Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Attempt

In criminal law, an attempt is an inchoate offense consisting of the specific intent to commit a substantive crime coupled with an overt act that constitutes a substantial step toward its completion, yet falling short of achieving the full criminal result. This doctrine punishes preparatory conduct deemed sufficiently proximate to the intended harm, reflecting a policy to deter dangerous behavior before harm materializes, though it requires distinguishing mere preparation from punishable attempts. The elements of criminal attempt universally demand in the form of purposeful intent to perpetrate the target offense—not mere recklessness or negligence—and actus reus via conduct beyond preparation, such as acquiring tools or reconnoitering a under circumstances indicating commitment. Under the Model Penal Code's influential formulation, adopted in many jurisdictions, the act must strongly corroborate the actor's criminal purpose, while traditional emphasized proximity to success or the "last proximate act." Penalties typically grade attempts as one degree lower than the completed crime, allowing for felony treatment even if the target offense is minor, with mirroring this approach. Historically, the crime of attempt emerged late in English , absent from early treatises and not systematically formulated until the , evolving from prosecutions for specific felonies to a general applicable across offenses. Defenses include factual impossibility in some older views (e.g., attempting to pick an empty pocket), though modern largely rejects it in favor of focusing on and conduct; legal impossibility, however, remains a bar, as one cannot attempt what is not criminal. Controversies persist over borderline cases, such as the sufficiency of online solicitations or feigned acts, underscoring tensions between prevention and overcriminalization.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Purpose

In , an is an consisting of the intent to commit a substantive coupled with an that constitutes a substantial step toward its completion, without the crime actually being consummated. The element requires specific intent to achieve the prohibited result or engage in the prohibited conduct of the target offense, distinguishing it from mere recklessness or sufficient for some completed crimes. The demands more than preparatory acts, such as acquiring tools or planning, but rather conduct that strongly corroborates the actor's criminal purpose and creates a reasonable likelihood of advancing toward the crime's execution. The purpose of criminalizing attempts is to intervene against individuals who demonstrate a clear dangerousness through purposeful conduct directed at causing , thereby protecting from the risks posed by such actors even when the full offense does not materialize due to external factors like or good fortune. This rationale rests on the recognition that the intent and substantial actions involved signal a high probability of future criminality if unchecked, justifying to deter progression and incapacitate threats before completion. Unlike , which remains non-punishable to avoid overreach into innocent , attempt liability targets the point where renunciation becomes improbable and societal is imminent. Penalties for attempts are typically graded lower than for completed crimes, reflecting the absence of actual while still affirming accountability for the culpable mindset and deeds.

Core Elements: Actus Reus and Mens Rea

Criminal attempt requires proof of both , the guilty act, and , the guilty mind, adapted to reflect the inchoate nature of the offense. Unlike completed crimes, where involves the full execution of prohibited conduct, attempt's demands only conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the target offense, beyond mere preparation. This threshold ensures liability attaches to dangerous proximity to harm without requiring its actual occurrence. The for attempt mandates specific , or purpose, to commit the substantive crime, irrespective of the mental state required for its completion. Defendants must act with the conscious objective of achieving the criminal result or engaging in the proscribed conduct, as mere recklessness or suffices neither for attempt nor aligns with the doctrine's rationale of preempting imminent threats. For instance, attempt for necessitates to kill, precluding based on reckless alone. Under the Model Penal Code (§5.01), which influences many U.S. jurisdictions, attempt culpability mirrors the purpose required for the underlying offense, coupled with conduct that either advances a plan to culminate in the crime or represents a substantial step under the defendant's believed circumstances. Substantial steps include acts like reconnaissance or possession of materials tailored to the offense, evidencing commitment. Common law variants employ tests such as "dangerous proximity" to the result or unequivocal acts implying no innocent purpose, reinforcing that actus reus must demonstrate irrevocability short of completion. Factual impossibility does not negate these elements, as liability hinges on the defendant's intent and progress under perceived facts, not objective feasibility.

Historical Evolution

Common Law Origins

The doctrine of criminal attempt emerged gradually in English , initially absent from early medieval precedents, which emphasized completed harms over preparatory acts due to the retributive focus of the blood-feud system underlying primitive criminal sanctions. Early adhered to the principle that an unconsummated endeavor to commit harm constituted no offense, reflecting a causal where required actual rather than mere or proximity to it. Limited exceptions arose in contexts like high , where statutes from the 14th century onward, such as the 1351 Treason Act, penalized preparatory acts toward compassing the king's death, treating them as constructive completion due to the existential threat posed. The first judicial recognition of attempt as a distinct at occurred in Rex v. Scofield (1784), where the ignited wet in an effort to burn a haystack, failing due to the material's dampness; the court convicted him of a misdemeanor attempt, establishing that an toward a , even if factually impossible, warranted punishment if it demonstrated dangerous proximity to the intended crime. This case marked a shift from preparatory , influenced by evolving societal needs to deter public dangers, though attempts remained misdemeanors punishable by fines or short rather than the or corporal penalties for completed felonies. Prior isolated precedents, such as 17th-century convictions for attempts to or with intent, had treated such acts as aggravated variants of or rather than a general category of inchoate liability. By the early , the doctrine coalesced into a general principle applicable to felonies, as articulated in cases like Rex v. Higgins (), where an unsuccessful inducement to commit was deemed an indictable attempt, requiring proof of specific intent () to commit the substantive offense coupled with an unequivocally renunciative of mere preparation. Courts distinguished attempt from or by demanding direct movement toward perpetration, excluding equivocal preparations like acquiring tools or reconnoitering sites unless fused with immediate execution. This framework, devoid of statutory codification until later reforms, prioritized of volitional proximity over abstract moral , reflecting a pragmatic balance against overcriminalization while addressing causal threats to .

Codification and Reforms

The offence of attempt, initially developed through English common law precedents without statutory codification, underwent gradual reforms to address ambiguities in its elements, particularly regarding the required proximity of acts to completion and the treatment of impossibility. By the 19th century, as criminal law expanded, legislative efforts sought to integrate attempts into broader codes; for instance, the English Draft Criminal Code of 1878–1880, prepared under James Fitzjames Stephen, proposed provisions treating attempts as inchoate offences punishable by half the penalty of the completed crime, though comprehensive codification failed due to parliamentary resistance favoring judicial discretion. Similar pushes in the United States, influenced by David Dudley Field's Penal Code of 1865 in New York, incorporated general attempt clauses applicable to felonies and misdemeanours, shifting from purely judge-made law to statutory frameworks that emphasized intent and overt acts. A pivotal reform occurred in with the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which abolished the and enacted a unified statutory definition under section 1: a person is guilty of attempting to commit an offence if, intending to commit it, they perform an act that is more than merely preparatory to its commission and which they believe constitutes such a step. This addressed prior inconsistencies, such as the common law's fragmented tests for (e.g., the "last step" or "proximity" doctrines from cases like R v Eagleton ()), by adopting a purposive, forward-looking assessment of the defendant's actions toward the intended crime. The Act also mitigated defences based on factual or legal impossibility, holding that impossibility does not negate liability if the intent and acts align with the statutory threshold, thereby prioritizing dangerousness over fortuitous barriers—a shift recommended by the Law Commission to enhance prosecutorial consistency and public safety. In the United States, mid-20th-century reforms drew heavily from the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (MPC), finalized in 1962, which defined attempt in section 5.01 as purposeful conduct constituting a "substantial step" in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the crime, supported by intent to complete it. This "substantial step" test, corroborated by lists of illustrative acts (e.g., reconnaissance or possession of materials), replaced vague common law proximity requirements and influenced over half of state penal codes by the 1980s, promoting uniformity while allowing legislative tailoring. Federally, while no general attempt statute exists, courts apply MPC-inspired principles under specific provisions like 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (attempt to commit murder), reflecting codification's role in clarifying mens rea as specific intent amid critiques of over-reliance on judicial gloss. These reforms collectively aimed to balance deterrence of preparatory criminality with safeguards against punishing remote ideation, though debates persist on under-inclusivity for reckless attempts.

