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INS Vishal

INS Vishal is a proposed for the , designated as the second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-2), intended to displace approximately 65,000 tonnes and feature a catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery () configuration with an (). The vessel, named after the word meaning "giant" or "vast," represents a significant technological leap from the Navy's existing short takeoff but arrested recovery () carriers like INS Vikrant, enabling operations with heavier and improved sortie rates. Currently in the feasibility and design phase, the project received initial of ₹30 from the Defence Acquisition Council in 2015 for preliminary studies, but full specifications and construction approval remain pending as of 2025, with estimated costs exceeding ₹50,000 and a potential commissioning timeline in the early contingent on budgetary prioritization. The carrier's development emphasizes indigenous construction, likely at , amid strategic debates within defense circles regarding the allocation of resources between surface fleet expansion and subsurface capabilities like .

Background and Strategic Context

Conception and Early Proposals

The Indian Navy's push for a third aircraft carrier, later named INS Vishal, emerged in the early 2010s as part of broader efforts to achieve persistent carrier strike group operations in the Indian Ocean region. This stemmed from the service's Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) for 2012-2027, which enshrined a requirement for three operational carriers to counter growing maritime threats, particularly from China's expanding naval presence. The plan aimed to transition from two carriers—INS Vikramaditya (refitted ex-Russian) and the indigenous INS Vikrant (IAC-1)—to a triad enabling sustained blue-water power projection, with Vishal positioned as the second fully indigenous design. Design conceptualization for Vishal began in 2012, led by the Navy's Warship Design Bureau in , emphasizing by forgoing early foreign design assistance. Initial proposals outlined a conventionally powered carrier with a of around 65,000 tonnes—over 60% larger than Vikrant's 40,000 tonnes—capable of embarking 54-55 , helicopters, and support assets for enhanced and roles. Cost estimates for the project were pegged at approximately ₹60,000 (about $8 billion at the time), reflecting ambitions for advanced features like improved efficiency beyond Vikrant's short take-off barrier-arrested recovery () system. By 2015, early deliberations had evolved to explore catapult-assisted take-off barrier-arrested recovery () configurations for greater aircraft operational flexibility, alongside initial discussions on to extend endurance and reduce refueling dependencies. In May 2015, then-Chief of Naval Staff publicly indicated that "all options are open" for , signaling a shift from purely conventional designs toward potentially transformative technologies. These proposals aligned with strategic imperatives for with allied navies and deterrence against peer competitors, though budgetary constraints and prioritization of other platforms like submarines soon tempered progress.

Geopolitical Drivers and Necessity

India's pursuit of INS Vishal, a proposed 65,000-75,000-ton aircraft carrier, is driven by the imperative to counter China's expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where Beijing has operationalized three carriers—Liaoning, Shandong, and Fujian—as of 2024, with plans for further expansion to project power westward. This development necessitates enhanced Indian carrier capabilities to secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital for 80-90% of India's trade and energy imports, which traverse the IOR and are vulnerable to disruption by Chinese assets, including submarine deployments and port access via the "String of Pearls" network in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar. With only two operational carriers (INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant), India requires a third to ensure persistent at-sea presence, as maintenance cycles typically render one unavailable, limiting sustained power projection against dual-front threats from China and Pakistan. The strategic necessity arises from causal asymmetries in naval force posture: China's () prioritizes carrier strike groups for anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) operations extending into the IOR, compelling to transition from coastal defense to blue-water operations for deterrence and rapid response. INS Vishal's scale would enable integration of advanced fixed-wing assets, extending 's air superiority beyond land-based limits and addressing gaps in the Andaman-Nicobar theater, where Chinese incursions challenge Indian dominance. This aligns with 's 2015 Maritime Security Strategy, emphasizing carrier-centric task forces to safeguard exclusive economic zones (EEZs) spanning 2.4 million square kilometers and to participate in alignments for stability, without which 's regional influence risks erosion amid Beijing's assertive maneuvers. Critics, including some naval analysts, question the opportunity costs of Vishal amid fiscal constraints and submarine prioritization, arguing that distributed lethality via frigates and UAVs could yield higher returns against asymmetric threats. However, empirical precedents from U.S. and carrier operations underscore their role in coercive diplomacy and , rendering Vishal essential for to maintain credible deterrence rather than reactive posture, particularly as China's carrier fleet is projected to reach six by 2030.

