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State Administration Council

The State Administration Council (SAC) was the military-led provisional government of Myanmar, formed on 2 February 2021 immediately after the armed forces seized control from the elected National League for Democracy administration on 1 February 2021. Chaired by Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with Vice Senior General Soe Win as deputy, the SAC exercised sovereign executive, legislative, and judicial powers under a declared one-year state of emergency, later extended multiple times, on grounds of purported systemic irregularities and fraud in the November 2020 parliamentary elections that returned a supermajority for the incumbent party. Primarily composed of active-duty Tatmadaw officers, the council centralized authority to purportedly safeguard national stability, combat corruption, and facilitate a transition to elections after rectifying electoral discrepancies, though it has contended with widespread civil disobedience, formation of parallel opposition structures like the National Unity Government, and escalating armed insurgencies by ethnic militias and People's Defense Forces that have eroded its territorial control to under half the country by late 2024. In July 2025, as preparations advanced for nationwide polls, the SAC underwent restructuring into the National Security and Peace Commission, effectively concluding its four-year tenure as the paramount governing body while retaining core military leadership.

Background and Establishment

Electoral Disputes Leading to the Coup

The occurred on 8 November 2020 amid the , with approximately 27.5 million voters participating despite restrictions. The incumbent (NLD), led by State Counsellor , achieved a , securing 346 seats across the (), (), and state/region assemblies, exceeding the 322 seats needed to form the government. The military-affiliated (USDP) won only a fraction of contested seats, prompting immediate complaints from USDP leaders who demanded a nationwide re-run, citing procedural flaws and voter disenfranchisement in military strongholds. Post-election disputes intensified as the Myanmar (Tatmadaw), under Commander-in-Chief Senior General , alleged massive fraud orchestrated by the (UEC). Specific claims included irregularities in voter lists affecting up to 10.5 million cases, such as duplicate national registration card (NRC) numbers (sometimes with different names attached) and nearly 5 million entries lacking verifiable registration cards, potentially enabling repeat or ballot stuffing. The presented aggregated data from voter rolls showing these discrepancies but provided no independently audited raw lists, as final voter records were reportedly removed after the vote. publicly described "terrible fraud in the voter lists," arguing it invalidated the results and justified intervention to prevent constitutional deadlock. The USDP filed over 1,000 complaints with the UEC regarding vote cancellations in 40 townships and other administrative errors, though these were concentrated in areas where USDP support was historically higher. The UEC, appointed under NLD influence, dismissed the fraud allegations as unsubstantiated, emphasizing safeguards like indelible ink on voters' fingers and mobility curbs that limited repeat voting opportunities. Independent international observers offered mixed but generally skeptical assessments: Center noted voter list preparation challenges and opaque decision-making by the UEC but observed no widespread irregularities during voting itself. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) concluded there was no credible evidence of fraud on a scale to alter outcomes, deeming results "by and large representative of the will of the people" despite issues like arbitrary vote cancellations in conflict zones and discriminatory laws excluding groups such as the Rohingya from participation. These observers highlighted pre-existing voter roll inaccuracies—estimated in the millions from prior audits—but attributed them to outdated data rather than deliberate manipulation sufficient to overturn the NLD's landslide. Tensions escalated through December 2020 and January 2021, with the military issuing ultimatums for UEC-led recounts and investigations, while blocking the new -dominated parliament from convening on 1 February 2021 as scheduled. The invoked Article 417 of the 2008 Constitution, which permits declaring a for electoral disputes, but critics argued this required judicial or legislative validation absent in the process. The unresolved standoff, framed by the military as a defense against democratic erosion, directly precipitated the 1 February 2021 coup, during which leaders were detained and power transferred to the State Administration Council. Subsequent junta-appointed probes reaffirmed the fraud narrative but relied on post-coup data collection, raising questions about impartiality given the military's structural incentives to challenge dominance over constitutional reforms curbing its influence.

