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Bargis

Bargis (Bengali: বর্গি), also known as bargirs, were irregular light cavalry mercenaries employed by the Maratha Confederacy, most notoriously during their repeated invasions of Bengal from 1741 to 1751, where they conducted raids characterized by extensive plundering, arson, massacres, and sexual violence against the civilian population.^[1]^[2] The term originates from the Persian bargir, denoting a horseman obligated to supply his own mount, a practice distinguishing these troopers from regularly paid soldiers in Maratha and Mughal forces.^[3] These expeditions, led by commanders under figures like Raghoji I Bhonsle, aimed primarily at extracting chauth—a quarter of revenue as tribute—from the Nawabs of Bengal but devolved into uncontrolled depredations that depopulated villages, destroyed agriculture, and prompted mass migrations, with contemporary accounts estimating tens of thousands killed or displaced in western Bengal and Bihar.^[1]^[4] The Bargis' hit-and-run tactics, leveraging mobility over pitched battles, exemplified the Maratha strategy of guerrilla warfare but cemented their legacy in Bengali culture as synonymous with barbaric invaders, immortalized in folk songs like the lullaby Bargi elo deshe warning children of approaching horsemen.^[2]^[4] While effective in weakening Bengal's Mughal-affiliated rulers and securing temporary tribute, the campaigns ultimately failed to establish lasting Maratha control, ending with a 1751 treaty that formalized payments but left enduring scars on regional memory and demographics.^[1]

Etymology and Definition

Origins of the Term

The term Bargi originates from the Persian bārgīr, literally denoting a "load bearer" or "burden taker," referring to a baggage carrier or horse handler in military contexts, derived from bār (load or burden) and gīr (carrier).^[5]^[6] In Persian-influenced Indian armies, including Mughal forces, bargir evolved to describe cavalrymen whose horses, arms, and equipment were supplied by the state rather than self-provisioned, contrasting with silladar troopers who bore their own costs.^[1] Historian Surendra Nath Sen, in his 1928 analysis of Maratha military organization, confirms this usage, noting bargir as state-maintained irregular cavalry focused on mobility.^[3] Adopted into Marathi as bargīr, the term designated light cavalry units within the Maratha army, emphasizing horsemen equipped for swift, unencumbered operations rather than heavier infantry or artillery roles.^[7] This linguistic borrowing reflects the syncretic Persianate influence on Deccan military terminology under Maratha rulers, who integrated Mughal administrative and tactical elements.^[1] In Bengali contexts, bargir was phonetically rendered as Borgi or Bargis, specifically denoting these Maratha light cavalry during 18th-century encounters, underscoring their distinction as mounted raiders optimized for rapid strikes over sustained sieges or foot soldier engagements.^[6]^[7]

Distinction from Broader Maratha Forces

The Bargis formed a specialized subunit of the Maratha cavalry, consisting of light horsemen equipped and maintained by the state, which distinguished them from silahdars who provided their own horses, arms, and upkeep.^[8]^[9] This state provisioning positioned Bargis as dependent troops reliant on regular salaries, typically ranging from 5 to 10 rupees monthly, in exchange for service in mobile, low-intensity operations.^[10] Unlike the more disciplined huzurat or khas paga units directly under Peshwa command, which emphasized structured formations and loyalty to central authority, Bargis operated as irregular forces suited for scouting, foraging, and rapid strikes, often detached for autonomous raiding under sardar oversight.^[11] Their recruitment drew predominantly from lower Maratha clans and opportunistic enlistees lacking personal resources, enabling quick mobilization but fostering a reputation for indiscipline in extended campaigns.^[12] The designation "bargir" echoed earlier Persian terminology in Mughal armies, where it denoted cavalrymen burdened with state-supplied mounts for logistical or combat roles, underscoring the Maratha adaptation of pre-existing Indian military conventions rather than an innovation unique to their confederacy.^[1]^[3] This continuity highlighted Bargis' niche as expendable, high-mobility elements within the broader Maratha forces, which integrated heavier cavalry, infantry, and artillery for conventional engagements.^[10]

