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Rapid Support Forces

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a Sudanese that originated from the militias mobilized during the and was formally established in as a government-aligned to suppress rebel activities. Commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, the RSF has developed into a powerful entity with extensive economic interests, including control over gold mining operations that fund its operations and provide revenue streams exceeding those of regular Sudanese military salaries. The RSF's emphasizes and deployment, from its tribal nomadic in , which enabled effective counterinsurgency tactics but also contributed to its for brutal methods inherited from predecessor militias. , who from a in camel trading to commanding through strategic alliances and foreign deployments—such as sending RSF fighters to the Saudi-led in —has positioned the group as a key actor in Sudan's power dynamics, often operating parallel to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Tensions between the RSF and escalated into full-scale in 2023 over disagreements on and political , with the RSF demonstrating tactical successes in and territorial , including the capture of Khartoum's and significant portions of . The has highlighted the RSF's reliance on decentralized command and foreign backing, amid on for alleged command responsibility in atrocities, though the group's stems from its economic and against a more conventional adversary.

History

Origins as Janjaweed Militias

The militias emerged in early as irregular Arab nomadic forces mobilized by the Sudanese under to counter the , which began with coordinated attacks on stations and installations in of that year. Primarily drawn from tribal groups such as the Rizeigat, including its Mahamid and Mahariya subclans, these militias were armed and directed by Sudanese military intelligence to target non-Arab rebel factions like the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), exploiting longstanding ethnic tensions over land and resources in western Sudan. The government's relied on the 's —often mounted on camels and —and intimate of Darfur's arid , enabling decentralized operations that bypassed the ' logistical constraints. This approach yielded territorial gains; by mid-2004, government forces supported by had recaptured most towns and centers previously held by , confining JEM and SLM fighters to peripheral mountainous and areas. Tribal loyalties among the militias fostered against rebel ambushes, as allowed for self-sustaining and command structures of central oversight, contributing to the suppression of immediate insurgent threats. Key figures like Mohamed Dagalo, known as Hemedti, within these ranks, commanding Janjaweed units in from 2003 onward and leading operations that demonstrated the militias' in high-intensity . The Janjaweed's of and aggressive patrols disrupted rebel supply lines and havens, with empirical assessments indicating a causal between their deployment and the rebels' fragmentation into smaller, less coordinated cells by late 2004. This underscored the militias' as multiplier for in ethnically divided regions, prioritizing stabilization over conventional military doctrine.

Formal Creation and Integration into State Forces

In 2013, Sudanese Omar issued a presidential formally establishing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a by designating and reorganizing tribal militias, primarily former elements, into a structured . This move aimed to harness the militias' combat experience against insurgencies while subjecting them to oversight, though retaining significant autonomy to leverage tribal loyalties for sustained effectiveness. Initially, the RSF operated under the administrative authority of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), with operational command during joint military actions delegated to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This dual structure positioned the RSF as a counterweight to the regular army, enabling al-Bashir to balance power among security institutions amid internal threats. Following al-Bashir's ouster in the 2019 revolution, transitional governments pursued of the RSF into the broader security framework, including proposals for partial incorporation under SAF oversight to centralize command and reduce parallel power centers. However, negotiations stalled due to disagreements over rank equivalencies, resource allocation, and command autonomy, perpetuating tensions between the RSF and SAF while allowing the paramilitary to expand its influence independently.

Evolution Under Bashir Regime

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were formally established on 14 June 2013 by Sudanese President through a presidential , transforming militias into a centralized under the (NISS) to counter insurgencies while maintaining operational from the regular (SAF). This restructuring aimed to professionalize the militias' in , allowing to deploy them as a flexible counterweight to both rebel groups and potential SAF disloyalty amid economic sanctions and internal pressures. By 2014, the RSF had expanded its mandate beyond Darfur, incorporating tribal fighters from Rizeigat and other Arab confederations, numbering approximately 30,000-50,000 personnel equipped with light vehicles and small arms sourced partly through state allocations but increasingly via self-generated revenue. RSF units were deployed to South and Blue states starting in 2013-2014 to combat the Sudan Movement-North (SPLM-N), marking a shift from Darfur-centric operations to broader counter-insurgency efforts against non-Arab in the "Two Areas." These deployments involved operations with SAF, where RSF forces conducted raids and village clearances, contributing to the government's scorched-earth tactics while demonstrating the militia's versatility in rugged terrains outside . By , RSF commanders reported successes in disrupting SPLM-N supply lines, though analyses noted high and as objectives, fostering the force's into a semi- entity capable of sustaining prolonged engagements without full reliance on Khartoum's strained bureaucracy. To ensure financial independence, Bashir granted RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) exclusive concessions for operations, particularly at Jebel Amer in , where the militia assumed full by 2017, generating revenues estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars annually through artisanal and semi-industrial . This , involving direct exports via UAE-based , allowed the RSF to procure arms, pay fighters, and expand —reaching over 100,000 by 2019—bypassing corrupt channels and insulating operations from fiscal shortfalls caused by revenue declines post-South Sudan . Such reinforced the RSF's as a apparatus, enabling Bashir to balance power against SAF generals while leveraging tribal loyalties for regime survival, though it entrenched predatory economic practices that prioritized militia enrichment over national oversight.

