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Command of the sea

Command of the sea denotes the strategic control of maritime communications, enabling a naval power to employ the oceans for its own military operations, commerce protection, and power projection while preventing adversaries from doing the same.^[1]^[2] This concept, distinct from localized tactical sea control, historically required decisive engagements to neutralize enemy fleets, as articulated by theorists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett, who viewed fleet superiority as the pathway to securing such dominance.^[2]^[3] In practice, command of the sea has underpinned great power ascendancy, allowing Britain to enforce global trade routes during the 19th century and the United States to sustain alliances and deter aggression post-World War II through carrier-based air superiority and fleet mobility.^[4] Mahan's emphasis on concentrated battle fleets influenced naval arms races, while Corbett stressed flexible, relative control adapted to specific theaters, highlighting that absolute command remains elusive amid submarines, mines, and asymmetric threats.^[5]^[6] Modern doctrines, such as the U.S. Navy's focus on sea control, operationalize this by integrating multi-domain forces to counter anti-access strategies, underscoring its enduring causal role in maritime supremacy.^[7]^[8]

Fundamentals of Command of the Sea

Definition and Core Principles

Command of the sea denotes the strategic dominance over maritime spaces that enables a naval power to utilize sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for its military and commercial purposes while denying the same to adversaries.^[1] British naval theorist Julian Corbett articulated this as "the control of maritime communications," encompassing both military movements and trade routes, achieved not merely through territorial possession but effective regulation of oceanic pathways.^[9] American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan similarly described it as "that over-burdening control on the sea-ways that protects the commerce of its own nation and cuts off the commerce of the enemy," emphasizing the foundational role of naval supremacy in projecting national power.^[5] This condition underpins naval warfare's primary objective: either securing such control or preventing the enemy from attaining it.^[10] Core principles revolve around the causal linkage between fleet capability and operational freedom, derived from empirical naval engagements where superior forces dictate maritime outcomes. Foremost is the principle of concentration of naval strength to achieve decisive superiority in key theaters, as Mahan advocated through battle fleets that shatter enemy cohesion, thereby securing SLOCs against interdiction.^[5] Corbett complemented this with the recognition that command need not be absolute or universal but can manifest locally or relatively, where even partial control suffices to enable amphibious operations, commerce protection, or blockades—evidenced historically in Britain's North Sea dominance during the Napoleonic Wars, which starved French supply lines despite incomplete global coverage.^[11] Another principle entails the integration of offensive and defensive measures: offensive actions target enemy naval assets to erode their contesting ability, while defensive patrols safeguard own forces, with success measured by sustained throughput of shipping tonnage rather than mere territorial claims.^[6] These principles distinguish command from mere sea denial, where the weaker power merely contests or harasses without affirmative control, highlighting a trade-off in resource allocation—command demands persistent presence and risk of fleet engagement, whereas denial permits asymmetric attrition.^[12] Empirical validation stems from cases like the Royal Navy's post-Trafalgar supremacy (1805 onward), which facilitated global trade volumes exceeding £100 million annually by 1815 while crippling French commerce to under 10% of pre-war levels, underscoring command's multiplicative effect on land campaigns through unhindered logistics.^[3] In essence, command derives from material superiority in hulls, tonnage, and firepower, coupled with doctrinal focus on communication lines, yielding causal advantages in endurance and initiative over dispersed or inferior foes.^[9]

Theoretical Foundations: Mahan, Corbett, and Key Proponents

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a U.S. Navy officer and historian, articulated the foundational theory of command of the sea in his seminal 1890 work The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783. He defined command of the sea as the ability of a nation to use the oceans freely for its purposes while denying the same to its adversaries, achieved primarily through the concentration of a battle fleet to seek out and destroy the enemy's principal naval force in a decisive engagement.^[13] Mahan argued that this supremacy historically underpinned commercial prosperity and imperial expansion, as evidenced by Britain's dominance from the late 17th century onward, where naval victories like those in the Anglo-Dutch Wars secured trade routes and colonies against rivals such as France and Spain.^[3] His neo-mercantilist framework linked sea power to economic elements—such as merchant shipping, naval bases, and government policy—emphasizing that without command, a nation's overseas interests remained vulnerable to blockade or interdiction.^[14] Julian Stafford Corbett, a British naval historian and strategist, offered a complementary yet distinct perspective in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911), viewing command not as an absolute condition but as a relative and graduated state that could be partial or local.^[15] Corbett contended that the primary object of naval warfare is either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from obtaining it, often without necessitating a cataclysmic fleet battle; instead, strategies like maintaining a "fleet in being"—an undefeated enemy force that ties down one's own navy—could achieve effective denial.^[14] He integrated Clausewitzian principles of limited war, stressing the subordination of naval operations to broader national objectives, including support for land campaigns via amphibious operations or convoys, as seen in his analysis of historical examples like the Napoleonic Wars where British blockades and cruiser actions contested French maritime ambitions without total annihilation.^[9] This approach critiqued Mahan's battle-centric focus by highlighting the risks of overcommitment and the value of dispersed forces for disputing command in contested theaters. Subsequent proponents built upon these foundations to adapt command theory to evolving technologies and contexts. French admiral Raoul Castex, in works like Strategic Theories (1929–1935), extended Corbett's emphasis on maneuver by introducing "manoeuvre de l'espace," which advocated spatial control through coordinated fleet movements to exploit sea areas for offensive or defensive advantage, influencing interwar doctrines.^[16] Similarly, British strategist James Cable in Gunboat Diplomacy (1971) refined denial strategies for gunboat-era conflicts, applying Corbett's relational command to low-intensity operations where partial sea control sufficed for political ends. These thinkers preserved Mahan and Corbett's core causal logic—that naval power derives from controlling maritime commons to enable or preclude force projection—while addressing limitations in absolute battle paradigms amid submarines, aircraft, and asymmetric threats.^[5]

