Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Assyrian Democratic Movement

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), known in Assyrian Neo-Aramaic as Zowaa D'mokreto Aturaya, is a representing the ethnic minority in , founded clandestinely on 12 April 1979 in cities including , , and to pursue the national and political aspirations of Assyrians amid Ba'athist repression. The party emerged as a democratic nationalist force committed to securing equal citizenship, cultural preservation, and representation for Assyrians, who trace their heritage to ancient and have faced historical marginalization, including massacres like the 1933 Simele . From its inception, the ADM engaged in armed resistance against Saddam Hussein's regime starting in 1982, aligning with Kurdish forces in northern and forming guerrilla units to challenge authoritarian control. Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and the fall of , the ADM transitioned into formal political participation, securing seats in the Iraqi parliament and contributing to the interim Governing Council, with leaders like Yonadam Kanna serving as prominent minority representatives until 2023. The party has advocated for administrative autonomy in Assyrian ancestral regions such as the , emphasizing partnership within federal structures like the Regional Government while resisting assimilationist pressures from dominant ethnic groups. During the 2014-2017 caliphate, ADM-affiliated militias defended Christian communities, highlighting the party's role in minority self-protection amid state fragility. Under current Secretary-General Yaqoob Gorgees Yaqo, it continues pressing for electoral reforms to counter quota manipulations that dilute minority voices, renewing demands for justice over past atrocities and cultural safeguards against extremist ideologies.

Ideology and Goals

Core Principles of Assyrian Nationalism and Democracy

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), operating under the Syriac name Zowaa, integrates Assyrian nationalism with democratic principles to advocate for the survival and empowerment of Assyrians as an indigenous people in their historic homeland of Bet Nahrain, encompassing the Nineveh Plains and surrounding areas in modern Iraq. Assyrian nationalism in ADM's framework emphasizes the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of the Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian community, rooted in millennia of continuous presence predating Arab and Kurdish dominance, and rejects assimilation or reduction to mere religious minority status. This nationalism demands constitutional affirmation of Assyrian identity, including incorporation of national symbols such as flags and anthems into regional emblems, and protection of ancestral lands from post-1961 encroachments through enforcement of laws like Iraq's Law No. 5 of 2015. Self-determination forms the cornerstone of this nationalism, with ADM pushing for administrative in Assyrian-majority areas like to preserve language, education in , and cultural heritage amid threats of demographic erasure. The movement's frames these goals as pragmatic necessities for national existence, opposing national chauvinism while asserting that Assyrian rights must be actively secured rather than passively granted, drawing from historical under Ba'athist rule. This approach aligns with broader rights for peoples, but prioritizes collective Assyrian control over destiny within a , including quotas for employment, , and equitable wealth distribution from regional resources. Democracy, in ADM's ideology, serves as the enabling mechanism for realizing nationalist aims, positing a democratic Iraq—free from authoritarian intolerance—as the foundation for freedoms that foster Assyrian national identity and unity. The party commits to progressive pragmatism, promoting mutual respect among ethnic groups and rejecting divisive ideologies, while seeking genuine power-sharing through fair electoral laws, separate voter registries for quota seats, and non-partisan representation in legislative, executive, and parliamentary bodies. This democratic ethos extends to opposition against regime appeasement, favoring active political engagement, such as participation in the Iraqi National Congress and Kurdish regional governance, to achieve equal citizenship without discrimination. The interplay of and in ADM underscores a vision of over symbolic , insisting on full political, administrative, economic, and social rights to counter marginalization, as evidenced in demands for reforms recognizing history and resolution of land disputes with compensation. Since its formation in amid Ba'athist suppression, ADM has consistently framed these principles as interdependent: nationalism without democracy risks isolation, while democracy absent national safeguards invites erasure.

Positions on Autonomy, Rights, and Federalism

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) supports Iraq's federal structure as a framework for accommodating ethnic , aligning with the 2005 constitution's provisions for decentralized power-sharing and minority protections under Article 125. The party demands recognition of Assyrians as an national group entitled to full political, administrative, cultural, economic, and social , including fair representation in regional presidencies, parliaments, and , rather than treatment as a mere religious minority. This stance emphasizes resolving historical land violations dating to 1961 and enforcing regional laws like Kurdistan's No. 5 of 2015 to prevent encroachments and ensure judicial accountability for abuses. On autonomy, ADM advocates self-administered districts or regions tailored to Assyrian-majority areas, such as an independent in within the , modeled on existing units like Soran or , to safeguard language, heritage, and social affairs from assimilation. In the , the party has explicitly called for a dedicated autonomous or region to enable self-rule, , and in mechanisms, citing reverse trends as necessitating robust administrative models against . Sarod al-Maqdisi, an ADM representative, articulated this in a March 2025 European Parliament hearing, urging comprehensive policies for job creation, electoral law reforms, and minority stability. ADM's positions extend to sponsoring initiatives like the Chaldean Syriac Conference in , which sought self-administered regions to secure collective rights amid ongoing threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach that prioritizes verifiable partnership over symbolic quotas. The movement critiques electoral systems for undermining these goals, pushing for laws that protect quota seats and incorporate symbols into official emblems to affirm national parity.

Historical Development

Formation Amid Ba'athist Persecution (1970s-1979)

The Ba'athist regime in , consolidating power after the 1968 coup and intensifying under Saddam Hussein's influence by the mid-1970s, pursued aggressive policies targeting non-Arab ethnic groups, including Assyrians, through forced assimilation, cultural suppression, and violent crackdowns. Following the 1975 , which curtailed autonomy and Iranian support for northern insurgents, the regime launched bloody campaigns against non-Arab nationalities in northern , displacing communities and imprisoning Assyrian intellectuals and activists for promoting cultural or . In the early 1970s, hundreds of Assyrian students and cultural figures were jailed for activities such as teaching the or organizing heritage events, reflecting a systematic effort to eradicate distinct existence in favor of Arab nationalist ideology. By 1977, the government banned self-identification as in the national census, compelling registration as or , which triggered further arrests of nationalists resisting this denial of ethnic rights. Amid this escalating persecution, communities in began clandestine efforts to unify fragmented nationalist groups, drawing from student and cultural associations active since the early . Contacts and meetings among these groups intensified around , aiming to form a cohesive political front against Ba'athist of identity, influenced by broader regional leftist democratic movements but rooted in ethnic . These initiatives responded causally to the regime's denial of basic , including language use and communal , which had left Assyrians vulnerable to demographic erasure in their ancestral regions like the and Dohuk. The push for was driven by recognition that isolated cultural efforts could not counter the state's coercive apparatus, leading to of a structured party committed to democratic principles and within a federal . The Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) was formally founded on April 12, 1979, during a constituent in Bet-Nahrain, emerging directly from these unification drives among small student groups and cultural organizations to address the political aspirations of Assyrians under Ba'athist oppression. Timed just months before Saddam Hussein's formal ascension to presidency in July 1979, the party's creation marked a shift from passive cultural resistance to organized , advocating for equal citizenship, cultural preservation, and resistance to without armed confrontation at . Though initially underground due to regime , Zowaa's democratic-nationalist platform positioned it as a counter to Ba'athist , prioritizing amid ongoing arrests and identity suppression. The founding reflected empirical necessities: without a unified voice, Assyrian communities risked further marginalization, as evidenced by prior failed fragmented efforts.