Organization and Leadership

Command Structure and Tribal Composition

The command of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) features a centralized combined with decentralized operational , heavily influenced by tribal hierarchies that prioritize and ties over formal . Established under the Rapid Support Forces of , which delineates ranks including , , , , and lower grades down to , the maintains a of while functioning through patronage networks that distribute commands along ethnic lines. This hybrid model enables subunit autonomy, as seen in border guard detachments tasked with frontier security and anti-smuggling, where local tribal leaders exercise significant discretion to respond to fluid threats. Tribally, the RSF draws its from Darfur's nomadic confederations, with the —particularly its Mahariya subclan—forming the foundational and providing pivotal command roles to historical ties to the militias from which the RSF evolved. Complementary groups such as the Misseriya, the second-largest in , contribute substantial fighters, though their has sparked internal frictions, including reported mutinies over . Additional aligned tribes, including the Beni Halba, Ta'isha, and Tarjam, the force through kinship-based , reinforcing via shared pastoralist traditions but exposing vulnerabilities to factionalism when tribal interests diverge. In contrast to the Sudanese Armed Forces' top-down, institutionalized chain of command, the RSF's tribal-patronage system fosters adaptability in decentralized operations, such as rapid mobilization for counterinsurgency or border patrols, by delegating authority to trusted kin networks rather than rigid protocols. This approach, while effective for asymmetric conflicts in expansive terrains like Darfur, has led to documented fragmentation in command-and-control during prolonged engagements, as subunit loyalties may prioritize tribal survival over overarching directives.

Key Leaders and Succession

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as , serves as the of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), having assumed upon its formal in from the remnants of militias active during the . Born around or into a of camel traders in , rose through militia ranks by aligning with Sudanese forces against starting in the early , reportedly commanding units of widespread atrocities including village burnings and killings. His ascent accelerated post-2011, as he negotiated the integration of his forces into state structures under President Omar al-Bashir, culminating in co-leadership of the 2021 military coup alongside Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, which positioned the RSF as a parallel power center. Hemedti's command relies heavily on familial and tribal for internal , with brothers appointed as RSF deputy and overseer of operations through entities like Al Junaid , while other siblings such as Algoney hold influential roles in and the force. This nepotistic , rooted in Hemedti's Mahamid tribal affiliations predominant in RSF ranks, fosters amid Darfur's fractious , where recruitment draws from allied Rizeigat and other groups incentivized by shares. Succession prospects hinge on these kinship ties rather than formalized protocols, as Hemedti has consolidated power without designating a clear heir, leveraging tribal patronage to deter rivals; empirical patterns show RSF resilience despite localized disruptions, such as the October 2024 defection of a Gezira commander prompting retaliatory operations but no erosion of central authority. Assassination attempts on peripheral figures, like the June 2023 killing of West Darfur official Khamis Abdallah Abbakar attributed to RSF elements by opponents, have not destabilized the core leadership, underscoring Hemedti's control through economic incentives and tribal veto powers over potential usurpers.