Jurisdictional Frameworks

England and Wales

In , criminal attempts are governed by the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, which applies to indictable offences and establishes liability for incomplete efforts to commit such crimes. Section 1(1) stipulates that a person commits an attempt if, intending to commit the offence, they perform "an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence." This statutory threshold replaced prior ambiguities, focusing liability on actions crossing into the execution phase of the crime rather than remote planning. Attempts require proof beyond of both the prohibited act and the mental state, with the prosecution bearing the burden. The demands an overt act exceeding preparation, interpreted through judicial tests emphasizing proximity to completion. In R v Jones 1 WLR 1057, the Court of Appeal upheld a for where the loaded a , entered the 's car, and pointed it at his head, deeming this entry into the "zone of execution" despite the safety mechanism preventing discharge. Conversely, in R v Geddes Crim LR 894, the court quashed a for attempted after the entered a toilet equipped with a , , and tape but failed to approach or select a specific , ruling the acts remained preparatory as they had not embarked on the offence's performance. These cases illustrate a fact-specific assessment, guided by whether the has "embarked on the proper," without requiring the full offence's inevitability. Mens rea necessitates specific to commit the full substantive offence, including foresight of its consequences, irrespective of whether the completed crime permits recklessness. This elevated standard ensures liability attaches only to purposeful criminality, as affirmed in cases requiring proof of unconditional intent; conditional purpose (e.g., intent if circumstances allow) may suffice if objectively dangerous. Factual or legal impossibility does not negate liability under section 1(2), provided the defendant believed the circumstances enabled the offence, allowing convictions for efforts like attempting to pick an empty pocket or currency. Punishment mirrors the maximum for the attempted offence on indictment (e.g., life for ), halved for summary offences or capped at the full term where lower, with sentencing reflecting harm, culpability, and proximity to completion. Voluntary withdrawal before the threshold may defend against liability if communicated and effective, though courts scrutinize motives for genuine versus desistance due to risk.

United States

In the United States, criminal attempt is recognized as an inchoate offense punishing preparatory conduct toward a substantive crime, but its application varies between federal and state jurisdictions. Unlike many states, federal law lacks a general attempt statute applicable to all offenses; attempt liability arises only where specific federal statutes expressly prohibit it. Courts determine attempt under federal law by requiring proof of specific intent to commit the target offense and a substantial step in its direction, often informed by common law precedents and Model Penal Code principles.

Federal Approach

Federal attempt provisions are embedded in particular statutes rather than a unified code section. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § subjects attempts to commit offenses under , wire, or chapters to the same penalties as the completed crimes. Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1113 punishes attempts to commit or with up to twenty years' imprisonment or fines. Absent such explicit language, federal prosecutors may not charge attempt for most offenses, relying instead on related doctrines like under 18 U.S.C. § 2 or . The substantial step test predominates in federal , where conduct must strongly corroborate the actor's criminal purpose, as affirmed in decisions like United States v. Resendiz-Ponce (2007), which upheld on overt acts advancing toward the offense.

Model Penal Code Influence

The (MPC) § 5.01, promulgated by the in 1962, defines attempt as occurring when a person, with the required for the target , purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances were as believed, provided the conduct constitutes a substantial step strongly corroborative of that purpose. This formulation shifted focus from common law's emphasis on proximity to completion or unequivocal acts toward a more objective assessment of preparatory behavior indicating firm intent. Federal courts frequently adopt the MPC's substantial step standard for interpreting specific attempt statutes, as seen in pattern requiring evidence of acts beyond mere preparation. The MPC also addresses legal and factual impossibility, treating them as non-defenses if the defendant believed circumstances enabled success.

State-Level Variations

Every state criminalizes attempt, with nearly all employing general statutes that apply to any target offense unless excluded, such as non-attemptable misdemeanors in some jurisdictions. tests vary: a of states follow the MPC's substantial step approach, while others adhere to variants like New York's "beyond a mere preparatory step" or "dangerous proximity" doctrines. uniformly demands purposeful or specific intent to complete the crime, rejecting recklessness or . Grading typically reduces the offense class by one level from the target crime—e.g., attempt to commit a Class A becomes Class B—but some states, like , align punishment more closely with the completed offense for serious crimes. Defenses like voluntary abandonment are recognized in most states, requiring genuine before completion, though federal influence limits its availability in specific statutory contexts.

Federal Approach

In federal criminal , there is no general criminalizing attempts to commit offenses, unlike in most states. Attempt liability thus depends on either explicit provisions within specific federal statutes or, in limited cases, principles applied by courts to statutes silent on attempts. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1113 punishes attempts to commit or with up to 20 years' , while § 1349 equates attempts or conspiracies to commit certain offenses under chapter 63 with the penalties for the completed . Federal courts uniformly require two core elements for attempt convictions: (1) specific intent to engage in the conduct that constitutes the substantive offense and awareness of its criminality, and (2) an amounting to a "substantial step" toward commission, strongly corroborating that intent. This standard, derived from and substantially influenced by § 5.01 of the , rejects mere preparation and focuses on dangerous proximity to success. In United States v. Reséndiz-Ponce (2007), the affirmed that a substantial step must be more than preparatory, such as acquiring tools or reconnoitering a target site in a manner evidencing . Punishments for attempts vary by statute but often mirror those of the target offense or provide graduated penalties based on proximity to completion; for example, under § 1113 carries a maximum of 20 years, half the penalty for completed first-degree . Defenses like legal or factual impossibility generally do not apply if and a substantial step are proven, as courts prioritize the defendant's culpable over external barriers to success. This approach reflects a policy of deterring inchoate threats to interests, such as or interstate commerce, without over-criminalizing remote preparations.

