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Agreement on Movement and Access

The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) is a bilateral accord signed on 15 November 2005 between the Government of and the Palestinian Authority, mediated by the , to regulate the flow of people and goods across 's external borders and between and the following Israel's unilateral disengagement from settlements earlier that year. The agreement sought to foster Palestinian economic viability and humanitarian access by designating specific border crossings—such as with under Palestinian-Egyptian operation and monitoring—and establishing protocols for internal movement, including bus convoys and safe passage routes linking to the . It emphasized security cooperation, with the Palestinian Authority committing to border protection, prevention of arms smuggling, and intelligence sharing with to enable smoother operations. Key provisions included the prompt clearance of perishable exports from via the , upgrades to crossing infrastructure for commercial viability, and phased reductions in internal checkpoints contingent on Palestinian security performance. The crossing was prioritized for immediate reopening to Palestinian ID holders, bypassing direct oversight, while other -Israel crossings like and were to handle pedestrian and goods traffic under joint management. Implementation began with 's brief operation in late 2005, but the accord's effectiveness hinged on the Palestinian Authority's capacity to suppress militant activities and enforce anti-smuggling measures, assumptions disrupted by the January 2006 election victory and the subsequent June 2007 violent takeover of by forces. The AMA's legacy is marked by partial and intermittent fulfillment, with citing persistent rocket attacks, tunnel incursions, and weapons proliferation as grounds for sustained closures and restrictions, while Palestinian officials have attributed to Israeli non-compliance. Post-2007, operated sporadically under Egyptian discretion, and Gaza-West Bank links remained severed, exacerbating territorial fragmentation; international assessments, including U.S. diplomatic statements, have repeatedly invoked the AMA as a for potential but noted its obsolescence amid eroded mutual trust and security vacuums. Despite these challenges, the agreement represented an early post-disengagement attempt at pragmatic , highlighting tensions between economic access and imperatives in the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic.

Historical Context

Israel's Unilateral Disengagement from Gaza

In December 2003, Israeli Prime Minister announced a plan for unilateral disengagement from the , which was formally approved by the Israeli cabinet on June 6, 2004. The plan entailed the evacuation of all Israeli settlements in , involving the dismantling of 21 settlements and the relocation of approximately 9,000 Israeli settlers. Evacuations commenced on August 15, 2005, with the overseeing the process, completing the withdrawal of military forces and demolition of infrastructure by September 12, 2005. The disengagement was executed unilaterally, without negotiated agreements or concessions from Palestinian authorities, as lacked a reliable partner for bilateral arrangements amid ongoing . Sharon's rationale centered on reducing daily between Israeli forces and Palestinian populations, thereby enhancing 's overall by freeing resources to address threats from the and preserving the state's Jewish and democratic character. Proponents argued it would diminish 's exposure to attacks while maintaining control over external borders and to prevent arms smuggling. Israel incurred significant financial costs, estimated at $2.2 billion overall, including compensation payments to settlers ranging from $200,000 to $400,000 per family for relocation and property losses. Despite these aims, the disengagement yielded no sustained security improvements; rocket attacks from Gaza into surged post-withdrawal, with confirmed strikes increasing over 500 percent in the following years compared to pre-disengagement levels. By 2007, thousands of such projectiles had been launched, underscoring the absence of reciprocal de-escalation and the persistence of militant threats from .

