Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Combined Space Operations Center

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) is the Department of Defense's premier multinational facility for operations, located at , , where it directs operational-level mission planning and for U.S. . Its core mission entails executing the operational of and forces around the clock to deliver tailored effects supporting theater and global military objectives, including real-time monitoring, , satellite communications coordination, and cyber defense integration. Staffed by U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel augmented by exchange officers from allied nations—primarily Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, with collaboration extending to France, Germany, and New Zealand—the CSpOC fosters interoperability among partners through shared operations and a commercial integration cell for civil sector input. Organized under Space Delta 5 of the U.S. Space Force, it manages tactical units, integrates with entities like the Missile Warning Center and National Space Defense Center, and ensures combatant commanders receive precise space battle management support for offensive and defensive operations. Established in to enhance multinational defensive space coordination beyond its predecessor, the Joint Space Operations Center, the CSpOC has become central to sustaining U.S. and allied freedom of action in space amid growing domain congestion and threats, prioritizing empirical tracking of orbital objects and causal effects on military capabilities over politicized narratives.

Mission and Objectives

Core Functions

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) executes operational of space forces on a continuous basis to support theater and global objectives. It maintains 24/7 operations, encompassing the coordination, planning, integration, synchronization, and execution of joint and combined space operations among participating nations, including the , , , and . A primary function involves delivering space situational awareness (SSA) through real-time monitoring and analysis of the space domain. This includes the detection and characterization of orbital debris, satellite anomalies, and potential adversarial threats, such as anti-satellite activities or maneuvers by foreign satellites that could endanger allied assets. The CSpOC leverages from co-located units like the 18th Space Defense Squadron to track over 23,000 resident space objects, enabling predictive assessments of conjunction risks and domain disruptions. Additionally, the CSpOC facilitates tactical space effects for warfighters by ensuring the availability and resilience of critical services, including positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) signals from systems like GPS, as well as communications for , , and dissemination. These efforts integrate and allied inputs via mechanisms such as the Commercial Integration Cell to enhance operational responsiveness without compromising security.

Strategic Role in National Security

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) underpins U.S. national security by executing 24/7 command and control of space forces, enabling theater-level and global operational objectives that deter aggression and sustain superiority in a contested domain. Through continuous space domain awareness and synchronized multinational planning, CSpOC integrates allied contributions from partners including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada to counter adversarial attempts to deny U.S. space advantages, thereby preserving critical enablers like satellite-based communications, navigation, and reconnaissance that form the backbone of modern military power projection. CSpOC's strategic contributions directly address empirical threats from peer competitors, as evidenced by China's January 2007 antisatellite missile test—which destroyed a defunct and produced over 3,000 trackable debris fragments endangering orbital assets—and Russia's November 2021 direct-ascent ASAT test that generated more than 1,500 debris pieces, both demonstrating operational counterspace weapons capable of disrupting U.S. and allied satellites. These incidents, alongside documented advancements in co-orbital killers, ground-based lasers, and systems by both nations, highlight the causal imperative for resilient, proliferated architectures that CSpOC operationalizes to mitigate denial risks and maintain deterrence by denial. U.S. Space Command leverages CSpOC to prioritize capability hardening over vulnerability exposure, recognizing that such threats target the space-dependent precision strike and awareness essential for multi-domain superiority. By fusing space effects into joint force operations, including infrared missile warning via systems like the and nuclear command, control, and communications continuity, CSpOC ensures causal linkages between resilience and credible extended deterrence against nuclear-armed adversaries. This integration supports U.S. operational plans that deter escalation by demonstrating inevitable failure for attacks on space infrastructure, while critiquing excessive deference to international norms—such as those in the 1967 —that adversaries routinely circumvent through asymmetric weaponization, thereby necessitating U.S.-led primacy to safeguard economic dependencies on space-derived services exceeding $1 trillion annually in global GDP contributions.

Organizational Structure

Command Hierarchy

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) operates under the direct authority of the (CFSCC), which serves as the primary command entity for planning, directing, and assessing and combined operations in support of U.S. Command objectives. The CFSCC, headquartered at , California, falls within the U.S. Forces-Space (S4S) structure under , ensuring alignment with broader U.S. priorities for and effects delivery. Historically, prior to the establishment of U.S. , the CSpOC reported through the Joint Force Space Component Commander (JFSCC) to U.S. Strategic Command, reflecting an evolution from to unified command frameworks. Leadership of the CSpOC is vested in a , typically a U.S. colonel dual-hatted as commander of , who maintains U.S. primacy in decision-making while integrating inputs from multinational partners such as the , , and through embedded liaison officers and shared operational planning processes. This structure ensures accountability flows upward to the CFSCC for theater-level effects, with the responsible for synchronizing forces across allied contributions without ceding operational . provides the core command-and-control personnel and infrastructure for CSpOC functions, stationed at Vandenberg, and receives specialized training and evaluation support from units including the 614th to maintain readiness in multinational coordination scenarios.

Key Components and Personnel

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) is structured around core divisions that enable continuous , including the Combat Operations Division for real-time execution of space missions, the Strategy and Plans Division for developing operational strategies, and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division for maintaining through and analysis. These divisions support 24/7 operations by dividing responsibilities across shifts, with empirical scaling derived from the need to monitor over 27,000 orbital objects and respond to threats in near-real time, necessitating redundant staffing layers to sustain global vigilance without lapses. Supporting squadrons provide specialized personnel for battle management and training, such as the 9th Combat Operations Squadron, which integrates Reserve forces for contingency planning and execution, and the 55th Combat Training Squadron, focused on simulating space combat scenarios to enhance operator readiness. Overall staffing draws from U.S. Space Force Guardians as the primary cadre, augmented by , , , and Marine Corps personnel for cross-domain expertise, totaling hundreds in rotational shifts to cover surveillance feeds and decision cycles. Multinational contributions from partners—Australia, , , and the —include exchange officers embedded in operational teams, providing verifiable inputs like shared sensor data and liaison support rather than merely ceremonial roles, which bolsters collective space situational awareness through integrated watch floors. Resource allocation emphasizes software systems like Space Command and Control (Space C2), intended for unified battle management across platforms, but as of June 2023, the program's acquisition strategy exhibited persistent delays and incomplete tracking of milestones, hindering full integration for scalable operations per assessment. These gaps underscore the need for refined oversight to match personnel demands with reliable tools for 24/7 efficacy.

