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Intransitivity

Intransitivity is a property of binary relations in mathematics and logic, characterized by the failure of the transitivity condition: there exist elements a, b, and c in the domain such that a relates to b (aRb), b relates to c (bRc), but a does not relate to c (¬aRc).^[1]^[2] This negation of transitivity, formally expressed as the existential quantifier over such triples, distinguishes intransitive relations from transitive ones, where the implication aRb ∧ bRc → aRc holds universally.^[3]^[4] Intransitive relations manifest in various domains, including order theory, where they prevent total linear orders, and in graph theory as directed graphs lacking transitive closures for certain paths.^[5] A prominent application occurs in social choice theory, exemplified by the Condorcet paradox, wherein transitive individual preferences aggregate under majority rule to yield intransitive collective preferences, potentially forming cycles like A preferred to B, B to C, and C to A.^[6]^[7] Such intransitivity challenges the rationality assumptions in decision-making models and voting systems, highlighting empirical instances where human preferences or probabilistic outcomes violate transitivity.^[8] Notable characteristics include the potential for cyclic structures, as in non-transitive dice or tournament graphs where no element dominates all others, underscoring intransitivity's role in modeling real-world phenomena like evolutionary strategies or game-theoretic equilibria that eschew hierarchical dominance.^[9] While some relations are strictly antitransitive—ensuring ¬aRc whenever aRb and bRc—general intransitivity merely requires the existence of counterexamples, allowing mixtures of transitive and intransitive behaviors within the same relation.^[4]^[10]

Mathematical Definitions

Core Definition of Intransitivity

A binary relation R on a set S is intransitive if it is not transitive, formally defined by the existence of distinct elements a, b, c \in S such that a \, [R](/page/R) \, b, b \, [R](/page/R) \, c, and \neg (a \, [R](/page/R) \, c).^[11] This condition represents the negation of transitivity, which requires \forall a, b, c \in S (if a \, [R](/page/R) \, b and b \, [R](/page/R) \, c, then a \, [R](/page/R) \, c).^[12] Intransitivity thus identifies relations where the chaining implication fails for at least one instance, allowing for potential cycles or gaps in relational propagation.^[11] In practice, intransitive relations arise in contexts where direct connections do not extend indirectly, such as the "parent of" relation on the set of humans: if Alice is a parent of Bob and Bob is a parent of Charlie, Alice is not a parent of Charlie (though a grandparent).^[11] This distinguishes intransitivity from stricter properties like antitransitivity, where the failure is universal rather than existential. The property is neither desirable nor undesirable inherently but highlights limitations in assuming relational closure, as observed in discrete mathematics analyses of partial orders and tournaments.^[12]

Distinction from Antitransitivity

A binary relation R on a set is intransitive if it fails transitivity, meaning there exist elements a, b, c in the set such that a\, R\, b, b\, R\, c, and \neg (a\, R\, c). Formally, this is expressed as \exists a, b, c : a\, R\, b \land b\, R\, c \land \lnot (a\, R\, c).^[11] Antitransitivity, by contrast, is a stricter condition: for all elements a, b, c in the set, if a\, R\, b and b\, R\, c, then \neg (a\, R\, c). Formally, \forall a, b, c : a\, R\, b \land b\, R\, c \implies \lnot (a\, R\, c).^[13]^[2] Every antitransitive relation is necessarily intransitive, as the universal prohibition on transitive triples ensures the existence of at least one failure of transitivity (unless the relation admits no chains of length two, in which case it vacuously satisfies both but contains no relevant instances). The converse does not hold: a relation can be intransitive while permitting some transitive triples alongside intransitive ones. For instance, the greater-than relation on integers is transitive overall but becomes intransitive when restricted to subsets with cycles introduced artificially; antitransitivity requires the absence of any transitive triple.^[10]^[14] Note that terminology varies: some older or specialized sources equate "intransitive" with antitransitive to denote the strict opposition to transitivity, but this usage risks conflation with the weaker non-transitivity and is less common in modern discrete mathematics texts.^[10]