Pre-Agreement Security and Economic Conditions

The Second Intifada, erupting in September 2000, precipitated a sharp escalation in Palestinian militant violence against Israeli targets, including a wave of over 130 suicide bombings that claimed more than 500 Israeli lives by mid-2005, contributing to a total of approximately 1,000 Israeli deaths from terrorism during the conflict. These attacks, often targeting civilian buses, cafes, and markets in urban centers like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, were orchestrated by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, exploiting porous borders and unrestricted movement to infiltrate Israel proper. Concurrently, from October 2001 onward, Gaza-based militants began firing Kassam-1 rockets with ranges of up to 4.5 kilometers, later improved to Qassam-2 variants reaching farther into southern Israeli communities such as Sderot and Ashkelon, with annual launches surging from dozens in 2002 to hundreds by 2004. This pattern of asymmetric attacks underscored how open access points enabled the rapid deployment of operatives and improvised munitions, directly threatening civilian populations within short-range striking distance. In response to these incursions, Israel imposed intermittent closures on Gaza and the West Bank starting in late 2000, severely curtailing Palestinian labor mobility into Israel—previously employing over 100,000 Gaza workers—and trade flows, which halved Gaza's GDP per capita from $1,200 in 1999 to around $600 by 2003. These measures, enacted after major terror incidents like the October 2000 lynching of Israeli soldiers and subsequent bombings, fragmented the Palestinian economy, with Gaza's unemployment exceeding 40% by 2002 amid factory shutdowns and restricted exports of agricultural goods like strawberries and flowers. Smuggling networks, including cross-border tunnels beneath the Egypt-Gaza barrier operational since the early 1990s, proliferated to bypass closures, facilitating not only consumer goods but also weapons and explosives precursors, as documented in Israeli interceptions of arms caches traced to Egyptian suppliers. Such tunnels, often rudimentary yet effective for evading detection, allowed militant groups to stockpile materials for bomb-making and rocket production, bypassing formal checkpoints. The interplay of unchecked mobility and economic desperation created a permissive environment for militant logistics, where dual-use —roads, crossings, and subterranean routes—served as conduits for both legitimate commerce and terror operations, as evidenced by pre-2005 IDF discoveries of tunnels laden with assault rifles, grenades, and bomb components intended for attacks inside . Without stringent controls, the influx of unregulated materials and personnel directly correlated with heightened attack frequencies, as militants leveraged Gaza's coastal position and proximity to (less than 1 km from some communities) to stage cross-border raids and launches, perpetuating a that eroded economic viability while amplifying security risks. This pre-agreement volatility highlighted the causal link between lax movement regimes and operational freedom for armed groups, informed by empirical patterns in intercepted shipments rather than institutional narratives prone to understating agency.

Negotiation and Provisions

Parties and Brokering Process

The Agreement on Movement and Access was signed on November 15, 2005, by representatives of the Government of and the Palestinian Authority, including Israel's Defense Minister and PA security official Muhammad Dahlan. U.S. Lieutenant General William Ward served as the designated security monitor, tasked with overseeing Palestinian security reforms and training to ensure compliance. U.S. personally brokered the deal during intensive negotiations, aiming to reconcile 's insistence on robust security controls with Palestinian demands for economic recovery and mobility post-disengagement. The pledged technical assistance and monitoring mechanisms, including Ward's team, to support PA capacity-building while linking expanded access to verifiable reductions in militant violence. The accord reflected cautious optimism after Mahmoud Abbas's election as PA president on January 9, 2005, which bolstered expectations of Fatah-led governance stabilizing the territories and enabling implementation. Yet it presupposed PA authority over Gaza amid evident fragility from Fatah-Hamas rivalries, which had intensified through competing militias and ideological clashes since the 1980s, foreshadowing challenges to unified enforcement.

Core Terms on Movement and Access

The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), signed on November 15, , outlined specific operational mechanisms for Gaza's border crossings to facilitate Palestinian movement and trade while incorporating security safeguards. The crossing with was designated for passenger movement, to be operated by (PA) and Egyptian personnel under (EU) monitoring as a , opening by November 25, , and restricted primarily to Palestinian ID holders with exceptions for diplomats and others requiring 48-hour PA notification to Israel. The was prioritized for Palestinian workers and visitors, while served as the primary goods crossing, both to operate continuously under a modeled on the existing Karni conveyor belt process, overseen by a bilateral PA-Israeli committee. Export and import targets emphasized economic viability, with Karni committed to processing 150 export trucks per day by December 31, 2005, scaling to 400 by the end of 2006, alongside urgent clearance of 's 2005 agricultural harvest; permitted limited exports to , and handled cargo with joint PA- customs supervision. Visitor access between and the included secure bus convoys starting by December 15, 2005, and truck convoys by January 15, 2006, to enable family visits and goods transfer under security oversight. Security protocols mandated PA responsibility for border protection, staff training, and prevention of weapons smuggling or terrorist activities, with real-time video cameras installed at for monitoring by the third party, which could order re-examinations for suspected non-compliance; vehicle inspections incorporated technologies like black lights and gamma detection, supported by third-party training. The U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC) was tasked with resolving disputes over implementation, including any violations of non-violence commitments. Economic objectives included feasibility studies for reactivating Gaza's airport and constructing a seaport, with seaport development led by a U.S.-chaired committee to address security arrangements, all contingent on sustained compliance with anti-smuggling and non-violence stipulations; Rafah operations were subject to a 12-month for potential adjustments. These mechanisms aimed to balance access with verifiable security controls, prioritizing continuous passage operations under bilateral and international oversight.