Underground Operations and Resistance (1979-2003)

The Democratic Movement (), known as Zowaa, was founded on April 12, 1979, in northern Iraq's Bet-Nahrain region amid intensifying Ba'athist repression that sought to suppress , including through a 1977 census that prohibited self-identification as Assyrian and forced registration as or . This clandestine formation followed secret dialogues among nationalist groups from 1976 to 1977, culminating in a constituent that adopted a democratic platform aimed at resisting cultural erasure and political marginalization under Saddam Hussein's regime. Operating underground from inception, the faced immediate regime crackdowns, including arrests and closures of affiliated youth groups, compelling members to conduct activities in secrecy to evade liquidation. By 1982, the ADM escalated to armed resistance against the Ba'athist regime, establishing bases in northern and launching guerrilla operations in coordination with and other opposition parties during the Iran- . These efforts included daring cross-river incursions, such as a 1985 operation over the Zab River that resulted in the martyrdom of key fighters, highlighting the high risks and sacrifices of the underground phase. The movement's alignment with larger resistance groups provided logistical support but exposed Assyrians to retaliatory Ba'athist policies, including heightened Ba'athification drives that reversed prior conciliatory measures toward minorities. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the endured severe persecution, with regime forces executing co-founders and imprisoning leaders like Yonadam Kanna, while targeting communities in campaigns such as the 1988 Anfal genocide, which devastated villages and displaced thousands. Members persisted in sabotage and propaganda efforts from hidden networks, contributing to the in the north, though the regime's brutal suppression forced further concealment. Basic rights, including language use, were denied, reinforcing the necessity of underground survival tactics until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion dismantled Ba'athist control.

Integration into Post-Saddam Iraqi Politics (2003-2014)

Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime, the , led by Secretary-General Yonadam Kanna, transitioned from clandestine operations to active participation in Iraq's nascent democratic institutions, leveraging its pre-existing opposition status recognized by the U.S. in December 2002. coordinated with forces to secure areas in province during the invasion and shifted its political focus from the Regional Government (KRG) base in to , prioritizing advocacy for autonomy in the —a historic Christian-majority region encompassing towns like , Bartella, and . This realignment reflected ADM's strategy to counter territorial expansion through channels, formalized at the in on October 24, 2003, which demanded a self-governing administrative unit under Article 125 of the emerging Iraqi Constitution. Kanna, appointed as the sole Christian member of the (IGC) from July 13, 2003, to June 2004, used his position to amplify , including de-Ba'athification reforms targeting Assyrian victims of prior persecution, though he later criticized the process for overreach against non-complicit Ba'athists. In the January 30, 2005, Transitional elections, ADM headed the Al-Rafidain List under the Chaldean-Assyrian quota, securing one seat amid allegations of voter intimidation and ballot stuffing in , prompting protests and demands for recounts. The party also won one seat on the Nineveh Provincial Council and four of five reserved Christian seats in the KRG Parliament that year, enabling influence over local policies despite ongoing encroachments, such as land seizures in Dohuk. By the December 15, 2005, parliamentary elections, ADM opposed provisions in the Iraqi Constitution that ambiguously placed the under disputed federal or regional jurisdiction, advocating instead for Assyrian-led security forces to prevent Arab- dominance. In the , 2010, Council of Representatives elections, ADM expanded to three seats via the quota system, outperforming Kurdish-aligned rivals like the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council, which captured two; Kanna retained his parliamentary role, serving on committees addressing minority displacement from , including the 2004 church bombings that killed over 20 and displaced thousands of s. Despite these gains, ADM faced systemic hurdles: blocked Assyrian access to polling stations, and Baghdad's indifference to implementation left autonomy proposals stalled until a partial endorsement of a province on January 21, 2014, which required multi-ethnic governance but lacked enforcement mechanisms amid rising instability. ADM's parliamentary tenure highlighted tensions with the KRG, accused of "" tactics like demographic engineering and vetoing security initiatives, while U.S. support—evident in training facilities and pressure on —provided leverage but waned post-2011 withdrawal. Internally, the party disbanded its at U.S. insistence to prioritize civilian politics, yet waves from 2006-2008 reduced populations by up to 50% in and the Plains, underscoring the limits of quota-based representation without territorial control. Kanna's advocacy, including ministerial roles in the KRG for , positioned ADM as a bridge between central and regional powers, though persistent claims—such as in 2009 provincial polls—eroded trust in . This period marked ADM's peak institutional embedding, yet unresolved autonomy demands foreshadowed vulnerabilities exposed by the 2014 offensive.

Response to ISIS Onslaught and Reconstruction Efforts (2014-2017)

In August 2014, the () launched a rapid offensive into the , overrunning Assyrian-majority towns such as , Bartella, and , displacing over 100,000 Assyrian Christians and destroying numerous churches and historical sites. The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), under leader Yonadam Kanna, publicly condemned the atrocities and urged the formation of Assyrian self-defense units to counter the unchecked advance, criticizing the withdrawal of forces from the region. By late 2014, the spearheaded the establishment of the Protection Units (), a comprising thousands of Assyrian volunteers aimed at safeguarding ancestral lands from further incursions and facilitating eventual liberation. The coordinated with Iraqi federal forces and international coalitions during counteroffensives, participating in operations to reclaim villages by 2016, though limited by resource shortages and reliance on external support. ADM leaders emphasized that such units represented a "last stand" for Assyrian survival, prioritizing the creation of a protected in the to prevent demographic erasure. Following the liberation of and surrounding areas in July 2017, the ADM shifted focus to , advocating for Assyrian-led security arrangements to enable the return of displaced families, who numbered around 120,000 by mid-2015. Efforts included lobbying Iraqi authorities and international donors for funding to rebuild infrastructure, with the securing liberated zones against insurgent remnants and facilitating aid distribution amid reports of uneven support. However, persistent challenges such as land disputes with forces and insufficient investment hindered full , with only partial returns achieved by 2017. The ADM positioned these initiatives as essential for preserving presence, warning that without autonomous governance, would fail to reverse ISIS-induced demographic shifts.