Design Evolution and Technical Specifications

Propulsion Systems Debated

The propulsion system for INS Vishal has been a focal point of debate within the Indian Navy and defense establishment, pitting nuclear power against conventional alternatives like integrated electric propulsion (IEP) or gas turbine systems. Proponents of nuclear propulsion argue it would provide virtually unlimited endurance—requiring refueling only every 20-25 years—high sustained speeds exceeding 30 knots, and ample electrical output to support energy-intensive features such as electromagnetic aircraft launch systems (EMALS) and advanced sensors, enabling sustained power projection in the Indo-Pacific against rivals like China. In contrast, conventional systems, while limiting range to around 8,000-10,000 nautical miles without refueling and constraining power for future upgrades, offer lower upfront costs, faster development timelines, and reliance on proven technologies like those used in INS Vikrant. Early planning in the mid-2010s envisioned for the 65,000-75,000-tonne carrier to align with India's experience via the Arihant-class reactors developed by the (BARC). However, by October 2017, the Navy shifted to an IEP based on gas turbines, citing prohibitive costs—estimated at double those of conventional carriers—and technical hurdles in scaling pressurized water reactors to deliver the 100-200 MW thermal output needed for carrier operations, far beyond the Arihant-class's 80-90 MW. This decision drew criticism from strategic analysts who viewed it as a on blue-water ambitions, especially as carriers like the U.S. Nimitz-class demonstrate superior operational flexibility. had offered collaboration on designs as early as 2016, potentially integrating with MiG-29K operations, but these were sidelined amid indigenous priorities. The debate reignited with the Indian Navy's Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) updated in 2025, which explicitly mandates nuclear propulsion for INS Vishal as India's first such carrier, projecting commissioning around 2040 to replace the retiring INS Vikramaditya. This shift, formalized on August 6, 2025, responds to geopolitical pressures, including China's advancing carrier fleet and the need for at least 10 nuclear propulsion units to equip Vishal and future surface combatants. Advocates, including Navy leadership, emphasize that nuclear power is essential for CATOBAR operations, avoiding the fuel logistics vulnerabilities of conventional designs in contested regions. Skeptics highlight persistent challenges: India's naval reactors remain sub-optimized for surface ships, with power density issues potentially requiring foreign assistance despite non-proliferation constraints under the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and total program costs could exceed $10 billion when factoring R&D delays. Alternative conventional paths persist in discussions, including IEP collaborations like the May 2025 UK-India agreement with Rolls-Royce for electric drives, which could integrate gas or diesel generators for 50-60 MW output but fall short of 's strategic edge. The Navy's insistence on aligns with first-principles needs for endurance in vast theaters, yet implementation hinges on BARC's advancements and budget allocations amid competing priorities like programs. As of October 2025, no final decision locks in , but the TPCR's framework signals a tilt toward it, with feasibility studies ongoing to mitigate historical abandonment risks.