Historical Context

Maratha Empire's Expansionist Policies

Following Shivaji's death in 1680, the Maratha state underwent a period of internal consolidation under the regency of Sambhaji and subsequent leaders, but it was the appointment of Balaji Vishwanath as Peshwa in 1713 that marked the beginning of systematic expansion beyond the Deccan.^[13] His successor, Baji Rao I, who served as Peshwa from 1720 to 1740, aggressively pursued campaigns northward, securing control over Malwa by 1728 and Gujarat by 1731 through decisive victories against Mughal forces, such as the Battle of Bhopal in 1737.^[14] These conquests were underpinned by the doctrine of chauth, a one-fourth levy on revenue originally instituted by Shivaji as payment for protection against plunder, which Baji Rao reframed as a legitimate Maratha right over Mughal-held territories to finance ongoing military operations and deter aggression.^[15] The expansionist rationale rested on exploiting the Mughal Empire's accelerating decline, evidenced by fiscal exhaustion from prolonged Deccan wars and succession disputes following Aurangzeb's death in 1707, which left provincial governors (nawabs) increasingly autonomous yet vulnerable.^[13] Maratha leaders aimed to siphon resources via chauth to sustain their mobile cavalry-based armies, numbering tens of thousands, while systematically eroding Mughal authority to prevent reconquest and establish de facto suzerainty across the subcontinent.^[14] This approach aligned with a broader objective of asserting Maratha political dominance, rooted in Shivaji's vision of swarajya (self-rule), by positioning the confederacy as the preeminent power capable of extracting tribute from weakened Islamic polities and thereby reallocating wealth from Mughal elites to Maratha sardars.^[15] Preceding the major eastern forays after 1741, Maratha chieftains like those of the Bhonsle lineage probed adjacent regions, including incursions into Odisha around the 1730s to enforce chauth claims on revenue-rich Mughal subahs extending from the Deccan eastward.^[14] These actions built on precedents like the 1719 imperial farman obtained by Balaji Vishwanath, which formalized chauth collection in Deccan provinces and served as a template for extending demands to peripheral areas under nominal Mughal control, such as Bihar and Odisha, where local nawabs resisted payment amid the empire's fragmentation.^[13] Such raids demonstrated the tactical use of swift cavalry strikes to compel acquiescence, prioritizing economic extraction over territorial annexation to maintain Maratha operational flexibility against larger foes.^[15]

Bengal Under Nawabi Rule and Tribute Disputes

Following the decline of central Mughal authority in the early 18th century, Bengal operated as a semi-independent subah under hereditary Nawabs who collected substantial revenues while nominally owing allegiance to the emperor in Delhi.^[16] This autonomy fostered internal power struggles, culminating in the usurpation by Alivardi Khan, who overthrew the incumbent Nawab Sarfaraz Khan on April 10, 1740, through a coup involving the murder of Sarfaraz and his supporters.^[17] Alivardi, previously the deputy governor of Patna, consolidated control amid factional rivalries among Mughal nobles and local zamindars, but his seizure of power disrupted prior fiscal arrangements with external claimants. Alivardi's regime inherited Mughal-era obligations for tribute payments, including chauth—a one-quarter levy on provincial revenues—demanded by the Marathas based on grants from earlier Chhatrapati rulers and claims to protect Mughal territories from rebellion. However, Alivardi refused to honor these demands, viewing them as illegitimate impositions on Bengal's de facto independence and prioritizing resources for internal stabilization and defense against Afghan incursions from Rohilla chiefs in Bihar and Odisha.^[18] This stance echoed the non-payment policies of preceding Nawabs like Murshid Quli Khan, but Alivardi's post-usurpation consolidation emboldened Maratha assertions, as the province's estimated annual revenue of over 14 million rupees represented a lucrative target untethered from Delhi's oversight.^[16] Bengal's economic prosperity amplified its vulnerability, with fertile alluvial plains yielding abundant rice harvests supporting a population of approximately 20-30 million, alongside thriving textile exports (muslins and silks) and maritime trade hubs like Hughli and Chittagong attracting European companies.^[19] These assets drew predatory interest from regional powers, compounded by Alivardi's preoccupation with suppressing Afghan tribal raids and mercenary unrest, which strained his forces and treasury. Diplomatic overtures from Maratha agents seeking recognition of chauth claims were rebuffed, as Alivardi focused on fortifying borders rather than negotiating fiscal concessions, thereby escalating tensions into military confrontation.^[18] This refusal, rooted in assertions of sovereignty, ignored the Marathas' expanding influence over eastern India and set the stage for retaliatory expeditions.

The Invasions of Bengal

Initial Raids Under Raghoji Bhonsle (1741–1743)

In late 1741, forces dispatched by Raghoji I Bhonsle, the Maratha ruler of Nagpur, under the command of Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar, crossed into Bengal via the province of Odisha, which fell under the Nawab's nominal authority following Alivardi Khan's consolidation of power after his 1740 usurpation from Sarfaraz Khan.^[20] The raiders, numbering approximately 20,000–25,000 cavalry, exploited local disaffection and the Nawab's preoccupation with internal revolts to advance swiftly eastward, targeting revenue collection as chauth—a one-fourth share of anticipated tribute—to assert Maratha suzerainty over the region. Their primary objective was to compel Alivardi Khan to acknowledge Maratha overlordship and remit arrears, prompted by invitations from disgruntled Mughal nobles opposed to the Nawab's Shiite leanings and Afghan alliances.^[21] By early 1742, the Marathas had overrun western Bengal districts, including Medinipur and Hooghly, where they imposed forced levies and disrupted Nawabi administration, reaching as far as Burdwan by April.^[20] Alivardi Khan, marching from Cuttack to confront them on 15 April 1742, found his forces outmaneuvered by the mobile cavalry, leading to an evasion rather than decisive engagement; the raiders bypassed direct battle to press toward the capital at Murshidabad. In September 1742, at the First Battle of Katwa, Maratha horsemen repelled a Nawabi counterattack, further weakening Alivardi's position and forcing him to sue for terms, including a tribute payment estimated at 20 lakh rupees to secure a temporary withdrawal.^[20] This agreement granted the Marathas nominal oversight of parts of western Bengal and Odisha for revenue extraction, though enforcement remained intermittent. The raiders retreated westward in mid-1742 amid the onset of monsoons, which hampered logistics and forage for their horse-dependent army, allowing Alivardi to regroup but leaving behind disrupted agrarian collections and provisional Maratha garrisons in frontier areas like Burdwan. Renewed incursions followed in 1743, with Kolhatkar's detachments re-entering to collect the stipulated dues, though supply strains and seasonal flooding again prompted phased withdrawals by year's end, yielding no permanent territorial annexation but establishing a pattern of annual pressure that strained Bengal's fiscal resources.^[21] These operations demonstrated the Marathas' strategic use of speed and intimidation to achieve fiscal goals without sustained occupation, temporarily asserting influence over districts yielding an estimated 10–12 lakh rupees annually in tributes.^[20]

Later Campaigns and Peshwa Involvement (1743–1751)

Subsequent Maratha campaigns in Bengal from 1744 onward were primarily led by commanders under Raghoji Bhonsle, such as Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar, who directed raids aimed at compelling the Nawab to remit chauth, the traditional one-fourth tribute on revenue. These expeditions, numbering around five major incursions between 1742 and 1751, involved swift cavalry strikes deep into Bengali territory, extracting payments through persistent harassment rather than permanent occupation. Kolhatkar's forces, estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 horsemen, targeted key districts to disrupt Nawabi control and secure fiscal concessions.^[22] Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, succeeding his father Baji Rao I in 1740, exercised nominal authority over the Maratha confederacy, coordinating broader imperial ambitions that encompassed the eastern raids alongside northern thrusts into Mughal territories like Malwa and Doab. While Raghoji operated with considerable autonomy from Nagpur, the Peshwa's oversight included diplomatic maneuvers, such as responding to Mughal appeals against Raghoji's depredations, reflecting internal confederacy tensions over resource allocation and rivalries among sardars. Balaji's strategy emphasized sustained pressure for tribute without full-scale conquest, amid debates on the risks of overextension in distant eastern provinces at the expense of consolidating gains in the Deccan and north.^[23] The campaigns wound down by 1751 after Nawab Alivardi Khan, exhausted by nine years of defensive warfare, concluded a treaty ceding annual chauth of 1.2 million rupees from Bengal and Bihar revenues, alongside surplus collections from Orissa to Raghoji Bhonsle. This agreement halted further invasions, as Maratha priorities shifted northward to counter Afghan incursions and pursue hegemony over the declining Mughal Empire, culminating in engagements like the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761.^[24]^[25]