Historical Evolution of Command Strategies

Command in the Age of Sail (Pre-19th Century)

During the age of sail before the 19th century, command of the sea entailed securing maritime dominance to safeguard trade routes, deter invasions, and enable amphibious operations by defeating or containing enemy fleets.^[17] European powers, particularly England and the Netherlands, vied for this control amid expanding colonial empires and mercantile rivalries, where superiority in sailing warships determined access to global commerce.^[17] Tactics evolved from melee boarding actions to disciplined line-of-battle formations emphasizing broadside gunnery, reflecting the increasing reliance on heavy cannon armament by the 17th century.^[18] Early efforts formalized fleet coordination through signaling systems using flags and pennants, essential for maintaining formation amid variable winds and combat chaos. In 1653, English Admiral George Monck issued Fighting Instructions mandating ships form a single line to optimize firepower while minimizing exposure.^[17] This approach proved critical in the Anglo-Dutch Wars, where battles like the Four Days' Battle of 1666 pitted 79 English against 84 Dutch warships, underscoring the need for organized maneuvers to achieve tactical advantage despite numerical parity.^[17] The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 exemplified early assertion of command, as English forces under Lord Charles Howard, aided by fireships launched on August 7-8, disrupted the invading fleet's cohesion off Calais, forcing its retreat and securing the English Channel for over two decades.^[19] By the mid-18th century, Britain's Royal Navy refined these strategies; the Battle of Quiberon Bay on November 20, 1759, saw Admiral Edward Hawke's aggressive pursuit into hazardous waters annihilate a French squadron, eliminating invasion threats and affirming British naval supremacy during the Seven Years' War.^[20] Such victories relied on superior seamanship, logistical sustainment, and willingness to engage in close-quarters combat, often at the risk of ship loss, to deny enemies operational freedom at sea.^[21]

Transition to Steam and Ironclads (19th Century)

The adoption of steam propulsion in naval vessels during the early to mid-19th century marked a pivotal shift from wind-dependent sailing ships, enabling greater reliability in operations essential for maintaining command of the sea. Steam engines allowed warships to maneuver independently of weather conditions, achieve higher sustained speeds, and conduct prolonged patrols or blockades without the limitations of sails, thereby enhancing a navy's ability to project power and deny sea access to adversaries. For instance, during the Crimean War (1853–1856), steam-powered ships facilitated more effective Allied naval support, including bombardments and logistics, demonstrating early advantages in contested waters. This transition accelerated after 1840, with major powers like Britain and France integrating auxiliary steam engines into warships, reducing vulnerability to calm winds that had previously stalled pursuits or evasions critical to sea control.^[22]^[23] The introduction of ironclad warships further transformed the capacity to achieve and hold command by rendering traditional wooden fleets obsolete through superior protection against explosive shells and gunfire. France launched the Gloire, the first ocean-going ironclad, in November 1859, featuring wooden hulls sheathed in 4.5-inch iron plates backed by timber, which prompted Britain to commission HMS Warrior in 1860 as a direct response to maintain its naval supremacy. These vessels combined steam propulsion with armored hulls, allowing aggressive engagements without the fragility of sail-era ships, thus enabling decisive fleet concentrations to contest and secure maritime domains. The Battle of Hampton Roads on March 8–9, 1862, during the American Civil War, exemplified this superiority when the Confederate ironclad CSS Virginia sank two wooden Union ships before being stalemated by the Union’s USS Monitor, proving that iron-armored steamers could neutralize superior numbers of unarmored opponents and shift control of vital coastal waters.^[24]^[25] By the 1860s and 1870s, the synergy of steam and ironclads compelled navies to prioritize armored, engine-driven fleets for command strategies, as reliance on sails diminished amid coaling infrastructure expansions. This evolution intensified fleet actions' decisiveness, with steam enabling rapid tactical maneuvers like ramming—initially emphasized post-Hampton Roads—and iron armor sustaining firepower dominance, thereby facilitating blockades and amphibious support that secured sea lanes against raiders. Britain's rapid scaling to over 20 ironclads by 1865 underscored how technological adoption preserved its global command, while laggards risked denial of sea use; however, early ironclads' vulnerabilities, such as low freeboard and engine overheating, highlighted the need for iterative designs to fully realize strategic control without excessive logistical burdens.^[26]^[27]

Emergence of Naval Aviation and Carrier-Based Power (Early 20th Century)

