Checkpoint Charlie
Checkpoint Charlie was the most prominent border crossing between West Berlin's American sector and East Berlin's Soviet sector, operational from 1961 until 1990 as part of the Berlin Wall's control regime designed by the German Democratic Republic to halt mass emigration to the West.[1][2] Named using the NATO phonetic alphabet's "Charlie" for the third Allied checkpoint (after Alpha at Helmstedt-Marienborn and Bravo at Drewitz), it exclusively handled non-German foreigners, diplomats, and Allied forces, distinguishing it from checkpoints for Germans like those at Friedrichstraße or Invalidenstraße.[1] The site epitomized Cold War tensions, most acutely during the October 1961 tank standoff, when U.S. and Soviet armored units positioned cannons mere meters apart for nearly two days following a dispute over access rights for Western diplomats, averting escalation only through backchannel de-escalation ordered by both Kennedy and Khrushchev.[3][4] Though rendered obsolete by the Berlin Wall's breaching on November 9, 1989, Checkpoint Charlie's booth was ceremonially dismantled on June 22, 1990, amid German reunification, leaving its location as a preserved historical marker amid subsequent commercialization.[2][5]Historical Context of Division
Post-WWII Division of Germany and Berlin
Following the Yalta Conference held from February 4 to 11, 1945, the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union agreed to partition Germany into three occupation zones administered respectively by each power, leaving open the addition of a French zone.[6] [7] Berlin, situated approximately 100 miles inside the Soviet zone, was stipulated for joint Allied occupation to ensure unified control over the former Nazi capital.[8] This arrangement reflected wartime compromises but sowed seeds for future friction, as the city's isolation in Soviet-controlled territory granted Moscow leverage to pressure Western access.[9] The Potsdam Conference, convened from July 17 to August 2, 1945, among the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union (with France later incorporated), formalized Germany's division into four zones by reallocating portions of the American and British sectors to France.[10] [11] Berlin's four-sector split mirrored this structure, with each occupying power controlling a distinct area despite the city's encirclement by the Soviet zone; the accords explicitly affirmed Western Allies' rights to unimpeded access via designated highways, railways, and air corridors.[10] These provisions aimed to sustain administrative unity under the Allied Control Council, but deepening ideological rifts—particularly Soviet insistence on heavy reparations from current production—undermined cooperation.[11] Soviet policies in the eastern zone prioritized reparations, involving the systematic dismantling of over 3,000 industrial plants between 1945 and 1948, with machinery, rolling stock, and infrastructure shipped to the USSR to offset war damages estimated at 30% of Soviet national wealth.[12] This extraction, which reduced East Germany's fixed capital by up to 40% in key sectors like machinery and chemicals, stifled reconstruction and perpetuated shortages, fostering systemic inefficiencies under centralized planning.[13] In the Western zones, the introduction of the Deutsche Mark on June 20, 1948, replaced the inflationary Reichsmark at a 10:1 conversion rate for most holdings, slashing black-market premiums from 100% to near parity and igniting a rapid rebound in output, with industrial production doubling by 1949.[14] [15] Such reforms, aligned with market incentives, contrasted sharply with eastern stagnation, accelerating skilled labor migration westward—over 1 million East Germans fled by mid-1949—via Berlin's open sector boundaries, amplifying pressures on Soviet control.[12] These divergences precipitated the Berlin Blockade, launched by Soviet authorities on June 24, 1948, which severed all road, rail, and canal routes to West Berlin, ostensibly to protest the Western currency reform but primarily to coerce Allied withdrawal from the city and consolidate Soviet dominance.[16] [17] The Western response, the Berlin Airlift from June 1948 to May 1949, ferried 2.3 million tons of essentials—including 1.5 million tons of coal—via 278,000 flights to sustain 2 million residents, demonstrating logistical resolve without capitulation.[17] The blockade's failure, lifted on May 12, 1949, exposed the limits of Soviet coercion amid Western economic vitality but entrenched Berlin's status as a Cold War flashpoint, with the enclave's dependence on vulnerable corridors incentivizing future containment measures.[16]Soviet Imposition of Emigration Controls and the Inner German Border
