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Turning movement

A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives in the enemy rear and force the enemy to move out of current positions or divert major forces to meet this new threat.^[1] This offensive tactic, often conducted at the division level or higher, emphasizes high tactical mobility, speed, surprise, and decisive action to disrupt enemy cohesion without engaging in costly frontal assaults.^[1] It differs from a standard envelopment by prioritizing the displacement of the enemy from their prepared positions rather than direct destruction in place, making it suitable for both offensive exploitation and defensive counterattacks.^[1] The maneuver remains relevant in modern multi-domain operations, integrating maneuver with long-range fires and information operations to exploit depth.^[2] The execution of a turning movement typically involves two primary components: a fixing force that maintains pressure on the enemy's front to prevent repositioning, and a turning force that maneuvers around or over obstacles to strike vital rear areas, such as command nodes, supply lines, or lines of retreat.^[1] Supporting elements include reserves for exploitation (often comprising up to one-third of the total force) and security forces to protect exposed flanks, all integrated through combined arms operations that synchronize maneuver with fires, obstacles, and intelligence.^[1] Control measures such as axes of advance, phase lines, and limits of advance ensure coordinated timing and prevent fratricide, while the turning force operates independently beyond mutual support distances, necessitating robust sustainment planning.^[1] This structure exploits enemy vulnerabilities in depth, canalizing their responses through terrain and engineered obstacles to facilitate encirclement or isolation.^[1] Historically, turning movements have proven decisive in campaigns where mobility and deception overwhelmed static defenses, with principles of initiative, synchronization, and exploitation of enemy overextension enduring in large-scale combat operations.^[3]

Definition and Principles

Definition

A turning movement is a form of offensive maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to bypass the enemy's principal defensive positions by passing around or over them to secure key objectives deep in the enemy's rear area, thereby compelling the defender to abandon its current position, divert major forces to counter the threat, or pursue an unfavorable course of action without requiring a direct frontal assault.^[4] This tactic emphasizes dislocation over annihilation, targeting vulnerabilities in the enemy's lines of communication, command structure, or reserves to disrupt cohesion and force a reactive repositioning.^[4] Key characteristics of a turning movement include its reliance on wide spatial maneuver to circumvent fortified fronts and strongpoints, prioritizing psychological pressure and positional advantage to erode the enemy's will to fight in place rather than seeking their physical destruction through close combat.^[4] It demands superior mobility—often enabled by armored, airborne, air assault, or mechanized units—to execute rapid shifts and outpace enemy responses, alongside precise intelligence from reconnaissance assets to identify rear-area targets and terrain opportunities.^[4] Unlike a simple envelopment, which focuses on engaging and surrounding the enemy in their current dispositions, the turning movement aims explicitly to force displacement by threatening vital support areas before reinforcements can arrive.^[4] The concept of the turning movement received initial codification in 19th-century military theory through the works of Antoine-Henri Jomini, particularly in his Précis de l'Art de la Guerre (1836), where he described it as a grand tactical maneuver to outflank and turn the enemy's wing nearest their line of retreat, supported by limited frontal attacks to achieve decisive results.^[5] Jomini integrated this approach into his framework of lines of operation and decisive points, emphasizing its role in compelling the enemy to reverse fronts or withdraw without a full battle of annihilation.^[6]