Key Military Engagements and Outcomes

In the First Battle of Katwa on 27 September 1742, Nawab Alivardi Khan executed a surprise nocturnal assault on the Maratha encampment near the town, compelling the Bargi forces under Bhaskar Pandit to retreat hastily and abandon substantial baggage and supplies, resulting in a clear tactical win for the Bengal army despite its numerical disadvantages.^[12] This engagement highlighted the vulnerability of Maratha camps to rapid Nawabi strikes but did not halt the raiders' broader operations, as the Bargis leveraged superior cavalry mobility to disperse and regroup swiftly. Earlier, on 6 May 1742, Bhaskar Pandit's detachment raided Murshidabad itself, bypassing defenses to plunder the Nawabi capital and extract 3 lakh rupees in treasure, exemplifying the hit-and-run tactics that allowed smaller Maratha contingents to target high-value assets against larger but slower Nawabi hosts.^[12] Such incursions near Katwa and adjacent areas repeatedly disrupted supply lines and forced Alivardi to divide his forces, though the Marathas avoided sustained confrontations, withdrawing during monsoons or when logistics strained their extended campaigns rather than risking annihilation. The Battle of Burdwan in March 1747 represented another Nawabi success, where Alivardi Khan's reinforced army repelled and routed Janoji Bhonsle's invading column, inflicting heavy casualties and halting a major thrust into central Bengal.^[12] Yet these defensive victories came at high cost, as the Marathas' attrition strategy—annual incursions from 1741 to 1751—compelled tribute payments, including 22 lakh rupees remitted to Peshwa Nanasaheb in March 1743 to secure temporary respite.^[12] Strategically, the engagements underscored Maratha proficiency in evasive warfare, preserving core forces for repeated extractions totaling over 50 lakh rupees in documented tributes by mid-decade, which eroded Bengal's fiscal and military resilience without requiring territorial conquest.^[12] Withdrawals were pragmatic responses to seasonal forage shortages and overextended supply chains, not battlefield reverses, enabling the Bargis to sustain pressure until the 1751 accord ceding Orissa and annual chauth of 12 lakh rupees, affirming the raids' coercive efficacy despite localized defeats.^[12]

Military Organization and Tactics

Composition of Bargir Units

Bargir units were predominantly composed of light cavalry troopers designated as bargirs, lower-ranking Maratha horsemen furnished with mounts, arms, and basic equipment from state or command resources rather than personal ownership.^[26]^[27] These forces favored Deccani breeds for their endurance in long-distance operations, with troopers equipped minimally for rapid strikes—typically spears for thrusting charges, curved swords (talwars) for close combat, and small shields, eschewing heavy chainmail or plate to preserve agility on horseback.^[28]^[12] Such units often incorporated allied irregulars resembling Pindari bands, freelance riders who augmented the core cavalry with opportunistic scouting and foraging roles, armed similarly but with even less standardization and dependent on captured supplies.^[12] Raiding expeditions assembled forces ranging from 10,000 to over 40,000 horsemen across multiple campaigns, structured in fluid paga (squadrons) under havildars for decentralized command, deliberately omitting substantial infantry, siege engines, or artillery to enable swift incursions and evasions against numerically superior foes.^[26] Logistics hinged on self-sufficiency through forage, with horsemen drawing grain and fodder directly from raided territories, supplemented by coerced local levies in the form of tribute (chauth) to sustain extended mobility without fixed supply lines.^[12] This approach exploited the cavalry's capacity for seasonal retreats, such as during monsoons, preserving unit cohesion amid prolonged detachments from primary bases in the Deccan.^[12]

Cavalry Strategies and Mobility Advantages

The Bargi cavalry, consisting primarily of light horsemen drawn from Maratha traditions, relied on rapid mobility to execute surprise raids deep into Bengal's countryside, targeting villages and rural economic resources while steering clear of heavily defended cities like Murshidabad unless opportunities arose. This approach stemmed from the Deccan-honed guerrilla tactics of hit-and-run operations, allowing small, agile detachments under commanders like Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar to penetrate enemy territory swiftly and extract tribute before organized resistance could mobilize.^[12]^[7] In retreats, Bargi units practiced scorched-earth methods, systematically depleting local food supplies and forage to hinder pursuit by the Nawab's larger but slower forces, thereby leveraging their endurance on horseback to outpace infantry-heavy Bengali armies across extended campaigns spanning 1741 to 1751. Maratha horsemanship, refined through generations of mounted warfare in arid terrains, provided a decisive edge in maneuverability, enabling Bargis to cover vast distances—often 50-100 kilometers daily—and evade encirclement despite Bengal's denser riverine landscape, which posed logistical strains like flooding and equine diseases.^[29]^[30] These strategies capitalized on the asymmetry between Bargi light cavalry, equipped for speed with minimal armor and reliance on sabers and lances, and the Nawab Alivardi Khan's predominantly infantry and artillery-based defenses, which struggled to match the raiders' operational tempo in open plains. By avoiding decisive pitched battles, the Marathas under Raghoji Bhonsle forced the Nawab into reactive postures, prolonging the invasions' effectiveness despite occasional setbacks from monsoon disruptions.^[12]

