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HAVAL

Haval (stylized as HAVAL) is a Chinese automotive marque owned by Great Wall Motor (GWM), specializing in premium sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and crossover utility vehicles (CUVs).^[1] Launched in March 2013 as a dedicated SUV brand, Haval focuses on innovative design, advanced technology, and global market expansion, positioning itself as a leader in the SUV segment.^[2] The brand draws from GWM's expertise in vehicle manufacturing, emphasizing safety, performance, and customer-oriented services.^[3] Haval's origins trace back to GWM's earlier SUV efforts, including the Hover series introduced in the mid-2000s, but the brand was established independently in 2013 to concentrate exclusively on high-quality SUVs.^[1] The inaugural Haval model, the H6, debuted in 2011 under GWM before fully aligning with the new brand, quickly gaining traction for its competitive pricing around 100,000 yuan and robust features.^[4] Subsequent models like the Jolion, Dargo, and H6 variants expanded the lineup, incorporating hybrid and plug-in hybrid powertrains to meet evolving demands for efficiency and electrification.^[5] As China's top-selling SUV brand for 16 consecutive years, Haval achieved 706,234 global sales in 2024, reflecting a 27.21% year-over-year increase, with the H6 remaining a flagship bestseller.^[2]^[5] The brand has expanded to over 60 countries across Asia, Europe, Australia, Latin America, and the Middle East, supported by a cumulative RMB 100 billion R&D investment plan through 2025 and a dedicated technical center spanning 260,000 square meters.^[2]^[6] Recent developments include the 2025 Haval H6 facelift with enhanced infotainment and hybrid options, underscoring Haval's commitment to technological advancement and sustainable mobility.^[7]

Overview

Definition and Purpose

HAVAL is a cryptographic one-way hashing algorithm designed to produce message digests for security applications, including digital signatures, message authentication codes, and password storage.^[8] Developed by Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, and Jennifer Seberry, it was proposed in 1992 to address the need for efficient and secure hashing in cryptographic protocols.^[8] The core purpose of HAVAL is to map input messages of arbitrary length to a fixed-size output hash value, rendering it computationally infeasible to reverse the process or find collisions, thereby ensuring data integrity and authenticity.^[8] It emphasizes key hash function properties such as one-wayness (preimage resistance, where recovering the original message from the hash is infeasible), collision resistance (difficulty in finding two distinct inputs producing the same output), and the avalanche effect (a small change in the input leads to a significant change in the output).^[8]^[9] HAVAL supports variable output lengths of 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits, allowing flexibility in balancing security and performance.^[8] In historical context, HAVAL was introduced as an enhancement over earlier hash functions like MD4 and MD5, offering comparable or superior speed on 32-bit processors while aiming for stronger security margins against brute-force attacks, where finding collisions is estimated to require approximately 2^(n/2) operations for an n-bit output.^[8] This design positioned it as a versatile alternative for emerging cryptographic needs in the early 1990s.^[8]

Key Features

HAVAL distinguishes itself through its support for variable-length outputs, allowing the production of hash values ranging from 128 to 256 bits in 32-bit increments, which enables users to select digest sizes tailored to specific security requirements.^[8] This flexibility contrasts with many contemporary hash functions that offered fixed output lengths, providing a customizable balance between computational efficiency and collision resistance.^[10] A key parameter of HAVAL is the adjustable number of processing passes—3, 4, or 5—applied to each message block, permitting trade-offs between processing speed and security strength. With fewer passes, the algorithm executes more rapidly, as demonstrated by benchmarks showing it to be approximately 60% faster than MD5 in the 3-pass mode, while the 5-pass variant offers heightened diffusion at comparable speeds to MD5.^[8] This tunability allows implementers to adapt the function for environments where performance constraints vary. HAVAL processes input messages in 1024-bit blocks within a Merkle-Damgård construction, augmented by multiple passes to promote avalanche effects and enhanced bit diffusion across the output.^[11] The algorithm maintains a 256-bit internal state, represented as eight 32-bit words, which serves as the chaining variable updated iteratively during compression.^[8] This state size supports robust mixing while keeping the core operations efficient on 32-bit architectures prevalent in the early 1990s. The name HAVAL derives from "HAsh of VAriable Length," underscoring its core innovation in producing adaptable hash sizes without compromising the one-way properties essential to cryptographic hashing.^[10]