Model Penal Code Influence

The (MPC), promulgated by the in 1962, defines criminal attempt in § 5.01 as occurring when a person, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the substantive offense, purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the offense if the attendant circumstances were as the actor believes them to be, or when the person acts with the purpose of committing the offense and takes a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in its commission. This formulation introduces the "substantial step" test, which requires an act strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, illustrated by non-exclusive examples such as acquiring materials to make a or reconnoitering the intended crime scene. Unlike approaches emphasizing physical proximity to completion or unequivocal acts, the MPC prioritizes evidence of intent through preparatory conduct that advances the criminal plan, while excluding mere preparation absent such corroboration. The MPC's attempt provision exerted substantial influence on state criminal codes during the mid- to late-20th-century codification wave, with over half of states enacting new penal laws by the that incorporated its elements, including the shift to a purpose-based and the substantial step threshold. A majority of U.S. jurisdictions have since adopted the substantial step test, either statutorily or through , supplanting stricter tests and enabling liability for earlier-stage interventions while tying punishment to demonstrated dangerousness. For instance, Alaska's statutes explicitly follow the MPC by requiring a substantial step strongly indicative of , as affirmed in state . Similarly, Maryland's Court of Appeals judicially adopted the test in 1978, drawing directly from MPC § 5.01 to define attempts as involving conduct beyond preparation but short of completion, corroborated by the actor's . The MPC also shaped state treatments of related doctrines, such as impossibility and voluntary renunciation. Under § 5.01(1)(a)-(b), factual impossibility does not preclude attempt if the actor's conduct would suffice under believed circumstances, a stance rejecting 's broader impossibility and adopted in numerous states to focus on the actor's rather than fortuitous . For renunciation, § 5.01(4) excuses only if the actor voluntarily abandons efforts under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary of purpose, influencing states to limit the defense to genuine disavowals rather than responses to external risks of apprehension. This comprehensive framework promoted uniformity and rationality in state attempt s, though variations persist, with some states blending MPC elements with retained proximity requirements.

State-Level Variations

State criminal attempt statutes exhibit notable variations in defining the requisite overt act, grading punishments, and available defenses, reflecting a mix of traditions and partial adoptions of the (MPC). All states criminalize attempts, typically requiring specific to commit the target offense and an beyond mere preparation, but the threshold for the differs. MPC-influenced jurisdictions, including , , and , define attempt liability as purposeful conduct constituting a "substantial step" strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal , such as reconnaissance or possession of materials adapted to the crime. In contrast, states adhering more closely to tests, like the "dangerous proximity" approach, require acts so near completion that success would likely have followed but for external interruption, as seen in interpretations under statutes like Texas Penal Code § 15.01, which demands acts "amounting to more than mere preparation." Grading of attempt offenses also varies, with many states reducing the completed crime's degree by one level but imposing statutory caps to avoid unduly lenient penalties for serious attempts. For instance, treats an attempt to commit a life as a first-degree punishable by up to 30 years, while attempt on a capital remains a first-degree . A majority of states diverge from the MPC's recommendation for uniform grading of inchoate offenses regardless of completion, opting instead for fixed reductions that reflect perceived dangerousness without fully equalizing attempt and consummated crimes. Some states further differentiate based on whether resulted, though the MPC limits such considerations primarily to mitigation rather than . Defenses to attempt show additional divergence, particularly regarding impossibility and . Most states, following MPC § 5.01, reject legal impossibility as a bar to if the took a substantial step with purposeful , treating factual impossibility (e.g., inability due to external circumstances) similarly as non-defensive. Several states have codified this rejection explicitly, such as Maryland's adoption of the substantial step test via its proposed mirroring MPC provisions. or abandonment defenses, requiring voluntary and complete desistance under MPC § 5.01(4), are unavailable or narrower in some jurisdictions, where incomplete efforts do not negate unless the becomes impossible through the defendant's actions alone. These differences arise because only a minority of states have enacted the MPC comprehensively, leading to hybrid approaches that blend its objective criteria with traditional subjective requirements.

Other Common Law Systems

In common law jurisdictions beyond and the , such as , , , and , criminal attempt liability typically requires proof of specific to commit the substantive coupled with an or omission that advances toward its , distinguishing it from mere . These systems retain English roots but emphasize statutory codification to clarify thresholds, often punishing attempts with penalties up to half those of the completed unless specified otherwise. Factual impossibility generally does not negate liability, aligning with modern trends that prioritize dangerousness over success. Canada's , enacted in 1892 and revised in 1985, defines attempt in section 24(1): "Every one who, having an intent to commit an offence, does or omits to do anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention is guilty of an attempt to commit the offence." Courts interpret this as requiring a "substantial step" beyond preparation, with proximity to completion assessed objectively; for instance, in R. v. (1986), the upheld attempt liability for insider trading preparations involving detailed plans and initial actions. Punishment mirrors half the maximum for the target offence, except for attempts at or specific crimes like , which carry fixed terms. This approach rejects legal impossibility as a defence, focusing on the offender's intent and conduct. Australia's framework varies by jurisdiction due to federalism, with states codifying attempt under criminal codes influenced by Sir Samuel Griffith's 1899 Queensland model. In Queensland, section 4 of the Criminal Code provides that a person commits an attempt by intending the offence and beginning execution through adapted means, followed by an act or omission toward commission, even if interrupted. New South Wales's Crimes Act 1900, section 344A, imposes liability for attempts equivalent to the substantive penalty, as affirmed in cases like R. v. McDonough (1983), where proximity was key. Federally, the Criminal Code Act 1995 (section 11.1) requires intent and a "substantial step," harmonizing with Model Penal Code influences while retaining common law tests for equivocality of acts. Penalties align with the underlying offence, reduced for incompleteness. New Zealand's Crimes Act 1961, section 72(1), codifies attempt as occurring when a person, with to commit an offence, "does or omits an act for the purpose of accomplishing" it, which must be "more than merely preparatory" to execution. This statutory test, rooted in the 1893 Criminal Code Act, draws from English proximity doctrine, as elaborated in R. v. Harpur (2017), where scouting a constituted preparation but not attempt without direct execution steps. extends to impossible attempts if intent and overt acts are proven, with maximum sentences halved from the completed crime. India's (), 1860, lacks a standalone definition of attempt but addresses it generally in section 511: whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by or other terms, and does "any towards the commission," faces up to half the punishment. Courts apply tests like last proximate act or equivocality, as in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of (1961), distinguishing attempt (e.g., submitting fake certificates for ) from preparation (mere acquisition of means). Specific provisions exist for attempts like ( section 308), but general application emphasizes societal danger, punishing even failed efforts to deter harm. This framework, while codified, reflects colonial English influence without modern reforms for impossibility defences.

Doctrinal Challenges

Impossibility as a Defense

Impossibility as a to criminal attempt liability arises when the defendant's conduct fails to consummate the intended offense due to circumstances beyond their control or inherent legal barriers. Courts distinguish between factual impossibility, where unknown external facts prevent completion—such as attempting to pick an empty pocket or shoot a already-deceased —and legal impossibility, where the defendant's intended acts do not violate the as defined, such as receiving property believed to be stolen but proven otherwise. Under traditional , factual impossibility did not excuse liability, as the defendant's intent and overt acts demonstrated sufficient dangerousness warranting punishment, exemplified by convictions in cases like State v. Wilson (1862), where an attempt to steal from an empty pocket was held punishable. Legal impossibility, however, negated attempt charges by undermining the criminal element of the offense, as seen in People v. Jaffe (1906), where attempting to receive non-stolen property failed as no crime was intended under the law. This distinction aimed to balance with objective criminality but often led to inconsistent outcomes due to its subjective application. The Model Penal Code (§ 5.01) rejects impossibility as a bar to liability, conditioning attempt on purposeful conduct that would constitute the crime if circumstances were as the defendant believed, thereby subsuming factual cases under punishable intent while addressing legal impossibility through mens rea requirements. This approach, adopted in many U.S. jurisdictions, prioritizes the defendant's subjective belief and potential harm over fortuitous facts, as in United States v. Thomas (1962), upholding attempted rape charges against a defendant unaware the victim was dead. In the UK, R v. Shivpuri (1986) overruled prior precedent, abolishing factual impossibility as a defense by convicting a defendant who believed he possessed drugs but carried harmless snuff, emphasizing societal protection from culpable intent. Doctrinal challenges persist in delineating the categories, with critics arguing the MPC's stance risks overpunishing low-risk or delusional attempts lacking empirical threat, such as using for , where no rational actor perceives success. Proponents counter that rejecting the ensures accountability for acts evincing resolve, deterring preparatory conduct irrespective of extraneous failures, supported by the policy that punishment should not hinge on luck. Empirical data on or deterrence remains limited, but the prevailing view in 37 U.S. states and favors abolition to align liability with culpability over factual outcomes. Some scholars advocate refining the via mistake analysis—assessing competence in formation—to exclude truly innocuous efforts without broadly excusing dangerous ones.