Socio-Economic and Human Impacts

Economic Exploitation and Chauth Collection

The Maratha forces, led by Raghoji I Bhonsle of Nagpur, systematically demanded chauth—a tribute amounting to one-fourth of Bengal's annual revenue—as an imperial entitlement, framed within the broader Maratha practice of extracting such levies from unsubdued territories to assert overlordship and deter rival incursions. These claims were enforced through repeated expeditions from 1741 onward, positioning the Marathas as de facto protectors against potential threats, though primarily serving to fill their treasuries amid the weakening Mughal provincial structure. Refusal by Nawab Alivardi Khan prompted annual raids, with demands escalating to include arrears for prior years. To secure compliance, Maratha cavalry units targeted key economic assets during incursions, plundering rural granaries to seize stored grain, despoiling zamindari treasuries for liquid wealth, and extracting resources from temples and villages that held communal reserves. Such tactics disrupted local fiscal systems, compelling zamindars and officials to negotiate payments on the spot or face intensified foraging, thereby converting resistance into coerced tribute that directly enriched Bhonsle's campaigns without establishing permanent administration. By 1751, the cumulative pressure yielded a formal accord whereby Alivardi Khan ceded perpetual rights to chauth from Bengal and Bihar at 12 lakh rupees annually, alongside an immediate payment of 32 lakh rupees to cover back dues, ensuring Maratha non-interference thereafter. These inflows substantially augmented Raghoji's coffers, funding military logistics and confederate expansions elsewhere in the Deccan and beyond. Over the decade of raids, the enforced extractions imposed a persistent fiscal drain on Bengal's predominantly agrarian economy, diverting revenues from local reinvestment and cultivation maintenance, which eroded productivity in western districts through disrupted harvests and resource depletion.^[32]

Reported Violence and Civilian Suffering

Contemporary accounts from Dutch and British East India Company officials documented extensive violence by Bargi forces during the 1741–1751 raids, including indiscriminate killings of civilians who resisted tribute demands, mass rapes of women and girls, and enslavement of captives for sale or labor.^[33] These acts served to instill terror, compelling villages to surrender chauth payments swiftly amid the Marathas' hit-and-run cavalry tactics, which prioritized mobility over prolonged sieges. Bengali literary sources, such as Bharatchandra Ray's Annadamangal (composed circa 1752–1753), vividly depict Bargis as predatory hordes engaging in arson, mutilation, and sexual assault, portraying the invasions as demonic incursions that left rural populations in abject fear.^[2] Estimates of civilian deaths varied widely, with Jan Kersseboom, chief of the Dutch factory at Cossimbazar, reporting approximately 400,000 fatalities in western Bengal and Bihar from direct violence, famine induced by crop destruction, and displacement between 1741 and 1751; however, such figures from eyewitnesses may reflect wartime hyperbole to underscore the raids' severity.^[33] Tens of thousands more were reportedly displaced, fleeing to fortified towns or across rivers, exacerbating suffering through exposure and starvation in an era when total warfare blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants. British records similarly corroborated patterns of brutality, noting that Bargi detachments under commanders like Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar systematically targeted undefended hamlets to maximize psychological impact and expedite compliance.^[33] Reciprocal violence marked the conflict's dynamics, as Nawab Alivardi Khan's forces conducted reprisals against suspected Maratha collaborators, including lootings and executions in contested districts to deter local aid to invaders. Following the 1744 Mankara treachery—where Alivardi's troops ambushed and killed 22 Maratha officers during parley—Bengali armies under his command intensified punitive raids on villages perceived as sympathetic, contributing to a cycle of civilian hardship amid mutual accusations of perfidy.^[34] Such countermeasures, while defensive, employed similar terror tactics prevalent in 18th-century South Asian warfare, where denying resources to mobile raiders often necessitated harsh measures against potentially disloyal populaces.