History and Development

Origins

HAVAL was developed in 1991–1992 by Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, and Jennifer Seberry at the University of Wollongong in Australia.^[12]^[8] The project originated within the university's cryptography research group, focusing on advancing one-way hash function designs amid growing concerns over emerging vulnerabilities in earlier algorithms.^[13] The primary motivations for creating HAVAL stemmed from identified weaknesses in MD4, such as its limited number of rounds that failed to provide adequate resistance against differential cryptanalysis, and the need for greater flexibility compared to MD5, which offered fixed output lengths and processing rounds.^[12] The designers sought to address these shortcomings by crafting a hash function that enhanced diffusion—ensuring small input changes propagate widely through the output—and confusion—obscuring the relationship between input and output—beyond the MD family, while incorporating user-configurable parameters for output length and processing passes to allow tunable security levels.^[13]^[12] Initial design goals emphasized efficiency on 32-bit processors, with HAVAL processing messages in 1024-bit blocks using an 8-word state buffer and highly non-linear Boolean functions involving seven variables per step to bolster cryptographic strength.^[8]^[12] Before its public presentation at AUSCRYPT '92, the team conducted extensive internal evaluations, including tests for collision resistance and performance benchmarks against MD5, confirming HAVAL's conjectured security of approximately $2^{n/2} operations for n-bit outputs under brute-force attacks.^[13] These pre-release assessments validated the algorithm's improvements in flexibility and speed, such as achieving up to 60% faster processing than MD5 in its three-pass mode.^[12]

Publication and Adoption

HAVAL was first introduced in 1992 through an extended abstract presented at the AUSCRYPT '92 conference, titled "HAVAL—A One-Way Hashing Algorithm with Variable Length of Output," authored by Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, and Jennifer Seberry.^[8] The full paper appeared the following year in the proceedings Advances in Cryptology—AUSCRYPT '92, published as part of Springer's Lecture Notes in Computer Science series.^[8] This publication positioned HAVAL as a flexible alternative to existing hash functions like MD5, emphasizing its variable output lengths and configurable rounds to balance speed and security. In the 1990s, HAVAL experienced initial adoption within academic research and select early software tools, where its adaptability appealed to developers exploring variable-length hashing.^[14] However, its uptake remained limited relative to more prominent algorithms such as MD5, introduced in 1991, and SHA-1, published by NIST in 1995.^[14] Additionally, in 2004, researchers demonstrated collisions for the 3-round HAVAL-128 variant with a complexity of about $2^6 operations, severely impacting its security reputation.^[15] The constrained adoption of HAVAL stemmed primarily from the rapid establishment of NIST standards, including the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) family, which received official endorsement and became the de facto choices for cryptographic applications.^[16] Unlike these standardized functions, HAVAL lacked inclusion in major regulatory frameworks like the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), reinforcing its status as a non-standard option unsuitable for government or enterprise compliance.^[16] By 2025, HAVAL sees negligible use in production systems, having been overtaken by robust successors like SHA-256 from the SHA-2 family and SHA-3, which offer superior security margins against known attacks.^[14] Its primary relevance persists in educational contexts for studying early hash designs and in isolated legacy systems where compatibility demands its retention.^[17]

Design Principles

Structure

HAVAL employs the Merkle-Damgård construction, in which a fixed-size compression function iteratively processes the input message in blocks to produce a hash value of variable length.^[8] The algorithm divides the message into 1024-bit blocks after padding, with each block combined with the current internal state to update it through a series of rounds.^[18] The internal state of HAVAL is maintained as a 256-bit value, consisting of eight 32-bit words labeled A through H.^[18] This state is initialized with specific constants before processing begins, and it is updated block by block until the entire message has been consumed.^[9] To prepare the message for processing, HAVAL applies a standard Merkle-Damgård-style padding scheme. This involves appending a single '1' bit, followed by zero or more '0' bits to reach a length that is a multiple of 1024 bits, and finally including a 64-bit big-endian representation of the original message length in bits. The padding ensures the message length is a multiple of the block size while embedding the original length to prevent certain extension attacks.^[9] The high-level flow of HAVAL proceeds as follows: the padded message is split into 1024-bit blocks, and starting from the initial state, each block is fed into the compression function to produce an updated state. After all blocks are processed, a finalization step applies a permutation to the state words, which varies according to the selected number of rounds (3, 4, or 5), before selecting the appropriate number of words to form the output hash. This final transformation distinguishes HAVAL from predecessors like MD4 and MD5 by tying the output permutation directly to the round parameter for added flexibility and security tuning.^[8]

