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Pacific Union

The Pacific Union is a proposed political and economic community of Pacific island nations and associated territories, envisioned as an evolution of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) into a framework with shared institutions, potentially including a common currency and coordinated policies on trade, security, and migration.^[1]^[2] First formally recommended in 2003 by an Australian Senate committee, the concept seeks to enhance regional sovereignty and bargaining power through pooled governance, amid challenges like climate vulnerability and external geopolitical pressures from powers such as China.^[3]^[4] Discussions have periodically resurfaced, including in 2023 when Samoa's Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mata'afa raised the idea at a PIF leaders' meeting, emphasizing free trade, investment, and people movement to foster intra-Pacific ties.^[4] While proponents argue it could mirror aspects of the European Union by amplifying small states' influence, critics highlight risks of dominance by larger members like Australia and New Zealand, potentially undermining island autonomy.^[5]^[6] To date, no formal union has materialized, with progress limited to incremental PIF initiatives like the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER).^[7]

Origins and Historical Precedents

2003 Australian Senate Proposal

In August 2003, the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee tabled its report A Pacific Engaged: Australia's Relations with Papua New Guinea and the Island States of the South West Pacific, recommending the formation of a Pacific economic and political community as a deepened framework evolving from the Pacific Islands Forum to bind Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island countries more closely in economic, security, and governance domains.^[8] The bipartisan committee, which began its inquiry on 13 March 2002, envisioned this community as recognizing cultural diversity while promoting independent nations' cooperation to address regional vulnerabilities, including state fragility observed in events like the 2000 Solomon Islands crisis and Fijian coups.^[8] ^[9] Key proposals centered on shifting from aid dependency to collective self-reliance through integrated mechanisms, such as expanded labour mobility programs allowing Pacific Islanders seasonal access to Australian agriculture and services sectors to boost remittances and skills transfer, alongside trade liberalization by dismantling non-tariff barriers and fostering private sector-led growth in tourism and resources.^[9] ^[10] Governance enhancements included shared anti-corruption institutions and capacity-building for rule of law, while security dimensions urged coordinated responses to transnational threats like people smuggling and organized crime, informed by post-9/11 priorities for regional stability.^[11] The report posited that these steps would yield mutual economic gains, with Australia's larger market absorbing regional exports and investments, rather than sustaining inefficient aid flows estimated at hundreds of millions annually.^[12] This initiative reflected early apprehensions over external influences, including nascent Chinese aid and infrastructure projects in forums like fishing access agreements, which the committee viewed as potential challenges to Western-aligned stability amid governance gaps.^[9] Committee member David Jull, a Liberal MP, publicly advocated the concept—later termed a "Pacific Union" in media—as essential for economic and social security, asserting Australia's de facto role in "keeping them afloat" via aid necessitated proactive integration akin to the European Union model.^[1] Though supplementary ideas like adopting the Australian dollar circulated in related briefings, Prime Minister John Howard tempered enthusiasm for a single currency, prioritizing voluntary cooperation.^[1]

1949 Chiang-Quirino-Rhee Initiative

In July 1949, Philippine President Elpidio Quirino hosted Republic of China leader Chiang Kai-shek in Baguio, where they issued a joint declaration on July 12 proposing the formation of a Pacific Union as a defensive alliance among non-communist Asian states to counter Soviet and communist expansionism, with an explicit call for United States involvement to bolster collective security.^[13]^[14] South Korean President Syngman Rhee quickly endorsed the initiative, joining Chiang and Quirino in advocating for a regional conference to establish the pact, motivated by the existential threats posed by communist advances in China and potential spillover to Korea and Southeast Asia.^[15]^[16] The proposal emerged amid the causal fallout of World War II decolonization and the Chinese Civil War, where Mao Zedong's communists had seized the mainland by early 1949, forcing Chiang's Nationalist government to retreat to Taiwan with approximately 2 million soldiers and civilians, heightening fears of a domino effect across the Pacific rim.^[17] Quirino, facing domestic insurgency from the Hukbalahap communists, sought external alliances to secure Philippine independence granted in 1946, while Rhee grappled with North Korean threats following U.S. troop withdrawals from the South in 1949.^[18] Discussions extended to Manila, where Quirino publicly urged a Pacific pact in speeches covered by local press, envisioning mutual defense mechanisms akin to the North Atlantic Treaty but tailored to Asian vulnerabilities.^[19] Domestic opposition in the Philippines was immediate and vocal, with the Nacionalista Party condemning the plan as a risky entanglement that could provoke communist retaliation and undermine national sovereignty, reflecting broader regional wariness of over-reliance on external powers.^[14] U.S. officials assessed the initiative as primarily driven by Chiang and Rhee's desperation for American backing, rather than broad regional consensus, leading to reluctance in Washington due to concerns over alienating neutral states like India and straining resources amid European priorities.^[20] No formal treaty materialized, as divisions persisted and U.S. policy favored bilateral aid over multilateral commitments at the time, though the effort underscored security realism as a foundational driver for Pacific cooperation, prioritizing deterrence against verifiable communist aggression over aspirational economic ties.^[18]^[21]

Existing Regional Frameworks

Pacific Islands Forum Structure

The Pacific Islands Forum was established in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum to facilitate cooperation among Pacific nations on regional issues.^[22] In 1999, leaders decided to rename it the Pacific Islands Forum, effective from 2000, to reflect the broader geographical scope including northern Pacific members.^[23] The organization currently comprises 18 members: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.^[22] The Secretariat, headquartered in Suva, Fiji, serves as the primary administrative body, supporting policy coordination and implementation.^[24] The Forum's primary decision-making mechanism is the annual Leaders' Meeting, where heads of government convene to address priorities such as economic development, security, and environmental challenges.^[25] These meetings produce communiqués outlining collective positions and directives for the Secretariat. Specialized committees and working groups, including those on trade and finance, provide technical input to inform leaders' deliberations.^[26] Core functions emphasize economic coordination, exemplified by the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), signed in 2001 and entering into force on April 13, 2003, which promotes tariff liberalization among 14 Forum Island Countries to enhance intra-regional trade.^[27] Regional aid coordination is guided by the Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles, adopted to align donor assistance with national priorities, fostering ownership and reducing fragmentation in development funding.^[28] In security matters, the Forum facilitated the Treaty of Rarotonga, signed in 1985 and entering into force in 1986, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone that prohibits nuclear weapons and has secured protocols from nuclear powers, contributing to zero reported deployments or tests in the zone since ratification.^[29] This outcome demonstrates the Forum's capacity to drive binding regional agreements with verifiable compliance effects.^[30]

