Annapolis Conference
![President George W. Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addressing the Annapolis Conference]float-right The Annapolis Conference was a U.S.-sponsored international summit convened on November 27, 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, by President George W. Bush to relaunch direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority aimed at achieving a two-state solution to their longstanding conflict.[1] The event gathered Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and high-level representatives from more than 40 countries, including members of the Quartet on the Middle East (United States, European Union, Russia, and United Nations), as well as Arab states supportive of normalization with Israel contingent on Palestinian statehood.[2] The conference produced a Joint Understanding on Negotiations, in which the Israeli and Palestinian leaders committed to immediate bilateral discussions facilitated by the United States, with the objective of concluding a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues—Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, and security—by the end of 2008, while implementing parallel confidence-building measures and upholding the Roadmap for Peace.[3] Bi-weekly meetings between Olmert and Abbas ensued, marked by exchanges of detailed proposals, including Olmert's offer of territorial concessions approaching 94% of the West Bank with land swaps and shared sovereignty in Jerusalem, though these were not formally accepted by Abbas amid mutual recriminations over implementation.[4] Despite initial momentum, the process collapsed without a final agreement, undermined by continued Israeli settlement activity, Palestinian failure to unify governance or curb militant violence from Gaza under Hamas control, and political upheavals such as Israel's 2008-2009 Gaza operation and Olmert's resignation over corruption allegations.[5] Critics, including from security-focused analyses, have characterized the conference as a high-profile but ultimately ineffective gesture, highlighting the absence of enforceable preconditions like a full settlement freeze or renunciation of violence by Palestinian factions, which perpetuated cycles of distrust and escalation rather than resolution.[4]Historical Background
Prior Peace Efforts and Failures
The Madrid Conference of October 30 to November 1, 1991, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, marked the first multilateral effort to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the Gulf War, convening Israeli, Palestinian (as part of a Jordanian delegation), and other Arab representatives for direct bilateral and regional talks.[6] The conference established working groups on issues like water, refugees, and arms control but produced no binding agreements, serving primarily as a framework that facilitated subsequent secret negotiations leading to the Oslo process; its failure to yield immediate resolutions stemmed from rigid positions, including Palestinian insistence on addressing core issues like Jerusalem and refugees upfront, amid ongoing Israeli settlement activity.[6] [7] The Oslo Accords, initiated with the 1993 Declaration of Principles signed in Washington, D.C., on September 13, represented a breakthrough through secret Norwegian-mediated talks, whereby the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) recognized Israel's right to exist and Israel acknowledged the PLO as the Palestinians' representative, establishing the Palestinian Authority (PA) for limited interim self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. Subsequent agreements, including the 1994 Gaza-J Jericho Agreement and 1995 Oslo II Accord, divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C, but the process collapsed amid mutual non-compliance: Palestinian leadership under Yasser Arafat failed to dismantle terrorist infrastructure as required, with over 1,000 Israeli deaths from suicide bombings during the Second Intifada starting in September 2000, while Israel continued settlement expansion, eroding trust and highlighting the accords' lack of enforcement mechanisms for final-status issues like borders and refugees. The Camp David Summit of July 11-25, 2000, convened by U.S. President Bill Clinton with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Arafat, aimed for a final-status agreement; Barak offered approximately 91-95% of the West Bank, land swaps, and shared control over Jerusalem, but Arafat rejected the proposal without a comprehensive counteroffer, citing insufficient concessions on refugees' right of return and holy sites, leading to the summit's breakdown and the immediate escalation of violence in the Second Intifada. Follow-up talks at Taba in January 2001 showed tentative progress on territory (up to 97% offered) and security but ended without agreement due to Barak's impending electoral defeat and Arafat's reluctance to conclude amid domestic opposition, underscoring Palestinian leadership's pattern of prioritizing maximalist demands over pragmatic compromise.[8] [9] Post-2000 efforts included the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, offering normalized relations in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines, which Israel rejected for not addressing security concerns or recognizing Jewish historical claims, and the Quartet's Road Map for Peace unveiled on April 30, 2003, outlining phased steps toward a Palestinian state by 2005 contingent on ending violence and reforms.