Initial Implementation and Early Failures

Operationalization of Crossings (2005-2006)

The Rafah crossing opened on November 25, 2005, under operation with supervision by the Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), facilitating limited pedestrian crossings between and . This marked the initial activation of key AMA provisions for southern access, with the terminal operating nearly daily for approximately 9.5 hours per day until June 25, 2006. Average daily pedestrian traffic reached about 650 individuals in each direction during this period, roughly double the pre-AMA average of 360 per day, though no commercial goods exports were permitted through . Northern crossings for goods and labor, such as Karni and , saw partial implementation hampered by operational constraints. Export truck volumes from averaged only 8 per day in September-October 2005, far below the AMA target of 150 trucks per day by year-end, with actual figures remaining under 25 per day by mid-June 2006 due to inconsistent operating hours and capacity limitations. At , Palestinian worker passages stabilized around 1,600 per day post-disengagement in late 2005, slightly below the early 2005 average of 1,800, but were frequently disrupted by extended closures and bureaucratic delays in permit processing and inspections. Brief economic gains emerged in perishable goods exports, such as limited and flower shipments, with isolated instances like three trucks reaching via in March 2006, providing momentary relief for seasonal harvests. However, overall throughput consistently fell short of benchmarks—aiming for 400 export trucks daily by end-2006—reflecting persistent low compliance rates driven by infrastructural inefficiencies rather than full-scale security incidents. These initial operations demonstrated partial feasibility for pedestrian movement but underscored challenges in scaling commercial access to pre-disengagement levels.

Security Incidents Undermining Compliance

On June 25, 2006, Hamas militants, in coordination with members of the Popular Resistance Committees and Islamic Jihad, infiltrated Israeli territory via an underground tunnel near the Kerem Shalom crossing, ambushing an IDF patrol and abducting soldier Gilad Shalit while killing two other soldiers and wounding several more. This cross-border raid directly violated security understandings embedded in the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), which presupposed Palestinian cooperation to prevent militant incursions from Gaza in exchange for eased movement restrictions. In response, Israel initiated Operation Summer Rains on June 28, comprising airstrikes on Hamas targets, artillery barrages, and incursions into Gaza, while permanently closing the Rafah crossing to Egypt—initially supervised by EU monitors under AMA terms—due to heightened smuggling and attack risks. Concurrent with the kidnapping, Qassam rocket and mortar attacks from escalated sharply, with Israeli defense records documenting over 1,000 projectiles launched in 2006 alone, compared to fewer than 500 in 2005 prior to full disengagement implementation. This surge, primarily by and allied groups, targeted Israeli communities in the western , invoking AMA provisions that authorized Israel to suspend crossing operations amid immediate security threats, such as ongoing barrages that endangered border infrastructure and personnel. The attacks underscored the agreement's conditional nature, where Palestinian compliance with non-aggression was tied to access facilitation, yet empirical data showed no abatement despite diplomatic appeals. The Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President , demonstrated limited capacity or resolve to enforce AMA terms by arresting or dismantling militant networks responsible for these breaches. Despite Abbas's public condemnations and calls for restraint, PA security forces conducted no significant operations against the Shalit kidnappers or rocket crews, hampered by internal divisions following Hamas's January 2006 electoral victory and the subsequent integration of its militants into governance structures. Israeli assessments and international observers noted repeated PA failures to preempt tunnel constructions or rocket launches, with only token arrests of low-level operatives amid widespread militant impunity in , eroding the agreement's foundational premise of joint security responsibility.