Formation of the SAC in February 2021

On 1 February 2021, Myanmar's , the , initiated a by detaining State Counsellor , President , and numerous National League for Democracy (NLD) officials, while blocking the convening of the newly elected parliament. Acting President , a retired general aligned with the military, declared a one-year and transferred executive, legislative, and judicial powers to Commander-in-Chief Senior General , citing alleged widespread in the November 2020 elections as justification. The following day, on 2 February 2021, the Office of the announced the formation of the State Administration Council () as the interim executive body to govern during the emergency period, with serving as its chairman and eight other senior military officers as members, alongside three civilian appointees, totaling 11 initial members. The was positioned to oversee administrative functions, implement the military's directives, and prepare for new elections after addressing purported voting irregularities, though independent verifications of the fraud claims were limited and contested by election monitors. This structure effectively centralized authority under military control, dissolving key civilian institutions and prompting immediate international condemnation from entities like the , which viewed the SAC's establishment as a consolidation of junta power rather than a temporary measure. The formation marked the formal replacement of the ousted NLD-led government with a military-dominated , setting the stage for ongoing governance amid rising domestic protests. The invoked Article 417 of Myanmar's 2008 Constitution as the legal foundation for its assumption of power, asserting that the provision empowered the declaration of a in response to internal disturbances threatening national stability. This article permits the to proclaim an upon the Commander-in-Chief's recommendation if the branch proves unable to govern amid natural disasters, external threats, or domestic upheaval endangering lives or sovereignty. On February 1, 2021, following the detention of U and other (NLD) leaders, Vice President —widely regarded as a military-aligned figure—formally declared the via Order No. 1/2021, transferring , legislative, and judicial authority to Commander-in-Chief and the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC), of which the SAC became the arm. The SAC's rationale centered on alleged widespread during the November 8, 2020, general elections, which it claimed invalidated the NLD's victory and risked precipitating unrest capable of eroding state cohesion. Military spokespersons, including , cited discrepancies in voter lists, duplicate votes, and procedural violations across thousands of polling stations, arguing these irregularities exceeded the Union Election Commission's (UEC) capacity for resolution and justified interim military administration to safeguard democratic processes. The one-year emergency period, extendable by the NDSC, was framed as a temporary measure to rectify these issues without permanently altering the constitutional framework, though critics, including constitutional scholars, contended that electoral disputes did not meet Article 417's threshold for "internal upheaval," as no widespread violence or governance collapse had occurred prior to the takeover. Among the SAC's proclaimed initial objectives were to conduct thorough probes into the purported fraud, revise electoral laws for transparency, update voter registries, and convene fresh multi-party elections under supervised conditions, with power handover pledged to the victors upon completion. emphasized in early addresses that these steps aimed to "discipline the country" and restore a functional free from manipulation, while also prioritizing economic continuity and public order amid nascent protests. The SAC positioned itself as a body, not a permanent regime, with the February 2, 2021, formation decree outlining 11 initial members tasked with interim governance until electoral rectification, though subsequent extensions of the emergency—renewed annually through 2025—have prolonged its rule.

Leadership and Organizational Structure

Key Members and Roles

The State Administration Council (SAC) was led by Senior General as Chairman, who concurrently held the positions of of the Defense Services and provisional (pro tem) , granting him overarching authority over military and executive functions following the February 1, 2021, coup. Vice Senior General Soe Win served as Vice-Chairman and Deputy of the Defense Services (Army), responsible for operational military command and acting as . Key supporting roles within the SAC included military and civilian appointees overseeing defense, security, and administration. The council's structure integrated high-ranking ( Armed Forces) officers with select union ministers, ensuring military dominance in governance.
MemberRole
U Nyo Saw and Union Minister for Planning and Economy, handling coordination.
U Aung Lin DweChief Executive of the Office of the and Security Council, managing strategic advisory functions.
General Maung Maung AyeUnion Minister for , overseeing military procurement and defense infrastructure.
Lt-Gen Tun Tun NaungUnion Minister for Home Affairs, responsible for and policing.
U Than SweUnion Minister for , directing diplomatic relations amid international isolation.
Lt-Gen Yar PyaeUnion Minister for Border Affairs, focusing on ethnic armed group negotiations and frontier security.
General Kyaw Swar LinChief of General Staff (, , ), coordinating tri-service operations.
General Ye Win OoJoint Chief Executive of the Office of the and Security Council and SAC Secretary, handling administrative and secretarial duties.
This core membership reflected the SAC's emphasis on military hierarchy, with roles often dual-hatted to consolidate power; expansions and reshuffles occurred over time to incorporate additional ministers, but the listed positions formed the foundational leadership until the SAC's into the State Security and Peace Commission in July 2025, retaining key figures like and Soe Win.

