Battle off Samar
The Battle off Samar was a pivotal naval engagement during World War II, fought on 25 October 1944 off the coast of Samar Island in the Philippine Islands, as part of the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf—the largest naval battle in history.[1] It involved a vastly outnumbered U.S. Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3"), consisting of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts under Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague, which unexpectedly confronted the Japanese Center Force led by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, comprising four battleships (including the massive Yamato), six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11 destroyers.[2] Despite the overwhelming disparity in firepower and speed—U.S. ships armed with 5-inch guns facing Japanese 18.1-inch battleship guns—the American forces launched daring torpedo attacks, smokescreens, and repeated air strikes from their aircraft, ultimately forcing the Japanese to withdraw and protecting the Allied invasion landings at Leyte Gulf.[3] The battle arose from strategic miscalculations on both sides during Operation Shō, Japan's desperate attempt to disrupt the U.S. invasion of the Philippines.[1] Admiral William F. Halsey's pursuit of a decoy Japanese carrier force to the north left the escort carrier groups vulnerable after Kurita's fleet passed undetected through the San Bernardino Strait during the night of 24–25 October.[3] At approximately 6:45 a.m., Taffy 3's radar detected the approaching Japanese armada emerging from a rain squall, prompting Sprague to order a high-speed retirement while launching all available aircraft—about 30 fighters and torpedo bombers—for attacks despite many lacking ordnance beyond machine guns and .50-caliber ammunition.[2] U.S. destroyers like the USS Johnston (under Commander Ernest E. Evans) and USS Hoel, along with destroyer escorts such as the USS Samuel B. Roberts (led by Lieutenant Commander Robert W. Copeland), executed bold "tin can" charges, firing torpedoes and laying smoke to shield the carriers, in what has been described as one of the most gallant actions in U.S. naval history.[3] The fighting raged for about two hours, with Japanese shells straddling the U.S. carriers and sinking the escort carrier USS Gambier Bay—the only U.S. aircraft carrier lost to conventional gunfire in the war—by 8:50 a.m., while the Johnston, Hoel, and Samuel B. Roberts were also lost to overwhelming fire.[1] The Japanese suffered significant damage in return, with three heavy cruisers (Chōkai, Chikuma, and Suzuya) severely damaged by combined air and surface attacks, leading to their subsequent sinkings, and a fourth cruiser damaged, amid confusion from friendly fire reports and the ferocity of the U.S. resistance.[2] U.S. losses in the surface action included approximately 650 killed and around 900 wounded or injured, primarily from the four sunk ships. Japanese personnel losses during the engagement were relatively light, though damaged ships suffered higher casualties when sunk later. Kurita, believing he faced a larger force, ordered a retreat around 9:30 a.m., allowing Taffy 3's surviving ships to rescue approximately 1,200 personnel over the following days.[1] The Battle off Samar exemplified extraordinary heroism, earning Taffy 3 the Presidential Unit Citation for "extraordinary heroism in action against powerful units of the Japanese Fleet," with Evans receiving a posthumous Medal of Honor.[2] Its outcome blunted Japan's final major naval offensive in the Pacific, securing the Leyte landings and accelerating the Allied advance toward Japan, while demonstrating the effectiveness of coordinated air-surface tactics against superior surface fleets.[3] As historian Samuel Eliot Morison later wrote, "In no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours... off Samar."[2]Strategic Background
Context in the Battle of Leyte Gulf
The Battle of Leyte Gulf, fought from October 23 to 26, 1944, represented the Imperial Japanese Navy's desperate counter to the Allied invasion of the Philippines, specifically the U.S. landings on Leyte Island on October 20, 1944.[4] As part of Operation Sho-1 (Shō Ichi Go), or "Victory Operation No. 1," Japanese Combined Fleet commander Admiral Soemu Toyoda orchestrated a multi-pronged assault using the remnants of Japan's naval strength— including battleships, cruisers, and carriers—to interdict American amphibious forces in Leyte Gulf and sever supply lines to the beachheads.[5] The plan divided the Japanese fleet into three primary elements: a northern decoy force under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa to lure away U.S. carrier groups, a southern force under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura to penetrate from the south, and a central force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita to strike the heart of the invasion fleet from the north.