Hamas Takeover and Systemic Breakdown

Escalation Leading to Gaza Coup (2006-2007)

In the January 25, 2006, Palestinian legislative elections, secured a in the Palestinian , winning 74 of 132 seats and defeating the incumbent party, which received 45 seats. This outcome reflected voter dissatisfaction with Fatah's corruption and ineffective governance, but it also elevated a militant Islamist group committed to armed resistance against . leader was appointed in March 2006, forming a government that explicitly rejected the Quartet's conditions—non-violence, recognition of , and acceptance of prior agreements like the —which were prerequisites for continued international engagement with the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Hamas government's stance triggered immediate international repercussions, including aid suspensions by the and in April 2006, and Israel's withholding of tax revenues transferred to the , exacerbating a severe fiscal crisis that left PA salaries unpaid for months. Haniyeh's refusal to renounce violence or recognize directly contravened the implicit assumptions of the Agreement on Movement and Access (), which relied on a unified PA committed to coordination and non-militant to facilitate controlled operations. This financial strangulation fueled internal divisions, as Fatah-affiliated security forces, still loyal to President , clashed with militants over control of institutions and resources, initiating sporadic street battles in as early as late 2006. Escalating factional violence between and from March 2006 onward resulted in over 600 intra-Palestinian deaths by mid-, primarily in , with clashes involving assassinations, ambushes, and control of security compounds. These killings, often targeting rival loyalists in brutal executions, eroded the PA's central authority and fragmented security apparatus, as 's Executive Force— a unit—gained operational dominance through superior organization and willingness to employ lethal force against elements. The violence peaked in the from June 10 to , , where forces overran positions, expelling Abbas's loyalists and seizing full control of the in what amounted to a unilateral coup, leaving the PA bifurcated between -ruled and -controlled West Bank. This internal collapse nullified the AMA's foundational premise of PA monopoly on force, rendering coordinated access management untenable amid unchecked militancy.

Immediate Post-Takeover Restrictions and Blockade

In June 2007, Hamas forces launched a violent coup against -dominated institutions in , culminating in the seizure of control on June 14 after a week of intense street battles that killed at least 84 , including executions of officials and affiliates. militants targeted security installations, government buildings, and personnel, employing tactics such as summary executions and hospital shootouts to consolidate power. This takeover, by a group designated as terrorist by the United States, European Union, and Israel, prompted immediate security responses from Israel and Egypt to address threats of arms importation and cross-border attacks. Israel classified Gaza as a "hostile entity" on June 19, 2007, and tightened border controls, shifting from the monitored access mechanisms outlined in the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) to stricter oversight aimed at preventing weapons transfers under principles of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Egypt concurrently closed the Rafah crossing on June 14, 2007, sealing the southern border due to concerns over smuggling networks originating in the Sinai Peninsula, which facilitated illicit arms flows into Gaza. The measures were empirically linked to surging threats post-takeover, including rocket barrages from that intensified immediately, with 1,508 rockets and 1,799 mortar shells fired at communities in the year following June 2007 alone. These attacks, documented by defense authorities, underscored the need for border restrictions to curb the influx of munitions via land routes, including tunnels under the Egypt- border that courts later deemed a direct threat requiring destruction. Egypt's closure aligned with its efforts to mitigate Sinai-based operations, which posed risks of weapons proliferation and jihadist activity spillover.