Current Levels of Integration

Economic integration among Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) members remains limited, with intra-regional trade constituting a modest share of total commerce. Under the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (PACER Plus), which entered into force for Australia, New Zealand, and initial Forum Island Countries like Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu in December 2020, tariffs on most goods have been eliminated to facilitate trade, though implementation varies by member and overall volumes have not yet significantly elevated regional flows.^[31]^[32] For most PIF island economies, intra-regional trade accounts for under 5% of GDP, reflecting heavy reliance on extra-regional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, and Asian markets for exports like fish, agriculture, and minerals.^[33] Labor mobility schemes represent a key implemented mechanism for human capital integration. Australia's Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (PALM) scheme, expanded since 2023, admitted over 30,000 Pacific workers by mid-2024, primarily in agriculture and horticulture sectors, addressing seasonal shortages while providing remittances equivalent to significant portions of home economies' GDPs—up to 10% for countries like Vanuatu and Tonga.^[34]^[35] This program, building on earlier initiatives, facilitates temporary migration without permanent settlement pathways, contrasting with deeper unions elsewhere.^[36] In fisheries management, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)—comprising eight PIF members—demonstrates advanced sectoral cooperation, controlling approximately 25% of the global tuna catch through a vessel day scheme that sets harvest limits and auction fees, generating revenues exceeding $100 million annually by 2023 for members.^[37]^[38] This harmonized approach to exclusive economic zones enforces sustainable quotas, differing from fragmented national efforts. Political coordination occurs via PIF platforms for disaster response, such as unified appeals for international aid following the 2022 Tonga volcanic eruption and tsunami, where members aligned on early warning systems and recovery funding.^[39]^[40] Overall, these ties indicate functional but shallow integration, with economic interdependence dwarfed by external dependencies; for instance, aid from Australia and New Zealand comprises over 20% of many island budgets, underscoring the baseline for debates on deeper alignment.^[41] No supranational institutions enforce binding policies beyond specific sectors, limiting spillover to broader political or monetary union.^[33]

Geopolitical Drivers

Responses to Chinese Expansionism

China's engagement in the Pacific Islands has encompassed substantial financial inflows, with commitments totaling nearly $3.15 billion in development finance, including loans and infrastructure projects, from 2008 to 2020.^[42] These efforts have facilitated diplomatic shifts, such as Kiribati's severance of ties with Taiwan and recognition of China on September 20, 2019.^[43] Similarly, the Solomon Islands finalized a bilateral security agreement with China in April 2022, permitting Chinese training of local police and potential vessel deployments for humanitarian or disaster relief purposes.^[44] Such initiatives have engendered debt sustainability risks, exemplified by Tonga's obligations to China surpassing $120 million—equivalent to approximately 25% of its GDP—as of recent assessments, with repayment terms compressing into five years and consuming over 20% of government revenue at peak.^[45] In Vanuatu, Chinese lending has elevated bilateral debt to a level where new infrastructure loans could push China's share of external debt beyond 50%, amid broader public debt-to-GDP ratios strained by post-disaster reconstruction needs.^[46] These patterns evoke debt accumulation mechanisms observed in cases like Sri Lanka's 2017 handover of the Hambantota port to China after default on $1.5 billion in loans, raising parallel apprehensions of asset concessions or policy concessions in Pacific contexts where repayment capacities are limited by small economies and vulnerability to shocks.^[47] Countermeasures have materialized through augmented Western commitments, notably Australia's Pacific Step-Up initiative, which by 2022 incorporated $1.44 billion in annual development assistance to the region, prioritizing infrastructure, health, and economic recovery to foster alternatives to non-transparent financing.^[48] This escalation aligned with the Pacific Islands Forum's resistance to China's May 2022 overture for a comprehensive regional strategic partnership encompassing security cooperation, which forum members declined in favor of selective bilateral engagements, citing concerns over sovereignty dilution.^[49] Proposals for a Pacific Union emerge in this context as a mechanism for pooled leverage, enabling unified negotiation of aid terms that emphasize fiscal transparency and concessionality over bilateral vulnerabilities, thereby insulating members from predatory lending cycles through diversified, accountable partnerships.^[50]

Strategic Alignment with Anglo-Pacific Powers

A proposed Pacific Union would deepen strategic alignment with Anglo-Pacific powers including Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom, leveraging frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and AUKUS to prioritize interoperability and deterrence rooted in shared democratic values and security realism. Australia's participation in the Quad originated from post-2004 Indian Ocean tsunami coordination, evolving into formal senior officials' meetings by 2007, fostering joint exercises and intelligence sharing among like-minded states.^[51] Complementing this, AUKUS—announced on 15 September 2021—encompasses Pillar II initiatives for collaborative development of advanced capabilities like quantum technologies and artificial intelligence, with potential extensions to Pacific partners to enhance regional technological edges and operational cohesion.^[52] The United States reinforces these ties via Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau, renewed through agreements signed in 2023 and ratified with $7.1 billion in economic assistance over 20 years, granting U.S. exclusive military access and strategic denial in exchange for development aid.^[53] Such mechanisms empirically reduce strategic vacuums by facilitating basing rights and joint patrols, as evidenced by post-AUKUS discussions on Pillar II tech-sharing eligibility for aligned Pacific entities, promoting causal deterrence through integrated capabilities rather than isolated efforts.^[52] Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review exemplifies hard power prioritization, directing investments toward expanded Pacific engagements including the Pacific Maritime Security Program, which delivered 21 Guardian-class patrol boats to regional partners by October 2024 to bolster maritime domain awareness and exclusive economic zone enforcement.^[54] This approach contrasts with critiques of overreliance on soft diplomacy, highlighting the 2016 UNCLOS arbitration's outcome—where the tribunal ruled against expansive maritime claims but enforcement faltered due to non-compliance—as underscoring the imperative for coalitions of committed powers over unenforced international rulings.^[55]^[56]