Local Resistance and Nawabi Countermeasures

Alivardi Khan, Nawab of Bengal from 1740 to 1756, mounted defensive military campaigns against the Maratha incursions, leveraging artillery and Afghan cavalry to break through enemy lines during engagements such as the April 1742 clash at Burdwan, where his forces repelled an initial raid before retreating to Katwa.^[35] A pivotal countermeasure occurred on March 31, 1744, when Alivardi orchestrated the massacre of Maratha commander Bhaskar Pandit and 21 of his captains during a negotiated conference near Berhampur, exploiting a moment of parley to eliminate key leaders and secure approximately 15 months of respite from raids.^[35] These efforts, however, faced limitations due to the Marathas' superior mobility and repeated incursions, prompting Alivardi to pay 22 lakh rupees as chauth to Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao in 1743 to divert forces against rival Maratha factions, and ultimately culminating in a 1751 treaty conceding 12 lakh rupees annually in chauth plus surplus revenue from Orissa to Raghuji Bhonsle, which ended the invasions but entrenched economic tribute as a de facto deterrent.^[35]^[21] Local populace supplemented Nawabi defenses through improvised fortifications, such as the Shyamnagar Garh constructed in 1744 near Kowgachi in North 24 Parganas, an earthen fort encircled by a moat and bolstered by natural barriers like the Bhagirathi River and surrounding wetlands, intended to shelter elites like the Burdwan royal family from Maratha cavalry sweeps.^[36] These garhs offered temporary refuge by impeding rapid assaults, though their earthen structures and abandonment after incidents like accidental deaths limited long-term viability against persistent raids.^[36] Folk expressions of resistance emerged in oral traditions, notably the anti-Bargi lullaby "Chhele ghumalo, paada judaalo bargi elo deshe," which evoked the invaders' arrival ("Bargi elo deshe") while urging communal vigilance ("paada judaalo" or gather the village), serving as a psychological tool to foster alertness and cohesion amid plundering that destroyed crops and homes.^[2] Originating during the 1741–1751 invasions, this rhyme preserved collective memory of economic devastation—such as lost grain ("roshoon boonechhi," garlic sown as meager substitute)—and bolstered morale by transforming terror into a shared cultural narrative, though it underscored the populace's vulnerability to unchecked cavalry tactics rather than enabling outright military success.^[2]

Long-Term Legacy

Effects on Bengal's Political Landscape

The Bargir invasions from 1741 to 1751 eroded the central authority of Bengal's Nawabs by imposing continuous military pressure and economic extraction, compelling Alivardi Khan (r. 1740–1756) to divert substantial resources toward defense against the Maratha cavalry's hit-and-run tactics. This prolonged strain diminished the Nawabs' ability to maintain internal order and fiscal solvency, as revenues were redirected from infrastructure and administration to fortification and troop maintenance.^[12]^[37] The 1751 treaty ending the raids formalized Bengal's subordination, requiring an annual chauth payment of 1.2 million rupees from Bengal and Bihar revenues, alongside cession of Orissa's surplus to Maratha commander Raghoji Bhonsle I. These concessions not only drained the treasury—equivalent to a significant portion of provincial income—but also established a precedent for external suzerainty claims, fostering perceptions of Nawabi weakness among local elites and zamindars. Under successor Siraj ud-Daulah (r. 1756–1757), the lingering financial burdens and military fatigue exacerbated internal divisions, enabling British East India Company alliances with disaffected factions.^[12]^[35] This vulnerability directly influenced post-Plassey dynamics, as the Nawabs' diminished legitimacy and resources post-1751 hindered effective resistance to European encroachments, culminating in the British victory at the Battle of Plassey on June 23, 1757. The Marathas' resource commitments to Bengal enforcement, amid broader imperial expansions, arguably contributed to their overextension, hastening vulnerabilities exposed in the Third Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761, which curtailed further eastern interference and allowed unopposed British consolidation in the region.^[37]^[38]^[39]

Cultural Memory in Bengali Folklore and Literature

In Bengali oral traditions, lullabies such as those invoking the Bargi raiders served to encode generational fears of the Maratha incursions, with mothers using threats of arriving horsemen to quiet children, reflecting the psychological imprint of repeated village devastations between 1741 and 1751.^[4]^[2] These folk songs, transmitted through rural households, preserved narratives of sudden cavalry assaults that disrupted agrarian life, emphasizing the raiders' mobility and indiscriminate plunder as a cautionary motif rather than detailed historical recounting.^[7] Literary depictions, exemplified by Bharatchandra Ray Gunakara's Annadamangal (composed circa 1750s), integrated critiques of the invasions into devotional poetry honoring Goddess Annapurna, portraying Bargi atrocities—including violence against civilians and temple desecrations—as chaotic interruptions to ritual order while attributing some provocations to prior Nawabi actions like temple destructions in Odisha.^[40] The epic's narrative frame, blending hagiography with eyewitness-like accounts of raids, underscores the invasions' role in heightening communal tensions without endorsing unprovoked aggression, thus embedding historical trauma within a broader cosmological restoration theme.^[40] Regional variations in cultural memory highlight contextual differences: in Bengal proper, folklore fixated on the raids' terror due to their extractive, non-administrative nature, whereas in Odisha—ceded to Maratha control in 1751—recollections incorporated governance elements, such as Bhonsle patronage of the Jagannath Temple through land grants and ritual endowments, tempering perceptions of the Marathas as transient destroyers into rulers who, despite heavy taxation, aligned with local Hindu devotional practices until British annexation in 1803.^[41] This divergence arose from Odisha's experience of sustained Maratha administration versus Bengal's exposure to episodic cavalry forays aimed at chauth extraction, influencing folkloric emphasis on predation in the east but on uneasy stewardship in the west.^[42]

