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Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions

Protocol Additional to the of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) is a adopted by a diplomatic conference on 8 June 1977 that supplements the four 1949 by establishing detailed humanitarian rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts, such as and organized internal rebellions, beyond the baseline protections of Common Article 3. The protocol entered into force on 7 December 1978, six months after deposit of the second instrument of ratification, and requires states parties to disseminate its provisions widely within their armed forces and civilian populations. Unlike Protocol I, which addresses international armed conflicts, Protocol II targets internal strife meeting specific thresholds: it applies only when dissident armed forces or organized groups under responsible command control territory, conduct sustained military operations, and demonstrate capacity to implement the substantive provisions, thereby excluding isolated or sporadic violence. Core protections mandate humane treatment without adverse distinction for all persons not actively participating in hostilities, prohibit murder, cruel treatment, , hostage-taking, collective punishments, and , and safeguard civilians from indiscriminate attacks while banning the use of as a method of combat. It also extends safeguards to the wounded, sick, and medical personnel, requiring care without discrimination and protection of medical units, and stipulates fundamental guarantees including fair judicial processes for accused persons, though without full prisoner-of-war status for captured combatants. Ratified by 169 states as of October 2020, the protocol reflects post-colonial efforts to codify rules for internal conflicts amid rising insurgencies, yet its non-universal adherence— including non-ratification by the despite signature in 1977, due to reservations over legitimizing non-state actors and inconsistencies with domestic —has limited its enforceability in major theaters. Debates persist on its scope, with critics arguing the territorial control criterion inadequately distinguishes protracted rebellions from mere , potentially constraining state responses to internal threats while imposing asymmetric obligations on governments. Despite these, has arguably incorporated many provisions, influencing judicial interpretations in bodies like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former .

Historical Development

Origins in Post-Colonial and Cold War Conflicts

The limitations of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions became evident in the post-World War II era as non-international armed conflicts proliferated, particularly amid the processes in and during the and . Newly independent states, often marked by fragile institutions, ethnic tensions, and economic disparities, frequently descended into civil strife, such as the (1967–1970), which resulted in an estimated 1 to 3 million deaths primarily from famine and indiscriminate violence rather than direct combat. These conflicts exposed the inadequacy of Common Article 3's brief provisions, which prohibited only the most egregious acts like and but lacked regulations on methods of warfare, protections, or humanitarian access. The Cold War intensified these challenges, as superpower rivalries fueled proxy engagements within sovereign territories, supplying arms and ideological support to insurgents or governments without altering the non-international character of the fighting. Examples include the protracted civil wars in and following Portuguese decolonization in 1975, where Cuban and South African interventions prolonged hostilities amid internal factional struggles, leading to massive displacement and civilian casualties. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), actively involved in providing aid during these crises, documented recurrent violations and gaps in existing law, prompting calls for elaboration on Common Article 3 to address the conduct of hostilities and safeguard non-combatants in high-intensity internal conflicts. By the late , the ICRC's observations of over 80 non-international armed conflicts since —most occurring in post-colonial contexts—underscored the need for a dedicated instrument, as the majority of war victims were civilians in internal wars rather than interstate ones. This realization drove the ICRC's international appeal for reaffirmation and development of , culminating in expert consultations that laid the groundwork for Protocol II's focus on threshold criteria for applicability and substantive rules binding armed groups alongside states.

Diplomatic Conferences of 1974–1977

The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Applicable in Armed Conflicts convened in under the auspices of the Swiss Federal Council to consider two draft additional protocols prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1973, one addressing international armed conflicts () and the other non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II). The conference comprised representatives from over 100 states, national liberation movements, and observers, including the ICRC, with proceedings emphasizing consensus-building amid tensions and decolonization-era conflicts that highlighted gaps in existing protections for internal strife. Protocol II faced particular scrutiny, as many governments viewed expanded rules for dissident armed groups as potential threats to and domestic order, leading to debates over limiting its scope to exclude sporadic or mere unrest. The conference held four sessions: the first from 20 February to 29 March 1974, focusing on organizational matters and initial reviews of the ICRC drafts; the second from 3 February to 18 April 1975, where substantive negotiations began and working groups dissected Protocol II's provisions; the third from 21 April to 11 June 1976, advancing textual amendments; and the fourth from 17 March to 10 June 1977, culminating in final compromises. During these sessions, Protocol II's applicability threshold under what became Article 1 emerged as a focal point of contention, with Western states advocating stringent criteria—such as organized armed groups under responsible command exercising territorial control and conducting prolonged operations—to distinguish qualifying conflicts from internal disturbances or , thereby preserving state authority. In contrast, some non-aligned and socialist-leaning delegations pushed for broader application to encompass a wider array of internal upheavals, reflecting influences from ongoing guerrilla wars, though compromises ultimately narrowed the protocol by omitting protections for situations below the threshold and rejecting expansive guerrilla combatant status akin to . Negotiations on Protocol II risked collapse, prompting a "salvage operation" in later sessions that retained core humanitarian safeguards—such as prohibitions on violence to life and person, hostage-taking, and collective punishments—while excising more intrusive elements like detailed rules on means of combat or by armed groups, to secure adoption without equating rebels' obligations to those of states. and other major powers expressed reservations over provisions potentially legitimizing insurgencies, influencing the final text's emphasis on non-international conflicts involving sustained opposition rather than mere riots. On 8 June 1977, during the fourth session, Protocol II was adopted by consensus alongside , with the Final Act signed on 10 June by representatives of 102 states and three national liberation movements, marking a milestone in codifying minimal standards for internal conflicts beyond Common Article 3 of the 1949 . This outcome reflected pragmatic balancing of humanitarian imperatives against state concerns over interference, though the protocol's restrictive thresholds have since limited its invocation in lower-intensity conflicts.