Historical Development

Origins as Joint Space Operations Center

The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) was established on May 18, 2005, at , through the redesignation of the prior Space Air Operations Center under the U.S. Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) Joint Functional Component Command for Space (JFCC Space). This consolidation aimed to centralize the operational employment of joint forces, integrating planning, execution, and monitoring of assets previously managed in service-specific silos by the , , and other components. The shift to a joint framework was driven by post-Cold War recognition of as a warfighting domain requiring unified , evidenced by increasing reliance on constellations for global , , and . From inception, the JSpOC prioritized space situational awareness (SSA) to track orbital objects and mitigate collision risks, operating the Space Surveillance Network to catalog over 17,000 resident space objects by the mid-2000s. This focus intensified amid empirical demonstrations of space vulnerabilities, including the January 11, 2007, Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test that destroyed the Fengyun-1C weather satellite, generating more than 3,000 trackable debris pieces—the largest artificial debris field in history—and highlighting threats to U.S. dependencies on low Earth orbit assets. Russian ASAT activities further validated the need for robust SSA, as debris propagation models showed potential cascading risks to operational satellites. The JSpOC's joint structure enabled cross-service data fusion via systems like the Joint Mission System (JMS), replacing legacy tools and providing USSTRATCOM commanders with real-time SSA for space control decisions, marking a departure from fragmented service-led operations that had limited domain-wide visibility. This U.S.-centric approach laid foundational capabilities for defending space interests against emerging peer competitors, without initial multinational integration.

Transition to Combined Operations and Space Force Integration

The transition from the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) culminated in a formal on July 18, 2018, at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, renaming the entity to emphasize enhanced multinational among the , , , and . This structural shift, directed by U.S. Strategic Command since 2017, aimed to synchronize space operations with allies amid rising threats from adversaries like and , formalizing coalition integration without altering core U.S.-led authority. The CSpOC's multinational framework supported U.S. Space Command's reestablishment on August 29, 2019, by providing unified and effects delivery to combatant commanders. The establishment of the U.S. Space Force on December 20, 2019, via the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, marked a pivotal integration point, transferring space operations—including the CSpOC—from Air Force oversight to the new service to address longstanding criticisms of bureaucratic inertia and inadequate prioritization of space as a warfighting domain. Under Space Operations Command (SpOC), activated on October 1, 2020, the CSpOC was realigned as Space Delta 5, enhancing its role in tactical control for joint and combined forces while augmenting personnel with U.S. inter-service experts and allied officers. This reorganization responded to pre-Space Force shortfalls, such as fragmented acquisition and delayed capabilities, by streamlining command chains to better counter great power competition, though implementation faced scrutiny for retaining some Air Force-era processes. Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessments highlighted persistent delays in the Space Command and Control (C2) program, critical for CSpOC modernization; a 2019 report identified management challenges and technical risks in delivering integrated systems, projecting over $65 billion in fiscal years 2019–2023 investments amid uncertain timelines. A 2023 GAO review reiterated these issues, noting incomplete tracking of milestones and inconsistent metrics despite statutory reporting requirements, which obscured progress on capabilities like resilient satellite communications and battle management. The Space Force addressed these through enhanced oversight, including annual reports incorporating GAO-recommended elements like cost-benefit analyses and risk mitigation, prioritizing empirical fixes over declarative reforms to accelerate C2 delivery. In September 2025, SpOC was redesignated as Combat Forces Command to underscore a warfighting , reflecting adaptations to intensified peer competition by clarifying its provision of combat-ready space forces to unified commands, with the change effective alongside new leadership to reduce ambiguity in operational roles. This evolution built on CSpOC's multinational posture, enabling shared and exercises while maintaining U.S. dominance in decision-making.

Operational Capabilities

Space Surveillance and Domain Awareness

The Combined Space Operations Center employs the to generate a comprehensive domain picture through from ground-based radars, electro-optical telescopes, and space-based sensors, enabling detection, tracking, and characterization of orbital objects. Ground-based phased-array radars, such as the AN/FPS-85 at , provide high-volume surveillance of objects with capabilities to track up to 200 simultaneously across 120 degrees of azimuth coverage. Optical systems like the Ground-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance telescopes contribute by monitoring geosynchronous and deep space regimes, detecting over 2,500 objects nightly under clear skies. Space-based assets, including the , offer persistent overhead coverage for timely custody and event detection, supplementing terrestrial limitations in weather-dependent or obscured conditions. This supports cataloging of more than 27,000 resident objects, primarily those exceeding 10 centimeters in size, with algorithms processing sensor data to predict within 1 kilometer accuracy for collision avoidance and issue reentry warnings for populated areas. Such capabilities have enabled over 1,000 annual assessments shared with operators, mitigating risks from close approaches that occur thousands of times yearly in crowded orbits. However, empirical data reveals persistent challenges: the February 10, 2009, collision between the operational 33 and derelict 2251 generated over 2,300 trackable fragments larger than 10 cm, plus thousands of smaller pieces, inflating sizes and demonstrating how unintended events can cascade into heightened collision probabilities, contrary to notions of as a perpetually benign domain. Adversarial activities compound these issues, as state actors employ satellite maneuvers—evident in documented changes by foreign assets—to evade detection, straining sensor revisit rates and predictive models that assume predictable trajectories. Data processing delays and incomplete coverage in certain orbital shells further limit real-time awareness, with ground systems vulnerable to atmospheric interference and space-based sensors constrained by fuel life and resolution limits. To address gaps, CSpOC integrates civil and commercial data sources via the Commercial Integration Cell, fusing private-sector observations from electro-optical and providers to enhance resolution on small and detection. This approach leverages industry capabilities for broader coverage, as outlined in U.S. Space Command's 2025 Commercial Integration Strategy, which emphasizes mutual for superior domain awareness. Nonetheless, reliance on such external feeds introduces risks, including unverified and potential disruptions from non-state actors targeting commercial or foreign entities embedding inaccuracies, as the Department of lacks a comprehensive for all commercial inputs, leading to uneven incorporation.

