Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Chung Eui-yong

Chung Eui-yong (Korean: 정의용; born 14 April 1946) is a South Korean career diplomat and politician who held senior positions in foreign policy and national security under President Moon Jae-in, including Director of the National Security Office from May 2017 to February 2021 and Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 2021 to May 2022. A graduate of with a B.A. in , Chung built a decades-long diplomatic career focused on multilateral affairs and , serving as ambassador to (1997–1998), deputy for (1998–2001), and economic in Washington and . He also co-chaired the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) starting in 2007. During the Moon administration, Chung was instrumental in backchannel diplomacy with , leading a secret envoy to in March 2018 where he met Kim Jong-un and secured commitments for dialogue, which he personally briefed to U.S. President . These efforts contributed to the historic between Moon and Kim. Post-tenure, Chung faced indictments related to the alleged leakage of operational details to anti-missile activists and involvement in the controversial of in 2019, though courts suspended sentences in the latter case, citing insufficient evidence of intent to harm national interests.

Early life and education

Academic background and early influences

Chung Eui-yong was born on April 14, 1946, in , , shortly after the peninsula's division amid post-World War II geopolitical realignments. His early years coincided with the onset of the and the (1950–1953), periods that underscored the precarious security environment shaping 's national priorities. He pursued higher education in , earning a degree in from in 1968. This program, focused on global affairs during an era of ideological confrontation and alliance-building, provided foundational knowledge in diplomatic principles and statecraft relevant to Korea's divided context. Subsequently, Chung obtained a in International Affairs and Security from Harvard University's Kennedy School, enhancing his expertise in policy formulation and strategic analysis. In December 2010, he received an honorary Ph.D. in from Cambodia's Royal Academy, recognizing his contributions to regional . These academic pursuits established a rigorous grounding in realist-oriented international dynamics, influencing his subsequent orientation toward pragmatic foreign policy engagement.

Diplomatic career

Key roles prior to political appointments

Chung Eui-yong joined South Korea's in 1971 following his graduation from . Throughout his career, he held several positions focused on economic and trade diplomacy, including serving as Minister for Economic Affairs at the South Korean embassies in Washington, D.C., and , where he worked to strengthen bilateral economic ties with the and . He also acted as deputy head of the ministry's trade bureau and director general for international economic affairs, contributing to policy formulation in these areas. In addition to bilateral roles, Chung represented in multilateral forums, serving as to and to international organizations in . From February 2007, he took on the position of Secretary General and co-chairman of the Standing Committee of the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP), an organization aimed at fostering dialogue among Asian political parties to promote regional cooperation and stability. This role underscored his engagement in track-two , building networks across and beyond, with a focus on security and peace initiatives through non-governmental channels. Prior to the 2017 presidential transition, Chung advised on matters, including during international summits and campaign preparations, leveraging his expertise in Northeast Asian security dynamics derived from decades in the foreign service. His institutional experience emphasized pragmatic, engagement-oriented approaches to regional challenges, consistent with South Korea's diplomatic traditions.

Service in the Moon Jae-in administration

Director of the National Security Office (2017–2021)

Chung Eui-yong was appointed Director of the National Security Office on May 21, 2017, shortly after Moon Jae-in's election as president, tasked with coordinating South Korea's foreign and security policies amid heightened North Korean threats. In this role, he oversaw the National Security Council and advised on responses to North Korea's series of ballistic missile launches, including intercontinental-range tests in July and November 2017 that demonstrated potential reach to the U.S. mainland. The office under Chung emphasized conditional dialogue alongside strengthened deterrence, contrasting with prior administrations' harder lines, while maintaining joint military exercises with the United States despite North Korean protests. Throughout 2017, Chung's office managed escalations following North Korea's sixth nuclear test on September 3, which yielded an estimated yield of 100-250 kilotons, prompting condemnations and tightened sanctions. South Korea's responses included emergency meetings condemning the provocations as violations of UN resolutions, yet Moon's administration, via Chung, pursued backchannel communications to leverage the upcoming Pyeongchang Winter Olympics for de-escalation. North Korea's participation in the 2018 Olympics, facilitated by pre-event contacts, created an opening for inter-Korean dialogue, with Chung coordinating policy to prioritize engagement over immediate confrontation. A pivotal action occurred on March 5, 2018, when Chung led a high-level delegation, including National Intelligence Service Director Suh Hoon, to for talks with Kim Jong-un lasting over four hours. The discussions covered denuclearization, peace on the peninsula, and 's willingness to halt nuclear and missile tests; Kim extended an invitation for a summit with U.S. President , which Chung relayed to on , securing Trump's acceptance. This effort marked a shift toward summitry, though it drew criticism for potentially legitimizing without verifiable concessions. From 2018 to 2021, Chung continued directing coordination, navigating ongoing North Korean activities—such as short-range tests in May 2019—and advocating sustained within the presidential office, even as tensions fluctuated post-summits. His tenure emphasized management with the U.S. and while pursuing Moon's vision of peninsula peace through incremental engagements, amid persistent North Korean advancements in solid-fuel and submarine-launched s.