Adoption and Entry into Force

Additional Protocol II was adopted on 8 June 1977 during the fourth and final session of the Diplomatic on the Reaffirmation and Development of Applicable in Armed Conflicts, convened by in from 1974 to 1977. The conference, which included representatives from over 100 states, approved the protocol by consensus alongside Additional , building on drafts prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross to address protections in non-international armed conflicts. The adoption marked the culmination of negotiations spanning four sessions, focused on extending humanitarian safeguards beyond the minimal standards of Common Article 3 of the 1949 . The protocol opened for signature on 12 December 1977 in and remained open until 12 December 1978, also at Headquarters in , allowing states to express intent to . Pursuant to Article 26, it entered into force six months after the deposit of two instruments of or accession with the Swiss Federal Council. became the first state party through deposited on 28 February 1978, followed by Libya's accession on 7 June 1978; accordingly, the protocol entered into force on 7 December 1978. For subsequent parties, entry into force occurs six months after their individual deposit. As of the latest records, 169 states have become parties to Protocol II through , , or , though major powers such as the , which signed but did not , remain outside its formal obligations. The protocol's depository functions are handled by the Swiss government, with notifications of and reservations publicly recorded.

Scope and Applicability

Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict

Additional Protocol II applies to armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that, under responsible command, exercise control over part of its territory sufficient to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the Protocol's provisions. This material scope, outlined in Article 1(1), supplements without altering the broader applicability of to the 1949 , which covers any non-international armed conflict. The definition imposes specific thresholds to delineate qualifying conflicts from lesser violence: the armed groups must possess organizational capacity via responsible command, enabling coordinated action akin to military structure; they must demonstrate territorial control enabling prolonged engagements rather than fleeting actions; and their operations must be systematic and implementable of Protocol obligations, such as humane treatment rules. These criteria reflect intent to regulate civil strife resembling interstate warfare while excluding purely internal disorders, as clarified in Article 1(2), which states the Protocol does not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar ." This narrower framing, adopted amid concerns over state during the 1974–1977 Diplomatic Conferences, ensures Protocol II's detailed protections—extending beyond Common Article 3's basics—activate only when non-state actors achieve minimum status, thereby facilitating state without encompassing routine policing or unrest. In practice, assessments of these elements, such as group organization and territorial sway, draw on factual indicators like command hierarchies, , and operational duration, as evidenced in International Criminal Tribunal for the former applying analogous thresholds.

Threshold Requirements under Article 1

Article 1 of Protocol II establishes the material scope of applicability, limiting its protections to specific non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) that meet defined thresholds of intensity and organization, thereby distinguishing it from the broader reach of Common Article 3 of the 1949 . The provision states that the Protocol applies to armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a High Contracting Party, between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that satisfy certain criteria, explicitly excluding situations of internal disturbances such as riots or isolated acts of violence. This framework aims to balance humanitarian needs with state sovereignty concerns, requiring a level of conflict escalation beyond mere unrest to trigger the Protocol's more detailed rules. The primary threshold elements include the requirement for the conflict to involve organized armed groups under responsible command, capable of exercising territorial control sufficient to conduct sustained and concerted military operations. "Responsible command" implies a hierarchical structure enabling accountability and discipline within the group, while territorial control denotes effective authority over an area, allowing not only operations but also the potential implementation of Protocol II's obligations, such as humane treatment of detainees. These criteria elevate the intensity bar compared to Common Article 3, which applies to any NIAC without such prerequisites, reflecting negotiations where states sought to prevent the Protocol from encumbering responses to low-level insurgencies. Article 1(2) explicitly carves out non-applicability to "internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature," ensuring the Protocol does not regulate purely domestic scenarios. This lower threshold aligns with jurisprudence, where courts like the have interpreted similar language to require protracted violence between organized parties for NIAC classification. The absence of an upper threshold—beyond exclusion of conflicts covered by —means Protocol II governs high-intensity civil wars meeting the organizational tests, without capping applicability based on scale. In practice, these requirements demand factual assessments of group capabilities at the conflict's outset or as it evolves, with the International Committee of the Red Cross emphasizing that partial or fluctuating control may suffice if it enables the stipulated operations. Non-state actors must demonstrate both military prowess and proto-governmental functions to qualify, a standard unmet in many insurgencies involving loosely affiliated militants. States party to Protocol II, upon , commit to respecting it in qualifying scenarios, though relies on domestic mechanisms and international monitoring rather than .