Contemporary Advocacy and Setbacks (2018-Present)

In the aftermath of the defeat, the Assyrian Democratic Movement intensified advocacy for the establishment of a protected Assyrian administrative zone in the to facilitate the return of displaced , emphasizing demilitarized governance free from militia influence. However, these efforts encountered significant setbacks, including persistent control by (PMF) units, which hindered reconstruction and security, leading to low return rates among the estimated 120,000 displaced from the region. During the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections, ADM candidates faced widespread allegations of , with non-Assyrian parties, including the (KDP) and , accused of manipulating minority quota votes through intimidation and ballot stuffing, resulting in protests by hundreds of outside the Kurdistan Parliament and diminished representation for independent Assyrian voices. The 2021 Iraqi parliamentary elections provided partial continuity for ADM, as party leader Yonadam Kanna retained his seat under the minority quota system amid overall low of 43%, reflecting broader disillusionment with Iraq's political process. Yet, setbacks persisted, exemplified by the arbitrary detention of Mayor Faiez Jahwareh, an ADM affiliate, by KRG security forces in July 2018 on unsubstantiated charges, highlighting ongoing frictions over local governance in disputed -majority areas. ADM's push for recognition of rights clashed with expansionist claims, as KRG authorities delayed implementation of rulings favoring land reclamation, exacerbating and internal community divisions. From 2022 onward, ADM focused on diplomatic advocacy, proposing a comprehensive framework in May 2025 for equitable national partnership within the , calling for in , cultural preservation, and of historical grievances to counter marginalization. In 2025, ADM Secretary General condemned armed groups—allegedly backed by external actors—for systematic efforts to destabilize in the through land seizures and provocations, urging Iraqi federal intervention to protect minority demographics. These initiatives underscore ADM's resilience amid challenges like Iranian-influenced proxy militias neutralizing rival factions and eroding autonomous aspirations, with party officials warning that unaddressed encroachments risk further demographic collapse in ancestral territories.

Leadership and Internal Organization

Prominent Leaders and Succession

Yonadam Kanna, a founding member of the Assyrian Democratic Movement established on April 12, 1979, emerged as one of its most enduring figures, serving as Secretary General from 2001 to 2023. Under his leadership, the party transitioned from clandestine operations to formal participation in Iraq's post-Saddam political institutions, including Kanna's appointment to the in 2003 and subsequent roles in the transitional . Kanna's advocacy focused on securing amid , though critics within Assyrian communities have questioned the party's alliances with broader Iraqi coalitions over exclusively ethno-nationalist priorities. Preceding Kanna, Ninos Pithyou held the position of first Secretary General during the ADM's formative underground years, directing armed resistance against the Ba'athist regime starting in 1982 to protect villages from and displacement. Pithyou's tenure emphasized guerrilla operations in northern , forging early tactical pacts with forces against shared threats, but ended amid intensified regime crackdowns in the and . Succession within the ADM occurs through internal conferences electing the Secretary General, reflecting the party's democratic despite operating under authoritarian constraints for decades. Kanna's replacement came on May 26, 2023, when Yacoob G. Yaco—previously Deputy Secretary General—was democratically selected at a general conference, signaling continuity in pushing for autonomy within . Yacoob has since led responses to post-ISIS displacement and disputes over minority quotas in elections, maintaining the ADM's commitment to national unity while critiquing structural marginalization of . This leadership shift preserved institutional stability, though it drew mixed reactions from factions favoring more confrontational stances toward regional powers like the .

Party Structure, Committees, and Affiliated Groups

The Assyrian Democratic Movement maintains a centralized hierarchical structure led by a Secretary-General, who serves as the primary executive authority responsible for directing party operations and representing it externally. As of August 2025, Yaqoob Gorgees Yaqo holds this position following his election. The structure includes a Deputy Secretary-General and other leadership roles to support administrative and political functions. The Political Bureau functions as the party's core decision-making body, formulating policies, overseeing strategic initiatives, and coordinating with external actors; notable members include Ninab Toma, who engaged in diaspora outreach in in September 2025, and Halan Hormuz. The provides broader oversight, involving elected representatives in organizational governance and congresses, as evidenced by its role in endorsing political visions for partnership in the in May 2025. Local branches extend the party's reach within Iraq and the diaspora, such as the Sennacherib Branch in Tesqopa (Nineveh Plain), directed by figures like Marqus Eramya, which handles community-level activities and security coordination. Affiliated entities include the (NPU), a militia formed by the party in 2014 to safeguard Assyrian-populated areas against threats like incursions. The party also maintains ties to media outlets like Al Rafidain, used for Assyrian perspectives.

Electoral Engagement and Performance

Pre-2003 Clandestine Efforts

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), also known as Zowaa, emerged from clandestine initiatives by Assyrian nationalists in Iraq during the mid-1970s, with secret meetings beginning in 1976 to consolidate fragmented groups seeking political representation for their community. These efforts intensified amid Ba'athist policies that, since 1975, targeted non-Arab ethnicities through forced assimilation and denial of national identity, including a 1977 census prohibiting Assyrian self-identification and mandating registration as Arabs or Kurds. The movement formalized on April 12, 1979, via a covert constituent congress in Bet-Nahrain (northern Iraq), establishing a platform to pursue equal citizenship rights and cultural preservation under oppressive conditions. ADM operations remained underground throughout the Ba'athist era, involving political organizing, community mobilization, and resistance against regime suppression, as open activities risked execution or imprisonment. In the late and , authorities conducted widespread arrests of activists; for instance, in late , dozens of ADM members were detained in a crackdown on nationalist networks. Young Assyrians, facing demographic erasure and cultural bans, formed armed units within the movement to counter government forces, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War era when Assyrian villages were depopulated. This semi-clandestine structure, partly in and partly domestic, sustained internal committees for ideological training and resource distribution despite infiltration risks. These pre-2003 efforts prioritized building a resilient organizational base for political agency, including for autonomous in any future democratic framework, while navigating alliances with broader opposition coalitions. The ADM's survival through such tactics positioned it to from to electoral participation after the regime's fall, though accounts from sources like atour.com emphasize heroism, potentially overlooking internal factionalism documented in academic analyses of the period. By the early , the movement had gained prominence in uprisings and safe-haven politics, laying groundwork for quota-based minority seats in post-Saddam elections.

