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Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the standing decision-making organ of the () charged with promoting peace, security, and stability across the continent through conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Established under the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, adopted on 9 July 2002 in , , and entering into force on 26 December 2003 after ratification by the required number of member states, the PSC serves as the centerpiece of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It comprises 15 member states elected by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the Assembly, with 10 serving two-year terms and 5 serving three-year terms to ensure equitable regional representation: four from Western , three each from Southern, Central, and Eastern , and two from Northern . Membership selection prioritizes states with demonstrated commitments to peace, security, and financial obligations, though political considerations often influence outcomes. The PSC's mandate includes early warning and preventive diplomacy, authorizing peace support operations, recommending AU intervention in cases of grave threats like or war crimes, imposing sanctions against unconstitutional changes of government, and fostering cooperation with regional economic communities and international partners. Since becoming operational in early 2004, it has authorized nine AU-mandated peace support missions, including the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which deployed over 20,000 troops to combat al-Shabaab and stabilize the region from 2007 until its transition to the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in 2022. These efforts have contributed to restoring order in post-conflict states like and , yet the PSC's interventions have often relied heavily on external funding from the and , exposing dependencies that undermine African-led solutions. Despite its ambitions, the PSC has encountered controversies over inconsistent , reluctance to address root causes such as deficits fueling conflicts, and structural gaps in its that limit enforcement powers and adaptability to evolving threats like transnational and climate-induced . Critics, including analyses from think tanks, highlight how competing national interests among members and chronic underfunding have hampered effectiveness, as seen in delayed or diluted responses to crises in Ethiopia's and Sudan's ongoing civil war. These challenges underscore the tension between the PSC's normative framework and practical implementation, prompting calls for reforms to enhance its and .

Origins and Establishment

Pre-AU Security Frameworks

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded on May 25, 1963, in , , by 32 independent African states, enshrined principles of non-interference, , and peaceful settlement of disputes in its , which limited its role in internal conflicts to diplomatic upon request by member states. This approach reflected the priority of and anti-apartheid struggles, with security efforts focused on supporting liberation movements through the OAU's Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, established in 1963 and headquartered in , , which channeled resources to armed groups in Portuguese colonies, , and until the early 1990s. However, the 's Article III emphasized mutual non-aggression and respect for borders, constraining proactive and resulting in responses to intra-state crises, such as failed attempts in the (1967–1970) and the (1960–1965). To formalize dispute resolution, the OAU established the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration in 1964 under a dedicated , headquartered in , tasked with facilitating voluntary arbitration and advisory opinions on inter-state disputes. Despite its mandate, the Commission handled only a handful of cases over three decades, undermined by the lack of enforcement mechanisms, member states' reluctance to submit to binding decisions, and resource shortages, rendering it largely ineffective for addressing the surge in civil wars during the and . Responding to escalating intra-African conflicts, including those in (1989), (1991), and (1994), the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Cairo Declaration on July 31, 1993, establishing the for Prevention, Management, and (MCPMR) as a permanent structure within the OAU . The MCPMR, operationalized through a Central Organ with three levels—Authority of Heads of State, Ministerial Committee, and Ambassadorial Committee—aimed to anticipate conflicts via early warning, undertake diplomatic peacemaking, and support peace processes, while retaining the consensus-based decision-making and non-coercion principles of the OAU Charter. It included a Conflict Management Division in and regional offices, facilitating interventions such as in (1994) and the , though constrained by annual budgets under $1 million, dependence on voluntary contributions, and the inability to deploy military forces without host consent. In June 1998, the OAU further refined the MCPMR through the Lomé Declaration, enhancing its early warning capabilities and authorizing observer missions, but persistent funding deficits and adherence to non-indifference exceptions only for extreme cases limited its scope. These frameworks marked a tentative shift from strict non-interventionism toward preventive diplomacy, yet their reactive, under-resourced nature—evident in failures to halt genocides or widespread coups—highlighted the OAU's structural inadequacies, paving the way for the more robust African Peace and Security Architecture under the AU.