Parameters

HAVAL features two primary configurable parameters: the output length n and the number of rounds r. The output length n can be set to 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits, allowing users to balance security needs with digest size. The final hash value is derived by taking the first n bits of the 256-bit chaining variable after processing the entire message.^[10]^[11] The number of rounds r is selectable as 3, 4, or 5, determining the iterations applied to each 1024-bit message block during compression. Each round consists of 32 steps operating on 32-bit words, with the compression function processing a 1024-bit message block alongside the 256-bit previous chaining value. The block size remains fixed at 1024 bits, and all operations use 32-bit words, optimizing for 32-bit architectures.^[10]^[11] These parameters interact to trade off security and performance. Increasing r enhances resistance to attacks like collisions by adding more processing layers—for instance, 5 rounds provide stronger security than 3—but raises computational cost, with 5-round HAVAL matching MD5 speed while 3-round is about 60% faster. Longer n improves collision resistance proportional to $2^{n/2} effort and preimage resistance proportional to $2^n effort, without altering processing speed. The combination yields 15 security levels, enabling customization for applications requiring varying protection.^[10]^[11]

Algorithm Details

Initialization

The initialization phase of the HAVAL hash function establishes a fixed internal state and preprocesses the input message for block-wise processing. The internal state begins with an initial hash value H_0, consisting of eight 32-bit words derived from the first 256 bits of the hexadecimal representation of the fractional part of \pi (approximately 3.243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A4093822299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89 in hexadecimal). These words are specifically: a_0 = 0x243F6A88, b_0 = 0x85A308D3, c_0 = 0x13198A2E, d_0 = 0x03707344, e_0 = 0xA4093822, f_0 = 0x299F31D0, g_0 = 0x082EFA98, and h_0 = 0xEC4E6C89. This fixed initial vector is independent of the chosen parameters for output length or number of passes, providing a consistent starting point for the compression process.^[9]^[19] Message preprocessing in HAVAL ensures the input is divided into 1024-bit blocks suitable for the compression function. The original message of length L bits (where L < 2^{64}) is first padded by appending a single '1' bit, followed by a sequence of zero bits such that the length of the message plus the '1' bit plus the zero bits is congruent to 944 modulo 1024, leaving exactly 80 bits at the end of the final block for additional metadata. These 80 bits encode: a 3-bit version field (set to 001 for the original specification), a 3-bit pass field indicating the number of rounds (011 for 3 passes, 100 for 4, or 101 for 5), a 10-bit fingerprint length field specifying the desired output size in bits (e.g., 1000000000 for 128 bits), and a 64-bit representation of the original message length L. This scheme not only aligns the message into complete 1024-bit blocks but also embeds the algorithm parameters directly into the padded data, allowing the compression function to adapt without external configuration.^[9]^[20] The fixed nature of H_0 and the self-contained padding distinguish HAVAL's initialization from parameter-dependent setups in other hash functions, ensuring reproducibility while incorporating flexibility through the embedded fields. Processing begins by loading H_0 into the internal registers and feeding the first padded block into the compression function.

Compression Function

The compression function of HAVAL processes each message block to update the running hash value through a series of bitwise transformations and mixing operations. It receives as input a 1024-bit message block M, divided into thirty-two 32-bit words, and the 256-bit previous hash value H, consisting of eight 32-bit words. The internal state is maintained as eight 32-bit words, initialized from H, and updated iteratively over multiple rounds to incorporate the block data.^[8] The function executes r rounds (where r is 3, 4, or 5, as specified in the parameters), with each round comprising 16 operations that mix portions of the state with message words. In each operation, a nonlinear function F_j (where j indexes the function type) is applied to three state words a, b, c, and the result is combined via modular addition (modulo $2^{32}) with a rotated state word and a permuted message word. Left rotations are applied by 5, 11, or 7 bits, varying by round to enhance diffusion, followed by S-box-like permutations on the message word indices to nonlinearly select and reorder the input words for better avalanche effects. The F-functions cycle every 16 steps across the rounds: F_1(a, b, c) = a \oplus b \oplus c, F_2(a, b, c) = \text{[majority](/page/Majority)}(a, b, c) = (a \land b) \lor (a \land c) \lor (b \land c), and F_3(a, b, c) = (a \land b) \lor (\lnot a \land c). These functions provide progressive nonlinearity, starting with simple parity in F_1 and increasing complexity in F_2 and F_3 to resist algebraic attacks.^[8] After completing all r rounds, the state undergoes a final permutation specific to the number of rounds, yielding the transformed output from which the new hash value H' is derived. This design ensures thorough mixing of the input block into the hash state while maintaining computational efficiency through word-level operations.^[8]