Participation in Transitional and Parliamentary Elections (2005-2021)

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) entered Iraq's post-Saddam electoral process with the January 30, 2005, transitional parliamentary elections, competing for one of the five seats reserved for Christian minorities under the quota system. Party secretary-general Yonadam Kanna secured the seat through strong support from Assyrian voters in the , including communities , where expatriates cast ballots that proved decisive amid low turnout in proper due to threats. This marked ADM's breakthrough in federal representation, emphasizing the party's advocacy for rights within Iraq's emerging democratic framework. ADM maintained momentum in the December 15, 2005, parliamentary elections, participating amid ongoing insurgent violence that targeted minority campaigns, including an attack on party members erecting posters in that killed Joseph Nabil Joseph. Kanna retained his seat, solidifying ADM's position as a key voice for Assyrians in the 275-seat Council of Representatives. The party aligned with broader coalitions to amplify minority influence, though quota seats remained contested due to fragmented Christian voting. In the March 7, 2010, elections, continued under Kanna's leadership, securing re-election for its quota seat as part of efforts to counter sectarian dominance and advocate for reconstruction in areas. Kanna's third term followed the May 2014 vote, where again claimed one Christian seat despite rising threats displacing communities and complicating voter mobilization. Facing allegations of external interference in minority polls, ADM formed the Al Rafidain Coalition in January 2018, incorporating allies like the Assyrian Patriotic Party, to contest the May 12 parliamentary elections. The list, dominated by ADM candidates, won one of the five Christian quota seats in the expanded 329-seat parliament, represented by Emanuel Khoshaba Youkhana from Dohuk. For the October 10, 2021, early elections, ADM participated in the Christian quota competition amid low national turnout of 41 percent and debates over electoral law changes favoring independent candidates. Kanna opted not to run, and the party failed to secure a seat, with results drawing criticism from ADM for producing unrepresentative outcomes influenced by larger political forces. Throughout 2005-2021, ADM's electoral efforts yielded consistent but limited gains, typically one seat per cycle, highlighting challenges in mobilizing a diminished Assyrian electorate amid displacement and quota manipulations.

Minority Quota Challenges and Alleged Manipulations

The minority quota system in Iraq's federal parliament reserves five seats for , , and Christians, allocated across provinces including one each in , Dohuk, , , and , with the intent to guarantee representation for these communities amid demographic decline post-2003. However, the Democratic Movement (Zowaa) has repeatedly contested the system's integrity, alleging that dominant political blocs—particularly Kurdish parties in the and (PMF) militias in disputed areas—manipulate outcomes through candidate control, voter intimidation, and procedural irregularities, undermining genuine minority voice. In the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Zowaa and allied Assyrian groups have accused the (KDP) of interfering in quota allocations, including endorsing proxy candidates and influencing voter registries to favor aligned figures, as evidenced by a July 30, 2018, protest in demanding an end to such practices. This interference contributed to a 2024 Iraqi Federal Court ruling stripping minority quota seats in the KRG parliament, which Assyrian representatives attributed to Kurdish parties' efforts to consolidate control over Christian representation rather than genuine electoral competition. Zowaa has advocated for safeguards like separate voter registries and polling stations to insulate quotas from external influence, but persistent disputes led to the exclusion of a Zowaa candidate from Nineveh's quota seat in August 2025 nominations, cited by authorities as due to incomplete documents amid broader claims of discriminatory barriers. Parallel challenges arise from Shia-majority PMF factions, notably the led by Rayan al-Kildani—a U.S.-sanctioned figure for abuses—which secured four of the five Christian quota seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections through alleged vote rigging, including militia intimidation in Christian enclaves and ballot stuffing. Observers noted that such tactics, repeated in preparations for 2025 elections, exploit fragmented party competition and low turnout, with militias reportedly pressuring voters and displacing rivals to dominate outcomes. In response, Zowaa's Secretary-General Yaqoob Gorgees Yaqo warned on August 26, 2025, of systemic electoral discrimination against minorities, prompting the party's of the November 2025 federal elections alongside calls from figures like Ablahad for systemic overhaul to prevent quota "hijacking" by non-minority blocs. These manipulations, Zowaa argues, perpetuate under-representation and erode the quota's original purpose, as larger parties co-opt seats for sectarian leverage rather than advancing interests.

External Relations and Conflicts

Alliances with Iraqi and International Actors

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), known as Zowaa, has primarily allied with other Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian political entities in to amplify minority representation amid electoral quotas and federal power-sharing. On July 22, 2023, ADM co-founded the Athra Alliance alongside the Assyrian Patriotic Party, Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party, Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council, and Sons of , unifying efforts to secure parliamentary seats and advocate for community rights in and the . Yacoub Gorgis, ADM's Secretary-General, was appointed head of the alliance, reflecting Zowaa's leadership in consolidating fragmented factions against perceived marginalization. Historically, ADM collaborated with opposition groups under the Front during the 1990s, endorsing regional autonomy while pursuing Assyrian-specific demands, and maintained ties with broader Iraqi exile coalitions like the to oppose Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. These partnerships facilitated clandestine operations and post-2003 transitional participation, though ADM emphasized to balance national integration with ethnic self-administration. In electoral contexts, such as Regional elections, ADM has formed coalitions with fellow minority parties like Bet-Nahrain organizations to contest seats under unified lists, aiming to counter dominant parties' influence without formal subordination. Internationally, ADM's alliances are more coordinative than institutional, focusing on networks and with Western entities to pressure for protections. It has engaged in joint forums with Syrian groups, including the Assyrian Democratic Organization and Bet-Nahrain parties, as seen in a 2023 Sweden meeting of six Syriac parties to align on cultural preservation and anti-extremism strategies. ADM participates in transnational unions, such as coordination with the Assyrian International Union, to lobby for global recognition of governance. Delegations, often comprising ADM alongside other Iraqi minorities, have met U.S. officials and members in to highlight and quota manipulations, securing rhetorical support for forces and aid post-ISIS. These efforts underscore ADM's pragmatic outreach to counterbalance regional isolation, though formal affiliations remain limited to ideological alignments like social-democratic opposition networks.