Size, Recruitment, and Capabilities

As of May 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were estimated to comprise 70,000 to 150,000 fighters, significantly smaller than the Sudanese Armed Forces' approximately 200,000 active personnel but sufficient to sustain prolonged irregular operations. This manpower has grown through aggressive expansion since the 2023 civil war onset, drawing primarily from Darfur's Arab tribes and other regional militias via large-scale recruitment drives that leverage tribal networks for fighters, logistics, and intelligence. Recruitment methods emphasize tribal , often involving alliances with clans that provide personnel in for , , or political , though reports indicate instances of coerced or illegal enlistment, including of minors and displaced persons, to ranks amid . Economic draws, such as payments or shares in RSF-controlled , further incentivize voluntary joiners from impoverished areas, the force to maintain despite lacking formal structures. The RSF's armament includes small arms, improvised explosive devices, and technical vehicles—typically Toyota pickups mounting heavy machine guns—suited for desert mobility, with supplies routed through networks in Libya, Chad, and Uganda. Foreign backing has enhanced capabilities: the United Arab Emirates has provided advanced drones, including Chinese-made Wing Loong models and quadcopters adapted for mortar bomb drops, violating UN arms embargoes and enabling precision strikes from afar. Ties to Russia's Wagner Group (now Africa Corps) have supplied additional weaponry and training, focusing on asymmetric tools like kamikaze drones with ranges up to 2,000 km. These assets underpin the RSF's proficiency in asymmetric tactics, such as hit-and-run raids, urban guerrilla operations, and swarms to overwhelm defenses, allowing a numerically inferior to control through speed, intelligence, and inducement rather than sustained conventional engagements. This approach has proven effective in fragmented environments, compensating for heavy armor or air superiority by exploiting and external .

Core Functions and Operations

Counter-Insurgency and Internal Security

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) were formalized as a paramilitary tasked with countering insurgent threats in Darfur, drawing from former Janjaweed militias to target separatist groups such as the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which had launched attacks against government positions since 2003. These operations emphasized mobile patrols across remote terrains, enabling rapid responses to rebel movements and contributing to the containment of large-scale offensives by the mid-2010s, as major rebel-held redoubts were progressively denied through sustained pressure. In Darfur, RSF units disrupted arms smuggling routes and rebel supply lines, leveraging their familiarity with local tribal dynamics and desert mobility to interdict logistics that sustained insurgent holdouts, thereby limiting the capacity for coordinated attacks on state infrastructure. This approach yielded territorial stabilization in central and southern Darfur sectors by the late 2010s, with empirical data indicating a marked decline in reported insurgency-related fatalities—from peaks exceeding 300,000 cumulative deaths by 2008 to sporadic incidents averaging under 1,000 annually post-2013—attributable in part to deterrence effects from RSF presence. Following the 2019 overthrow of , the RSF expanded its remit within the transitional , deploying to peripheral regions where () capacity was strained, including quelling localized tribal clashes and preventing separatist resurgence amid vacuums. This filled operational gaps, enhancing deterrence against domestic threats like coup attempts and low-level militancy, as evidenced by RSF's in securing Bashir-era assets against prior to the transition. However, reliance on tribally affiliated recruits fostered excesses, including indiscriminate against perceived rebel sympathizers—predominantly non-Arab communities—exacerbating ethnic grievances and undermining long-term , with reports documenting over ,000 civilian casualties in RSF-led actions in alone by 2021.

Border Patrol and Anti-Smuggling Efforts

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) assumed responsibility for border security patrols following their formalization in 2013, replacing elements of the Popular Defence Forces along Sudan's western and northern frontiers, including those shared with Chad, Libya, and Ethiopia. These deployments focused on monitoring desert routes prone to arms trafficking from Libya and irregular migrant flows toward Europe, with RSF units establishing checkpoints and conducting sweeps in Darfur and Kordofan regions to intercept smuggling networks. RSF operations have resulted in documented interceptions of migrants and traffickers, such as the 2018 capture of 66 individuals in linked to human smuggling routes to , and a 2023 raid near Safer-Let base that dismantled an group engaged in , weapons, and narcotics smuggling. These actions contributed to Sudan's broader migration control efforts, which aligned with initiatives to stem Mediterranean crossings, leading to a reported decline in departures from Sudanese territory between 2016 and 2019. However, independent verification of sustained reductions in cross-border weapons flows or migrant incursions remains scarce, with RSF-claimed engagements against smuggling gangs—resulting in hundreds of trafficker casualties—largely unquantified by external observers. Criticisms of RSF border activities include allegations of profiteering through of intercepted and involvement in trade networks, particularly in and hubs near the Chad-Libya-Sudan tri-border area, where paramilitary control has facilitated rather than curtailed some flows. Despite these concerns, verifiable busts demonstrate tactical successes in disrupting specific operations, bolstering Sudanese state sovereignty over fragmented frontiers amid ongoing rebel threats from groups like the . Such efforts underscore the RSF's dual role in security provision and economic opportunism, with empirical impacts more evident in migrant deterrence than comprehensive eradication.