Core Principles

The core principles of a turning movement revolve around achieving strategic advantage by bypassing the enemy's main defensive positions and compelling them to react to threats in their rear, thereby disrupting their cohesion and forcing repositioning. These principles emphasize the integration of tactical elements to exploit enemy vulnerabilities while minimizing direct confrontation with their primary strength. Drawing from established military doctrine, the maneuver's success hinges on four interrelated fundamentals: surprise and deception, mobility and speed, objective selection, and force allocation.^[4] Surprise and deception form the foundational element, as the turning force must mask its intentions to prevent the enemy from reinforcing the threatened flank. This is accomplished through feints, demonstrations, and diversions that mislead the enemy regarding the direction, timing, or scale of the attack, creating a dilemma that divides their attention and combat power. Passive measures such as camouflage, noise and light discipline, and operations security further conceal movements, while active tactics like decoys or false positions enhance the illusion of a conventional frontal assault. By denying the enemy timely intelligence, these actions ensure the turning force arrives at the objective before reinforcements can respond, amplifying the maneuver's disruptive effect.^[4] Mobility and speed are essential to outpace enemy reactions and maintain operational momentum, allowing the turning force to reposition rapidly behind enemy lines. High-mobility assets, including mechanized units, cavalry, or air-assault elements, enable the force to traverse terrain quickly, exploiting multiple routes and engineer support to overcome obstacles like gaps or rivers. This principle demands superior tempo to prevent the enemy from occupying defensible positions or consolidating reserves, ensuring the turning element strikes while the enemy remains disoriented. Without sustained speed, the maneuver risks becoming a vulnerable envelopment susceptible to counterattacks.^[4] Objective selection focuses on targeting high-value assets in the enemy's rear to maximize psychological and logistical impact, compelling the defender to abandon their position or divert forces at significant cost. Ideal objectives include lines of communication, supply depots, command centers, or choke points such as bridges and passes, which, if seized, isolate forward elements and erode sustainment. Selection criteria prioritize terrain that offers cover, concealment, and defensibility for the turning force, while avoiding prolonged engagements that could alert the enemy. This targeted approach transforms the maneuver from mere avoidance into a decisive blow against the enemy's operational base.^[4] Force allocation typically divides the attacking formation into complementary components: a fixing element that pins the enemy frontally with suppressive fires, obstacles, or limited assaults to restrict their maneuver, and a turning element that executes the deep maneuver to seize the objective. The fixing force employs minimal combat power to hold the enemy in place, often supported by artillery or aviation, while the turning force—designated as the main effort—concentrates superior strength for local overmatch in the rear. Reserves and security elements protect flanks and exploit success, ensuring the overall allocation balances economy of force with decisive application. This division enables synchronized pressure that overwhelms the enemy's ability to respond coherently.^[4]

Historical Context

Origins in Ancient Warfare

The turning movement, as a tactical maneuver involving forces shifting to attack an enemy's flank or rear, finds its conceptual roots in ancient strategic thought, particularly in the emphasis on indirect approaches to avoid direct confrontation with superior strength. Sun Tzu's The Art of War, composed around the 5th century BCE, advocates for such methods, stating that "in all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory," highlighting the value of maneuvering around enemy positions to exploit weaknesses rather than clashing head-on.^[7] This principle influenced early Eastern and Western military practices by prioritizing deception, speed, and positional advantage over brute force.^[7] In ancient Greek warfare, the phalanx formation— a dense block of hoplite infantry armed with spears and shields—served as a foundational structure that adapted to terrain for rudimentary turning maneuvers. By the 5th to 4th centuries BCE, Greek commanders learned to wheel or oblique the phalanx lines to refuse flanks or pivot against uneven ground, such as hills or rivers, allowing portions of the formation to outmaneuver opponents while maintaining cohesion.^[8] These adaptations, seen in battles like those of the Peloponnesian War, marked an evolution from rigid frontal assaults to more flexible positioning that foreshadowed deliberate flank turns, though still constrained by the phalanx's need for close-order discipline.^[9] One of the earliest prominent applications of a turning movement occurred during Alexander the Great's Battle of Gaugamela in 331 BCE, where Macedonian forces executed a flanking maneuver against the Persian army. Alexander positioned his companion cavalry on the right wing and advanced obliquely to target a gap in the Persian line, effectively turning the enemy flank while his phalanx pinned the center, compelling Persian King Darius III to retreat and exposing vulnerabilities in the extended formation.^[10] This tactic leveraged cavalry mobility to outpace the Persians' numerical superiority, demonstrating how turning could disrupt a longer line stretched across prepared terrain.^[10] A more sophisticated proto-example of the turning movement emerged in Hannibal's double envelopment at the Battle of Cannae in 216 BCE, during the Second Punic War. Carthaginian forces, outnumbered by the Romans, deployed a deliberately weakened center of infantry to draw the enemy forward, while strong cavalry wings under commanders like Hasdrubal executed wide turns to outflank and encircle the Roman flanks, ultimately attacking from the rear to complete the surround.^[11] As military analyst Alfred von Schlieffen later noted of this action, "the weaker Hannibal had… turned not only both wings, but even the rear of the enemy," illustrating an intuitive grasp of envelopment as a form of turning to achieve annihilation.^[11] Despite these innovations, turning movements in ancient contexts faced significant limitations due to the era's technological and organizational constraints. Reliance on infantry phalanxes and cavalry for execution meant maneuvers were vulnerable to disruption by terrain features like dust storms or uneven ground, which impaired visibility and timing, as evident at Gaugamela where obscuring dust complicated coordination.^[10] Moreover, slower communication—dependent on messengers or visual signals—exposed turning forces to effective counter-maneuvers by alert opponents, often preventing the full encirclement intended and limiting scalability against larger armies.^[11] These factors confined ancient turning tactics to battles where commanders could maintain tight control over relatively small, disciplined units.^[11]