Tensions with Kurdish Regional Government and Land Claims

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), advocating for Assyrian self-administration in the as an indigenous homeland, has clashed with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) over territorial control and minority rights in disputed areas of northern . ADM views the Plains—encompassing districts like Al-Hamdaniya, Tel Kaif, and Al-Shaikhan—as historically Assyrian territory predating modern Kurdish claims, rejecting KRG assertions of inclusion in based on demographic engineering and post-2003 expansions. These tensions stem from Kurdish advances into the region after the 2003 U.S. invasion, which ADM and other Assyrian groups perceive as annexationist, including the disarming of local Assyrian militias in 2014 just before the Islamic State's offensive, leaving communities undefended. Land disputes intensified with documented Kurdish encroachments, such as over 130 illegal seizures of villages and farmlands in the since 1992, often facilitated by KRG inaction despite official orders to halt them, constituting what advocates describe as systematic dispossession akin to . ADM's formation of the Protection Units (NPU) in 2015 aimed to secure lands independently, but faced KRG opposition, including delays in permitting bases and expulsions of mayors in towns like and in 2017 by KRG-aligned forces. Historical patterns trace back to the , with authorities annexing villages and denying restitution, exacerbating ADM's distrust amid failed returns for displaced post-ISIS liberation. Electoral manipulations have further strained relations, with the KRG's dominant (KDP) accused of rigging minority quota seats in regional parliamentary elections through voter fraud, threats, and incentives for pro-KRG candidates, undermining independent voices like . In the 2005 KRG elections, KDP blocked ballot access for approximately 100,000 votes; similar irregularities persisted in 2009 and 2013, prompting widespread protests in on July 30, 2018, against KDP interference. has criticized the quota system for enabling dominant groups to co-opt minority representation, as reiterated in its August 2025 statement on Iraqi federal elections, while opposing the Plains' inclusion in the 2017 independence referendum to preserve autonomy outside KRG jurisdiction.

Opposition to Islamist Threats and Sectarian Policies

The Democratic Movement () responded to the Islamic State's () invasion of the in August 2014 by establishing the Nineveh Plains Protection Units () in late November 2014, aiming to liberate territories and safeguard displaced communities from Islamist . The assault displaced approximately 70,000 Assyrians from 12,000 families, prompting the to recruit over 2,000 initial members, with forces expanding to 1,500 by mid-2016 through training and integration into Iraq's in March 2016. The focused on territorial defense tied to the ' indigenous Christian identity, seeking U.S. support for resources and legitimacy while conducting operations to reclaim areas like and secure front lines against advances. In alignment with Baghdad, the ADM balanced against both ISIS and perceived Kurdish encroachments, advocating for a protected Assyrian province in the Nineveh Plains under Article 125 of the Iraqi Constitution to enable safe returns and prevent future Islamist incursions. This strategy included proposals for an internationally backed safe haven and a post-liberation referendum on affiliation with either Baghdad or the Regional Government (KRG). By 2024, on the 10th anniversary of the ISIS genocide, the ADM joined other Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian parties in demanding Iraqi government and UN action for justice, internally displaced persons' returns, and accountability for atrocities including mass executions and forced conversions. The has criticized sectarian policies in for exacerbating minority vulnerabilities to Islamist threats, including the KRG's withdrawal on August 6, 2014, which left areas undefended, and subsequent "" efforts like voter fraud and unfulfilled promises. It opposed the KRG's 2017 independence referendum's inclusion of the , demanding exclusion to avoid subsuming lands into ethnic Kurdish dominance, and condemned both and for exploiting intra-Christian divisions and neglecting minority protections. Advocating genuine over symbolic representation, the promotes secular, territorial as a bulwark against sectarian marginalization and the rise of extremist groups fueled by governance failures.

Achievements, Criticisms, and Debates

Key Accomplishments in Advocacy and Security

The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), founded on April 12, 1979, initiated armed resistance against the Ba'athist regime in the early 1980s, organizing thousands of Assyrian youths into formations and irregular forces that conducted guerrilla operations in northern , contributing to the broader Iraqi opposition efforts. This clandestine struggle persisted until the regime's fall in 2003, establishing the ADM as a pioneering force in nationalist advocacy for and security amid . In the post-2003 era, the ADM advocated for Assyrian integration into Iraq's security apparatus, securing approval from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in 2006 to recruit 800 Assyrian policemen specifically for the , enhancing local protection against insurgent threats. Facing the ISIS offensive in 2014, the ADM established the (NPU) in December of that year as its armed wing, comprising Assyrian volunteers trained and equipped to defend ancestral villages in the from jihadist incursions. The NPU participated in defensive operations and supported liberation efforts, reclaiming areas such as parts of the Hamdaniya district, and has since assumed responsibility for security in significant portions of the , preventing further displacement and enabling partial returns of the Assyrian population. On the advocacy front, the ADM has pressed for equitable representation in regional , proposing quotas for Assyrians in Asayish and Zerevani units as outlined in its 2025 political vision, which seeks to institutionalize Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian participation in to counter marginalization. This includes sustained campaigns for recognition of historical injustices, such as the 1933 , renewing demands in 2025 for autonomy and reconstruction in Assyrian-majority areas to address ongoing vulnerabilities in security and governance. Through these efforts, the ADM has positioned itself as a key stakeholder in advocating for minority protections within Iraq's federal structure, influencing dialogues on despite persistent challenges.

Criticisms of Ineffectiveness and Internal Divisions

Critics within the Assyrian community and observers have argued that the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), despite decades of political activism, has failed to deliver substantive protections or for Assyrians, as evidenced by the continued displacement from ancestral lands like the and a shrinking population share in from approximately 1.5 million pre-2003 to under 300,000 by 2020. Electoral participation has yielded sporadic seats—such as two in the 2014 Iraqi parliamentary elections—but overall gains remain minimal, with the party's strategy of coalition-building often diluting Assyrian-specific demands in favor of broader alliances that prioritize short-term access over long-term sovereignty. This perceived ineffectiveness is attributed to an over-reliance on manipulated minority quotas, where ADM's vote totals, like the 6,345 garnered in a 2017 council race, prove insufficient against systemic exclusions and rival encroachments. Internal divisions have compounded these challenges, fragmenting the Assyrian vote and undermining collective bargaining power. A notable rift occurred with the Abnaa al-Nahrain (Sons of Mesopotamia) party, which emerged as a rival entity over a decade ago, leading to direct competition for quota seats in elections such as the 2017 Nineveh Plains vote where Abnaa secured one seat with 1,093 votes against ADM's two. This split persisted until March 2024, when Abnaa dissolved itself to reunify with ADM, a move framed by ADM leadership as resolving "a longstanding issue" but highlighting prior factionalism that diluted electoral strength and advocacy coherence. Such infighting echoes earlier power struggles documented in 2002 among Assyrian coalitions, including ADM affiliates, where internal bickering stalled unified platforms against Ba'athist-era repression and post-2003 opportunities. Detractors contend these divisions reflect leadership entrenchment under figures like Yonadam , who has headed the party since its 1979 founding, fostering perceptions of stagnation rather than adaptive reform amid evolving threats from Islamists and regional powers. The resulting disunity has, according to Assyrian policy analyses, enabled external manipulations that repress rather than empower communal representation.