Economic Activities and Resource Control

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have derived substantial revenue from controlling artisanal and small-scale operations in , particularly in North Darfur's Jebel Amer area, which they secured by 2017 and reasserted dominance over at the outset of the 2023 civil war. This control encompasses oversight of extraction, processing, and networks, with the RSF reportedly seizing approximately $150 million in bars from Khartoum's national in mid-2023 to bolster supply chains. Such activities have positioned as a primary self-funding mechanism, enabling the RSF to operate with relative autonomy from Sudan's central budget amid chronic fiscal constraints. Beyond , the RSF engages in and cross-border facilitation, leveraging its dominance in to regulate commercial flows, including vehicle trade and commodity taxation along routes to and . Affiliated networks in the handle gold exports and vehicle dealings, registering firms for consultancy and that indirectly support RSF operations. These ventures provide localized in mining labor and within volatile regions, stabilizing economic niches where has collapsed, though they distort broader by prioritizing RSF-aligned actors. This economic independence, formalized under the regime to circumvent budgetary oversight and graft in regular forces, mitigated short-term funding shortfalls but facilitated unchecked organizational growth by tying paramilitary loyalty to resource rents rather than . In Sudan's resource-scarce context, where constitutes over 80% of exports, RSF control of zones has entrenched a parallel economy resilient to central fiscal pressures, though vulnerable to global commodity fluctuations and efforts.

Major Military Engagements

Campaigns in Darfur

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), evolving from the militias integrated into formal structures in 2013, inherited and continued counter-insurgency roles in against groups like the (SLM/A) and (JEM). From 2003 to 2010, predecessor forces conducted intensive operations that reclaimed numerous villages and displaced thousands of rebel fighters, restoring government authority over previously contested rural areas initially seized by SLM/A and JEM in early 2003 attacks on police stations and garrisons. By 2005, these efforts had fragmented rebel command structures, confining SLM/A factions to peripheral zones and reducing their operational bases from over 100 villages to scattered holdouts, as evidenced by Sudanese military reports of securing key supply routes around and . JEM, meanwhile, suffered setbacks including the loss of eastern Darfur enclaves, with an estimated 5,000-10,000 fighters displaced or defecting by 2010, per analyses of government offensives that prioritized rapid militia sweeps over sustained peacekeeping. Rebel leaders, such as those from SLM/A under , have portrayed RSF precursors as proxies for Khartoum's ethnic favoritism toward tribes, arguing that operations masked resource grabs rather than neutral restoration. However, empirical outcomes favored control: by 2010, active rebel-held territory shrank to less than 10% of Darfur's landmass, with major towns like Zalingei and Ed Daein under state administration, enabling stabilized trade corridors and reduced cross-border incursions from . These gains stemmed from militia mobility in reclaiming 200+ villages through tactics, though at the cost of civilian disruptions that rebels cited as evidence of bias. Post-2013, RSF-led stabilization emphasized targeted sweeps against residual insurgencies, notably in Jebel Marra, SLM/A's core redoubt. In late 2015 to 2016, RSF units joined assaults that overran rebel positions in , displacing SLM/A contingents and securing 150 kilometers of contested highlands, thereby contracting active rebel zones from 20% to under 5% of the massif by mid-2016. A RSF operation in Ain Siro, Kutum locality (), defeated JEM-allied forces, killing dozens and capturing arms caches, which Sudanese officials quantified as neutralizing 300-500 combatants and restoring local governance. These actions correlated with a 70% drop in reported rebel ambushes between 2013 and 2018, per UN monitoring, reflecting RSF's role in patrolling borders and dismantling JEM supply lines from . While JEM spokespersons dismissed victories as temporary, reliant on foreign backing, the net effect was nominal government oversight over 85% of by 2020, with insurgents relegated to hit-and-run tactics in remote areas.

Interventions in Libya and Yemen

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) deployed approximately 1,000 fighters to in 2019 to support General Khalifa Haftar's (LNA) during its offensive against the UN-recognized in . These deployments, facilitated through routes and airlifts, provided RSF personnel with urban combat experience against coordinated defenses, enhancing tactical proficiency in operations. By mid-2020, as Haftar's campaign stalled, RSF withdrawals were reported, though some elements reportedly remained to secure logistics corridors. In , RSF elements joined the Saudi-led coalition against Houthi forces starting around 2015, with thousands of fighters rotated through frontline roles in northern Yemen's buffer zones. These troops, often paid $300–$1,000 monthly per fighter—far exceeding Sudanese domestic wages—focused on ground assaults and border patrols, incurring heavy casualties; Houthi sources claimed over 5,000 Sudanese deaths by , including many RSF veterans dispatched to high-risk positions. Deployments tapered after amid Sudanese political transitions, but residual RSF involvement persisted into the early , yielding revenues estimated in hundreds of millions of dollars that funded RSF expansion and procurement. These interventions bolstered RSF capabilities through direct exposure to drone warfare, artillery coordination, and foreign-supplied weaponry in Yemen, while Libya honed skills in expeditionary logistics and mercenary contracting. Returning fighters brought technical knowledge and seized equipment, such as small arms and vehicles, which integrated into RSF arsenals. Critics, including UN reports, argue these profit-driven engagements prolonged stalemated conflicts, prioritizing financial gains over strategic Sudanese interests and exacerbating mercenary reliance. RSF leadership justified deployments as revenue diversification, enabling independence from Khartoum's budget constraints.

