume Spain Betrayed: The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War, drawing from Russian State Military Archives, reveals Comintern directives from mid-1937 instructing Spanish communists to prioritize elimination of "Trotskyist" and anarchist elements under the guise of anti-fascist unity, with Stalin personally approving assassinations and show trials to consolidate Soviet influence. These findings underscore Soviet agency in transforming the Republican coalition from a revolutionary front into a centralized apparatus aligned with Moscow's geopolitical aims, rather than internal Spanish dynamics alone driving the post-May crackdown. Recent scholarship, leveraging both Soviet and archives, has shifted focus to the mechanics of worker and during the May events, highlighting anarchist organizational frailties. A 2022 analysis by historian Ángel Smith examines how CNT-FAI militants rapidly armed on May 3 but by May 7 due to lacking unified command structures and faltering supply lines, contrasting with PSUC's disciplined of Soviet . This , per empirical from militia records, reflected not just Stalinist pressure but inherent anarchist aversion to hierarchical coordination, which impeded sustained urban defense amid wartime resource scarcity. Economic reassessments, incorporating metrics from collectivized factories, further critique romanticized narratives by quantifying how anarchist self-management—while innovative in peacetime—yielded inefficiencies in munitions output (e.g., Barcelona's collectives averaging 20-30% below pre-war levels by 1937), rendering them incompatible with industrialized warfare demands. Debates persist on the May Days' causality in the Republican defeat, with archival evidence tempering views of it as the singular "end of the revolution." Post-1990s syntheses argue the events accelerated but did not originate the counter-revolutionary turn, as Soviet shipments (peaking at 648 tons of arms in May alone) were conditional on purging rivals, making collapse inevitable absent anarchist concessions to centralization. Critics of anarchist strategy, informed by these revelations, contend that ideological rejection of state mechanisms doomed revolutionary gains to military subordination, though some analyses allow for contingent factors like Franco's northern advances hastening internal fractures.

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