Distinction from Common Article 3 and International Conflicts

Protocol II explicitly develops and supplements Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which establishes baseline protections in non-international armed conflicts, without altering the latter's conditions of applicability. Common Article 3 applies to any armed conflict occurring within the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups, encompassing a broad range of internal violence that reaches the level of protracted armed violence between governmental and non-governmental forces. In contrast, Protocol II imposes stricter threshold criteria under Article 1(2) for its full substantive provisions to take effect: the non-international armed conflict must involve dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups that are (a) under responsible command, (b) exercise control over a part of the state's territory sufficient to enable sustained and concerted military operations, and (c) engage in protracted armed violence. This elevated intensity requirement excludes situations of internal disturbances, isolated acts of violence, or mere riots from Protocol II's scope, though such scenarios may still trigger Common Article 3 if they constitute an armed conflict. The separation preserves Common Article 3's universal applicability as a minimum standard in all non-international armed conflicts, while layers additional protections—such as rules on the treatment of detainees, prohibitions on collective punishments, and safeguards for civilian objects—only when the higher threshold is met. This distinction reflects diplomatic compromises during the 1974–1977 conferences, where states sought to avoid extending detailed humanitarian rules to low-intensity unrest, yet 's drafters intended it to address the gaps in Common Article 3 for more structured civil wars without undermining the latter's broader reach. Consequently, in conflicts falling below 's criteria, parties remain bound solely by Common Article 3's fundamental guarantees against violence to life, , and humiliating treatment, but lack 's expanded obligations like or protection of cultural objects. Regarding international armed conflicts, Protocol II applies exclusively to non-international ones and expressly excludes those between two or more High Contracting Parties, which fall under the full protections of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and, if applicable, Additional Protocol I. International armed conflicts involve interstate hostilities or, under Protocol I's Article 1(4), certain wars of self-determination against colonial domination, alien occupation, or racist regimes, triggering comprehensive rules such as prisoner-of-war status under the Third Convention and detailed civilian protections under the Fourth. Protocol II, by design, omits such categorizations, focusing instead on internal dissensions where no inter-state element exists; its Article 3 reinforces non-intervention by foreign states, underscoring its delimitation from cross-border wars. This bifurcation ensures that escalations involving multiple states retain international law's state-centric framework, while purely domestic conflicts adhere to Protocol II's tailored regime only upon meeting its organizational and territorial thresholds.

Substantive Provisions

Protections for Civilians, Wounded, and Detainees

Article 4 of Protocol II provides fundamental guarantees applicable to all persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities, including civilians, wounded, , and detainees, mandating humane treatment in all circumstances without adverse distinction based on , color, , , birth, political , or other status. It prohibits violence to life and person, including , cruel treatment, , mutilation, and outrages upon personal dignity such as humiliating treatment, , enforced , and any form of ; it also bans taking hostages, collective punishments, , , , and reprisals, as well as threats to commit such acts. Children are afforded special respect and protection, including continued education, , prohibition on recruitment under age 15, and, where possible, safe evacuation from conflict zones. Persons deprived of their liberty, including detainees, receive elaborated protections under Article 5, ensuring treatment with , adequate food and to maintain , appropriate clothing, , and medical care, as well as hygiene conditions and opportunities for religious practice. Detainees must be allowed to receive individual or collective relief, communicate with family, and benefit from no adverse distinction; women shall be held separately from men and protected against and , while all are shielded from pressure to order or authorize medical procedures contrary to ethics, and from abusive experiments. Parties are required to evacuate detainees from combat zones when possible and to take measures for their safety upon release or handover. The wounded, sick, and shipwrecked are protected and cared for under Articles 7–12, with Article 7 requiring respect and humane treatment in all circumstances, prompt medical attention based on need without non-medical distinctions, and priority for the gravely wounded or sick. Article 8 obliges parties to search for, collect, and evacuate such persons without delay, protect them from and ill-treatment, facilitate identity records and information transmission, and ensure respectful disposal or return of the dead. Medical and religious personnel enjoy respect and protection (Article 9), cannot be compelled to non-humanitarian tasks, and perform duties under ethical safeguards (Article 10); medical units and transports are similarly shielded unless misused for hostile acts, with protection resuming post-warning if misuse ceases (Article 11), and all must display the distinctive emblem (red cross, red crescent, or red ) for recognition (Article 12). Civilians and the civilian population benefit from targeted safeguards in Article 13, enjoying general protection against dangers from military operations and prohibition as objects of attack, with acts or threats intended to spread deemed unlawful. Such protection lapses only for individuals directly participating in hostilities but resumes upon cessation; these rules complement the broader prohibitions in Article 4, extending to vulnerable groups like children.

Prohibitions on Violence and Punishments

Article 4 of Protocol II establishes fundamental guarantees applicable to all persons not actively participating in hostilities, including civilians, the wounded, and detainees, prohibiting specific forms of and punitive measures during non-international armed conflicts. These provisions build upon the baseline protections in Common Article 3 of the 1949 by explicitly enumerating acts such as murder, torture, mutilation, and as violations against the life, health, and physical or mental well-being of . The article mandates humane treatment without adverse distinctions based on race, religion, sex, or other criteria, emphasizing respect for personal honor, convictions, and religious practices in all circumstances. Key prohibitions under Article 4(2) include:
  • Violence to life and person: Explicit bans on murder, cruel treatment including and , and any , extending to threats of such acts.
  • Collective punishments: Forbids imposing penalties on groups for individual acts, a measure absent from Common Article 3 but incorporated to prevent indiscriminate reprisals observed in internal conflicts.
  • Hostage-taking and : Prohibits seizing individuals to compel concessions and acts intended to spread terror, addressing tactics common in insurgencies.
  • Outrages upon dignity: Bans humiliating treatment, , enforced , , , slave trade, and , with these acts deemed non-derogable regardless of context.
Regarding punishments, Article 4(4) requires fair trial standards for those arrested or detained on conflict-related charges, including , prompt notification of charges, right to defense (in person or with assistance), and prohibition of or punishment for acts already adjudicated. Death sentences necessitate clemency appeals, and responsibility attaches only to committed acts, countering arbitrary or retroactive justice in . These rules apply equally to state forces and organized armed groups, promoting accountability without granting combatants immunity from domestic prosecution for crimes. The provisions reflect negotiations from 1974–1977 diplomatic conferences, where delegates sought to codify protections against abuses in and civil strife, such as those in Nigeria's Biafran War (1967–1970) or Yemen's conflicts, without legitimizing rebellions. Enforcement relies on state implementation and potential international criminal liability, though Protocol II lacks dedicated war crimes provisions, deferring to grave breaches in linked instruments.

Obligations of Armed Groups and Humanitarian Access

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, known as Protocol II, imposes direct obligations on organized armed groups involved in non-international armed conflicts, requiring them to respect fundamental guarantees for persons not taking direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to do so, regardless of whether their liberty has been deprived. These include prohibitions against violence to life and person, , cruel treatment, , mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment, summary executions without fair trial, taking of hostages, collective punishments, and pillage; additionally, acts or threats of violence primarily intended to spread terror among the civilian population are forbidden. Armed groups must also ensure respect for convictions and religious practices, protect women against and , safeguard family unity, and prohibit the recruitment or active participation of children under fifteen in hostilities. These obligations extend to the treatment of under armed group control, mandating that enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations and shall not be the object of attack; furthermore, armed groups are required to distinguish between civilian populations and combatants, refraining from indiscriminate attacks. Protocol II's provisions build upon Common Article 3 of the 1949 by specifying enforceable standards for dissident forces, thereby holding non-state actors accountable for humane conduct in territories they control, though enforcement relies on state implementation or international mechanisms absent direct state authority over such groups. Regarding humanitarian access, Article 18 obliges parties to the conflict, including armed groups, to permit impartial relief societies—such as National Cross or Red Crescent Societies located in the High Contracting Party's territory—to offer their services for the civilian population's benefit. Where the civilian population faces grave need, armed groups must agree to impartial and non-discriminatory relief actions aimed at providing essential foodstuffs, medical supplies, and care, while ensuring such actions respect principles and do not serve as pretexts for foreign intervention. This facilitates humanitarian activities for victims wherever required, promoting access without adverse distinction, though practical implementation often encounters challenges from armed groups' security concerns or strategic interests.

Ratification and International Status

Ratification by States and Geographic Patterns

As of June 2024, 169 states are parties to Additional Protocol II via or accession. demonstrates distinct geographic patterns, with near-universal acceptance in (47 parties among roughly 50 states) and substantial adherence in (53 parties). The show widespread (26 parties), while has 29 parties amid a larger number of states, and 7 parties. These disparities highlight higher engagement in regions with established traditions of multilateral humanitarian compliance, such as post-World War II and many post-colonial African and Latin American states, contrasted with sparser uptake in where internal security concerns predominate. Non-parties cluster in , the , and , including major powers like the , , , , , , and . The signed the Protocol in 1977 but has not ratified it, with the President transmitting it to the in 1987 for , where it remains pending. No ratifications have occurred since 2020, stabilizing the roster despite ongoing advocacy by the International Committee of the Red Cross for universality.

Positions of Major Non-Ratifying States

The signed Additional Protocol II on December 12, 1977, but the has not provided to ratification despite its transmission by President in January 1987, who described it as a valuable codification of protections supplementing Common Article 3 for victims of non-international armed conflicts while excluding mere internal disturbances. U.S. officials have expressed reservations about specific provisions, such as those potentially affording undue procedural rights to captured insurgents or blurring distinctions between lawful combatants and terrorists in asymmetric conflicts, arguing that full ratification could constrain operations without reciprocal benefits given the Protocol's high applicability threshold requiring organized armed groups with territorial control. Nonetheless, the U.S. Department of Defense incorporates many of its substantive rules into doctrine and operational practice as reflective of , applying protections for civilians and detainees in internal conflicts subject to caveats. India has neither signed nor ratified the Protocol, maintaining during its 1977 negotiations and subsequent reviews that its framework risks elevating non-state actors in internal disturbances—such as Maoist insurgencies or separatist violence in regions like Jammu and Kashmir—by imposing symmetric obligations on state forces and implying a degree of legitimacy through requirements for "responsible command" and sustained operations. Indian government statements emphasize preservation of sovereignty in addressing domestic threats, viewing the Protocol's exclusion of "situations of internal disturbances" as insufficiently robust to prevent judicial or international scrutiny of counter-insurgency measures, which could politicize law enforcement against groups not meeting the full armed conflict threshold. This stance aligns with India's broader reticence toward treaties perceived to constrain internal security autonomy, prioritizing unilateral application of core Geneva Conventions protections over formal accession. Pakistan signed the on December 12, 1977, but has not proceeded to , with non-adherence linked to operational challenges in protracted internal conflicts involving groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan in tribal border regions, where Protocol provisions could mandate humanitarian access or detainee safeguards that complicate territorial reclamation efforts against loosely organized militants. Official positions underscore the need to safeguard national authority in , avoiding any framework that might interpret sporadic violence as qualifying non-international armed conflicts and thereby grant procedural equities to adversaries lacking state-like control. Iran, a non-signatory and non-ratifier, has articulated no formal public endorsement of the , reflecting a doctrinal emphasis on absolute state in internal matters and skepticism toward humanitarian instruments that could invite external monitoring of security operations against dissident or ethnic separatist elements. This position coheres with Iran's selective engagement with frameworks, applying Common Article 3 domestically while resisting expansions perceived as infringing on governmental prerogative to classify and respond to unrest without third-party validation of conflict intensity or actor status.