Sudanese Civil War (2023–present)

The civil war in broke out on 15 April 2023, triggered by escalating tensions between the (RSF), commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), and the (SAF), led by , primarily over the terms of integrating the RSF paramilitary into the regular army structure. RSF units launched coordinated attacks on SAF positions in , rapidly seizing the , , and several military bases, exploiting their tactical mobility from vehicle-mounted forces to overwhelm initial defenses. SAF responded with airstrikes, leveraging air superiority to regain parts of the capital's core, but RSF maintained control over suburbs like and Bahri, turning urban areas into protracted battlegrounds with heavy artillery exchanges. By mid-2023, fighting expanded westward into , where RSF forces, drawing on their Janjaweed-era tribal networks, captured key cities including and , securing dominance over much of the region's resource-rich territories and supply routes. RSF's strategic objective centered on consolidating control in the periphery to sustain operations through revenues and cross-border , while avoiding decisive SAF urban assaults. In early 2024, RSF intensified offensives in central areas, briefly threatening before SAF counterattacks reclaimed it, shifting the frontline eastward and highlighting RSF's vulnerabilities in conventional positional warfare against SAF armor and aviation. In 2025, RSF refocused on Darfur strongholds, achieving territorial gains along Sudan's borders with and by June, enhancing logistics via allied militias and foreign supply lines. The siege of El Fasher, initiated in May 2024, escalated with RSF encircling the SAF-held city—North Darfur's last major enclave—trapping over 260,000 civilians and launching assaults on supply routes, hospitals, and displacement camps through October. By mid-October 2025, RSF advances on dual fronts aimed to dismantle SAF remnants in the west, maintaining approximate control over 40-50% of national territory, predominantly rural and western zones, while SAF consolidated urban centers like Khartoum's core amid mutual attrition.

Foreign Relations and Alliances

Partnerships with Gulf States, Especially UAE

The has developed extensive ties with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since the early 2010s, initially rooted in commercial partnerships involving and agricultural investments in , which provided the RSF with significant revenue streams. These economic links evolved into military cooperation, including the deployment of RSF fighters to support UAE-backed forces in starting in 2015, aligning with shared interests in countering regional threats. The UAE perceives the RSF as a strategic to Islamist influences in , particularly those affiliated with the , which the UAE has outlawed domestically and views as a destabilizing force; this stance contrasts with elements within the (SAF) that maintain historical ties to such groups. Empirical evidence of UAE material support includes arms shipments, such as advanced weaponry transferred to the RSF in violation of the UN , as documented by investigations identifying serial numbers on captured equipment. The UAE has reportedly supplied drones, howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), enhancing RSF mobility and enabling it to challenge SAF air superiority during the 2023–present . Logistics often involve transit through , with funding channeled via UAE-based entities to sustain RSF operations, including resource extraction in gold-rich areas like . While the UAE officially denies these transfers, attributing them to illicit , UN Panel of Experts reports and U.S. assessments corroborate the flows as deliberate state-backed aid disguised in some cases as humanitarian deliveries. This partnership serves UAE's broader anti-Islamist regional strategy, positioning the RSF as a secular-leaning proxy to secure access, counter Iranian-aligned actors, and protect economic footholds in , though it has drawn accusations of prolonging 's conflict and indirectly enabling RSF-linked atrocities by bolstering its warfighting capacity. Sudanese authorities severed diplomatic ties with the UAE in May 2025 over these alleged interventions, highlighting tensions despite the strategic alignment. Other Gulf states, such as , have engaged more through mediation efforts like the talks, but lack the RSF-specific depth of UAE involvement.