Abandonment and Withdrawal

In jurisdictions, including , voluntary abandonment or withdrawal from an attempt does not serve as a once the has performed acts more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offense. Under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 in , liability attaches upon such acts, and subsequent desistance fails to negate the offense, as the 's demonstrated intent and dangerous proximity to harm suffice for . This traditional position reflects the view that the risk created by the attempter's actions cannot be retroactively undone, prioritizing public safety over rewarding belated change of mind. In contrast, the (§ 5.01(4)), influential in many U.S. states and federal interpretations, recognizes of criminal purpose as an to attempt if the voluntarily abandons the effort under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary , such that the offense is neither perpetrated nor likely to resume. must be voluntary, excluding withdrawals motivated by fear of detection, increased difficulty, or external intervention, and often requires affirmative steps like thwarting accomplices or alerting authorities to demonstrate sincerity. Federal courts have variably applied this, with some circuits upholding abandonment where evidence shows genuine, unsolicited cessation before the crime's consummation, as in cases rejecting defenses prompted by apprehension. Doctrinal challenges arise from tensions between deterrence and encouragement of desist. Proponents of the traditional no-defense argue it avoids incentivizing partial efforts toward under the illusion of safe , while empirical analyses suggest recognition of abandonment may reduce completed offenses by rewarding early halt, though verification of "voluntariness" burdens courts with subjective probes. Critics of expansive defenses note risks of fabricated claims, as abandonment timing often aligns with failed execution rather than moral epiphany, undermining causal attribution to the defense itself. Jurisdictional variations persist, with some states codifying MPC-like provisions (e.g., Texas Penal Code § 15.04, allowing evidence to mitigate attempt liability) and others adhering to rigidity.

Merger Doctrine and Non-Attemptable Acts

The merger doctrine, as applied to criminal attempts, prevents the imposition of cumulative liability for multiple inchoate offenses stemming from the same underlying criminal purpose, subsuming preparatory crimes like or into the more proximate attempt when the conduct advances toward the same target offense. This principle, rooted in efficiency and concerns, ensures that defendants are not punished twice for the same dangerous intent and acts, with courts typically allowing conviction only for the furthest stage reached—such as attempt over —absent distinct harms or objectives. Under the § 1.07(1)(a), which influences many U.S. jurisdictions, merger operates similarly by prohibiting multiple convictions under inchoate provisions for conduct culminating in the same crime, emphasizing that attempt absorbs prior inchoates to avoid over-punishment without evidence of separate culpability. In practice, this doctrine has been invoked in cases like People v. Ireland (1969), where courts extended merger to bar using as a for felony murder, illustrating how merger limits lesser acts into graver liabilities, though its application to pure attempts remains narrower, focusing on inchoate overlap rather than substantive mergers. Non-attemptable acts arise when the target offense's elements preclude the specific intent and substantial step required for attempt liability, rendering prosecution logically or doctrinally untenable. Crimes of general intent, recklessness, , or —lacking the purposeful essential to attempt—cannot be attempted, as the defendant's for the substantive crime does not align with the heightened intent needed to punish interruption before completion; for example, attempted involuntary is unrecognized across U.S. jurisdictions because the underlying offense involves unintended risk rather than deliberate pursuit of harm. Similarly, offenses like in some formulations defy attempt charges, since completion hinges on the alone without volitional foresight of unlawfulness, making any "substantial step" indistinguishable from the crime itself or incompatible with intent requirements. , lacking a general attempt (18 U.S.C. §§ 1113, 1841 et al. provide specifics), implicitly follows this by tying attempts to specific-intent predicates, as affirmed in cases like United States v. Farner (2001), where courts rejected attempts on non-intent crimes to preserve doctrinal . This limitation extends to factually indivisible crimes where no meaningful "step" precedes consummation, such as (complete upon false statement under oath) or (instant upon invalid marriage act), precluding attempt liability as there is no causal chain for intervention or failure. Jurisdictions adopting the (§ 5.01) reinforce this by requiring acts "strongly corroborative" of intent, excluding targets where proximity tests fail inherently, though critics argue such exclusions under-punish preparatory dangers in low-intent contexts, prompting rare state expansions via specific statutes. Empirical reviews of sentencing data indicate merger and non-attemptability doctrines reduce over-charging by 15-20% in multi-count indictments, per U.S. Sentencing Commission analyses, balancing deterrence against arbitrary escalation while prioritizing evidence of imminent harm over speculative intent.

Applications to Specific Offenses

Homicide-Related Attempts

constitutes the paradigmatic homicide-related attempt offense, requiring proof of specific intent to kill the victim and commission of a substantial step toward causing , even if the attempt fails. This standard exceeds that for many completed s, which may rest on implied malice such as extreme recklessness or liability without deliberate intent to kill. In , under 18 U.S.C. § 1113, attempted murder carries a maximum penalty of twenty years' , mirroring the structure for manslaughter attempts but distinguished by the underlying offense's gravity. Jurisdictions uniformly reject transferring non-intentional theories—like depraved-heart or —to attempts, as attempt liability demands purposeful causation of the proscribed result, precluding convictions where the defendant merely intended a dangerous without aiming to kill. Attempted voluntary manslaughter, recognized in numerous states, similarly demands specific to kill but incorporates mitigating circumstances such as adequate provocation or that negate malice for the completed offense. Courts have upheld its viability, as the to kill aligns with attempt's core requirement, while heat-of-passion factors reduce culpability post-act but not pre-act . In contrast, attempted involuntary manslaughter remains rare and jurisdictionally limited, often requiring proof of to commit an unlawful but non-malicious act likely to cause death, though some analyses question its coherence given the absence of to kill. Under the , which imputes murder liability for deaths during enumerated irrespective of intent to kill, attempts do not straightforwardly extend to "attempted felony murder" as a standalone charge; instead, failure to cause death typically yields conviction only for the underlying attempt, without elevating to attempt absent specific lethal intent. This limitation preserves attempt's focus on volitional of life, avoiding overreach where mere commission risks but does not target death. Empirical data on prosecutions indicate convictions hinge heavily on evidentiary proof of intent, such as weapon use or targeting, with substantial step assessments varying by jurisdiction—e.g., firing a at a suffices federally if strongly corroborative of purpose.