Finalization

After the compression of the last message block, the 256-bit internal state in HAVAL undergoes a final permutation P_r, where r denotes the number of rounds (3, 4, or 5), to promote additional bit diffusion across the state.^[9] These permutations—P_3, P_4, and P_5—consist of predefined reorderings of the eight 32-bit words comprising the state, tailored to each round count to maximize mixing and achieve strong avalanche effects without introducing computational overhead.^[9] The resulting permuted state then yields the final hash output: for desired lengths n \leq 256 bits (specifically 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits), the initial n bits of this 256-bit value are selected.^[9] This concluding process safeguards the hash value against vulnerabilities arising from potential observation of the unpermuted internal state, thereby bolstering overall security.^[9]

Variants

Output Lengths

HAVAL supports variable output lengths of 128, 160, 192, 224, or 256 bits, allowing users to select an appropriate digest size based on security requirements and application constraints.^[8] This flexibility distinguishes HAVAL from fixed-length hash functions like MD5, enabling tailored use cases while maintaining a core internal state of 256 bits. The derivation process involves adjusting the final 256-bit state—either by direct use for 256 bits or by combining specific segments of it for shorter lengths—to produce the desired output without altering the core compression mechanism.^[9] Security implications vary significantly with output length, primarily due to the reduced resistance to brute-force attacks and collisions in shorter digests. A 128-bit output offers the weakest protection, with conjectured collision resistance around 2^{64} operations, rendering it vulnerable to modern computational resources in a manner similar to the broken MD5 algorithm.^[8] In contrast, 160-bit and 192-bit outputs provide moderate security (collision resistance of approximately 2^{80} and 2^{96}, respectively), with preimage resistance following the generic 2^n bound. The 224-bit and 256-bit variants deliver stronger safeguards in terms of bit length, with the latter offering theoretical brute-force collision resistance of 2^{128}, comparable to SHA-256; however, due to identified design vulnerabilities and cryptanalytic results, HAVAL is generally not recommended for new high-security applications.^[15] Practical examples illustrate these trade-offs. For instance, 128-bit HAVAL might be used in legacy systems requiring compatibility with older protocols that expect MD5-like digests, despite its diminished security. Conversely, 256-bit outputs might be considered in non-critical scenarios where legacy compatibility is needed, though modern alternatives are preferred for robust integrity checks such as digital signatures or blockchain applications, where the added bit length enhances resistance without excessive overhead.^[21] Longer outputs generally increase storage needs and minor final processing time, but security gains plateau after 256 bits, as further extension would require iterative applications of the function on the state itself, introducing inefficiency without proportional benefits in collision resistance. Output length selection should thus balance these factors, often prioritizing established secure hashes over HAVAL for new deployments to align with current cryptographic standards.^[8]

Number of Rounds

HAVAL supports three configurable numbers of rounds in its compression function: 3 rounds for the fastest variant with the lowest security margin, 4 rounds for a balanced trade-off between speed and security, and 5 rounds for the highest security at the cost of greater computational overhead. These options allow customization based on application needs, with the variant denoted as HAVAL(r,n), where r represents the number of rounds (3, 4, or 5) and n the desired output length. The original design posits that 5 rounds provide the strongest resistance to cryptanalytic attacks, making it suitable for security-critical applications, although subsequent analyses have shown that even the 5-round version does not meet contemporary security standards compared to modern hash functions like SHA-3.^[22] Each round processes the 1024-bit message block through 32 steps, incorporating all 32 message words exactly once via a dedicated nonlinear F-function unique to that round, along with round-specific permutations of the message words and the chaining value registers. These permutations rearrange the order of message word selection (denoted as σ_i for round i) and the assignment of intermediate results back to the eight 32-bit registers (A through H), ensuring varied mixing patterns across rounds to enhance bit diffusion. The F-functions, such as f_1(X, Y, Z, W, E, F, G, H) = (X ⊕ E) ∨ (Y ∧ F) ∨ (Z ∧ G) ∨ (W ∧ H) for the first round (adjusted for the eight inputs), are chosen for high nonlinearity and compliance with the strict avalanche criterion, where a one-bit input change affects each output bit with probability 1/2 independently.^[8] The round count directly influences the achievement of diffusion and the avalanche effect in HAVAL. Additional rounds improve bit propagation and mixing, enhancing the overall avalanche properties where a one-bit input change ideally affects about half the output bits. This progressive diffusion design aims to thwart differential attacks by ensuring broad bit dependencies, though the fixed structure per round set introduces some predictability that later cryptanalyses exploited.^[8]