Changes in Membership and Reshuffles

The underwent at least 23 reshuffles and reappointments during its four-and-a-half-year tenure from February 2021 to July 2025, with a total of 33 individuals serving as members. These changes included the removal of at least three generals and 14 civilian members, often without publicly stated reasons, reflecting internal adjustments amid ongoing conflict and governance challenges. One notable early case involved Pugin Kanglian, who was appointed and removed within two weeks. In August 2022, the SAC announced a limited cabinet reshuffle, forcing the retirement of Immigration and Population Minister Khin Yi, Union Government Office Minister Chit Naing, and one deputy minister, alongside retirements at the central bank including the governor and a deputy governor, with the latter's subordinate promoted to the top role. Core leadership positions remained unchanged, with Senior General Min Aung Hlaing retaining the premiership, Vice Senior General Soe Win as deputy, and key ministers like Defense Minister General Mya Tun Oo and Transport Minister Admiral Tin Aung San in place. A subsequent adjustment in September 2022 discharged Deputy Prime Minister and Union Minister for Union Government Office 1 Lieutenant General Soe Htut from his duties. By early 2025, further military promotions sidelined senior commanders in favor of younger officers as part of a broader reshuffle. On January 31, 2025, the reorganized its to 35 members, transferring SAC members U Shwe Kyein and U Yan Kyaw to the Central Advisory Board, while also shifting the Minister for Home Affairs and the Minister for Border Affairs to new roles and announcing unspecified retirements. This followed a pattern of incremental adjustments, including a February 2024 reshuffle coinciding with the coup's third anniversary, which reconstituted parts of the . The SAC's most significant transformation occurred on July 31, 2025, when it was dissolved alongside the end of the , paving the way for December elections. stepped down as but assumed leadership of the new 10-member and Peace Commission, composed entirely of generals with half drawn from former SAC ranks, including Soe Win and Kyaw Swar Lin. An interim Union Government was appointed under U Nyo Saw, a business figure and advisor since 2023, with minimal cabinet alterations beyond omissions like the Ministry of Education initially. This rebranding maintained military dominance while redistributing civilian officials, such as into a new National Defense and Security Council advisory body led by Saw Tun Aung Myint.

Central Advisory Body and Supporting Entities

The Central Advisory Body of the State Administration Council (SAC) was formed on 1 February 2023 via Order No. 7/2023, pursuant to Article 419 of Myanmar's 2008 Constitution, which empowers emergency governance measures. This civilian-led group, initially comprising nine members, serves to furnish policy recommendations to the SAC on administrative, political, and ethnic affairs, drawing from representatives of political parties and ethnic organizations to supplement the military-dominated council. U Saw Tun Aung Myint, a former regional administrator, was appointed leader, with initial members including U Thein Nyunt ( of the New National Democracy Party), U Khin Maung Swe, Daw Aye Nu Sein, U Lone Sai, U Long Hseng, U Banyar Aung Moe, and U Maung Ha. Several members, such as Long Hseng and Banyar Aung Moe, faced international sanctions from the in 2024 and 2025 for their roles in endorsing decisions linked to restrictions and security operations. The body underwent adjustments, including the retirement of U Lone Sai on 10 January 2025 due to health issues, approved by Order No. 11/2025. Supporting entities for the SAC's advisory functions include subordinate administrative offices, such as the Office of the National Defence and Security Council, which handles order issuance, member appointments, and coordination of emergency governance tasks under SAC oversight. This office facilitated ongoing appointments, including deputy ministers and additional advisory roles via orders like No. 15/2025 for Central Advisory Body expansions. Other linked structures encompass specialized committees, such as those for ethnic affairs and border development, which provide operational input aligned with the advisory body's recommendations, though these remain under direct SAC control without independent authority. The framework persisted until the SAC's transition to the National Security and Peace Commission on 31 July 2025, after which a restructured 15-member advisory board was appointed under Order No. 10/2025, retaining core figures like Saw Tun Aung Myint as leader.