Sexual and Violent Offenses

Attempt liability for sexual offenses typically requires proof of specific intent to engage in non-consensual or by force or threat, combined with an constituting a substantial step toward , such as , removal of clothing, or positioning for without achieving it. In jurisdictions following the , this substantial step must be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, excluding mere preparation like purchasing restraints. Federal crime reporting under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program separately tallies attempted s, encompassing acts like assault with intent to rape, reflecting doctrinal acceptance of inchoate punishment to deter progression to completed harm. Many states prosecute attempted rape through statutes criminalizing with to commit , which merges attempt elements into the charge; for instance, § 220 defines such assault as a punishable by 2 to 8 years in prison, applicable when the harbors to but is interrupted before . Courts apply proximity tests, holding where the 's acts create a "dangerous proximity" to the completed offense, as in cases involving forcible entry into a victim's space with clear sexual purpose but halted by resistance or intervention. Empirical data from state convictions indicate that successful attempt prosecutions often hinge on evidence of force or duress , with proven via victim testimony or physical evidence like DNA on discarded clothing, though challenges arise in distinguishing genuine attempts from exploratory advances absent consummation. For violent offenses, attempted murder demands specific intent to cause death—beyond mere recklessness—and an actus reus advancing toward lethal harm, such as discharging a firearm at a vital area or administering poison with knowledge of its fatal potential, even if the victim survives. Under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 1113 imposes up to 20 years' imprisonment for attempted murder, emphasizing that the intent must be to kill, not merely injure, as illustrated in jury instructions requiring proof that the defendant acted with purpose to end the victim's life. State courts similarly enforce this, rejecting convictions based on wanton conduct alone; for example, firing shots indiscriminately may suffice for aggravated assault but not attempted murder without evidence of targeted lethality. Attempted battery or assault in violent contexts often overlaps with completed assault statutes, which inherently punish preparatory violence; under common formulations, liability arises for intentional acts creating apprehension of imminent harmful contact or attempting such contact without success, as in swinging a that misses due to evasion. In federal definitions, includes attempts to inflict injury with force, punishable as misdemeanors or felonies based on injury risk, underscoring the doctrine's role in intervening before physical consummation. Prosecutions succeed where acts like brandishing a in a thrusting motion demonstrate unequivocal progress toward , supported by eyewitness accounts or forensic traces of , though merger doctrines may preclude separate attempt charges if the conduct constitutes the offense itself.

Property and Fraud Attempts

Attempt liability for property offenses, such as or , requires the to act with specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of property and to take a substantial step strongly corroborative of that criminal purpose, as defined under the Model Penal Code's formulation adopted in many jurisdictions. Factual impossibility does not negate liability; for example, a who reaches into a victim's pocket intending to steal but finds it empty has committed attempted , as the focus remains on the dangerousness of the intent and conduct rather than extrinsic circumstances thwarting success. Legal impossibility, however, may bar conviction if the intended acts, even if completed, would not constitute a , such as attempting to receive goods believed stolen but proven not to be. In attempted burglary, which typically involves intent to commit a or inside a building, substantial steps include preparatory acts like possessing tools suited for forcible entry or conducting of the target premises, provided they manifest the defendant's criminal design. Courts assess these under an to ensure the conduct poses a real risk, distinguishing mere preparation—such as purchasing gloves—from acts crossing into attempt, like approaching the structure with intent to break in. Empirical patterns in prosecutions show attempted burglary convictions often hinge on overt intrusions or tool , reflecting policy aims to deter intrusions threatening personal even absent completed . For offenses, including wire or mail under , attempt requires purposeful intent to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud and a substantial step toward its execution, such as initiating deceptive communications via interstate wires. Statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 1349 explicitly criminalize such attempts and conspiracies, imposing even without victim loss or deception success, as the emphasis lies on preventing schemes that endanger economic . Prosecutions frequently involve partial executions, like transmitting fraudulent solicitations, where the defendant's conduct demonstrates firm commitment beyond ideation. This approach aligns with broader inchoate principles, prioritizing against incipient harms in deception-based crimes where full completion may evade detection.

Criticisms, Reforms, and Empirical Insights

Philosophical and Policy Debates

Philosophical discussions on criminal attempt often revolve around the tension between subjectivist and objectivist theories of . Subjectivists emphasize the actor's intent and choice to engage in wrongdoing, arguing that attempt should primarily reflect the moral blameworthiness inherent in purposeful conduct toward a prohibited end, irrespective of success or harm. Objectivists, conversely, incorporate assessments of , harm, and external consequences, contending that requires a sufficiently proximate act that manifests genuine danger to societal interests. This divide influences debates on doctrines like factual impossibility, where subjectivists would impose based on the actor's in feasibility, while objectivists might withhold it absent . A central philosophical issue is , questioning why attempts—lacking completed harm—are punished less severely than consummated crimes despite comparable intent and effort. Critics of differential punishment assert that outcomes influenced by extraneous factors, such as victim resistance or third-party intervention, should not modulate blame, as the actor's resolve to violate norms remains constant. Proponents of outcome-based gradation counter that completed harms justify heightened and reflect greater societal disruption, aligning punishment with the full scope of wrongdoing. This debate underscores broader inquiries into whether should prioritize internal states of mind or observable impacts in apportioning desert. Policy debates focus on the preventive rationale for attempt statutes, weighing incapacitation of dangerous actors against s of overreach in punishing unconsummated acts. Advocates argue that for attempts deters escalation to harm by signaling intolerance for preparatory steps, thereby enhancing public safety through early intervention. Critics highlight underinclusiveness—failing to capture renounced efforts—and overinclusiveness, as in harmless factual impossibilities, potentially eroding and straining resources on low-utility prosecutions. Sentencing policies often mitigate these concerns by mandating reductions for incomplete attempts, typically 50% or more below completed offense maxima, to calibrate to actualized risk rather than pure intent. Empirical policy analysis further probes abandonment defenses, suggesting that rewarding voluntary desistance incentivizes self-correction without undermining deterrence, provided thresholds for genuine renunciation are rigorously defined.

Evidence on Deterrence and Accountability

Economic models of criminal behavior indicate that for attempts enhances deterrence by increasing the expected costs of initiating criminal plans, thereby discouraging potential offenders from progressing toward . In particular, the concept of marginal deterrence posits that if attempts were not punishable or punished equivalently to completed crimes, rational actors might be incentivized to escalate efforts once begun, as the additional risk of completion yields no further penalty; thus, graduated sanctions for attempts—typically less severe than for consummated offenses—optimize prevention of both attempts and completions. Analyses further suggest that punishing attempts raises overall sanction certainty for dangerous conduct, intervening before harm materializes and potentially averting multiple future offenses through early incapacitation. Direct empirical studies isolating the deterrence effects of attempt liability remain limited, with most evidence derived from theoretical economic frameworks rather than randomized or quasi-experimental data on rates. Broader criminological research on deterrence emphasizes of over severity, aligning with attempt laws' role in signaling accountability for and substantial steps, though aggregate studies on inchoate offenses do not conclusively quantify reductions in completed s attributable to attempt prosecutions. For instance, while general increases in correlate with modest declines, no large-scale analyses specifically link attempt convictions to measurable drops in target offense rates, partly due to challenges in disentangling attempt effects from completed . On accountability, attempt liability ensures proportional retribution for culpable intent and actions posing real risks, as evidenced by lower recidivism among those convicted of inchoate versus completed offenses in select jurisdictional data, reflecting early neutralization of threats. This mechanism supports causal accountability by attributing responsibility based on volitional dangerousness rather than outcomes influenced by luck or external factors, with economic models confirming that such liability maximizes social welfare by aligning sanctions with harm probabilities. Critics note potential overreach, where low-success attempts might inflate without commensurate risk reduction, but proponents counter that empirical gaps in deterrence do not negate the accountability value in incapacitating actors who demonstrate willingness to violate norms. Overall, while deterrence benefits appear theoretically robust, accountability gains manifest through systemic consistency in addressing preparatory , independent of empirical reductions.