Minister of Foreign Affairs (2021–2022)

Chung Eui-yong was nominated by President as Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 19, 2021, succeeding , who had served since 2017. The appointment occurred against the backdrop of renewed North Korean missile launches and the need to realign South Korea's diplomatic posture following the U.S. presidential transition to . As head of the , Chung assumed responsibility for coordinating bilateral and multilateral engagements, managing consular services, and directing the ministry's 7,000 personnel across global missions. Early in his tenure, Chung prioritized alliance reinforcement, hosting U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Seoul on March 17, 2021, for discussions on the U.S.-South Korea alliance amid shared concerns over North Korean threats and regional stability. The meeting, part of the inaugural 2+2 Foreign and Defense Ministerial under the Biden administration, emphasized extended deterrence and trilateral cooperation with Japan to address security challenges. Chung also conducted South Korea's first high-level diplomatic visit to China in three years, meeting State Councilor Wang Yi on April 3, 2021, to discuss pandemic cooperation and economic ties strained by U.S.-China tensions. Chung's leadership extended to administrative oversight of , including efforts to secure and support post-COVID recovery through trade negotiations and international aid coordination. He represented at forums such as the Regional Forum and bilateral summits, focusing on diversified global partnerships beyond security imperatives. His tenure ended on May 10, 2022, following the inauguration of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who appointed as the new foreign minister.

Foreign policy initiatives

Inter-Korean diplomacy and summits

As Director of the National Security Office, Chung Eui-yong played a pivotal role in facilitating the 2018 by leading high-level delegations to . In early March 2018, Chung headed a South Korean envoy team that met Kim Jong-un, securing assurances on denuclearization talks and an invitation for U.S. President to engage directly with the North Korean leader. Following this visit, Chung briefed at the on March 8, 2018, announcing 's acceptance of the summit invitation by May to pursue permanent denuclearization. These efforts paved the way for the first inter-Korean summit on April 27, 2018, at , where and Kim issued the committing to peace and denuclearization. Chung continued to lead preparatory envoys for subsequent summits, including a September 5, 2018, trip to ahead of the third inter-Korean summit from September 18-20, where discussions focused on implementing prior agreements and advancing denuclearization. His diplomatic shuttle contributed to the U.S.- Singapore Summit on June 12, 2018, which produced a joint statement on complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, though lacking verifiable mechanisms or timelines. Chung supported the South Korean administration's phased approach to denuclearization, emphasizing incremental steps tied to sanctions relief, which influenced the agenda for the Summit on February 27-28, 2019. However, collapsed amid disagreements, with offering partial Yongbyon facility dismantlement in exchange for full sanctions removal, a proposal rejected by the U.S. Empirically, Chung's engagements correlated with a temporary moratorium on tests and launches, initiated in November 2017 and extending through the summits until short-range missile tests resumed in May 2019. also demolished structures at the Punggye-ri test site in May 2018, but no comprehensive inspections or verifiable dismantlement of its occurred, as required for lasting denuclearization. Post-Hanoi, the moratorium ended formally in December 2019, after which accelerated advancements in solid-fuel missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and hypersonic technologies, expanding its without corresponding concessions. This sequence underscores a causal where diplomatic overtures yielded short-term testing pauses but failed to constrain 's underlying buildup, as subsequent tests and developments demonstrated resumed absent enforceable .