Core Proposals and Mechanisms

Economic and Trade Components

The proposed economic framework for a Pacific Union centers on establishing a free trade zone by expanding the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), which facilitates tariff reductions among Forum Island Countries, and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), a broader liberalization framework involving Australia and New Zealand.^[57]^[58] This would entail comprehensive tariff elimination, standardized investment protections to encourage capital flows, and currency stabilization measures, including potential adoption of the Australian dollar as a common currency to reduce exchange rate volatility and transaction costs.^[59]^[60] Proponents reference empirical outcomes from ASEAN's liberalization under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), where intra-bloc trade shares rose from approximately 20% in the early 1990s to over 25% by the 2010s, correlating with accelerated regional GDP growth rates averaging 5-6% annually during peak integration periods.^[61] Labor mobility forms a key pillar, enhancing existing seasonal worker schemes such as Australia's Pacific Australia Labour Mobility program, which deployed over 20,000 Pacific Islanders annually by 2023, with provisions for permanent residency pathways targeting skilled migrants.^[62] This addresses demographic pressures, including Australia's projected median age rising to 45 by 2050 amid a shrinking workforce, contrasted with youth bulges in Pacific islands where over 60% of populations in countries like Papua New Guinea are under 25. Such integration aims to channel remittances, which already exceed $1 billion annually from Pacific diaspora, into island economies while alleviating labor shortages in sectors like agriculture and horticulture.^[63] Fiscal mechanisms emphasize revenue-sharing from shared resources, particularly fisheries within vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs) spanning 20 million square kilometers, generating approximately $5-6 billion yearly from tuna licenses predominantly licensed to foreign fleets.^[64] This approach seeks to curtail dependence on official development assistance (ODA), which averages over 25% of GDP across many Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) nations—for instance, exceeding 40% in Kiribati and [Marshall Islands](/page/Marshall Islands)—by promoting self-sufficiency through bloc-managed funds.^[65] Critics of aid reliance, grounded in observations of governance erosion in high-dependency states, argue it incentivizes rent-seeking and corruption over productive investment, as Pacific countries score below global averages on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, with aid inflows correlating to weaker institutional accountability in empirical studies.^[66]^[67]

Security and Political Dimensions

Proposals for a Pacific Union envision collective defense mechanisms modeled on lighter variants of NATO's mutual assistance provisions, whereby member states commit to coordinated responses to territorial or maritime threats. Such arrangements would emphasize institutional deterrence through shared intelligence and rapid response protocols, drawing from existing bilateral pacts like the 2025 Australia-Papua New Guinea Pukpuk Treaty, which mandates joint action against aggression and facilitates Australian military access to PNG bases.^[68] Joint maritime patrols, leveraging Australia's naval capabilities—such as expanding Operation Sovereign Borders-style enforcement to cover exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of smaller island states—aim to secure vast oceanic domains against illegal fishing and coercion, building on current Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) maritime surveillance initiatives that have logged over 1,000 patrol hours annually since 2020.^[69]^[70] Harmonized governance standards form a core political dimension, with proposals for unified anti-corruption bodies aligned to international benchmarks, including mutual audits and enforcement cooperation to elevate regional compliance. Pacific Island nations exhibit persistent governance deficits, as evidenced by Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores averaging around 40 for small island states in 2024—lagging the global average of 43 by up to 20 points in cases like Papua New Guinea (score 29) and Solomon Islands (35), compared to Australia's 75.^[71] These mechanisms would integrate existing regional efforts, such as the UNODC-supported Pacific Regional Anti-Corruption platform launched in 2024, which unites 18 countries for cross-border investigations, but extend them via binding supranational oversight to enforce democratic norms like free elections and judicial independence, countering elite capture prevalent in aid-dependent economies.^[72]^[71] Political union elements prioritize a supranational forum for foreign policy alignment, mitigating the consensus-based veto dynamics in the PIF that have stalled decisions, such as on security partnerships where single members like Solomon Islands have blocked external dialogues.^[73] This structure, analogous to the European Coal and Steel Community's early supranationality in 1951 which fostered unified stances amid Cold War pressures, would enable qualified-majority voting on external threats, allowing coordinated diplomacy without unanimous consent and enhancing bargaining power against great-power influence.^[74] Verification through annual compliance reports tied to indices like Freedom House democracy scores would ensure adherence, promoting causal stability by institutionalizing collective resolve over fragmented sovereignty exercises.^[69]

Evaluations and Debates

Empirical Advantages

Deeper regional integration in the Pacific promises measurable economic gains through expanded trade, reduced transaction costs, and shared infrastructure, as regional analyses indicate that enhanced cooperation facilitates market access and productivity improvements for small island economies. The Asian Development Bank reports that closer trade and financial integration across Asia and the Pacific correlates with sustained economic growth by enabling poorer countries to leverage larger markets and supply chains.^[75] World Bank assessments of Pacific trade facilitation strategies project efficiency gains that could streamline goods and services flows, potentially lifting intra-regional commerce and overall GDP by lowering barriers akin to those addressed in existing frameworks like PICTA.^[76] Security cooperation under a unified Pacific framework empirically diminishes individual states' exposure to external coercion by pooling resources for collective deterrence, mirroring how EU Eastern enlargement integrated vulnerable states into a supranational structure that restrained Russian adventurism through 2021 via economic interdependence and shared defense commitments.^[77] In the Pacific, initiatives for intelligence-sharing, such as the proposed Pacific Eyes network, would bolster early warning against gray-zone tactics, enhancing regional resilience without relying on perpetual bilateral aid that perpetuates dependency cycles.^[70] Labor mobility and remittances underscore integration's alignment with existing economic realities, with Pacific island small states receiving approximately $1.3 billion in remittances annually as of 2024, primarily from workers in Australia and New Zealand, which stabilize household incomes and fund local development.^[78] Empirical migration data reveal strong voluntary preferences for these destinations among Polynesians, driven by familial ties, linguistic compatibility, and higher wage opportunities, rather than alternatives like China, evidencing organic affinities that deeper union could amplify through formalized pathways, thereby fostering self-sustaining prosperity over aid-based models often critiqued for entrenching underdevelopment.^[79]^[80]