The pioneering efforts in naval aviation began with experimental shipboard aircraft operations in the United States. On November 14, 1910, aviator Eugene B. Ely achieved the first successful takeoff from a warship, launching a Curtiss Model D pusher biplane from a temporary wooden platform installed on the armored cruiser USS Birmingham at Hampton Roads, Virginia; the flight lasted approximately five minutes before Ely landed on a nearby beach.^[28] ^[29] Two months later, on January 18, 1911, Ely completed the first shipboard landing, touching down on a 120-foot platform aboard the armored cruiser USS Pennsylvania using ropes and nets to arrest the aircraft's momentum, demonstrating the feasibility of recovering wheeled planes at sea.^[30] These feats, conducted under contract with Glenn Curtiss, highlighted aviation's potential to extend naval reconnaissance and spotting capabilities beyond battleship gun ranges, though initial applications remained limited to auxiliary roles due to aircraft fragility and lack of dedicated platforms.^[31] World War I accelerated naval aviation's integration, primarily through floatplanes launched from catapults on capital ships and early improvised carriers. The Royal Navy pioneered offensive use in 1917 when HMS Furious, converted from a battlecruiser, launched Sopwith Pups for raids on German zeppelin sheds at Tondern on July 19, marking the first carrier-based air strikes against land targets.^[32] By war's end, the British commissioned HMS Argus on September 14, 1918, as the world's first flush-deck carrier designed for wheeled aircraft operations, featuring a continuous 550-foot flight deck without obstructions to enable safer launches and recoveries.^[33] These developments shifted naval tactics from surface gun duels toward aerial scouting and bombing, with over 100 British ship-launched aircraft conducting reconnaissance by 1918, though carriers still supplemented rather than supplanted battleship-centric fleets. Postwar conversions solidified carrier-based power's strategic role. The U.S. Navy recommissioned the collier USS Jupiter as USS Langley (CV-1) on March 20, 1922, after installing a 400-foot flight deck and hangar for up to 33 aircraft, becoming America's first dedicated carrier; on October 17, 1922, Lieutenant Virgil C. Griffin executed the Navy's inaugural carrier takeoff in a Vought VE-7 from her deck.^[34] Japan followed with Hōshō, commissioned December 1922 as the first purpose-built carrier, displacing 7,470 tons and carrying 15-21 aircraft for scouting and strike missions.^[35] These platforms enabled sustained air operations at sea, fostering doctrines emphasizing carrier task forces for power projection; by the late 1920s, exercises revealed carriers' ability to deliver decisive strikes from standoff distances, challenging Mahanian battleship dominance through empirical demonstrations of aerial superiority in fleet maneuvers. Technological refinements, including arrestor wires and folding-wing designs, addressed recovery challenges, paving the way for carriers as central to command of the sea.^[36]

World Wars and Decisive Applications (1914–1945)

In World War I, the Royal Navy asserted command of the sea through a distant blockade of Germany initiated on November 5, 1914, which restricted imports of food, raw materials, and war supplies via the North Sea and English Channel, enforced initially by the 10th Cruiser Squadron of older vessels and later augmented by armed merchant cruisers and patrols.^[37] This strategy, rooted in Britain's numerical superiority—28 dreadnought battleships against Germany's 15 at the war's outset—prevented the German High Seas Fleet from breaking out effectively, maintaining Allied sea lines of communication while starving German industry and civilian morale.^[38] The blockade's cumulative impact included severe shortages, with German caloric intake dropping below subsistence levels by 1917, contributing to domestic unrest and the Central Powers' collapse, though exact civilian death tolls from malnutrition and disease remain disputed, with estimates ranging from hundreds of thousands tied directly to the blockade's effects.^[39] The Battle of Jutland on May 31–June 1, 1916, represented the war's sole major fleet engagement, pitting 151 British warships against 99 German ones in the North Sea off Denmark's Jutland Peninsula.^[40] Tactically, Germany inflicted heavier losses (6,094 British killed and 3 battlecruisers sunk versus 2,551 German killed and 1 battlecruiser sunk), but strategically, the Royal Navy retained command by repelling the German sortie and preserving its battle fleet's "fleet in being," deterring further challenges and sustaining the blockade uninterrupted.^[38] Germany's subsequent shift to unrestricted U-boat warfare in February 1917 aimed to deny Allied sea control by targeting merchant shipping, sinking 5,000 vessels totaling 13 million tons over the war, but countermeasures including convoy systems introduced in 1917, destroyer escorts, and depth charges reduced sinkings from a peak of 860,000 tons monthly in April 1917 to under 300,000 by late 1917, restoring secure transatlantic routes critical for U.S. reinforcements.^[41] In World War II, Allied command of the sea proved decisive across theaters, enabling logistical dominance and amphibious offensives that overwhelmed Axis forces. The Battle of the Atlantic, spanning September 1939 to May 1945, saw Germany deploy over 1,100 U-boats to interdict 14.5 million tons of Allied shipping, peaking at 695,000 tons sunk in March 1943, but Allied adaptations—long-range aircraft patrols, improved radar and sonar, and hunter-killer groups—sank 783 U-boats by war's end, securing supply lines for the buildup to D-Day and Soviet Lend-Lease aid.^[42] In the Pacific, the June 4–7, 1942, Battle of Midway marked a pivotal shift, where U.S. carrier-based aircraft sank four Japanese fleet carriers (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu) from a task force of 200 ships, inflicting irreplaceable losses that ended Japan's offensive initiative and transferred strategic command to the U.S. for subsequent island-hopping campaigns.^[43] The Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 23–26, 1944, the largest naval battle in history involving over 300 ships, exemplified decisive application of sea command as U.S. forces, leveraging superior intelligence and carrier air power, annihilated much of Japan's remaining surface fleet—including four carriers and three battleships—across four sub-battles, securing the Philippines and isolating Japanese garrisons, which accelerated their logistical collapse.^[44] U.S. submarines further eroded Japanese command by sinking 1,314 warships and 4.8 million tons of merchant shipping, comprising 55% of Axis naval tonnage losses and crippling oil imports, which fell to 7% of prewar levels by 1945, directly enabling Allied advances from Guadalcanal to Okinawa.^[45] Overall, Allied sea control facilitated 70 million tons of annual wartime shipping and invasions like Normandy (June 6, 1944), where naval gunfire and transports overwhelmed German defenses, underscoring command's causal role in projecting power ashore and sustaining global coalitions against numerically inferior but initially aggressive foes.^[46]

