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Union Solidarity and Development Party


The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) is a political party in Myanmar closely affiliated with the country's military establishment, founded on June 2, 2010, by then-Prime Minister Thein Sein and senior members of the State Peace and Development Council to contest the general election later that year. It succeeded the Union Solidarity and Development Association, a mass mobilization organization established by the military regime in 1993 to garner public support for its policies. The party secured a parliamentary majority in the 2010 election—held under conditions widely criticized for lacking fairness due to opposition boycotts and restrictions—allowing Thein Sein to assume the presidency in 2011 and oversee initial economic and political liberalization efforts.
Subsequent electoral defeats in 2015 and 2020, where the USDP won only a fraction of seats against the National League for Democracy, underscored its dependence on military influence amid freer voting. The party's fortunes shifted after the February 2021 military coup, which nullified the 2020 results citing alleged fraud, positioning the USDP as a key ally to the junta's State Administration Council under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. It has since condemned international sanctions on the regime and begun campaigning for junta-scheduled elections, leveraging military networks for advantage. Defining characteristics include its role as a conduit for military interests in civilian governance, with leadership drawn from retired officers, though it has drawn scrutiny for opaque funding ties to military-linked businesses and perceptions of enabling authoritarian continuity over democratic pluralism.

Historical Background

Predecessor Organizations and Formation

The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) was established on September 15, 1993, by Myanmar's ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the military junta that had seized power in 1988, as a mass-based social organization aimed at fostering national unity, solidarity, and development while mobilizing support for the regime and countering pro-democracy opposition groups such as the National League for Democracy (NLD). The USDA, often described as a front for junta interests, grew to include millions of members through state-directed recruitment and was frequently implicated in acts of intimidation and violence against dissidents, including attacks on NLD supporters during the 2003 Depayin massacre. In preparation for Myanmar's first general elections in two decades, scheduled under the framework of the 2008 Constitution—which enshrined military influence through reserved parliamentary seats and oversight of key institutions—the USDA underwent a reorganization in early 2010 to transform into a formal political party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), enabling participation in the electoral process while maintaining continuity in its pro-stability and pro-military objectives. This shift was encouraged by the junta's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), with former Prime Minister Thein Sein resigning from the military on April 2, 2010, to lead the new entity as its chairman, drawing on USDA networks for organizational strength. The USDP was officially registered with the Union Election Commission (UEC) on May 27, 2010, after submitting required documentation including a party constitution, candidate lists, and financial disclosures, positioning it as the primary vehicle for junta-aligned civilian political engagement ahead of the November 7 polls. Founding leadership included figures like U Htay Oo, a former USDA head who became USDP secretary-general, reflecting the seamless integration of predecessor structures into the party's hierarchy to ensure alignment with military-guided governance goals.

Early Governance Role (2011–2015)

Following the 2010 general election, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured a dominant position in the , holding approximately 75% of contested seats alongside military-appointed representatives, which facilitated the formation of a USDP-led quasi-civilian under President starting in March 2011. This legislative control enabled the passage of key transitional measures, including the suspension of controversial projects like the Myitsone Dam in September 2011, signaling a shift toward greater responsiveness to public and environmental concerns. The USDP-backed administration pursued by reducing state involvement in sectors such as energy, forestry, and agriculture, alongside establishing an Economic Advisory Unit in April 2011 to guide policy. These efforts correlated with accelerated GDP growth, reaching 7.6% in 2012/13, driven partly by increased following the easing of . Concurrently, the government negotiated preliminary ceasefires with several ethnic armed organizations, achieving agreements with groups like the in January 2012, though full implementation remained elusive due to ongoing territorial disputes. Partial media reforms included relaxing , allowing private newspapers to resume publication in April 2013, and releasing hundreds of political prisoners, which expanded press freedoms and public discourse. Challenges emerged in balancing entrenched military prerogatives with civilian-oriented reforms, as evidenced by internal USDP tensions over the pace of liberalization and power-sharing. President Thein Sein resigned as USDP chairman on May 2, 2013, amid criticism of his dual role potentially undermining impartial governance, with parliamentary speaker Shwe Mann assuming the position to refocus party efforts on legislative priorities. This transition highlighted debates within the party on maintaining military influence while advancing economic and political openings, though measurable progress in growth and ceasefires underscored the administration's capacity for directed change.