Development in Modern Military Doctrine

The formalization of turning movements in 19th-century military doctrine drew heavily from the Napoleonic Wars, where theorists like Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz analyzed maneuvers to derive principles of operational art. Jomini, influenced by his observations of Napoleon's campaigns, emphasized strategic lines of operation and the importance of interior lines to enable rapid turning maneuvers that divided and enveloped enemy forces, allowing attackers to engage isolated fractions of the opposing army.^[12] Clausewitz, in his seminal work On War, further refined these concepts by describing turning movements as strategic envelopments that could compel the enemy to fight on unfavorable terms, often by outflanking defensive positions to strike at lines of communication or retreat.^[13] A prime example was Napoleon's Ulm Campaign in 1805, where French forces executed a wide turning movement around the Danube River to envelop Austrian General Karl Mack von Leiberich's army, isolating it from reinforcements and forcing its surrender without a major pitched battle.^[14] These analyses shifted turning movements from ad-hoc tactics to codified elements of strategy, prioritizing speed and deception over direct confrontation. The advent of industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries enhanced the feasibility of turning movements through improved logistics and mobility. Railroads, emerging after the Napoleonic era, revolutionized army deployment by allowing rapid concentration of forces over long distances, as seen in European conflicts like the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, where Prussian rail networks facilitated swift maneuvers to outflank French positions.^[15] In World War I, the German Schlieffen Plan exemplified this evolution with its ambitious wide turning movement through neutral Belgium in 1914, aiming to envelop French armies by swinging the right wing southward to Paris while a weaker left held the line against Russia.^[16] Although logistical strains and Belgian resistance stalled the plan, it underscored how rail-enabled mass mobilization could support large-scale turns, though trench warfare ultimately constrained fluid maneuver.^[17] World War II marked a paradigm shift with mechanization and air power accelerating turning movements to unprecedented speeds. The German Blitzkrieg doctrine in 1940 integrated tanks, motorized infantry, and close air support for rapid, deep penetrations that turned enemy flanks, as in the Ardennes offensive that outflanked the Maginot Line and severed Allied forces in France.^[18] Tanks provided the armored spearhead for breakthroughs, while aircraft suppressed defenses and disrupted rear areas, enabling panzer divisions to advance 50 miles or more per day and execute turning envelopments that collapsed French resistance in weeks.^[19] This combined-arms approach transformed turning movements from deliberate operations into high-tempo shocks, emphasizing initiative and exploitation of breakthroughs over static lines. Post-World War II doctrines institutionalized these technological enablers within structured frameworks. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, first published in 2001 and updated in March 2025, discusses turning movements as a form of maneuver to achieve dislocation by gaining a significant positional advantage, often through envelopments, while integrating multidomain operations including air-ground coordination to synchronize aviation assets with ground forces for rapid flanking and interdiction.^[20] The 2025 update refines these concepts within multidomain operations, emphasizing convergence across domains for enhanced synchronization in large-scale combat.^[20] Similarly, Soviet deep battle theory, developed in the 1920s–1930s by theorists like Vladimir Triandafillov and Mikhail Tukhachevsky, advocated wide operational maneuvers using mechanized echelons to penetrate deep into enemy territory, encircling and destroying reserves through successive waves supported by air and artillery.^[21] These concepts, refined during the Cold War, emphasized echeloned forces for sustained turns, with aircraft enabling reconnaissance and strikes to maintain momentum across vast fronts. Overall, modern doctrine views turning movements as multidimensional operations, leveraging technology for decisive operational effects while mitigating risks through joint integration.