[10] The Road Map faltered early, with Palestinian suicide bombings continuing (over 400 Israeli deaths in 2002-2003 alone) despite PA pledges, Israeli targeted killings and settlement growth persisting, and the 2006 Hamas election victory derailing PA reforms, as Hamas refused to recognize Israel or renounce violence, fracturing Palestinian governance and halting progress toward benchmarks like a viable Palestinian economy and demilitarized state.[11] [12] These repeated failures revealed deep asymmetries: Israeli offers of statehood on substantial territory were unmet by Palestinian cessation of incitement and terrorism, perpetuating a cycle where concessions bred further demands rather than reciprocity.[13]Immediate Context and Prelude
The violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in June 2007 marked a pivotal fracture in Palestinian governance, ending the short-lived Fatah-Hamas unity government formed in March and enabling President Mahmoud Abbas to consolidate Fatah control in the [West Bank](/page/West Bank).[5] On June 14, 2007, Abbas dismissed Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and declared a state of emergency, prompting the United States and other Quartet members (United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) to withhold recognition of the Hamas-led administration in Gaza due to its refusal to recognize Israel, renounce violence, or accept prior agreements.[5] This schism created a diplomatic opening for renewed Israeli-Palestinian engagement, as the Bush administration viewed Abbas's [West Bank](/page/West Bank) authority as a counterweight to Hamas's Islamist militancy and Iranian influence.[14] In response, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice intensified U.S. shuttle diplomacy, making eight trips to the region in 2007 to foster a "political horizon" and prepare for multilateral talks.[5] A June 25, 2007, summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, brought together Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordan's King Abdullah II, where Olmert pledged limited goodwill gestures such as prisoner releases to bolster Abbas, though substantive progress remained elusive amid ongoing security concerns from Gaza rocket fire.[15] On July 16, 2007, President George W. Bush delivered a speech endorsing Abbas's leadership and announcing plans for an international conference later that year to review Palestinian institution-building and advance a two-state solution based on the 2003 Roadmap for Peace. This initiative built on the Arab League's March 2007 re-endorsement of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which Olmert had signaled openness to discussing despite Israeli reservations over its demands for full withdrawal to 1967 borders.[5] Preparatory bilateral meetings between Olmert and Abbas from July to November 2007, facilitated by negotiators Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, aimed to draft a joint declaration on core issues including borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, and security but yielded no consensus.[5] Rice's efforts sought to align the conference with Quartet benchmarks while securing broad Arab and international participation to pressure both sides toward negotiations, reflecting U.S. calculations that Olmert's weakened domestic position—stemming from the 2006 Lebanon War inquiries and corruption allegations—nonetheless offered a narrow window for concessions, paralleled by Abbas's need for legitimacy against Hamas challenges.[16] The prelude underscored persistent obstacles, including Palestinian internal divisions and Israeli security priorities, yet positioned the Annapolis gathering as a mechanism to relaunch direct talks with a target resolution by the end of 2008.[5]Organization and Participants
Hosting and Logistics
![President George W. Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas addressing the Annapolis Conference][float-right]The Annapolis Conference was hosted by the United States government under President George W. Bush on November 27, 2007, at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.[14] The venue selected was Memorial Hall on the academy grounds, chosen for its symbolic significance as a site associated with American military tradition and leadership.[17] This one-day event was organized by the U.S. Department of State in coordination with the White House, aiming to facilitate multilateral discussions on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.[2] Logistically, the conference accommodated representatives from more than 50 countries and international organizations, requiring extensive security arrangements provided by U.S. federal agencies, including the Secret Service and local law enforcement in Annapolis.[14] Proceedings were structured around opening speeches by key leaders, followed by a joint understanding announcement, with bilateral side meetings facilitated in adjacent facilities at the academy.[18] The U.S. provided interpretation services, simultaneous translation in multiple languages, and media facilities to broadcast the event globally, underscoring its role as the primary convener and logistical supporter.[2] No significant disruptions were reported, reflecting effective planning amid heightened regional tensions.[19]