Following the formal establishment of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1949, open movement across the intra-German border persisted initially, but mass emigration soon ensued as East Germans sought superior economic prospects and freedoms in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Between 1949 and 1961, West German authorities registered over 2.6 million refugees from the GDR, representing roughly 20% of East Germany's population and disproportionately including skilled professionals, engineers, and young adults—exacerbating a severe brain drain.[18] This exodus stemmed primarily from the GDR's centrally planned economy, which stifled productivity through forced collectivization of agriculture starting in the early 1950s, leading to inefficient resource allocation, harvest shortfalls, and chronic food shortages that contrasted sharply with the FRG's postwar Wirtschaftswunder.[19] Political repression by the Ministry for State Security (Stasi), founded in 1950, further alienated citizens via surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and suppression of dissent, driving many to flee before full border fortifications could trap them.[20] To counteract this hemorrhage of human capital and prevent systemic collapse, the Soviet-occupied zone's leadership, under directives influenced by Moscow, imposed stringent emigration controls culminating in the fortification of the Inner German Border in 1952. On May 25, 1952, the GDR's Socialist Unity Party (SED) issued a "police directive for establishing special security arrangements in the border zone," designating a 5-kilometer-wide prohibited Sperrzone along the 1,393-kilometer frontier, enforced by barbed-wire fences, patrol paths, guard towers, and armed border troops.[21] Subsequent enhancements included anti-vehicle ditches, signal fencing, and minefields by the late 1950s, transforming the boundary into a lethal barrier that reduced but did not eliminate crossings—over 200,000 still escaped annually in the mid-1950s via less-secured routes, often toward Berlin. These measures targeted the "Republikflucht" (flight from the republic), which GDR economists quantified as costing billions in lost labor productivity, underscoring the regime's dependence on coerced retention to sustain its socialist model amid industrial lags and consumer goods deficits.[22] GDR propaganda justified these controls as an "anti-fascist protective barrier" against Western "imperialist sabotage," revanchist spies, and economic lures designed to undermine socialism, echoing Soviet narratives that framed the border as a bulwark preserving peace from alleged Nazi remnants in the FRG.[23] In reality, such rhetoric masked the causal failures of Marxist-Leninist policies: collectivization quotas ignored local incentives, yielding persistent agricultural underperformance (e.g., grain yields stagnating at 1950s levels while FRG output doubled), and Stasi files later revealed internal admissions that emigration reflected irrepressible popular rejection of the state's utopian promises.[19] Independent analyses post-reunification confirm the border's role not in defense but in propping up a viably uncompetitive system, where per capita GDP in the GDR trailed the FRG by over 50% by 1960, compelling citizens to "vote with their feet" toward market-driven prosperity.[20]Construction and Purpose of the Berlin Wall
Events Leading to the Wall's Erection in August 1961
In November 1958, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued an ultimatum to the Western Allies, demanding their withdrawal from Berlin within six months and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized "free city," while pressuring recognition of East German sovereignty over access routes.[3] This demand aimed to undermine Allied rights in Berlin established post-World War II, threatening a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that would transfer control to East German authorities.[24] Khrushchev renewed these pressures in 1961, particularly at the Vienna Summit with U.S. President John F. Kennedy in June, where he reiterated demands for a German peace treaty and Allied concessions on Berlin, escalating tensions without achieving agreement.[3] By early 1961, the GDR faced a severe refugee crisis, with monthly escapes to West Berlin exceeding 20,000 by mid-year, driven by economic stagnation and political repression; in July alone, 30,415 East Germans fled, the highest since 1953, threatening the regime's viability.[25] GDR leader Walter Ulbricht repeatedly urged Soviet backing for border closure measures, including in a June 15 public statement demanding West Berlin halt refugee inflows, and in private talks with Khrushchev in early August, where they coordinated logistics to seal East Berlin's sector borders.[26] On August 12, Ulbricht signed an order to implement the closure, framing it as anti-fascist protection but primarily to stem the exodus that had seen over 2.7 million departures from East Germany since 1949.[4] Overnight from August 12 to 13, 1961—known as "Barbed Wire Sunday"—East German forces, numbering around 14,500 troops, erected barbed wire fences and coils along the 155-kilometer border encircling West Berlin, blocking roads, railways, and the S-Bahn subway system that previously allowed unrestricted travel between sectors.[27] This initial barrier instantly separated thousands of families, workers, and commuters, with construction crews working under armed guard to prevent defections, marking the abrupt physical division demanded by Ulbricht and enabled by Khrushchev's ultimatums rather than a mere response to external threats.[3] In the preceding half of August, refugee registrations had already reached 36,800, underscoring the urgency behind the GDR's action to preserve its population and authority.[28]Strategic Role in Halting Mass Exodus from East Germany
The construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, represented a desperate measure by the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to stem the hemorrhage of its population to the West, following the flight of approximately 2.7 million East Germans between 1949 and 1961, many via Berlin's open sector border.[29] This exodus, equivalent to about 20% of the GDR's population, included disproportionate numbers of skilled workers, professionals, and youth, exacerbating labor shortages and undermining the socialist economy's viability.[30] The Wall's erection immediately curtailed legal and semi-legal crossings, reducing successful defections from over 200,000 annually pre-1961 to roughly 5,000 over the subsequent 28 years, despite more than 100,000 attempts.[31][32] To enforce this containment, the GDR evolved its border fortifications across four generations, beginning with barbed-wire fences and concrete posts, progressing to dual concrete slab walls (up to 3.6 meters high by the 1970s), expansive "death strips" cleared of cover and raked for footprints, anti-vehicle trenches, and over 300 watchtowers manned by Volkspolizei (Vopos) border guards.[33] Guards operated under explicit Schießbefehl (shoot-to-kill) orders, requiring them to fire on escapees without warning after a failed verbal challenge, a policy documented in GDR military directives and only formally rescinded in 1989.[34][35] This system, combined with minefields in early variants and automatic firing devices, prioritized deterrence through lethality over mere prevention, reflecting the regime's prioritization of population retention amid systemic economic underperformance. The Wall's efficacy came at a profound human toll, with at least 140 confirmed deaths directly attributable to the Berlin border regime between 1961 and 1989, primarily from shootings, though also drownings in associated waterways or vehicle impacts during pursuits.[32] These fatalities, verified through archival research by German historical commissions post-reunification, underscore the coercive lengths to which the GDR went to suppress emigration, an implicit concession to the uncompetitiveness of its centrally planned economy—evidenced by West Germany's GDP per capita exceeding East Germany's by roughly a factor of two in the 1960s, driven by market incentives absent in the East.[36][37] The barrier's necessity arose from "voting with feet," as citizens rejected socialism's material privations and political repression in favor of Western prosperity, rendering open borders untenable for the regime's survival.[38]Establishment and Functioning of the Checkpoint
Designation as Checkpoint Charlie for Allied Access
Checkpoint Charlie was designated in August 1961 as the principal border crossing point controlled by Western Allied forces into East Berlin, following the erection of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, to regulate access for military personnel, diplomats, and other non-German foreigners while upholding the Allies' legal rights to the city under postwar agreements.[39] The name derived from the NATO phonetic alphabet, with "Charlie" standing for the letter C as the third designated checkpoint—after Alpha on the Helmstedt autobahn route and Bravo at Drewitz airfield—standardized by NATO in 1956 for clear radiotelephony communication.[40][41] Situated at the intersection of Friedrichstraße and Zimmerstraße in Berlin's Mitte district, the checkpoint faced East German Democratic Republic (GDR) border controls directly across the dividing line, near the elevated U6 line's Friedrichstraße station, which functioned as a sealed "ghost station" for Western transit trains under Soviet oversight.[5][42] This location on a key north-south artery maximized its utility for asserting Western presence amid escalating tensions, without encroaching on civilian East-West family visits handled elsewhere.[43] The initial infrastructure was rudimentary: a prefabricated wooden guard shack, approximately 10 feet by 10 feet, fortified with sandbags and basic barriers to demarcate the American sector's control zone, embodying a deliberate minimalism that projected resolve without provocation.[39][44] U.S. Army personnel manned the post from the outset, with the setup expandable via typewriters and passport stamps but reliant on portable structures to adapt to the fluid crisis.[45] This outpost symbolized the Allies' commitment to freedom of access in Berlin, as guaranteed by the 1944–1945 Yalta and Potsdam protocols, countering Soviet attempts to isolate the Western sectors.[46]Operational Procedures for Crossings by Diplomats, Military, and Civilians