Tactical Execution

Planning Phases

The planning of a turning movement begins with a structured preparatory process to ensure the maneuver's feasibility and synchronization, drawing on established military doctrine to assess variables such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civil considerations (METT-TC). This phase emphasizes developing situational understanding and allocating resources to create conditions for surprise and decisive action against the enemy's flank or rear, without engaging in direct confrontation along the front. Commanders integrate staff estimates and wargaming to refine courses of action, focusing on isolating the enemy from support while maintaining operational momentum.^[22]^[23] Intelligence gathering forms the foundation of planning, involving comprehensive reconnaissance to identify enemy flanks, terrain features, and rear vulnerabilities. Units conduct zone, area, route, and ground reconnaissance using scouts, cavalry, aviation assets, and special operations forces to map enemy dispositions, probable intentions, obstacle locations, and gaps in defenses, such as assailable flanks or choke points wider than 65 feet for deliberate crossings. This effort includes intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), which templates enemy patterns and updates priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) through tools like situation templates and event matrices to pinpoint high-value targets and decision support points. Maps and technical reconnaissance complement these activities, ensuring continuous information flow before operations commence, as effective reconnaissance precedes and informs all subsequent planning.^[22]^[23] Force assessment evaluates available mobility assets, such as cavalry squadrons or mechanized vehicles, to determine the division of forces into fixing (or direct pressure) elements and the turning (or encircling) force, with the bulk of combat power—typically one-half to two-thirds—allocated to the main effort of the turning element operating independently. Fixing forces require minimum combat power to pin the enemy, while the turning force must match or exceed the encircled enemy's strength for containment, often task-organized with reduction assets like engineers for breaching. Relative combat power assessments compare friendly and enemy capabilities two levels below the planning unit, incorporating staff estimates on functional areas to identify the main effort and supporting roles, such as reserves comprising up to one-third of forces in uncertain environments. This division applies core principles of mobility by ensuring the turning force can outpace enemy reactions.^[22]^[23] Terrain and logistics analysis selects routes that offer cover, concealment, and speed for the turning force, analyzing factors like trafficability, cross-mobility corridors, and natural defensive strengths using the OAKOC framework (observation, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, cover and concealment). Favorable routes avoid principal enemy defenses, prioritizing gaps and defensible linkup points, while logistics planning secures supply lines through multiple main supply routes (MSRs), pre-positioned caches, and logistics release points to sustain rapid, dispersed operations with prioritized fuel and ammunition. Engineer support enhances mobility by improving routes and countermobility via obstacles, ensuring intermittent lines of communication (LOCs) do not hinder the turning force's independence. IPB products, such as modified combined obstacle overlays, guide this analysis to confirm operational feasibility.^[22]^[23] Timing coordination synchronizes diversions, such as feints or suppressive fires, with the turning advance to exploit brief windows of enemy disarray, using phase lines, decision points, and synchronization matrices to align actions across time, space, and purpose. Planning allocates time for movement durations and environmental impacts, integrating fire support redistribution to the encircling force while employing restricted fire lines to prevent fratricide, with rehearsals and liaison ensuring precise execution. This phase anticipates enemy decision cycles and retrograde indicators, planning branches like pursuit if the enemy flees, to maintain momentum and achieve encirclement effects.^[22]^[23]

Operational Implementation

The operational implementation of a turning movement begins with the initiation phase, where the commander launches fixing attacks or demonstrations to pin the enemy force in position and prevent it from repositioning or reinforcing its flanks. The fixing force, often comprising a portion of the main body or security elements, conducts shaping operations using direct and indirect fires, electronic warfare, or nonlethal effects to disrupt the enemy's combined arms cohesion and limit its options for maneuver. This simultaneous action diverts the enemy's attention forward while the turning force, operating independently outside the supporting range of the main body, advances rapidly to seize objectives in the enemy's rear or deep flank. For instance, security forces may deploy to covered positions to suppress enemy reconnaissance with long-range fires, ensuring the turning force achieves surprise and maintains the initiative. During maneuver execution, the turning force navigates around the enemy's flank via concealed routes, such as multiple axes of advance or terrain features that provide cover and concealment, to avoid decisive engagement until reaching the objective. Emphasis is placed on sustaining high momentum through rapid, synchronized movement—often leveraging aerial or ground mobility assets—to outpace the enemy's ability to redeploy reserves or establish new defensive lines. The force strikes the enemy's rear or flank with overwhelming combat power, employing a formation that maximizes forward firepower while exploiting identified weaknesses, such as salients or gaps in the defensive posture. This phase requires the turning force to transition fluidly from approach marches to tactical assaults, using obstacles and fires to channel the enemy into less favorable positions if needed, thereby forcing displacement without direct confrontation on the main defensive front. Command and control during execution relies on robust synchronization through established control measures, including boundaries, phase lines, objectives, and named areas of interest, to coordinate the fixing and turning forces while allowing decentralized execution by subordinates. The commander retains oversight of reserves—typically one-quarter to one-third of available combat power—to exploit emerging opportunities or counter enemy responses, such as a counter-flank maneuver, via preplanned contingencies like bypass criteria or defensive shifts. Communication employs redundant signals, including radio networks, pyrotechnics, or digital spot reports, to maintain a common operational picture and issue fragmentary orders for real-time adjustments, ensuring the turning force's isolation does not compromise overall cohesion. Termination of the turning movement occurs upon achieving the objective, such as cutting off enemy lines of communication or forcing withdrawal, at which point forces exploit success by linking up with the main body and transitioning to pursuit or exploitation operations. Reserves and follow-on elements aggressively pursue fleeing units to prevent reorganization, encircling remnants and destroying command nodes to deepen the disruption, while securing key terrain only as necessary to support subsequent phases. This exploitation maintains relentless pressure, leveraging the momentum gained to transition the operation into a broader offensive or defensive posture based on the tactical situation.