Sovereignty and Cultural Criticisms

Critics of deeper integration under a potential Pacific Union have raised concerns over the erosion of national sovereignty, particularly citing the dominant influence of larger members like Australia and New Zealand. Former Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama, prior to his 2022 electoral defeat, repeatedly accused Australia and New Zealand of exerting "big brother" dominance within the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), advocating for restrictions on their voting rights to prevent undue sway over regional decisions.^[81] ^[82] These assertions reflect broader apprehensions among smaller island states that enhanced economic or security pacts could subordinate their policy autonomy to metropolitan powers, as evidenced by PIF voting dynamics where island nations have blocked initiatives perceived as favoring Australian priorities. A notable instance occurred during the 2019 PIF summit in Tuvalu, where negotiations nearly collapsed amid clashes over a climate change declaration; smaller islands, led by Tuvalu's prime minister, insisted on stronger language condemning coal use, overriding Australia's resistance and highlighting the forum's consensus model as a bulwark against larger members' agendas.^[83] ^[84] Such episodes underscore sovereignty advocates' arguments that isolationist stances preserve leverage, though empirical data on Pacific economies reveal persistent vulnerabilities— including aid dependency exceeding 50% of GDP in nations like Nauru and Tuvalu—suggesting that non-integrated models foster reactive rather than proactive resilience.^[70] Cultural criticisms focus on the risk of tradition dilution through increased migration and shared governance, with indigenous voices warning that influxes to Australia and New Zealand could erode linguistic and customary practices amid urbanization.^[85] Reports from Pacific diaspora communities note challenges in maintaining heritage, yet counter-evidence from host nations indicates robust retention: New Zealand's Pacific Languages Strategy documents sustained acquisition rates, with over 80% of Samoan and Tongan youth in Auckland proficient in heritage tongues, implying that voluntary mobility does not inherently dissolve identities as critics claim.^[86] Left-leaning outlets, such as The Guardian, have portrayed Australian-led integration efforts as neo-imperialist encroachments on sovereignty, framing pacts like those with Tuvalu as extensions of historical dominance despite their bilateral consent.^[87] ^[88] In contrast, analyses of voluntary federations, such as U.S. states where regional identities persist post-union (e.g., distinct linguistic enclaves in Hawaii and Louisiana), suggest that cultural pluralism can endure under integrated frameworks, challenging isolationism's assumption of inherent preservation through separation. These media divergences often reflect institutional biases, with progressive sources emphasizing power asymmetries while underplaying agency in Pacific decision-making.^[89]

Recent Developments (2010s–2025)

Revival Amid Indo-Pacific Tensions

Discussions of a Pacific Union gained renewed traction in the 2020s amid escalating U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, particularly following China's assertive diplomacy in the region. The 2022 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting in Fiji highlighted tensions, as China's attempts to expand influence through security and economic pacts—such as the Solomon Islands security agreement—prompted pushback from Australia and New Zealand, who intensified efforts to deepen regional ties and counterbalance Beijing's outreach. This fallout underscored vulnerabilities in Pacific agency, spurring advocacy for closer integration to enhance sovereignty amid great-power rivalry.^[90] The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in February 2022, emphasized bolstering partnerships in the Pacific to promote a free and open region, including through the inaugural Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative launched that September. This framework supported enhanced regional cooperation on infrastructure, climate resilience, and security, implicitly aligning with union-like benefits by committing over $810 million in aid to Pacific Island nations to address development gaps and reduce reliance on Chinese financing. Subsequent U.S.-Pacific Islands summits in 2022 and 2023 reinforced these commitments, with aid disbursements exceeding $800 million by 2023 to fund undersea cables, health programs, and economic resilience projects.^[91]^[92]^[93] A concrete manifestation emerged in November 2023 with the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty, which established a special pathway for up to 280 Tuvaluans annually to gain Australian permanent residency, alongside provisions for free movement, trade facilitation, and joint security measures. Signed amid Tuvalu's existential threats from sea-level rise and China's Pacific inroads—such as diplomatic overtures to switch recognition from Taiwan—this agreement represented a partial union model, prioritizing human mobility and mutual defense without full political merger. Concurrently, the Young Australians Institute advocated for a broader Pacific Union in a January 2023 analysis, proposing free trade zones leveraging Australia and New Zealand's economies to foster island agency against geopolitical pressures.^[94]^[95]^[6] By 2025, analyses like Talanoa 'o Tonga's October assessment acknowledged mounting implicit integrations—through forums like the PIF and bilateral pacts—but questioned the feasibility of an explicit union, citing diverse sovereignty preferences and logistical hurdles despite shared incentives from Indo-Pacific tensions. These developments reflected a pragmatic revival, driven by empirical needs for economic scale and security amid China's $2 billion-plus annual Pacific lending, yet constrained by island nations' emphasis on autonomy.^[7]