Adoption of the Constitutive Protocol

The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the , serving as its constitutive instrument, was adopted on July 9, 2002, during the inaugural Ordinary Session of the Assembly in , . This protocol operationalized Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act of 2000, which had provisionally established the as one of the Union's principal organs but deferred detailed mandates and structures to subsequent elaboration. The adoption reflected a among heads of state to institutionalize a continental mechanism for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts, drawing from lessons of prior regional security shortcomings, such as the limited efficacy of the Organization of Unity's non-interventionist approaches during crises like in 1994. The session marked the formal transition from the OAU to the framework, with the 's text emphasizing proactive intervention principles, including the right to suspend governments that undermine or commit atrocities, as outlined in 4(p) of the Constitutive Act. Negotiations leading to adoption involved input from the AU's predecessor structures and , prioritizing over strict sovereignty to address recurring intra-state conflicts. The required by at least 15 member states to enter into force, a threshold met through subsequent accessions. Entry into force occurred on December 26, 2003, following the 15th deposit, enabling the PSC's operational launch in , , with initial meetings commencing in 2004. By March 2017, all 54 AU members had signed, and 53 had ratified, underscoring broad continental endorsement despite varying implementation capacities. This adoption phase highlighted the AU's intent to position the PSC as Africa's primary security decision-making body, complementary to but distinct from frameworks.

Institutional Design

Membership and Representation

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the consists of fifteen member states, all possessing equal voting rights and serving without permanent membership status. Unlike the , the PSC features no veto powers or designated permanent seats, emphasizing collective decision-making among elected representatives. Members are elected by the AU Assembly, following recommendations from the AU Executive Council, to ensure broad continental participation in peace and security matters. Election to the PSC adheres to specific criteria outlined in Article 5(2) of the Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, adopted on July 9, 2002, in , . These include a state's commitment to AU principles, contributions to peace and security efforts (with experience in peace support operations as an advantage), capacity to fulfill membership responsibilities, participation in at regional and continental levels, willingness to lead initiatives, financial contributions to the AU Peace Fund, adherence to constitutional governance, , and per the Lomé Declaration, maintenance of adequately staffed missions at AU and UN headquarters, and fulfillment of financial obligations to the AU. The Assembly conducts periodic reviews to verify ongoing compliance with these standards. To promote equitable , membership incorporates and regional across 's five geographic regions, with seats allocated as follows: four to Western Africa, three each to Central, Eastern, and , and two to Northern Africa. Terms are staggered for continuity, with ten members serving two-year terms and five serving three-year terms; retiring members remain eligible for immediate re-election, allowing capable states repeated involvement without entrenching any single nation. This structure, operational since the PSC's activation on May 26, 2004, following the Protocol's on December 26, 2003, aims to reflect diverse interests while enabling responsive action on conflicts.
RegionSeats
Western Africa4
Central Africa3
Eastern Africa3
Southern Africa3
Northern Africa2

Leadership and Operational Procedures

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is chaired by a rotating Chairperson selected from among its 15 member states, with the position held in English of the countries' names for one calendar month at a time. This monthly rotation ensures equitable representation and prevents dominance by any single member, as stipulated in the . The presides over sessions, drafts provisional agendas and work programs, draws attention to emerging threats, and represents the PSC in external engagements, such as coordination with the UN Security Council. The Chairperson is supported by a , typically comprising the current , the incoming , and a , which facilitates continuity in operations. Subsidiary structures include the Committee of Experts, which assists in elaborating draft decisions and reports, and the Military Staff Committee, which provides technical advice on peace support operations. These bodies operate under the PSC's overarching rules, adopted pursuant to its to govern internal processes. Operationally, the PSC convenes in ordinary sessions at least twice per month at the ambassadorial level (Permanent Representatives), with flexibility for ministerial or Heads of State and Government meetings based on urgency. Extraordinary sessions can be called by the or a majority of members to address immediate crises. A of two-thirds of the total membership is required for proceedings. Decisions prioritize among members; in its absence, they are adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Council. Sessions may be open to non-members like states or closed for sensitive deliberations, with the PSC submitting its detailed rules of procedure for Assembly approval to ensure procedural transparency.