Modern Requirements and Operational Frameworks

Technological and Doctrinal Essentials for Achieving Command

Achieving command of the sea in modern contested environments requires doctrines centered on offensive sea control, emphasizing the destruction of enemy naval assets, suppression of commerce, and protection of sea lines of communication (SLOCs).^[47] The U.S. Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) framework integrates dispersed naval, air, and land forces to enable resilient power projection and large-scale sea control against peer competitors, such as in the Western Pacific.^[48] ^[49] This approach shifts from centralized formations to distributed lethality, complicating adversary targeting while leveraging joint networks for synchronized strikes.^[8] Key technological platforms include nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, which serve as mobile bases for air superiority and long-range strikes, sustaining operations without frequent port calls and projecting combat airpower over vast areas.^[50] Attack submarines, particularly nuclear-powered ones, provide stealthy undersea dominance for anti-surface, anti-submarine, and intelligence roles, critical for denying enemy sea control.^[50] Surface combatants equipped with Aegis Combat Systems, such as Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, integrate phased-array radars, vertical launch systems, and interceptors to counter aircraft, missiles, and submarines, forming protective screens for carrier strike groups.^[51] ^[52] Doctrinal integration demands advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks to enable real-time data sharing across distributed units, supported by machine learning for decision superiority.^[53] Offensive capabilities rely on long-range precision weapons like the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and emerging hypersonics for standoff strikes, while directed-energy systems such as high-energy lasers (targeting 300–500 kW) and railguns enhance defensive layers against saturation attacks.^[8] ^[54] Unmanned systems, including underwater vehicles and drones, extend sensing and lethality without risking manned platforms, addressing gaps in persistent surveillance and subsea warfare.^[55] These elements collectively ensure operational tempo exceeds adversaries', as evidenced by post-Cold War naval planning that prioritizes multi-domain integration over unchallenged supremacy.^[8]

Sea Control Versus Sea Denial: Strategic Distinctions and Trade-offs

Sea control refers to the capacity of a naval force to operate effectively within a defined maritime area while simultaneously preventing the adversary from doing so, enabling unrestricted use for offensive and logistical purposes such as amphibious assaults, blockades, and commerce protection.^[56] This concept, rooted in the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, emphasizes decisive fleet engagements to achieve dominance, as exemplified by the British Royal Navy's maintenance of superiority during the Napoleonic Wars, which secured trade routes and supported continental allies.^[47] In contrast, sea denial focuses on disrupting or preventing enemy maritime operations without requiring affirmative control of the area, often through indirect means like submarines, mines, or long-range strikes that impose attrition without exposing surface fleets to decisive battle.^[57] Julian Corbett formalized this distinction in his 1911 work Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, arguing that denial represents a limited form of command suitable when full control is unattainable, as seen in Germany's U-boat campaign during World War I, which targeted Allied shipping but failed to secure German sea lanes.^[58] The strategic distinctions lie in their objectives and force employment: sea control demands persistent presence and superiority to project power and sustain operations, aligning with offensive strategies that link naval dominance to broader war aims, whereas sea denial prioritizes defensive attrition to raise enemy costs, preserving one's own forces for survival rather than expansion.^[56] U.S. Navy doctrine, as outlined in joint publications, defines sea control operations as actions to locate, target, and restrict enemy forces across domains, implicitly encompassing denial as a prerequisite but distinguishing it from the sustained freedom of maneuver that control provides. For instance, during World War II, the Allies transitioned from initial denial tactics—such as convoy protections against submarines—to control in the Pacific, enabling island-hopping campaigns after neutralizing Japanese carrier strength at Midway in June 1942.^[47] Sea denial, however, allows weaker powers to contest stronger navies asymmetrically, as in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's use of fast-attack boats and mines in the Persian Gulf, which deterred unrestricted U.S. operations without achieving parity.^[59] Trade-offs between the two strategies revolve around resource allocation, risk exposure, and operational sustainability. Achieving sea control necessitates large-scale investments in capital-intensive assets like aircraft carriers and escorts, which are vulnerable to concentrated attacks and require extensive logistics; the U.S. Navy's carrier strike groups, for example, demand billions in annual sustainment and expose platforms to anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats from hypersonic missiles, as analyzed in post-Cold War assessments.^[60] This approach yields high rewards in power projection but risks catastrophic losses if superiority wanes, as evidenced by the sinking of four British capital ships early in World War II due to inadequate denial countermeasures.^[56] Sea denial, by contrast, trades offensive potential for lower costs and reduced vulnerability, employing submarines or standoff weapons to impose asymmetric attrition—German U-boats sank over 2,800 Allied ships between 1939 and 1945 at a fraction of surface fleet expenses—but forfeits the ability to exploit maritime spaces for decisive victories, potentially prolonging conflicts without resolving them.^[57] Modern doctrines, including those from the U.S. Naval War College, note that total control or denial remains unsustainable indefinitely due to technological attrition, favoring hybrid approaches where denial supports eventual control, though weaker actors like China prioritize A2/AD denial to offset U.S. carrier advantages in potential Taiwan scenarios.^[47]^[58] Ultimately, the choice hinges on relative power: control suits maritime powers seeking global influence, while denial preserves options for continental or resource-constrained navies, with empirical outcomes tied to integration with land-air campaigns rather than naval isolation.^[61]