Command, Control, and Integration Systems

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) employs the Space Command and Control (Space C2) program to unify legacy systems into a single operational platform, facilitating battlespace management by providing access to shared data and services for command decisions across space forces. This integration supports wide-ranging functions, including space domain awareness and defensive operations, through a commercially supported architecture that enables real-time coordination without relying on outdated silos. However, the program's progress has been hampered by developmental delays stemming from immature requirements and persistent management issues, as detailed in a June 2023 Government Accountability Office assessment, which recommended enhanced tracking of milestones like the Advanced Tracking and Launch Analysis System to clarify advancement amid setbacks. Core processes within these systems prioritize resilient decision loops with low latency, essential for directing space effects in contested environments, such as synchronizing responses to GPS signal jamming via fortified military codes that resist denial attempts. Satellite protection measures, integrated into C2 workflows, draw from operational exercises demonstrating causal effectiveness, where defensive maneuvers preserved asset functionality against simulated threats. For instance, Space Flag 25-1 in January 2025 tested C2 centers' ability to replicate contested scenarios, validating synchronized effects that mitigated disruptions without broader domain awareness dependencies. Human-machine teaming forms a foundational element, pairing operator judgment with automated analytics to counter adversary AI-driven threats, ensuring decisions remain adaptive rather than overly reliant on unproven autonomous capabilities. This approach accelerates processing in high-stakes scenarios, as evidenced by doctrinal frameworks emphasizing hybrid teams for space superiority, where human oversight prevents errors in dynamic threat responses. Such integration avoids overhyping nascent technologies, focusing instead on verifiable enhancements to operational tempo derived from exercise outcomes and system prototypes.

International Cooperation

Multinational Partnerships

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) coordinates multinational space efforts under U.S. leadership through the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, launched in 2014 by the Five Eyes intelligence partners—, , , the , and the —to foster , coordination, and in space domain awareness and operations. The initiative formalized a multinational statement on April 10, 2019, emphasizing enhanced sharing of space situational awareness (SSA) data among participants to support collective space activities and mitigate risks. Expansion followed, with and joining as full members in February 2020, followed by , , and by late 2023, and further growth to approximately 18 partner nations by mid-2025, including select allies. These partnerships yield empirical benefits in through and joint characterization efforts, such as the Phantom Echoes experiment series focused on objects, enabling improved collective tracking of over 27,000 orbital objects and reducing collision risks for allied assets. U.S. Space Command shares data with up to 33 international partners via CSpO mechanisms, optimizing resource use and enhancing resilience against domain threats without sole reliance on unilateral U.S. sensors. However, allied contributions remain supplementary, as partner nations operate fewer dedicated sensors and platforms compared to the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, which integrates dozens of global radars, optical telescopes, and data feeds for comprehensive cataloging. Integration challenges persist due to technical incompatibilities, restrictions, and overclassification, which limit the incorporation of allied data into U.S. systems and hinder seamless . reviews highlight how overlapping organizational roles and personnel shortages further impede effective , potentially amplifying U.S. resource burdens in scenarios of asymmetric dependence. While CSpO promotes consensus-driven synchronization, these structural disparities underscore causal constraints on mutual gains, with the U.S. maintaining operational primacy amid partners' scaled-down investments in space infrastructure.

Joint Exercises and Interoperability

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) contributes to multinational joint exercises designed to validate integrated in contested space domains. The Schriever Wargame series, organized by the U.S. Space Force's Space Training and Readiness Command, routinely incorporates CSpOC personnel to simulate coalition responses to adversary actions, such as disruptions modeled on Russian capabilities and attacks reflecting Chinese threats. For instance, Schriever Wargame 2025, held August 10–21 at , , engaged over 350 participants from the and nine partner nations in scenarios assessing multi-domain strategies across conflict spectra, with a focus on advancing shared operational concepts. Outcomes from these exercises have driven procedural and enhanced responsiveness. In 2022, CSpOC conducted its first multinational mission analysis with representatives from seven partner countries, aligning mission essential tasks and refining collaborative processes to support theater and global objectives. Schriever iterations have similarly identified gaps, informing U.S. requirements for resilient networks and joint frameworks, as evidenced by post-exercise evaluations emphasizing in jammed environments. Despite these gains, analyses of space wargames reveal limitations in replicating full-spectrum threats, particularly kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) engagements central to and operational doctrines. Reports from recent simulations underscore that while non-kinetic threats like receive extensive testing, co-orbital ASAT scenarios—capable of generating persistent fields—often warrant expanded emphasis to better prepare for -mitigated strategies. This selective focus may stem from international norms discouraging , yet it risks underpreparing forces for adversary-normalized kinetic risks observed in events like Russia's 2021 ASAT demonstration.