Broader Controversies Over Strategy and Representation

The Democratic Movement (ADM, or Zowaa) has faced internal and external debates over its political strategy, particularly its historical alliances with groups during the anti-Ba'athist in the , which some critics argue diluted demands for autonomous in ancestral regions like the . Founded in 1979, the ADM joined the Iraqi opposition alongside parties such as the (PUK), framing its armed participation as a broader national liberation effort rather than a subservient ; however, detractors, including rival factions, contend this approach prioritized short-term survival over long-term territorial claims, leading to concessions in post-2003 power-sharing arrangements with the Regional (KRG). Representation controversies intensified around electoral manipulations, as evidenced in the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections, where the KDP and Iran-linked allegedly engineered proxy Christian parties to fragment the Assyrian vote, reducing the ADM's minority quota seats despite its status as the largest political entity with tracing to pre-2003 clandestine operations. This strategy of creating loyalist proxies—rewarded with resources to undermine independent voices like the ADM—has been cited as a mechanism of repression, eroding genuine minority under Iraq's constitutional quotas, which allocate five seats for but often favor Baghdad- or Erbil-aligned groups over ethno-nationalist ones. Further debates center on the ADM's push for "" in the KRG, articulated in 2025 statements rejecting symbolic roles in favor of equitable political influence, yet critics from Assyrian nationalists accuse the party of monopolistic ambitions that stifle unified representation, as seen in the 2020 rejection of the Nahrain Democratic Party's initiative amid persistent fragmentation in Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian . Such divisions, exacerbated by external powers like neutralizing ADM influence through rivals such as the , highlight causal tensions between pragmatic coalition-building and purist autonomy advocacy, with empirical election outcomes showing ADM's vote share vulnerable to engineered splits. These strategic choices have drawn accusations of ineffectiveness in countering existential threats, including land encroachments by authorities and Islamist militias, where the ADM's reliance on Iraqi alliances—while opposing KRG dominance—has not yielded verifiable gains in securing a protected administrative unit, prompting internal calls for reevaluation toward more assertive, self-reliant defense mechanisms akin to the Nineveh Plains Protection Units.