Domestic Policies and Governance

Military and Security Reforms

The State Administration Council activated the People's Military Service Law on February 10, 2024, enforcing for the first time since its 2010 enactment to address acute manpower shortages in the , which had reportedly dwindled to approximately 130,000 active personnel amid battlefield losses to ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces. Eligible conscripts include male citizens aged 18 to 35 and female citizens aged 18 to 27, with technical specialists up to age 45; mandatory service requires a minimum of two years, extendable to five years during the , and evasion carries penalties of up to five years' . The measure prompted widespread public panic, including a surge in applications, crossings, and reports of forced from streets and displacement camps, exacerbating flows estimated at 1.35 million externally and 2.6 million internally displaced persons. In response to perceived threats from online dissent and information operations supporting resistance groups, the SAC enacted the Cybersecurity Law effective January 1, 2025, imposing regulations on digital activities including criminal penalties for using virtual private networks (VPNs) to access blocked or share prohibited content. The law mandates registration of digital platforms and enhances surveillance capabilities, framed by the regime as necessary for national stability amid ongoing . Toward the end of its tenure, the facilitated the establishment of the State Security and Peace Commission on July 31, 2025, via National Defence and Security Council Order No. 4/2025 under Section 427 of the 2008 Constitution, to coordinate defence, security operations, peace processes, and preparations for multiparty elections following the repeal of the . Chaired by Senior General with Vice-Senior General Soe Win as vice-chairman and a membership of active and retired officers, the commission effectively restructured oversight of security functions as the SAC transitioned to a caretaker framework, though critics characterized it as a superficial retaining dominance without substantive .

Economic Stabilization Measures

Following the 2021 coup, the introduced to preserve reserves and curb , including restrictions on outward remittances and mandatory conversion of export earnings into kyat at official rates set by the (CBM). In June 2023, the SAC mandated that exporters surrender a portion of their foreign earnings to the CBM at non-market rates, reverting to a multi-tiered exchange system that diverged from black-market values, where the kyat depreciated to over 4,000 per USD by late 2023. These measures aimed to rebuild CBM reserves depleted by post-coup outflows, but they fostered parallel markets and reduced export incentives, as official rates undervalued foreign currency earnings. To combat inflation, which reached 25.4% by mid-2025 amid supply disruptions from conflict, the SAC imposed price caps on essential goods like rice, cooking oil, and fuel, alongside import bans on non-essentials to prioritize domestic production and conserve forex. Price controls were enforced through tax compliance drives and penalties on hoarders, yet they contributed to shortages and black-market premiums, as producers withheld supplies rather than sell at capped prices. In agriculture, a key sector employing over 60% of the workforce, the SAC promoted self-sufficiency via subsidies for rice and pulses, export incentives, and restrictions on farmland abandonment in conflict zones, though ongoing violence disrupted planting and harvests, reducing output by up to 20% in affected areas by 2022. Banking reforms under SAC oversight included capital controls and directives to state-owned banks to channel credit toward priority sectors like and , while private banks faced liquidity squeezes from deposit withdrawals and non-performing loans exceeding 10% by 2023. The CBM, aligned with SAC priorities, shifted toward forex accumulation over , printing kyat to finance military spending, which exacerbated despite stabilization rhetoric. These interventions, framed as essential for economic , prioritized survival over , yielding mixed results: modest reserve gains but persistent GDP contraction of 18% cumulatively from 2021-2023. The exercised direct legislative authority following the 2021 coup, invoking Section 417 of the Constitution to declare a , which it extended five times—initially for one year until February 2022, and subsequently until July 2025—to address alleged electoral irregularities and maintain order. This framework enabled the SAC to enact laws bypassing parliamentary processes, including amendments to the Penal Code that removed safeguards against arbitrary and , such as revisions to Sections 122 and 124A criminalizing more broadly. Additionally, the SAC promulgated the Political Parties Registration Law on January 26, 2023, mandating reregistration of all parties under stricter criteria, including bans on participation by individuals convicted of certain offenses, effectively sidelining opposition groups like the . In response to manpower shortages amid ongoing conflicts, the SAC activated the dormant People's Military Service Law on February 10, 2024, requiring mandatory service for males aged 18-35 and females aged 18-27 for a minimum of two years, with provisions for extension up to five years in wartime; implementation began in April 2024, drafting thousands despite widespread evasion and resistance. The SAC also enacted the Cybersecurity Law (No. 1/2025) on January 1, 2025, effective July 30, 2025, which expanded state oversight of digital communications, criminalized online and unauthorized VPN use, and authorized warrantless data access to curb perceived threats like and . To facilitate planned elections, a July 2025 electoral law imposed penalties including or death for obstructing polls, targeting amid territorial losses. Administratively, the SAC pursued centralization by purging thousands of civil servants deemed disloyal, particularly from the pre-coup administration, and replacing them with military officers and affiliates in key roles across ministries and local governance. It enacted the third amendment to the Law on May 28, 2025, streamlining disciplinary measures and loyalty oaths to enhance control over bureaucratic operations. At the local level, the SAC imposed in targeted townships—expanding to 63 by mid-2025—transferring administrative powers to military commanders for rapid security enforcement, while establishing four new ministries in 2023-2024 to handle civilian functions under direct military oversight, such as border affairs and natural resources. These measures prioritized operational continuity in junta-held areas but contributed to administrative vacuums in resistance-controlled territories.