Achievements and Criticisms

Major Accomplishments

The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) demonstrated effective coordination in mitigating risks from the direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) test on November 15, 2021, which produced more than 1,500 trackable debris pieces threatening satellites in . Operating under U.S. Space Command, CSpOC facilitated real-time , trajectory tracking, and conjunction assessments, enabling protective maneuvers for U.S. and allied assets without reported collisions in the immediate aftermath. This response underscored CSpOC's role in operational resilience against debris-generating events, with continuous monitoring shared across partners to minimize long-term orbital hazards. CSpOC advanced resilient space architectures through integration with U.S. initiatives following the service's 2019 establishment and the National Space , which prioritized proliferated, disaggregated constellations and cyber-hardened command systems to counter adversarial threats. These efforts enhanced CSpOC's capacity for distributed operations, including deployment supporting joint forces in contested domains, with over 100,000 active communications users connected and capabilities extended to 10 nations by 2024. Such developments fortified deterrence postures by ensuring uninterrupted space support to warfighters, aligning with directives for affordable, survivable architectures amid rising counterspace risks from actors like and . Training enhancements under CSpOC's 55th Combat Training Squadron have improved operator proficiency, including the 2021 establishment of a library and processes that boosted readiness for space surveillance and tasks. In the 2023 BLACK SKIES exercise—the largest joint event to date—CSpOC successfully integrated across multi-service, distributed units, validating in simulated contested scenarios. By 2025, multinational training integrations, such as Navy officers completing U.S. space weapons courses, have further elevated combined readiness metrics for allied personnel.

Identified Shortcomings and Reforms

The U.S. identified significant deficiencies in the program in 2019, noting the absence of a comprehensive , which contributed to risks in delivering unified capabilities for space operations. This lack of exacerbated challenges in integrating complex requirements deferred from prior programs, hindering timely development of operational systems. By 2023, reported persistent delays in key Space deliverables, attributing them to ongoing management shortcomings and inadequate tracking metrics, despite program adjustments, resulting in prolonged gaps in unified command capabilities essential for the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC). Legacy frameworks inherited from Space Command have proven inadequate for contested space environments, as they rely on pre-counterspace assumptions that fail to address tactical threats like or kinetic attacks, leading to empirical deficiencies in operator training for dynamic scenarios. Analyses indicate these structures prioritize uncontested mission assurance over resilient operations, creating vulnerabilities in CSpOC's domain awareness and integration during adversarial conditions. Current architectures, optimized for benign settings, inefficiently support rapid decision-making in contested domains, amplifying risks to multinational space coordination. In response, the U.S. revised its on September 6, 2023, to "secure our Nation's interests in, from, and to ," emphasizing warfighting priorities such as superiority and over ambiguous stewardship roles, aiming to realign CSpOC operations toward deterrence and resilience in contested environments. This doctrinal shift seeks to address acquisition and training shortfalls by focusing resources on capabilities that enable proactive defense, though implementation requires sustained oversight to mitigate historical delays.

Future Developments

Modernization Initiatives

The U.S. Space Force has prioritized investments in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to enable predictive analytics and automated threat response in space operations, directly supporting centers like the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) amid increasing domain congestion and competition. These efforts stem from fiscal year 2023-2025 budgets that allocate resources for digital fluency and AI integration across Guardians' workflows, emphasizing tools for real-time data processing and decision acceleration. The FY2025 Data and AI Strategic Action Plan specifies actionable steps toward AI-driven operations, including emphasis on ML for modeling and simulation modernization to maintain edges in contested environments. Such capabilities address technical gaps in manual processing, where legacy systems struggle with the volume of orbital data exceeding human throughput limits. Parallel upgrades involve shifting to cloud-based architectures to enhance scalability and integration in CSpOC-linked systems, responding to Government Accountability Office (GAO) findings on federal cloud adoption challenges like acquisition inefficiencies and oversight gaps. The Department of Defense's Cloud Smart strategy, influencing Space Force implementations, promotes hybrid cloud models for resilient, elastic computing that supports distributed space command without single-point failures. GAO reports highlight that agencies adopting leading private-sector practices—such as modular procurement and continuous monitoring—achieve better cost controls and agility, principles applied to space architectures to handle surging data from proliferated satellites. This transition mitigates risks from on-premises limitations, enabling seamless scaling for multinational data fusion as identified in broader DoD evaluations. Validation of these modernizations occurred through empirical testing in 2025 exercises, particularly Resolute Space 25, the Space Force's largest service-wide drill involving over 700 personnel worldwide. Conducted from to August 2025, the exercise simulated contested scenarios with integrated cyber, , and orbital threats to assess system resilience and automated responses. Aggressor units replicated peer-level disruptions, forcing validation of AI-enhanced analytics and cloud-distributed controls under duress, confirming technical viability for peer competition without reliance on unproven assumptions. Outcomes underscored necessities like edge autonomy to counter electronic jamming and cyber intrusions, with post-exercise analyses informing iterative refinements to CSpOC protocols.

Responses to Emerging Threats

In response to China's deployment of large-scale satellite constellations in during the 2020s, intended for enhanced , , and maneuverability capabilities that enable potential "dogfights" , the Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) has prioritized strategies emphasizing proliferated and attritable architectures to maintain domain access. These architectures involve deploying numerous small, inexpensive satellites that can withstand from anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks without catastrophic loss of overall capability, as single-point failures in traditional high-value assets prove vulnerable to kinetic or non-kinetic denial tactics. CSpOC integrates these into multinational operations to provide resilient and support joint forces against China's "kill web" of integrated counterspace systems. Russia's development of nuclear-armed ASAT systems, confirmed in U.S. assessments as of February 2024, poses a high-altitude threat that could indiscriminately disable satellites across orbits, prompting CSpOC to adapt through hardened, distributed networks that mitigate widespread disruption. These adaptations reject reliance on regimes, which U.S. analyses argue have failed to constrain adversarial advances while limiting Western offensive options, thereby undermining deterrence by signaling restraint amid verifiable cheating and capability buildup. Policy evolution within U.S. Space Command, overseeing CSpOC, has shifted toward explicit offensive space capabilities for denial strategies, enabling preemptive disruption of adversary ASAT platforms to restore domain superiority in contested scenarios. To counter tactics blending cyber, electronic, and kinetic domain denial, CSpOC incorporates mega-constellations modeled on , which by mid-2025 comprised over 3,000 satellites offering proliferated coverage for resilient communications. These integrations, via contracts like the Space Force's Proliferated program, provide dynamic rerouting and redundancy against targeted outages, with vulnerability mitigations including that distributes data loads across thousands of nodes, reducing single-satellite failure impacts by up to 90% in simulated attacks per modeling. Such architectures enhance CSpOC's , allowing seamless blending of military and assets for sustained operations amid adversary escalation.