Electoral Participation

2010 General Election

The general election on November 7, 2010, marked Myanmar's first parliamentary vote in two decades and operated under the 2008 Constitution, which allocated 25% of seats in both legislative chambers to military appointees and required supermajorities for constitutional amendments. The National League for Democracy (NLD), led by detained opposition figure Aung San Suu Kyi, boycotted the polls, arguing that electoral laws—such as restrictions on campaigning and candidate eligibility—prevented a free and fair process, leading to the party's deregistration by authorities. Voter turnout was notably low, with reports of polling stations where officials outnumbered participants, contributing to an overall subdued participation rate amid the boycott and prevailing apathy. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), formed by former military officials including then-Prime Minister Thein Sein, dominated the campaign with messaging centered on "discipline-flourishing democracy"—a phrase emblematic of the junta's guided transition model—and appeals to national solidarity and stability under continued military influence. The party secured a resounding victory, capturing approximately 80% of the popular vote and a supermajority of contested seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) and Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house), ensuring control alongside the military's reserved bloc. Procedural issues drew criticism from domestic opposition groups and international monitors, including United Nations reports documenting discrepancies in voter lists, undue influence in advance voting—where ballots were reportedly collected and funneled to USDP candidates—and instances of votes being reassigned to the party during counting. Smaller parties conceded defeat but alleged fraud, such as pre-poll vote buying and intimidation, though comprehensive independent verification was limited by restricted observer access. These concerns, while substantiated in specific cases by observer accounts, occurred within a framework where the USDP's organizational advantages and military ties facilitated its overwhelming success.

2015 and 2020 General Elections

In the 2015 general elections held on November 8, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 30 seats in the out of 330 contested and 11 seats in the out of 168 contested, totaling 41 seats or roughly 8% of the available elected positions in the Union Parliament. This outcome reflected a sharp decline from the party's previous dominance, as voters shifted toward the (NLD) amid aspirations for accelerated reforms following initial economic and political liberalizations initiated under USDP President . The certified these results, with the securing a that enabled it to form the . The USDP's poor performance underscored public preference for opposition-led change in a first fully competitive nationwide vote since 1990, despite the party's incumbency advantages and military ties. In the 2020 general elections, also on November 8, the USDP further declined, capturing 26 seats in the Pyithu Hluttaw and 7 in the Amyotha Hluttaw, amounting to about 6% of contested Union Parliament seats. The party contested the results, alleging systemic fraud by the NLD, including inflated voter rolls, irregularities in advance voting, and vote-buying, which they claimed invalidated up to millions of ballots. These assertions, echoed by military leaders, prompted investigations into electoral processes but were disputed by the Union Election Commission and some international monitors who found discrepancies insufficient to overturn the NLD's supermajority. The USDP's marginal gains in ethnic areas did little to offset broader voter rejection, continuing the trend of preference for NLD governance amid ongoing reforms.
Chamber2015 USDP Seats (out of contested)2020 USDP Seats (out of contested)
Pyithu Hluttaw30 (330)26 (330)
Amyotha Hluttaw11 (168)7 (168)