Flight Deck and Aircraft Launch Mechanisms

The of INS Vishal is planned to incorporate a configuration, marking a departure from the systems used on India's existing carriers and . This design enables the launch and recovery of heavier , including potential unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), (ASW) platforms, and (AEW&C) aircraft, which require greater deck space and launch energy than ski-jump ramps can provide. Central to the launch mechanisms is the proposed integration of an (EMALS), an advanced electromagnetic catapult technology that uses linear induction motors to accelerate aircraft along the deck, offering precise control over launch forces and reduced wear compared to traditional steam catapults. Discussions on EMALS for Vishal date back to at least 2013, with the expressing interest in acquiring the system to support a larger air wing capable of operating jets with full and weapons loads. In 2017, the offered EMALS technology as part of bilateral defense cooperation, aligning with Vishal's projected 65,000-ton displacement and extended length exceeding 270 meters to accommodate multiple catapults and an angled recovery area. Recent reports indicate ongoing evaluations, including potential procurement requests for EMALS units alongside Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) for wire-based recoveries, though final adoption remains contingent on technological and budgetary feasibility. The deck's layout is expected to feature two to four EMALS catapults positioned for efficient sortie generation, with an angled deck configuration to allow simultaneous launches and landings, enhancing operational tempo in contested environments. This setup prioritizes compatibility with twin-engine deck-based fighters under development, such as the TEDBF, which demand higher launch velocities than can reliably deliver. While steam catapults have been mentioned as a potential alternative due to EMALS's complexity and cost—estimated in billions for integration— statements emphasize pursuing electromagnetic systems for long-term efficiency and reduced maintenance. Source credibility varies, with defense industry analyses from outlets like USNI providing detailed technical insights based on official engagements, whereas speculative forums highlight unverified details without primary confirmation.

Hull and Displacement Features

INS Vishal is envisioned with a full load of approximately 65,000 tonnes, markedly exceeding the 45,000 tonnes of the Vikrant-class carriers to accommodate advanced operational requirements such as electromagnetic aircraft launch systems and an expanded air wing. This scale positions it as a supercarrier, enabling greater endurance, stability, and internal volume for fuel, munitions, and crew support during extended deployments. The hull design adopts a conventional form optimized for high-speed transits and carrier-specific stability, with an overall length of about 300 meters to support a spacious and . Unlike the ski-jump configuration of earlier carriers, Vishal's hull integrates provisions for a flat-top deck suited to catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery () operations, potentially drawing conceptual influences from foreign designs like the UK's Queen Elizabeth-class for enhanced deck efficiency. Detailed parameters such as beam width and draught remain provisional, as the project emphasizes indigenous steel construction and modular assembly at to achieve amid evolving geopolitical needs. The larger also facilitates improved through deeper draft and integration, reducing wave resistance and enhancing fuel efficiency in conventional propulsion setups under consideration.

Armament and Defensive Systems

INS Vishal is planned to incorporate a layered defensive armament suite emphasizing close- to medium-range protection against aerial and missile threats, consistent with carrier designs. Primary surface weaponry includes four 76mm Otobreda Super Rapid Guns for anti-surface and anti-air roles, capable of firing 120 rounds per minute each to engage incoming threats at ranges up to 20 kilometers. Surface-to-air missile systems are anticipated to feature vertical launch systems (VLS) integrated with the Barak-8 missile family, providing medium-range interception against and anti-ship missiles with a reported engagement envelope exceeding 70 kilometers. These systems enable multi-target engagement and are networked for cooperative defense with escort vessels, reflecting standard protocols for carrier battle groups. For terminal defense, the carrier will employ Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), potentially including the American 20mm or equivalent gatling gun-based setups, designed to autonomously detect and destroy sea-skimming missiles and drones at ranges under 2 kilometers using radar-guided bursts of 4,500 rounds per minute. Additional point-defense elements may incorporate decoy launchers and electronic countermeasures, though specific integrations remain under evaluation in ongoing design phases. Defensive sensors are expected to include multi-function radars such as active electronically scanned arrays (AESA) for 360-degree , air search, and fire control, drawing from indigenous developments like the MF-STAR system used on prior platforms to support automated threat prioritization and . Overall, these systems prioritize in high-threat environments, with reliance on accompanying destroyers and frigates for outer-layer interception, as standalone armament focuses on rather than offensive projection.