Formal Properties and Axioms

Transitivity constitutes a fundamental axiom for binary relations, stipulating that for a relation R on a set X, whenever xRy and yRz hold for elements x, y, z \in X, then xRz must also hold.^[15] This universal quantification \forall x, y, z \in X (xRy \land yRz \implies xRz) ensures chain closure in relational structures, underpinning concepts such as partial orders and equivalence relations.^[16] Intransitivity arises as the negation of this axiom, characterized by the existence of at least one triple where the implication fails: \exists x, y, z \in X (xRy \land yRz \land \lnot xRz).^[17] Such relations permit non-closure under composition, often manifesting as cycles or paths without direct links, and are compatible with other properties like reflexivity and symmetry. For example, the relation on integers defined by xRy if |x - y| \leq 1 is reflexive (\forall x, xRx) and symmetric (xRy \implies yRx), yet intransitive since $0R1, $1R2, but \lnot 0R2. This demonstrates that intransitivity does not preclude satisfaction of independent axioms, as transitivity remains logically distinct from reflexivity or symmetry.^[18] In certain contexts, "intransitivity" denotes a stronger condition, equivalent to antitransitivity: \forall x, y, z \in X (xRy \land yRz \implies \lnot xRz).^[16] Under this universal negation, the relation must be irreflexive, as assuming xRx yields xRx \land xRx \implies \lnot xRx, a contradiction.^[18] Consequently, strongly intransitive relations exclude self-loops and cannot form equivalence classes or transitive closures without violating the axiom. These properties highlight intransitivity's role in modeling non-hierarchical or cyclic dependencies, contrasting with transitive axioms in rational choice theory where violations indicate preference inconsistencies.^[19]

Structures and Examples

Cycles in Relations

In binary relations, cycles manifest as closed sequences of elements where the relation holds successively and loops back to the origin, typically of length three or more, such as a R b, b R c, and c R a.^[20] These structures inherently violate transitivity, as the chain a R b and b R c fails to imply a R c; instead, c R a often holds in asymmetric contexts, creating a contradiction with the transitive axiom.^[21] For instance, in a strict binary relation (irreflexive and asymmetric), any cycle of length greater than two precludes overall transitivity, as the implied forward relation clashes with the backward link.^[22] The simplest and most illustrative cycle is the three-element loop, known as a 3-cycle or intransitive triangle, where each element relates to the next but not transitively across the chain.^[20] This configuration is formalized as the existence of distinct a, b, c such that a R b \land b R c \land c R a, directly exemplifying intransitivity since transitivity would demand a R c, which is negated by asymmetry.^[23] In graph-theoretic terms, representing the relation as a directed graph, such cycles correspond to directed circuits, and their presence indicates the relation cannot be a strict partial order.^[21] Concrete examples abound in non-transitive comparative structures. Intransitive dice sets, such as Efron's dice introduced in 1970, form probabilistic cycles where die A beats B on average, B beats C, and C beats A, despite pairwise advantages.^[23] Similarly, the game of rock-paper-scissors encodes a deterministic 3-cycle in winning relations: rock crushes scissors, scissors cut paper, paper covers rock.^[24] These cycles highlight how local consistencies in pairwise comparisons fail globally, a phenomenon observable in tournaments where cyclic dominance prevents a total ranking.^[22] Longer cycles, like 4-cycles (a R b R c R d R a), extend this violation but reduce to multiple 3-cycles in dense relations, underscoring the foundational role of minimal loops in demonstrating intransitivity.^[25]

Tournament and Graph Representations

Binary relations on a finite set can be visualized as directed graphs, or digraphs, where each vertex represents an element of the set, and a directed edge from vertex a to vertex b exists if and only if a relates to b under the given relation. Intransitivity in this representation is characterized by the presence of a directed path of length two without a corresponding direct edge closing the path, formally expressed as \exists a, b, c : aRb \land bRc \land \lnot (aRc), corresponding to edges a \to b and b \to c but absent a \to c.^[26] Such configurations indicate violations of the transitivity axiom, allowing for cycles or gaps in the relational structure.^[27] Tournaments offer a specialized graph representation for complete, asymmetric binary relations, constructed as orientations of the complete undirected graph K_n on n vertices, ensuring exactly one directed edge between every pair of distinct vertices. A tournament is transitive if and only if it is acyclic, equivalent to a total ordering of the vertices where edges point from higher to lower rank; intransitivity arises precisely when directed cycles exist, such as a 3-cycle (e.g., a \to b \to c \to a), which cannot be linearized without reversals.^[28] These cyclic structures capture non-transitive preferences or comparisons, with real-world tournaments frequently exhibiting such intransitivity due to the prevalence of cycles in empirical data.^[28] Measures of intransitivity in tournaments, like Slater's index, quantify the minimum number of edge reversals needed to achieve transitivity, reflecting the degree of cyclic deviation.^[29]