Key Reports and Proponent Statements

A 2023 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) document outlined a "Pacific Union Proposal" emphasizing a work agenda centered on free trade, free investment, and free movement of people to strengthen ties among Pacific nations and counter external influences.^[4] This proposal aimed to bind Pacific countries economically, fostering deeper integration amid concerns over fragmented responses to geopolitical pressures. The Lowy Institute analyzed the 2023 Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty as a model extending beyond climate resilience, incorporating strategic elements like security cooperation and implications for alliances such as AUKUS.^[96] Proponents highlighted its role in enhancing deterrence through tailored bilateral arrangements, including potential intelligence-sharing and resettlement provisions that could scale regionally. Tuvaluan Prime Minister Feleti Teo endorsed the Falepili Union's collective security components in March 2024, noting they provide "the impression of a deeper strategic partnership" to address vulnerabilities, including those from external actors securing over a dozen policing and influence agreements across Pacific states since 2018.^[97] Australian officials, via the treaty's joint statement, affirmed commitments to stewardship of the Blue Pacific, positioning it as a foundation for unified regional fronts against divided security pacts.^[98] Parallel multilateral ideas emerged in Universal Peace Federation (UPF) discussions for an Asia-Pacific Union Forum in the 2020s, gaining support from regional parliamentarians for integration frameworks that echo Pacific-specific economic and political unity efforts, though focused more broadly on continental cooperation.^[99] These statements underscore empirical arguments for pooled resources, contrasting China's fragmented bilateral deals—such as the 2022 Solomon Islands pact—with the potential of a cohesive Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) response leveraging shared sovereignty mechanisms.^[96]

Obstacles and Prospects

Practical Barriers

The economic diversity among potential Pacific Union members poses significant challenges to harmonization efforts. Australia's GDP per capita reached $64,407 in 2023, while Fiji's stood at approximately $5,737, creating a roughly tenfold disparity that hinders unified fiscal policies, trade standards, and resource allocation.^[100]^[101] Smaller island states like Kiribati face even lower figures, around $1,900, exacerbating inequalities in bargaining power and development priorities within forums like the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Geographic fragmentation compounds these issues, with member territories spanning over 10,000 kilometers across the Pacific Ocean, elevating logistical costs for coordination, such as transport and communication infrastructure required for joint initiatives.^[102] Political resistance further impedes integration, as demonstrated by internal divisions that fracture regional unity. The 2021 riots in Solomon Islands, triggered by protests against Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and escalating into widespread looting in Honiara, exposed longstanding ethnic and provincial tensions, prompting intervention by Australian-led forces and raising alarms among other PIF members about instability's contagion effects.^[103]^[104] Aid dynamics reinforce this inertia, with many islands favoring bilateral deals from China for rapid infrastructure delivery—such as roads and ports—over slower multilateral arrangements, as evidenced by China's funding of a third of regional bilateral infrastructure works from 2008 to 2016 and ongoing resurgence in commitments.^[105] Institutional weaknesses underscore enforcement gaps in existing frameworks, limiting prospects for deeper union. The Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), intended to foster intra-regional trade, remains incompletely ratified, with only 11 of the eligible 14 states (excluding non-signatories like Palau and Marshall Islands, and unratified Federated States of Micronesia) having done so as of recent assessments, resulting in uneven implementation and minimal tariff reductions among parties.^[57] This partial adherence reflects broader hesitancy toward binding commitments, prioritizing national sovereignty over collective mechanisms amid divergent geopolitical alignments.

Scenarios for Advancement

An incremental advancement toward a Pacific Union could occur through incremental enhancements to existing frameworks like the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus, which has seen recent ministerial commitments to bolster private sector engagement and trade capacities among Pacific Island Countries (PICs).^[106] Such steps might extend to security alignments, including potential AUKUS Pillar II expansions involving non-nuclear technology sharing with partners like New Zealand or Japan, fostering deeper interoperability without immediate supranational structures.^[107] Post-2025 geopolitical shifts, particularly a U.S. administration emphasizing alliance fortification, could accelerate these via bilateral aid and capacity-building, leveraging PICs' strategic positions to counterbalance external influences.^[108] Radical scenarios for a fuller union might emerge from escalated Chinese assertiveness, such as a Taiwan Strait crisis spilling over into Pacific logistics and alliances, compelling PICs to consolidate defenses through shared sovereignty mechanisms to secure maritime routes and deter coercion.^[109] Analyses indicate that such a contingency could disrupt regional trade by up to 25% of GDP in affected areas, incentivizing collective responses despite sovereignty costs, though free-rider dynamics among small states—where larger members like Australia bear disproportionate burdens—pose persistent risks of fragmentation.^[110] Absent such shocks, stagnation remains likely, as historical patterns in small-state groupings reveal collective action failures driven by mismatched incentives and veto-prone decision-making.^[111] Empirical parallels underscore a cautious prognosis: the East African Community's repeated collapses, including its 1977 dissolution amid economic imbalances and political mistrust, highlight how supranational ambitions falter without equitable gains, requiring multiple restarts to achieve modest customs union progress.^[112] Successes in regional integration, such as limited intra-trade growth in revived East African structures, often stem from market-led bilateral deals rather than imposed equity models, suggesting Pacific prospects favor decentralized enhancements over coerced unity to mitigate disparities among resource-poor islands and developed anchors like Australia.^[113] This aligns with causal trends where external threats spur temporary cohesion, but enduring advancement demands aligned economic incentives over ideological federation.^[114]