Checkpoint Charlie served as the designated crossing point for Western Allied military personnel, diplomats, and foreign civilians seeking access to East Berlin, in accordance with post-World War II agreements guaranteeing free movement for Allied forces across Berlin's sectors.[47] East German authorities, operating under Soviet oversight, conducted rigorous passport verifications, vehicle inspections, and personal searches on all entrants, often imposing deliberate delays to assert de facto control despite lacking jurisdiction over Allied personnel under the four-power framework. These procedures applied exclusively to non-East Germans, as ordinary East German citizens were prohibited from crossing westward, with rare exceptions requiring special authorization from GDR officials.[47] To uphold access rights and deter encroachments, U.S. and Allied forces maintained routine patrols and convoys through the checkpoint, including armored elements from the Berlin Brigade such as the 287th Military Police Company, which manned operations and tested unrestricted passage into the Soviet sector.[48] These crossings emphasized compliance with protocols like presenting identification and adhering to speed limits, while soldiers carried briefing materials outlining conduct to preserve diplomatic leverage under the agreements.[49] East German guards, known as Volkspolizei, monitored from guard towers and barriers but refrained from direct interference with military traffic to avoid escalation, though bureaucratic scrutiny persisted for diplomatic and civilian vehicles. Civilian crossings were incidental and tightly regulated, primarily accommodating foreign tourists and divided families under limited diplomatic arrangements. In a notable exception, the December 17, 1963, border-crossing agreement between Berlin's mayoral offices enabled West Berlin residents to obtain one-day passes for visits to relatives in East Berlin, facilitating over 170,000 crossings—many via Checkpoint Charlie—between December 19, 1963, and January 5, 1964.[50][51] These passes required approval from East German authorities and were subject to the same inspections, marking a temporary easing amid economic pressures on the GDR rather than a policy shift.[52] Such allowances remained exceptional, reverting to restrictions barring unauthorized East-West German travel thereafter.[50]Major Incidents and Confrontations
U.S.-Soviet Tank Standoff in October 1961
The standoff at Checkpoint Charlie escalated on October 27, 1961, when East German border guards attempted to inspect the passport of U.S. diplomat Allan Lightner, the principal officer of the U.S. Mission in Berlin, as he attempted to cross into East Berlin.[24] This action violated established Allied access rights, which did not permit such checks on Western military or diplomatic personnel. In response, U.S. military commander General Lucius D. Clay ordered an armed escort of jeeps and tanks to accompany Lightner on a subsequent crossing, prompting the Soviets to deploy tanks of their own.[46] By midday, ten U.S. M48 Patton tanks faced ten Soviet T-55 tanks across a barricade, positioned approximately 100 yards apart along Friedrichstraße.[53] President John F. Kennedy, briefed on the situation, instructed U.S. forces to respond in kind to any Soviet tank movements, authorizing combat-ready postures including loaded weapons and readiness to fire if fired upon first.[46] The confrontation lasted about 16 hours, with tank crews maintaining high alert amid fears of accidental escalation that could trigger broader conflict.[54] This direct superpower tank face-off tested Western commitment to Berlin's status, as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev sought to pressure the Allies over access protocols following the recent erection of the Berlin Wall.[3] De-escalation began that evening through parallel telephone communications between U.S. and Soviet tank commanders, facilitated by a backchannel approved by Kennedy, leading to the simultaneous withdrawal of tanks starting with one Soviet vehicle pulling back, followed by its U.S. counterpart.[55] The incident concluded without shots fired or concessions on access rights, affirming Allied prerogatives and demonstrating that Soviet threats were a bluff rather than intent for immediate military action.[56] This resolution averted crisis escalation while underscoring U.S. resolve against Soviet brinkmanship in divided Berlin.[57]Escape Attempts and Successful Defections via the Checkpoint