References

  1. [1]
    Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC)
    The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), based at Vandenberg Space Force Base, Calif., reports to the Combined Force Space Component Command (CFSCC)
  2. [2]
    Combined Space Operations Center / Space Delta 5
    The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), Delta staff augmented U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine space personnel, along with exchange officers from ...
  3. [3]
    [PDF] Combined Space Operations Center / Space Delta 5 Fact Sheet
    It operates 24 hours a day, seven days a week; continuously coordinating, planning, integrating, synchronizing and executing space operations; providing ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] U.S. Strategic Command Fact Sheet Combined Space Operations ...
    The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC), reports to the Joint Force Space Component. Commander (JFSCC) and executes the operational command and control of ...
  5. [5]
    Combined Space Operations Center established at Vandenberg AFB
    Jul 19, 2018 · It is designed to improve coordination between the U.S., its allies, and commercial and civil partners for defensive space efforts. It will ...Missing: functions | Show results with:functions
  6. [6]
    [PDF] Combined Space Operations Center / Space Delta 5 Fact Sheet
    The CSpOC is co-located with the 18th Space Control Squadron, a tactical unit within the Space Delta 2, which delivers foundation space situational awareness to ...
  7. [7]
    [PDF] Risks from Orbital Debris and Space Situational Awareness
    • Space situational awareness (SSA) and risks from small debris. Orbital ... • The U.S. Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) tracks. ~23,000 large ...
  8. [8]
    CSpOC - Combined Space Operations Center
    Combined Space Operations Center / Space Delta 5. MISSION. EXECUTE OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL OF SPACE FORCES TO ACHIEVE THEATER AND GLOBAL OBJECTIVES.
  9. [9]
    U.S. Space Force Primer - CSIS Aerospace Security
    Dec 22, 2022 · Mission: The CSpOC is the 24/7 operations center where “operational command and control of space forces [is executed] to achieve theater and ...
  10. [10]
    Multinational Statement for Combined Space Operations
    Apr 10, 2019 · ... Combined Space Operations Center and the other national Space Operations Centers. We recognize tangible advances in space cooperation and ...
  11. [11]
    [PDF] Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic ...
    Dec 18, 2024 · details regarding ASAT or counterspace functions during wartime as new capabilities are fielded. Counterspace actions are intended to deny ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] Commercial Integration Strategy - U.S. Space Command
    Mar 25, 2025 · USSPACECOM will operationalize commercial capabilities for subordinate units through deliberate planning, data sharing agreements, and joint and.
  13. [13]
    The future of security in space: A thirty-year US strategy
    Apr 11, 2021 · This visionary Atlantic Council Strategy Paper calls for the US and its allies and partners to secure space over the next three decades.
  14. [14]
    S4S, CSpOC discuss C2 operations, recognize 'Outstanding ...
    Space Delta 5 commander and CSpOC director, US Space Force Col. Justin E. Sorice, honored the following individuals who were recognized as 'Outstanding ...
  15. [15]
    CFSCC Spotlight: CSpOC Specialist represents Guardian Ideal
    Dec 15, 2021 · The CSpOC reports to the Combined Force Space Component Command (CFSCC) and executes operational command and control of space forces ...Missing: structure | Show results with:structure
  16. [16]
    CSpOC and 614th AOC Change of Command, Space Delta 5 ...
    May 26, 2022 · She is responsible for coordinating, planning, integrating, synchronizing and executing space operations; providing tailored space effects on ...
  17. [17]
    CFSCC Spotlight: 55th Combat Training Squadron ensures space ...
    Feb 3, 2022 · Monique DeLauter, commander of Space Delta 5 and CSpOC director. “Our mission set of providing dependable space support to combatant commanders ...
  18. [18]
    Spotlight: USAF Reserve associate unit integrated with Combined ...
    Jul 19, 2021 · The 9th Combat Operations Squadron is the only Reserve Associate unit that integrates with Space Delta 5 and conducts day-to-day and contingency operations.Missing: key | Show results with:key
  19. [19]
    Space Command and Control: Improved Tracking and Reporting ...
    The Space C2 program is making changes to address persistent management challenges, but it is too soon to tell if changes will lead to improvement.Missing: gaps | Show results with:gaps
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Space Command and Control System (Space C2)
    Space C2 uses a common platform for command and control, enabling battle management, space awareness, and defense, and is used by USSF Guardians.
  21. [21]
    https://www.af.mil/News/
  22. [22]
    [PDF] Space Situational Awareness in the Joint Space Operations Center ...
    The Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) requires highly responsive SSA capabilities that rapidly detect, track and characterize objects in space.Missing: origins | Show results with:origins
  23. [23]
    Space Situational Awareness | Prof. Marcus J. Holzinger
    The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) operates the Space Surveillance Network (SSN) and currently tracks 17,000 objects ...
  24. [24]
    Saltzman: China's ASAT Test Was 'Pivot Point' in Space Operations
    Jan 13, 2023 · China's destruction of one of its own weather satellites by means of a modified ballistic missile created the largest-ever debris field in space.
  25. [25]
    [PDF] Analysis of the 2007 Chinese ASAT Test and the Impact of its Debris ...
    Jan 11, 2007 · The test produced at least 2,087 pieces of debris large enough to be routinely tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network and the NASA Orbital ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] The Characteristics and Consequences of the Break-up of
    The intentional break-up of the Fengyun-1C spacecraft on 11 January 2007 via hypervelocity collision with a ballistic object created the most severe artificial ...