References

  1. [1]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement - GlobalSecurity.org
    Assyrian Democratic Movement. Established in 1979, this group began actively struggling against the Hussein regime in 1982. It is headed by Yonadam Kanna.
  2. [2]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement - History - atour.com
    The Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) was established on April 12, 1979 to satisfy the political objectives of the Assyrian people in Iraq.
  3. [3]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement marks 92 years since Simele ...
    Aug 6, 2025 · Thousands of Chaldeans–Syriacs–Assyrians civilians were killed, and dozens of villages destroyed, under the pretext of suppressing a supposed ...
  4. [4]
    The President Meets Yonadam Kanna
    Dec 5, 2022 · The President of the Republic of Iraq, Abdullatif Jamal Rashid met with the Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, Yonadam Kanna alongside his ...
  5. [5]
    The Political Vision of the Assyrian Democratic Movement for ...
    May 8, 2025 · The Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) was among the political forces within the Kurdistan Front that endorsed the region's first ...
  6. [6]
    The Assyrian Democratic Movement in Iraq and the Nineveh Plains ...
    This dissertation explores how a second-order minority mobilized to protect its homelands during state breakdown and state recalibration. It examines how an ...
  7. [7]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement Secretary-General Yaqoob Gorgees ...
    Aug 26, 2025 · Assyrian Democratic Movement Secretary-General Yaqoob Gorgees Yaqo warns of electoral discrimination against minorities in upcoming Iraqi ...
  8. [8]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement - Strategy for Leadership - atour.com
    Zowaa offers a progressive and pragmatic political program for achieving our legitimate national rights. It begins with the proposition that we are one people.Missing: principles ideology
  9. [9]
    The Reestablishment of the Assyrian Nationalist Political Movement ...
    The article advocated a democratic Iraq in which freedoms thrived as the “foundation for building an Assyrian national identity that connects the Assyrian ...
  10. [10]
    Sarod al-Maqdisi of the Assyrian Democratic Movement calls for an ...
    Mar 15, 2025 · He called for new administrative frameworks to safeguard their existence and advocated for an autonomous region for the Assyrian people in the Nineveh Plain.Missing: party | Show results with:party
  11. [11]
    Iraqi Assyrians Seek Self Administered Region
    Officially known as the Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Conference, the Baghdad conference was jointly sponsored by the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) and the ...
  12. [12]
    Indigenous People in Distress - atour.com
    Decree # 251 of April 16, 1972 intentionally marginalized and undermined the ethnic and indigenous Assyrians. In that decree, the Baghdad Ba'ath regime granted ...
  13. [13]
    40 Years ago today Zowaa launched its military campaign Dourara ...
    Apr 14, 2022 · Assyrian Democratic Movement or simply Zowaa (The movement) was established by small cultural and university students groups in 1979 to ...
  14. [14]
    January 20, 2002 - Zindamagazine
    It was here when Zowaa was born. The Iraqi government reacted swiftly, by arresting some of these active Assyrians, the closure of the youth group movements ...
  15. [15]
    The Heroes of the Assyrian Democratic Movement - atour.com
    Dec 20, 2003 · He had a strong personality and was committed to his nation and it's nationalist path, and never compromised on his nationalist principles.Missing: democracy | Show results with:democracy
  16. [16]
  17. [17]
    Assyrians in Iraq - Minority Rights Group
    Two members of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, a Christian political party, were killed and two others wounded in November 2005 when gunmen opened fire in ...
  18. [18]
    Iraqi Assyrians: Barometer of Pluralism - Middle East Forum
    The most successful Assyrian political movement has been the Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa Demoqrataya Aturaya, ADM). Formed in 1979, the ADM has a ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
  19. [19]
    The Assyrian Test of Pluralism in Iraq - The Forward
    Nov 28, 2003 · Assyrians were denied the most basic of rights in Saddam's Iraq; indeed, they were not even allowed to speak their own language, familiar to ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Christian Minorities and the Struggle for Nineveh: The Assyrian ...
    Dec 13, 2018 · The binding principle of the NPU was an indigenous-based attachment to the. Nineveh Plain, including the right to defend it, and Christianity in ...
  21. [21]
    Younadam Yousef Kanna - atour.com
    Feb 25, 2010 · Younadam Yousef Kanna (fondly known as Rabi Yacoub Yousip) was born in Al-Anbar, Iraq in 1951. He is an Aramaic-speaking Christian Assyrian activist.Missing: Yonadam | Show results with:Yonadam
  22. [22]
    [PDF] ASSYRIAN MILITIAS IN IRAQ 2014–2017
    In August 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked the Nineveh Plain, a diverse area bordering the city of Mosul, and the historical heartland ...<|separator|>
  23. [23]
    Between Two Caesars: The Christians of Northern Iraq - Providence
    May 11, 2018 · The Nineveh Plains Protection Units (NPU) was formed by the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM). ... Nineveh Plains in the post-ISIS period.
  24. [24]
    'Thousands' of Iraqi Christians form their own militia to fight Isis
    Feb 9, 2015 · The ADM says the militia's main aim to “protect the remaining Assyrian lands from further attacks by Isis and liberate the Assyrian homeland of ...
  25. [25]
    Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU) - Modern Insurgent
    Nov 1, 2023 · (1) Founded towards the end of 2014,(2) The NPU were instrumental to the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq's North ...Missing: Zowaa onslaught
  26. [26]
    Christian (Second-Order) Minorities and the Struggle for the Homeland
    It examines how an Iraqi Christian political party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), responded to the rise and spread of the Islamic State. More ...
  27. [27]
    [PDF] Post-conflict Reconstruction in the Nineveh Plains of Iraq - SIPRI
    In post-conflict settings, restoring economic activities is a key task for reconstruction efforts. People should be at the centre of these efforts. This ...
  28. [28]
    Iraq's Stolen Election: How Assyrian Representation Became ...
    Nov 27, 2018 · Crude Iraqi electoral law left the voting process for the selection of Christian MPs open to abuse. This enabled powerful non-Christian parties ...Missing: setbacks | Show results with:setbacks
  29. [29]
    [PDF] Iraq's Stolen Election: How Assyrian Representation Became ...
    Jun 19, 2018 · Hundreds of Assyrians stage a protest against electoral fraud outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament building on July 30, 2018. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
  30. [30]
    Assyrian Mayor of Alqosh detained and beaten by the Kurdistan ...
    Jul 16, 2018 · The mayor of Alqosh, Nineveh Plain, Faiez Abed Jahwareh was arbitrarily detained yesterday on Sunday, July 15, 2018 by Kurdistan Regional ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  31. [31]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) proposes vision for ...
    May 8, 2025 · The Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa) announced a bold political vision aimed at securing genuine national partnership for the Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian ...
  32. [32]
    Secretary General: Armed groups working hard to destabilize civil ...
    Sep 22, 2025 · “There are parties backed by armed groups that are working relentlessly to destabilize civil peace in the Nineveh Plain. From time to time, we ...Missing: advocacy 2018- present
  33. [33]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement to KRG: Where can our people turn ...
    Jul 27, 2025 · The letter concluded with a strong condemnation of the broader treatment of the Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian people in Arba'ilo (Erbi) and Nohadra ...Missing: 2018-2025 | Show results with:2018-2025
  34. [34]
    Iran is Hijacking Assyrian Politics in Iraq
    Apr 10, 2024 · Another key ruling seen to target the KDP and federalism occurred in mid-2023 when the Court declared that the Kurdish parliament's one year ...
  35. [35]
    An exclusive interview with Yonadam Kanna - YouTube
    Mar 13, 2024 · On this episode of "Talk of The Nation" David Albazi presents an exclusive interview with Yonadam Kanna - يونادم كنا, Member of Assyrian ...
  36. [36]
    Hon. Mr. Yonadam Kanna - - World Forum for Ethics in Business
    Mr. Yonadam Kanna is a Member of the Iraqi National Assembly, and is the Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement. He served in the Kurdistan ...
  37. [37]
    ‏‎TheAssyrianGallery‎‏ | ‏• Assyrian Democratic Movement ‎ܙܘܥܐ ...
    Faced with brutality and forced displacement, they took up arms in 1982, led by Ninos Pithyou, to defend their villages. Despite immense sacrifices, including ...
  38. [38]
    #AssyrianDemocraticMovement - Search / X
    Member of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa). Co ... May 27, 2023. On May 26, 2023, Rabi Yacoob G Yaco was democratically elected as the new Secretary ...
  39. [39]