Challenges, Countermeasures, and Asymmetric Responses

Vulnerabilities in Contested Environments

In contested maritime environments, naval forces attempting to secure command of the sea encounter significant vulnerabilities stemming from advanced anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems deployed by peer adversaries, which exploit the inherent exposure of surface vessels to long-range precision strikes. Anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), including hypersonic variants, pose disproportionate threats to surface combatants due to their speed and potential for saturation attacks that can overwhelm layered defenses, as evidenced by analyses showing that a single ship's radar cross-section and emission signatures increase detection and targeting probabilities during littoral operations.^[62] Submarines, particularly quiet diesel-electric models equipped with modern torpedoes, further compound these risks by enabling stealthy ambushes in chokepoints and littorals, where water depth limits countermeasures like active sonar.^[63] Logistical sustainment emerges as a critical weakness, with supply chains for fuel, ammunition, and repairs highly susceptible to interdiction in environments where forward basing is contested or denied. A 2024 RAND study highlights that U.S. Navy logistics in such scenarios face industrial base constraints, preventing rapid surges in production and delivery, while funding mechanisms hinder adaptive procurement for distributed maritime operations.^[64] Sea mines, inexpensive yet effective, represent another asymmetric vulnerability; adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran maintain large inventories capable of rapidly closing key waterways, rendering minesweeping assets indispensable but themselves high-risk targets.^[65] Command, control, and communications (C3) networks amplify these operational fragilities, as reliance on satellite and radio links exposes forces to jamming, cyber intrusions, and electronic warfare that degrade situational awareness and coordination. Recent assessments indicate U.S. Navy systems lack sufficient resilience for fully contested communications, potentially isolating distributed units and eroding the coherence required for sustained sea control.^[66] High-value assets, such as aircraft carriers, demand extensive protective screens that strain resources, making prolonged presence in A2/AD zones probabilistically untenable without unmanned systems or standoff capabilities to dilute threats.^[67] These vulnerabilities underscore the need for doctrinal shifts toward resilient, dispersed operations to mitigate the causal risks of concentrated fleet deployments against integrated denial strategies.^[68]

Evolving Threats: A2/AD, Missiles, and Submarine Warfare

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies integrate land-based missiles, submarines, aircraft, and sensors to create layered defenses that restrict adversary naval forces from entering or operating effectively within contested zones, thereby challenging traditional sea control by prioritizing sea denial over direct fleet engagements.^[47] These approaches, exemplified by China's deployment across the First Island Chain in the South China Sea, employ ballistic and cruise missiles alongside submarine patrols to deter or degrade U.S. carrier strike groups, forcing reliance on standoff operations or distributed forces.^[69] Russia's application in the Black Sea and Baltic regions similarly leverages coastal missile batteries and submarine-launched strikes to impose risks on surface fleets, as seen in Kalibr cruise missile salvos that have targeted Ukrainian infrastructure while maintaining a denial posture.^[70] Such systems exploit geographic chokepoints and shallow waters, where detection and neutralization become asymmetrically difficult for projecting powers.^[71] Modern anti-ship missiles amplify A2/AD potency through extended ranges, supersonic or hypersonic speeds, and precision guidance, rendering large surface combatants vulnerable even at standoff distances exceeding 1,000 kilometers.^[72] China's DF-21D and DF-26 ballistic missiles, integrated into its A2/AD network, target moving carriers with maneuverable reentry vehicles, while Russia's 3M-14 Kalibr, deployable from submarines or coastal platforms, offers subsonic stealth with ranges up to 2,500 kilometers, as demonstrated in over 100 strikes during the Ukraine conflict.^[73] These weapons' proliferation—now including export variants to nations like Iran and Venezuela—erodes the survivability of blue-water fleets, compelling navies to invest in electronic warfare, decoys, and long-range counters like the U.S. LRASM, though saturation attacks remain a persistent risk in high-threat littorals.^[74] Empirical data from simulations indicate that unaddressed missile barrages could sink multiple capital ships in initial salvos, disrupting command by denying freedom of maneuver.^[75] Submarine warfare has evolved as a stealthy pillar of A2/AD, with diesel-electric boats providing acoustic advantages in littoral environments where nuclear submarines' higher speeds generate detectable noise.^[76] Advanced diesel-electrics, such as Russia's Kilo-class "Black Hole" variants equipped with Kalibr missiles, achieve near-silent operation on battery power, enabling ambush tactics in shallow seas like the South China Sea or Baltic, where they can loiter undetected for weeks and launch salvoes against transiting carriers or supply lines.^[77] China's growing fleet of Yuan-class diesel subs, numbering over 20 by 2023, complements its missile defenses by patrolling chokepoints, posing asymmetric threats that historical ASW (anti-submarine warfare) platforms struggle to counter amid proliferating quiet designs from nations including Japan and Iran.^[78] Nuclear-powered submarines retain blue-water superiority for sustained pursuits, but diesel threats in denied areas force distributed operations, minefields, and unmanned undersea vehicles as mitigations, underscoring a shift where subsurface denial undermines surface dominance essential for command of the sea.^[79]

Strategic Impacts, Achievements, and Criticisms

Empirical Successes and Causal Links to National Power

British achievement of command of the sea in the 18th and 19th centuries exemplified its causal role in elevating national power, as naval supremacy secured maritime trade routes essential for economic expansion. Alfred Thayer Mahan analyzed how Britain's naval dominance from 1660 to 1783 facilitated the accumulation of wealth through commerce and colonies, outpacing continental rivals constrained by land-based conflicts. ^[13] This control enabled Britain to impose blockades, such as during the Napoleonic Wars, which economically isolated France and contributed to its defeat by 1815, while British merchant shipping grew to dominate global trade, supporting industrial output that rose from 2% of world manufacturing in 1750 to 20% by 1870. ^[80] ^[81] Secure sea lanes protected imports of raw materials and exports of goods, generating revenues that funded further naval investments in a self-reinforcing cycle of power projection and deterrence against invasion. ^[2] In the 20th century, United States naval command post-World War II established a parallel link to hegemony, with absolute supremacy over rival fleets enabling the maintenance of open sea lanes that underpinned economic globalization and military forward presence. By 1945, the U.S. Navy's carrier-centric fleet allowed projection of power across oceans, securing alliances and containing Soviet expansion without direct land confrontations, while facilitating trade volumes that grew U.S. GDP from $228 billion in 1945 to over $1.8 trillion by 1970 in constant dollars. ^[82] ^[83] This dominance deterred peer conflicts and supported interventions, correlating with America's emergence as the world's largest economy and arbiter of international norms through institutions like Bretton Woods, where naval guarantee of shipping lanes ensured dollar stability via import/export flows. ^[84] World War II provided stark empirical validation of sea command's decisiveness, as Allied naval victories directly enabled logistical sustainment and offensive operations critical to triumph. The Battle of the Atlantic, culminating in 1943 with the defeat of German U-boats, preserved supply lines to Britain, delivering over 14.5 million tons of merchant shipping despite losses of 3,500 vessels, which was indispensable for sustaining European operations including the 1944 Normandy invasion. ^[85] Similarly, the June 1942 Battle of Midway shifted Pacific momentum by sinking four Japanese carriers, inflicting irreplaceable losses that permitted U.S. island-hopping campaigns and ultimate atomic strikes, without which Japan's defensive perimeter would have prolonged attrition and risked stalemate. ^[86] These outcomes underscore causal mechanisms: sea control neutralizes enemy denial strategies, amplifies amphibious capabilities, and starves adversaries of resources, thereby converting naval assets into broader national ascendancy through preserved industrial base and expeditionary reach. ^[3]

Debates on Relevance: Historical Critiques and Contemporary Controversies

Julian Corbett critiqued Alfred Thayer Mahan's emphasis on absolute command of the sea through decisive fleet battles, arguing instead for a relative and limited form of sea control that integrates naval operations with land forces and recognizes the sea's role as a medium for maneuver rather than total dominance.^[87] Corbett maintained that true command is rarely absolute, as enemy forces can contest it via submarines or raiders, and prioritized denying the enemy use of the sea over seeking a conclusive battle.^[11] This view stemmed from Britain's experience in the World Wars, where U-boat campaigns and air power eroded presumptions of unchallenged supremacy, illustrating that command facilitates but does not guarantee operational success without complementary army actions.^[2] Historical analyses further question Mahan's causal linkage between sea command and national victory, noting instances like the Battle of Jutland in 1916, where Britain's tactical draw failed to translate into strategic sea denial against Germany, allowing continued commerce raiding.^[88] Critics contend that sea power's influence is overstated in continental theaters, as evidenced by Napoleon's land conquests despite British naval supremacy post-Trafalgar in 1805, underscoring that command of the sea protects trade and enables amphibious operations but cannot substitute for ground forces in decisive continental struggles.^[5] In contemporary debates, anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including hypersonic missiles and advanced submarines, have fueled arguments that traditional command of the sea is increasingly unattainable against peer competitors like China, whose layered defenses in the South China Sea could render U.S. carrier strike groups vulnerable at standoff ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers.^[89] Proponents of obsolescence highlight empirical risks, such as the 2022 sinking of Russia's Moskva cruiser by Ukrainian Neptune missiles, demonstrating how asymmetric threats can negate surface fleet advantages without requiring command-level engagements.^[7] Counterarguments assert sea control remains foundational, as denying it to adversaries enables sustained logistics and power projection, with U.S. Naval War College analyses emphasizing that even in missile-saturated environments, distributed operations and long-range strikes can erode A2/AD bubbles, as simulated in exercises projecting over 80% attrition of Chinese assets in a Taiwan scenario.^[47] Recent Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since October 2023, disrupting 12% of global trade despite U.S. patrols, illustrate ongoing controversies over partial versus full command, where localized denial succeeds but fails to achieve broader strategic paralysis without integrated air and land denial.^[11] These debates underscore trade-offs: while submarines and drones offer denial at lower cost, empirical data from post-Cold War operations, including the 1991 Gulf War where U.S. sea control facilitated 90% of coalition logistics, affirm that contested control still correlates with operational freedom, though requiring doctrinal shifts toward hybrid fleets.^[12]