References

  1. [1]
    attempt | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
    A person is guilty of an attempted crime if they took a “substantial step” towards the completion of that crime.
  2. [2]
    Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law - Congress.gov
    Apr 11, 2025 · Attempt is an offense of misconduct incomplete, frustrated, or prevented. It is an offense of general application in every state in the Union, ...
  3. [3]
    Foundations of Law - Attempt - Lawshelf
    The intent or mens rea aspect of attempt has two elements to it. The first is that the defendant must have intent to commit an act that is necessary for the ...
  4. [4]
    8.1 Attempt – Criminal Law - OPEN SLCC
    The criminal intent element required for attempt is specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue. Aside from failure of proof defenses to attempt ...Learning Objectives · Attempt Grading · Key Takeaways
  5. [5]
    Attempt to Commit a Crime & Legal Defenses | Criminal Law Center
    Nov 13, 2024 · Information about the crime of attempt. Attempt generally requires intent, a substantial step, and failure to complete the crime.
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Attempt – Elements - National Paralegal College
    Attempt requires an act tending to effectuate an illegal result, specific intent, and a substantial step, but not the last act. It cannot be reckless or ...
  7. [7]
    Section 2923.02 | Attempt to commit an offense. - Ohio Laws
    An attempt to commit aggravated murder, murder, or an offense for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life is a felony of the first degree.
  8. [8]
    [PDF] Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law - Congress.gov
    Apr 11, 2025 · Nothing of such a doctrine is to be found in the treatises on criminal law prior to the nineteenth century, in spite of the fact that records of.<|control11|><|separator|>
  9. [9]
    [PDF] CRIMINAL ATTEMPT-A STUDY OF FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL ...
    Criminal attempt is conspicuous for its absence in early English law.' There is not the slightest suggestion of theory or general doctrine- indeed one could ...
  10. [10]
    [PDF] Impossibility as a Defense to Criminal Attempt - SMU Scholar
    " For the historical development of the law of attempt, see ... would involve the use of the doctrine of attempt to remedy defects in the criminal law,.
  11. [11]
    Criminal Attempts - The Yale Law Journal
    Oct 1, 2014 · The theory of the nature of criminal attempt being developed in this Article began with the appealing idea that attempts are those failures that ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] trying, acting and attempted crimes - Yale Law School
    In this sense of the term, throughout the history of the criminal law, and in every juris- diction, there are two elements of an attempt to commit crime C: (1) ...
  13. [13]
    Foundations of Law - Attempt - Lawshelf
    Under the common law it is a crime to attempt to commit any misdemeanor or felony. The basic components of attempt are: a specific intent to commit a crime and ...
  14. [14]
    Criminal Attempt - FindLaw
    Sep 29, 2023 · A criminal attempt involves the intent to commit a crime with some type of related action. There is a legal difference between actually ...
  15. [15]
    Foundations of Law - Attempt - Lawshelf
    The intent or mens rea aspect of attempt has two elements to it. The first is that the defendant must have intent to commit an act that is necessary for the ...
  16. [16]
    Tanaka Criminal Law Casebook : MPC 5.01 Criminal Attempt | H2O
    SECTION 5.01. CRIMINAL ATTEMPT. (1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability ...
  17. [17]
    [PDF] Criminal Attempts at Common Law
    "This doctrine of attempt to commit a substantive crime is one of the most important, and at the same time most intricate, titles of the criminal law." Peyton,.
  18. [18]
    [PDF] Criminal Attempt and the Theory of the Law of Crimes | Hollins ...
    was apparently only extended to attempted felonies.5. The modern doctrine of criminal attempt had to wait until 1801 for its formulation. The case was Rex v ...
  19. [19]
    [PDF] Bad Attempts - Emory Law Scholarly Commons
    of a criminal attempt in English common law was not until 1784 in Rex v. Scofield.131 Professor Thomas Weigend perceived a general attempts doctrine as.Missing: early | Show results with:early
  20. [20]
    [PDF] The American Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview
    The strongest foreign influence on the code came in the person of Glanville Williams, a. British criminal law expert on the uncodified English common law. A ...
  21. [21]
    [PDF] The Challenge of a Modern Federal Criminal Code
    For developments in state penal codification since the Field Code, see G. MUELLER,. CRIME, LAW, AND THE SCHOLARS; A HISTORY OF SCHOLARSHIP IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL ...
  22. [22]
    Criminal Attempts Act 1981 | LawTeacher.net
    The Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (the Act) is an Act which amends the law of England and Wales regarding attempts to commit offences and conspiracy to commit ...
  23. [23]
    8.1 Attempt | Criminal Law - Lumen Learning
    In general, there are two types of attempt statutes. Some states have general attempt statutes that set forth attempt elements and apply them to any criminal ...
  24. [24]
    Attempt | Legal Guidance - LexisNexis
    Jul 16, 2024 · Significant emphasis is placed on the mens rea, or the mental element, required for an attempt offence. Unlike completed offences which might ...
  25. [25]
    R v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 1057 - Lawprof
    D prepared to murder V by sawing off the end of a shotgun · D climbed into back of V's car but could not fire as safety was not released, V threw the gun out of ...
  26. [26]
    R v Geddes - 1996 - LawTeacher.net
    A person is guilty of attempting to commit an offence where a person does an act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence.
  27. [27]
    R v Geddes (1996) 160 J.P. 697, [1996] Crim LR 894 - Lawprof
    Key Point. The facts suggest that lying in wait with prepared weapons and equipment to perform an offence does not amount to attempt ...
  28. [28]
    Mens Rea Lecture | LawTeacher.net
    A defendant must be shown to have a guilty mind at the same time that they commit the actus reus. This guilty mind, or mental element, is known as mens rea.
  29. [29]
    Attempted murder - Sentencing Council
    Triable only on indictment. Maximum: Life imprisonment. Offence range: 3 – 40 years' custody. This is a Schedule 19 offence for the purposes of sections 274 ...
  30. [30]
    18 U.S. Code § 1349 - Attempt and conspiracy - Law.Cornell.Edu
    Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense.
  31. [31]
    18 U.S. Code § 1113 - Attempt to commit murder or manslaughter
    Attempts to commit murder or manslaughter, shall, for an attempt to commit murder be imprisoned not more than twenty years or fined under this title, or both.
  32. [32]
    2480. Attempt To Aid And Abet | United States Department of Justice
    Generally, in order to convict an accomplice of a completed substantive crime (rather than a mere attempt), there must be a guilty principal.
  33. [33]
    Attempt
    A defendant commits an attempt if he or she performs an act that, "under the circumstances as he[/she] believes them to be," constitutes a substantial step ...
  34. [34]
    Model Penal Code (MPC) - Penn Law School
    5.01 Criminal Attempt ... Section 5.01. Criminal Attempt. (1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the ...
  35. [35]
    5.3 Attempt | Model Jury Instructions
    "To attempt a federal crime is not, of itself, a federal crime. Attempt is only actionable when a specific federal criminal statute makes it impermissible to ...<|separator|>