Ties to Russia and Private Military Actors

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) forged ties with Russia's Wagner Group starting in 2017, primarily through gold mining agreements that enabled resource extraction and military collaboration. In November 2017, the Sudanese government signed a contract with M-Invest, a firm owned by Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, providing access to gold mines in exchange for investment and support. Wagner subsequently established gold processing facilities in Sudan and engaged in smuggling operations, channeling proceeds to fund Russian military efforts amid Western sanctions. These arrangements yielded reciprocal advantages: obtained untraceable gold revenues, estimated to support broader geopolitical aims including operations in , while the RSF benefited from Wagner's operational know-how in securing sites. Prior to the civil war, Wagner provided to RSF personnel, enhancing their tactical proficiency in and border operations. As the RSF clashed with the from April 2023, Wagner supplied armaments including surface-to-air missiles, often transshipped via , bolstering RSF defenses without direct Russian state involvement. This assistance aligned with Moscow's use of private actors to extract minerals and counter Western resource access, positioning Russia as an alternative partner amid anti-Western sentiments in the region. After Prigozhin's death in August 2023, Wagner's African operations transitioned to the state-controlled , integrating former Wagner fighters and sustaining RSF linkages through arms provision and advisory roles. While has hedged by engaging the Sudanese government, the Corps' continuity with RSF underscores enduring interests in Sudanese flows and proxy influence.

Relations with Regional Neighbors

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) maintain pragmatic ties with , leveraging cross-border tribal networks among Arab communities in to counter non-Arab rebel groups like the Zaghawa, as evidenced by Goran fighters backed by RSF targeting Zaghawa areas near the in 2024, including looting operations in Ambar. These alliances facilitate mutual security against shared insurgent threats, though they coexist with Sudanese accusations of Chadian facilitation of arms deliveries—over 400 UAE flights via Adré and airports since April 2023—and mercenary recruitment from and transiting to bolster RSF ranks. officially denies direct support, asserting neutrality to preserve stability amid inflows exceeding 930,000 Sudanese by November 2024, yet cross-border smuggling and tribal mobilizations underscore the intertwined security dynamics. Relations with Ethiopia involve cautious cooperation amid spillover risks from the , particularly following RSF advances in by late June 2024, which displaced over 125,000 toward the border and heightened concerns over weapons inflows destabilizing Ethiopia's Amhara and Tigray regions. RSF has alleged Tigrayan militants align with the (), potentially aligning informal interests with Ethiopian Amhara militias against common foes, despite no formal pacts; RSF control in Blue Nile facilitates smuggling networks and tribal ties that could exacerbate Ethiopia's border vulnerabilities. Tensions persist from against Tigrayan refugees in RSF-held areas, yet Ethiopia's IGAD and mediation pushes for stability, indirectly benefiting RSF by curbing SAF-backed insurgent support that previously strained the Al-Fashaga border. Kenya's engagement with the RSF emphasizes diplomatic hosting for regional , including RSF allies signing a for a parallel government in on February 23, 2025, framed as non-partisan peace efforts despite SAF backlash. This prompted 's to suspend all Kenyan imports on March 14, 2025, disrupting key exports like tea (12% of prior volume to Sudan) and pharmaceuticals, stranding goods at ports and signaling economic leverage amid migration pressures from Sudan's war. Kenya pursues balanced ties with both RSF and to mitigate spillover instability, prioritizing trade corridor security and refugee management through IGAD frameworks, even as the ban risks broader foreign exchange losses.

Controversies and Assessments

Documented Atrocities and International Accusations

In , the RSF and allied militias have systematically targeted non-Arab ethnic groups, including the Masalit, through mass killings, rapes, and since the escalation of the 2023 , building on patterns from their predecessors in the 2003–2005 genocide. documented over 40 rapes by RSF forces in in August 2023 alone, based on interviews with survivors who described attackers identifying victims by ethnicity before assaulting them. The Fact-Finding Mission reported in October 2024 that RSF perpetrators committed "staggering" levels of against civilians aged 8 to 75, often as a during territorial advances, corroborated by medical examinations and witness accounts across camps. During the Battle of starting April 15, 2023, RSF forces were implicated in widespread civilian killings and sexual violence, with documenting over 100 cases of in the by 2024, including gang rapes in homes and displacement sites, drawn from survivor testimonies and forensic evidence. Mass graves near in , linked to RSF operations in June–November 2023, contained hundreds of bodies showing execution-style wounds, as verified by and ground reports from humanitarian observers. Victim accounts consistently describe RSF fighters separating men for execution and targeting women for sexual enslavement, though evidentiary challenges persist due to restricted access, destroyed infrastructure, and risks to witnesses in active combat zones, potentially leading to unverified or misattributed incidents amid chaotic reporting. In El Fasher, , RSF assaults intensified from April 2024 onward, with a major offensive on August 11, 2025, killing at least 57 civilians in camps like Abu Shouk through and ground attacks, according to UN monitors relying on local clinic data and eyewitnesses. An RSF strike on a in El Fasher on October 8, 2025, killed 12 people, including medical staff, and wounded 17 others, as reported by on-site medics and corroborated by the . These actions have trapped over 800,000 civilians in a , exacerbating risks, with attacks on displacement shelters documented via satellite analysis showing deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure. Internationally, the U.S. State Department determined on January 7, 2025, that RSF members and allied militias committed in , citing systematic ethnic murders of men and boys—including infants—and widespread rape as acts intended to destroy non-Arab groups in whole or part, based on aggregated from UN, NGO, and satellite data. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for outlined in September 2024 extensive war crimes by RSF, including intentional civilian targeting, while noting verification difficulties from both sides' interference with investigations. These accusations draw from empirical patterns in victim interviews, medical records, and geospatial , though fog-of-war conditions and partisan local reporting introduce risks of over- or misattribution, as independent access remains limited.