  27. [27]
    [PDF] Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS)
    The JMS was established to provide JFCC SPACE with the capabilities to effectively employ forces in this challenging domain. Page 2. Today, the JSpOC uses 48 ...
  28. [28]
    NATO Space Operations
    ... established a variety of sub-unified and functional component commands. In May 2005, the Space AOC was redesignated as the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) ...
  29. [29]
    Joint Space Operations Center Changes Name to Combined Space ...
    Jul 20, 2018 · Gen. John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, has been directing the transition since 2017 in aims to support coordination between ...
  30. [30]
    Combined Force Space Component Command established at ...
    ... Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) at Vandenberg AFB, Calif.; Missile ... communications, missile warning, nuclear detonation detection ...
  31. [31]
    [PDF] United States Space Force Chronology 2019 - 2024
    Dec 19, 2024 · The mission of the new service was to “provide resilient and affordable space capabilities for the Joint Force and the nation.” The president's ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] GAO-20-146, Space Command and Control - DTIC
    Oct 30, 2019 · The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend more than $65 billion from fiscal years 2019 to 2023 to acquire space systems that provide.
  33. [33]
    [PDF] GAO-23-105920, SPACE COMMAND AND CONTROL: Improved ...
    Jun 8, 2023 · The Space C2 program, intended to improve space command and control, faces persistent delays and unclear reporting, despite the 2022 report ...
  34. [34]
    GAO Report on Military Space Command and Control - USNI News
    Jun 14, 2023 · With its persistent delays in delivering key capabilities, improved tracking and consistent metrics would help demonstrate the extent to which ...
  35. [35]
    Space Command and Control: Opportunities Exist to Enhance ... - GAO
    Dec 22, 2021 · The Air Force's 2020 and 2021 Space C2 annual reports on program status addressed all eight of the required reporting elements outlined in statute.
  36. [36]
    Space Operations Command Getting New Name, New Boss
    Sep 5, 2025 · A Space Force spokesperson confirmed that Combat Forces Command is the planned new name for Space Operations Command. The formal name change ...
  37. [37]
    On a day of rebranding at the Pentagon, this name change slipped ...
    Sep 8, 2025 · A Space Force spokesperson said Space Operations Command would be designated Combat Forces Command “upon the establishment of a new ...
  38. [38]
    USSPACECOM expands key allied space partnerships through ...
    Dec 27, 2019 · ... United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, operate together at the Combined Space Operations Center. Additional nations ...
  39. [39]
    Our Capabilities - U.S. Space Force
    Dec 8, 2022 · The Space Surveillance Network (SSN) is a collection of radar and optical sensors used to detect and track man-made objects orbiting the Earth ...
  40. [40]
    [PDF] S USSF ALMANAC 2025 SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS
    Jun 20, 2025 · The AN/. FPS‐85 can detect, track, and identify up to 200 satellites simultaneously and provides 120-degree azimuth of coverage. Generating a ...Missing: CSpOC picture
  41. [41]
    Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance
    The Ground-Based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) System plays a vital role in tracking deep space objects. More than 2500 objects, ...
  42. [42]
    Space Based Space Surveillance - Space Force
    SBSS collects data on orbiting objects, predicts collision risks, and uses a visible sensor with a gimbal for quick target changes.
  43. [43]
    [PDF] GAO-23-105565, SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: DOD ...
    Apr 24, 2023 · 18th Space Defense Squadron: Conducts daily SSA operations by tracking and monitoring objects in space, predicting potential collisions, and ...
  44. [44]
    [PDF] Orbital Debris - NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)
    Apr 2, 2009 · These observations confirmed a large number of small debris from both spacecraft. The collision of Iridium 33 and Cosmos. 2251 occurred in a ...
  45. [45]
    [PDF] The collision between the Iridium satellite and the defunct Cosmos ...
    Feb 26, 2009 · The collision will produce space debris ranging in size from large pieces to dust particles. How much debris was created is not yet known ...
  46. [46]
    U.S. military space tracking systems strain under new threats
    a critical capability they say is falling ...
  47. [47]
    [PDF] Commercial Integration Cell Fact Sheet
    MISSION. The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) Commercial Integration Cell (CIC) enables operational and technology exchange between operators at the ...
  48. [48]
    [PDF] Space Command and Control System (Space C2) - DOT&E
    The Space Command and Control (Space C2) program continues to progress toward delivery of capabilities that will allow for the retirement of aging Space ...
  49. [49]
    [PDF] GPS MODERNIZATION Space Force Should Reassess ...
    Jun 5, 2023 · M-code will help military users overcome attempts to block the GPS signal, known as jamming, by using a more powerful signal with a broader ...
  50. [50]
    Operational C2 Centers take Center Stage in Space Flag 25-1
    Jan 6, 2025 · The C2 centers were able to provide a more accurate representation of the operational environment, allowing exercise participants to test their ...
  51. [51]
    Operational C2 Centers take Center Stage in Space Flag 25-1
    Jan 6, 2025 · The US Space Force's premier space exercise, Space Flag 25-1, marked a significant milestone in the evolution of the exercise with the participation of ...<|separator|>
  52. [52]
    Accelerating Decision-Making Through Human-Machine Teaming
    Jun 28, 2024 · This paper first explores several human-machine teaming frameworks, then advocates for their incorporation into existing doctrinal authorities.
  53. [53]
    [PDF] HOW HYBRID HUMAN-AI TEAMS GAIN THE ADVANTAGE IN ...
    May 31, 2024 · Both sources speak to how AI can enhance space operations across common mission requirements across civilian or military applications. Emphasis ...