Status as Customary Law and Domestic Incorporation

Certain provisions of Additional Protocol II (AP II) are recognized as reflecting customary (IHL), binding on all states regardless of , particularly those supplementing Common Article 3 of the 1949 , such as prohibitions on violence to life and person, , and humiliating treatment in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s study on customary IHL identifies over 40 rules applicable to NIACs drawn from or consistent with AP II, including the fundamental guarantees in Article 4 (e.g., protections against collective punishments and hostage-taking) and civilian protections under Article 13, asserting their customary status based on state practice, military manuals, and judicial decisions. However, this characterization is disputed; the , a non-party, contends that AP II's expansions beyond Common Article 3—such as detailed obligations on armed groups or broader territorial control thresholds—lack sufficient uniform state practice and opinio juris to constitute custom, emphasizing instead that only core humanitarian minima are customary for NIACs to avoid legitimizing insurgents. Domestic incorporation of AP II varies by ratification status and legal tradition. Ratifying states, numbering 169 as of 2024, must implement its provisions through national legislation to criminalize grave breaches (per AP II Article 6) and ensure humane treatment, often via dedicated IHL laws or amendments to penal and military codes; for instance, the incorporated compatible rules through the Geneva Conventions Act 1957, as amended in 1995, which penalizes violations and aligns domestic military practice with AP II's protections for the wounded and civilians in NIACs. The ICRC facilitates this via national advisory committees, having supported over 140 new domestic laws or case-law integrations between 2020 and 2022, though implementation gaps persist in regions like , where ratification is near-universal but enforcement relies on weak judicial systems. Non-ratifying states, including the , incorporate select AP II-compatible rules as customary IHL or via unilateral mechanisms rather than obligations; U.S. , as outlined in the 2015 Department of Defense Law of Manual, reflects AP II's substantive protections (e.g., against indiscriminate attacks) through training and operational rules, supplemented by statutes like the 1996 , which criminalizes certain NIAC violations akin to AP II Article 4. This approach prioritizes in internal conflicts while aligning with empirical practice to mitigate reciprocity issues with non-state actors, though it rejects AP II's direct applicability to avoid implying for rebels. Overall, domestic measures emphasize penalization of abuses and military instruction, but effectiveness hinges on institutional capacity and political will, with non-parties demonstrating de facto adherence to core norms without formal incorporation.

Practical Application

Use in Specific Conflicts Post-1978

In the (1980–1992), , having ratified Additional Protocol II on November 23, 1978, faced debates over its applicability amid fighting between government forces and the (FMLN). The government rejected Protocol II's application, arguing it would confer belligerent status on rebels and undermine sovereignty, instead treating captured insurgents as political detainees rather than prisoners of war entitled to protections under Article 4. In contrast, the FMLN invoked Protocol II, asserting compliance with its obligations, including cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for humanitarian actions such as temporary ceasefires for vaccinations, and claimed control over sufficient territory to meet Article 1's threshold for organized armed groups. Despite these invocations, widespread violations occurred, including forced relocations prohibited by Article 17(1), with the protocol's discretionary compliance highlighted as a barrier to enforcement. Colombia's internal armed conflict, involving groups like the (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) since the 1960s but intensifying post-1978, saw Protocol II ratified by the state in 1995 and integrated into domestic law via rulings affirming its consistency with the . The court emphasized interpreting Protocol II within the broader corpus of , applying protections such as those for civilians under Article 13 to non-international conflicts without requiring formal negotiations for baseline standards. documented its automatic applicability to all parties, prohibiting attacks on objects indispensable to civilian survival per Article 14, amid ongoing hostilities that included and actions. Protocol II influenced peace processes, including FARC's 2016 agreement, where amnesties were assessed against Article 6(5)'s provisions on excluding serious violations from . During the (1991–2002), primarily between government forces and the (RUF), the (SCSL)—established in 2002—prosecuted violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, with having ratified the protocol in 1986. The SCSL Statute explicitly granted jurisdiction over serious breaches, including those against under Protocol II Articles 4 and 13, as seen in cases like Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., where RUF leaders were convicted for acts such as murder and attacks on civilians violating the protocol's fundamental guarantees. The court applied Protocol II alongside , rejecting arguments that its higher intensity threshold (Article 1) precluded coverage, and emphasized prohibitions on child recruitment and as integral to the regime. Post-conflict, 's 2012 Geneva Conventions Act incorporated Protocol II domestically, aiding prosecutions of over 10,000 violations documented during the war.

Role in International Criminal Proceedings

Protocol II has informed the prosecution of war crimes in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) before international tribunals, particularly by supplying substantive content to prohibitions under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which tribunals treat as customary international law binding on all parties. In the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Appeals Chamber's 1995 decision in Prosecutor v. Tadić established jurisdiction over violations of the laws or customs of war in NIACs, interpreting Article 3 of the ICTY Statute to encompass breaches of Common Article 3 and additional customary rules derived from Protocol II, such as protections against violence to life and person, including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. This ruling rejected arguments limiting NIAC prosecutions to internal matters, affirming that serious violations in conflicts like the Bosnian War—deemed NIACs under Protocol II's Article 1 criteria—could be internationally adjudicated, leading to convictions in cases such as Prosecutor v. Kordić for acts like attacks on civilians that mirrored Protocol II's safeguards. The (ICTR) similarly applied Protocol II standards under its Statute's Article 4, prosecuting violations like violence to life and outrages upon personal dignity in the 1994 context, where the conflict qualified as a NIAC; for instance, convictions in Prosecutor v. Akayesu drew on these rules to establish criminal liability for acts prohibited by Protocol II Article 4. At the (ICC), Protocol II contributes to defining war crimes under Article 8(2)(c) for Common Article 3 breaches and Article 8(2)(e) for other serious NIAC violations, with the Elements of Crimes document referencing Protocol II provisions—such as bans on collective punishments (Article 4(2)(b)) and starvation as a method of combat (Article 14)—to specify elements like intentionally directing attacks against civilians or humanitarian objects. This integration enabled prosecutions in NIAC situations, as in Prosecutor v. Ntaganda (2019), where convictions for murder and rape as war crimes relied on customary norms codified in Protocol II, without requiring state ratification of the Protocol itself. Tribunals have consistently viewed Protocol II not as a direct basis for —given its non-universal —but as evidentiary for customary prohibitions, ensuring for armed groups' conduct in NIACs exceeding mere internal disturbances, as per Protocol II's Article 1 threshold. This approach has facilitated over 100 convictions across ICTY and ICTR for NIAC-related crimes incorporating Protocol II elements, though challenges persist in proving under Article 6 for non-state actors' violations.

