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Civil Protection Units

The Civil Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl; YPS) was a Kurdish urban militia affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), operating primarily in southeastern Turkey as part of the group's shift to city-based guerrilla warfare following the collapse of peace talks in 2015. Formed on December 20, 2015, as a rebranding of the PKK's youth wing (YDG-H) to emphasize civilian defense in declared autonomous zones, the YPS conducted ambushes, barricade defenses, and improvised explosive attacks against Turkish security forces in urban centers like Cizre, Sur, and Nusaybin. These operations, framed by the group as protective measures against state aggression, escalated into prolonged sieges that resulted in hundreds of militant casualties, widespread urban destruction, and civilian hardships, with Turkish counteroffensives neutralizing key YPS networks by 2016. The YPS maintained a loose structure of local cells, often comprising young recruits, and coordinated with PKK rural units, contributing to the broader insurgency that has claimed over 40,000 lives since the PKK's founding in 1978. As a PKK offshoot, it was designated a terrorist entity by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, reflecting its role in tactics including urban terrorism that blurred lines between combatants and non-combatants. The group's activities ceased following the PKK's announcement on May 12, 2025, to disband and disarm, marking the end of its decade-long urban campaign amid shifting regional dynamics and internal pressures.

Origins and Development

Predecessor Organizations

The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H), known in Kurdish as Yekîneyên Durûbûn a Ciwanên Şoreşger, served as the primary urban youth wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) prior to the establishment of the Civil Protection Units (YPS). Emerging amid heightened PKK-Turkey hostilities following the breakdown of peace talks in 2011–2013, the YDG-H focused on recruiting and mobilizing young Kurds in southeastern Turkish cities to counter state security operations perceived as oppressive. Local branches began forming in 2013, with the group conducting public inaugurations to assert presence in Kurdish-majority districts. A pivotal early event occurred in June 2013 in , where approximately 100 assembled in ceremonial formation to announce the launch of the , signaling organized resistance against Turkish authorities. This branch opening, held hours after a similar youth gathering, underscored the YDG-H's emphasis on visible defiance and local training. Comparable branches surfaced in nearby towns such as Silopi throughout 2013, expanding the network amid escalating protests over Kurdish rights and police crackdowns. Initially, operations involved low-intensity actions like street protests, construction, and sporadic targeting vehicles and infrastructure, aiming to disrupt state control without full-scale combat. By late , these tactics evolved toward armed engagement, with youth cadres employing ambushes and rudimentary explosives in urban settings like and Silopi, marking a transition from passive mobilization to proactive . This shift reflected the PKK's to urban demographics, where younger recruits—often in their teens—underwent basic guerrilla preparation for close-quarters confrontations.

Formation and Early Activities

The Civil Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl, YPS) emerged as a rebranding of the PKK-affiliated YDG-H youth militia in late 2015, following the collapse of the 2013–2015 ceasefire between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in July 2015. This shift occurred amid escalating Turkish military operations in Kurdish-majority southeastern provinces, prompted by a surge in PKK attacks, including a suicide bombing in Suruç that killed 34 people and subsequent retaliatory strikes. The YPS positioned itself as an urban defense force, absorbing YDG-H fighters to adapt to intensified counterinsurgency efforts, with announcements of the reorganization appearing by January 2016. In early 2016, YPS declared "" zones in urban areas such as Sur district in and in , erecting barricades, digging trenches, and deploying improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to obstruct Turkish security forces. These fortifications aimed to create autonomous enclaves resistant to control, drawing on tactics of guerrilla to prolong engagements and inflict casualties. Turkish forces responded with curfews and large-scale operations, leading to prolonged street-to-street fighting that devastated infrastructure and displaced residents. The curfew, imposed from March 14 to early May 2016, exemplified YPS's initial operations, involving clashes that resulted in significant losses on both sides. Turkish security forces reported neutralizing numerous YPS militants during the 53-day operation, contributing to broader urban campaign tallies where over 2,700 combatants and civilians perished across southeastern from mid-2015 onward. YPS fighters utilized positions, booby-trapped buildings, and , though these efforts ultimately failed to hold territory against superior Turkish firepower and armor.

Organizational Ties and Ideology

Connection to PKK

The Civil Protection Units (YPS) function as an urban militia extension of the (PKK), established to integrate and formalize youth fighters previously organized under the PKK-linked Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (). Turkish security assessments and captured operatives have revealed operational directives from PKK leadership to YPS commanders, coordinating city-based ambushes and barricade defenses as a complementary front to PKK's rural guerrilla campaigns in southeastern Turkey's mountainous regions. YPS statements frequently invoke PKK founder as a guiding ideological figure, framing their actions within his doctrines of and armed against perceived Turkish oppression. For instance, in a 2020 communiqué marking the anniversary of urban clashes in Sur district, YPS leadership explicitly referenced Öcalan's writings to justify sustained resistance, underscoring doctrinal alignment with PKK's core tenets. Shared command elements are evidenced by eliminations of dual-designated PKK/KCK-YPS officers, such as Özgür Şoreş (codename Özgür Alparslan) in 2023, who coordinated cross-front logistics including urban sabotage. International assessments by entities like the treat YPS as a PKK affiliate youth structure, subject to the same terrorist prohibitions as the parent organization, which receives designations from the , , and for orchestrating violence across affiliates. PKK provision of training, weaponry, and embedded snipers to YPS units during 2015-2016 urban escalations further demonstrates centralized , prioritizing verifiable command linkages over YPS claims of local .

Stated Objectives and Tactical Differences

The Civil Protection Units (YPS) publicly articulate their primary objective as the of civilians in southeastern Turkish cities against perceived Turkish aggression, framing their formation on December 20, 2015, as a necessary response to historical grievances including the destruction of thousands of villages during the and ongoing military operations. YPS spokespersons have described their role as communal self-protection amid claims of systematic , with statements emphasizing to "racist attacks" and the establishment of autonomous urban self-governance zones to safeguard local populations from what they term genocidal policies. This rhetoric aligns with broader nationalist narratives of existential threat, positioning YPS actions as reactive measures rooted in the of life rather than offensive . Tactically, YPS diverges from the Kurdistan Workers' Party's (PKK) longstanding emphasis on rural in remote mountainous regions by adopting an model focused on within densely populated areas. This includes the construction of barricades and trenches to control neighborhoods, deployment of snipers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for ambushes, and hit-and-run operations designed to inflict on Turkish while minimizing exposure. YPS has leveraged platforms extensively for , disseminating videos of attacks and calls to arms to urban youth and portray their efforts as resistance, thereby sustaining momentum in cities like , Sur, and where rural PKK mobility is infeasible. Critics, including security analyses, argue that these tactical distinctions mask deeper integration with PKK operations, with empirical evidence from 2015-2016 urban clashes revealing coordinated offensives rather than isolated self-defense. For instance, following the PKK-linked assassination of two police officers on July 20, 2015, YPS fortified urban zones and received PKK reinforcements by December 2015, employing shared tactics like basement fortifications that resulted in over 189 civilian deaths in Cizre alone by June 2016—outcomes inconsistent with purely defensive postures. Such patterns, documented in multiple incidents of preemptive ambushes on security personnel, suggest YPS's urban focus serves as a strategic extension of PKK aims to provoke widespread unrest and erode state control, rather than genuine autonomy.

Structure and Composition

Core Units and Leadership

The Civil Protection Units (YPS) maintain a decentralized operational structure suited to urban insurgency, with autonomous local cells led by commanders responsible for district-level activities such as barricade construction, ambushes, and intelligence gathering. These local leaders coordinate through PKK-linked intermediaries rather than a rigid central hierarchy, enabling rapid adaptation to Turkish security operations while minimizing risks from infiltration or decapitation strikes. YPS units emphasize recruitment from aged 15-25, selected for their agility in navigating narrow and familiarity with local neighborhoods, which facilitates in cities like , , and Sur. Without formalized ranks akin to conventional militaries, authority derives from experience and PKK vetting, with core operatives often comprising small teams of 5-10 members trained in the PKK's Qandil Mountain camps on improvised explosive devices (IEDs), operations, and urban . PKK-provided training focuses on essentials, including booby-trap assembly and coordinated small-unit assaults, to compensate for limited manpower and weaponry. Accounts from captured YPS documents and defectors highlight this reliance on seasoned PKK cadres to embed within cells, imparting skills for sustaining prolonged sieges. Turkish security operations in 2015-2016 inflicted substantial losses on YPS leadership, eroding command continuity; for example, Selim Nervehi, the YPS commander for , was neutralized on , 2016, following on his role in coordinating attacks and threats against non-supporting locals. Overall, Turkish forces reported neutralizing 538 YPS militants by June 2016, including multiple regional commanders, which fragmented cell cohesion and forced reliance on replacements.

YPS-Jin Women's Brigade

The YPS-Jin Women's Brigade, or Civil Protection Units-Women (Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl a Jin), was established on , , as the all-female branch of the Civil Protection Units, focusing on women's participation in to promote gender liberation within the framework of Kurdish self-defense. This formation aligned with the broader resurgence of urban militancy in southeastern following the collapse of peace talks with the Turkish government in mid-2015, positioning YPS-Jin as a mechanism for female recruits to engage in armed resistance against state forces. Drawing from the (PKK)'s doctrine—which frames women's as foundational to dismantling patriarchal structures and achieving societal —YPS-Jin emphasized appeals to anti-patriarchal ideology and personal empowerment through combat roles. YPS-Jin operations parallel those of the male YPS units, involving ambushes on , improvised explosive device attacks, and dissemination of videos to claim responsibility and rally support. In May 2020, YPS-Jin announced participation in a joint "revenge offensive" with YPS, targeting elements and their alleged collaborators in northern , framed as retaliation for state repression. These actions, often conducted in urban settings like and , underscore the brigade's integration into PKK-coordinated tactics rather than independent female-led initiatives. Independent verification of specific claims, such as targeting individuals accused of , remains limited, with reports primarily from affiliated outlets lacking corroboration from neutral observers. Assessments of YPS-Jin's effectiveness highlight its subordination to PKK oversight, with female members operating under the same command hierarchies as male counterparts, constraining autonomous impact despite ideological emphasis on gender-specific liberation. Recruitment narratives invoking and anti-patriarchy have drawn young women into high-risk urban combat, where exposure to Turkish operations has resulted in notable among PKK-affiliated female fighters, raising questions about the causal trade-offs between ideological appeals and practical outcomes in protracted . Turkish authorities classify YPS-Jin activities as extensions of PKK , with neutralized operatives often including female militants in raids documented since 2016.

Local Urban Branches

The local urban branches of the Yekîneyên Parastina Sivîl (YPS), or Civil Protection Units, emerged in Kurdish-majority districts of southeastern after the breakdown of the with Turkish authorities in July 2015, focusing on localized defensive postures within urban settings. These branches were concentrated in cities including (Kurdish: Nisebîn), Şırnak (Şirnex), the Sur district of , and Yüksekova (Gever), where geographic proximity to rural PKK strongholds and sympathetic demographics provided tactical edges such as rapid reinforcement and terrain familiarity for construction and ambushes. YPS branches in these locales contributed to the short-lived declarations of "democratic " or self-governing zones starting in 2015, erecting urban fortifications like trenches and explosives-laden barriers to deter state incursions and assert control over neighborhoods. In Sur, YPS elements initiated siege-like conditions from mid-September 2015, escalating into sustained combat through March 2016 that involved street-to-street fighting and the use of improvised explosive devices against advancing Turkish forces. Analogous operations unfolded in from March 2016, where YPS conducted hit-and-run attacks on military diggers and personnel, and in , with reported clashes yielding claims of dozens of Turkish security casualties in early 2016. Turkish military reclamation of these zones by mid-2016 inflicted severe setbacks on YPS branches, including the neutralization of over 500 militants across operations and widespread destruction of infrastructure—such as the razing of hundreds of buildings in Sur alone. While these branches exploited for initial , post-reclamation assessments indicate diminished coherence, with surviving elements resorting to intermittent low-intensity actions amid heightened .

Recruitment and Operational Tactics

Methods of Enlistment

The Civil Protection Units (YPS) drew recruits primarily from disaffected youth in urban centers of southeastern , such as and , leveraging local networks within neighborhoods, schools, and community gatherings affiliated with the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H). These networks emphasized ideological appeals framing enlistment as essential against perceived Turkish state aggression, providing incentives like elevated community status and a sense of empowerment amid socioeconomic grievances including high rates exceeding 20% in the region during the mid-2010s. Propaganda disseminated through platforms and pro-PKK channels portrayed YPS fighters as heroic resisters, targeting teenagers vulnerable to narratives of ethnic and revenge for alleged atrocities, though such efforts often romanticized high-risk urban combat without disclosing operational perils. Turkish government reports, corroborated by some UN documentation, highlight coercive elements, including abductions of minors as young as 11-13 and pressured in PKK-influenced enclaves, where families faced threats for non-compliance; sources counter that participation remained voluntary, driven by genuine conviction rather than duress. Enlistees were overwhelmingly urban adolescents and young adults, with a focus on those aged 14-20 lacking formal , reflecting the YPS's of mobilizing local, expendable volunteers for barricade defenses and ambushes; by mid-2016, involvement peaked with thousands reportedly active amid escalated clashes, but rates soared due to Turkish security operations neutralizing over 2,000 insurgents in urban theaters from July 2015 onward.)

Guerrilla Warfare and Urban Insurgency

The Civil Protection Units (YPS) employed adapted for urban environments during the 2015-2016 escalation of conflict in southeastern , focusing on densely populated districts such as Sur in and Cizre in . These operations involved constructing barricades from earth, concrete, and vehicles to control street access, combined with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and positions to advancing . By embedding fighters within residential areas, YPS sought to exploit restrictions on Turkish , which limit operations to minimize civilian harm, thereby prolonging engagements and inflicting attrition through hit-and-run attacks rather than sustained conventional battles. Key ambushes during this "urban war" phase demonstrated these methods' lethality against Turkish personnel. For instance, in Sur district operations starting December 2015, YPS-linked militants used coordinated detonations and fire from barricaded positions to target patrols, contributing to broader PKK-affiliated attacks that killed over 150 via IEDs alone between February and July 2016. Similar tactics in involved trembler- or photocell-triggered booby traps in buildings, designed to detonate during clearance efforts, which compounded the challenges of urban maneuver and resulted in multiple soldier casualties from sequential strikes. These approaches, while tactically disruptive, causally heightened risks to non-combatants by integrating explosives into civilian infrastructure, such as homes and streets, leading to indiscriminate effects from booby-trapped sites and . Reports documented nail bombs, suicide devices, and rigged structures that endangered residents attempting to flee or return, exacerbating over 200,000 displacements in Turkish during 2015-2016 amid the fighting. Such embedding prioritized militant survival over population safety, with traps often failing to distinguish between targets, as evidenced by civilian blasts like the May 2016 Silopi explosion attributed to PKK/YPS networks.

Turkish Government Response

Military Operations and Curfews

In response to urban insurgency activities by the Civil Protection Units (YPS) in southeastern Turkey, the Turkish military initiated special forces raids and imposed curfews in key strongholds such as Sur in Diyarbakır and Nusaybin in Mardin starting December 15, 2015. These measures, extended intermittently through mid-2017, restricted militant movement, facilitated civilian evacuations, and enabled systematic clearing of barricades and trenches established by YPS networks. In Sur, operations continued from December 2015 until areas were secured by early 2016, while Nusaybin's curfew lasted until June 3, 2016, contributing to the dismantling of local urban command structures. Tactics employed included joint police-military operations with counter-terrorism units, supported by armored vehicles for advancing through fortified zones, bulldozers to remove obstacles, and via drones for . Human and aerial guided targeted raids, neutralizing fighters in vertical engagements within buildings and advances across districts. Turkish forces reported neutralizing approximately 250 YPS and affiliated urban militants in the initial weeks following , 2015, across multiple sites including Sur and . These urban efforts aligned with concurrent campaigns against PKK rural bases, pressuring YPS remnants to withdraw from cities by mid-2016 and reducing the overall threat of coordinated urban-rural attacks. Secured districts like Sur and saw the destruction of militant infrastructure, mass captures of auxiliary members (e.g., 82 in by January 2017), and a shift in insurgent focus to peripheral areas, restoring state control over previously contested urban zones.

Neutralizations and Legal Actions

Turkish security forces conducted operations that neutralized hundreds of YPS militants during the 2015–2016 urban insurgency phase, with reporting that YPS casualties, which constituted about 40% of PKK fighter deaths in urban clashes during the first half of 2016, nearly halted by late that year amid intensified Turkish military pressure. These neutralizations—encompassing killings, captures, and surrenders—disrupted YPS command structures in southeastern cities like and , where specific leaders such as Berivan Avesta, co-leader of YPS in , were eliminated in clashes. Subsequent efforts sustained pressure on YPS remnants integrated into broader PKK networks, with Turkish authorities reporting over 2,000 PKK-linked terrorists neutralized across operations in , including and cross-border targets tied to groups like YPS. Arrests complemented these actions; for instance, in April , detained 110 individuals suspected of PKK affiliations, many involving akin to YPS roles. Further raids in October apprehended dozens more with alleged PKK connections, reflecting ongoing domestic intelligence efforts against YPS-affiliated cells. Prosecutions of captured YPS suspects proceed under Turkey's Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 3713), which equates YPS operations with PKK organizational crimes, leading to convictions for membership, propaganda, and attack planning; sentences typically range from 5–15 years for aiding, up to aggravated for direct involvement in . Courts link YPS explicitly to PKK command hierarchies, justifying enhanced penalties, as evidenced in cases where defendants received decades-long terms for urban ambush coordination. YPS-PKK ties facilitate international legal measures, as the PKK's designation as a foreign terrorist organization by the , , and others extends scrutiny to affiliates like YPS, enabling extraditions, asset freezes, and joint operations; for example, Turkish requests align with U.S. sanctions under targeting PKK networks. This cooperation has supported arrests of YPS-linked figures abroad, though challenges persist due to varying national interpretations of affiliate liability.

Controversies and Assessments

Terrorist Designation and PKK Affiliation

The Turkish government designates the Civil Protection Units (YPS) as a terrorist , classifying it as the urban armed wing of the (PKK), a group responsible for initiating cycles of violence through targeted strikes on state security apparatus. This assessment stems from YPS's role in urban insurgency operations, including ambushes on police convoys and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) such as pothole bombs in southeastern cities like and starting in late 2015. The , under which YPS operates, was proscribed as a terrorist entity by in 1984, the in 1997, and the in 2002, with no independent listing for YPS but implicit inclusion via its PKK ties. Affiliation evidence includes YPS's formation in September 2015 from PKK-affiliated youth militias like the , sharing PKK's ideological framework and , as documented in operational coordination during the 2015-2016 urban conflicts where YPS militants barricaded neighborhoods and engaged Turkish forces. Turkish security reports attribute over 500 YPS-linked neutralization operations to these activities, reflecting PKK-directed guerrilla tactics that escalated after the PKK's , 2015, on in Suruç, breaking a prior . While YPS statements portray its actions as localized defense against state aggression, verifiable attack patterns—such as IED placements in civilian-populated areas and strikes on military patrols—demonstrate proactive initiation of hostilities consistent with terrorist methodologies rather than reactive measures. International designations reinforce this view, as and sanctions on PKK assets and operatives extend to affiliates like YPS through shared and , despite some analyses from outlets with perceived sympathies toward minimizing PKK oversight. Empirical data from conflict tracking, including YPS-claimed assaults on security installations in and , underscores causal links to PKK strategy, prioritizing offensive disruption over de-escalation.

Impact on Civilians and Alleged Atrocities

The YPS's insurgency tactics, which involved establishing , trenches, and firing positions within residential neighborhoods of cities like , , and , placed civilians in the midst of active combat zones and amplified risks of and . From August 2015 to May 2016, these operations coincided with at least 338 documented civilian deaths in YPS-affected districts, as verified by on-site investigations into clashes between the group and Turkish . tallies from the period indicate broader civilian tolls exceeding 600 fatalities amid the intensified fighting. These tactics precipitated large-scale internal displacements, with between 300,000 and 500,000 residents evicted from southeastern provinces during prolonged curfews and evacuations in 2015-2016, according to government and NGO estimates derived from affected population sizes and migration data. Infrastructure devastation was severe, reducing swaths of to rubble with collapsed buildings and scorched facades, while Diyarbakır's Sur district lost key commercial and historic sites, and saw approximately one-quarter of its housing stock destroyed. YPS actions drew allegations of direct harm to non-combatants, including of locals into support roles and extrajudicial killings of those labeled as collaborators or resisters, as detailed in examinations of PKK-affiliated campaigns where militants enforced compliance through threats and targeted violence. Reports from the era highlight instances of YPS using crowds or structures as cover during retreats, tactics likened to human shielding in strategic analyses of the group's shift to city-based resistance. While Turkish operations verifiedly contributed to casualties through and raids, assessments by conflict monitors emphasize YPS's initiation of fortified strongholds as the causal trigger, embedding fighters amid populations and foreclosing de-escalation short of clearance actions.

Self-Defense Claims vs. Security Threat Perspectives

The Civil Protection Units (YPS), an urban affiliated with the (PKK), have consistently framed their operations as defensive measures against Turkish state aggression and systemic denial of cultural and political . In statements, YPS commanders describe their formation in December 2015 as a response to intensified military operations in southeastern , positioning the group as protectors of local and against perceived , including curfews and raids. This narrative emphasizes retaliatory actions, such as barricade defenses in cities like and Şırnak, as necessary self-protection amid historical marginalization, with recruits urged to organize against "racist attacks" rather than initiate conflict. Critics, including Turkish security analysts, counter that YPS activities demonstrate proactive aggression rather than mere defense, particularly after the PKK's July 2015 ceasefire collapse, which followed PKK-claimed killings of two police officers in Ceylanpınar. Formed amid escalating urban clashes, YPS conducted ambushes, attacks, and operations targeting Turkish forces, contributing to a documented surge in violence that resulted in at least 1,501 personnel deaths from militant actions since July 2015. These tactics, integrated with PKK's broader of territorial through "self-administration" zones, align with separatist objectives that undermine Turkish , as evidenced by YPS's role in declaring autonomous urban enclaves and sustaining despite lacking external invasion threats. Such patterns indicate causal intent to fragment state authority, prioritizing ethnic over reactive defense, with YPS's youth and hit-and-run methods mirroring PKK's long-term guerrilla rather than resistance. Perspectives diverge internationally, with Turkish authorities and allies like the — which designates the PKK as a terrorist —viewing YPS as an extension of this , emphasizing empirical on cross-border attacks and domestic bombings that endanger civilians and cohesion. In contrast, segments of and advocacy groups often amplify framing, attributing YPS actions to Turkish "repression" while downplaying PKK-initiated violence post-2015, a tendency attributable to ideological sympathies for that overlook the group's Marxist-Leninist and rejection of negotiated . This variance highlights source credibility issues, as pro-Kurdish outlets like ANF uncritically relay YPS claims, whereas security-focused assessments prioritize verifiable attack over narratives of victimhood, underscoring the PKK's causal role in perpetuating through irredentist demands.

Current Status

Post-2016 Activities

Following the ' operations that neutralized strongholds in southeastern by mid-2016, the Civil Protection Units (YPS) experienced a marked decline in operational capacity, with activities shifting from sustained to intermittent and targeted revenge actions embedded within the (PKK)'s wider rural and asymmetric resistance. Turkish security dominance in cities precluded renewed large-scale battles, confining YPS efforts to low-level disruptions rather than territorial control or . In May 2020, YPS and its affiliated women's brigade, YPS-Jin, declared a "revenge offensive" against alleged counter-guerrilla operatives and their supporters in northern Kurdistan, citing retaliation for prior military actions; this included a claimed assault on a police station in Amed (Diyarbakır), though Turkish authorities reported no significant casualties or disruptions from such sporadic hits. These operations emphasized hit-and-run tactics over sustained engagements, aligning with PKK directives to preserve urban youth cadres amid heightened surveillance and intelligence penetration. By 2022, YPS issued public calls for in response to reported racist mob attacks on communities in Turkish cities, framing resistance as a bulwark against "inculcated " without evidence of coordinated territorial advances or major incidents. Such statements underscored a rhetorical persistence but operational restraint, as Turkish forces' urban patrols and demolitions of former YPS sites effectively neutralized and logistics bases. No verifiable data indicates territorial gains or beyond isolated claims, reflecting into PKK's decentralized networks to evade systematic neutralizations exceeding 500 YPS-linked militants overall.

Recent Developments and PKK Negotiations

In the period from 2023 to early 2025, YPS activities in urban areas of southeastern remained subdued compared to the 2015-2016 peak, with Turkish security forces reporting fewer direct confrontations amid a shift in PKK operations toward rural and cross-border engagements in . Turkish military operations continued to target YPS-linked militants, contributing to cumulative PKK losses exceeding 4,800 confirmed fatalities since July 2015, many of which involved urban guerrilla elements like YPS during intensified efforts. The PKK's announcement on May 12, 2025, to abandon armed struggle, disband, and initiate marked a pivotal shift, directly undermining YPS viability as its urban self-defense arm, with directives encompassing all affiliated groups including those in Turkey's cities. By July 2025, the PKK began concrete steps after four decades of , reducing recruitment for urban units like YPS and prompting expectations of their dissolution or integration into non-militant political structures. Ankara's subsequent , coordinated with regional states, emphasized of militant withdrawals, further eroding YPS operational capacity in Turkish territories. On October 26, 2025, the PKK declared a full withdrawal of its militants from to northern as part of the process, urging legal reforms for rights while signaling an end to domestic armed presence, which Turkish officials interpreted as inclusive of YPS remnants. Despite these developments, maintained a of lingering threats from holdout cells, continuing airstrikes and ground operations against PKK-affiliated targets in and into late 2025 to ensure long-term security and prevent urban resurgence. This cautious approach reflects Ankara's prioritization of verifiable demobilization over premature de-escalation, given historical PKK negotiation breakdowns.

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