Relations with the United States and regional allies

During his tenure as National Security Office Director from 2017 to 2021, Chung Eui-yong coordinated closely with the on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, navigating domestic opposition from progressive groups and amid the Moon Jae-in administration's initial review of the project inherited from the prior conservative government. The administration delayed full installation of additional launchers through an , but Chung emphasized maintaining alliance commitments, stating in June 2017 that Seoul had no intention of altering core agreements with on THAAD. This reflected tensions between bolstering deterrence against North Korean missile threats—evidenced by over 20 ballistic missile tests in 2017—and signals perceived as conciliatory toward , which imposed economic retaliation costing an estimated $7.5 billion in losses. As Foreign Minister from 2021 to 2022, Chung advanced trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan, participating in high-level meetings to address North Korean provocations and Chinese assertiveness. In September 2021, he joined U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi in Washington for a trilateral dialogue, where the trio underscored shared values and the need for coordinated responses to regional threats, including missile launches and supply chain resilience. This built on earlier 2+2 ministerial talks in March 2021, affirming trilateral exercises and intelligence-sharing as pillars of alliance interoperability, with Chung advocating for sustained U.S.-Japan-South Korea alignment despite historical frictions between Seoul and Tokyo. Conservative critics in and the U.S. argued that Chung's policies under the administration inadvertently diluted deterrence by prioritizing inter- engagement over rigorous enforcement of sanctions and joint military posture, potentially signaling weakness to adversaries. For instance, a March 2018 briefing by Chung in on North overtures omitted explicit reaffirmation of the U.S. , drawing scrutiny for optics that could undermine extended deterrence amid escalating North advancements. Such approaches, per analyses from security-focused outlets, risked eroding U.S. confidence in Seoul's reliability, especially as defense cost-sharing negotiations under the administration highlighted fiscal strains without commensurate hardening against risks. Nonetheless, bilateral like 's May 2021 visit, facilitated by Chung, reaffirmed the 's ironclad status, with commitments to 50,000 U.S. troops and enhanced combined exercises resuming post-2018 pauses.

Controversies and legal issues

Forced repatriation of North Korean defectors (2019 case)

In November 2019, two North Korean fishermen in their twenties crossed the inter-Korean maritime border in the East Sea aboard a squid fishing boat, where they were apprehended by South Korean naval forces. The men, identified as U Bom Son and Kim Hyon Uk, confessed during interrogation to murdering their captain and 15 crewmates at sea, an act they claimed stemmed from disputes over food rations and harsh working conditions, before fleeing toward South Korea in hopes of defection. Despite expressing fears of execution upon return to North Korea, they were classified by South Korean authorities not as political refugees eligible for asylum under the North Korean Human Rights Act, but as perpetrators of serious non-political crimes warranting repatriation to face justice. Chung Eui-yong, serving as Director of the National Security Office at the time, played a central role in the decision-making process, overseeing the brief investigation and ultimately approving the forcible handover to North Korean counterparts on November 7, 2019, without granting access to independent status determinations or legal counsel. The administration defended the action by emphasizing that harboring confessed murderers would undermine legal principles and norms against shielding violent criminals, prioritizing accountability over defector protections typically extended to non-criminal North Koreans. Chung later reiterated this stance in 2022, arguing that the fishermen's brutal killings disqualified them from sanctuary, as South Korea's policy distinguishes between political defectors and those guilty of grave offenses like murder. Human rights organizations and defector advocacy groups, including , condemned the repatriation as a violation of obligations under , which prohibit returning individuals to states where they face or death, regardless of criminal history—asserting that the fishermen's likely execution in (given the regime's severe penalties for and ) outweighed their crimes. Critics, including South Korean opposition lawmakers, argued the rushed process—lacking transparent asylum reviews—eroded the country's reputation as a haven for North Korean escapees and signaled acquiescence to Pyongyang's demands, potentially discouraging future defections amid ongoing inter-Korean tensions. In February 2025, the Seoul Central District Court convicted Chung and three other former officials of misconduct for the forcible repatriation, citing procedural irregularities such as coercion during questioning and denial of due process, though sentences were suspended for 10 months in recognition of the fishermen's heinous acts and the absence of political motivations in the crimes. The ruling highlighted tensions between humanitarian imperatives and criminal justice but affirmed that the decision reflected a deliberate policy exception for extreme cases, rather than systemic defector mistreatment, as South Korea had repatriated nearly 200 border crossers since 2010 primarily for voluntary returns or minor infractions, not comparable violence.