Engagement by Humanitarian Organizations

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) serves as the primary guardian of (IHL), including Additional Protocol II, by promoting its principles through dissemination, training, and direct operational engagement in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). The ICRC conducts confidential dialogues with state forces and non-state armed groups to encourage adherence to Protocol II's protections for civilians, wounded persons, and detainees, often integrating these rules into armed groups' doctrines and codes of conduct. Between 2014 and 2017, for instance, the ICRC delivered IHL training sessions to non-state groups in , while similar programs in and from 2019 to 2020 focused on Protocol II's prohibitions against indiscriminate attacks and . Article 18 of Protocol II explicitly facilitates relief actions by impartial humanitarian organizations like the ICRC, permitting them to provide assistance to victims of NIACs subject to the of the responsible and without diversion to military ends. The ICRC leverages this provision to negotiate access for aid delivery, medical support, and detainee visits, as evidenced by its mediation of over 1,000 detainee exchanges in in 2020 and the release of more than 1,800 individuals in by the same year. Such engagements underscore the ICRC's operational mandate under Protocol II to mitigate suffering, though they remain contingent on host state or group approval, which can impose supervisory conditions to ensure neutrality. Other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) complement the ICRC's efforts by focusing on medical aid, monitoring, and advocacy. (MSF) operates in NIAC zones, invoking Protocol II's safeguards for medical personnel and hospitals to deliver emergency care while documenting attacks on health facilities that violate Article 11. and similar groups monitor compliance by investigating alleged breaches, such as indiscriminate violence against civilians, and reporting them to mechanisms, as in their analyses of amnesty provisions under Article 6(5) that prohibit shielding perpetrators of grave violations. These activities enhance accountability but face recurrent obstacles, including access denials by conflict parties—reported in over 60% of ICRC access requests in protracted NIACs—and risks from anti-terrorism designations that constrain engagement with certain non-state actors.

Controversies and Criticisms

Equivalence Between State and Non-State Actors

Protocol II imposes symmetric humanitarian obligations on both state armed forces and qualifying non-state armed groups in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), as outlined in Article 1, which applies the protocol to conflicts occurring in a state's territory between its forces and "dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups" under responsible command, exercising territorial control, and capable of sustained military operations. This framework treats the parties as equivalent bearers of (IHL) duties, extending protections and restraints—such as prohibitions on attacks against civilians (Article 13) and requirements for humane treatment (Article 4)—without differentiating based on the state's sovereign legitimacy or the armed groups' unlawful status under domestic law. Proponents, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), argue this equality fosters reciprocity, incentivizing armed groups to comply with IHL by mirroring state obligations, thereby enhancing civilian protection in asymmetric conflicts. Critics contend that such equivalence erodes the fundamental distinction between a government's legitimate monopoly on force and the illicit violence of insurgents or terrorists, potentially conferring status on non- actors who reject and democratic processes. For instance, scholars like Yuval Shany argue against full parity in obligations, positing that , as bearers of and accountability to , should not be burdened equivalently with entities lacking popular legitimacy, territorial responsibility, or post-conflict governance capacity, as this could prolong NIACs by validating armed groups' claims and limiting states' recourse to law enforcement paradigms over wartime rules. This perspective aligns with non-ratifying states' reservations; the , while deeming much of Protocol II reflective of , has withheld ratification partly due to concerns that its application to "dissident forces" equates organized rebels with military operations, undermining domestic in internal disturbances and risking undue protections for groups like guerrillas that fail to meet thresholds. Empirically, the has faced scrutiny in conflicts where non-state actors exploit IHL parity to blend with civilians or claim protections unavailable under pure frameworks, as seen in debates over or operations, where symmetric rules complicate state targeting without reciprocal compliance from groups prioritizing ideological warfare over humanitarian restraint. Non-ratifiers such as and similarly critique the protocol for intruding on sovereign responses to insurgencies, viewing the lack of hierarchical distinctions as a politicization of IHL that favors narratives over imperatives. In international proceedings, this tension manifests when courts apply Protocol II norms to non-state actors without addressing legitimacy asymmetries, potentially incentivizing violations by groups unaccountable to state-like structures.