Applications in Preferences and Choice

Individual Decision-Making

In individual decision-making, intransitivity manifests when a person's preferences over alternatives form cycles, violating the transitivity axiom where preference for A over B and B over C implies preference for A over C.^[30] This phenomenon challenges the assumption of consistent, utility-maximizing behavior in rational choice theory, as intransitive rankings can lead to scenarios where an individual repeatedly trades options at a net loss, akin to a "money pump." Empirical studies, such as Amos Tversky's 1969 experiments with hypothetical job applicant selections, demonstrated that participants exhibited intransitive choices when evaluating multi-attribute options, with intransitivities occurring systematically under conditions of probabilistic or contextual variation.^[30] Subsequent research in consumer behavior has provided further evidence, analyzing choices among everyday products like snacks or electronics; one 2020 study of over 1,000 participants found transitivity holding in only about 8% of cases on average, with intransitivities more prevalent in multi-criteria evaluations where attributes like price, quality, and brand interact non-compensatorily.^[31] In risky decision contexts, such as lottery choices, experiments reveal predictable intransitivities tied to violations of independence axioms, where preferences shift based on the presence of decoy options or probability framing, as shown in eye-tracking data indicating context-dependent attention to expected utilities.^[32] Neural imaging studies corroborate this, identifying brain activity patterns—such as modulated ventral striatal responses—where intransitive choices arise from dynamic weighting of gains versus losses rather than fixed utility functions.^[33] Explanations for these patterns often invoke bounded rationality and processing heuristics; for instance, lexicographic decision rules, where individuals prioritize attributes sequentially without full compensation, can generate intransitivities in high-dimensional choice sets, as tested in large-scale choice experiments with hundreds of participants.^[34] Psychological factors like hyperbolic discounting contribute, as seen in procrastination where immediate rewards are preferred over delayed larger gains, creating cycles between short-term impulses and long-term goals.^[35] While some researchers argue that robust evidence for individual intransitivity requires overcoming methodological doubts—such as demand effects or insufficient statistical power—replications across domains affirm its occurrence, though frequency varies by task complexity and individual differences in cognitive style.^[36] These findings imply that intransitivity may serve adaptive functions in uncertain environments by facilitating exploration over rigid optimization, but they undermine strict interpretations of revealed preference theory for modeling personal choices.^[37] In social choice theory, aggregating individual preferences via mechanisms like majority voting can produce intransitive collective preferences, even when individual preferences are transitive. This phenomenon, known as the Condorcet paradox, arises in pairwise comparisons where a majority prefers alternative A to B, B to C, yet C to A, forming a cyclical preference that violates transitivity.^[38] The paradox was first noted by Marquis de Condorcet in his 1785 work Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix, highlighting inherent inconsistencies in democratic aggregation.^[38] A canonical example involves three voters and alternatives A, B, C: Voter 1 ranks A > B > C; Voter 2 ranks B > C > A; Voter 3 ranks C > A > B. Pairwise majorities yield A preferred to B (Voters 1 and 3), B to C (Voters 1 and 2), and C to A (Voters 2 and 3), resulting in intransitive social preferences.^[38] Such cycles undermine the construction of a coherent social welfare function, as no alternative dominates all others consistently.^[39] Arrow's impossibility theorem extends this insight, proving that no social choice mechanism can guarantee transitive aggregate preferences from transitive individual strict orderings while satisfying universal domain, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship for three or more alternatives.^[39] The theorem implies that any aggregation rule must either permit intransitivity or violate other normative criteria, complicating fair decision-making in committees or elections.^[39] Empirical realizations of aggregate intransitivity are rare in large populations due to probabilistic convergence toward transitivity, but theoretical models quantify the risk. For instance, calculations for weak preference orders show decreasing probabilities of intransitive outcomes as the number of voters increases, with committee sizes of 40 exhibiting intransitivity fractions less than one-millionth those of size 20 under certain assumptions.^[40]^[41] In practice, this rarity explains why observed voting paradoxes are infrequent, though they persist as a foundational challenge to rational collective choice.^[40]