Planned Air Wing and Operational Capabilities

Aircraft Composition and Integration

The planned air wing for INS Vishal emphasizes a balanced composition of fixed-wing aircraft, (AEW&C) platforms, (ASW) assets, unmanned systems, and rotary-wing helicopters, totaling approximately 40-50 aircraft to leverage the carrier's anticipated (Catapult Assisted Take-Off Barrier Arrested Recovery) configuration. This setup contrasts with the STOBAR limitations of predecessors like , enabling fuller integration of heavier, fuel-laden aircraft for extended range and payload. Primary fixed-wing fighters are projected to include the indigenous Twin Engine Deck-Based Fighter (TEDBF), designed as a multirole platform to succeed the MiG-29K, alongside potential acquisitions of carrier variants such as the Dassault Rafale-M for strike and air superiority roles. Support elements within the air wing incorporate fixed-wing AEW&C aircraft for surveillance and command, platforms for detection, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UCAVs) for and precision strikes, enhancing multi-domain operations. Rotary-wing components, numbering around 10 units, focus on helicopters like the MH-60R Seahawk and utility models for search-and-rescue, logistics, and vertical replenishment, integrated via dedicated hangar and deck facilities. The system's (EMALS), if adopted, facilitates seamless integration by accommodating varied aircraft weights up to 30-40 tons during launches, reducing wear on airframes compared to ski-jump takeoffs and enabling higher rates of 120-150 per day. Aircraft integration challenges include with EMALS, arrestor gear synchronization for recoveries, and deck cycle management to minimize turnaround times, drawing from operational lessons with MiG-29K on . The design prioritizes modular interfaces for systems like TEDBF, ensuring with naval radars and data links for networked warfare, though foreign dependencies for initial Rafale-M may introduce certification delays. Overall, this composition aims to project power across the , with scalability for future unmanned and stealth assets as technologies mature.

Support and Logistics Elements

The support and logistics elements of INS Vishal's planned air wing are designed to provide airborne early warning, , and sustainment capabilities for prolonged carrier operations, leveraging the vessel's configuration with electromagnetic aircraft launch systems (EMALS). A key upgrade includes fixed-wing (AEW&C) , heavier platforms than the rotary-wing used on prior Indian carriers, to direct air battles and enhance over extended ranges. The projected 15 rotary-wing aircraft will feature integral helicopters for (ASW) and communications, such as the MH-60R Seahawk, a multi-role platform capable of , surface search, and logistics tasks including and search-and-rescue. Utility helicopters, including variants of the HAL Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH Dhruv) or legacy Chetaks, are expected to support onboard logistics by facilitating personnel transfers, spare parts delivery, and command-relay functions, compensating for the absence of a dedicated fixed-wing (COD) aircraft in the Indian Navy's inventory. Unmanned combat air vehicles and surveillance drones are planned to integrate into these elements, augmenting and without risking manned assets.

Development Timeline and Challenges

Key Milestones and Delays

The concept for INS Vishal emerged in the mid-2010s as a larger, CATOBAR-equipped successor to , with initial feasibility studies focusing on a 65,000-ton incorporating advanced electromagnetic launch systems. By 2018, design challenges, including integration of foreign propulsion and arrestor technologies, had already postponed detailed project sanction, as the grappled with aligning indigenous capabilities against escalating regional threats from China's carrier fleet. Approval processes stalled further in 2020 amid inter-service prioritization debates, where acquisitions were favored over a third carrier, leading to reports of the project being deprioritized or shelved temporarily to address immediate undersea warfare gaps. No keel-laying or was awarded by 2025, with the vessel remaining in the conceptual and (RFI) stage, as foreign dependencies—particularly U.S. approvals for components like EMALS—introduced additional timelines slippage beyond initial 2030s projections. In September 2025, the Indian Navy's Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR 2025) reaffirmed commitment to a third , likely INS Vishal, signaling potential approval for construction at Limited and a projected commissioning around 2032–2035, contingent on resolving technological hurdles. Delays stem primarily from budgetary reallocations favoring nuclear submarines (e.g., a ₹40,000 SSN program cleared in January 2025), persistent challenges in acquiring restricted U.S. technologies amid sensitivities, and domestic design iterations to enhance . These factors have extended the overall timeline by at least five years from early estimates, underscoring tensions between ambitious naval expansion and resource constraints.

Technological Hurdles and Foreign Dependencies

The pursuit of a CATOBAR configuration for INS Vishal, incorporating an Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), represents a major technological leap from the STOBAR systems of INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, requiring precise synchronization of electromagnetic catapults with the carrier's flight deck and power systems to enable launches of heavier fixed-wing aircraft. This shift demands advancements in high-energy power generation and control, areas where India's indigenous capabilities remain nascent, potentially leading to protracted testing phases for reliability under combat conditions. Nuclear propulsion, outlined as a goal in the Indian Navy's Technology Perspective Capability Roadmap (TPCR) 2025, introduces further engineering complexities, including the design of compact, high-output s capable of sustaining a 65,000-ton over extended deployments without frequent refueling. Developing such systems domestically involves overcoming material science barriers for radiation-resistant components and management, with analysts noting that integration could compound these hurdles by necessitating compatible power distribution for both and EMALS operations. These challenges are intensified by foreign dependencies, as seeks technology transfers for EMALS from U.S. entities like , whose expertise in electromagnetic launchers is pivotal yet contingent on bilateral agreements under frameworks like the Initiative on Critical and Emerging (ICET). Delays in U.S.- negotiations, attributed to restrictions and mismatched priorities, have pushed potential tech access beyond 2030, stalling prototype integration and risking obsolescence against peer adversaries' carriers like China's . Alternative pursuits of EMALS development, while aligned with self-reliance goals, face resource constraints that historically prolong naval projects, as evidenced by iterative hurdles in prior carrier builds.

Financial Constraints and Budgetary Realities

The development of INS Vishal has been hampered by significant budgetary limitations within India's defense allocations, with the withholding financial sanction since 2017 due to fiscal constraints. Initial feasibility studies allocated only Rs 30 (approximately $4 million) in May 2015 for project planning, reflecting limited preliminary funding amid competing naval priorities such as submarine acquisitions and surface fleet modernization. Estimated construction costs for the 65,000-tonne range from $6-8 billion, excluding air integration and operational expenses, which could extend the total to over $10 billion based on precedents like INS Vikramaditya's cumulative costs exceeding $10-11 billion including refits and armaments. These figures strain the Indian 's capital budget, which constitutes a modest portion of the overall defense outlay—rising to Rs 6,81,210 ($78.8 billion) for -26 but with for modernization remaining limited after accounting for pensions and revenue needs. High-profile projects like Vishal compete directly with urgent requirements, including nuclear-powered and border deployments, prompting the government in 2023 to urge the Navy to scale back ambitions amid fund shortages. Tight fiscal realities have delayed approvals, with analysts noting in 2024 that lacks a concrete funding plan despite strategic pressures from China's expanding fleet, exacerbating inter-service rivalries over . The Navy's broader force goals, targeting 200 ships by 2050, face scalability issues under persistent budgetary caps, as evidenced by the 2025 shelving of a sustained three- posture in favor of immediate asset maintenance like INS Vikramaditya's Rs 1,207 refit. This environment underscores a causal tension between aspirational blue-water capabilities and pragmatic fiscal discipline, where escalating costs for advanced features like electromagnetic catapults further risk project viability without supplemental funding.

Controversies and Criticisms

Cost-Benefit Analyses and Opportunity Costs

The projected construction cost for INS Vishal ranges from $6 billion to over $12 billion, excluding air wing integration and lifecycle expenses, which could elevate the total to $20 billion or more when accounting for procurement and maintenance. Proponents argue that these investments yield benefits in across the , enabling sustained air operations for deterrence against regional adversaries like , whose carrier fleet expansion necessitates parity to safeguard vital for India's 90% oil import dependency. However, empirical precedents from —where initial $0.97 billion acquisition escalated to $2.35 billion amid delays and refits—highlight systemic risks of cost overruns in carrier programs, amplifying fiscal exposure without proportional operational uptime. Opportunity costs manifest acutely in India's constrained defense allocations, where INS Vishal's $6-8 billion baseline equates to roughly 10-15% of annual capital outlay, diverting resources from and systems better suited for asymmetric denial strategies against peer threats. Analysts note that nuclear-powered attack (SSNs), prioritized in recent reallocations, offer stealthier, lower-signature deterrence at fractional carrier costs, enabling undersea interdiction of chokepoints like the Malacca Strait more effectively than surface-centric platforms vulnerable to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) weapons such as hypersonic s. This reorientation reflects causal trade-offs: carriers demand exorbitant sustainment—estimated at $300,000 per operational hour fleet-wide—straining logistics amid competing inter-service needs for land and air modernization against and border contingencies. Critics, including reviews, contend that Vishal's scale exacerbates these imbalances, as the platform's 10-14 year build timeline and foreign technology dependencies (e.g., electromagnetic catapults) yield in a missile-saturated where distributed from smaller assets outperforms concentrated strike groups. Budgetary stalls since 2017 underscore this realism, with scaled-back designs reflecting acknowledgment that prestige-driven expenditures undermine holistic force multipliers like indigenous submersibles, whose proliferation could achieve sea control at lower risk and cost.

Reliability Concerns from Precedent Carriers

The INS Vikramaditya, a refurbished Kiev-class acquired from and commissioned in November , has faced persistent and reliability issues that have compromised its operational availability. During initial sea trials in September 2012, the ship failed to achieve required speeds due to malfunctions in its eight new , attributed to inadequate heat insulation and design flaws in the combustion chambers. Repairs, involving specialists and components, extended into , delaying delivery and adding to costs originally contracted at $974 million in 2004, which escalated beyond $2.35 billion by commissioning. These problems echo earlier incidents, including a 1994 room explosion during its service as Admiral Gorshkov, which sidelined the vessel for repairs. Post-commissioning, frequent technical failures and concerns have confined the carrier to extended refit periods rather than sustained deployments, limiting its effective . The indigenous INS Vikrant, commissioned in September 2022 after construction began in 2009, encountered reliability challenges rooted in integration and quality control during its development, foreshadowing sustainment risks. The project suffered delays exceeding seven years from initial timelines, with full combat readiness not attained until mid-2023 due to unresolved technical hurdles in systems assembly and testing. Costs ballooned sixfold from original estimates of around ₹4,600 crore to over ₹27,000 crore, reflecting inefficiencies in coordinating indigenous and imported components, such as propulsion and aviation systems. While specific post-commissioning breakdowns are less documented given its recency, the build process exposed vulnerabilities in scaling complex carrier technologies domestically, including ski-jump launch constraints and aircraft lift limitations that strain operational tempo. These precedents underscore reliability risks for INS Vishal, a proposed 65,000-75,000 carrier, including potential inheritance of propulsion vulnerabilities from legacy refits like Vikramaditya or amplified integration failures from indigenous efforts akin to Vikrant. High dependency on foreign suppliers for critical systems—evident in Vikramaditya's boilers and spares—could exacerbate , while domestic fabrication shortfalls may perpetuate delays and elevate lifecycle maintenance burdens, estimated to exceed 20% of acquisition costs annually for similar platforms. Such issues have historically reduced rates to below 100 per day on carriers, far short of peer benchmarks, raising doubts about Vishal's sustained deployability amid resource constraints.

Inter-Service Rivalries and Prioritization Debates

The proposed construction of INS Vishal, estimated at approximately ₹40,000 crore (around $5-6 billion at 2020 exchange rates), has intensified inter-service rivalries within India's forces, primarily due to the country's limited , which stood at about 2.5% of GDP in the late and early . The advocates for the carrier as essential for maintaining two carriers operational at sea for credible in the , arguing that a single-carrier fleet leaves vulnerabilities during maintenance cycles. However, this prioritization has drawn opposition from the and , who view the expenditure as diverting scarce resources from immediate continental threats posed by and along the land borders. The (IAF) has been particularly vocal, contending that funding for INS Vishal undermines its multi-role fighter aircraft (MRFA) program, a $15-20 billion for 114 advanced jets to address squadron shortages amid ongoing tensions. IAF leaders have highlighted that a third carrier would exacerbate funding shortfalls for critical air superiority assets, especially given the service's depletion to around 30 s against an authorized strength of 42. Similarly, the Army prioritizes investments in high-altitude warfare equipment, artillery modernization, and infrastructure along the (LAC), where skirmishes with Chinese forces, such as the 2020 Galwan clash, underscore the primacy of land-based contingencies over maritime ambitions. These disputes reflect a broader zero-sum dynamic in capital acquisitions, where the Navy's blue-water aspirations clash with the Army and IAF's focus on terrestrial and aerial defense, compounded by the Ministry of Defence's reluctance to approve large-ticket naval projects without offsetting efficiencies. Critics within strategic circles, including some defense analysts, argue that such rivalries stem from mismatched threat perceptions: the emphasizes long-term deterrence against China's expanding carrier fleet in the , while the other services stress short-term readiness for two-front wars. This has led to delays in INS Vishal's approval, with the project stalled since due to budgetary constraints and inter-service pushback, forcing the to justify the carrier's opportunity costs against alternatives like additional or systems. Despite these tensions, the persists in lobbying through forums like the , underscoring ongoing prioritization debates that pit naval expeditionary capabilities against the and IAF's operational imperatives.

Recent Advancements and Future Outlook

2025 Technology Roadmap Integration

The Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) , released by India's on September 5, 2025, explicitly incorporates INS Vishal into its 15-year blueprint for naval modernization, emphasizing the of advanced and launch systems to enhance capabilities. This roadmap marks a shift from prior iterations, such as the version, by establishing and an (EMALS) as firm requirements for the carrier, enabling compatibility with heavier and unmanned systems. Central to the integration is the adoption of indigenously developed EMALS technology, which replaces traditional steam catapults to support catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations, allowing for the deployment of advanced fighters like the Rafale-M and future unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The TPCR prioritizes domestic R&D through entities like the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), aiming to reduce foreign dependencies while aligning with bilateral cooperation efforts, including the India-US Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology, which held its eighth meeting in May 2025 to advance EMALS transfer and adaptation. Nuclear propulsion integration, drawing from India's submarine expertise, is projected to provide unlimited endurance compared to conventional systems on predecessors like INS Vikrant, though it introduces challenges in miniaturizing reactors for a 75,000-ton displacement vessel. Additional roadmap elements include advanced and integrated sensor suites for stealthier operations, with provisions for directed-energy weapons and AI-driven combat management systems to counter regional threats from adversaries' carriers like China's . These technologies are sequenced for phased incorporation during INS Vishal's design phase at Cochin Shipyard Limited, with initial feasibility studies targeting completion by 2027 to align with the carrier's projected keel-laying in the late . The emphasis on indigenous content, exceeding 60% as mandated, supports broader self-reliance goals under the initiative, though execution hinges on overcoming technological maturation risks evidenced in prior carrier programs.

Projected Commissioning and Indigenous Contributions

INS Vishal is anticipated to enter service in the early to mid-2030s, contingent on approval of detailed project reports and allocation of funds, though historical delays in naval projects suggest potential slippage to the late 2030s if is pursued. The Navy's Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap (TPCR) 2025 outlines the carrier's 40-year lifecycle, emphasizing integration with , but construction has not commenced as of late 2025, with design studies ongoing at Limited. Recent proposals to adopt , reviving earlier considerations, would extend timelines due to unproven domestic reactor technology for supercarriers, requiring over a decade of development post-2026 funding. Indigenous contributions for INS Vishal are projected to exceed 70%, leveraging lessons from INS Vikrant (IAC-1), which achieved 76% local content in hull fabrication, steel supply, and subsystems like propulsion auxiliaries. Domestic firms such as Tata Advanced Systems Limited will contribute to airframe integration and avionics, while the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) focuses on electromagnetic aircraft launch systems (EMALS) and advanced radars to reduce foreign dependencies. This build emphasizes atmanirbhar (self-reliant) manufacturing, with over 90% of structural steel and cabling sourced locally, though critical elements like CATOBAR mechanisms may involve licensed technology transfers pending international collaborations. Such indigenization aims to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities observed in prior carriers, prioritizing empirical validation through Vikrant's operational data over unproven foreign designs.

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