[4] This strategy aimed to exploit the vulnerability of U.S. troop transports and supply ships during the early phases of the landings, potentially reversing the tide in the Pacific theater.[4] Parallel engagements across the theater served as diversions or feints that inadvertently paved the way for the climactic action off Samar. In the Battle of Surigao Strait on October 24–25, the U.S. Seventh Fleet under Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf annihilated Nishimura's southern force as it attempted to enter Leyte Gulf, effectively neutralizing that prong and drawing American surface units southward.[5] Simultaneously, preliminary strikes in the Sibuyan Sea on October 24 damaged Kurita's central force, while Ozawa's carriers at Cape Engaño drew Admiral William Halsey's Third Fleet northward on October 25, creating an unguarded passage through San Bernardino Strait.[4] These actions fragmented Allied attention, allowing Kurita's battered but intact central force to advance undetected toward the invasion area.[1] The Battle off Samar held particular strategic weight within this framework, as it unfolded off the eastern coast of Samar Island, adjacent to Leyte and part of the broader Philippine archipelago targeted for liberation.[5] U.S. escort carrier groups, organized as Task Unit 77.4.3 (including Taffy 3), were positioned in the gulf to provide close air support for ground troops and anti-submarine warfare screening for the vulnerable amphibious assembly.[1] Their presence was crucial for sustaining the momentum of General Douglas MacArthur's "I shall return" campaign, protecting the fragile supply chain against any breakthrough by Japanese heavy units.[5] Kurita's unexpected emergence threatened to shatter this support, but the ensuing clash ultimately preserved Allied control of the gulf, marking a pivotal moment in securing the Philippines.[4]Halsey's Diversion and Kurita's Advance
As part of the broader Japanese strategy in the Battle of Leyte Gulf to divide Allied forces through decoy operations, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force faced severe aerial attacks in the Sibuyan Sea on October 24, 1944, resulting in the sinking of the battleship Musashi and heavy damage to other ships.[6] Interpreting these strikes as potentially decisive, Admiral William F. Halsey, commanding the U.S. Third Fleet, initially believed Kurita's force was retreating northward.[7] However, at approximately 16:40 that afternoon, U.S. aircraft sighted Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's Northern Force carriers northeast of Luzon, prompting Halsey to reassess the primary threat as the Japanese carrier remnant rather than the battered surface units.[8] By 20:00, Halsey ordered his entire carrier force—Task Groups 38.2, 38.3, and 38.4—to steam northward at high speed, forming Task Force 34 as a contingency for surface action but leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded.[7] Unbeknownst to Halsey, Kurita had temporarily reversed course during the Sibuyan Sea attacks to evade further bombing but, convinced of his force's resilience despite losses, ordered a resumption of the advance toward Leyte Gulf by late afternoon on October 24.[9] His fleet, now reduced but still formidable with battleships Yamato and Nagato leading, proceeded undetected through the narrow San Bernardino Strait overnight, aided by typhoon-like squalls that masked their passage from Allied reconnaissance and patrols.[9] These weather conditions, including heavy rain and poor visibility, prevented any effective surveillance, allowing the Japanese ships to maintain radio silence and steam in a tight formation without interference from submarines or surface units.[6] By around 03:00 on October 25, 1944, Kurita's Center Force had fully exited San Bernardino Strait into the Philippine Sea east of Samar, positioning it for an unexpected thrust toward the Allied invasion forces in Leyte Gulf while Halsey's Third Fleet continued its pursuit of Ozawa over 200 miles to the north.[6] This convergence of command decisions and environmental factors set the stage for the ensuing surface engagement off Samar, exposing the vulnerability of the U.S. escort carrier groups to a superior battleship force.[8]Positioning of Taffy 3