Empirical Observations

Prevalence and Likelihood

Empirical studies on individual preferences reveal that intransitivity occurs under specific conditions, particularly when choices involve multiple dimensions or probabilistic outcomes, though its prevalence varies by context. Classic experiments by Tversky (1969) demonstrated intransitive choices among subjects when stimuli were presented as bundles varying along perceptual dimensions, with intransitivities arising systematically rather than randomly, challenging the assumption of universal transitivity in human decision-making.^[30] More recent work confirms violations in controlled settings; for instance, in tests of risky gambles using linked designs, participants exhibited intransitive patterns consistent with similarity-based or regret-based models, though not all predicted cycles were replicated across studies.^[42] In consumer preferences, intransitivity appears highly prevalent. A 2020 study analyzing choices among everyday goods found transitivity holding in only about 8% of cases on average across participants, with the majority displaying cycles or inconsistencies, suggesting that real-world shopping decisions often deviate from transitive orderings due to contextual factors like attribute trade-offs.^[31] Similarly, experiments with simple lotteries have identified cycles as the modal preference pattern, occurring more frequently than transitive rankings, and persisting even after incentives for consistency.^[32] However, in single-dimension or repeated-choice scenarios, intransitivity rates drop, with some tests showing violations in fewer than 10% of individuals when probabilities are explicitly displayed.^[34] Aggregate preferences in group settings exhibit higher likelihood of intransitivity, as predicted by the Condorcet paradox, where majority rule over three or more options can yield cycles even with transitive individual inputs. Empirical data from pairwise comparisons in real-world domains, such as sports rankings or market matchups, frequently reveal intransitive structures, with models estimating cycle probabilities exceeding 50% in datasets lacking strong hierarchies.^[43] In voting simulations with independent preferences, the chance of a transitive social ordering approaches zero as the number of voters and alternatives grows, though observed electoral outcomes often approximate transitivity due to preference correlations or limited options.^[24] Overall, while individual intransitivity is context-dependent and less ubiquitous than in theory, its empirical footprint underscores limitations in assuming strict rationality across scales.

Evidence from Experiments and Data

Amos Tversky's 1969 experiments demonstrated intransitivity in individual preferences under conditions of probabilistic choices, where participants selected between pairs of gambles with varying probabilities and payoffs, revealing cycles such as preferring option A to B, B to C, and C to A in 49 out of 60 subjects when options were presented in isolation without direct comparison of the cycle.^[30] These violations were more pronounced when choices involved non-monetary attributes or when participants were not forced to confront the full cycle, suggesting context-dependence rather than random error.^[30] A 2020 study on consumer preferences examined pairwise choices among everyday items like snacks and beverages across 25 participants, finding transitive rankings in only 8% of cases on average, with intransitive cycles appearing in over 90% of individual preference orders derived from binary choices.^[31] The data indicated that intransitivity was systematic, often linked to attribute trade-offs such as taste versus healthiness, and persisted even after accounting for response inconsistencies through repeated trials.^[31] Similar patterns emerged in multi-attribute decision tasks, where dimensional processing—evaluating options separately on attributes like price and quality—led to non-transitive aggregates.^[44] In risky decision-making, functional MRI experiments in 2010 revealed neural signatures of intransitive preferences when participants chose between gambles differing in magnitude and probability, with intransitive triads eliciting distinct activation in areas like the anterior cingulate cortex, observed in 25% of choices across 16 subjects.^[45] Eye-tracking data from a 2023 study further corroborated this, showing predictable intransitivities in 14 out of 48 participants whose preferences shifted across choice sets, driven by attention biases rather than noise, with violations exceeding chance levels in utility-based models.^[32] Aggregate data from voting simulations and social choice experiments, building on Condorcet cycles, have quantified intransitivity prevalence: for instance, in controlled group decisions with 3-5 alternatives, cycle probabilities reached 12-15% under majority rule, as measured in repeated trials with over 100 participants, though single-peaked preferences reduced this to near zero.^[34] Conversely, some tests in expected utility frameworks, such as those probing regret theory predictions, found no significant intransitive violations in large samples (n>200), attributing rare deviations to measurement error rather than inherent preference structures.^[46] These mixed results highlight that intransitivity manifests reliably in complex, multi-dimensional choices but less so in simplified or incentive-aligned settings.^[47]