Core Mandate and Powers

Fundamental Objectives

The fundamental objectives of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), as outlined in Article 3 of its establishing adopted on July 9, 2002, in , , are to promote peace, security, and stability across to ensure the of its peoples and states while fostering socio-economic . This primary aim addresses the interconnectedness of security and development, recognizing that instability undermines continental progress, as evidenced by the Protocol's emphasis on guaranteeing foundational conditions for growth amid historical challenges like post-colonial conflicts. A second core objective is to anticipate, prevent, and mitigate disputes, conflicts, and crises through mechanisms such as early warning systems and proactive interventions to halt escalation. This preventive focus builds on lessons from prior African security arrangements, like the Organization of African Unity's non-interventionist stance, by empowering the to act decisively before situations deteriorate, as seen in its mandate for timely responses to emerging threats. The PSC also seeks to harmonize and coordinate member states' efforts in peace and security matters, promoting unified African approaches over fragmented national policies. Finally, it aims to formulate a common , including a collective defense framework, to enable joint responses to external and internal threats, reflecting the Protocol's vision of pooled sovereignty for continental resilience. These objectives collectively position the PSC as the African Union's principal organ for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, operationalized since its on December 26, 2003.

Authorization Mechanisms

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorizes peace support operations through its mandate under Article 7(1)(c) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, which empowers it to mount and deploy such missions as a core function for conflict management and resolution. These operations, including the deployment of the , require PSC approval of detailed tasks, mandates, and guidelines, which it reviews periodically to adapt to evolving threats. The PSC's Peace Support Operations Division subsequently plans, launches, sustains, and monitors authorized missions, ensuring compliance with PSC directives. For more coercive measures, the PSC recommends to the AU Assembly military intervention in member states facing grave circumstances, such as war crimes, , or , as outlined in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act; the PSC also approves the modalities for any such Assembly-authorized intervention under Article 7(1)(e) and (f) of the . Additionally, the PSC institutes targeted sanctions against perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government, in line with the Declaration, as part of its preventive and punitive toolkit. Member states commit to accepting and implementing PSC decisions, providing a basis for enforcement through cooperation on troop contributions and logistics. Decisions on authorizations follow procedures in Article 8 of the , prioritizing among members; absent , substantive matters require a two-thirds majority vote of members present, while procedural issues need only a . A of two-thirds of the 15-member Council is mandatory for meetings, which occur regularly at ambassadorial, ministerial, or summit levels. PSC-authorized enforcement actions, including interventions, must seek prior approval from the UN Security Council under Article 53 of the UN , reflecting the PSC's coordination with the UN for logistical and financial support via Chapter VIII mechanisms. This framework has enabled nine AU-mandated peace support operations since 2003, though transitions to UN-backed missions often follow initial PSC deployments.

Operational Interventions

Framework for Peace Support Operations

The framework for peace support operations (PSOs) under the Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) is established primarily through the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, adopted on 9 July 2002 in , , and entered into force on 26 December 2003 following by the required number of member states. Article 7(1)(c) empowers the PSC to "authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions," while Article 7(1)(d) mandates it to "lay down general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandate thereof, and undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines." These provisions enable the PSC to deploy operations ranging from observation and to more robust interventions in response to conflicts, drawing on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Authorization for PSOs requires a decision by the , typically acting under Article 7 of the Protocol, with the Chairperson of the Commission recommending deployment options based on assessments from the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The may invoke Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act for interventions in grave circumstances such as war crimes, , or , bypassing traditional non-interference principles when is at stake. Decisions are made by or a two-thirds majority of members present, as per the PSC's Rules of Procedure, and operations must align with modalities approved by the , including mandates for stabilization, , or protection of civilians. The framework emphasizes coordination with (RECs), allowing hybrid missions where REC forces form the backbone under oversight. Central to the operational framework is the (ASF), outlined in Article 13 of the , which envisions multidisciplinary standby contingents from member states for rapid deployment in PSOs. The ASF Policy Framework, adopted in 2003 and revised in subsequent years, defines four scenarios for response: regional observation/monitoring (preparable in 30 days), /stabilization (30 days), rapid intervention in grave circumstances (14 days), and post-conflict reconstruction. These contingents include military, police, and civilian elements, supported by the Military Staff Committee for strategic advice on requirements and . Although full operationalization of the ASF has faced delays—targeted for 2010 but remaining partially implemented as of 2025—the framework integrates ASF principles into AU-led missions, with PSOD responsible for policy development, , and building. Guiding principles for PSOs, as embedded in the PSC Protocol's Article 4 and elaborated in the AU Peace Support Operations Doctrine, include respect for and , promotion of peaceful settlement, impartiality, and the use of force only in or as mandated, while prioritizing African solutions to African problems. The doctrine, revised to incorporate multidimensional approaches, stresses consent of parties where feasible, coordination with humanitarian actors, and protection of civilians, drawing lessons from missions like AMISOM. Oversight involves regular PSC reviews of mission performance, with the implementing directives and reporting progress, ensuring through mechanisms like the African Union Mission Evaluation System. Financing remains a core challenge, relying on the AU Peace Fund, assessed contributions, and external partnerships, such as UN reimbursements authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023) for up to two missions annually.