Balanced Historical Evaluations and Perspectives

Bengali regional accounts and contemporary observations, including those preserved in local records, consistently depict the Bargi raids as unprovoked acts of predation that targeted civilian populations indiscriminately, fostering a narrative of existential threat to the province's stability.^[7] In opposition, Maratha-aligned perspectives, rooted in the empire's expansionist ideology, justified the expeditions as rightful enforcement of chauth tribute from territories notionally under Mughal overlordship, viewing the Bengal Nawabs as illegitimate extensions of a crumbling imperial order rather than sovereign entities.^[43] Modern scholarly evaluations, such as those examining 18th-century Bengal's political economy, quantify the raids' role in generating fiscal strain and eroding the Murshidabad regime's authority, thereby constraining Nawabi centralization without fundamentally altering landholding structures like zamindaris.^[16] These assessments prioritize causal factors, including the opportunistic exploitation of Alivardi Khan's contested usurpation in 1740, over moral binaries, recognizing that revenue-oriented raiding constituted a routine mechanism of power projection in fragmented post-Mughal polities, akin to Afghan incursions or earlier imperial campaigns.^[16] The Marathas infused their operations with Hindu revivalist rhetoric, framing incursions as assertions of indigenous sovereignty against Muslim administrative dominance, a theme resonant in some period Hindu elite discourses despite the raids' alienation of local Hindu communities through generalized exactions.^[43] Empirical historiography cautions against retrofitting contemporary ethical standards, emphasizing instead how such strategies facilitated Maratha territorial gains, like the eventual cession of Orissa, while exposing systemic vulnerabilities in Nawabi governance.^[16]