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The Pacific Islands Forum brings the region together to address pressing issues and challenges, and foster collaboration and cooperation.Missing: proposal | Show results with:proposal
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The Pacific Islands Forum_Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's ...
Nov 15, 2000 · The 30th session of Forum Summit Meetings in 1999 decided to change the name,the South Pacific Forum, to the Pacific Islands Forum, effective as ...
[24]
Contact Us | Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
Our Location: Pacific Island Forum Secretariat Ratu Sukuna Road Private Mail Bag Suva, Fiji. Phone number: +679 331 2600. General enquires: info@forumsec.org.
[25]
Pacific Islands Forum | Regional Cooperation, Climate Change ...
Sep 27, 2025 · Pacific Islands Forum, organization established in 1971 to provide a setting for heads of government to discuss common issues and problems ...Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
[26]
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat: Home page
The Forum's Pacific Vision is for a resilient region of peace, harmony ... Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Ratu Sukuna Road, Suva, Fiji. What we do.
[27]
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)
Signed: 2001. Entry into force: 13 April 2003. PICTA is the first; and remains the only Free Trade Agreement between the 14 Pacific Forum Island Countries ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
[28]
Forum countries attend international aid effectiveness meeting
A range of regional frameworks and principles including the Pacific Aid Effectiveness Principles have been adopted to provide guidance and direction in ...
[29]
Treaty of Rarotonga | United Nations Platform for Nuclear-Weapon ...
The Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature on 6 August 1985 and entered into force on 11 December 1986.
[30]
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and Protocols - State.gov
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty) was opened for signature at Rarotonga on August 6, 1985, and entered into force December 11, 1986.
[31]
PACER Plus news - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
PACER Plus to maximise opportunities for Forum Island Countries to use trade and investment as engines of growth, to create jobs, ensuring higher incomes and ...
[32]
PACER Plus Overview
PACER Plus is a landmark trade and development agreement that will raise living standards, create jobs and increase exports in Pacific Island countries.
[33]
[PDF] The EU and the Pacific Island countries - European Parliament
Intraregional trade is modest, and many PICs depend on budgetary and development aid from abroad. Main regional organisations. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF): The ...
[34]
PALM scheme data
PALM scheme worker data · there were 30,215 workers participating in the scheme · 14,300 were short-term workers and 15,920 were long-term workers.
[35]
Fiji replaces Vanuatu as top PALM sending country - Devpolicy Blog
Jul 23, 2024 · In June 2019, there were 5,886 PALM visa holders in Australia. Five years later, in May 2024, there were 32,513, an increase of 450%. There are ...<|separator|>
[36]
Pacific Labour Mobility | Australian Government Department of ...
The PALM scheme is an important temporary migration program to address unskilled, low-skilled and semi-skilled labour shortages across rural and regional ...
[37]
PNA Tuna: Small Islands Big Opportunities
PNA countries control a large ocean area with a quarter of the world's tuna, and are taking control of their fishery, with a major source of revenue from ...
[38]
How Pacific Island nations built one of the world's largest ...
Jun 5, 2024 · The key to creating the world's largest sustainable tuna purse seine fishery, responsible for around 50% of the global supply of skipjack tuna.
[39]
Early warnings and sea level rise are focus of Pacific Islands Forum
Aug 26, 2024 · The app is a direct response to the volcanic eruption and tsunami of 2022 and the request for assistance by Tonga to WMO and the Climate Risk ...Missing: joint examples
[40]
Climate Change and Disasters - Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
This collective effort has been focused on identifying and coordinating regional and international funding to support national responses to climate change and ...
[41]
Pacific islands regional organisations
Forum members are serviced by a Secretariat based in Suva, Fiji. Australia contributes approximately 36 percent (2023) of the budget for the PIF Secretariat.
[42]
China's influence as a Pacific donor - Lowy Institute
Oct 31, 2022 · For example, China provided a total of nearly US$3.148 billion to the Pacific between 2008 and 2020, including US$3.145 billion and US$2.7 ...Missing: empirical | Show results with:empirical
[43]
Taiwan loses second ally in a week as Kiribati switches to China
Sep 20, 2019 · Taiwan has lost its second diplomatic ally in less than a week after the Pacific nation of Kiribati moved to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
[44]
China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement and Competition for ...
Dec 2, 2022 · Signed in April 2022, the China-Solomon Islands security agreement has raised concern among Western countries about China's growing influence, ...
[45]
Tonga's Balancing Act: Navigating a High-Stakes Debt Dilemma ...
The amount owed to China is over US$120 million, approximately a quarter of Tonga's annual GDP. The peak of these repayments will take up more than a fifth of ...
[46]
A new China loan threatens Vanuatu's debt outlook | Lowy Institute
Feb 6, 2024 · 2 billion (A$168 million) or around 12% of Vanuatu's GDP. With this, China's share of Vanuatu's external debt would rise to over 50%. There is ...
[47]
Tonga walks a tightrope on its Chinese debts - Lowy Institute
Jan 31, 2024 · Rather than paying the loan over 15 years as originally planned, Tonga must now repay loans worth over a quarter of its GDP in just five years.
[48]
2. Key themes and framework - Parliament of Australia
... Australia's aid program in the Indo Pacific and its role in ... …we have committed a record $1.44 billion in development assistance to the Pacific in ...
[49]
Full article: The Solomons-China 2022 security deal
Jun 7, 2022 · The security deal struck between the Solomon Islands and China in April 2022 has triggered dismay and outrage in Australia and New Zealand.Missing: pact | Show results with:pact
[50]
Geopolitics in the Pacific Islands: Playing for advantage | Lowy Institute
Jan 31, 2024 · [45] This regional fund has AU$3 billion for infrastructure lending and another AU$1 billion for grants, and supports airports, sea cables, ...<|separator|>
[51]
The Quad | Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs ...
The Quad's origins date back to our collaboration in response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The partnership is known formally as the 'Quad', not ...
[52]
AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for ...