Conflicts and Security Challenges

Outbreak of Armed Resistance

The shift from non-violent protests to armed resistance occurred as the intensified its crackdown on demonstrators following the , 2021, coup, with employing lethal force that resulted in over 1,000 protester deaths by May 2021. Local defense forces (LDFs), initially formed in mid-March 2021 to protect protesters in townships like , marked the earliest organized self-defense efforts, evolving into broader militias amid escalating junta violence. The first documented armed clash took place on March 28, 2021, during a protest in Tarhan village, Kalay Township, , where protesters exchanged fire with troops after security forces opened fire on the crowd. This incident, involving rudimentary weapons among civilians, signaled the breakdown of non-violent , as the (NUG)—a parallel entity formed by ousted parliamentarians—authorized the creation of the People's Defense Force (PDF) on May 5, 2021, to coordinate resistance nationwide. By April 2021, resistance expanded into ethnic border regions, with groups like the and breaking ceasefires and engaging SAC forces in Kayah (Karenni) State, where initial skirmishes involved ambushes on military convoys. Urban clashes followed, including a June 22, 2021, firefight in between PDF fighters and junta troops, resulting in at least four militia deaths and highlighting the spread of guerrilla tactics to major cities. These early engagements, often asymmetric and reliant on captured weapons, laid the groundwork for a nationwide , as civilian casualties from junta airstrikes and artillery—exceeding 2,000 by late 2021—further radicalized populations.

Conscription and Manpower Policies

The State Administration Council (SAC) activated the People's Military Service Law on February 10, , enforcing mandatory for the first time since its enactment in 2010, amid severe manpower shortages in the due to battlefield losses exceeding 5,000 personnel annually since the 2021 coup and widespread desertions. The law requires all male citizens aged 18 to 35—and professionals such as doctors or engineers up to age 45—to serve a minimum of two years in the armed forces, while women aged 18 to 27 (and professionals up to 35) face similar obligations, with service extendable to three years for specialists or up to five years in non-combat roles. Initial implementation targeted summoning up to eligible individuals, but enforcement has involved coercive tactics including arbitrary arrests, house-to-house raids, and pressure on local authorities to meet quotas, exacerbating public resistance and prompting mass border crossings estimated at over young people fleeing to neighboring , , and by mid-2024. documented cases of under-18 recruitment and forced participation, with the SAC's policies failing to stem desertion rates that reached 20-30% among conscripts due to inadequate training, poor pay, and frontline deployments against ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces. To address evasion, the SAC promulgated by-laws on January 23, 2025, prohibiting overseas travel for those receiving summons without central committee approval and imposing penalties including fines or imprisonment for non-compliance, while expanding recruitment drives in junta-controlled urban areas like and . These measures reflect the SAC's reliance on compulsory service to sustain a force strained by territorial losses covering over 40% of Myanmar's land by early 2025, though analysts note that conscription has fueled anti-junta sentiment and bolstered resistance recruitment rather than stabilizing manpower.

Counter-Insurgency Efforts and Territorial Dynamics

The State Administration Council (SAC) has prioritized air superiority and artillery barrages in its counter-insurgency campaigns against ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People's Defense Forces (PDFs), compensating for ground force limitations amid high attrition rates. Following the coordinated offensive known as Operation 1027, launched on October 27, 2023, by the Three Brotherhood Alliance (comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army), the SAC lost control of 24 towns across 17 townships in northern Shan State within the first year. In response, the junta deployed relentless airstrikes and drone operations to disrupt rebel supply lines and fortifications, enabling partial territorial recoveries such as the recapture of Lashio town by late 2024. To address manpower shortages exacerbated by desertions and casualties—estimated in the tens of thousands since the 2021 coup—the SAC enforced conscription decrees starting in February 2024, mandating service for males aged 18-35 and expanding to include women and older recruits by mid-2025. These measures, which involved forced recruitment drives in urban and rural areas, have bolstered infantry units for ground assaults but triggered widespread evasion, internal dissent, and cross-border flight, limiting their effectiveness in sustaining prolonged engagements. The SAC has also cultivated alliances with proxy militias, such as Pyusawhti groups, to conduct localized patrols and intelligence operations in ethnic minority regions, though these partnerships have proven unreliable amid shifting loyalties. Territorial dynamics reflect a fragmented landscape, with the retaining firm control over major cities, transportation hubs, and population-dense lowlands—encompassing roughly 70% of Myanmar's inhabitants—while resistance forces dominate peripheral border zones and rural interiors. As of October 2025, independent assessments place SAC-held territory at approximately 21% of the national total, contrasted with 42% under EAO and PDF control, and the remainder in contested flux; these figures underscore the junta's reliance on aerial to deny rebels consolidation rather than achieve outright reconquest. Operation 1027's successes catalyzed broader resistance coordination, including advances by the in and PDF expansions in and Magway regions, yet internecine rivalries among EAOs—over resources and administration—have afforded the SAC opportunities for divide-and-rule tactics. Recent counteroffensives in 2025, bolstered by Russian-supplied weaponry and Chinese-mediated ceasefires with select border groups, have reclaimed pockets in northern Shan and Kachin States, signaling a potential rather than decisive reversal. However, the junta's territorial persists due to dynamics, where resistance networks exploit mountainous terrain and local intelligence to evade conventional assaults, perpetuating a protracted with no clear path to SAC dominance.

International Relations and Recognition

Imposition of Sanctions and Diplomatic Responses

Following the 1 February 2021 coup, the United States imposed targeted sanctions on members of the State Administration Council (SAC), including asset freezes and visa restrictions on key figures such as coup leader Min Aung Hlaing, for their roles in undermining democracy and suppressing protests. On 17 May 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department designated 13 SAC officials and family members, citing violent repression of pro-democracy movements, and expanded measures to military-linked entities for revenue generation supporting the regime. By 2025, these sanctions encompassed a broad range of military-affiliated companies, aiming to disrupt funding for ongoing conflicts, though the SAC has evaded some through foreign banking channels and rebranding efforts. The responded with sanctions on eight individuals, three economic entities, and the War Veterans Organisation shortly after the coup, focusing on those responsible for the power seizure and human rights abuses. The enacted asset freezes and travel bans on three SAC members on 18 February 2021, later broadening to additional regime figures. , alongside allies, targeted further entities like the SAC's State Security and Peace Commission in 2025 calls, addressing sanction loopholes amid the junta's planned elections. Diplomatic responses from Western nations and the emphasized non-recognition of the SAC's legitimacy, with the U.S. and refusing to accept credentials at international forums and supporting the parallel (NUG) in credential disputes. The UN has not granted formal recognition to the SAC, viewing the coup as unconstitutional, while urging member states to withhold legitimacy from the regime's actions. ASEAN adopted a Five-Point Consensus in April 2021, calling for an end to violence, , and humanitarian access, but implementation has stalled, with the SAC rejecting mediation efforts and excluding invited envoys. By May 2025, ASEAN reiterated the consensus and demanded an extended , yet divisions persist, as some members engage the SAC bilaterally while others, alongside UN experts, condemned planned 2025 elections as illegitimate without inclusive . ASEAN has not explicitly recognized the SAC or NUG, maintaining a stance on representation. China and Russia provided de facto support to the SAC, with Beijing offering economic engagement and diplomatic backing post-coup, enabling sanction evasion through trade and arms channels. Russia similarly supplied military aid, helping the junta bypass Western restrictions on weapons and revenue, as evidenced by continued exports despite global isolation. This alignment has allowed the SAC to sustain operations amid broader diplomatic isolation from democratic states.