Checkpoint Charlie, designated primarily for Allied military personnel, diplomats, and foreigners, presented limited opportunities for East German civilians to defect legally, as East Berlin authorities tightly controlled exits to prevent emigration. However, the checkpoint became the site of ingenious escape attempts involving deception, modified vehicles, and smuggling, often aided by Western individuals risking arrest or diplomatic incidents. These efforts underscored widespread dissatisfaction with East German socialism, where over 3.5 million had fled to the West before the Wall's construction in 1961, prompting the barrier's erection to stem the exodus. Successful defections via the checkpoint numbered in the dozens, contrasting sharply with the Wall's overall record of approximately 5,000 escapes and over 140 deaths across all methods from 1961 to 1989.[31][58] One early and audacious success occurred on May 5, 1963, when East German Heinz Meixner drove an Austin Healey Sprite convertible through the checkpoint after removing its windshield and deflating the tires to simulate severe damage from an accident. This improvisation prevented guards from inspecting the interior closely or requiring the driver to exit, allowing Meixner to cross undetected into West Berlin. Such vehicle modifications exemplified defectors' resourcefulness, as East German border controls at checkpoints involved meticulous document checks and vehicle searches, but physical alterations could exploit procedural gaps. Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, occasionally supported similar operations by providing technical advice on hidden compartments or forged credentials for select high-value defectors, though most checkpoint escapes relied on individual initiative rather than organized extraction.[59][60] Smuggling East Germans concealed in vehicle trunks or custom compartments proved another viable tactic, with Western allies playing a crucial facilitative role. For instance, American serviceman Eric Yaw assisted teacher Peter Spitzner and his seven-year-old daughter Peggy in defecting on January 30, 1989, by hiding them in the trunk of his Toyota Corolla despite heat sensors at the crossing; Spitzner's wife had already escaped legally for medical treatment. This marked the last verified family defection via Checkpoint Charlie before the Wall's fall, highlighting how U.S. military presence enabled such risks amid easing tensions. Earlier, groups like seven Humboldt University students were reportedly smuggled westward in multiple vehicle trips through the checkpoint by sympathetic drivers, demonstrating repeated use of the route for low-profile escapes. These cases, often involving forged travel invitations or posing as aides to Westerners, totaled dozens of successes, as documented in exhibits of escape artifacts, though exact figures remain elusive due to secrecy.[39][61][62] The rarity of legal routes for East Germans—requiring special invitations rarely granted—made checkpoint defections emblematic of the regime's coercive emigration controls, where citizens faced imprisonment for attempting flight. Western facilitation, including by U.S. personnel who faced court-martial risks, reflected ideological commitment to individual liberty over East Berlin's collectivist suppression. While most escapes elsewhere involved tunnels or ladders, checkpoint successes via deception affirmed the Wall's porousness at controlled points, fueling propaganda victories for the West and exposing the human cost of division.[58][63]Border Shootings and the Death of Peter Fechter in 1962
On August 17, 1962, 18-year-old East Berlin masonry apprentice Peter Fechter was shot and left to bleed to death in the border strip adjacent to the Berlin Wall near the Friedrichstrasse/Zimmerstrasse crossing, known in the West as Checkpoint Charlie.[64] Fechter and his colleague Helmut Kulbeik attempted to scale the wall during their lunch break from a nearby construction site, with Kulbeik reaching the Western side while Fechter was struck by gunfire from East German border guards (Volkspolizei or Vopos) as he climbed a ladder.[64] He fell into no-man's land, wounded in the pelvis, and lay there for approximately one hour, calling out "Help! The guards shot me!" before succumbing to blood loss from an estimated 7.62mm bullet wound.[65] East German guards, positioned nearby, neither provided aid nor retrieved his body immediately, adhering to protocols that prohibited assistance to escapees to deter further attempts.[64] This incident exemplified the East German Democratic Republic's (GDR) Schießbefehl policy, which authorized border troops to use lethal force without warning against individuals attempting to cross the inner German border or Berlin Wall, a directive rooted in efforts to stem the exodus of citizens to the West.[32] By 1962, such orders had contributed to dozens of fatalities at the Berlin Wall alone, with guards incentivized through promotions, bonuses, and decorations for preventing escapes, fostering a culture of unaccountable enforcement where hesitation could lead to punishment for the guards themselves.[66] Fechter's death occurred amid heightened border security measures following the Wall's construction in 1961, where Vopos fired a total of 35 rounds during the episode, underscoring the policy's emphasis on deterrence over restraint.[64] Western observers, including U.S. soldiers and West Berlin police stationed at Checkpoint Charlie, photographed Fechter's prone body and the gathering crowd of protesters, images that were disseminated globally and sparked immediate outrage, including chants of "Murderers!" directed at East German forces.[66] Despite diplomatic protests from Western allies, the GDR faced no immediate repercussions, and similar shootings persisted, highlighting the inefficacy of international condemnation in altering the regime's border control practices.[64] Fechter's prolonged agony in plain view amplified anti-communist sentiment worldwide, with his case becoming a poignant symbol of the human cost of the GDR's emigration blockade, though it did not prompt policy changes or accountability for the involved guards at the time.[65]Dismantling and Immediate Post-Cold War Legacy