May 21, 2024 · With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological ...AUKUS Overview · Alignment with National... · Pillar 2 Activities · Electronic Warfare
[53]
Interior Department Applauds Renewed Economic Assistance for ...
Mar 11, 2024 · The Compact of Free Association packages will provide economic assistance of $3.3 billion to the FSM, $2.3 billion to the RMI, and $889 million ...
[54]
Pacific Maritime Security Program | Defence Activities
Australia is delivering 24 Guardian-class Patrol Boats to partner nations under the PMSP, with 21 vessels already delivered as of October 2024. The Guardian- ...Missing: 2023 | Show results with:2023
[55]
South China Sea Arbitration - Cases | PCA-CPA
The arbitration concerned the role of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea.
[56]
Australia's 2023 Defence Strategic Review
Apr 24, 2023 · The DSR commits Australia to strengthening defence engagement with Indo-Pacific partners, 'particularly in the Pacific and Southeast Asia'. It ...
[57]
[PDF] PACIFIC ISLAND COUNTRIES TRADE AGREEMENT (PICTA)
PICTA entered into force on 13 April 2003 after six FICs ratified the Agreement. The Agreement closed for signature on 17 August 2006.
[58]
https://bilaterals.org/?-pacer-picta-
[59]
[PDF] Strengthening Australia's relationships with countries in the Pacific ...
regional integration – a Pacific union of as yet unknown dimensions”, and ... in 2003 [Senate Committee 2003], the Labor Party policy discussion paper.
[60]
[PDF] A Single Currency for Pacific Island Countries: a Revisit
One of the recommendations made by the. Australian Senate Committee for promoting regional stability was adopting a common currency, preferably the Australian ...
[61]
[PDF] Services and Investment Liberalisation in ASEAN | ERIA
ASEAN's services and investment liberalization, driven by agreements like ACIA and AFAS, has enhanced economic growth, with services being the dominant sector ...
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PICTA, PACER and EPAs: weaknesses in Pacific island countries ...
Jun 9, 2019 · Most Pacific island countries are signatories to several overlapping regional and international agreements encompassing trade,Missing: zone | Show results with:zone
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https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/pacific-aid-map-2025-key-findings-report
[64]
[PDF] The Case of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations ...
This report examines the potential implications of the transparency provisions in the Pacific Agreement on. Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus for gender.
[65]
[PDF] Growth and Foreign Direct Investment in the Pacific Island Countries
On average ODA accounted for over 25 per cent of recipient GDP in Pacific island countries. Despite these aid levels, Pacific island countries have experienced ...<|separator|>
[66]
Why are aid projects less effective in the Pacific? - PMC
Aid projects in the Pacific are less effective due to isolation and small populations, which are difficult to change.
[67]
2023 Corruption Perceptions Index: Explore the… - Transparency.org
Corruption Perceptions Index 2023 · 90. Denmark1 · 87. Finland2 · 85. New Zealand3 · 84. Norway4 · 83. Singapore5 · 82. Sweden6 · 82. Switzerland6 · 79. Netherlands8.CPI 2024 · 2023 · 2022
[68]
How the Historic Australia-PNG Pukpuk Treaty Could Reshape ...
Oct 14, 2025 · The Pukpuk Treaty transforms Australia–Papua New Guinea relations and reshapes strategic power across the Pacific.
[69]
The Case for a Pacific Defense Pact - Foreign Affairs
May 27, 2025 · The time has come for the United States to build a collective defense pact in Asia. For decades, such a pact was neither possible nor necessary.Missing: Union | Show results with:Union
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Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 - Transparency.org
The Corruption Perceptions Index 2024 ranks 180 countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. Find out the scores and read our analysis.2023 · CPI 2024 for Asia Pacific · 1995 - CPI · 2010 - CPI
[72]
Addressing corruption in the Pacific to build better now
Aug 28, 2024 · 18 Pacific Island Countries are uniting to combat corruption and address interconnected challenges under a regional anti-corruption platform.Missing: standards harmonization proposals
[73]
Pacific Islands Forum sees Australia-China push for regional ...
Sep 7, 2025 · The Pacific nations of Nauru and Tuvalu have both signed sweeping treaties with Australia that effectively give Canberra veto power over their ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[74]
https://www.pacforum.org/publications/issues-and-insights-making-collective-deterrence-and-defense-work-in-the-indo-pacific/
[75]
Regional Cooperation and Integration in Asia and the Pacific
Closer regional trade and financial integration in Asia and the Pacific has huge benefits that drive economic growth and development. · As poorer countries ...
[76]
Pacific Regional Trade Facilitation Strategy - World Bank
Jul 15, 2024 · The strategy seeks to enhance access to both regional and international markets for goods and services produced by Pacific people.
[77]
Occupational therapy: Frozen conflicts, Russian aggression and EU ...
Aug 4, 2025 · The EU's approach towards frozen conflicts to its east was long governed by a reluctance to upset Russia; and by a lack of interest in enlarging ...
[78]
Personal remittances, received (current US$) - World Bank Open Data
All Countries and Economies. Country. Most Recent Year. Most Recent Value ... Pacific island small states. 2024. 1,285,874.81. Small states. 2024. 6,525,191.08.
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The Embarrassed Colonialist: Our migration problem - Lowy Institute
Feb 25, 2016 · This is because many Polynesian countries have migration access to New Zealand, and thus Australia via our open border policy with New Zealand.
[80]
Pacific Islanders in Australia: where are the Melanesians?
Aug 28, 2014 · This is because many Polynesian countries have migration access to New Zealand, and thus Australia via our open border policy with New Zealand.
[81]
Australia Vindicates PM Bainimarama' s Advocacy That It And New ...
They act like “Big Brother” and will now be fighting on two fronts, one against New Zealand and the other against the forum members. Mr Bainimarama has ...
[82]
Full article: Contradictions in Australia's Pacific Islands discourse
Jul 9, 2021 · This exchange highlighted the unclear nature of Australia's assumed role in the Pacific family: is it a 'big brother' (de Brum quoted in O' ...
[83]
Revealed: 'fierce' Pacific forum meeting almost collapsed over ...
Aug 15, 2019 · Critical talks at the Pacific Islands Forum almost collapsed twice amid “fierce” clashes between the Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, and Tuvalu's ...Missing: voting | Show results with:voting
[84]
The state of the Pacific as the 2019 Forum convenes | Lowy Institute
Aug 14, 2019 · This year's Forum comes in the wake of promises of a major re-orientation in both Australian and New Zealand policy towards the Pacific Islands.
[85]
[PDF] Once Were Pacific