Variations and Types

Wide Turning Movement

Turning movements at the operational or theater level involve attacking forces, typically comprising multiple corps or divisions, executing a broad maneuver to bypass the enemy's primary defensive line and target vital rear areas, such as lines of communication or strategic objectives, compelling the adversary to abandon positions or redirect substantial forces.^[24] This approach emphasizes large-scale operations to threaten operational depths, often integrating envelopment principles to isolate and disrupt enemy cohesion without direct confrontation on fortified positions.^[24] Key features of operational turning movements include the coordinated deployment of extensive maneuver elements, such as army groups or multiple divisions, to achieve the necessary breadth and depth, alongside robust logistical integration to support prolonged advances over expansive distances. For instance, securing extended supply lines through rail or motorized transport is essential to sustain the momentum of these operations, preventing attrition from overextension.^[24] Such maneuvers demand precise synchronization of reconnaissance, fires, and engineer support across units to exploit gaps and maintain operational tempo.^[24] The Schlieffen Plan of 1914 exemplifies an operational turning movement, as it envisioned German armies executing a sweeping arc through neutral Belgium to envelop French forces on a grand scale, aiming to outflank the entire Allied line and sever Paris from reinforcements.^[25] This historical application highlighted the doctrine's reliance on rapid, multi-corps advances to achieve strategic surprise.^[25] At this scale, operational turning movements offer the advantage of potentially collapsing broad enemy fronts by forcing wholesale repositioning, thereby creating opportunities for exploitation and decisive victory while minimizing exposure to the enemy's main strength. However, they necessitate immense resources, including vast logistical networks and high-level coordination, to mitigate risks like flank vulnerabilities or supply failures.^[24]

Narrow Turning Movement

Turning movements at the tactical level, executed at the brigade or battalion level, are designed to outflank and turn a specific fortified line or strongpoint while avoiding engagement with larger enemy forces. In this approach, the attacking unit bypasses the enemy's principal defenses to seize an objective in the rear, thereby compelling the defender to relocate or redirect assets without engaging the main strength head-on. This localized application emphasizes precision and economy of force, distinguishing it from operational-scale maneuvers by targeting immediate vulnerabilities rather than extensive lines of communication.^[24] Central to tactical turning movements are features that prioritize rapid exploitation of local terrain for cover and mobility, enabling forces to advance swiftly with reduced personnel and logistics demands. Terrain elements such as folds in the ground, wooded areas, or urban structures provide essential concealment during the approach, minimizing exposure to observation and fire. Execution is typically faster than in operational operations, allowing for surprise and momentum, but the smaller scale heightens the risk of early detection, as the turning force operates closer to enemy positions with limited screening elements. Security and fixing forces play a crucial role in diverting attention, while the main turning element—often supported by local reserves—strikes the decisive objective.^[24] In practice, tactical turning movements find frequent application in assaults on trench systems or urban environments, where units bypass strongpoints to seize rear objectives and force defenders to abandon positions. For example, during World War I, German assault tactics involved infiltrating weak points to disrupt linear defenses and achieve local envelopments, enabling incremental gains in dense terrain using suppressive fire from adjacent units to cover the maneuver.^[26] Such tactics leverage adjacent cover to turn defender positions, employing local reserves to isolate strongpoints without prolonged direct fighting. Despite their utility, tactical turning movements yield less decisive results than operational counterparts, as they disrupt only localized defenses rather than the enemy's overall posture or sustainment. The confined scope limits strategic ripple effects, often resulting in tactical concessions rather than operational breakthroughs. Moreover, the maneuver's vulnerability to swift enemy countermeasures—such as immediate flanking responses or reinforcements—can lead to the isolation or defeat of the committed force if mutual support with fixing elements falters.^[24]