Alleged leaking of classified military information

In April 2025, Chung Eui-yong, former director of South Korea's Office, was indicted without detention by the Central District Prosecutors' Office on charges of leaking classified military operational details related to the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to civic groups opposing its deployment. The allegations center on disclosures made during the administration (2017–2022), including advance notice of military movements for replacing THAAD guided missiles and radar electronic units, which prosecutors classify as level-1 military secrets under South Korean law. These leaks purportedly enabled anti-THAAD activists to organize protests that disrupted operations, such as at the Seongju deployment site. THAAD, a U.S.-developed system deployed in since 2017 to counter North Korean ballistic threats, faced domestic opposition during the era due to concerns over economic retaliation, including tourism boycotts and trade restrictions that cost an estimated $7.5 billion. A November 2024 by the Board of and (BAI) concluded that the government, including Chung, deliberately shared such information to delay full THAAD operationalization, originally initiated under , thereby prioritizing diplomatic overtures to and over alliance commitments with the . Critics, including conservative lawmakers and defense analysts, contend this reflected an ideological tilt toward , potentially emboldening North Korean missile advancements by signaling reduced deterrence readiness. Chung and co-indictees, such as former Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo, face violations of the Military Secret Protection Act and could receive up to 10 years imprisonment if convicted. The first trial commenced in May 2025, with prosecutors arguing the leaks compromised operational security and U.S.- . Supporters of Chung, aligned with circles, have portrayed the actions as efforts to foster domestic policy debate on THAAD's environmental and impacts, though no public defense from Chung explicitly denying intent has been documented in proceedings to date. The case has fueled partisan tensions, with opposition parties decrying it as evidence of in Moon-era security decisions that favored anti-U.S. over empirical threat assessments from North Korea's 2020–2022 tests.

Legacy and evaluations

Achievements in diplomatic engagement

As Director of the Office, Chung Eui-yong spearheaded preparations for the first inter-Korean summit on April 27, 2018, at House of Peace. On March 5-6, 2018, he led a delegation to , delivering President Moon Jae-in's invitation to Kim Jong-un and securing the North Korean leader's agreement to hold the summit while expressing openness to denuclearization talks with the . This visit marked a breakthrough in direct high-level communication, contributing to the , which committed both sides to ending war hostilities, pursuing peace, and advancing denuclearization efforts. Chung's diplomatic maneuvers facilitated a temporary moratorium on North Korean and long-range tests, with no launches recorded throughout following the November 2017 Hwasong-15 ICBM test, extending until short-range projectile firings on May 4, 2019. He further advanced engagement by leading another envoy mission to on September 5, , ahead of the third inter-Korean summit, where agreements were reached to dismantle test facilities and promote joint economic projects. These steps underscored South Korea's proactive mediation in bridging divides with and coordinating with allies. The initiatives elevated South Korea's international stature as a key player in , with observers noting Chung's influence in fostering dialogue to reduce immediate risks. Proponents of policies have highlighted these outcomes as evidence of diplomacy's capacity to prioritize and avert conflict through persistent negotiation, distinct from reliance on deterrence alone.

Criticisms regarding policy outcomes and ethical lapses

Chung Eui-yong's advocacy for engagement with , including summits and economic incentives, has been criticized for yielding no verifiable progress toward denuclearization, as instead accelerated its nuclear and programs following the failed Hanoi summit on February 27-28, . Skeptics, including U.S. officials and conservative analysts in , argued that Seoul's unreciprocated concessions—such as joint military declarations and aid shipments—emboldened Kim Jong-un without extracting concrete dismantlement steps, a pattern evidenced by 's subsequent series of short-range tests starting , , and its enrichment of to near-weapons-grade levels by 2020. Right-leaning commentators, such as those in Chosun Ilbo, contend that this approach reflected a left-leaning tendency to legitimize the regime prematurely, undermining deterrence and straining alliances with the by prioritizing inter-Korean rapport over verifiable compliance. Ethical concerns arose from the November 2019 forced of two North Korean fishermen who had arrived by boat on July 17, 2019, confessed to killing 16 crewmates, and repeatedly expressed intent to defect, yet were returned to despite claims. A court convicted Chung and three other officials in February 2025 of violating defector protection laws, imposing suspended 10-month , as the repatriation disregarded Article 9 of the UN and South Korea's own statutes, potentially leading to the fishermen's execution in by May 2021 per defector testimonies. Critics, including groups and Yoon Suk-yeol administration probes, highlighted this as prioritizing inter-Korean optics over individual , eroding institutional trust and exposing seekers to empirical harm under 's penal system. Further ethical lapses involved allegations of leaking classified THAAD-related to anti-deployment activists around 2017-2018, with Chung indicted in 2025 for disclosing operational details to delay the system's full activation amid domestic protests. The Board of and Inspection report detailed how such disclosures compromised U.S.- defense exercises, incentivizing North Korean aggression by signaling reduced readiness, as evidenced by Pyongyang's exploitation of perceived vulnerabilities in subsequent provocations. Conservative evaluations frame these incidents as symptomatic of policy-driven ethical compromises that weakened posture and cohesion, contrasting with claims of diplomatic necessity.