Alliances with Key Partners

The State Administration Council () has relied heavily on alliances with and for military, economic, and diplomatic support following the 2021 coup, compensating for isolation from Western countries and much of . has become Myanmar's largest arms supplier, delivering at least $406 million in arms, ammunition, and related materials from state-owned entities between 2021 and 2023, including fighter jets, helicopters, and missiles critical for counter-insurgency operations. Bilateral ties deepened further in March 2025 during SAC leader Min Aung Hlaing's visit to , where discussions focused on expanding defense cooperation and positioning Myanmar as a key Russian partner in amid shared experiences with internal conflicts. China's support emphasizes strategic economic interests, including border security, energy pipelines, and rare earth minerals, viewing the SAC as essential to preventing state fragmentation that could spill over into province. In early 2025, escalated , including technical assistance and mediation in ceasefires with northern ethnic militias like the , to stabilize junta-held territories. By October 2025, pledged financial and logistical support for the SAC's planned elections, marking a shift from earlier ambivalence to overt backing amid rebel advances. This assistance has included dual-use goods and imports exceeding $1 billion since the coup, enabling sustained air operations against resistance forces. India has pursued a more hedged engagement with the SAC, prioritizing counter-terrorism along the 1,643-kilometer shared border and infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport, while trade volumes reached $2.1 billion in fiscal year 2024-25. New Delhi has hosted SAC officials and provided humanitarian aid but simultaneously contacted ethnic armed organizations controlling peripheral regions, reflecting concerns over instability rather than unqualified alliance. Critics, including regional analysts, argue this approach indirectly enables the junta by forgoing stronger pressure for democratic restoration, though India cites balancing Chinese influence as a rationale.

Debates on Legitimacy and International Standing

The State Administration Council (SAC) has justified its seizure of power on February 1, 2021, by invoking provisions in Myanmar's 2008 Constitution, which permit the to assume control during a to address alleged in the November 2020 elections. Supporters of the SAC, including its leadership, argue that this action preserved national stability against what they describe as irregularities favoring the (NLD), though independent verification of fraud claims remains contested and unproven by international observers. Critics, including the (NUG) and (CRPH), contend that the takeover constituted an unconstitutional coup, violating democratic mandates and lacking broad popular consent, as evidenced by widespread protests and armed resistance that control an estimated 42% of as of October 2025. Internationally, the SAC faces near-universal non-recognition from Western governments and bodies like the , where Special Rapporteur declared it "illegal and illegitimate" in January 2023, urging states to deny diplomatic engagement. This stance reflects concerns over abuses and suppression of dissent, yet de facto interactions persist due to SAC's control over 21-50% of territory, including 77% of major urban centers, enabling pragmatic dealings in trade and border issues. and have provided material and diplomatic support, viewing the SAC as a stabilizing force against chaos, while the regime has gradually reduced isolation through regional outreach, such as objecting to Timor-Leste's accession in July 2025 to assert influence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations () maintains an ambiguous position, adhering to its non-interference principle while endorsing the unfulfilled Five-Point Consensus of 2021, which calls for dialogue without explicitly affirming SAC legitimacy. Internal divisions hinder unified action, with members like facilitating engagement, but recent calls from UN experts and rights groups urge to reject SAC's planned December 2025 elections as a "sham" designed to entrench military rule amid ongoing conflict and restricted freedoms. In August 2025, the SAC rescinded its four-year emergency declaration and formed a administration, positioning the vote—starting December 28—for 310 parliamentary seats—as a step toward legitimacy, though opponents dismiss it as rigged, citing battlefield losses and exclusion of key actors. This maneuver underscores a broader legitimacy contest, where SAC's territorial hold contrasts with NUG's normative appeals, yet empirical control over economic hubs sustains its international standing despite formal isolation.