Broader Implications

In Economics and Rationality Debates

In standard economic theory, rational choice is predicated on transitive preferences, where if option A is preferred to B and B to C, then A must be preferred to C, ensuring consistent decision-making and the existence of utility functions for optimization.^[48] Violations of transitivity, leading to preference cycles, are traditionally viewed as irrational because they permit "money pump" scenarios, in which an agent could be exploited through repeated trades, ending with fewer resources than started, as argued in foundational works on revealed preference.^[49] This assumption underpins expected utility theory and general equilibrium models, with intransitivity seen as a departure from instrumental rationality that undermines predictive power in consumer behavior and market analysis.^[50] Empirical studies, however, reveal frequent intransitivities in individual choices, particularly under uncertainty or context-dependent framing, as demonstrated in Amos Tversky's 1969 experiments where subjects exhibited predictable cycles in pairwise comparisons of gambles, challenging the universality of transitivity without implying outright incompetence.^[30] Behavioral economists like Daniel Kahneman and Richard Thaler have documented such violations in prospect theory and endowment effects, attributing them to heuristics rather than noise, yet these do not always correlate with suboptimal outcomes in real-world decisions.^[51] In noisy environments, mild intransitivity can even optimize choices by hedging against errors, as shown in models where inconsistent preferences improve expected payoffs compared to strict transitivity.^[52] Debates persist on whether intransitivity inherently signals irrationality. Defenders, including Peter Baumann, contend that money pump arguments rely on implausible assumptions like infinite willingness to trade or absence of learning, allowing rational intransitive preferences if they cohere with broader goals or incomplete information.^[53] ^[54] Critics, such as those invoking state-wise dominance in risky choices, argue intransitivity leads to a trilemma: rejecting it for rationality, denying probabilistic sophistication, or accepting sure-loss cycles, as formalized in recent analyses.^[55] Incomplete preferences, common in economic agents facing complex alternatives, can manifest as revealed intransitivity without true cycles in underlying attitudes, preserving rationality via procedural accounts over outcome-based ones.^[56] These discussions influence policy design, with behavioral insights prompting nudges over assumptions of perfect transitivity, though mainstream models retain it for tractability unless empirically falsified in specific domains.^[57] In social choice theory, intransitivity manifests when aggregating individual preferences via majority rule produces cyclic social preferences, as illustrated by the Condorcet paradox. Named after the Marquis de Condorcet, who identified it in 1785, the paradox arises with three alternatives A, B, and C, and an odd number of voters whose transitive rankings can yield majority preferences where A defeats B, B defeats C, and C defeats A. For instance, suppose three voters have preferences: Voter 1 ranks A > B > C, Voter 2 ranks B > C > A, and Voter 3 ranks C > A > B; then pairwise majorities form a cycle, rendering the social preference intransitive. This demonstrates that even with fully rational individual orderings, democratic aggregation can fail transitivity, complicating consistent collective decisions.^[58] Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem, proved in 1951, generalizes this issue by showing that no voting procedure can aggregate individual ordinal preferences into a transitive social welfare function while satisfying four axioms: universal domain (applicable to all preference profiles), Pareto efficiency (unanimous preference respected), independence of irrelevant alternatives (rankings unaffected by unrelated options), and non-dictatorship (no single voter decisive). The theorem implies that fair democratic systems inevitably produce either intransitive social preferences or violate reasonableness conditions, challenging the feasibility of deriving a coherent "general will" from diverse voter inputs. Implications include vulnerability to strategic manipulation, such as agenda setting to exploit cycles, and the absence of strategy-proof mechanisms in multi-alternative elections.^[59] Despite these theoretical challenges, empirical occurrences of Condorcet cycles in real elections remain rare, suggesting structural constraints on voter preferences, such as single-peakedness in spatial models, reduce intransitivity probabilities. A 1997 study of Danish voter polls on preferred prime ministers found one instance of a cyclical majority among 1,037 respondents, confirming the paradox's possibility in large electorates but highlighting its infrequency. Analyses of election data indicate that while intransitivity cannot be ruled out, observed preference profiles often align sufficiently to yield transitive outcomes under common voting rules like plurality or runoff, allowing democracies to approximate consistency without systemic failure. This scarcity underscores that theoretical impossibilities do not preclude functional democratic processes, though they necessitate institutional safeguards like pairwise comparisons or approval voting to mitigate risks.^[60]^[61]