Notable Examples

Ancient and Medieval Battles

One of the notable examples of a turning movement in ancient warfare occurred at the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BCE, during the Second Punic War, where Hannibal Barca's Carthaginian forces maneuvered to ambush a Roman army led by consul Gaius Flaminius. Hannibal positioned his troops along the hilly shores of Lake Trasimene, allowing the Romans to march into a narrow pass; as the column advanced, hidden Carthaginian infantry and cavalry attacked from the flanks and rear, avoiding a direct frontal engagement and forcing the Romans into a disorganized fight in fog-shrouded terrain. This maneuver, leveraging surprise and terrain to strike the enemy's extended formation, resulted in approximately 15,000 Roman deaths and 6,000 captured, with minimal Carthaginian losses of around 2,500, compelling Flaminius to react hastily and disrupting Roman pursuit of Hannibal.^[27] In medieval Europe, the Battle of Mohi on April 11, 1241, during the Mongol invasion of Hungary, demonstrated a turning movement executed by Batu Khan and Subutai's forces against King Béla IV's Hungarian army. After the Hungarians encamped near the Sajó River, the Mongols conducted a daring night march to ford the river upstream and position themselves behind the enemy lines, bypassing the main defensive positions; at dawn, they launched a surprise assault on the Hungarian camp from the rear while feigning a frontal attack with a smaller force to fix the defenders. This coordinated deep maneuver, integrating cavalry mobility and deception, shattered the Hungarian cohesion, leading to heavy casualties—estimated at 40-50% of the Hungarian force, including many nobles—against lighter Mongol losses, and forced the survivors to flee, marking a pivotal Mongol victory in Europe.^[28] The outcomes of these battles highlighted the effectiveness of turning movements in pre-modern warfare, where mobility, surprise, and rear threats could exploit enemy vulnerabilities despite limited technology. At Lake Trasimene, the Roman army's linear march amplified the impact of the flank and rear attacks, leading to one of the Punic Wars' greatest ambushes and illustrating the dangers of predictable advances. Similarly, Mohi showed how engineered crossings and deception could enable a turning force to unhinge a prepared defense, emphasizing the value of operational depth and combined arms—even in nomadic contexts—to achieve decisive results through initiative on the enemy's unprotected sides.^[27]^[28]

19th and 20th Century Engagements

In the Battle of Ulm during the 1805 Ulm Campaign, Napoleon Bonaparte's Grande Armée executed a classic turning movement against Austrian forces commanded by General Karl Mack von Leiberich. By crossing the Danube east of Ulm and employing multiple corps in a multicorps envelopment, French forces rapidly outmaneuvered the Austrians, encircling approximately 30,000 troops through coordinated advances on a 150-mile front.^[29] This strategic encirclement relied on forced marches covering 10-12 miles per day, allowing corps under marshals like Ney and Soult to converge and cut off retreat routes without engaging in a major pitched battle.^[30] On October 20, 1805, Mack surrendered his entire army at Ulm, marking one of the most decisive operational victories of the Napoleonic Wars and demonstrating the effectiveness of mobility and surprise in turning movements.^[29] During Operation Barbarossa in 1941, German Army Group Center under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock conducted wide turning thrusts deep into Soviet territory as part of the initial invasion launched on June 22. Employing Panzer Groups 2 and 3, the force advanced 440 miles in six weeks, bypassing fortified strongpoints to encircle Soviet armies in large pockets such as Bialystok-Minsk and Smolensk, capturing over 300,000 prisoners by early August.^[31] These deep penetrations, averaging 70-100 km per day in the early phases, aimed to disrupt Soviet command and logistics while pushing toward Moscow, reaching within 18 miles of the capital by late November.^[31] However, the overextension of supply lines across vast distances and poor infrastructure exposed the flanks, allowing Soviet counterattacks and contributing to the halt of the offensive amid winter conditions.^[32] The 1991 Gulf War featured the Coalition's "Hail Mary" or "Left Hook" maneuver, a sweeping turning movement designed to envelop Iraqi defenses in Kuwait under Saddam Hussein. Led by General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps shifted westward into Iraq, with the former covering 40 miles to attack positions by mid-February and the latter advancing 300 miles to Rafha by late January, before swinging east to target the Euphrates Valley and Republican Guard units.^[33] Supported by air assaults from the 101st Airborne Division and feints by the 1st Cavalry Division, this wide envelopment cut off Iraqi retreat routes northward, destroying elite forces in under 100 hours of ground combat starting February 24.^[34] By February 27, Coalition forces had liberated Kuwait City and seized key objectives like An Nasiriyah over 100 miles into Iraq, with Iraqi casualties exceeding 20,000 and minimal Coalition losses under 250.^[33] Turning movements in these 19th- and 20th-century engagements succeeded in mobility-dominant environments where rapid advances and deception overwhelmed defenders, as seen in Ulm's encirclement and the Gulf War's flanking sweep that neutralized Iraqi positions without prolonged attrition.^[32] Yet, they faltered when logistics strained under overextension, exemplified by Barbarossa's failure where stretched supply lines and winter hardships reduced German combat effectiveness by over 500,000 men and enabled Soviet recoveries.^[31] These outcomes underscored the tactic's reliance on sustained tempo and resupply in industrial-era warfare, influencing later doctrinal emphases on operational depth.^[32]