References

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Command of the Sea: Why It Is Essential to U.S. Maritime Strategy
The noted British historian and naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett defined command of the sea as simply the control of maritime communications, be they for ...
[2]
[PDF] Command of the Sea: An Old Concept Resurfaces in a New Form
and properly applies means to ends; and naval strategy, like naval tactics, when boiled down, is simply the proper use of means to attain ends. But in peace ...
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Mahan's Illusory Command of the Seas | Proceedings
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Jul 10, 2019 · Command of the sea is the foundation of American national security. Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the greatest strategist in American history, identified it as the ...
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Nov 1, 2021 · But in his chapter entitled “Command of the Sea,” McCranie dives deeply into the writings of both Mahan and Corbett to determine what they meant ...
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[PDF] Command of the Sea Redux
Jul 18, 2022 · This leads it to define its key war-fighting concept as sea control, which is a tactical, and therefore inherently a local, function. A ...
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It All Comes Down to Sea Control | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations must make the case for sea control as a driving concept for determining what the Navy needs and why.
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[PDF] COMMANDING THE SEAS - CSBA
1. Sea control is defined by the Navy as “The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military ...
[9]
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1489&context=nwc-review
[10]
Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Warfare
The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.<|separator|>
[11]
Commanding the Red Sea: Mahan, Corbett, and the Houthi Threat
Neither Mahan nor Corbett believed that command of the sea equated to absolute security for ships. It merely meant that the side that possesses command can ...
[12]
Sea Control and Command of the Sea Remain Essential
Sea control is the ability to control maritime communications, while command of the sea is a strength relationship where the weaker navy does not directly ...
[13]
Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon History
Mahan argued that British control of the seas, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great ...
[14]
Mahan and Corbett on Maritime Strategy.
While Mahan's theory that winning naval battles might be the quickest path to achieving one's goal of command of the sea, as history shows, it is simply one ...
[15]
From Mahan to Corbett: An Inquiry into the Development of Chinese ...
May 8, 2024 · Corbett argued that the objective of naval warfare should be to secure command of the sea or prevent the enemy from doing so. Unlike Mahan ...
[16]
[PDF] Corbett in Orbit - U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
For example, the work of Charles E. Callwell, Wolfgang Wegener, Raoul Castex, and James Cable merits revisiting for this purpose.
[17]
Command and Control in the Age of Sail | Naval History Magazine
Flags and banners already distinguished friend from foe and identified an admiral's flagship (hence the name), and some were used for limited signaling.
[18]
Tactics in the Age of Sail - GlobalSecurity.org
Jul 22, 2011 · Throughout the Age of Sail, boarding was the primary tactical objective at sea. Long after the advent of gunpowder and the broadside cannon, ...
[19]
Launch of fireships against the Spanish Armada, 7 August 1588
On the night of 7 August Sir Francis Drake, second in command of the English fleet, sent in eight small ships packed with inflammables, known as fire-ships.
[20]
The Trafalgar of the Seven Years' War | Naval History Magazine
The 1759 battle at Quiberon Bay established Britain as the world's dominant naval power and changed the course of North American history.Missing: significance | Show results with:significance
[21]
The battle of Quiberon Bay, 20 November 1759
The Battle of Quiberon Bay, on 20 November 1759, was the most decisive naval encounter during the Seven Years War, 1756-63.
[22]
Metamorphosis: The Navy at the End of the Nineteenth Century
Steam propulsion offered an alternative to the caprices of the winds, rifling was improving the marksmanship of naval guns, and armor was transforming ships ...
[23]
From Sails to Steam: The Evolution of Naval Power - EOXS
Feb 17, 2025 · – Naval Strategy: Steam power altered naval strategy, allowing for more effective blockades, faster deployment of naval forces, and increased ...
[24]
Steel & Steam | American Battlefield Trust
Union and Confederate ironclads first met in battle in March 1862 at the Battle of Hampton Roads – the world's first naval engagement between ironclad warships.<|separator|>
[25]
When Ironclads Clashed: How Hampton Roads Changed Naval ...