Globalization has brought economic opportunities but also dependency and cultural dilution. Many Pacific Islanders migrate to urban centers or abroad for ...
[86]
[PDF] PACIFIC LANGUAGES STRATEGY AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND
• Acquisition and retention of Pacific languages, culture and heritage is consistently identified as a shared priority in the region (New. Zealand's Pacific ...
[87]
Emmanuel Macron denounces 'new imperialism' in Pacific on ...
Jul 27, 2023 · French president Emmanuel Macron has denounced “new imperialism” in the Pacific during a landmark visit to the region, warning of a threat to the sovereignty ...
[88]
Neo-Imperialist Australia's colonial interests in Tuvalu - CPA
Oct 21, 2024 · Neo-imperialism is the dominance over another country through legal agreements, economic power, and cultural influence. Neo-imperial anxiety ...
[89]
The Pacific's diplomatic retreat from great power competition
Sep 8, 2025 · For Australia and New Zealand, integration offers predictability; but for the smaller states, it raises difficult questions about sovereignty ...Missing: concerns | Show results with:concerns
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Pacific islands summit begins amid US-China battle for influence
Jul 11, 2022 · Key summit comes as region grapples with the fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change and US-China rivalry.
[91]
Indo-Pacific Strategy - United States Department of State
Trade between the United States and the Indo-Pacific region reached over $2 trillion in 2022, and the United States benefits from $956 billion in foreign direct ...
[92]
US, Pacific Island Leaders Reach Partnership Deal at Historic Summit
Sep 29, 2022 · The Declaration on US-Pacific Partnership includes more than $810 million in expanded programs to aid the Pacific Islands nations.Missing: 800 | Show results with:800
[93]
The United States' Enduring Commitment to the Indo-Pacific Region
Jan 10, 2025 · We supported Pacific island countries by funding over $37 million in undersea cables projects–providing communications connections to ...
[94]
Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty
The Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union treaty was signed on 9 November 2023 and entered into force on 28 August 2024. As part of the Falepili Union treaty, ...Missing: SMH | Show results with:SMH
[95]
Australia offers Tuvalu residents special visa in 'groundbreaking' treaty
Nov 10, 2023 · In 2019, Kevin Rudd proposed in an essay that Australia should offer citizenship to residents of the small Pacific nations of Tuvalu, Kiribati ...
[96]
A Pacific union: Australia-Tuvalu deal goes well beyond climate
Nov 14, 2023 · This tailored arrangement has implications for AUKUS, legal proceedings, as well as the potential resettlement of climate refugees.
[97]
Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union: The First Bilateral Climate Mobility ...
Sep 9, 2025 · In March 2024, Tuvaluan Prime Minister Feleti Teo remarked that the collective security elements of the Falepili Union give “the impression of ...
[98]
Joint Statement on the Falepili Union between Tuvalu and Australia
We have today signed a new bilateral Treaty to give effect to our closer relationship. This embodies our commitment to the collective stewardship of the Blue ...
[99]
Plans for Asia Pacific Union Forum Garner Multilateral Support
Apr 11, 2025 · Moderated by Hon. Ek Nath Dhakal, member of Parliament of Nepal and chair of UPF Asia Pacific, the session focused on the idea proposed by UPF ...
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GDP per capita (current US$) - Australia - World Bank Open Data
GDP per capita (current US$) - Australia from The World Bank: Data.
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Fiji GDP - Worldometer
GDP per Capita in Fiji (with a population of 924,145 people) was $5,737 in ... World Bank - World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data.
[102]
Pacific Ocean - Wikipedia
Geography · The Pacific separates Asia and Australia from the Americas. · Extending approximately 15,500 km (9,600 mi) from the · Due to the effects of · Along the ...List of islands in the Pacific... · Geology of the Pacific Ocean · Pacific Asia
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Pacific Ocean - World Atlas
Mar 24, 2021 · It spans over 63 million square miles from China to California, and ... The Pacific Ocean has over 25,000 islands and numerous islets and rocks.Origin Of The Name · Geography · Islands · Climate
[104]
Solomons unrest fuels Pacific island concerns over U.S-China rivalry
Dec 1, 2021 · The civil unrest suffered by the Solomon Islands in the past week raised alarm among leaders of other Pacific island nations that rivalry ...
[105]
Explainer: -What is behind unrest in the Solomon Islands? | Reuters
Nov 29, 2021 · Witnesses said rioting erupted after Sogavare failed to meet them. Much of Honiara's Chinatown area was destroyed during the unrest that ...
[106]
China returns to Pacific with aid and influence push, report shows
Nov 20, 2024 · Overall development finance to the Pacific Islands fell the most on record in 2022, dropping by 18%, as COVID-19 support was reined in.
[107]
PACER Plus Ministers review implementation and commit to ...
Nov 21, 2024 · Ministers reviewed progress in implementing the Agreement, noting the advancements made in strengthening the trading capacities of Pacific ...Missing: prospects | Show results with:prospects
[108]
The AUKUS Expansion: A Step Towards Bolstering Security and ...
May 2, 2024 · The proposed expansion of AUKUS to include additional like-minded nations, starting with Japan and potentially involving Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea.
[109]
The Trump Administration's AUKUS Review: Trajectory and Long ...
Sep 9, 2025 · These facilities will provide the United States with new repair and maintenance hubs for nuclear submarines operating in the Indo-Pacific. ...
[110]
China-Taiwan Reunification and Potential Impacts to the Asia ...
Aug 5, 2024 · These consequences include negative impacts to regional and global trade, human rights and freedoms, political ideologies, US national strategic ...
[111]
The Taiwan scenarios 4: The catastrophe - ASPI Strategist
Jul 24, 2025 · A conflict in the Western Pacific over the Taiwan question could result in an estimated 25 percent GDP contraction in Asia. Oil shipments to ...
[112]
(PDF) Regional integration in the South Pacific: challenges for ...
Aug 6, 2025 · PDF | On Jul 3, 2020, Joanna Siekiera published Regional integration in the South Pacific: challenges for public governance | Find, ...
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The Collapse of the East African Community - jstor
East African Common Market. Tanzania has in the past complained bitterly about the failure to compensate adequately the disadvantaged partners for the concen-.
[114]
Expansion versus Cohesion: The East African Community's ... - CSIS
May 7, 2024 · The EAC's failure to assist in resolving the conflict has prompted President Tshisekedi to seek help elsewhere, turning to the Southern African ...
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https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-703