    The API extends our warmest congratulations to Yacoob G. Yaco on ...
    The API extends our warmest congratulations to Yacoob G. Yaco on his recent election to the position of Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement.
  40. [40]
    About ADM - zowaa.org
    MP Yonadam Kanna met with Archbishop Mar Emil Nona in Sydney. Sun Mar 25. Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, MP Yonadam Kanna met with the ...
  41. [41]
    The challenges the Assyrian Democratic Movement Confront - SBS
    Sep 22, 2025 · ... Assyrian nation and the ADM, particularly in managing its affairs in northern Iraq and within the Kurdistan Region.
  42. [42]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement hosts delegation of Syriac-Assyrian ...
    Sep 18, 2024 · Assyrian Democratic Movement hosts delegation of Syriac-Assyrian political parties in Syria following successful general conference in Erbil, ...Missing: Pithyou | Show results with:Pithyou
  43. [43]
  44. [44]
    Understanding The Christian Militias Of Iraq And Syria
    Aug 16, 2017 · The NPU was formed in 2014 by the Assyrian Democratic Movement also known as Zowaa. The ADM is a popular political party of the Assyrian ( ...Missing: affiliated | Show results with:affiliated<|control11|><|separator|>
  45. [45]
    Political Bureau - zowaa.org
    Political Bureau. MP Yonadam Kanna met with H.B. Mar Meelis Zaia in Sydney. Mon Mar 26. The Assyrian Democratic Movement's Secretary General and Member of the ...
  46. [46]
    [PDF] continuous and silent ethnic cleansing Displaced persons in Iraqi ...
    The members of Assyrian political parties, such as the Assyrian Democratic Movement, founded in 1979, were repressed: the regime carried out arrests ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  47. [47]
    [PDF] Iraq's New Battlefront: The Struggle Over Ninewa
    Sep 28, 2009 · Like Shiite Islamist parties, it enjoyed a head start in 2003, having previously existed partly in exile and partly as a semi-underground ...
  48. [48]
  49. [49]
    Tension Mounting on Day of Iraqi Elections - International Christian ...
    Tension Mounting on Day of Iraqi Elections. December 17, 2005 | Iraq. December 17, 2005 ... On November 29, 2005, a group of four Assyrian Democratic Movement ( ...
  50. [50]
    Campaigning for a better Iraq - Turlock Journal
    Yonadam Kanna, a member of the Republic of Iraq's Council of Representatives, visited Turlock Saturday on his 51st day spent campaigning for the coming, ...
  51. [51]
  52. [52]
    Assyrian Democratic Movement declares its coalition (Al Rafedain ...
    Jan 21, 2018 · Assyrian Democratic Movement declares its coalition (Al Rafedain Coalition) in the upcoming Iraqi Elections and stresses that the doors of ...
  53. [53]
  54. [54]
    Mr. Yonadam Kanna discusses the upcoming Iraqi election. - SBS
    Jan 23, 2021 · The Assyrian MP was asked if he is going for re-election and his response was “my personal will is that I do not run for another term”. He ...
  55. [55]
    The new election law is unfair to the Christian component - Al Sharqiya
    ... Yonadam Kanna, said that the results of the legislative elections produced false representatives of Christians in Iraq. Kanna added, via Al Sharqiya News ...
  56. [56]
    Babylon Brigade Plans to Rig 2025 Voting in Christian Areas
    Mar 3, 2025 · An Iran-backed brigade led by a US-designated human rights abuser is preparing to repeat its unfair practices and dominate local Christian voting in this year' ...
  57. [57]
    Assyrians Stage Protest in Erbil Demanding an End to KDP ...
    Jul 30, 2018 · Hundreds of Assyrians gathered outside the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament in Erbil, Iraq to demand an end to the Kurdistan Democratic Party's (KDP) interference in ...
  58. [58]
    Assyrians Blame Kurdish Parties for Losing Quota Seats in Iraq ...
    Feb 25, 2024 · Yonadam Kanna, a veteran Assyrian politician and former secretary-general of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, said on Friday that his party ...
  59. [59]
    Official Statement on the Exclusion of Our Movement's ... - Facebook
    Official Statement on the Exclusion of Our Movement's Candidate The Assyrian Democratic Movement expresses its deep regret over the decision made by the...
  60. [60]
  61. [61]
    Iraq's Assyrian Christians' struggle to secure political rights - EPIC
    Sep 10, 2019 · While in Erbil, we interviewed Yacoob Yaco of the Assyrian Democratic Movement to hear about the concerns and aspirations of Iraq's Assyrian ...
  62. [62]
    Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian political parties in Iraq unite to form ...
    Jul 25, 2023 · Additionally, the parties appointed Yacoub Gorgis, the Secretary General of the Assyrian Democratic Movement, as the head of the Athra Alliance.
  63. [63]
    Six political parties of Syriac people met in Sweden to discuss joint ...
    Assyrian Democratic Organization (ADO), Assyrian Democratic Movement (Zowaa), Beth Nahrin Democratic ...
  64. [64]
    Chaldean-Syriac-Assyrian delegation continues meetings in ...
    Feb 9, 2025 · The delegation has engaged with U.S. officials, international research institutions, and members of Congress to discuss the challenges facing ...
  65. [65]
    How U.S. Policy Enables Assyrian Erasure - Middle East Forum
    Sep 25, 2025 · Instead of enabling Kurdish domination, U.S. policy should support the establishment of an autonomous Assyrian region in the Assyrian Triangle— ...
  66. [66]
    Northern Iraq and the Kurdistani Disputed Territories
    Nov 20, 2022 · Why are the Kurdish officials claiming that the historic Assyrian Nineveh Plain (al-Hamdaniya, Tel Kaif and al-Shaikhan Districts) is a ...
  67. [67]
    Iraq | Assyrian Policy Institute
    Official KRG documents ordering an end to Kurdish encroachments of Assyrian land date back to 1992. ... claims to the Nineveh Plain, while imposing restrictions ...
  68. [68]
    [PDF] Erasing Assyrians - atour.com
    Sep 25, 2017 · The NPU was met with opposition from the. KRG when it attempted to build a base in the. Nineveh Plain. The process was delayed more than two ...
  69. [69]
    Statement issued by the Secretary General of the Assyrian ...
    Aug 25, 2025 · ... ( ZOWAA) on the Upcoming Iraqi Federal Parliamentary Elections. Posted ... parties and forces representing minorities of their right to ...Missing: performance | Show results with:performance
  70. [70]
    On the Removal of Assyrian Mayors in Nineveh by the Kurdistan ...
    Aug 5, 2017 · The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) have repeatedly called for the Nineveh Plain to be excluded from the upcoming referendum, knowing too ...Missing: opposition | Show results with:opposition
  71. [71]
    Northern Iraq, Ethnic Minorities Are Key to Rebuilding After ISIS
    Nov 12, 2017 · In the security vacuum created by the Islamic State, Assyrians and Yazidis began forming their own militias, recalling strategies from their ...
  72. [72]
    Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian political parties mark 10th anniversary of ...
    On the 10th anniversary of Islamic State's (ISIS) invasion of Nineveh Plains in Iraq, political parties representing the ...Missing: onslaught | Show results with:onslaught
  73. [73]
    Assyrian Security Force Needed in Iraq's Nineveh Plain
    In 2006, when the Assyrian Democratic Movement received permission from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to assign 800 new policemen in the Nineveh Plains, to ...
  74. [74]
    What happened to the Assyrian Militias in Iraq after the defeat of ISIL ...
    May 10, 2024 · NPU is still very well active and alive. The problem is the dashta is a contested area post ISIS. Alqosh for example has the Iraqi army, ...
  75. [75]
    [PDF] ERASING ASSYRIANS:
    Sep 25, 2017 · Abnaa al-Nahrain (opposed to KDP) ran its own slate, earning 1,093 votes and securing one seat. • Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council ...
  76. [76]
    Abnaa al-Nahrain political party in Iraq dissolves itself ... - SyriacPress
    Mar 25, 2024 · Abnaa al-Nahrain political party in Iraq dissolves itself ahead of unification with Zowaa. 25/03/2024. NOHADRA, Kurdistan Region of Iraq ...Missing: rivalry | Show results with:rivalry
  77. [77]
    Statement of the Political Bureau of Our Assyrian Democratic ...
    Mar 31, 2024 · ... ideological, organizational, and political principles of our Assyrian democratic movement. This step is highly valued and appreciated by our ...
  78. [78]
    November 18, 2002 - Zindamagazine
    ZN: Let's jump into internal bickering and power struggles among the Assyrian political parties. What do you think is happening in the Coalition (Awyoota)?
  79. [79]
    Assyrian Nationalists Cooperate with Kurdish PKK Insurgents
    Apr 3, 2009 · The Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM – Zowaa Demoqrataya Aturaya) ... Under the leadership of Yunadam Kanna, the ADM was involved in armed ...Missing: era | Show results with:era
  80. [80]
    (PDF) Iraq's Stolen Election: How Assyrian Representation Became ...
    Deliberate interference of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Badr Organization in the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary elections for Christian representatives, ...
  81. [81]
    IRAQ: Beth Nahrain Democratic Party's National Initiative declined ...
    Sep 7, 2020 · The initiative aimed to increase national unity and organize internal matters of our Chaldean–Syriac–Assyrian people and thus activating joint national work ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies