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Operation 1111

Operation 1111 is an ongoing military offensive launched on November 11, 2023, by Karenni ethnic armed organizations, primarily the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), Karenni Army (KA), and allied People's Defense Force (PDF) units, targeting in to seize the capital and dismantle junta control across the region. The operation, coordinated with broader anti-junta campaigns like , achieved rapid territorial advances, with resistance forces capturing over 65 junta bases and outposts, securing control of seven townships including Mese, Shadaw, Mawchi, Demoso, and parts of by early 2024, thereby controlling nearly 80% of and severing key junta supply lines. These gains disrupted junta logistics from to surrounding areas, forcing regime reliance on air resupply amid intensified ground fighting. Despite these successes, the campaign has encountered fierce counteroffensives, including airstrikes and barrages, leading to contested recaptures such as Demoso in August 2025, while resistance groups shifted to guerrilla tactics to sustain pressure amid resource constraints and ongoing battles for . Operation 1111 exemplifies the decentralized yet effective resistance strategy in Myanmar's post-2021 , highlighting ethnic armed groups' role in challenging the 's authoritarian grip through and local support.

Overview and Strategic Context

Name Origin and Operational Scope

The designation "Operation 1111" originates from its launch date of , 2023 (11/11 in day-month format), when Karenni groups initiated a synchronized multi-front assault against Myanmar's (SAC) forces in . This naming convention mirrors other operations, such as , which emphasize symbolic dates tied to tactical initiations rather than formal . The operation's scope focused primarily on , targeting the capture of , the state capital, along with adjacent townships like Demoso, Mawchi, and Shadaw to sever SAC supply lines and administrative outposts. Resistance leaders articulated the core aim as dismantling the 's governance infrastructure, expelling SAC troops from the territory, and enabling local administrative control by allied forces, with initial advances seizing over 65 bases by early 2024. While centered in Kayah, the offensive influenced adjacent border regions, contributing to broader anti- momentum without expanding into full-scale invasion of neighboring states.

Involved Forces and Objectives

Operation 1111 was initiated by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), a coalition of local defense forces formed in 2021, in coordination with the (KA) and the (KNPLF). These ethnic armed organizations allied with People's Defense Force (PDF) units affiliated with Myanmar's shadow , targeting junta installations across . The primary opposing force was the Myanmar Armed Forces (), the military junta's regular army, bolstered by border guard forces and pro-junta militias such as the Karenni State Border Guard Force. The resistance forces' principal objective was to capture , 's capital, and secure territorial control over the region by overrunning bases and outposts. Launched on , 2023, the offensive sought to exploit weaknesses following concurrent operations elsewhere, aiming to seize seven towns including Demoso, Mawchi, and Shadaw, and establish parallel administration in liberated areas. By December 2023, these groups claimed control of nearly 80% of and 65 installations. The Tatmadaw's objectives centered on defending key positions, particularly in , and subsequently launching counteroffensives like Operation Yan Naing Min to reclaim lost ground, including towns such as Demoso in August 2025.

Prelude and Launch

Historical Background in

, historically known as the , comprised a cluster of semi-autonomous principalities inhabited primarily by the Kayah (Karenni) ethnic group, which maintained relative under colonial administration without formal annexation to Burma. Following Myanmar's from on January 4, 1948, Karenni leaders initially acceded to the Union of via an signed on January 5, 1948, but ethnic grievances over centralization and lack of quickly escalated into armed resistance. On August 9, 1948, Burmese military police attacked the headquarters of the Karenni National Organization (KNO), sparking the first major clashes and marking the onset of a protracted that has persisted in varying intensities since. The (KNPP), founded in 1953 as the primary political organization representing Karenni interests, established the as its armed wing to pursue greater or amid ongoing skirmishes with Burmese forces. Internal divisions emerged, notably in 1978 when ideological splits led to the formation of the (KNPLF), which aligned temporarily with the before pursuing separate ceasefires. characterized the region through the late , with intensified fighting between 1994 and 2000 displacing thousands of civilians and forcing many to flee to as the expanded control through forced relocations and village destruction. A partial between the KNPP and the in 1995 reduced hostilities temporarily, but sporadic violence continued, compounded by resource exploitation and abuses documented in the state. Post-2011 political reforms under President brought tentative peace initiatives, including ceasefires with some Karenni factions, yet underlying demands for and remained unmet, sustaining underlying tensions. The military coup on February 1, 2021, reignited widespread resistance, prompting the formation of the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) on May 31, 2021, as a of local defense forces and People's Defense Force affiliates to counter junta offensives. By mid-2023, KNDF and allied groups controlled significant rural territories in , setting the stage for coordinated offensives against military positions in urban centers like , amid a broader escalation of the following the coup. This historical pattern of resistance, rooted in post-independence exclusion and exacerbated by military repression, directly informed the strategic buildup to major resistance operations in the state.

Immediate Triggers and Preparations

The launch of Operation 1111 on November 11, 2023, was directly spurred by the rapid successes of , initiated by the in northern on October 27, 2023, which resulted in the capture of numerous outposts and towns, thereby exposing vulnerabilities in the Tatmadaw's defenses and galvanizing resistance momentum across . This northern offensive weakened reinforcements and logistics, creating a strategic window for ethnic armed organizations in to escalate their campaign against the regime's administrative control. Additionally, intensified offensives during the preceding summer—targeting revolutionary forces and imposing severe restrictions on civilians—served as a proximate catalyst, particularly following the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force's (KNDF) capture of Mese township amid the rainy season, which heightened local oppression and prompted a unified response. Preparations involved extensive coordination among key Karenni resistance groups, including the KNDF, (KA), (KNPLF), local People's Defense Force (PDF) units, Urban Guerrilla Force, and Southern Shan PDF contingents, who aligned their efforts to conduct simultaneous predawn assaults on positions starting at approximately 5:00 a.m. on November 11. These groups focused on targeted strikes against outposts that had been central to public suppression and prior attacks on resistance positions, integrating intelligence on movements to maximize initial gains. Political consultations preceded the military phase, with resistance leaders engaging the Karenni State Interim Executive Council to plan civilian aid, administrative transitions, and post-capture governance in seized areas, ensuring alignment between combat operations and broader revolutionary objectives like establishing a federal union. This networked approach linked local efforts to nationwide anti- campaigns, amplifying operational effectiveness through shared resources and synchronized timing.

Course of the Offensive

Initial Karenni Advances (November-December 2023)

Operation 1111 commenced on November 11, 2023, when combined Karenni resistance forces, including the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF), Karenni Army (KA), and allied People's Defense Force (PDF) units, launched coordinated offensives against Myanmar junta positions across Kayah State. The initial assaults targeted multiple outposts in Loikaw Township, the state capital, as well as adjacent areas in Demoso and Pekon townships, aiming to disrupt junta supply lines and seize strategic bases. By November 14, resistance fighters had captured University, a major base, following two days of intense combat that included artillery shelling and five airstrikes. In the preceding days, KNDF-led groups seized at least 20 outposts in the region, reporting the deaths of over 110 soldiers—including two commanders—and the capture of 38 troops, who were subsequently treated in accordance with the . Resistance casualties included six KNDF fighters killed during these engagements. Concurrently, forces captured Demoso town, a key administrative center, marking a significant early gain in the offensive. Throughout , clashes extended to Moebye Township in Pekon, where units pressed against remaining holdouts. By early December, Karenni forces had secured the Police Headquarters in on and controlled approximately 80% of the capital city, with the retaining only its main camp and airport. In Moebye, they held the entire township except for a single battalion position. These advances resulted in control over nearly 80% of by the end of December 2023, including multiple townships such as Demoso and Moebye. The responded with 353 airstrikes in alone during , contributing to 82 civilian deaths between November 11 and December 8.

Stalling and Escalation Around

By late November 2023, Karenni resistance forces, including the (KNDF) and allies, had encircled and captured key locations such as the police station and several bases, but full control of the capital eluded them amid escalating urban combat. The intensified with forces deploying airstrikes and artillery to defend entrenched positions, slowing resistance advances into December. Into January 2024, the offensive stalled in prolonged within township, where ongoing gun clashes and shelling prevented displaced residents from returning home. groups reported heavy fighting, with reinforcements erecting roadblocks and launching counterattacks, leading to a around the city center. This phase saw escalation in tactics, including mortar shelling on resistance positions and resistance use of ambushes, resulting in significant casualties on both sides, though exact figures varied by source. The stalling around highlighted the challenges of assaulting a defended , with air superiority and complicating efforts to consolidate gains. By early 2024, while peripheral areas remained under control, the core of held as a stronghold, prompting shifts toward broader operations elsewhere in .

Expansion to Border Areas and Mobye

Following initial advances in November 2023, Karenni resistance forces under Operation 1111 extended their offensive to border townships in , particularly Mese, which lies adjacent to the Thai border and serves as a critical and supply corridor for the . By late November, combined units from the (KNPLF), (KA), and Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF) had overrun approximately 20 outposts in Mese Township, disrupting regime logistics and preventing reinforcements from crossing into proper. This expansion secured a perimeter along the border, enabling resistance groups to establish alternative supply lines from while isolating garrisons in interior areas. Parallel to border operations, fighting spilled over into adjacent southern , culminating in the capture of Mobye town in Pekon Township on or around , 2023. Mobye's seizure was facilitated by KNDF-led assaults on convoys and bases along the Loikaw-Mobye , a vital artery linking to Shan State's military hubs; resistance fighters employed ambushes and strikes to neutralize armored vehicles, reportedly destroying several and killing over 50 personnel in the process. The town's fall provided resistance forces with control over a strategic and railway , enhancing their ability to movements between and . Joint Karenni announcements on December 11 confirmed dominance over Mobye alongside , marking a high point in territorial gains during the offensive's early phase. These expansions strained junta resources, as Operation 1111 forces captured a total of 65 regime bases and outposts across by March 2024, including those in border enclaves like Shadaw and Mawchi townships, which further consolidated resistance hold on peripheral regions. However, the push to Mobye exposed logistical vulnerabilities for the rebels, reliant on captured and local , amid intensified aerial bombardments that displaced thousands toward the borders. claims of minimal involvement in these operations contrast with reports of forced by EAOs, though independent verification remains limited due to restricted access in conflict zones.

Shifts in Fighting Dynamics

As Operation 1111 progressed beyond the initial rapid advances in -December 2023, where Karenni-led forces captured over 65 bases and outposts, seizing control of six townships including Demoso and Mawchi, the fighting transitioned from mobile offensives to protracted sieges around key urban centers like . Resistance fighters initially overran peripheral positions through coordinated assaults, but encountered heavier defenses in , where they captured more than half the city by late while aiming to isolate troops within their bases to prevent resupply and movement. By early 2024, the dynamics shifted toward , with forces relying increasingly on air and strikes to break sieges, conducting nearly 20 airstrikes in contested areas near and Demoso townships during intensified clashes. This forced (KNDF) and allies to adopt more dispersed, guerrilla-style tactics, focusing on ambushes, supply line disruptions, and urban raids rather than sustained positional holds, as direct assaults on fortified positions in resulted in high casualties—over 300 KNDF fighters reported killed by mid-2024. The 's launch of Operation Yan Naing Min in May 2024 marked a further evolution, emphasizing reinforced counteroffensives with improved infantry-artillery coordination and drone usage to reclaim territory, successfully retaking most of by mid-October and Demoso by August 2025 after 16 days of heavy fighting. In response, KNDF announced strategic adjustments by November 2024, scaling back large-scale captures in favor of targeting and avoiding decisive engagements against bolstered defenses, reflecting a broader to the regime's escalated firepower and manpower redeployments from other fronts. These changes prolonged the conflict, reducing resistance momentum in central while sustaining pressure on outposts through asymmetric means.

Counteroffensive and Recaptures

Tatmadaw's Operation Yan Naing Min

The launched Operation Yan Naing Min in May 2024 as a nationwide counteroffensive to reclaim territories lost to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces during prior resistance advances, with primary focus on and southern . The operation's name translates approximately to "King Conquers the Enemy," reflecting junta leader Min Aung Hlaing's emphasis on subduing insurgent-held townships, villages, and supply routes through coordinated ground assaults and aerial superiority. Objectives included disrupting the four-cuts strategy employed by resistance groups—severing funds, food, intelligence, and recruits—while reasserting control over strategic areas near the Thai border and around . Tactics centered on heavy reliance on airstrikes using unguided bombs, drones for and strikes, and infantry advances supported by , often targeting police stations, camps, and contested positions. Initial phases in June and July 2024 saw advances toward , with the reclaiming Mobye township in southern on July 6 after expelling forces, alongside securing Hsi Hseng, eastern Pekon Lake areas, and key roads linking to Mobye, Pekon, and Pinlaung by July 31. These efforts involved reported use of drones and chemical agents in some engagements, though junta sources denied the latter. By August 2025, the operation intensified around Demoso township in , where forces conducted a 16-day offensive starting August 4, culminating in a claimed full recapture on August 20 against joint , KNDF, and allied PDF units. Resistance fighters reported fierce defensive clashes, including ambushes and withdrawals to preserve manpower, while disputing the junta's assertion of complete control, citing persistent guerrilla activity in surrounding hills. Further pushes targeted Nanmaikhan and Hpruso townships, aiming to encircle remaining pockets and reduce resistance territorial dominance from over 80% in late 2023 to approximately 70% by mid-2025. The operation's progress stalled in some sectors due to resistance attrition tactics and terrain challenges, but junta reinforcements and air dominance enabled incremental gains, marking a shift from defensive postures post-Operation 1111. As of October 2025, fighting persisted along border fringes, with sources emphasizing sustained momentum toward stabilizing supply lines.

Key Recapture Efforts (2024-2025)

In mid-2024, the intensified its counteroffensive under Operation Yan Naing Min, targeting resistance-held territories in , including advances toward . By late May 2024, junta forces had pushed into the outskirts of the state capital, recapturing approximately half of the contested areas by early June through combined ground assaults and airstrikes. Resistance groups, including the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), reported heavy fighting but acknowledged territorial losses around key positions. Efforts extended to strategic towns like Mobye in southern bordering Kayah, where the regained control in early July 2025 after dislodging KNDF and (KNPP) forces. This recapture secured vital road networks, facilitating supply lines to and easing blockades on essential commodities. By mid-July, junta troops had cleared resistance from segments of the Loikaw-Mobye highway, reducing insurgent ambushes and restoring partial civilian access. A major success occurred in Demoso township, captured by Karenni forces during Operation 1111 in November 2023 but retaken by the after 16 days of intense combat ending on August 19, 2025. reported full control of the town and surrounding outposts, attributing the victory to coordinated operations supported by , though independent verification was limited due to ongoing . These gains reversed some rebel advances, shrinking resistance control in central Kayah but leaving peripheral areas and parts of under dispute as of October 2025.

Disruptions from Natural Events

Impact of Typhoon Yagi

Typhoon Yagi, which intensified into a super typhoon before making landfall near , , on September 6, 2024, and subsequently brought heavy rains to , triggered catastrophic flooding across , severely disrupting ongoing operations in Operation 1111. In and surrounding townships like Demoso, Hpruso, and Pekon—key battlegrounds where Karenni forces had besieged junta positions since late 2023—rivers swelled, submerging homes, farmlands, and displacement camps housing thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the . By mid-September, at least 24 deaths were reported in Karenni areas alone, with entire villages evacuated and access roads rendered impassable, halting supply lines for both fighters and troops. The flooding exacerbated the in war-ravaged Kayah, where pre-existing blockades and communications blackouts had already strained aid delivery. Ten camps in , sheltering Catholic families and others displaced by Operation 1111 clashes, faced inundation, forcing rushed evacuations and compounding shortages of food, medicine, and shelter amid ongoing artillery exchanges. Resistance groups, including the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), issued warnings to civilians and paused offensives to assist flood rescues, diverting resources from frontline advances around and Mobye. This natural disruption stalled the momentum gained by Karenni EAOs, who had controlled approximately 80% of the state prior to the storm, allowing temporary lulls in combat as both sides contended with submerged positions and logistical breakdowns. Junta forces exploited the chaos to launch opportunistic advances, framing movements as disaster relief while consolidating gains in flooded zones. In Township, troops entered inundated areas under the pretext of evacuations, subsequently imposing demands for money or allegiance from locals and pushing back resistance perimeters in Demoso and nearby outposts captured during the initial 2023 phases of Operation 1111. People's Defence Force spokespersons reported that these "" operations enabled the to regain footholds lost in prior months, with blockades tightened to restrict cross-border aid from , further isolating resistance-held territories. By late September, the national flood death toll in reached over 350, with Kayah's conflict zones facing compounded vulnerabilities due to destroyed and delayed recovery efforts persisting into . Overall, Typhoon Yagi shifted tactical dynamics, providing the a respite to reinforce besieged garrisons while underscoring the resistance's challenges in sustaining operations amid recurrent natural and military pressures.

Effects of the 2025 Earthquake

The 7.7 magnitude earthquake that struck Myanmar's on March 28, 2025, inflicted over 3,600 deaths and widespread infrastructure damage in central areas, diverting resources toward relief and security operations far from the theater of Operation 1111. This strain on personnel, equipment, and logistics hampered ground mobility and reinforcement for junta counteroffensives around and Mobye, creating opportunities for resistance consolidation. Karenni resistance forces, including the (KNDF), capitalized on the disruption to achieve territorial gains in contested border and highland zones shortly after the quake, as units were redeployed to manage aftershocks and aid distribution in and . The National Unity Government-aligned groups observed a brief humanitarian pause, but forces maintained aerial superiority, conducting at least five airstrikes in Karenni State within days of the event despite their own April 2–22 ceasefire declaration. Logistical ripple effects compounded challenges for both sides, with damaged roads and bridges in central delaying supply convoys to southeastern fronts, exacerbating shortages of fuel and amid pre-existing blockades. Resistance reports indicated intensified and use post-quake to offset ground weaknesses, yet overall offensive momentum stalled until mid-April. The event underscored the 's prioritization of regime survival over sustained peripheral campaigns, temporarily tilting local dynamics toward Karenni EAOs without altering core control lines.

Ongoing Developments and Strategic Outcomes

Recent Clashes and Territorial Changes

In 2025, clashes in intensified as the 's forces, supported by airstrikes and artillery, sought to reverse resistance gains from Operation 1111, recapturing key towns including Mobye in July after prolonged fighting. The also claimed of Demoso in following 16 days of heavy combat, marking a significant territorial shift in an area seized by Karenni resistance groups in November 2023. By mid-2025, these efforts had extended to Nan Mae Khon , with troops advancing amid reports of improved coordination between ground units, drones, and air support. Resistance forces, including the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) and allies, responded with guerrilla tactics and targeted strikes, capturing two junta infantry battalions (Nos. 134 and 135) in Hpasawng Township in early July after over a month of siege warfare. In January, KNDF fighters launched a rocket attack on junta facilities in Loikaw, firing five 107mm rockets at the State Hall and two at a regional command, highlighting persistent threats to the state capital despite junta reinforcements. Ground engagements escalated in townships such as Bawlakhe, Hpruso, Pekon, and Loikaw outskirts, with daily skirmishes reported from March onward, often involving ambushes and counter-ambushes. Airstrikes remained a junta mainstay, with multiple incidents causing civilian casualties and hindering resistance movements; for instance, strikes in Mawchi Township in June killed at least seven miners and injured over 20, while a attack on a in Daw Se Ei village killed four students and wounded 27 others. These operations contributed to further territorial fluidity, as blockades and bombardments displaced an additional 30,000 people by September, particularly in Pekon, , Mawchi, and Nan Mae Khon areas, though resistance groups retained control over peripheral strongholds and supply routes. Landmine incidents in , remnants of earlier clashes, injured civilians returning to contested zones as late as June. Overall, while the reclaimed urban centers, resistance forces adapted through , preventing full consolidation and sustaining pressure on supply lines into late 2025.