  36. [36]
    [PDF] 1001. Criminal Attempt. - Penn Law School
    1. Objectives. In addition to making conspiracy an offense when its objectives are to commit defined offenses, existing statutes define as separate crimes ...
  37. [37]
    Criminal Law : Notes on attempt liability | H2O - Open Casebooks
    (1) A person commits criminal attempt if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of an offense, he engages in conduct ...<|separator|>
  38. [38]
    8. Chapter Eight: Inchoate Offenses - Criminal Law - CALI
    A majority of U.S. jurisdictions now use the concept of a “substantial step” to define attempt, rather than one of the older common law tests. Whether this ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  39. [39]
    6.1: Attempt - Business LibreTexts
    May 9, 2023 · The Substantial Step Test. Alaska has adopted the test developed by the Model Penal Code – the substantial step test. This test was developed ...
  40. [40]
    [PDF] Maryland Adopts the Model Penal Code's Substantial Step Test for ...
    The court adopted the State of Maryland. Commission on Criminal Law Proposed Criminal Code § 110.00 (1972) which fol- lowed the Model Penal Code§ 5.01 (Proposed ...<|separator|>
  41. [41]
    [PDF] Criminal Law - Impossible Attempts
    1915) : "If a person attempts to do something which, even if his purpose is accomplished, will not be crime in law, he is not guilty of a criminal attempt, ...
  42. [42]
    [PDF] Rethinking Attempt under the Model Penal Code
    But the law of attempt in the United States has been heavily influenced by the Model Penal Code, which permits the imposition of attempt liability for conduct ...
  43. [43]
    Attempts - Criminal Law Notebook
    The mens rea for an attempt is the same as the mens rea as the offence itself. The only difference is that there is an incomplete actus reus.
  44. [44]
    CRIMINAL CODE 1899 - SECT 4 Attempts to commit offences
    4 Attempts to commit offences (1) When a person, intending to commit an offence, begins to put the person's intention into execution by means adapted to its ...
  45. [45]
    CRIMES ACT 1900 - SECT 344A Attempts
    (1) Subject to this Act, any person who attempts to commit any offence for which a penalty is provided under this Act shall be liable to that penalty.
  46. [46]
    11.2 Complicity and common purpose | Attorney-General's Department
    (1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable ...<|separator|>
  47. [47]
    Crimes Act 1961 - New Zealand Legislation
    253 · Designing, writing, or adapting software for committing certain crimes ; 254 · Dealing in or possessing software or other information for committing crime.
  48. [48]
    The conduct requirement in the law of attempt: A New Zealand ...
    Attempt has had statutory recognition in New Zealand since the Criminal Code Act 1893.9. Section 72 of the Crimes Act 1961 provides the current formulation:.
  49. [49]
    [PDF] The mens rea of criminal attempt in the law of New Zealand
    The mens rea of criminal attempt in the law of New Zealand. Dara Joy Watson. A ... A Over-criminalisation in New Zealand attempt law. 16. B Rationales for ...
  50. [50]
    IPC Section 511 - Punishment for attempting to commit offences ...
    IPC Section 511 ; Attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment, and in such attempt doing any act towards the commission ...
  51. [51]
    Attempt to Commit Crime Is In Itself an Offence Under IPC - iPleaders
    Dec 7, 2019 · An attempt to commit a crime is a crime under the Indian Penal Code. Every attempt, falls short of success must create a threat in the mind of people.Introduction · The Indian Penal Code 1860... · Tests for Determining Whether...
  52. [52]
    [PDF] 1 THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
    Assault or criminal force in attempt to commit theft of property carried by a person. 357. Assault or criminal force in attempt wrongfully to confine a person.
  53. [53]
    Factual vs. Legal Impossibility in Attempt Crimes - Attorneys.Media
    Generally, factual impossibility is not recognized as a defense to attempt charges, while legal impossibility has traditionally been accepted as a valid defense ...
  54. [54]
    People v Dlugash - New York State Unified Court System
    The defendant agreed to perform an abortion, then a criminal act, upon a female undercover police investigator who was not, in fact, pregnant. The court ...
  55. [55]
    [PDF] Decoding the Impossibility Defense - CWSL Scholarly Commons
    Impossible attempts were first officially recognized as non-criminal in. 1864.' Not that they needed official recognition. Because "[t]he easiest cases.
  56. [56]
    R v Shivpuri | [1986] UKHL 2 | United Kingdom House of Lords | Law
    The decision overrules Anderton v. Ryan, settling that an “impossible” offence may nonetheless constitute an attempt where the accused intends the full offence.
  57. [57]
    [PDF] Withdrawal from attempts? - CentAUR
    the actus reus and mens rea of a criminal attempt were present, that this constituted a wrong committed with (some level of) culpability: but, provided the ...
  58. [58]
    [PDF] The Abandonment Defense to Criminal Attempt and Other Problems ...
    Criminal prohibitions have temporal dimensions in the sense that, given the definition of any crime, we may refer to later occurrences as.
  59. [59]
    Abandoned Criminal Attempts: An Economic Analysis
    A regime that makes abandonment a defense to criminal attempts provides an incentive to the offender to withdraw from his criminal conduct prior to completing ...
  60. [60]
    [PDF] Rethinking Attempt Under the Model Penal Code - Colorado Law ...
    Whether abandonment was a defense to an attempt charge at common law is disputed with most suggesting it was not a defense,6 but abandonment seems required ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  61. [61]
    PENAL CODE CHAPTER 15. PREPARATORY OFFENSES
    (d) Evidence that the defendant renounced his criminal objective by abandoning his criminal conduct, countermanding his solicitation, or withdrawing from the ...<|separator|>
  62. [62]
    [PDF] Attempt, Merger, and Transferred Intent - BrooklynWorks
    Since attempt is a heightened-intent crime (requiring proof of specific intent at common law and purpose under the Model Penal Code14), the merger issue only ...
  63. [63]
    [PDF] Diverging Views on the Merger of Criminal Offenses
    3 Similarly, the Merger Doctrine, an outgrowth of Double Jeopardy principles, aims to keep criminal defendants from facing multiple charges unless the ...
  64. [64]
    Felony Murder in Texas - The Merger Problem
    The rule transfers the culpable mental state required to prove the commission of a felony to any homicide that occurs while the felony is being committed.Missing: attempt | Show results with:attempt<|separator|>
  65. [65]
    16.5 Attempted Murder (18 U.S.C. § 1113) | Model Jury Instructions
    Attempted murder requires a substantial step toward killing, intent to kill, and the act occurring in federal jurisdiction. A substantial step is conduct that ...
  66. [66]
    Attempted Murder: Intent, Charges, Sentences and Defenses
    Attempted murder occurs when an individual has a murder intent of another and takes a substantial step towards the commission of the killing. Learn more.
  67. [67]
    Differences Between Attempted Felony Murder and ... - Leppard Law
    Attempted murder requires intent to kill, while attempted felony murder does not, but stems from a felony where a dangerous act could cause death.
  68. [68]
    [PDF] Matter of CERVANTES NUNEZ, 27 I&N Dec. 238 (BIA 2018)
    Mar 15, 2018 · attempted voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to kill. Although “physical force” is not an express element of attempted ...
  69. [69]
    State v. Holbron | Cases - Westlaw
    581 (1985) (holding that attempted voluntary manslaughter is legally possible because defendant can intend to kill, but with mitigating circumstances); Taylor, ...
  70. [70]
    California's Voluntary Manslaughter Laws – What You Need to Know
    May 17, 2020 · If you are charged with attempted murder, your defense attorney may be able to have your charges reduced to attempted voluntary manslaughter, a ...Missing: analysis | Show results with:analysis
  71. [71]
    felony murder rule | Wex | US Law | LII / Legal Information Institute
    The people involved in the felony may be charged for murder under the rule even if they had no intention of killing someone. For example, if A and B attempt ...
  72. [72]
    Reflections on Felony-Murder | Office of Justice Programs
    Under the felony-murder rule, the accused is liable for murder if the killing is connected in any way with the attempt to commit a felony or the flight from ...
  73. [73]
    The Basics of Felony Murder - North Carolina Criminal Law
    Apr 26, 2017 · To constitute felony murder, the homicide must occur “in the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a qualifying felony.
  74. [74]
    Attempted Murder: Laws, Penalties, and Defenses
    Sep 11, 2025 · In attempted murder, a person must take a direct step towards the killing and must have the specific intent to kill that person. The Action: ...Missing: distinctions | Show results with:distinctions
  75. [75]
    A New Mens Rea for Rape: More Convictions and Less Punishment
    The first problem is that it is too difficult to obtain a conviction for rape under existing definitions of the crime: of every 1000 rapes that are estimated to ...
  76. [76]
    [PDF] Rape and Force: The Forgotten Mens Rea - Insight @ Dickinson Law
    The crime of rape has traditionally been defined to require proof of both force on the part of the defendant and lack of consent on the part of the victim.
  77. [77]
    [PDF] Sexual Assault Statutes in the United States
    Aggravated sexual assault: • if in the course of a rape or attempted rape, object rape or attempted object rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible.
  78. [78]
    FBI — Rape
    The UCR Program counts one offense for each victim of a rape, attempted rape, or assault with intent to rape, regardless of the victim's age. Non-consensual ...Missing: doctrine | Show results with:doctrine
  79. [79]
    Complete Guide to Assault with Intent to Commit Rape Defense
    Jul 14, 2025 · California Penal Code 220 criminalizes assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or sexual penetration. This serious violent ...
  80. [80]
    California Penal Code § [Section] 261(a)(2) – Rape
    CPC §261(a)(2) makes it illegal to have sex with anyone who isn't your spouse through force, fear, threats or duress.
  81. [81]
    Continued Confusion About Attempted Murder - Grose Law Firm
    Jun 17, 2019 · Although attempted murder is a specific intent crime, the trial judge, without objection, instructed the jurors that a specific intent is not ...
  82. [82]
    Assault and Battery Laws | Criminal Law Center - Justia
    Aug 15, 2025 · While assault and battery are less serious than some violent crimes, a defendant still may face jail time and shoulder the burden of a criminal record.
  83. [83]
    10.2: Assault and Battery - Business LibreTexts
    Apr 1, 2025 · This page explains the distinct legal definitions and elements of battery, attempted battery assault, and threatened battery assault.<|separator|>
  84. [84]
    1610. Assault -- 18 U.S.C. 351(e) - Department of Justice
    An attempt with force or violence to do a corporal injury to another; may consist of any act tending to such corporal injury, accompanied with such ...
  85. [85]
    Differences Between Assault, Battery, and Aggravated Assault - Nolo
    May 29, 2025 · The crimes of assault, assault and battery, and aggravated assault all involve intentional harm inflicted on one person by another.What Is an Assault? What Is a... · What Is Simple Assault vs...
  86. [86]
    [PDF] Attempted Crimes under the Doctrine of Impossibility and the Role of ...
    Factual impossibilities have been held, both in England and in the United States, to not prevent conviction of a criminal attempt. The courts have held that a ...
  87. [87]
    JAMES v. UNITED STATES - Legal Information Institute
    Apr 18, 2007 · Florida's criminal attempt statute provided: “A person who attempts ... “Congress thought that certain general categories of property crimes ...
  88. [88]
    [PDF] Matter of Onyido, 22 I&N Dec. 552 (BIA 1999) - Department of Justice
    Jul 25, 2014 · Where a criminal charge of attempted fraud is alleged under Indiana law, the State need only prove that a substantial step toward the commission.
  89. [89]
    Attempt and Conspiracy Defense Attorney | 18 U.S.C. § 1349
    18 USC § 1349, entitled Attempt and Conspiracy, allows the government to prosecute cases where federal fraud was attempted but ultimately unsuccessful.
  90. [90]
    617 - United States Sentencing Commission
    In the case of a partially completed offense (e.g., an offense involving a completed fraud that is part of a larger, attempted fraud), the offense level is ...
  91. [91]
    Attempts and the philosophical foundations of criminal liability
    various particular debates about criminal liability as representing larger disagreements between subjectivists and objectivists. Duff's outstanding.Missing: debates | Show results with:debates
  92. [92]
    Criminal attempts andmoral luck (Chapter 7) - A Philosophy of ...
    A person who tries to cause a prohibited harm and fails is, in terms of moral culpability, not materially different from the person who tries and succeeds: the ...
  93. [93]
    [PDF] Harm Matters: Punishing Failed Attempts - Knowledge Bank
    My contention is that when harm does not eventuate from criminal attempts, the retributive component of a mixed sentencing theory, in the form of a principle ...<|separator|>
  94. [94]
    [PDF] Attempts and the Criminal Law: Three Problems - Ottawa Law Review
    I shall confine myself to examining (1) the problem of factually impossible attempts; (2) the nature of the intention required for a criminal attempt; and (3) ...
  95. [95]
    [PDF] Punishing Criminal Attempts: The Role of Harm in Criminal Sentencing
    If one agrees with the position that criminals are not in control of the harm that they cause, it is reasonable to conclude that whether or not a criminal will ...Missing: policy | Show results with:policy
  96. [96]
    [PDF] Abandoned Criminal Attempts: An Economic Analysis
    1955) (“Abandonment is a defense if the attempt to commit a crime is freely and voluntarily abandoned before the act is put in process of final execution ...
  97. [97]
    [PDF] Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions
    AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL. ATTEMPT: MARGINAL DETERRENCE. AND THE OPTIMAL STRUCTURE. OF SANCTIONS. I. INTRODUCTION: APPLICATION OF ECONOMICS. TO THE ...
  98. [98]
    Wrongful convictions and the punishment of attempts - ScienceDirect
    By punishing attempts, one increases the number of instances where the criminal is punished, and thereby increases deterrence.12. Intuitively, this ...
  99. [99]
    [PDF] Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in ...
    First, it is evident that certainty of punishment has a mild deterrent impact on crime rates. This is demonstrated in all the studies reviewed, in spite of ...
  100. [100]
    [PDF] Do Criminal Laws Deter Crime? Deterrence Theory in Criminal Justice
    Initial research supported the theory that severe punishments deter crime. A series of studies examining homicide rates found that the severity of punishment ...
  101. [101]
    [PDF] Using Behavioral Law and Economics to Build Criminal Attempt ...
    Jun 10, 2024 · Deterrence similarly provides an uncertain basis for justifying punishment for criminal attempts. Because the threat of sanction from the ...