Post-2021 Coup Developments and 2025 Election Plans

Following the 1 February 2021 coup d'état by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, which established the State Administration Council (SAC) to govern amid a declared state of emergency, the USDP publicly endorsed the military's actions as necessary to address alleged widespread irregularities in the November 2020 general election, where the party had secured only 33 seats compared to the National League for Democracy's (NLD) landslide victory. USDP leaders, including allies of Min Aung Hlaing, integrated into SAC-aligned administrative structures at regional and local levels, participating in junta-appointed councils that managed governance functions such as resource allocation and security coordination in junta-controlled areas. This positioning allowed the party to maintain influence despite the dissolution of the NLD and other opposition groups, which were barred from participation following SAC decrees labeling them as unlawful associations amid ongoing civil unrest and armed resistance. By mid-2025, the USDP had ramped up preparations for the SAC-announced general elections, scheduled to commence in a phased manner starting 28 December 2025, targeting initially secure townships before expanding, though explicitly not nationwide due to territorial losses to ethnic armed organizations and the People's Defense Forces. The party fielded candidates in over twice as many constituencies as its nearest rival, submitting nominations across hundreds of seats in the and , leveraging eased rules that reduced the required national coverage for party registration from 50% to 25% of townships. USDP chair expressed optimism for a multi-party contest, mobilizing ultranationalist figures in to rally support and framing the polls as a restoration of constitutional order, even as independent observers and exiled analysts highlighted the exclusion of major opposition voices and the improbability of free voting in conflict zones covering over 60% of the country. The USDP's electoral strategy has faced empirical scrutiny, with reports indicating pre-poll manipulations including the disqualification of rival candidates on technicalities and the use of party-affiliated militias for in accessible areas, contributing to low anticipated turnout estimated below 20% in initial phases based on prior by-elections under SAC rule. Despite these challenges, the party's dominance in candidate slates—exceeding 1,000 nominations by September 2025—positions it to capture a in junta-vetted legislatures, potentially legitimizing SAC extensions of emergency rule beyond the planned August 2026 deadline. Critics, including monitors, argue this setup entrenches military-aligned rule under electoral veneer, as evidenced by the party's prior roles in SAC proxy administrations that prioritized over civilian welfare, leading to documented humanitarian declines in and displacement affecting millions.

Ideology and Political Positions

Core Principles and Policy Stances

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) espouses a foundational ideology centered on pragmatic nationalism, emphasizing national unity, sovereignty, and the preservation of Myanmar's territorial integrity against disintegration or excessive decentralization. This orientation aligns closely with the military's "three main national causes": the non-disintegration of the union, the non-disintegration of national solidarity and solidarity, and the perpetuation of sovereignty. The party's principles derive from its origins as the successor to the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), promoting disciplined governance to ensure state stability over unchecked pluralism or rapid liberalization that could invite chaos. Central to USDP's political stance is adherence to the "discipline-flourishing democracy" framework outlined in the 2008 Constitution and the military's Seven-Step Roadmap, which institutionalizes a tutelary role for the armed forces (Tatmadaw) to oversee transitions and prevent democratic excesses from undermining order. This approach prioritizes gradual, controlled democratization, viewing military involvement as essential for fostering discipline and averting the instability seen in other transitional states, rather than pursuing full civilian supremacy. On policy matters, the USDP advocates anti-corruption measures, infrastructure development, and selective economic openings, as demonstrated during its 2011–2016 governance period under President Thein Sein, when it pursued ceasefires with ethnic armed groups and partial market liberalization to attract foreign investment while retaining state oversight of strategic sectors. Economically, the party supports state-guided , favoring regulated private enterprise alongside public in key industries to drive growth without relinquishing central control, a shift from pre-2011 toward pragmatic engagement with global markets. This includes policies for tempered by considerations, such as maintaining military-linked conglomerates' dominance in resources and defense-related sectors to ensure revenue stability. The USDP's stances reflect a causal emphasis on military-derived as a prerequisite for , critiquing alternatives that prioritize or unchecked markets as risks to cohesion.

Nationalist and Unionist Orientation

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) prioritizes the preservation of Myanmar's through advocacy for a structure that incorporates limited to ethnic regions, aiming to mitigate separatist risks posed by armed insurgencies. This orientation reflects a to national unity over expansive , which the party views as potentially enabling fragmentation, as evidenced by internal debates where USDP members struggled to endorse robust federal reforms during peace negotiations. The party's approach critiques ethnic demands for as often intertwined with irredentist agendas, favoring centralized authority to enforce cohesion, consistent with the military's longstanding emphasis on non-disintegration of the union. In alignment with this unionist stance, the USDP under President Thein Sein actively pursued the 21st Century Panglong peace process starting in 2015, building on bilateral ceasefire agreements signed with 14 ethnic armed organizations to foster dialogue within a framework preserving central control. These efforts, including the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement with eight groups, facilitated temporary de-escalations in hostilities in select border areas, contrasting with pre-2011 levels of persistent low-intensity conflict driven by insurgent operations. While Western analyses frequently attribute violence solely to state forces, empirical patterns indicate that ceasefires curbed some escalations by addressing mutual economic incentives, though non-inclusive pacts limited enduring stability and insurgent violations persisted. On the Rohingya situation in Rakhine State, the USDP upholds citizenship verification under the 1982 Citizenship Law as a prerequisite for integration, rejecting proposals for eased restrictions or automatic repatriation due to documented security threats from militant affiliations. Party representatives opposed relaxing travel limits for those holding temporary National Verification Cards, prioritizing scrutiny to prevent infiltration by groups with transnational jihadist ties over humanitarian repatriation narratives. This position stems from causal assessments of historical insurgent activities exacerbating communal tensions, rather than deference to international pressures that overlook verification's role in safeguarding border stability.

Organizational Structure

Leadership Succession

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) traces its leadership transitions to figures with deep military ties, maintaining alignment with the Tatmadaw's priorities through successive changes. The party was initially headed by , who served as chairman from its registration in 2010 until May 2013, when he stepped down amid preparations for the 2015 elections. Shwe Mann, a retired and then-speaker of the , succeeded him as chairman on May 2, 2013, emphasizing party reorganization and electoral strategy. Shwe Mann's tenure focused on positioning the USDP as a viable alternative to the , but it ended abruptly in a late-night party purge on August 13, 2015, reportedly involving military intervention to avert perceived risks to national stability ahead of the November vote. Following Shwe Mann's ouster, Htay Oo, a deputy chairman since 2011 with a background in military-affiliated organizations, assumed effective leadership of the USDP, guiding it through electoral defeats in 2015 and internal restructuring. Htay Oo's period emphasized party discipline and recovery, but by September 2022, he was sidelined as acting chairman after a senior leadership meeting, reflecting shifts in junta influence post-2021 coup. Khin Yi, a retired brigadier general and former chief of Myanmar's police force, was elevated to vice chairman and then formally elected chairman at the USDP congress on October 6, 2022, as a close ally of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. This transition consolidated military oversight, with Khin Yi's selection viewed as preparation for junta-orchestrated elections. Under 's chairmanship in 2025, the USDP has reaffirmed commitment to electoral participation, with stating on August 14 that the party is confident in the planned vote's success despite ongoing conflicts. He has accused opposition of engineering and through "selfish politicians," framing such actions as violations of electoral laws, while mobilizing nationalist supporters to bolster the party's platform. All USDP chairs since have held senior military or roles prior to , underscoring causal continuity in prioritizing Tatmadaw-aligned governance over reformist shifts seen under Shwe Mann. Membership retention under remains stable at around 1.5 million reported affiliates as of mid-2025, per party disclosures, indicating sustained loyalty amid post-coup purges.

Party Membership and Internal Dynamics

The USDP maintains a mass-based structure derived from its predecessor, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), emphasizing broad recruitment to foster national cohesion across ethnic and regional lines. Party membership involves formal enrollment with annual fees, such as 1,000 kyats reported in 2020, and is organized through local branches that prioritize loyalty to unionist principles. As a national party under Myanmar's Political Parties Registration Law, it must sustain at least 50,000 members and offices in one-third of townships, enabling extensive networks in junta-aligned areas. Internal decision-making is centralized via the party's central executive , which handles candidate selection through vetting processes designed to enforce ideological alignment and prevent factionalism. This includes scrutiny for disloyalty, as demonstrated in the August 2015 purge of chairman Shwe Mann and his allies by President , who cited their outreach to opposition figures as a to party and unity goals. Dispute resolution relies on hierarchical appeals within the , often resulting in expulsions or reassignments to maintain operational cohesion without external adjudication. Following the 2021 coup, the USDP has adapted by intensifying recruitment and organizational activities in military-controlled territories, sustaining its mass base amid civil conflict to support regime stability initiatives. This expansion focuses on areas free from resistance control, where local chapters promote enlistment tied to national solidarity narratives, enabling the party to field over 1,000 candidates for the anticipated 2025 elections.

Ties to Military and Resources

Relationship with the Tatmadaw

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) originated as the political successor to the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), a established in 1993 during to mobilize public support for the junta's policies. The USDP was formally founded on April 29, 2010, by retired officers, including , who transitioned from under the to lead the party in the inaugural elections under the 2008 Constitution—a document drafted and approved under military oversight to embed influence in civilian governance. This formation reflected the military's strategy to channel retired personnel into electoral politics, ensuring continuity of influence as active-duty officers were constitutionally barred from direct candidacy but retained reserved parliamentary seats. Personnel overlap between the USDP and Tatmadaw has been extensive, with retired officers comprising a significant portion of party leadership and candidates. For instance, in preparations for the 2020 elections, the USDP nominated 88 retired military officers and 14 former ministers as candidates, underscoring the party's reliance on ex-Tatmadaw expertise for organizational and strategic roles. Party chairmen such as U Khin Yi, a retired general installed in 2022, exemplify this integration, facilitating coordination on national security matters. This symbiosis allows the USDP to draw on military networks for logistical support in campaigning and operations, while providing the Tatmadaw a civilian veneer for political outreach, particularly in unionist advocacy amid ethnic tensions. Following the February 1, 2021, coup establishing the State Administration Council (SAC) under Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the USDP aligned explicitly with the military regime, echoing pre-coup allegations of electoral fraud raised by both the Tatmadaw and USDP against the National League for Democracy's victory. USDP members, including defeated 2020 candidates, were appointed to the SAC's initial cabinet on February 2, 2021, integrating party figures into the post-coup administration. The party has since advocated for political backing of military rule, with its Naypyitaw chairman stating in December 2024 that all registered parties must support the Tatmadaw to participate in planned elections, thereby furnishing legislative and rhetorical cover for repeated extensions of the state of emergency—such as the six-month prolongation on January 31, 2025. This mutual dependence enables the Tatmadaw to leverage USDP's civilian status for dialogues with ethnic groups, complementing direct military negotiations without ceding operational control.

Funding Mechanisms and Sources

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) derives primary funding from inherited assets and revenues linked to its predecessor, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), including state-appropriated properties transferred from the dissolved . These assets encompass interests in markets, vehicle imports, agriculture, transport, and leasing arrangements such as cargo scanners to the Customs Department, which yielded 6 billion kyat (approximately $4.3 million) in fees during the 2016-2017 financial year. Business operations tied to these holdings, often involving military-affiliated conglomerates like Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL), provide ongoing income streams through activities in , port operations, and , with historical profits reported at 362 billion kyat in 1995 from USDA-era extortion and state property use. Donations from crony entities, including those connected to jade licensing and privatization deals (e.g., 361 jade licenses issued pre-2016), supplement these mechanisms, though party statutes prohibit foreign contributions. Internal funding includes member dues and party-issued loans, restricted to USDP affiliates under party rules, enabling low-interest access to funds as a . Post-2021 coup, administrative roles for party members in structures have facilitated indirect resource access, such as through state contracts, amid persistent financial opacity exemplified by scandals like a 2 billion kyat (US$1.07 million) loan to a senior leader in 2022. Public disclosures remain minimal, with no comprehensive audits available, contrasting with legal requirements under Myanmar's Political Parties Registration Law that mandate asset reporting yet lack enforcement transparency.