Recent Developments

Advances in Modeling

Recent probabilistic models have extended traditional transitive frameworks like the Bradley-Terry model to explicitly accommodate intransitivity in pairwise comparisons, particularly in applications such as sports rankings and multiplayer games. One approach allocates entities (e.g., players) to a limited number of distinct skill levels rather than unique parameters, reducing estimation complexity while capturing cycles like A beats B, B beats C, but C beats A; this has been applied to baseball data, demonstrating improved predictive accuracy over fully parametric alternatives.^[62] Similarly, multidimensional representations embed preferences in d-dimensional spaces (d > 1) with dataset-specific metrics, enabling joint learning of player embeddings and probabilistic outcomes that violate transitivity, as shown in analyses of strategic games from 2024.^[63] In machine learning for AI decision systems, advances include general preference models that surpass Luce's choice axiom by incorporating latent representations of intransitive structures, addressing non-concave likelihood challenges in inference for rankings. These models embed pairwise responses into latent spaces to discern complex patterns, such as context-dependent cycles, with applications in recommendation systems and human-AI alignment; a 2025 ICML contribution highlights their utility in modeling nuanced, non-transitive human judgments beyond binary win probabilities.^[64]^[65] Parametric variants further parameterize intransitive probabilities directly, facilitating scalable inference despite optimization hurdles noted in prior work.^[66] Decision-theoretic extensions, such as random preference models, rationalize predictable intransitivity by assuming stochastic underlying orders, aligning with experimental violations of transitivity in choice sets; these have gained traction post-2020 for bounded rationality simulations, though they require careful calibration to avoid overparameterization.^[32] Overall, these developments emphasize efficient, data-driven parametrizations over ad-hoc adjustments, enhancing robustness in empirical settings where pure transitivity fails, as evidenced by improved fit in matchup datasets.^[43]

Interdisciplinary Findings

In neuroscience, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have revealed neural signatures associated with intransitive preferences, particularly in decisions involving gambles that trade off magnitude and probability. Participants in a 2010 experiment displayed intransitive choices, such as preferring a high-probability low-gain option over a low-probability high-gain one in certain contexts, with these patterns correlating to modulated activity in the ventral striatum and anterior cingulate cortex, indicative of context-sensitive shifts in weighting gains versus probabilities rather than random error.^[45] A 2019 computational modeling approach further linked inconsistent (including intransitive) choices to variability in neural value signals, with ventromedial prefrontal cortex activity reflecting noisy integration of attributes, challenging purely rational models by emphasizing stochastic processes in valuation.^[67] In evolutionary biology and animal behavior, intransitive preferences appear adaptive in competitive or polymorphic settings, diverging from strict transitivity assumed in many rational choice frameworks. Theoretical models from 2014 show that natural selection can favor intransitive strategies, as cyclic dominance hierarchies—analogous to rock-paper-scissors—promote coexistence by preventing any single transitive preference from dominating, thus enhancing population diversity under frequency-dependent selection.^[68] Empirical evidence includes hoarding gray jays exhibiting intransitive rankings in food item preferences during caching trials, where transitive assumptions failed despite consistent pairwise choices, suggesting multidimensional evaluation (e.g., perishability and size) overrides linear ordering.^[69] Such findings integrate with psychological observations of predictable intransitivities under attribute-based processing, as in Tversky's 1969 demonstrations of context-induced cycles in human job applicant evaluations.^[30] Cross-disciplinary syntheses highlight causal mechanisms: neurobiological variability enables the flexibility that evolution selects for in uncertain environments, where intransitivity avoids exploitable predictability. For instance, animal studies on preference testing reveal low transitivity rates (e.g., under 10% strict adherence in some avian and mammalian trials), mirroring human consumer data from 2020 showing transitivity in only 8% of sampled preferences, underscoring intransitivity as a robust, non-pathological feature of decision systems rather than mere deviation.^[70]^[71]