Consequences and Impacts

Economic and Trade Effects on Gaza

The Agreement on Movement and Access, signed in November 2005, envisioned facilitating 's exports through designated crossings to support economic viability post-disengagement, including continuous operation for agricultural goods and access to ports like for international trade. However, implementation faltered prior to the 2007 takeover due to repeated security breaches, such as rocket fire and attacks on , which prompted frequent closures and prevented the realization of export targets; for instance, , intended for bulk goods, operated at under 10% capacity in 2006 amid militant . These disruptions, rooted in escalating violence rather than the agreement's framework, foreshadowed broader economic , with 's pre-takeover export volumes already negligible compared to aspirations for $100 million annually in agricultural shipments. Following the June 2007 Hamas coup, Gaza's real GDP growth averaged just 0.4% annually from 2007 to 2022, with GDP declining at 2.5% per year, reflecting not only tightened access controls in response to rocket barrages—over 4,000 launched in 2007 alone—but also investor exodus and market losses amid by a militant entity prioritizing conflict over commerce. Initial contraction was acute: 2007 growth stalled at approximately 0%, implying a drop exceeding rates of 2.9%, as legitimate channels collapsed, with exports plummeting from $30 million in 2006 to near zero by 2008 due to forfeited and regional markets and shrinkage from insecurity. This stagnation contrasted sharply with the , where Palestinian Authority-Israel coordination enabled average annual GDP growth of around 4% from 2007 to 2010, underscoring and security compliance as pivotal factors over border policies alone; rose progressively, while Gaza's halved relative to it by 2015. The proliferation of smuggling tunnels under the Egypt-Gaza border post-2007 emerged as a de facto trade conduit, with estimated annual volumes reaching $700 million by 2012, ostensibly supplying consumer goods like food and construction materials to circumvent restrictions. Yet, this shadow economy facilitated primarily unregulated and contraband flows, including weapons and dual-use materials that bolstered militant capabilities rather than sustainable legitimate trade; operators reported shifting from small arms shipments to bulk goods, but Hamas oversight ensured prioritization of military logistics, distorting incentives away from export-oriented industries and perpetuating dependency on illicit channels vulnerable to Egyptian crackdowns. Empirical comparisons reveal that while tunnels mitigated some shortages, they failed to revive formal exports or attract investment, as evidenced by Gaza's private credit to GDP ratio languishing at 22% versus the West Bank's 33% over the period, tying economic malaise to internal militancy and rule-of-law deficits rather than access limits in isolation.

Humanitarian Outcomes and Aid Dynamics

Despite intensified security restrictions following the 2007 Hamas takeover in , substantial volumes of humanitarian aid continued to enter the territory through Israeli-controlled crossings such as and , with Israeli data indicating over 500 trucks per day on average in the years preceding the October 2023 escalation, facilitating millions of tons annually despite periodic closures triggered by rocket fire from militants. These flows included , medical supplies, and materials, though Israeli assessments consistently highlighted 's systematic diversion of 20-40% of incoming for purposes, such as tunneling and rocket production, based on intelligence intercepts and seized stockpiles. agencies, while disputing the scale of organized diversion, have documented instances of aid looting along distribution routes—reaching up to 88% in some post-2023 reports—and acknowledged challenges from armed groups controlling access within . Civilian health and nutrition outcomes in Gaza exhibited cyclical patterns tied to conflict intensity rather than a uniform blockade effect, with and data showing baseline acute rates among children under five hovering at 2-5% from 2007 to 2022—below thresholds—amid ongoing inflows, but spiking during major escalations like the 2008-2009 and wars due to disrupted distribution and infrastructure damage. For instance, stunting rates remained stable at around 11% pre-2023, reflecting chronic poverty exacerbated by governance priorities, while UN reports noted the weaponization of dual-use items, such as and intended for but repurposed for over 500 kilometers of attack tunnels by 2023. Post-escalation surges in , such as acute rates doubling to over 15% in northern by mid-2025, correlated directly with intensified fighting and interception rather than entry restrictions alone. Egypt's control over the Rafah crossing introduced independent bottlenecks, with Cairo imposing prolonged closures—such as extended shutdowns after political unrest and intermittent restrictions through —severely limiting and passenger movement, thereby amplifying Gaza's isolation beyond policies. These Egyptian measures, often justified by security concerns over Sinai-based militants, reduced 's operational days to under 25% in some years, forcing greater reliance on crossings and underscoring multifaceted barriers to sustained dynamics under the Agreement on Movement and Access .

Security Rationale and Measurable Effectiveness

The security restrictions imposed following the collapse of the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) were predicated on preventing terrorist infiltrations and weapons smuggling from , a necessity demonstrated by the agreement's operational failures in 2005-2006. During this period, lax border controls enabled multiple attacks at crossings, including the June 25, 2006, raid at , where militants tunneled under the border, killed two Israeli soldiers, and abducted , highlighting the risks of unverified oversight. Similar incidents, such as mortar barrages targeting crossings, underscored the empirical inadequacy of open-access policies without robust security vetting, validating Israel's precondition for verifiable control that the PA could not sustain. Post-2007 restrictions correlated with a marked decline in successful suicide bombings and ground infiltrations from compared to peaks. From 2000 to 2005, Gaza-originating suicide attacks contributed to over 100 incidents killing hundreds of , with annual peaks exceeding 20 in years like 2002; by 2007, only one such attack succeeded from Gaza, and subsequent years saw near elimination of this tactic due to enhanced border barriers and naval enforcement preventing bomber transit. Infiltration attempts dropped sharply, with Israeli forces intercepting numerous tunnel networks and operations annually, such as vessel seizures carrying arms destined for Gaza-based groups, thereby disrupting logistics for cross-border raids. Long-term metrics further affirm the restrictions' deterrent effect, as sustained controls from onward aligned with fewer successful cross-border attacks relative to the pre-blockade era. Data indicate a between tightened access—limiting unmonitored movement—and reduced ground incursions, with post- incidents primarily confined to rocket fire rather than penetrative assaults that plagued 2005-2006. This pattern supports the causal link between verifiable border enforcement and threat mitigation, as alternatives like the AMA's framework empirically enabled exploitation by militants lacking PA restraint.

Controversies and Perspectives

Criticisms from Palestinian and International Sources

officials and leaders have portrayed the restrictions implemented under the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) as a form of economic strangulation and , arguing that Israel's control over crossings prevented the anticipated economic recovery in and equated to apartheid-like segregation by curtailing Palestinian movement and trade. narratives specifically frame post-AMA border controls as an extension of policies designed to isolate , exacerbating which spiked to over 30% by late 2006 amid reduced exports through crossings like Karni and . International organizations, including UN agencies, have echoed these concerns, with a 2006 OCHA review of the AMA stating that closure of Gaza's crossing points significantly worsened the economic situation, hindering peaceful development and increasing humanitarian dependency without fulfilling the agreement's access provisions. The initial findings of the UN Goldstone Report on the 2008-2009 Gaza conflict described the blockade—building on AMA-era restrictions—as a policy of collective punishment violating , alleging disproportionate civilian impacts from limited movement and goods access, though Goldstone later retracted aspects of the report's conclusions on . Advocacy groups like and have advocated for unconditional opening of crossings, characterizing the overall regime of movement controls as sustaining an system through fragmented territorial access and economic isolation. These critiques often highlight sharp rises in and reliance, with UN reports noting that by 2006, Gaza's humanitarian conditions deteriorated due to curbs, prompting calls for unrestricted flows to avert . Yet, empirical data on delivery shows volumes of truck entries into stabilizing or surpassing pre-Second (pre-2000) averages in the years following AMA implementation, with thousands of trucks monthly facilitating imports despite security protocols.