Key Historical Missions

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), deployed from February 2003 to October 2004, marked the inaugural armed peace support operation mandated by the African Union, preceding the full operationalization of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) but laying groundwork for its subsequent interventions. Authorized on 2 April 2003 by the AU's Central Organ to support the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, monitor ceasefires, and protect political actors, AMIB comprised approximately 1,350 troops primarily from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, replacing an earlier South African protection detachment. The mission facilitated the disarmament of militias and contributed to Burundi's transitional elections, though hampered by funding shortages and attacks on personnel, before transitioning to the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The PSC's first major authorized operation was the (AMIS) in , established on 24 May 2004 and deployed from July 2004 to December 2007 to monitor the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004, protect civilians, and ensure humanitarian access amid allegations. Expanding under AMIS II in October 2004, the mission peaked at around 7,730 military personnel, police, and civilians from troop-contributing countries including , , , and , but struggled with vast terrain, Sudanese government non-cooperation, and inadequate logistics, deploying only partially despite a mandated 11,171 authorized strength. AMIS mediated ceasefires and reduced violence in monitored areas but failed to halt atrocities comprehensively, leading to its hybrid transition into the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in (UNAMID) via UN Security Council 1769 on 31 July 2007. A cornerstone of PSC-led efforts has been the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), authorized by PSC Communiqué PSC/MIN/Comm.(CLXXV) on 19 January 2007 and initially deployed in March 2007 to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), stabilize Mogadishu, and counter Al-Shabaab insurgents following the failed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) deployment. Mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1744, AMISOM evolved from protecting key infrastructure to offensive operations, peaking at over 22,000 troops from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone, enabling the liberation of territory, TFG parliamentary functions, and the 2012 provisional constitution adoption. Despite over 2,000 peacekeeper fatalities and reliance on UN-assessed contributions for 75% of funding, AMISOM reduced Al-Shabaab-controlled areas from 40% of Somalia in 2011 to under 10% by 2021, concluding on 31 December 2022 with transition to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Other early PSC-authorized missions included the African Union Military Observer Mission in (AMIOMCom), deployed from 14 July 2006 to December 2006 with 41 observers to verify and support post-coup elections under the 2000 Fomboni Declaration. These operations underscored the PSC's emphasis on rapid response to intra-state conflicts but highlighted persistent challenges in self-financing, with missions often dependent on external donors like the and UN for sustainment.

Recent Deployments and Activities

In , the PSC authorized the transition from the Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to the Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) effective January 1, 2025, with an initial mandate of 1,167 personnel focused on supporting Somali security forces against al-Shabaab, alongside capacity-building and stabilization efforts. AUSSOM, comprising troops and police from contributing countries including and , has faced persistent funding shortfalls, prompting PSC calls for predictable financing from international partners during its 1287th meeting on July 3, 2025. The conducted multiple field missions in 2025 to assess conflict dynamics firsthand, including a visit to , , from August 10 to 12, amid delays in the transitional process and rising inter-communal violence, where council members urged extension of the unity government beyond December 2024. Similar missions targeted , the , , and to evaluate needs and local stabilization, reflecting the council's emphasis on direct engagement over large-scale troop deployments. In response to escalating crises without authorizing new military operations, the PSC held emergency sessions, such as the 1256th ministerial meeting on January 28, 2025, condemning M23 advances in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and calling for diplomatic pressure on , while endorsing sanctions against spoilers. On the Sahel, the 1304th meeting on September 30, 2025, highlighted jihadist expansion and state fragility in , , and , advocating enhanced AU-ECOWAS coordination but noting limited PSC intervention capacity following the 2023 dissolution of the Joint Force. These activities underscore the PSC's pivot toward hybrid approaches combining , targeted consultations like the November 2023 deployment of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration expert to , and reliance on for operational execution.

International and Regional Relations

Coordination with the United Nations

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the maintains a structured partnership with the (UNSC), rooted in Article 17 of the , which mandates close cooperation given the UNSC's primary responsibility for international peace and security under Chapter VII of the . This includes provisions for periodic consultations, mutual briefings on threats to peace, and the PSC's ability to request UNSC enforcement actions or support when African mechanisms prove insufficient. The arrangement aligns with Chapter VIII of the , enabling regional organizations like the AU to address continental threats while seeking UN endorsement for enforcement measures. A cornerstone of this coordination is the Joint United Nations-African Union for Enhanced Partnership in and , signed on 19 April 2017 by the UN Secretary-General and AU . The framework emphasizes joint early warning, conflict prevention, mediation, and post-conflict reconstruction, with specific commitments to align AU and UN agendas on , counter-terrorism, and women, , and security initiatives. It facilitates information-sharing through mechanisms like the Joint UN-AU Strategic Assessment Group and promotes UN financial and logistical support for AU-led operations authorized by the UNSC. The UNSC routinely authorizes PSC-mandated peace support operations under Article 53 of the UN Charter, which requires such endorsement for enforcement actions by regional arrangements; as of 2023, nine operations, including those in and the , have received this backing. UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023) further advanced coordination by establishing a framework for UN assessed contributions to fund up to 75% of qualified peace operations, addressing chronic financing gaps while mandating PSC-UNSC reporting on eligibility criteria like mission planning and compliance. This financial linkage has been operationalized through joint reviews, though implementation remains tied to case-by-case UNSC approvals. Institutional dialogues sustain ongoing alignment, including annual consultative meetings and joint informal seminars between the PSC and UNSC, which in October 2025 addressed synergies in AU-led operations and UN . Enhanced coordination with the members of the UNSC (A3 plus one), formalized in a manual adopted by the PSC on 24 July 2025, enables pre-UNSC briefings on issues and joint advocacy for continent-specific priorities. These mechanisms, complemented by UN Office to the AU liaison efforts, ensure tactical-level collaboration on early warning and rapid response, as evidenced by aligned positions on instability and transitions.

Interaction with Regional Economic Communities

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the collaborates with (RECs) under the principle, whereby RECs hold primary responsibility for peace and security in their respective regions, while the PSC provides continental oversight, harmonization, and support for cross-border or continent-wide threats. This framework is outlined in Article 16 of the PSC Protocol, adopted on 9 July 2002 and entering into force on 26 December 2003, which mandates the PSC to coordinate actions with RECs, facilitate , and ensure alignment with policies. The 2008 Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs further operationalizes this by establishing binding principles for joint early warning, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction, including reciprocal invitations to meetings and shared use of continental resources like the . Coordination mechanisms include annual joint consultative meetings between the PSC and RECs/regional mechanisms (RMs), initiated in 2021, to review progress on shared priorities such as structural prevention and transitions. For instance, the Fourth I-RECKE Session on 16 July 2025 convened the AU Commission with RECs to advance continental structural prevention frameworks. These platforms emphasize information sharing and capacity-building, with the PSC often endorsing REC-led initiatives to legitimize them internationally and secure funding, such as through partnerships. Practical cooperation is evident in endorsed REC missions. In West Africa, the PSC authorized the ECOWAS-led African-led International Support Mission to (AFISMA) on 27 January 2013, deploying 3,300 troops initially to combat Islamist insurgents, which later transitioned into the UN's MINUSMA with PSC support. Similarly, in the Gambia crisis of 2016–2017, the PSC endorsed the ECOWAS Mission in (ECOMIG) on 13 January 2017, facilitating the peaceful after the . In the Horn of Africa, the PSC authorized the IGAD-supported African Union Mission in (AMISOM) on 19 January 2007, evolving into the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) by 2022 and the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) authorized on 3 July 2025, involving up to 11,900 troops from IGAD states to counter Al-Shabaab. In Southern Africa, the PSC endorsed the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) on 15 July 2021, deploying 1,000 troops to Cabo Delgado against insurgents, and the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of (SAMIDRC) on 7 December 2023, with 5,000 personnel to stabilize eastern provinces amid M23 rebel advances, though SAMIDRC's mandate ended on 13 March 2025 due to operational challenges. These cases illustrate the PSC's role in providing political backing and , though implementation often faces gaps in funding and harmonization.

Assessment of Performance

Documented Achievements

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has authorized and overseen peace support operations that have contributed to stabilizing select conflict-affected regions. The African Mission in (AMIB), deployed from April 2003 with PSC involvement following the Protocol's , monitored ceasefire agreements, facilitated , , and reintegration processes under the Arusha Peace Agreement, and supported the restoration of constitutional order, marking an early milestone in African-led that helped end a decade-long . In , the PSC-authorized Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), launched on 19 January 2007 with up to 8,000 troops, achieved territorial recoveries from Al-Shabaab militants, protected key urban centers including , and enabled the Somali Federal Government to extend authority, thereby reducing the group's operational capacity and fostering efforts over 16 years until its transition to ATMIS in 2022. The has advanced preventive frameworks through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the Continental Early Warning System operationalized since 2002 and the Panel of the Wise established in 2007, which have supported in over 20 conflict situations by providing early alerts and high-level diplomatic interventions to avert escalations. Under the Silencing the Guns initiative, endorsed by the PSC at its 648th meeting on 16 January 2017 via the Master Roadmap of Practical Steps, the Council has coordinated efforts to address root causes of instability, resulting in the cessation of active armed conflicts in several countries and the reintegration of thousands of ex-combatants through post-conflict reconstruction programs. The PSC's enforcement of suspensions against member states following unconstitutional changes of government—such as in (2020 and 2021 coups) and (2019)—has pressured rapid returns to transitional arrangements, with at least five instances since 2004 leading to elections or power-sharing deals that restored partial constitutional .

Criticisms and Systemic Failures

The (PSC) of the has faced persistent criticism for its inability to enforce decisions, with over 90% of its more than 1,157 meetings since producing outcomes that often go unimplemented due to weak drafting, absence of mechanisms, and insufficient allocation of resources or timelines. This undermines the PSC's credibility, as member states frequently prioritize national interests over collective action, lacking formal legal tools to compel compliance. For instance, a PSC decision to establish a sanctions was delayed for over a decade before prioritization, while a 2020 resolution to deploy 3,000 troops to the remains unexecuted. In managing political transitions following coups, the PSC has repeatedly seen its directives ignored, eroding its authority in countries undergoing complex instability. During its 1212th session on 20 May 2024, the PSC highlighted non-compliance in , where transitional leader Mahamat violated ineligibility rules by running in elections; in , where the transition was extended by three years allowing junta leader to contest elections despite AU opposition; and in , where a five-year extension permitted Ibrahim Traoré's eligibility, contravening agreed timelines. Sanctions imposed on , , , and after coups in 2021–2023 failed to deter subsequent power grabs in (2023) and (2023), reflecting the PSC's limited coercive power and member states' reluctance to sustain pressure. The PSC's reactive posture has contributed to failures in conflict prevention and resolution, with delayed responses exacerbating crises despite early warnings from the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which member states often disregard due to sensitivities. In , coups in 2019 and 2021 elicited ineffective interventions, failing to avert the 2023 civil war between the and . Similarly, during the 2011 Libyan crisis, PSC mediation efforts were undermined by divergent member state positions and NATO's military intervention, sidelining African initiatives; in (2015), an authorized 5,000-personnel mission was reversed by the AU amid internal divisions. Ambiguities in subsidiarity principles have further weakened coordination with , as seen in overlapping but uncoordinated responses to conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Understaffing in the PSC Secretariat and unoperationalized bodies, such as the Military Staff Committee, compound these issues, limiting analytical capacity and execution. Critics argue that consensus-based fosters dilution of strong measures, while the absence of monitoring tools—like an effective 2022 decision-tracking matrix—perpetuates a cycle of declarative rather than actionable outcomes, mirroring institutional erosion observed in the PSC's predecessor, the Organization of African Unity.

Ongoing Challenges and Reforms

Funding and Resource Constraints

The African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) operates within a funding framework heavily constrained by inconsistent member state contributions, which cover only a fraction of operational needs. Member states are statutorily required to fund a significant portion of the AU's budget, yet payments are frequently delayed or incomplete, with the 2025 statutory levy capped at $200 million amid broader shortfalls. This has resulted in the AU's overall annual budget of approximately $650 million being funded up to 70% by external donors, rendering the PSC's authorized peace support operations vulnerable to financial instability. To address these gaps, the relies on the Peace Fund, established under Article 21 of the to finance operational activities, but its resources remain limited despite revitalization efforts. For instance, in 2024, the Fund disbursed $7 million for peace initiatives, supplemented by $10 million allocated for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in (AUSSOM) in 2025, covering just a small share of the mission's $166 million annual budget. External partners, including the —which provided $370 million toward the 's $605 million budget in 2024—and UN assessed contributions via Council Resolution 2719 (2023), fill much of the void, enabling up to 75% UN financing for eligible AU-led operations. However, this dependency introduces risks, such as donor-imposed conditions that can compromise operational and African , as evidenced by the UN Council's failure to approve full AUSSOM funding in May 2025 due to U.S. opposition. These constraints manifest in logistical and sustainment challenges for PSC-endorsed missions, limiting rapid deployment, troop reimbursements, and equipment maintenance. Historical assessments highlight the PSC's "" as inadequate self-generated resources, forcing reliance on bilateral pledges that prove unreliable for long-term engagements. Efforts to enhance the Peace Fund's capacity through contributions—yielding $398 million by mid-2024, predominantly from member states—have yet to achieve full , perpetuating cycles of under-resourcing that hinder the PSC's preventive and responsive mandates. Critics, including AU Commission Chair Mahamat and philanthropist , argue this external dominance undermines the principle of African solutions to African problems, as member states' fiscal indiscipline erodes institutional credibility and operational efficacy.

Debates on Sovereignty and Intervention

The African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) operates amid ongoing tensions between the principle of state sovereignty and the imperative for intervention in cases of severe threats to peace and security. This debate traces back to the shift from the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) strict adherence to non-interference, which prioritized post-colonial territorial integrity, to the African Union's (AU) Constitutive Act of 2000, which introduced Article 4(h). This provision grants the AU "the right... to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity." The inclusion of Article 4(h) reflected lessons from atrocities like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, where OAU non-interference enabled over 800,000 deaths, prompting a reconceptualization of sovereignty as conditional on protecting populations rather than absolute. Central to these debates is the AU's "non-indifference" doctrine, which supplants non-interference by emphasizing to prevent mass atrocities, as articulated in the 2005 Ezulwini Consensus and the 2006 Common African Position on the UN's (R2P). Proponents, including AU officials, argue that non-indifference enables regionally tailored responses, such as the PSC's authorization of the 2008 intervention in under Article 4(h) to oust a coup leader and restore the elected , involving 1,500 troops from AU and regional forces that succeeded within weeks. However, critics contend that this erodes , potentially inviting external manipulation or favoring powerful states; for instance, during the 2011 Libyan crisis, the AU rejected NATO-led intervention despite reported war crimes, prioritizing non-interference and proposing an African-led roadmap that was ignored. This stance aligned with concerns that interventions could destabilize regimes without addressing root causes, echoing broader African resistance to precedents like the 1990s Western interventions in and . Empirical evidence underscores implementation challenges: despite over 30 PSC decisions invoking potential intervention since 2002, forceful actions remain rare, with only marking a full Article 4(h) application, due to member states' veto power and sensitivities. In cases like Sudan's conflict (2003–present), where was declared by the U.S. in 2004 affecting over 300,000 deaths, the PSC authorized the (AMIS) in 2004 with 7,000 troops but deferred to UN hybrid forces amid objections from , highlighting causal realism in how domestic politics constrain . Similarly, in Ethiopia's (2020–2022), involving documented war crimes and over 600,000 deaths per joint AU-UN estimates, the PSC opted for mediation by a high representative rather than intervention, reflecting fears of infringing on host-state consent and risking escalation. Legal scholars debate compatibility with UN Charter Article 2(7), which prohibits intervention in domestic affairs, though the Ezulwini Consensus asserts AU primacy on the continent without UN Security Council (UNSC) approval in extremis; in practice, AU missions like AMISOM in Somalia (2007–2022) succeeded via UNSC mandates, underscoring dependency on global coordination to legitimize actions. These debates reveal systemic trade-offs: while Article 4(h) theoretically advances causal to halt atrocities—evidenced by reduced civilian deaths in AU-monitored ceasefires—political reluctance, as in the 2015 crisis where threats averted but did not execute amid 1,200 killings, perpetuates inaction. African leaders, wary of precedents undermining their authority, often prioritize , as seen in the 's 2021 suspension of and post-coups under the Declaration but avoidance of military enforcement. This selectivity, per analyses from institutions like the Institute for Security Studies, stems from resource asymmetries and intra-AU divisions, where stronger states like or block actions against allies, contrasting with more assertive regional bodies like . Ultimately, the 's framework privileges empirical triggers for but yields to realism, limiting its deterrent effect against ongoing threats like those in the , where over 20,000 deaths occurred in 2023 from jihadist insurgencies despite declarations.

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