References

  1. [1]
    아시아정당국제회의사무국
    Born in Seoul, Korea in 1946, Mr. Chung received a B.A. in International Relations from Seoul National University in 1968 and an M.P.A. in International Affairs ...Missing: South | Show results with:South
  2. [2]
    Former Ministers | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
    Former Ministers · Cho Tae-yul. Cho Tae-yul. 2024.01.12. - 2025.07. · Park Jin. Park Jin. 2022.05.12. · Chung Eui-yong. Chung Eui-yong. 2021.02.09. · Kang Kyung-wha.
  3. [3]
    Impact Player: Chung Eui-yong - CSIS
    May 23, 2017 · Chung Eui-yong is the director of the Blue House (Cheongwadae) National Security Office for President Moon Jae-in. Chung served as a top foreign ...Missing: biography | Show results with:biography
  4. [4]
    Remarks by Republic of Korea National Security Advisor Chung Eui ...
    Mar 8, 2018 · Remarks by Republic of Korea National Security Advisor Chung Eui-Yong – The White House.Missing: career achievements
  5. [5]
    4 ex-ministerial officials indicted over alleged involvement in N.K. ...
    Feb 28, 2023 · The four are former national security adviser and foreign minister Chung Eui-yong ... controversial deportation case, the officials said.
  6. [6]
    Seoul court suspends sentences for Chung Eui-yong, Seo Hoon in ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · Seoul court suspends sentences for Chung Eui-yong, Seo Hoon in North Korean repatriation case During the Moon Jae-in administration, ...
  7. [7]
    Former national security chief Chung Eui-yong indicted for leaking ...
    Apr 8, 2025 · Former National Security Office Chief Chung Eui-yong has been indicted without detention on charges of leaking military operations-related secrets to anti-THAADMissing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  8. [8]
    Chung Eui-yong - Wikiwand
    He subsequently served as Korean Ambassador to Israel (1997–1998), Deputy Minister for Trade (1998–2001), and as Korean Ambassador to the Permanent Mission of ...
  9. [9]
    ຂ່າວ Laos News - KPL - Republic of Korea's FM to ... - Facebook
    Aug 26, 2021 · Chung Eui-yong's Profile Date of birth: 14 April 1946 Education - Dec.2010 Honorary Ph.D. in Political Science, Royal Academy of Cambodia ...
  10. [10]
    President fills foreign affairs, security posts with diplomatic experts
    May 22, 2017 · A diplomacy major at Seoul National University, he joined the Foreign Ministry in 1971. He previously served as a deputy head of the trade ...
  11. [11]
    Moon Jae-in's Foreign Policy & Roh Moo-hyun's Shadow
    Jun 29, 2017 · Chung Eui-yong (71), chairman of the National Security Office. Chung is a retired diplomat who served as ambassador to Geneva and Israel and ...
  12. [12]
    A Conversation With Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong of the ...
    Sep 22, 2021 · South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong discusses the peace process on the Korean peninsula, South Korea's role in the Asia-Pacific and ...Missing: biography | Show results with:biography
  13. [13]
    Security Council Stands United in 2017 against Nuclear Testing on ...
    Jan 11, 2018 · Security Council stands united in 2017 against nuclear testing on Korean Peninsula, yet members Veto drafts addressing Syrian crisis, Middle East peace.
  14. [14]
    North Korean missile test fails, US and South Korea say | CNN
    Apr 15, 2017 · South Korean officials convened a meeting of the National Security Council in the wake of the failed test. “Our government condemns this serious ...Missing: Office responses
  15. [15]
    North Korea and Trump: The South Koreans behind a diplomatic ...
    Mar 8, 2018 · He was the foreign policy adviser during Moon Jae-in's presidential election campaign and was named South Korea's national security adviser in ...Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements
  16. [16]
    North Korea Hails 'Openhearted Talk' With South Korean Envoys
    Mar 5, 2018 · Mr. Kim spent more than four hours with the South Korean envoys, including Mr. Moon's national security adviser, Chung Eui-yong. They met in ...
  17. [17]
    Setting the Stage for the Third Inter-Korean Moon-Kim Summit in ...
    Sep 6, 2018 · Chief of the national security office at Seoul's presidential Blue House Chung Eui-yong meets with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang, ...
  18. [18]
    Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea – United States ...
    Mar 18, 2021 · Republic of Korea (ROK) Minister of Foreign Affairs Chung Eui-yong and Minister of National Defense Suh Wook hosted a Joint Foreign and ...
  19. [19]