Task Unit 77.4.3, known as "Taffy 3," operated under the command of Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague as part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's escort carrier groups during the Leyte invasion.[1] Its primary mission was to deliver close air support to the Allied landings on Leyte Island and maintain an anti-submarine warfare screen to protect the invasion forces from underwater threats, with no anticipation of confronting a major Japanese surface fleet.[3][10] Positioned approximately 100 miles east of Samar Island on the northern flank of the Leyte operational area, Taffy 3 patrolled in a defensive circular formation designed to maximize protection from submarines and aircraft.[10] The six escort carriers formed the core of this screen, ringed by three destroyers and four destroyer escorts that provided a layered perimeter against potential incursions.[1] This eastward placement, while ideal for launching strikes toward the beaches, left the group exposed to approaches from the San Bernardino Strait, where Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's Center Force was advancing undetected.[3] The escort carriers, or CVEs, inherent to Taffy 3's composition amplified its vulnerabilities in this exposed position. Limited to a maximum speed of 18 knots, these vessels could not easily evade faster surface threats, relying instead on their aircraft for offensive and defensive capabilities rather than substantial gunfire.[10] Each CVE mounted only a single 5-inch gun for self-defense, underscoring their design for convoy escort and support roles rather than fleet actions against battleships or heavy cruisers.[1] On the early morning of October 25, 1944, Taffy 3's routine operations heightened its initial vulnerability as aircraft were launched from the carriers for standard anti-submarine patrols and ground support missions just after sunrise.[3] With many planes airborne and rearming cycles underway, the task unit's defensive posture was temporarily compromised, positioning it as an unintended frontline against the encroaching Japanese force.[10]Opposing Forces
United States Escort Carrier Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3)
Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3") was the northernmost of three escort carrier groups positioned off Samar Island to provide close air support and anti-submarine protection for the Leyte invasion landings.[1] Commanded by Rear Adm. Clifton A. F. Sprague from the flagship USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70), the unit included Commander Ernest E. Evans as commander of the destroyer screen aboard USS Johnston (DD-557).[11] These vessels were Casablanca-class escort carriers and Fletcher-class destroyers or John C. Butler-class destroyer escorts, optimized for convoy escort duties and lacking the heavy armor, speed, and gunnery suited for major surface actions against battleships.[12] The group's core consisted of six escort carriers: USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70), USS White Plains (CVE-66), USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68), USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71), USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73), and USS St. Lo (CVE-63).[13] Supporting them were three destroyers—USS Johnston (DD-557), USS Hoel (DD-533), and USS Heermann (DD-532)—along with four destroyer escorts: USS John C. Butler (DE-339), USS Dennis (DE-405), USS Raymond (DE-341), and USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413).[13] Each escort carrier mounted only a single 5-inch stern gun for defense, while the destroyers and escorts carried 5-inch guns and torpedoes primarily intended for anti-submarine roles, rendering the formation vulnerable to capital ship gunfire.[12] Taffy 3's air wing comprised fighter and torpedo bomber aircraft from composite squadrons, including FM-2 Wildcat fighters and TBM Avenger torpedo bombers, with roughly 100 planes available across the carriers at the onset of operations.[12] Collectively, the three Taffy groups fielded about 450 aircraft, underscoring Taffy 3's limited share in providing the primary offensive capability through aerial attacks rather than surface armament.[6] The task unit operated these lightly protected ships, focused on aviation support rather than fleet actions.[11]Japanese Center Force under Kurita
The Japanese Center Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita aboard the battleship Yamato, represented the Imperial Japanese Navy's primary surface striking power during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.[1] Following the loss of his initial flagship Atago to a U.S. submarine attack in the Palawan Passage on October 23, 1944, Kurita had transferred his command, maintaining an aggressive operational doctrine focused on decisive engagement with Allied naval forces to disrupt the Leyte invasion.[9] By the morning of October 25, as the force emerged from San Bernardino Strait into the engagement off Samar, its composition included four battleships (Yamato, Nagato, Haruna, and Kongō), six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers (including Yahagi), and eleven destroyers.[1] The fleet's armament underscored its overwhelming superiority over lighter U.S. escort carrier groups, with the Yamato's nine 46 cm (18.1-inch) Type 94 naval guns capable of firing 1,460 kg (3,219 lb) armor-piercing shells at ranges up to approximately 25 miles (42 km).[14] These guns, the largest ever mounted on a warship, were supplemented by the battleships' secondary batteries and the cruisers' 20 cm (8-inch) main guns, providing a combined broadside far exceeding the 5-inch guns and torpedoes of opposing destroyer escorts in both caliber and destructive potential.[1] The destroyers added Long Lance torpedoes, known for their extended range and reliability, enhancing the force's close-range lethality.[9] Entering the battle, Kurita's force was in a fatigued state after enduring intense U.S. air attacks in the Sibuyan Sea on October 24, which had sunk the battleship Musashi and inflicted damage on several cruisers, while submarine strikes earlier had claimed two heavy cruisers (Atago and Maya).[1] Crew exhaustion from prolonged operations and fuel constraints limited endurance, and the absence of dedicated aircraft carriers left the force reliant on limited floatplanes for reconnaissance, heightening vulnerability to air threats.[9] Despite these impairments, the core heavy units remained intact and battle-ready, positioning the Center Force as a formidable threat capable of annihilating lightly defended invasion support elements.[1]The Engagement
Initial Detection and Japanese Attack (Pre-Dawn to 06:45)
At approximately 06:32 on 25 October 1944, radar operators aboard ships of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3) detected the approaching Japanese Center Force to the northwest, though the exact range was difficult to determine due to the effects of morning mist and intermittent rain squalls that reduced visibility.[1] These weather conditions initially obscured the full scale of the threat, delaying clear identification of the enemy formation, which included four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and eleven destroyers.[1] Visual confirmation occurred shortly after dawn around 06:45, when lookouts on Taffy 3's escort carriers and escorts spotted antiaircraft fire and the silhouettes of large enemy warships emerging from the haze approximately 20 miles away.[1] U.S. pilots preparing for routine anti-submarine patrols mistook the towering Japanese battleships for friendly heavy cruisers at first glance, contributing to momentary confusion amid the surprise emergence of such a formidable surface force opposite the lightly armed escort carrier group.[15] Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague, commanding Taffy 3 from the escort carrier USS Fanshaw Bay, quickly assessed the dire situation and ordered the immediate launch of all available aircraft to engage the Japanese ships, despite most planes being configured for close air support and anti-submarine roles rather than anti-surface warfare.[1] The six escort carriers turned into the wind to facilitate takeoffs, exposing their slow, unarmored hulls to the rapidly closing enemy.[1] The Japanese response was swift; heavy cruisers opened fire at about 06:50, with the first salvos straddling Fanshaw Bay and sending plumes of water skyward, the colored splashes from dye-filled spotting shells vividly marking the near misses.[1] The persistent mist and rain squalls continued to hinder accurate ranging by Japanese gunners during these opening exchanges, providing Taffy 3 with fleeting moments of partial concealment as the battle commenced.[1]Taffy 3's Evasive Run to the East (06:45-07:15)
Upon detecting the approaching Japanese Center Force at around 06:45, Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague, commander of Taffy 3, immediately recognized the dire threat posed by the vastly superior enemy fleet.[2] At 06:50, Sprague issued orders for his escort carriers to turn to course 090 degrees—due east—at maximum speed of 18 knots, initiating a desperate evasion maneuver to increase the distance from the pursuers and buy time for air operations.[16] Simultaneously, the accompanying destroyers and destroyer escorts commenced laying dense smoke screens to shield the vulnerable carriers from Japanese gunfire, creating a protective veil that forced the enemy to adjust their targeting.[1] The Japanese response was swift and aggressive, with Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's battleships, including the massive Yamato, rapidly closing the range to approximately 15,000 yards by 07:00, their 18.1-inch guns capable of devastating the lightly armored American vessels from afar.[2] Heavy cruisers in the van of the Japanese formation opened fire on the trailing elements of Taffy 3, their salvos splashing close to the rearmost ships and signaling the onset of a one-sided gunnery duel.[16] Despite the smoke obscuring their aim, the Japanese pressed forward, their spotting planes aiding in bracketing the American formation amid the morning haze.[1] To disrupt the Japanese advance, Sprague launched all available aircraft—about 25 fighters and torpedo bombers, though many were configured for antisubmarine warfare rather than surface strikes—ordering them to harass the enemy fleet.[2] These planes conducted low-level strafing runs on Japanese deck crews and gun positions, causing minor disruptions such as scattering personnel and temporarily hampering secondary battery operations, though they inflicted limited material damage due to inadequate ordnance.[16] This aerial activity provided fleeting relief, allowing Taffy 3 to maintain its eastward flight while the pilots circled overhead, awaiting further instructions.[1] During this tense evasion, the first direct hits occurred on the escort carrier USS Kalinin Bay, which, as the trailing ship in the formation, absorbed multiple 8-inch shells (and possibly larger caliber) from Japanese heavy cruisers and battleships around 07:10, piercing her wooden flight deck and starting fires that her damage control teams struggled to contain.[2] These impacts marked the beginning of significant damage to Taffy 3's carriers, underscoring the precariousness of their flight as the Japanese continued to narrow the gap despite the combined effects of smoke and air harassment.[16]Destroyer Charges and Carrier Counterattacks
Following the initial evasive run to the east by Taffy 3, the accompanying destroyers formed a protective screen to shield the vulnerable escort carriers from the advancing Japanese battleships and cruisers.[1] At approximately 07:00 on October 25, 1944, Commander Ernest E. Evans of the USS Johnston (DD-557) ordered a daring solo charge against the superior Japanese force, accelerating to flank speed without awaiting further orders from Task Unit commander Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague.[17][18] The Johnston laid down a smoke screen to obscure the carriers, while her crew fired over 200 rounds from the 5-inch guns and launched all ten torpedoes targeting the heavy cruiser Kumano.[1] One torpedo struck Kumano's bow, severely damaging the ship and igniting fires that forced the Japanese formation to zigzag evasively, temporarily disrupting their coordinated advance.[18][17] This audacious maneuver not only drew heavy enemy fire onto the Johnston but also exemplified the aggressive spirit that defined Taffy 3's defense.[1] Emboldened by the Johnston's initiative, the destroyers USS Hoel (DD-533) and USS Heermann (DD-532) soon joined the attack, closing to point-blank range to launch torpedoes and unleash salvos from their 5-inch batteries against battleship Kongō and cruiser Haguro.[1] Around 07:42, the destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413) integrated into the assault, racing forward to engage Japanese cruisers with her own torpedoes and 3-inch guns in close coordination with the larger destroyers.[19][1] These successive destroyer runs hammered the Japanese van, compelling further evasive actions and inflicting enough confusion to blunt their momentum toward the carriers.[18] Complementing the surface charges, pilots from Taffy 3's escort carriers—primarily the Casablanca-class vessels Fanshaw Bay, White Plains, and Kalinin Bay—launched F6F Hellcats and TBM Avengers for immediate low-level counterattacks starting around 07:00.[20][1] The fighters strafed Japanese bridges and anti-aircraft positions with .50-caliber machine guns, while the torpedo bombers executed daring runs, dropping bombs and torpedoes on cruiser superstructures to exacerbate damage from the destroyer strikes.[20] These air efforts, though limited by the carriers' short-deck operations and lack of armor-piercing ordnance, added to the chaos by harassing command elements and forcing gunners to divide their attention.[20] The synchronized destroyer charges and carrier strikes collectively stalled the Japanese Center Force, causing their battleships and cruisers to veer northward away from Taffy 3 for 20 to 30 minutes and providing critical breathing room for the task unit to continue evading under smoke and speed.[18][1] This interval allowed the American ships to reposition and launch additional aircraft, underscoring the effectiveness of improvised aggression against overwhelming odds.[20]Japanese Assault on the Carriers
Following the initial destroyer charges that delayed the Japanese advance, Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita issued orders for his Center Force to close to point-blank range and annihilate the American escort carriers of Taffy 3, aiming to overwhelm them decisively.[15] At approximately 07:30, the battleship Yamato, flagship of the Japanese fleet, opened fire with its massive 18.1-inch guns, targeting the fleeing carriers from a range of about 20,000 yards, while other battleships and cruisers joined the barrage in a coordinated assault.[21] This marked the intensification of the Japanese push, with Kurita's forces steaming at full speed to reduce the distance and maximize accuracy against the lightly armored U.S. vessels.[22] Heavy cruisers Chōkai and Chikuma focused their 8-inch gunfire on the escort carrier Gambier Bay, scoring multiple hits starting around 08:10 that ignited fires and caused severe flooding, contributing to her eventual sinking by 08:50.[15] Meanwhile, the carrier Fanshaw Bay, serving as Taffy 3's flagship, endured over 20 shell impacts from Japanese battleships and cruisers, including near-misses that rocked the ship but failed to disable her flight operations due to her evasive maneuvers and the relative inaccuracy of long-range fire.[21] Other carriers, such as Kalinin Bay and White Plains, also absorbed hits during this phase, with the Japanese concentrating fire to exploit the carriers' vulnerability to surface gunfire.[15] American resistance persisted through relentless air attacks launched from the surviving carriers and nearby Taffy groups, with torpedo and dive bombers harassing the Japanese battleships and cruisers to disrupt their formation and gunnery.[21] U.S. destroyers maintained smokescreens that shrouded the carriers, frustrating Japanese targeting and forcing repeated course adjustments amid poor visibility from rain squalls.[15] These tactics, combined with the destroyers' earlier sacrificial runs, bought critical time for the carriers to evade the closing net.[22] A pivotal moment came from U.S. radio deception, where Taffy 3 personnel broadcast misleading messages imitating the communications of heavier Third Fleet forces, including calls for battleship support, sowing confusion among Japanese commanders about the true scale of opposition.[15] This ploy, amplified by the ongoing air harassment, led Japanese spotters to misidentify distant silhouettes as additional American capital ships, heightening Kurita's uncertainty during the assault.[21]Inflicted Losses and Damage Assessment
The Battle off Samar resulted in significant losses for the outnumbered U.S. Task Unit 77.4.3 (Taffy 3), particularly among its escort carriers and destroyer escorts, while inflicting notable damage on the Japanese Center Force without sinking any major warships during the surface engagement itself.[11] The U.S. Navy lost four ships sunk: the escort carrier USS Gambier Bay (CVE-73), overwhelmed by heavy cruiser gunfire after sustaining multiple hits that knocked out her engines and left her listing; the destroyer USS Johnston (DD-557), which absorbed over 40 shell hits and a torpedo before sinking; the destroyer USS Hoel (DD-533), crippled by 40 shells and torpedoes; and the destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413), which took 11 shell hits and a torpedo during her torpedo run but remained afloat for 12 hours before sinking.[11][12] Several other vessels suffered damage, including escort carriers USS Kalinin Bay (CVE-68), hit by at least seven 8-inch shells and numerous smaller projectiles; USS White Plains (CVE-66), struck by a 152 mm shell; USS Kitkun Bay (CVE-71), damaged by shellfire; and USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE-70), grazed by shells and later hit by a kamikaze.[11][1] U.S. casualties totaled approximately 1,118 killed and 913 wounded, with 1,785 personnel going into the water from the sunk ships, of whom 635 perished.[11] Taffy 3 also lost 23 aircraft, primarily to antiaircraft fire during low-level attacks on the Japanese fleet.[2]| U.S. Losses in the Battle off Samar | Details |
|---|---|
| Ships Sunk | USS Gambier Bay (CVE), USS Johnston (DD), USS Hoel (DD), USS Samuel B. Roberts (DE) |
| Ships Damaged | USS Kalinin Bay (CVE), USS White Plains (CVE), USS Kitkun Bay (CVE), USS Fanshaw Bay (CVE), USS Heermann (DD) |
| Personnel Casualties | 1,118 killed, 913 wounded |
| Aircraft Lost | 23 (to flak and combat) |
| Japanese Losses in the Battle off Samar | Details |
|---|---|
| Ships Sunk (during surface battle) | None |
| Ships Heavily Damaged (later sunk) | Heavy cruisers Chōkai (gunfire/torpedo/air), Chikuma (torpedo/air), Suzuya (shells/air) |
| Ships Damaged | Heavy cruiser Kumano (torpedo); battleships Yamato, Kongō; heavy cruisers Haguro, Maya; destroyers (minor hits) |
| Personnel Casualties | ~1,000 (estimated from cruiser damage) |
| Aircraft Lost | Negligible in surface action; overall ineffective |