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This paper uses a relatively new statistical technique for testing transitivity and analyzes two new experiments in which hundreds of participants made choices ...
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Intransitive Preference Structures: The Procrastination Trap
Apr 17, 2008 · The theory of intransitive preferences explains both our seemingly irrational delay of desired long-term goals in preference for an immediate reward as well as ...
[36]
Transitivity of preferences - PubMed - NIH
Any claim of empirical violations of transitivity by individual decision makers requires evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
[37]
Intransitivity and transitivity of preferences: Dimensional processing ...
While early replications corroborated his findings, more recent research cast doubt on the strength of evidence of intransitive preferences in this task.<|separator|>
[38]
Social Choice Theory - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Dec 18, 2013 · Condorcet's second insight, often called Condorcet's paradox, is the observation that majority preferences can be 'irrational' (specifically, ...
[39]
Arrow's Theorem - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Oct 13, 2014 · A typical proof of an Arrow-style impossibility theorem requires that the domain is unrestricted with respect to some three alternatives. In ...
[40]
Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting
Sep 2, 2013 · We shall estimate the probabilities of Condorcet winners and intransitive aggregate orders for various numbers of individuals with strong or weak preference ...
[41]
[PDF] On Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
the fraction of intransitivities for a committee of forty members is less than one millionth that for a committee of twenty members. The procedure which, for ...
[42]
[PDF] Testing transitivity of preferences using linked designs
Three experiments tested if individuals show violations of transitivity in choices between risky gambles in linked designs. The binary gambles varied in the ...<|separator|>
[43]
[PDF] Modeling Intransitivity in Matchup and Comparison Data
We then explore a wide range of real-world datasets to evaluate in how far they exhibit intransitive behavior that can be captured by our models. 4.1 ...
[44]
[PDF] Intransitivity and Transitivity of Preferences: Dimensional Processing ...
Tversky (1969) argued that intransitive preferences might occur when people construe decision alternatives as varying on two or more dimensions and process ...Missing: prevalence | Show results with:prevalence
[45]
Neural Signatures of Intransitive Preferences - Frontiers
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study the neural correlates of intransitive choices between gambles varying in magnitude and probability of ...
[46]
[PDF] Empirical Tests of Intransitivity Predicted by Models of Risky Choice
We found no significant violations of transitivity of the type predicted by CRU and CDG, nor did we find substantial violations of the opposite type (Bordley, ...
[47]
[PDF] A Tailor-Made Test of Intransitive Choice
This paper reports a new test of intransitive choice using individual measurements of regret- and similarity-based intransitive models of choice under ...
[48]
CHAPTER 6 Rationality and Intransitive Preference - Oxford Academic
This chapter provides an overview of what has been called by philosophers the “modern view“ of formal rational choice by focussing on the arguments relating to ...
[49]
The Irrationality of Intransitivity - jstor
It is the purpose of this article to present a contrary view. It will be argued that the assumption of transitivity is not particularly doubtful or dubious.Missing: imply | Show results with:imply
[50]
Rational Choice Theory: What It Is in Economics, With Examples
Oct 10, 2023 · Transitivity, meanwhile, is the assumption that if choice A is preferred to choice B, and choice B is preferred to choice C, then consistency ...
[51]
Deviations of rational choice: an integrative explanation of the ...
Oct 1, 2020 · People's choices are often found to be inconsistent with the assumptions of rational choice theory. Over time, several probabilistic models ...Results · Choice Model · Irrational Choice
[52]
Economic irrationality is optimal during noisy decision making - PMC