    S.Korean foreign minister going to China for first time in 3 years
    Mar 31, 2021 · Chung Eui-yong will go to China on Friday, and on Saturday will meet with the Chinese government's top diplomat, State Councillor Wang Yi, ...Missing: tenure | Show results with:tenure
  20. [20]
    https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=321814
  21. [21]
    President Trump To Meet With Kim Jong Un, White House Says - NPR
    Mar 8, 2018 · "President Trump appreciated the briefing and said he would meet Kim Jong Un by May to achieve permanent denuclearization," Chung said. A senior ...
  22. [22]
    2018 1st Inter-Korean Summit - KBS WORLD Radio
    A five-member South Korean delegation, including National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong and National Intelligence Service Director Suh Hoon, visited North ...
  23. [23]
    Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy ...
    From the White House lawn following his meeting with Trump, Chung Eui-yong announces that Trump accepted Kim Jong Un's invitation to "meet Kim Jong Un by May to ...
  24. [24]
    Chung Eui-yong, the ICAPP and the Korea Summits - The Diplomat
    Jun 18, 2018 · Chung was appointed Co-Chairman of the International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) in 2007, holding that post until he was ...Missing: biography | Show results with:biography<|separator|>
  25. [25]
    North Korea: A Chronology of Events from 2016 to 2020
    May 5, 2020 · The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 2321, which condemns the recent nuclear and ballistic missile tests and expands sanctions, ...
  26. [26]
    Full article: The 2018-2019 Summitry Process and Prospects for ...
    The DPRK moratorium on nuclear tests and ICBM launches, as well as the closure of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, have served to limit the development of ...
  27. [27]
    Kim Missile Tests Draw Muted U.S. Reaction
    Jun 3, 2019 · The Trump administration has touted the lull in missile testing and the announced moratorium as positive outcomes of the diplomatic process, and ...<|separator|>
  28. [28]
    North Korea Is No Longer Bound by Nuclear Test Moratorium, Kim ...
    Dec 31, 2019 · Kim Jong-un said North Korea was free of a self-imposed pause on testing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, which President Trump had ...
  29. [29]
    Kim Jong Un's First Decade - PISM
    During the 2018-2019 diplomatic opening, North Korea ceased testing, but ... North Korea will improve its nuclear deterrence and diversify its missile arsenal.
  30. [30]
    Nuclear Notions: The Post-Hanoi Trajectory in US-North Korea ...
    Jun 4, 2024 · Today, North Korea presses forward with an ambitious program of modernization for its strategic nuclear forces while it simultaneously develops ...Missing: advancements | Show results with:advancements
  31. [31]
    South Korea: No Change in THAAD Deal - VOA
    Jun 9, 2017 · Chung Eui-yong called the decision to delay installation of remaining launchers of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system ...
  32. [32]
    South Korea says no fundamental changes coming to THAAD ...
    Jun 11, 2017 · “The government has no intention to make fundamental changes to the content of our agreements made in terms of the South Korea-US alliance,” ...
  33. [33]
    Trump's demand Seoul pay for THAAD will test ties as Moon ...
    Apr 28, 2017 · ... THAAD poses fundamental questions about where the alliance may be headed. "This is a new dimension," said Chung Eui-yong, a former South ...
  34. [34]
    Secretary's Trilateral Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi ...
    Sep 22, 2021 · The Secretary and the Foreign Ministers highlighted the global scope of U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation based upon our shared values, as well as our ...
  35. [35]
    Joint Statement of the 2021 Republic of Korea – United States ...
    Mar 19, 2021 · The Ministers and Secretaries affirmed the importance of ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation and pledged to continue promoting mutually- ...
  36. [36]
    A Bold Peace Offensive to Engage North Korea - War on the Rocks
    Dec 4, 2020 · Critics argue that a conciliatory approach to North Korea reflects weakness, naïveté, and a premature compromise in U.S. defense posture. We ...
  37. [37]
    Strange optics of the North Korea announcement - BBC
    Mar 8, 2018 · In this he announced - on behalf of Donald Trump - that the US president would accept an invitation to meet the North Korean leader. In the span ...
  38. [38]