  54. [54]
    Space Systems Command Advances Space C2 Dominance ...
    May 16, 2025 · The Space C2 Data Platform harnesses the power of data to enable military leaders to make decisions more quickly, efficiently and with greater confidence.
  55. [55]
    Combined Space Operations initiative welcomes France and Germany
    Feb 13, 2020 · France and Germany decisions to formally become members of CSpO alongside Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States
  56. [56]
    U.S. Leads Allies, Partners as Space Cooperation Expands
    May 23, 2025 · U.S. Space Force Gen. Stephen Whiting, Space Command commander, said the initiative now boasts 18 partner nations, “who all work together to ...
  57. [57]
    NATO Allies enhance Space coordination and capabilities
    Dec 11, 2023 · During the Combined Space Operations Initiative (CSpO) conference hosted by Germany, new participants Italy, Norway and Japan were welcomed.
  58. [58]
    Phantom Echoes | Space Systems Engineering Laboratory
    PHANTOM ECHOES is the current Combined Space Operations (CSpO) 5-Eyes (FVEYs) Space Situational Awareness (SSA) experiment, focusing on Geostationary (GEO) ...
  59. [59]
    Should the US Go It Alone in Space? - Global Security Review
    Sep 23, 2025 · The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits ...<|separator|>
  60. [60]
    Space Order of Battle: Beyond Domain Awareness
    Jul 26, 2024 · A more contested space domain calls for better-prepared Guardians and faster responses to dangers in space. The U.S. has been the dominant ...
  61. [61]
    [PDF] better leveraging international capabilities for Space Domain ...
    The United States has found it difficult to incorporate space domain awareness (SDA) data from allies and partners due to both technical and policy obstacles.
  62. [62]
    Allies struggle to work with US military in space operations, GAO finds
    Jul 10, 2025 · Many of them do something space-related, but they aren't well integrated, resulting in duplication and siloed efforts. ... joint exercises.
  63. [63]
    [PDF] DOD Is Pursuing Efforts to Collaborate with Allies and Partners but ...
    Jul 8, 2025 · The Department of Defense (DOD) uses various mechanisms and agreements to collaborate with allies and partners on space operations and other ...
  64. [64]
    Maj. Christopher Nelson, Combined Space Operations Center - DVIDS
    Apr 24, 2025 · Maj. Christopher Nelson, Combined Space Operations Center, participates in the Chalkydri 1 wargame as part of the Blue Cell – CSpOC team at Schriever Space ...
  65. [65]
    U.S. Space Force holds war game to test satellite network under attack
    Dec 13, 2021 · The United States is testing satellite resiliency to threats from China and Russia miles above the earth's surface, just weeks after Russia ...
  66. [66]
    Schriever Wargame 2025 to explore future space strategy ...
    Aug 11, 2025 · The U.S. Space Force is hosting the Schriever Wargame Capstone 2025 at Maxwell AFB, bringing together more than 350 participants from the ...
  67. [67]
    Schriever Wargame 2025 Strengthens International Partnerships ...
    Aug 25, 2025 · Schriever Wargame 2025 is a tabletop event where nations test strategies, evaluate technologies, and strengthen cooperation in space, with over ...Missing: CSpOC improvements
  68. [68]
    CSpOC conducts mission analysis with coalition partners
    Nov 15, 2022 · The Combined Space Operations Center (CSpOC) conducted a mission analysis with representatives from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the United ...
  69. [69]
    [PDF] High Frontier, The Journal for Space & Missile Professionals ... - DTIC
    wargames, the Schriever Wargame has helped identify areas of improvement in our national space community to significant- ly bolster America's national ...
  70. [70]
    Space Force wargame could inform framework for allied info sharing
    Aug 7, 2025 · Events like the Schriever Wargames and Global Sentinel, pictured here, are intended to improve collaboration between the U.S. and its allies.
  71. [71]
    Two recent wargames hold timely lessons for space resilience
    Apr 7, 2023 · ... ASAT threats. Ultimately, the report found that a key variable likely to affect the makeup, usability, and impact of the PLA's ASAT ...
  72. [72]
    Focused on the Threat: Kinetic Energy Weapons (Part 4 of 6)
    Sep 23, 2024 · Focused on the Threat: Kinetic Energy Weapons (Part 4 of 6) ... El Segundo, CA -- In today's congested and contested space domain, space threats ...
  73. [73]
    Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test creates significant ...
    Nov 15, 2021 · “The debris created by Russia's DA-ASAT will continue to pose a threat to activities in outer space for years to come, putting satellites and ...
  74. [74]
    U.S. Response to Russian Anti-Satellite Test
    U.S. Space Command continues to monitor the trajectory of the debris and will work to ensure all space-faring nations have the information necessary to ...
  75. [75]
    [PDF] National Space Policy of the United States of America
    Dec 9, 2020 · Increase the quality of life for all humanity through the cultivation, maturation, and development of space-enabled scientific and economic ...
  76. [76]
    In Fifth Year, Space Force Commander Details Service's Stellar ...
    Dec 17, 2024 · "We've connected over 100,000 active [satellite communications] users; we've deployed electronic warfare capabilities to 10 nations for a ...Missing: major | Show results with:major
  77. [77]
    USSF Conducts LargestEver Joint Space Warfare Exercise
    Oct 5, 2023 · BLACK SKIES 23-3 was also an opportunity for the CSpOC to integrate command and control of multiple distributed, multi-service units in open ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  78. [78]
    NSDC member is first Navy officer to attend USAF Weapons ...
    Jun 23, 2025 · Students undergo five to six months of rigorous training before becoming weapons officers—experts in tactical and operational space integration.
  79. [79]
    GAO-20-146 - Government Accountability Office
    Oct 30, 2019 · GAO is making two recommendations, including that DOD should ensure the Air Force develops a comprehensive acquisition strategy for the Space C2 ...
  80. [80]
    GAO Says Critical Space C2 Effort At Risk - Breaking Defense