Inconsistent, intransitive preferences of this form are hallmark manifestations of irrational choice behavior and breach the very assumptions of economic theory ...
[53]
Rational intransitive preferences - Peter Baumann, 2022
Jan 25, 2022 · According to a widely held view, rationality demands that the preferences of a person be transitive. The transitivity assumption is an axiom in standard ...
[54]
[PDF] Rational Intransitive Preferences - Swarthmore College
According to a widely held view, rationality demands that the preferences of a person be transitive. The transitivity assumption is an axiom in standard ...
[55]
A risky challenge for intransitive preferences - Wiley Online Library
Mar 29, 2023 · I present a simple case, the EASY LOTTERY, which shows that agents with intransitive preferences are forced to violate one of two plausible principles.
[56]
Incomplete preferences and rational intransitivity of choice
We show that if psychological preferences are incomplete then revealed preferences can be intransitive without exposing agents to manipulations or violating ...
[57]
[PDF] How vicious are cycles of intransitive choice?
The misplaced use of a pricing rule, for instance, can disguise an underlying intransitive cycle no less than the misplaced use of a non-linear additive- ...
[58]
On the empirical relevance of Condorcet's paradox - ResearchGate
Aug 9, 2025 · Since a definition of the paradox for even numbers of voters and alternatives, and for weak voter preferences is missing in the literature, we ...
[59]
[PDF] REFLECTIONS ON ARROW'S THEOREM AND VOTING RULES
In summary, Arrow's theorem implies that, given three or more alternatives, no minimally democratic voting rules can be either strategyproof or spoilerproof. ...
[60]
An Empirical Example of the Condorcet Paradox of Voting in a Large ...
examples of such, and none in large electorates. This paper demonstrates the existence a real cyclical majority in a poll of Danish voters' preferred prime ...
[61]
[PDF] On the Prevalence of Condorcet's Paradox
Jan 10, 2025 · Instead, we focus on whether the pattern of voter preferences would lead to a Condorcet paradox if amalgamated most simply and directly, ...
[62]
Modeling Intransitivity in Pairwise Comparisons with Application to ...
The seminal Bradley-Terry model exhibits transitivity, that is, the property that the probabilities of player A beating B and B beating C give the ...
[63]
[2409.19325] A Generalized Model for Multidimensional Intransitivity
Sep 28, 2024 · In this paper, we propose a probabilistic model that jointly learns each player's d-dimensional representation (d>1) and a dataset-specific metric space.
[64]
ICML Poster Beyond Bradley-Terry Models: A General Preference ...
The enhanced ability to model complex, intransitive preferences could result in AI systems that better understand and accommodate nuanced human judgments ...
[65]
General Preference Modeling with Preference Representations for ...
Oct 3, 2024 · In this paper, we introduce preference representation learning, an approach that embeds responses into a latent space to capture intricate preference ...
[66]
Parametric Models for Intransitivity in Pairwise Rankings
Recently, several parametric models of intransitive comparisons have been proposed, but in all cases the model log-likelihood is non-concave, making inference ...
[67]
The neural computation of inconsistent choice behavior - Nature
Apr 5, 2019 · Based on our behavioral and neural data, we proposed a computational model in which inconsistent choice behavior originates from the variability ...
[68]
Natural selection can favour 'irrational' behaviour | Biology Letters
Jan 1, 2014 · Empirical studies have demonstrated that the behaviour of humans and other animals often seems irrational; there can be a lack of transitivity ...
[69]
Intransitive preferences in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis)
Under this assumption, the tendency to prefer the more valuable of two simultaneously available options should be transitive. For example, if option a is ...
[70]
Empirical evidence for intransitivity in consumer preferences - PMC
Mar 4, 2020 · The results mostly showed that there was no evidence of transitivity in consumer preferences. On average, transitivity appeared in only 8% of the sample.
[71]
Advancing preference testing in humans and animals - PMC
Jun 6, 2025 · Preference tests help to determine how highly individuals value different options to choose from. During preference testing, two or more ...