Security Analysis

Known Weaknesses

One of the earliest documented weaknesses in HAVAL was identified in its reduced-round variants. In 2000, Kasselman and Penzhorn applied differential cryptanalysis to find collisions in the last two rounds of the 3-pass version, demonstrating non-random behavior in the compression function with a feasible computational effort. This attack highlighted vulnerabilities in the stepwise processing of message blocks. A more comprehensive break followed in 2004, when Wang, Feng, Lai, and Yu developed a practical collision attack on the full 3-pass HAVAL-128, achieving collisions with a complexity of approximately $2^6 compression function evaluations.^[23] The method exploited differential paths in the nonlinear F-functions and message scheduling, allowing the generation of colliding message pairs differing in only a few bits, thus rendering the 3-pass variant insecure for cryptographic purposes. For the 4-pass variant, Yu et al. reported partial collision attacks in 2006, focusing on 2-block messages. These practical attacks achieved collisions with complexities of $2^{36} and $2^{43} evaluations, respectively, using refined differential techniques and early termination conditions to propagate differences efficiently through the passes.^[24] Although not extending to arbitrary-length messages, these results significantly undermine confidence in the 4-pass design's collision resistance. The 5-pass version remains unbroken in terms of practical full collisions as of 2025, but theoretical analyses reveal exploitable weaknesses. Yu et al. outlined a collision attack with complexity around $2^{123}, surpassing the generic birthday bound of $2^{128} for 128-bit outputs yet infeasible in practice.^[24] Additionally, differential probabilities in the F-functions (F4 and F5 used in later passes) allow for high-probability paths that weaken the overall structure, though no optimized practical preimage attack exists beyond the expected $2^{128} complexity for 128-bit outputs. Sasaki and Aoki extended preimage attacks to 158 of 160 steps in 5-pass HAVAL (256-bit output) at complexities near $2^{254}, confirming theoretical vulnerabilities without practical impact.^[25] In 2009, Moon et al. presented a second preimage attack on 5-pass HAVAL-256 with complexity $2^{227}, using a differential path with probability $2^{-227}. This attack improves upon the generic bound of $2^{256} but remains infeasible in practice.^[26] HAVAL's 1024-bit block size, while adequate at design time, lacks the enhanced diffusion and formal security proofs of modern constructions like SHA-3, contributing to its obsolescence. No dedicated proofs exist for second-preimage resistance beyond the generic Merkle-Damgård bound, and the accumulation of reduced-pass attacks has led to its deprecation in favor of standardized alternatives. No new practical breaks have emerged since 2008.

Collision Resistance

HAVAL employs the Merkle-Damgård construction, leveraging a permutation-based compression function to achieve collision resistance, with the designers asserting that finding two distinct inputs producing the same n-bit output would require approximately $2^{n/2} computational effort, rendering it infeasible for practical purposes. The algorithm's collision resistance fundamentally depends on the one-wayness of its compression function, which combines nonlinear permutations, modular additions, and bitwise operations to diffuse input differences. No formal security proof was provided, but in the 1990s, HAVAL underwent rigorous testing against differential cryptanalysis and other known attacks of the era, with the 5-round variant demonstrating resilience beyond the capabilities of contemporary adversaries. Theoretically, the full 5-round HAVAL with 256-bit output aligns with the birthday bound for collision resistance, expecting $2^{128} operations to find a collision. However, the 3-round and 4-round variants have been practically broken through differential attacks, enabling collisions with complexities as low as $2^6 and $2^{36} operations, respectively (detailed in Known Weaknesses).^[23]^[27] For the full 5-round version, a differential collision attack achieves $2^{123} computations for 256-bit output, outperforming the generic birthday attack but still far beyond current computational feasibility.^[24] As of 2025, HAVAL is viewed as inferior to established standards like SHA-2 and SHA-3, with its reduced-round weaknesses raising concerns over potential undiscovered flaws in the full implementation; it is not recommended for new cryptographic applications.^[17] A second preimage attack on 5-pass HAVAL-256 achieves complexity of approximately $2^{227} operations, better than the generic bound of $2^{256} but still infeasible in practice.^[26]