Achievements and Failures of Both Sides

The Karenni resistance forces, primarily the (KNDF) alongside allies such as the and People's Defence Force (PDF), achieved significant territorial gains during Operation 1111's initial phase. By March 2024, they had captured 65 bases and outposts across , securing control over six townships including Mese, Demoso, Ywathit, Shadaw, and Mawchi, while besieging the state capital and overrunning multiple military positions in its vicinity. In January 2024, resistance fighters seized Mawchi town without major opposition, disrupting supply lines and expanding their influence toward the Thai border. These advances resulted in the reported elimination of over 110 troops, including two commanders, during early assaults on Loikaw-based units in November 2023, alongside the capture of 38 soldiers. However, these successes were tempered by heavy losses, with over 315 combined combatant and civilian deaths in the operation's first 10 days, and logistical strains including shortages that forced a withdrawal from central by June 2024 amid pressure. Persistent guerrilla actions continued, such as a January 2025 rocket barrage on 's State Hall targeting leadership, but the failure to hold urban centers like limited consolidation of gains, exacerbating internal coordination challenges among allied groups. The , Myanmar's military junta, faced substantial setbacks in defending , losing dozens of outposts and suffering disproportionate casualties in ambushes and sieges that eroded its presence in rural and peri-urban areas by early 2024. Initial defenses collapsed in key sectors, enabling resistance encirclement of and exposure of vulnerabilities in troop rotations and aerial support efficacy against entrenched fighters. Despite these reversals, the junta mounted a partial recovery through Operation Yan Naing Min, launched in May 2024, deploying around 2,000 troops to reclaim by mid-2024 and retaining control over Bawlakhe township amid ongoing clashes. By August 2025, junta forces claimed recapture of Demoso township, severing some resistance-held corridors in southern and southern , though such assertions remain contested by local reports of continued skirmishes. Airstrikes intensified civilian targeting, with strikes on and Demoso townships in late December 2024 killing non-combatants and displacing thousands, yet failing to decisively suppress resistance mobility or prevent retaliatory attacks into 2025. Overall, the junta's achievements in selective recaptures were offset by unsustainable attrition rates and reliance on scorched-earth tactics, which alienated populations without restoring pre-operation .

Humanitarian and Economic Consequences

Displacement and Civilian Suffering

The launch of Operation 1111 by Karenni resistance forces on November 11, 2023, intensified fighting in , resulting in widespread displacement. In the initial weeks, over 35,000 civilians fled conflict zones in Pekon Township, Mobye Township, and areas surrounding , seeking refuge in forests and makeshift camps due to advancing clashes and junta counteroffensives. By January 2024, the cumulative displacement linked to the operation exceeded 90,000 to 100,000 individuals across , with reports documenting over 80 civilian deaths from , barrages, and aerial bombardments. The junta's retaliatory tactics, including the imposition of blockades and indiscriminate shelling of populated areas, accelerated this exodus, destroying at least 556 homes and injuring 249 civilians by late 2024. Displaced populations endured severe hardships, including exposure to harsh weather in forested hideouts, acute shortages of and supplies due to junta supply disruptions, and vulnerability to further attacks. In Mobye Township alone, thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled during the operation's early phases remained without adequate into mid-2025, relying on limited amid ongoing skirmishes. Kayah State's pre-operation population of approximately 300,000 saw over 80% displaced by the broader conflict encompassing Operation 1111, with IDPs facing heightened risks of disease, malnutrition, and secondary displacement from sweeps. Resistance advances into urban centers like and Demoso exposed civilians to , while air campaigns targeted , compounding the humanitarian toll without verified discrimination between combatants and non-combatants.

Blockades and Resource Shortages

In response to the Karenni resistance forces' launch of Operation 1111 on , 2023, Myanmar junta troops imposed road blockades around key areas in , including and Demoso Township, to restrict supplies and civilian movement amid the offensive. These measures, including closures of major routes except the Taungoo road under strict checkpoint controls at Yado, aimed to isolate resistance fighters but severely disrupted fuel and commodity deliveries to civilian populations. By early December 2023, supplies had dried up in western Demoso Township and the Kayan area of Pekon Township, with households rationed to approximately 2 liters every 10 days. Petrol prices in affected Karenni areas surged to 5,000–7,000 kyats per liter by December 2023, exacerbating transportation challenges for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and relief efforts, while broader commodity costs rose sharply, such as reaching 150,000 kyats per . A displaced resident from Hseebu highlighted the difficulties, noting that "for the fighters who are traveling by , it is very difficult to move around without ," underscoring impacts on both and . These shortages persisted into 2024 and 2025, with tactics including bans on supplies to resistance-held territories contributing to ongoing disruptions, though some blockades were also enforced by allied groups like the Kayan New Land Party on Taungoo-Pekhon routes. By mid-2025, fuel prices had more than tripled from pre-blockade levels of 3,500–4,000 kyats per liter to over 14,000 kyats per liter in Pekhon Township and surrounding areas, hindering agriculture and emergency travel, with civilians limiting vehicle use to essentials. Food prices in escalated by 300–400% due to sustained military blockades of trade routes, compounding humanitarian strain amid over 35,000 IDPs from the initial fighting. Such restrictions, while strategically pressuring resistance advances that captured numerous outposts, have drawn criticism for indiscriminately affecting civilian access to essentials.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations Against Resistance Forces