Role in the Fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989
The opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, stemmed from the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) deepening economic crisis, characterized by chronic shortages, foreign debt exceeding $20 billion, and industrial inefficiency that left the regime unable to maintain its repressive apparatus without risking total collapse. Peaceful mass protests, peaking at over 300,000 demonstrators in Leipzig by early October, further delegitimized the Socialist Unity Party (SED) leadership, compelling concessions amid Gorbachev's refusal to intervene militarily as in prior suppressions. Checkpoint Charlie, long a focal point of Cold War tensions due to its status as the primary Allied military crossing into East Berlin, became a site of spontaneous breach when crowds, galvanized by Politburo member Günter Schabowski's televised announcement of new travel regulations—misconstrued as permitting immediate unrestricted passage—gathered in the thousands by evening.[67] East German border guards, lacking explicit orders to fire and overwhelmed by the surging numbers demanding exit stamps, began processing and then waiving formalities, allowing the first major influx of East Berliners into the American sector without resistance.[68] This event at Checkpoint Charlie exemplified the regime's cascading failure to enforce borders, as unsustainable central planning and suppressed dissent eroded enforcement capacity, leading to ad hoc openings rather than orchestrated reform. Unlike crossings such as Bornholmer Straße, where guards initially hesitated before yielding under pressure, Checkpoint Charlie saw no shots fired or physical confrontations, attributable to its high-profile location under perpetual Western military and media observation, which amplified the risks of violence for GDR forces already demoralized by internal unrest.[68] By midnight, jubilant East Germans crossed en masse, hammering at barriers and symbolizing the Eastern Bloc's unraveling through economic inviability and popular non-violent insistence on freedom, rather than violent overthrow or Western orchestration.[67] The checkpoint's role underscored how visibility constrained repression, contributing to the Wall's effective nullification within hours across multiple sites.[5]Relics and Artifacts Preserved from the Original Site
Few physical relics from the original Checkpoint Charlie endure, as the site's infrastructure was largely dismantled following the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and formal German reunification on October 3, 1990. The principal surviving element is the metal guardhouse employed by U.S. military personnel, installed in the 1980s to supersede an initial wooden structure and operational until its removal on June 22, 1990. This guardhouse was subsequently transported to and displayed at the Allied Museum in Berlin's Zehlendorf district, where it preserves the austere, provisional character of Western Allied border operations.[5][69][70] The multilingual warning sign declaring "You Are Leaving the American Sector" in English, French, and German—erected to alert travelers crossing into Soviet-controlled territory—represents another key artifact, with originals or period exemplars retained in historical collections. Replicas of this sign have been positioned at the former site since the post-reunification era, maintaining visual continuity with the checkpoint's appearance during its active years from 1961 to 1990. Such signage underscored the segmented administration of Berlin under the Four Powers Agreement, serving as a stark reminder of the ideological divide.[71][39] Additional preserved items encompass fragments of concrete barriers, barbed wire entanglements, and uniforms from border guards, dispersed across specialized repositories. These scarce artifacts authenticate the checkpoint's role in regulating crossings amid the East German government's efforts to stem an exodus that saw approximately 3.5 million citizens depart for the West between 1949 and 1961, countering official GDR portrayals of the barrier system as a defensive measure against external aggression rather than internal containment. Their materiality refutes attempts to minimize the Wall's coercive purpose, offering empirical substantiation for the human costs of division.[35][72]