Effects on Military Operations and State Security

Additional Protocol II requires parties to non-international armed conflicts to distinguish between populations and combatants, prohibiting attacks that fail to discriminate or employ methods of warfare proscribed in , as outlined in Article 13. This mandates state forces to verify targets and assess incidental harm prior to engagements, constraining tactics such as or unrestricted sieges in urban or populated theaters where exploit proximity. Provisions in Articles 14 and 15 further limit the use of as a method of and attacks on objects indispensable to survival, like dams and systems, potentially complicating strategies or resource denial in prolonged insurgencies. These rules can impede military tempo and effectiveness in , where rapid, decisive operations are often prioritized to deny safe havens to rebels; empirical analyses indicate that heightened legal scrutiny under similar frameworks correlates with extended decision cycles and reduced force options, favoring adaptive non-state actors who routinely violate distinctions. Non-ratifying states, such as , withhold consent precisely to preserve operational latitude in addressing internal threats like Maoist insurgencies, treating such conflicts as domestic rather than regulated warfare, thereby avoiding Protocol II's internationalization of response measures. For state security, the protocol's applicability threshold—demanding dissident groups possess responsible command, territorial control, and capacity for sustained operations (Article 1)—excludes sporadic guerrilla actions, enabling governments to deploy or less restrained units without full humanitarian overlay in nascent disturbances. When triggered, however, it elevates rebels to quasi-combatant status, potentially eroding on legitimate violence and inviting external scrutiny that pressures restraint, as seen in ratifying states' adjustments to amid insurgencies in and the post-1977. The , while aligning domestic doctrine with core provisions, eschews ratification to sidestep binding constraints that might legitimize non-state challengers in low-threshold scenarios, prioritizing flexibility for hybrid threats blending and . Overall, the protocol may enhance long-term security legitimacy through humane conduct but at the cost of short-term tactical advantages, with compliance varying widely due to enforcement gaps against non-state violators.

Threshold Debates and Gaps in Coverage

The threshold for applicability under Article 1 of Additional Protocol II requires that a non-international conflict involve forces or organized groups under responsible command, exercising general control over a part of state territory, and engaging in protracted confrontations of a collective character, while excluding mere internal disturbances, riots, or isolated . This formulation, adopted in 1977, has sparked ongoing debates regarding its stringency, with critics arguing it imposes an excessively high bar that limits protections in many internal conflicts, potentially leaving civilians vulnerable in situations of widespread but less organized violence. For instance, legal scholars have noted that the "general control over territory" requirement, absent from Common Article 3 of the 1949 , excludes applicability in urban insurgencies or fluid where territorial control is temporary or contested, as seen in analyses of conflicts like those in or prior to escalation. Proponents of the threshold, including some state representatives during the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference, defend it as essential to preserve state sovereignty and avoid regulating purely domestic unrest, preventing the protocol from encumbering routine law enforcement operations. Gaps in coverage arise prominently from the protocol's deliberate exclusion of situations not meeting the threshold, such as sporadic , , or state responses to isolated uprisings, which fall under domestic law rather than (IHL). This distinction has been critiqued for creating a "legal vacuum" in hybrid threats, where non-state actors employ asymmetric tactics without achieving the required organization or territorial hold, as evidenced in post- evaluations of conflicts in regions like , where many insurgencies began below the threshold and escalated without retroactive IHL safeguards. Furthermore, the protocol's silence on certain actors—such as private military companies or cyber-enabled groups—and its lack of provisions for or resource-based conflicts highlights structural omissions, with commentators pointing to the 1977 text's focus on traditional civil wars as ill-suited to modern NIACs involving transnational elements or non-territorial control via technology. These gaps have prompted supplementary customary law developments, like the International Committee of the Red Cross's interpretive guidance extending Common Article 3 more broadly, though Protocol II's stricter criteria remain binding only on ratifying states meeting its terms. Debates also center on interpretive flexibility, with some jurists advocating a lower threshold based on the protocol's object and purpose to protect victims, arguing that "protracted" and "concerted" operations should be assessed dynamically rather than rigidly, as rigid application risks undermining the humanitarian rationale amid evolving conflict dynamics. However, states like the United States, a non-party, have emphasized the threshold's role in maintaining a clear delineation from peacetime law, cautioning against dilution that could equate insurgents with lawful combatants under Protocol I. Empirical studies of NIAC classifications, such as those by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, reveal inconsistencies in application, where over 40% of post-1977 internal conflicts were deemed below the threshold initially, delaying IHL enforcement and complicating accountability. These unresolved tensions underscore the protocol's foundational compromise between humanitarian expansion and state concerns, with no consensus amendments proposed despite periodic reviews.