    The US and South Korea: A Fracturing Alliance? - RUSI
    Jun 27, 2017 · However, reports suggest the US–South Korean relationship is currently strained. There has been some friction over the deployment of THAAD: Moon ...
  39. [39]
    A New Chapter in U.S.-South Korea Relations: Seoul Embraces a ...
    Jun 25, 2021 · Following the Moon-Biden summit, South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong sought to reassure Beijing that Seoul was not “interfering in ...
  40. [40]
    South Korea court finds former officials guilty of forcible return of N ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · At the time they were deported, the government of former President Moon Jae-in called the fishermen "dangerous criminals" who had killed 16 ...
  41. [41]
    2 North Koreans Tried to Defect. Did Seoul Send Them to Their ...
    Dec 18, 2019 · The repatriation of two squid fishermen, to what rights activists said was a certain execution in North Korea, has incited outrage in the South.
  42. [42]
    Lawmakers reveal identities of two North Koreans forcibly ...
    Sep 15, 2022 · According to the lawmakers, the two fishermen apprehended near the inter-Korean maritime border in Nov. 2019 were U Bom Son and Kim Hyon Uk, who ...
  43. [43]
    South Korea investigating 2019 repatriation of North Korean fishermen
    Jul 18, 2022 · The two men caught in the East Sea in November 2019 confessed to killing 16 of their fellow crew members in a bid to defect to South Korea, ...
  44. [44]
    Former national security adviser defends 2019 repatriation of North ...
    Jul 18, 2022 · “North Korean residents who have committed non-political serious crimes such as murder ... 2019, three young sailors brutally killed the ...
  45. [45]
    South Korea just repatriated two North Korean fishermen. Why?
    Nov 21, 2019 · That's because the two North Korean fishermen who were found, both in their 20s, are suspected of murdering 16 of their fellow crew members and ...
  46. [46]
    Former National Security Adviser Says He Decided the 2019 ...
    Feb 2, 2023 · Chung is accused of involvement in the deportation of two North Korean fishermen against their will in November 2019. The prosecution reportedly ...
  47. [47]
    Ex-top officials of Moon Jae-in gov't found guilty of deporting N ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · After a brief investigation as to why they crossed the sea border, South Korean officials concluded that they had murdered 16 of their crewmates ...
  48. [48]
    South Korea Investigates Forcible Return of Two North Koreans
    Jul 22, 2022 · Few details about the case are known. The South Korean navy reportedly apprehended the two men off South Korea's coast in November 2019.
  49. [49]
    Forced Repatriation Spurs Political, Legal Debate in South Korea
    Jul 15, 2022 · South Korean naval authorities captured the two fishermen in November 2019, when their small squid fishing boat crossed the eastern sea border.
  50. [50]
    The cruel return of two fishermen shows why we must stand up to ...
    Jul 24, 2022 · The fate of two North Korean fishermen who were forcibly returned to the North in November 2019 has exploded into a scandal that tears at the ...Missing: repatriates | Show results with:repatriates<|separator|>
  51. [51]
    South Korean Officials Convicted Over Forcibly Sending North ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · The case of two North Korean fishermen, who murdered 16 compatriots ... They confessed that they fled after killing the captain and 15 ...
  52. [52]
    South Korea repatriated nearly 200 North Koreans but only 'expelled ...
    Jul 15, 2022 · South Korea has repatriated nearly 200 North Koreans who crossed the inter-Korean sea border since 2010, unification ministry data obtained ...
  53. [53]
    4 officials under Moon get suspended prison terms in N. Korean ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · The government cited the fishermen's confession to killing 16 fellow crew members as the reason for denying them protection and repatriating ...Missing: murder | Show results with:murder
  54. [54]
    (LEAD) Ex-senior officials under Moon indicted for leaking THAAD ...
    Apr 8, 2025 · The Seoul Central District Prosecutors Office indicted former National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong and former Defense Minister Jeong ...
  55. [55]
    Former top security adviser indicted for leaking THAAD-related ...
    Apr 8, 2025 · Chung is accused of informing activists opposed to South Korea's hosting of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system beforehand of ...
  56. [56]