References

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Who are the Bargis? - CivilsDaily
Feb 1, 2021 · Bargis were cavalrymen in Maratha and Mughal armies, now used to refer to outsider campaigners in Bengali politics.
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Borrowed from Hindi बरगीर (bargīr), from Persian بارگیر (bârgir, “baggage-horse”), from ‍بار (bâr, “load, burden, cargo”) + گیر (gir, “carrying”), the present ...
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[16]
The Maratha invasions, 1742-1751 (Chapter 8) - Land and Local ...
Yet the invasions might not have occurred but for the circumstances surrounding Alivardi Khan's usurpation of power from Nawab Sarfaraz in 1740. Sarfaraz, ...Missing: refusal | Show results with:refusal
[17]
[PDF] alivardi and his times
government of this virtually independent province of Bengal. The most significant of these, from the standpoint of the history of the Bengal ... Maratha Empire ...
[18]
Why did Marathas campaign in Bengal in the 18th century-Part 1 ...
Oct 4, 2023 · Part 1 covers rise of semi-independent Bengal Nawabs, usurpation of the province by Alivardi Khan, the first Maratha campaign of Bhaskar Ram ...
[19]
https://brill.com/downloadpdf/display/title/3492.pdf
[20]
[PDF] alivardi and his times
BY. KALIKINKAR DATTA, M.A., Ph.D. (Cal.) Vice-Chancellor, Magadh University ... Effects of the Maratha Invasions of Bengal' before the All-India. Sixth ...
[21]
[PDF] Orissa Under Marathas 1751-1803
Oct 4, 2024 · OIUSSA UNDER MARATHAS. From Nagpur he went to the Deccan only a few mo-nths before the battle of Plasscy. During his absence from Cut- tack ...<|separator|>
[22]
BHASKARRAM'S INVASION - NDHistories
Mar 23, 2024 · Whatever the cause of the Maratha invasion, Bhaskarram set out for Bengal with an army estimated to be between ten and twenty thousand men, ...
[23]
[PDF] Chapter-7-Maratha.pdf - Plutus IAS
Balaji Baji Rao/Nana Saheb (1740-1761). Baji Rao was succeeded by his son ... the Maratha incursions on Bengal and Bihar in the 1740s and early 1750s.
[24]
First Phase (1741-52) - The Maratha Advance into Doab and Punjab
Later an agreement was signed with Nawab Alivardi Khan, according to which, Marathas would get a fixed Chauth of Rs. 12,000 per year from the areas of Bengal, ...
[25]
Maratha - First Phase (1741-52); Second Phase (1752-61) - Edukemy
Despite strong opposition from Nawab Alivardi Khan, an agreement was reached in 1751, fixing the Chauth at Rs.12,000 annually. South Orissa was ceded to Raghuji ...
[26]
[PDF] The Military System Of The Marathas (1958)
... Bargir literally means a burden taker but in the Mughal as well as in the Maratha army the term signified a soldier who rode a horse furnished by his ...
[27]
[PDF] A History Of The Mahrattas Vol-i (1918)
... History of the Marathas. Bargir is not a caste. Any cavalry soldier who could not supply his own horse and who was therefore left in charge of an animal ...
[28]
(PDF) Geographical Vision of Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj
As against this, the Maratha soldier carried very little light arms like a shield, a sword and. a spear. Therefore, his movements were very rapid and could ...
[29]
The Maratha Invasion of Bengal
Mar 29, 2014 · Bengalis called these Marathas “Bargis” which is a corruption of the Marathi word, "bargir" (etymology: Persian) which means “light cavalry”.
[30]
The Bargi Menace – Sifting Fact from Fiction - cbkwgl
Jan 10, 2017 · The word Bargi, meaning plunderer came to be synonymized with the Marathas in Bengal. The word originated from the Marathi Bargir meaning horseman.
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5 - From the Mughals to the Raj: India 1700–1858
The Marathas 'raided' across northern, central and eastern India, and went as far as western Bengal. They extorted substantial payments.Footnote According to ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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How many people got killed and raped by borgis in rarh region ... - X
Rapes: Contemporary accounts, including Dutch and British reports, document mass gang rapes and wartime sexual violence against women and children by the Bargis ...
[33]
Why did Marathas campaign in Bengal in the 18th century-Part 2 ...
Oct 6, 2023 · How Alivardi Khan deceived the Marathas? Did Marathas loot villages of Bengal? If Marathas had crossed the Ganga & uprooted the domination ...
[34]
Relation of Alivardi with the Marathas - History Discussion
Orissa was lost only to the Nawabship of Bengal but also to the Mughal empire. This was the final outcome of the Maratha invasions of Bengal. Midnapur was, ...<|separator|>
[35]
[PDF] An Outline of the Geo-historical Context of Shyamnagar 'Garh'
While exploring the geo-cultural history of Shyamnagar 'Garh' or. Fort, it is found that the Garh or fort was built to provide temporary shelter to the powerful ...
[36]
[PDF] THE PERIOD OF THE NAWABS IN BENGAL (1717 – 1757)
Bengal saw a dramatic political shift at the beginning of the 18th century, going from being a Mughal subah ruled by the Mughal. Emperor to becoming a more ...
[37]
EARLY MANIFESTATION OF THE COLONIALIST PREMISE ... - jstor
In the Subahdari of Bengal,. Bihar and Orissa, an internally divided Mughal elite, crippled by. Maratha raids and subversion by Afghan mercenaries, was split ...
[38]
Third Battle of Panipat (1761) | Panipat, Haryana | India
The Third Battle of Panipat took place on 14 January 1761, at Panipat, about 60 miles (95.5 km) north of Delhi between a northern expeditionary force of the ...
[39]
How Bengali Literature Perceives Maratha Heroism - Outlook India
Mar 22, 2025 · The Bargi invasions sparked fresh interests, too. Taking references from 'Siyar-Ul-Mutakherin: History of the Mahomedan Power in India during ...
[40]
When Lord Jagannath Witnessed The Great Maratha Devotion
Mar 5, 2017 · The Marathas rejuvenated Orissa. They were administrators of the former Mughal province from 1751 to 1803. The first eight years through ...
[41]
[PDF] Contributions of Marathas Towards Shree Jagannath Culture
After the end of Mughal period the Marathas exercised their power in Orissa. Being Hindus they had a great respect for Lord Jagannath.Missing: memory | Show results with:memory
[42]
What Happened When Marathas Came To Liberate Hindus Of Bengal
Apr 22, 2021 · However, his description of the Maratha invasion of Bengal in 1742 ... Sarkar, in his monumental work on the history of Bengal, quoted ...