Impact and Assessment

Empirical Evidence of Compliance and Violations

Empirical assessments of with Additional Protocol II reveal persistent challenges, with non- and systematic violations documented across numerous non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). Studies indicate that violations of (IHL), including Protocol II provisions on and humane , remain common despite the protocol's by 169 states as of 2020. Enforcement mechanisms are limited, contributing to low adherence, as armed groups and state forces often prioritize military objectives over restraints on methods of warfare. Quantitative data on is scarce due to methodological difficulties in verifying conduct, but annual global assessments identify over 50 ongoing NIACs with recurrent breaches of core rules like the on targeting . In Colombia's decades-long conflict with the (FARC), both government forces and insurgents committed widespread violations, including of over 1.8 million civilians between 1985 and 1998, contravening Article 17's prohibition on compelling civilians to leave their homes except for imperative reasons. documented indiscriminate attacks on civilians by paramilitaries and guerrillas, as well as executions and torture by state agents, highlighting failures to uphold Article 4's fundamental guarantees. reported targeted killings and bombings of civilian areas, classifying these as war crimes under Protocol II, with limited accountability despite domestic incorporation of the protocol in 1995. Partial compliance efforts included FARC's issuance of internal codes referencing IHL norms, though implementation was inconsistent amid ongoing atrocities. The , escalating since 2011, exemplifies large-scale breaches, with the regime and opposition groups responsible for over 30,000 documented child killings by 2023, violating Article 4(3)(c)'s protections against and attacks on civilians. The UN Commission of Inquiry reported indiscriminate bombings and sieges in and other areas, breaching Article 13's principle of distinction and precautions against civilian harm. Non-state actors, including affiliates, perpetrated summary executions and , further undermining Protocol II's humane treatment mandates, with geospatial analyses confirming disproportionate civilian impacts from airstrikes. Compliance indicators, such as ICRC dissemination programs, have had marginal effects amid the conflict's dynamics and chemical weapon use. In African NIACs, such as Sudan's ongoing , violations include mass displacement and attacks on humanitarian access, exacerbating what the described in 2025 as the world's worst , with breaches of Articles 14 and 18 on protected objects and relief actions. Broader data from IHL monitoring frameworks underscore that while some non-state groups in conflicts like those in the reference Protocol II in operational guidelines, empirical outcomes show elevated civilian casualties, indicating superficial rather than substantive adherence. Prosecutions remain rare, with international tribunals addressing only a fraction of violations, reinforcing patterns of .

Influence on Customary Norms and Future Developments

Protocol II has contributed to the crystallization of several rules into customary for non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), particularly by expanding protections beyond Common Article 3 of the 1949 . The International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) 2005 study on customary IHL identifies 136 of its 161 rules as applicable in NIACs, with many—such as the principles of distinction between civilians and combatants (Rule 1), prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks (Rule 11), and fundamental guarantees against and cruel treatment (Rule 87)—drawing directly from or aligning with Protocol II's provisions, supported by extensive state practice including manuals from over 100 countries and consistent operational behavior in conflicts post-1977. This influence is evidenced by opinio juris in national legislation and , where states like those in and have incorporated Protocol II-like norms into domestic law, filling regulatory gaps in NIAC conduct of hostilities that the treaty itself leaves underdeveloped. Despite broad acceptance, the customary status of some provisions remains disputed due to inconsistent state practice and objections from non-parties. , a non-party, has affirmed that core substantive elements of Protocol II—such as protections for the wounded and (Article 7) and bans on collective punishments (Article 4(2)(b))—reflect pre-existing custom but rejects broader assertions, arguing that opinio juris cannot be presumed from treaty adherence alone without parallel evidence of acceptance as law in non-party practice, as critiqued in its 2006 response to the ICRC study. Similarly, tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former (ICTY) in the 1995 Tadić decision have invoked Protocol II alongside custom to extend protections, yet persistent objections from states like and highlight limits, with their military doctrines prioritizing over expansive NIAC rules. Looking to future developments, Protocol II's framework has informed adaptive interpretations amid rising NIACs involving non-state actors, prompting reliance on customary evolution rather than new treaties. Post-1977 state practice has addressed treaty gaps, such as through prohibitions on starvation as a method of warfare (now Rule 53 of the ICRC study), derived from operational conduct in conflicts like those in Syria and Yemen. Its principles underpin the 1998 Rome Statute's war crimes provisions under Article 8(2)(c)-(e), which prosecute serious violations of Protocol II, influencing international criminal proceedings and encouraging non-state groups' self-regulation via codes of conduct. Emerging challenges, including transnational NIACs and cyber operations, have spurred discussions on convergence with international human rights law, as noted in ICRC analyses, but without universal ratification (169 states parties as of 2020), future codification efforts may prioritize customary reinforcement over amendments to avoid sovereignty concerns.

Overall Effectiveness in Mitigating NIAC Harms

Despite its provisions prohibiting indiscriminate attacks, targeting of civilians, and acts like as a method of warfare, Protocol II has demonstrated limited overall effectiveness in mitigating harms in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), as evidenced by persistent high rates of civilian casualties and widespread violations. Empirical data from the (UCDP) indicates that NIACs, which constitute the majority of global armed conflicts since the , have not seen a systematic decline in following the protocol's adoption in 1977 and in 1990; instead, organized deaths exceeded 80,000 annually in recent years, with explicit civilian targeting rising sharply to 13,900 deaths in 2024 alone. Studies further reveal that civilian-to-combatant casualty ratios in NIACs remain heavily skewed against non-combatants, often exceeding 1:1 or higher, undermining the protocol's core protections under Articles 13 and 14. Several causal factors contribute to this inefficacy, including the protocol's applicability threshold—requiring organized groups with territorial control—which excludes many low-intensity or NIACs, leaving only the weaker Common Article 3 applicable and limiting Protocol II's reach to roughly half of post-1977 internal conflicts. Non-state actors, unbound by state (over 170 states parties as of 2023), exhibit variable and often minimal , prioritizing objectives over humanitarian restraints, as seen in cases like Syria's where tactics violated Article 14 despite the protocol's invocation. Enforcement gaps exacerbate this, with international criminal proceedings rarely deterring violations due to jurisdictional hurdles and impunity; analyses of "" highlight how fragmented, identity-based conflicts erode reciprocal incentives inherent to international conflicts. While some restraint may occur through normative diffusion—such as groups occasionally adopting IHL codes to legitimize —these instances are anecdotal and do not translate to aggregate , as geospatial studies show states and rebels alike failing distinction and principles in populated areas. Ultimately, Protocol II's has influenced customary norms but failed to causally curb NIAC brutality, reflecting the primacy of power asymmetries and weak over legal obligations.

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