    Prosecution Indicts Jeong Eui-yong on Charges of Leaking THAAD ...
    Apr 8, 2025 · Former Director Chung and former Minister Jeong are accused of instructing the disclosure of military operation information classified as ...
  57. [57]
    Exclusive: Audit finds Moon administration leaked THAAD details to ...
    Nov 19, 2024 · The Moon Jae-in administration allegedly leaked details of US-South Korea military operations related to the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system ...
  58. [58]
    State auditor accuses Moon gov't of leaking THAAD-related ...
    Nov 19, 2024 · The BAI suspects the Moon government leaked the information as part of attempts to delay the full deployment of THAAD, which the Park Geun-hye ...Missing: relations | Show results with:relations
  59. [59]
    Alleged THAAD leak by former Moon officials may intensify partisan ...
    Nov 20, 2024 · Alleged THAAD leak by former Moon officials may intensify partisan divisions. South Korea's then-foreign minister Chung Eui-yong holds a ...
  60. [60]
    First Trial Begins for Moon Administration Security Officials Accused ...
    Former Director Chung and others were indicted last month on charges of instructing that military operation information be provided to THAAD opposition groups, ...
  61. [61]
    Ex-South Korean defence chief, officials accused of THAAD data ...
    Nov 20, 2024 · South Korea's state auditor alleges that the former officials disclosed the details in a bid to slow down the full deployment of THAAD.
  62. [62]
    North Korea willing to talk to US about giving up nuclear weapons ...
    Mar 7, 2018 · Chung said Pyongyang expressed willingness to talk to the United States “in an open-ended dialogue to discuss the issue of denuclearization and ...
  63. [63]
    2018 Inter-Korean Summit
    Apr 18, 2018 · Director of National Security Chung Eui-yong Briefs the Media on His Meeting with New U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton
  64. [64]
    North Korea launched no missiles in 2018. But that isn't necessarily ...
    an apparent vindication of President Donald Trump's unconventional foreign ...
  65. [65]
    Downplaying North Korea's Missile Tests Carries Risks - RAND
    Jun 5, 2019 · North Korea test-fired short-range ballistic missiles in early May 2019, marking the country's first missile tests in 18 months.
  66. [66]
    South Korean envoys meet Kim in North to prepare for third summit
    Sep 6, 2018 · South Korean President Moon Jae-in's special envoys were led by the national security chief at the presidential Blue House, Chung Eui-yong, and ...
  67. [67]
    North Korea agrees to shut down missile test sites as leaders hail ...
    Sep 18, 2018 · Under the agreement signed by the men, North Korea will shut down the Dongchang-ri missile engine testing facility and missile launch pad, ...
  68. [68]
    North Korea's New Nuclear Promises Fall Short of U.S. Demands
    Sep 19, 2018 · American officials, mindful of North Korea's past failures to honor promises, are insisting that North Korea move quickly toward ...
  69. [69]
    Inter-Korean Relations: How North Korea Is Conditioning South ...
    Dec 5, 2019 · Although the world witnessed three inter-Korean summits and two US-DPRK summits, these were made possible because the United States and ...<|separator|>
  70. [70]
    South Korea's Moon taps ex-adviser as foreign minister in bid to ...
    Jan 20, 2021 · The nomination of Chung Eui-yong, 74, to replace Kang Kyung-wha as foreign minister was seen as a bid to help revive stalled denuclearization ...
  71. [71]
    South Korea court finds former officials guilty of forcible return of N ...
    Feb 19, 2025 · A South Korean court found four former government officials guilty on Wednesday of forcibly repatriating two North Korean fishermen in 2019.Missing: ethical lapses
  72. [72]
    suspended sentences for Chung Eui-yong, Seo Hoon in first trial
    Feb 20, 2025 · The defendants were indicted without detention in February 2023 for ordering the forced repatriation of two defector fishermen in November 2019.
  73. [73]
    N. Korea appears to have executed two men forcibly repatriated by ...
    May 18, 2021 · The materials listed instances where North Korean defectors attempted to escape and then were forcibly repatriated. One of the examples listed ...Missing: lapses | Show results with:lapses
  74. [74]
    Yoon administration vows to uncover truth of 2019 repatriation of NK ...
    Jul 13, 2022 · “If they were forced to return to North Korea even though they expressed their intention to defect, this is a crime against humanity that ...Missing: ethical lapses