On February 5, 2024, during clashes near Daw Ka Tel village in Shadaw Township, Karenni State, six civilians—including a pregnant woman, Ma Mae Mo, aged 33, and three children aged 7, 5, and 3—were killed amid an armed exchange between Myanmar military forces from Light Infantry Battalion 249 and resistance fighters from the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and Karenni Army (KA). The civilians had been captured by junta troops prior to the encounter, and witness accounts, including from a survivor and KA fighter, described screams and gunshot wounds on the bodies, with one child succumbing despite medical efforts; Fortify Rights documented the incident through interviews with 11 individuals but could not independently verify which side fired the fatal shots, calling for investigations into potential war crimes by both parties. Broader allegations against KNDF and allied groups in include sporadic killings of suspected junta informants and occasional harm to civilians caught in crossfire during Operation 1111 advances, though such claims remain underdocumented compared to junta-perpetrated atrocities. reporting has noted that anti-junta armed groups, including ethnic armed organizations, have committed abuses such as arrests and killings in contested areas, potentially exacerbated by territorial gains enabling greater enforcement powers. In territories controlled post-Operation 1111, such as parts of Demoso and Mawchi townships, forces have faced accusations of extortion through arbitrary taxation on residents and businesses to fund operations, alongside demands for forced of able-bodied men, actions that strain amid ongoing . These practices, while less systematic than junta equivalents, reflect challenges in by nascent administrations lacking formal structures, with reports indicating underreporting due to fear of reprisal. and similar monitors emphasize that such violations, though not on the scale of scorched-earth tactics, undermine legitimacy and contribute to displacement in .

Junta Responses and Atrocity Claims

The Myanmar junta mounted a multifaceted military response to Operation 1111, primarily relying on air superiority after suffering significant ground losses. Following the launch of the operation on November 11, 2023, junta forces conducted relentless airstrikes and artillery barrages on resistance positions and nearby civilian areas in Kayah State, aiming to disrupt advances by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and allies. By late 2023, as resistance groups captured seven towns including Demoso and besieged the state capital Loikaw, the junta withdrew from exposed positions, confining troops to fortified bases while escalating aerial operations to stem territorial erosion. To bolster its depleted ranks amid these setbacks, the initiated a forced campaign in early 2024, targeting civilians to reinforce counteroffensives. In a notable , troops claimed recapture of Demoso on August 20, 2025, after two years of control, though fighting persisted in surrounding areas. These responses, however, failed to reverse broader gains by Operation 1111 forces, who by March 2024 had seized 65 bases and outposts across the state. Atrocity claims against the intensified as its operations caused substantial civilian harm. Reports documented over 300 civilian deaths from escalated attacks in late 2023, coinciding with retreats during Operation 1111 and parallel offensives. groups, including Fortify Rights, detailed airstrikes as components of a systematic of atrocities, with specific incidents like an August 18, 2025, bombing in Karenni State killing at least 25 civilians in the deadliest single strike recorded there. The Center for previously identified patterns of civilian murders and use as human shields by forces in Karenni State, a tactic alleged to persist amid Operation 1111. and have characterized such actions since the 2021 coup as war crimes and , driven by impunity. The has consistently rejected these allegations, framing its operations as necessary countermeasures against "terrorist" exploiting civilian areas, though independent verification remains limited due to access restrictions. experts have urged accountability, highlighting the 's airstrike reliance as exacerbating humanitarian crises without proportionate military gains.

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