Transition and Future Plans

Establishment of Caretaker Mechanisms

On July 31, 2025, the State Administration Council (SAC) declared an end to the state of emergency that had been in effect since the February 2021 coup, marking the seventh such extension. This announcement coincided with the dissolution of the SAC and the establishment of a new interim Union Government, described as a caretaker administration to oversee preparations for general elections tentatively scheduled for December 2025. The move was presented as a step toward political normalization, with the SAC stating it would enable more efficient governance during the transitional phase. The new caretaker government was formalized on August 1, 2025, through Order No. 3/2025, appointing a cabinet led by Nyo Saw, a close adviser to SAC Chairman Senior General and head of military-linked conglomerates. Nyo Saw convened the cabinet's first meeting on August 2, 2025, focusing on administrative continuity and election logistics. However, effective control remained with the military; transitioned to chair a newly formed State Security and Prosperity Council (SSPC), comprising 10 members including key SAC loyalists, which retained authority over security, defense, and foreign affairs. Critics, including opposition groups, characterized this as a superficial rebranding, with no substantive devolution of power from the military, as the SSPC holds veto rights over major decisions. At the subnational level, the caretaker mechanisms extended to appointing chief ministers for states and regions, alongside the creation of electoral oversight bodies under military supervision. These included and township-level committees tasked with and setup, though operations were limited to junta-controlled territories amid ongoing armed conflicts that control over 60% of the country remains contested. The , restructured under the interim framework, was mandated to conduct the vote, but reports indicated restrictions on opposition participation and media access, raising doubts about the process's inclusivity. This setup echoed the 2021 SAC reformation into a but was explicitly tied to the 2025 electoral timeline, with signaling intent to run for president post-election.

Preparations for Political Transition

Following the 2021 coup, the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Senior General , initially pledged to hold nationwide elections within one year to restore democratic rule, but repeatedly extended the , citing ongoing armed resistance and security challenges as justifications for delays. The emergency, first declared on February 1, 2021, was prolonged six times, with the most recent extension in January 2025 granting an additional six months until July 31, 2025. In March 2024, indicated that the upcoming vote might not cover all regions due to conflict zones, reflecting territorial limitations on preparations. Preparatory measures accelerated in late 2024, including a and census conducted from October 1 to 15, intended to update voter rolls amid criticisms of incomplete coverage in resistance-held areas. The (UEC), restructured under SAC oversight, eased party registration rules in early 2024 to facilitate participation, though major opposition groups like the (NLD) remain dissolved or excluded. By April 2025, the SAC reaffirmed plans for multi-party elections in the second half of the year, with institutional redesigns aimed at ensuring military-aligned continuity, including proxy parties and electoral laws favoring supporters. On July 31, 2025, the formally ended the after 4.5 years, dissolving the council and transitioning to a civilian-led under , who retained overarching military authority as . This shift positioned the regime for phased general elections, with the UEC announcing the first phase to commence on December 28, 2025, targeting legislative seats in the and . International observers, including the UN, have described these steps as lacking credibility, arguing they serve to legitimize rather than enable genuine transition, given restrictions on free , assembly, and opposition amid ongoing atrocities. China, however, pledged support for the process in November 2024, viewing it as advancing reconciliation.

Recent Developments in 2024-2025

In 2024, the faced significant territorial losses to ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People's Defense Forces (PDFs), particularly following the escalation of into northern and eastern regions, resulting in the capture of key towns in and the loss of two regional military commands. By mid-2024, SAC forces had ceded control over substantial peripheral areas in Rakhine, Kachin, and Kayah States, with reports documenting over 200 air strikes on civilian sites in Karen State alone from 2021 to June 2024. These setbacks prompted intensified under a enacted in February 2024, which involved forced drives affecting thousands, including minors and displaced persons, to bolster manpower amid high rates. By early 2025, the SAC shifted tactics toward heavy reliance on air power and artillery to reclaim ground, achieving partial successes such as truces with the (MNDAA) in northern and maintaining neutrality pacts with the (UWSA), which halted some insurgent advances as of 2025. A 7.7-magnitude on March 28, 2025, along the Sagaing Fault exacerbated humanitarian crises, with SAC military operations continuing amid relief efforts, leading to documented attacks on community infrastructure in southeast through June 2025. On , 2025, the SAC enacted a Cybersecurity Law to regulate online activities and enhance digital , amid broader governance breakdowns in , , and taxation. Politically, SAC leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing announced the partial lifting of the on July 31, 2025, in select regions, followed by a full extension end on August 1 to facilitate preparations for nationwide elections slated for late December 2025, though these plans have been criticized as unfeasible given ongoing conflict and lack of legitimacy. assumed formal presidential duties by July 2024 and conducted diplomatic outreach, including a second visit to in late August 2025 for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, signaling efforts to counter despite persistent sanctions. Economically, conflict and survival-focused policies continued to suppress growth, with foreign investment climates deteriorating further into 2025.

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