Governance Contributions and Policies

Implemented Reforms and Stability Measures

Under the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) administration led by President from 2011 to 2016, policies, including foreign investment incentives and deregulation, drove annual GDP growth rates of 6.4% in 2011, 7.3% in 2012, 8.4% in 2013, 8.0% in 2014, and 7.0% in 2015, according to data. These reforms facilitated expansions, such as networks and projects, which supported rising from 3% of GDP pre-2011 to 7% by 2015. The government pursued stability through peace initiatives, securing eight bilateral ceasefires with ethnic armed organizations between 2011 and 2015, which laid groundwork for the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement signed by eight groups on October 15, 2015. These accords reduced active hostilities in border regions, correlating with enhanced urban security and economic continuity amid ongoing insurgencies. Post-2021 military coup, USDP leaders endorsed the State Administration Council's actions as compliant with the 2008 Constitution's emergency provisions under Chapter VII, framing them as necessary for restoring order. This stance aligned with counter-insurgency operations that preserved regime control in key urban areas, including and , preventing widespread disruption to administrative functions despite rural conflicts. The era's stability narrative drew substantial foreign aid, with commitments surging from minimal levels pre-2011 to over $5 billion annually by 2013-2016 across donors like the and , funding development projects tied to reform progress.

Criticisms of Policy Outcomes

Critics have accused the USDP-led government under President Thein Sein (2011–2015) of perpetuating crony networks in natural resource sectors, including jade mining and telecommunications, where contracts favored military-linked conglomerates and limited competitive bidding, exacerbating institutional corruption amid incomplete market reforms. These practices, inherited from prior military rule but sustained through opaque privatization processes, contributed to revenue mismanagement and heightened resource conflict risks in ethnic borderlands, despite some liberalization efforts. Human rights advancements were criticized as insufficient and uneven, with Freedom House reporting a decline in Myanmar's civil liberties rating from 5 to 6 in 2015 due to media restrictions, including arrests of journalists and censorship of critical reporting on government policies. While initial releases of political prisoners occurred, opposition groups and international observers highlighted persistent limitations on assembly and expression, reflecting slow progress against entrenched authoritarian structures rather than transformative reform. On ethnic policies, the USDP administration's bilateral ceasefires with eight armed groups by 2015 failed to halt insurgencies, as non-inclusive negotiations excluded key factions like the , leading to renewed clashes and land dispossession in Kachin and . Critics, including ethnic leaders, argued that these agreements prioritized military consolidation over genuine federal power-sharing, allowing ongoing operations to undermine trust amid decades-old grievances. The USDP's post-2021 alignment with the has drawn blame for policy outcomes exacerbating escalation, with over 3 million internal displacements recorded by mid-2024, primarily from intensified conflicts in ethnic regions inherited from unresolved prior tensions. This surge, per UN estimates, stems from junta offensives supported by USDP rhetoric framing resistance as , perpetuating cycles of violence despite contextual factors like pre-existing insurgencies.

Controversies and Debates

Allegations of Electoral Irregularities

In the 2010 general election, opposition parties accused the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) of manipulating advance voting processes and illegally collecting votes prior to polling day. Reports documented systematic irregularities, including and procedural abuses favoring the military-backed USDP, which secured approximately 77% of contested seats amid a by the (NLD). These claims were echoed by smaller opposition groups, though the USDP maintained that any lapses stemmed from rivals' non-compliance with electoral rules rather than party misconduct. During the 2020 general election, the USDP alleged widespread fraud by the NLD, including irregularities in voter registration and ballot counting that purportedly affected millions of votes, prompting calls for annulment and fresh polls under military oversight. The party cited evidence of duplicate entries and undue influence, contributing to the military's narrative that justified the February 2021 coup; however, independent domestic and international monitors, including those from the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), reported no substantial fraud capable of altering outcomes. USDP leaders defended their position by emphasizing procedural failures in NLD-dominated areas, while dismissing observer findings as limited in scope. Ahead of the junta-scheduled 2025 elections, set to begin in late December across select townships, opposition voices have raised alarms over potentially biased voter lists, with even USDP Naypyidaw branch chairman Hla Swe publicly highlighting "widespread errors" such as duplicates and omissions in the Union Election Commission's (UEC) published rolls. The USDP has countered such concerns by stressing the necessity of security-driven restrictions, including non-nationwide voting in conflict zones, to ensure procedural integrity amid ongoing insurgencies. Domestic validations by the UEC have affirmed list accuracy based on census data, but international skepticism persists, with ASEAN deliberations on observer deployment tempered by UN experts' warnings of a "sham" process lacking credibility due to restricted access and junta control.