Contextual Factors and RSF Justifications

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) emerged from the militias, which were mobilized in the early 2000s to counter insurgent threats from non-Arab rebel groups such as the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and (JEM) in , where fighters frequently embedded within civilian communities, necessitating operations that blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants. This historical role framed RSF actions as essential for restoring security in asymmetric conflicts characterized by and tribal alliances with rebels, rather than indiscriminate violence. RSF leadership, including commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), has justified the 2023 civil war escalation as a defensive response to () attempts to subordinate the under Islamist-influenced command structures, portraying the as enablers of and . In specifically, RSF operations are presented as tribal self-protection for Arab communities against retaliatory attacks by non-Arab militias historically linked to anti-government insurgencies, amid cycles of intercommunal violence predating the current war. While reports predominantly highlight RSF-perpetrated abuses, RSF denies systematic targeting, attributing collateral incidents to the challenges of and warfare, and counters that SAF aerial bombardments—unconstrained by ground-level precision—inflict equivalent or greater indiscriminate harm through bombings of populated areas. Independent assessments confirm bidirectional violations, with both factions employing tactics like warfare and strikes in zones, underscoring that casualty patterns reflect mutual escalations rather than unilateral aggression.

Comparative Analysis with Sudanese Armed Forces

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) exhibit a decentralized, militia-style rooted in tribal militias, particularly elements from , which contrasts with the ' (SAF) more conventional, centralized military modeled on lines with formal ranks and command chains. This RSF model fosters agility through autonomous mid-level commanders tied to ethnic networks, enabling rapid adaptation in fluid combat environments, whereas the SAF's rigidity has hindered effective responses to asymmetric threats, as evidenced by its historical struggles in insurgencies. Both forces have faced accusations of widespread looting and during operations, though the RSF's tribal integration provides superior local intelligence and in rural western , offsetting the SAF's logistical dependencies. In terms of equipment, the SAF maintains advantages in heavy weaponry, including armor, , and air assets like fighter jets and helicopters, which allow for sustained bombardment but limit maneuverability in urban or guerrilla settings. The RSF, lacking comparable air power, relies on light vehicles, small arms, and captured munitions for , dispersing forces amid civilian areas to neutralize SAF firepower—a that has prolonged stalemates despite the SAF's superior conventional arsenal. The RSF's decentralized approach, originally designed for , proves more adaptable to Sudan's fragmented terrain and insurgent-like warfare than the SAF's top-down model, which has suffered from , poor morale, and over-reliance on static defenses. As of October 2025, territorial control reflects these disparities: the RSF dominates much of western , including regions like and border areas with and , leveraging tribal ties for sustained rural holdouts. In contrast, the SAF holds eastern states, , and recovering urban centers in and al-Jazirah, bolstered by air operations but strained by stretched supply lines. This bifurcation underscores the RSF's edge in decentralized suited to ethnic enclaves, versus the SAF's centralized failures in integrating peripheral forces, contributing to mutual operational faults without resolving the conflict's core asymmetries.

Recent Developments

Advances and Setbacks in 2024–2025

In late 2024, the () launched a major offensive in the Khartoum metropolitan area, targeting RSF-held positions in , , and Bahri, resulting in significant RSF territorial losses and logistical disruptions. By February 2025, SAF forces had routed RSF from large parts of , with reports of RSF disarray in western and northern Bahri amid advancing SAF troops. In March 2025, SAF recaptured the and other central sites, further straining RSF operations and limiting their supply networks in the east. RSF demonstrated resilience in Darfur, where it consolidated control over most western territories, including resource extraction sites that sustained funding amid eastern setbacks. In June 2025, RSF forces seized border areas with and , enhancing strategic depth and potential smuggling routes. By October 2025, RSF escalated its —SAF's last major stronghold—through intensified ground assaults and aerial bombardments after over 500 days of encirclement. To counter SAF air superiority, RSF expanded drone operations, launching over 50 strikes on SAF logistics and infrastructure in northern Sudan between October 2024 and May 2025, including attacks on Port Sudan airstrips housing SAF drones. In October 2025, RSF drones targeted El Fasher displacement sites and hospitals, killing dozens in strikes on October 8 and 11, while also hitting Khartoum International Airport multiple times. In December 2025, RSF drone strikes in Kalogi, South Kordofan, targeted a kindergarten and hospital, killing at least 50 people including 33 children. These tactics allowed RSF to impose attrition on SAF despite ground losses elsewhere, leveraging Darfur-based launch sites for long-range precision strikes.

Diplomatic Initiatives and Negotiations

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) participated in U.S.-mediated talks in Geneva in August 2024, where indirect discussions focused on humanitarian access and confidence-building measures, but the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) boycotted the process, citing RSF intransigence on withdrawing from civilian areas. RSF representatives emphasized proposals for a nationwide ceasefire and transitional governance structures that would preserve their institutional role, amid ongoing battlefield advantages in Khartoum and Darfur. Critics, including SAF leadership and Sudanese civil society groups, accused the RSF of using the talks to stall for time and consolidate territorial gains rather than commit to de-escalation, pointing to continued RSF drone strikes and urban operations during the sessions. In September 2025, the RSF indirectly endorsed a U.S.-Saudi-Egypt-UAE "" peace roadmap proposing phased ceasefires, power-sharing in a civilian-led transition, and RSF integration safeguards, which aligned with the paramilitary's demands for assurances against unilateral dissolution. RSF-aligned entities, including a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" announced in February 2025, welcomed elements of the plan as a basis for negotiations, while rejecting SAF preconditions for exclusive control over . SAF intransigence, evidenced by their rejection of similar frameworks and vows to prosecute RSF leaders as rebels, has been cited by RSF commanders as evidence of genuine negotiation efforts thwarted by the army's monopoly-seeking stance. Indirect Washington talks in October 2025, confirmed by multiple sources despite denials, involved RSF proposals for joint humanitarian corridors and power-sharing councils, reflecting incentives for to legitimize control over captured territories without full-scale counteroffensives. Observers note that RSF engagement persists despite boycotts, potentially driven by external pressures from backers like the UAE, though skepticism remains over the paramilitary's willingness to cede urban strongholds without ironclad transitional guarantees.

Humanitarian and Strategic Implications

The ongoing conflict involving the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has exacerbated Sudan's , contributing to the internal of over 11 million people since April 2023, with 8.6 million displaced specifically due to the war. In RSF-controlled areas, particularly in and western , reports document widespread atrocities including ethnic-targeted violence and aid obstructions, which have intensified and risks affecting millions, as fighting disrupts agricultural production, trade routes, and humanitarian access. Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) actions, such as sieges and blockades in eastern and central regions, similarly impede aid delivery, underscoring mutual responsibility for the crisis where over 20 million people—40% of the population—require urgent medical care amid collapsed infrastructure. Mass displacement has fueled regional migration pressures, with millions fleeing to , , and , straining neighboring economies and security, while cross-border flows risk amplifying instability in the . However, between November 2024 and September 2025, approximately 2.6 million displaced Sudanese returned to areas of origin across the country, including over 1 million to amid fragile ceasefires and partial withdrawals, suggesting localized perceptions of relative stability despite persistent violence and destroyed infrastructure. In RSF-held zones like parts of , such returns occur alongside ongoing risks, highlighting a complex dynamic where enables some civilian movement but perpetuates vulnerability to renewed fighting. Strategically, RSF territorial in western and southern Sudan has led to , positioning the group as a pragmatic, tribal-based alternative to the SAF's increasing Islamist influences, including ties to former National Congress Party elements blamed for prior . This bifurcation reduces the prospect of unified Islamist dominance under SAF victory, potentially mitigating risks of Sudan reverting to a jihadist hub akin to the Bashir era, though the stalemate fosters ungoverned spaces vulnerable to transnational threats like al-Qaeda affiliates exploiting chaos. Regionally, RSF gains along borders with and enhance its leverage for resource extraction and alliances, complicating stability in the by enabling proxy dynamics and migration surges that burden neighbors like and .