    Nov 1, 2019 · GAO finds that the Space C2 program "is planning to meet previously deferred requirements that proved too complex for prior programs to ...
  81. [81]
    [PDF] The Gaps in Tactical Space Operations - Air University
    These problems exist because current AFSPC training and opera- tions frameworks are founded in past, pre-CDO space assumptions not sufficient for today's space ...
  82. [82]
    Getting Space Acquisition Right - RAND
    Jan 30, 2024 · However, these traditional mission assurance objectives are inadequate for ensuring mission success in a contested space environment because ...
  83. [83]
    Space Force announces new mission statement
    Sep 6, 2023 · The Space Force has announced its new mission statement - “secure our Nation's interests in, from, and to space.”
  84. [84]
    Space Force publishes 2025 Data, AI strategic action plan
    Mar 19, 2025 · The US Space Force published its Data and Artificial Intelligence FY 2025 Strategic Action Plan providing a clear, actionable path toward becoming a more data- ...Missing: CSpOC 2023-2025
  85. [85]
    [PDF] DATA & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FY 2025 STRATEGIC ACTION ...
    The USSF recognized the need for digital fluency within the Guardian workforce, and based on the latest national guidance, the Space Force needs to emphasize AI ...Missing: ML CSpOC 2023-2025
  86. [86]
    Space Force Combining AI, Autonomy To Multiply Capability at the ...
    Space is growing increasingly congested, and the Space Force is looking to disruptive technologies such as artificial ...Missing: ML CSpOC
  87. [87]
    Cloud Smart - Federal Cloud Computing Strategy - CIO Council
    The new strategy is founded on three key pillars of successful cloud adoption: security, procurement, and workforce.
  88. [88]
    Cloud Computing: Private Sector Leading Practices in Acquisition ...
    Mar 24, 2025 · Eighteen private sector companies surveyed by GAO reported using the majority of 19 leading practices across three management areas—acquisition, ...Missing: CSpOC architecture
  89. [89]
    [PDF] GAO-19-58, CLOUD COMPUTING: Agencies Have Increased ...
    Apr 4, 2019 · 24 This proposed Cloud Smart policy outlines a strategy for agencies to adopt cloud solutions that streamline transformation and embrace modern ...Missing: CSpOC | Show results with:CSpOC
  90. [90]
    Large-scale US Space Force exercise tests, validates 'allied by design'
    Aug 6, 2025 · Resolute Space 2025 is the U.S. Space Force's largest service-wide exercise, executed as part of the broader Department-Level Exercise series ...Missing: cyber CSpOC
  91. [91]
    Space Force training for on-orbit warfare in inaugural Resolute ...
    Jul 16, 2025 · Over 700 Space Force guardians are participating in Resolute Space 2025, where they conduct orbital warfare, electromagnetic warfare, cyber ...Missing: resilience CSpOC
  92. [92]
    RESOLUTE SPACE 25: Space Force aggressors aim to stress, test ...
    Aug 1, 2025 · Aggressors are responsible for creating a realistic, threat-informed environment pitted against operational forces in cyber, orbital and ...Missing: CSpOC | Show results with:CSpOC
  93. [93]
    US Space Force Warns Of Chinese Satellite 'Dogfights' In Space
    Mar 26, 2025 · The People's Republic of China (PRC) is working on improving its space maneuverability skills with its satellites to the point of “dogfighting in space”.
  94. [94]
    [PDF] Chinese Military Views of Low Earth Orbit - RAND
    PLA responses to new U.S. capabilities in space are driven by perceived threats to the PLA's ability to conduct operations, fear of falling behind in U.S.-China ...
  95. [95]
    The U.S.-China Military Balance in Space - MIT Press Direct
    May 1, 2025 · This article develops a framework to assess the US-China military balance in space and applies that framework to a Taiwan scenario.
  96. [96]
    Space Threat Fact Sheet
    Russia is developing an ASAT capability using a satellite designed to carry a nuclear weapon. Such a capability could threaten all satellites and the vital ...
  97. [97]
    US space chief warns of emerging threats from China and Russia
    May 15, 2025 · Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, speaking at the POLITICO Security Summit, said China's “kill web” is the biggest threat in US adversaries' growing space capabilities.
  98. [98]
    Averting 'Day Zero': Preventing a Space Arms Race - Nuclear Network
    Aug 6, 2025 · On Feb 13, 2024, the House Intelligence Committee publicly released intelligence which confirmed that Russia is developing nuclear ASAT weapons ...
  99. [99]
    How the US can counter Russian and Chinese nuclear threats in ...
    Oct 28, 2024 · How the US can counter Russian and Chinese nuclear threats in space ... satellites supporting NC3 address high-altitude nuclear detonation threats ...
  100. [100]
    Space Denial: A Deterrence Strategy - NDU Press
    Oct 30, 2023 · Space-based capabilities offer support in areas such as missile warning; nuclear detection warning; secure communications; intelligence- ...
  101. [101]
    A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture
    Oct 16, 2025 · Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required. Insufficient yet required ...
  102. [102]
    [PDF] Space Deterrence: The Delicate Balance of Risk
    United States in nuclear arms, deterrence from the point of view of US policy makers shifted from a reliance on retaliation alone, to an interplay of ...
  103. [103]
    https://www.facebook.com/L3HarrisTechnologies/posts/from-traditional-military-constellations-to-emerging-commercial-space-internet-n/1245133697651836/
  104. [104]
    Space Force is contracting with SpaceX for new, secretive MILNET ...
    Jun 18, 2025 · The Space Force also has contracts with SpaceX for use of Starshield terminals to link to Starlink under its Proliferated Low Earth Orbit ...
  105. [105]
    As Military SATCOM Grows, Rivals Vie to Cut SpaceX Market
    Apr 18, 2025 · In the Space Force's push to embrace commercial SATCOM capabilities, it faces questions about competition and accessibility.
  106. [106]
    Why the United States Should Not Fear a Space Pearl Harbor | RAND
    Jul 28, 2025 · Integrating commercial space providers can strengthen resiliency by adding capacity and access to commercial proliferated constellations like ...<|separator|>