Israeli Security Justifications and Achievements

Israel maintained that the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), signed on November 15, 2005, was contingent upon Palestinian compliance with prior commitments to halt violence, as reaffirmed at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit earlier that year, where both sides pledged to end acts of aggression against each other. The agreement explicitly required to facilitate Palestinian movement and access "consistent with security needs," prioritizing measures to prevent terrorist incursions and arms transfers while enabling economic activity under reciprocal non-violence. Following the coup in in June 2007, which involved the violent expulsion of forces and establishment of control by a designated terrorist organization, invoked these security provisions to impose tightened restrictions, arguing that 's charter-mandated hostility and immediate escalation of rocket attacks nullified the reciprocity essential to the AMA framework. The subsequent blockade, intensified in 2007-2008, was justified by Israeli authorities as a lawful naval and land perimeter to isolate Gaza's armament by a non-state armed actor posing an existential threat, preventing the influx of weapons and dual-use materials that could enhance rocket ranges and payloads, as evidenced by intercepted smuggling attempts via sea and tunnels. From Israel's perspective, this measure addressed the surge in Qassam rockets—over 1,500 fired into southern Israel in the year following the Hamas takeover—while complying with international law on blockades against belligerent threats, without intent to target civilians but to neutralize cross-border attacks. Official assessments highlighted the blockade's role in constraining Hamas's military buildup, limiting access to advanced Iranian-supplied munitions that extended rocket threats beyond pre-disengagement ranges. Key achievements included a marked decline in Israeli casualties from Gaza-originated ground-level terrorism post-disengagement and controls; during the Second Intifada (2000-2005), Gaza facilitated numerous suicide bombings that killed over 100 civilians inside proper, but fortified border fences and access restrictions virtually eliminated such infiltrations thereafter, with zero successful suicide bombings from Gaza reaching population centers after 2006. Overall fatalities from direct Gaza attacks shifted to longer-range rockets, which proved more interceptable and less lethal per incident compared to pre-2005 close-proximity assaults, contributing to fewer civilian deaths annually from Gaza threats despite increased launch volumes—averaging under 10 per year in the 2008-2010 period before advanced defenses. This isolation enabled to pursue targeted aerial and intelligence-driven operations against infrastructure, avoiding the higher casualties and ethical dilemmas associated with sustained ground occupation in densely populated areas, thus partially realizing the disengagement's goal of externalizing and containing the threat without territorial entanglement.

Causal Analysis of Failure

The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) presupposed Palestinian governance capable of suppressing militancy and facilitating economic integration, yet its collapse originated in the ideological foundations of , which explicitly rejected compromise with as outlined in its 1988 charter. Article 13 of the charter deems "peace initiatives and so-called peaceful solutions" incompatible with Hamas's principles, framing the conflict as an irrevocable religious struggle for all of historic rather than a negotiable . This rejectionism precluded any sustained adherence to the AMA's security provisions, which required the (PA) to dismantle terror infrastructure and prevent attacks—obligations unmet even before Hamas's 2007 coup. From September 2005 to May 2007, under PA control, Palestinian groups launched nearly 2,700 rockets into , killing four civilians and injuring dozens, demonstrating a failure to curb smuggling and launches via rudimentary tunnels that bypassed border controls stipulated in the agreement. Hamas's violent usurpation of Gaza in June 2007, through a bloody intra-Palestinian conflict that killed over 160 Fatah members, extinguished the AMA's viability by installing a regime inherently hostile to its cooperative mechanisms. The coup reflected not mere opportunism but alignment with Hamas's charter-mandated armed resistance, overriding PA efforts at implementation and severing channels for joint monitoring at crossings like Rafah and Karni. Pre-coup PA lapses in security enforcement—stemming from corruption, divided loyalties to militant factions, and inadequate reform—eroded trust, but Hamas's takeover amplified these into systemic sabotage, as aid inflows intended for civilian reconstruction were redirected to military ends. Reports document Hamas skimming construction materials, such as cement, for tunnel networks used in attacks, with UN-labeled bags found in such sites, underscoring how governance breakdown prioritized militancy over economic stabilization. Counterfactual analysis reveals that full PA implementation, absent Hamas's interference, could have realized the AMA's goals of exports reaching 40% of pre-2000 levels and workforce access to , as initial post-disengagement data showed potential for growth before escalation. Yet Palestinian prevailed through persistent dual governance: Fatah's tolerance of Hamas militancy and post-coup dependency fueled a cycle where resources sustained rejectionist ideologies rather than . Empirical patterns of diverted —estimated at tens of millions annually to weapons —contradict narratives attributing failure solely to external restrictions, as internal prioritization of conflict over compliance perpetuated isolation. This causal chain, rooted in ideological militancy and enforcement deficits, rendered the AMA's framework untenable absent fundamental Palestinian reforms.

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