Advantages, Risks, and Comparisons

Strategic Advantages and Disadvantages

Turning movements offer several strategic advantages in military operations by enabling forces to bypass heavily defended positions and target vulnerabilities deep in the enemy's rear or flanks. This approach avoids the high casualties associated with costly frontal assaults, instead compelling the enemy to abandon prepared defenses or divert significant resources to protect their lines of communication and support areas.^[1] By striking critical rear objectives, the maneuver disrupts enemy cohesion and morale, often leading to disorganized withdrawals or exposure of reserves to friendly fires on less favorable terrain.^[35] Furthermore, it exploits superior mobility to achieve disproportionate gains, such as cutting escape routes and facilitating the annihilation of isolated enemy elements through decisive massing of effects at key points.^[1] Despite these benefits, turning movements carry notable disadvantages that can undermine operational success if not carefully managed. The maneuver exposes the turning force to significant risks during its execution, particularly overextension beyond supporting distances, which leaves flanks vulnerable to enemy counterattacks or rapid reserve responses.^[1] It heavily depends on accurate intelligence to identify exploitable gaps and enemy dispositions; flawed assessments can result in the force operating in isolation or facing fortified flanks unexpectedly.^[35] Sustainment challenges arise from the dispersed operations required, straining logistics and mission command across extended distances.^[1] To mitigate these risks, commanders employ reserves to reinforce threatened flanks and air reconnaissance for real-time intelligence on enemy movements, while synchronizing fires and obstacles to suppress counter-threats.^[1] The tactic performs best in open terrain where friendly interior lines allow rapid repositioning and maneuver, leveraging echelons like divisions or larger for robust execution.^[35] Overall, turning movements prove highly effective against static defenses, where they can shatter enemy cohesion and force decisive outcomes with minimal direct engagement, but they are less reliable against highly mobile opponents capable of swift counter-turns that neutralize the maneuver's momentum.^[1] The turning movement maneuver contrasts with a direct assault, or frontal attack, by deliberately avoiding engagement with the enemy's principal defensive positions and strengths, instead seeking to bypass them to target rear areas or lines of communication. In contrast, a frontal attack involves a direct advance over a broad front to overwhelm or fix enemy forces through massed firepower and continuous pressure, often resulting in higher casualties due to exposure to concentrated defenses.^[1]^[36] Turning movements generally incur lower casualties by exploiting mobility and space but demand greater operational depth and maneuver room to execute effectively.^[1] Relative to envelopment, the turning movement represents a deeper and more independent variant, focusing on forcing the enemy to abandon or reorient their defenses by seizing distant objectives in the rear, such as command posts or supply lines, often operating beyond the range of supporting fires. Envelopment, by comparison, is a shallower maneuver that engages the enemy in place through attacks on the flanks or rear to encircle and destroy forces within their current positions, typically employing fixing and enveloping elements in closer coordination.^[1]^[36] While envelopment often involves double-flank efforts for tighter isolation, a single-flank turning movement emphasizes economy of force by concentrating on one side to achieve broader disruption with fewer resources.^[1] In distinction from infiltration, which relies on small, covert units moving undetected through enemy lines to bypass defenses and attack from within, the turning movement is an overt, large-scale operation conducted by major formations to achieve positional advantage through visible maneuver around flanks. Infiltration prioritizes stealth and minimal exposure to gain surprise at vulnerable points, whereas turning movements leverage combined arms and mobility for decisive thrusts that compel enemy repositioning.^[1]^[36] These tactics can be combined, with infiltration enhancing turning movements by creating gaps or disrupting enemy cohesion covertly before the main force maneuvers.^[36] Doctrinally, U.S. Marine Corps operations integrate turning movements with vertical envelopment through air assault, using aviation to insert forces rapidly behind enemy lines for multi-dimensional effects that amplify the maneuver's depth and speed. This approach complements ground-based turning by enabling swift exploitation of sea-based power projection within the Marine Air-Ground Task Force structure.^[36]