Implementations and Performance

Software Implementations

The original reference implementation of HAVAL was written in C by its designers Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, and Jennifer Seberry, and included as an appendix in their 1993 paper; this code targets 32-bit computers and is placed in the public domain.^[8] HAVAL is supported in several established cryptographic libraries across programming languages. In C++, the Crypto++ library includes a dedicated HAVAL class for generating hashes with configurable parameters, as part of its comprehensive suite of hash functions. Similarly, the Bouncy Castle library for Java provides HAVAL as a supported digest algorithm, including variants like HAVAL-5-160, through its provider framework.^[28] For Python, support is limited to third-party libraries rather than the standard hashlib module, which does not include HAVAL among its built-in algorithms such as SHA-256 or MD5.^[29] Examples of HAVAL implementations exist in other ecosystems via open-source wrappers and crates. In Rust, community efforts provide basic hashing functionality, though no dedicated crate dominates like those for SHA families in the RustCrypto collection.^[30] For Node.js, simple wrappers enable HAVAL usage in web applications, often leveraging C++ bindings or external libraries for validation and computation, as seen in example code snippets for string hashing.^[31] HAVAL's reliance on 32-bit word operations enhances its portability, allowing straightforward adaptation to resource-constrained environments like embedded systems without requiring specialized hardware acceleration.^[9] However, such implementations remain uncommon in production due to the preference for more standardized hashes like SHA-2. As of 2025, standalone open-source projects on GitHub continue to offer accessible HAVAL code, such as the mikedld/haval repository, which provides a modern C++14 implementation for buffers, strings, and streams with the last update in 2020.^[32]

Performance Metrics

HAVAL's performance is characterized by its computational efficiency, which depends on the number of rounds and output length, making it adaptable but generally slower than simpler fixed-round hashes like MD5 due to its variable permutation structure. The 3-round configuration prioritizes speed over added security margins from extra rounds. In terms of cycles per byte, HAVAL requires more cycles than MD5 on similar setups; this higher cost stems from HAVAL's more complex message scheduling and multiple passes. Memory usage for HAVAL remains minimal, with the internal state comprising just 256 bits (8 32-bit words) plus temporary buffers totaling around 1 KB, rendering it well-suited for resource-constrained devices like embedded systems. HAVAL's throughput lags behind SHA-256, primarily because HAVAL's variable permutations introduce extra computational steps without hardware-specific accelerations like those for SHA-2. Key trade-offs include a speed reduction for higher rounds, while varying output lengths adds negligible overhead, as finalization involves simple truncation or padding of the state without additional passes.^[8]

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Collection of cryptographic hash functions written in pure Rust. All algorithms reside in separate crates and are implemented using traits from digest crate.Missing: HAVAL | Show results with:HAVAL
[31]
Node.js Hash Algorithms: SHA-1, HAVAL, MD2, MD5, SHA-256 ...
(Node.js) Hash Algorithms: SHA-1, HAVAL, MD2, MD5, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 ... How to create hashes (message digests) for strings.
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mikedld/haval: Standalone HAVAL implementation in C++14 - GitHub
a one-way hashing algorithm with variable length of output", Advances in Cryptology — AUSCRYPT'92, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.718, pp ...Missing: text | Show results with:text
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Crypto++ 5.6.0 Benchmarks
Mar 31, 2009 · Here are speed benchmarks for some of the most commonly used cryptographic algorithms. All were coded in C++, compiled with Microsoft Visual C++ 2005 SP1.
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Use Intel's ISA-L_crypto library for computing checksums #14940
Jun 5, 2023 · ~3.5 GB/s for md5. Compared to 2017 openssl performance, these are 10-20x faster. With these speeds an older quad-core laptop broadwell CPU ...