Proxy Party Accusations and Responses

Critics, including opposition figures from the (NLD) and international observers, have long portrayed the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) as a extension of the , or , designed to legitimize interests in civilian politics. This view gained prominence after the USDP's formation in 2010 from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), with allegations that it serves to channel military influence into electoral processes without genuine autonomy. For instance, following the NLD's landslide victory in the November 2020 elections—where the USDP secured only 33 of 476 contested seats in the —dissidents and Western analysts attributed the military's subsequent February 2021 coup to the party's electoral humiliation, framing the USDP as a tool to undermine democratic outcomes when it fails. In response, USDP leaders have emphasized the party's commitment to national stability and constitutional governance over subservience to any single institution, positioning it as an independent advocate for disciplined amid Myanmar's turmoil. During the pre-coup era, instances of internal party maneuvering suggested attempts at divergence from strict alignment; notably, in August 2015, USDP chairman Shwe Mann pursued outreach to leader and pushed reformist policies, leading to his abrupt ouster by party mechanisms reportedly influenced by reservations, which some interpret as evidence of the USDP's capacity for autonomous policy advocacy rather than rote obedience. Under chairman Khin Yi, appointed in October 2022 as a figure aligned with junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the USDP has maintained close coordination on post-coup electoral plans, such as mobilizing candidates for the junta-announced December 2025 polls—fielding over twice as many contenders as rivals—yet articulated a distinct strategy focused on resolving political and military conflicts through voting rather than indefinite rule. Khin Yi has publicly stated that elections represent a pathway to stability, countering proxy narratives by highlighting the party's proactive role in nation-building independent of direct military command. Dissidents, however, dismiss these claims, viewing the USDP's support for junta-supervised polls—amid the dissolution of the NLD and suppression of competitors—as further proof of instrumentalization, with no verifiable instances of the party opposing military directives on core issues like election timing or oversight.

Role in National Unity Amid Ethnic Conflicts

The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) has advocated for national unity in by promoting a centralized state structure that prioritizes over devolved arrangements, arguing that excessive for ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) risks fragmenting the union along ethnic lines, akin to historical precedents of in multi-ethnic states. This approach reflects a causal emphasis on maintaining Bamar-majority institutional frameworks to manage resource disputes and insurgencies, which have persisted due to competing claims over borderlands and economic corridors rather than solely cultural grievances. During the USDP-led government's tenure from 2011 to 2015, efforts to foster unity included initiating the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord process, which secured preliminary agreements with eight EAOs by 2015, temporarily stabilizing frontlines in regions like Kayin and by addressing immediate ceasefires over broader demands. Critics from minority communities, however, contend that these initiatives reinforced centralization by sidelining demands for fiscal and administrative , perpetuating perceptions of Bamar dominance in decision-making bodies such as the Union Peace Conference. In defense, USDP-aligned analyses point to the (NLD)'s subsequent governance (2015–2021), where rhetorical commitments to federalism yielded minimal legislative progress—such as retaining discriminatory citizenship laws and failing to appoint ethnic ministers in minority-heavy regions—exacerbating distrust and stalling the , as ethnic groups viewed the central government's resource allocations as favoring the Bamar heartland. Following the 2021 military coup, the USDP has backed the State Administration Council's (SAC) military operations against non-aligned EAOs, such as those in the , portraying them as necessary countermeasures to splinter groups exploiting post-coup instability for territorial gains, thereby linking unity preservation to broader anti-insurgency and counter-terrorism imperatives. This support extends to alliances with pro-junta ethnic entities like the , which maintain ceasefires with the SAC while opposing secessionist factions, though such alignments have drawn accusations of selective unity that privileges compliant groups over genuine . Data from conflict trackers indicate that SAC offensives, endorsed by USDP rhetoric, have reclaimed pockets of territory from hybrid EAO-People's Defense Force alliances by mid-2025, yet at the cost of intensified civilian displacement in ethnic peripheries, underscoring the trade-offs of coercive centralism in addressing root drivers like uneven development and arms proliferation.

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