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[15]
Clausewitz: The Principles of War - ClausewitzStudies.org
To cut the enemy's line of retreat, however, strategic envelopment or a turning movement is very effective. But we can achieve this, if necessary, through ...
[16]
Napoleon's Ulm Campaign – Inside Bonaparte's 'Masterpiece ...
Oct 18, 2020 · Mack, convinced that the main force was approaching from the Black Forrest, decided to wait in Ulm, an advanced position for the Austrian army.
[17]
Reign of the Railroads - HistoryNet
Oct 9, 2018 · Their practice of issuing soldiers their rations aboard trains made travel much faster than the German method, which required the trains to stop ...
[18]
The Schlieffen Plan explained | Imperial War Museums
While a few army corps held the border with France, the bulk of the German army moved forwards in Belgium, bringing Britain into the war the following day. The ...
[19]
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/rise-panzer-division
[20]
Blitzkrieg Explained - Lightening War Of World War 2
The whole point of blitzkrieg is to keep moving, don't stop, because if you stop you get entangled in a battle of attrition. Keep moving, always look for the ...Missing: mechanized | Show results with:mechanized
[21]
The Rise of the Panzer Division | New Orleans
Jul 19, 2018 · The Panzer division brought the concept of sustained mobility to modern warfare. Such a formation could travel 50 miles or more per day, and then repeat the ...
[22]
[PDF] FM 3-0 - Intelligence Resource Program
Oct 1, 2022 · especially helpful in air-ground coordination or facilitating rapid changes of direction. Leaders balance the complexity of control measures ...
[23]
[PDF] Deep Attack: The Soviet Conduct of Operational Maneuver. - DTIC
The Soviets have long believed that the effective conduct of operational maneuver is essential for a military force tq achieve success at the operational level ...
[24]
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN33063_FM_3-90_FINAL_WEB.pdf
[25]
None
Below is a merged summary of the "Planning Turning Movements (Preparatory Phases)" from MCWP 5-10, consolidating all information from the provided segments into a comprehensive response. To maximize detail and clarity, I’ve organized the content into a dense, tabular format where appropriate, followed by narrative sections for additional context. All key points, quotes, and URLs are retained.
[26]
FM 3-90.2 Chapter 5, Offensive Operations - GlobalSecurity.org
In a turning movement (Figure 5-4), the unit passes around and avoids the enemy's main force, then secures an objective that causes the enemy to move out of its ...
[27]
[PDF] U.S. Army Doctrine for Encirclement/Envelopment Operations ... - DTIC
May 22, 1986 · "Military doctrine is a guide to action, one objective of which is to furnish a basis fcr prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate ...
[28]
[PDF] The Schlieffen War Plan: What Impact Did Logistics ... - DTIC
... turning movement. The Schlieffen plan called for the use of Belgian railways to extend the German lines of communication north ofthe Meuse River, and would ...
[29]
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[30]
[PDF] FM 3-90 Tactics - Central Army Registry (CAR)
May 1, 2023
[31]
[PDF] The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War
23 The tactics were the product of an effective corporate effort. A better term is "infiltration tactics. ... The difference between techniques and tactics is ...<|control11|><|separator|>
[32]
Timeless Lessons from Cannae to D-Day: Operational Art on the ...
Mar 21, 2025 · Hannibal wanted the Romans to focus on his center and advance with the bulk of their forces to significantly condense the spacing between Roman ...
[33]
Battle of Agincourt - British Battles
In front of the English position forests approached the road from each side, leaving an area of muddy plough between them, insufficient for the French army to ...
[34]
Napoleon Revisited - NDU Press
May 4, 2023 · His multicorps attack toward Ulm completely overwhelmed the Austrians. Their commander, General Karl Mack, believed Ulm far too strong a ...Missing: turning | Show results with:turning<|control11|><|separator|>
[35]
[PDF] Crossing the Line of Departure - Army University Press
Feb 3, 2006 · Figure 3 1805 Ulm Campaign, Final Phase ... In the October 1805 Ulm operation, Napoleon crossed the Rhine from French-controlled.
[36]
[PDF] Soviet Defense against Operation BARBAROSSA - DTIC
Sep 13, 1991 · This monograph examines the historic attack by A,'olph Hitler's. Germany against the Soviet defenses in 1941. It exanines actions of both.Missing: wide bypassing
[37]
[PDF] Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat ...
To emphasize the importance of the Army's continued preparation for large-scale combat operations, the US Army Combined Arms Center has published these volumes ...<|separator|>
[38]
Deception in the Desert: Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM
In what eventually became known as the “Left Hook,” the newly-added armored corps would then move quickly north from its attack positions west of the Kuwaiti ...
[39]
Always Faithful Chapter 4 - Marine Corps University
The movement of Coalition forces in the famous “Hail Mary” or “Left Hook” of the ground campaign. Coalition forces blocked the escape route for Iraqi troops ...
[40]
None
Below is a merged summary of Turning Movement, Envelopment, Infiltration, Frontal Attack, and Vertical Envelopment as described in the USMC Doctrine (MCDP 1-0 Operations). To retain all information in a dense and comprehensive format, I’ve organized the details into a table in CSV format, followed by a narrative summary that integrates key points and overlaps. This approach ensures all details from the provided segments are captured efficiently.