Mar 9, 2017 · The battle ended the era of wooden warships, leading to the construction of steam-powered ironclads and a revolution in naval warfare.
[26]
The Steam Navy - Naval History and Heritage Command
Jun 7, 2024 · The birth of the new steam and steel Navy in the late 19th century also facilitated a new age of U.S. involvement in global naval operations.
[27]
Naval Warfare in the Age of Steam and Steel - War History
Aug 8, 2015 · The tempo of the naval battle under steam was faster. The end of reliance on the wind for mobility, the marked increase in the speed of ships, ...
[28]
Eugene Ely Makes Naval Aviation's First Shipboard Launch - Navy.mil
Nov 14, 2014 · Somewhat overshadowed is what occurred two months before on November 14, 1910, when Ely successfully took off from the cruiser Birmingham (CL 2) ...
[29]
The First Time an Aircraft Took Off from a Navy Warship | Military.com
Oct 25, 2023 · Eugene Ely flies his Curtiss pusher biplane from the USS Birmingham in Hampton Roads, Virginia, on Nov. 14, 1910, the first time ...
[30]
Today in Aviation History: Eugene Ely and the First Shipboard ...
Jan 18, 2025 · American aviator Eugene Ely became the first pilot to land an airplane on a ship with his Curtiss Model D pusher.
[31]
The Short, Eventful Life of Eugene B. Ely | Proceedings
The runway was 83 feet long, which meant Ely could travel only 57 feet before taking off. The five-minute flight was a success…but just barely. The plane ...<|separator|>
[32]
The Ten Most Pivotal Events in U.S. Naval Aviation | Proceedings
Glenn Curtiss' and Eugene Ely's experiments in 1910–11 are inevitably featured in any list of significant events in naval aviation history. But that is an ...
[33]
HMS Argus (1917) - Naval Encyclopedia
A very short WWI career. HMS Argus was commissioned on 16 September 1918, late in the war, and before any action she was tasked to conduct deck-landing trials. ...
[34]
USS Langley (CV-1) - Naval History and Heritage Command
Jun 20, 2024 · On 17 October 1922, Lieutenant Virgil C. Griffin made the Navy's first carrier takeoff when he flew a Vought VE-7-SF from Langley's decks while ...
[35]
Aircraft Carrier Number 1 | Naval History Magazine
The Langley's conversion was completed on 22 September 1922. On 17 October, while she was anchored in the York River, Lieutenant Commander Virgil C. Griffin ...
[36]
The Cradle Of Naval Aviation | Proceedings - May 1954 Vol. 80/5/615
Naval Aviator No. 16, Whiting headed the first advance guard of fighting men, seven pilots and 122 mechanics, to be sent to Europe in World War I. He was ...<|separator|>
[37]
Naval Gazing Main/Jutland - The Blockade
May 31, 2020 · Initially, the blockade was enforced by the 10th Cruiser Squadron, made up of older protected cruisers, but these proved to be unequal to the ...
[38]
World War One and the Battle for Command of the Seas - Historic UK
By 1918 the U-boats had largely been brought to heel and the Royal Navy's blockade of Germany in the Channel and the Pentland Firth had brought her to the ...
[39]
The British Naval Blockade Of The First World War
By maintaining a blockade of enemy ports it hoped to cut off supplies from the outside world. The consequences of this strategy were complex.
[40]
What Was The Battle Of Jutland? | Imperial War Museums
The Battle of Jutland (May 31-June 1, 1916) was the largest naval battle of WWI, the only time British and German 'dreadnought' fleets met, involving 250 ships ...
[41]
German U-Boat Attacks: 1915-17
German U-boats sunk or captured neutral ships, including the SS Gulflight and Lusitania, resulting in American deaths. In 1917, all Allied/neutral ships were ...
[42]
[PDF] Defeating the U-Boat - U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
The transformation of naval warfare from the surface of the seas to the water column below had served to bifurcate command of the sea. Britain in 1917 still ...
[43]
Battle of Midway: 4-7 June 1942
The Battle of Midway, fought near the Central Pacific island of Midway, is considered the decisive battle of the war in the Pacific.
[44]
The Battle of Leyte Gulf | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans
Oct 25, 2024 · In October 1944, the largest naval battle ever fought raged in the Pacific. The Battle of Leyte Gulf ended in American victory—but the outcome ...
[45]
Submarine Warfare Played Major Role in World War II Victory
Mar 16, 2020 · In all, U.S. submarines destroyed 1,314 enemy warships in the Pacific, representing 55% of all Axis power warships lost and a total of 5.3 ...
[46]
The Decisive Battle of the Pacific War - May 1946 Vol. 72/5/519
The decisive battles of the Pacific War were the Battle of Santa Cruz and the Battle of Guadalcanal, which occurred nineteen days apart.
[47]
Sea Control - Marine Corps University
The Navy defined sea control as a nation's ability to operate in the maritime domain without enemy interference.18 Regardless of the category or focus of ...
[48]
Navy Embracing Distributed Operations in Quest to Regain Sea ...
Sep 13, 2016 · The admiral is still in talks with type commanders and numbered fleet commanders about how to design a fleet that can maintain sea control in ...
[49]
[PDF] DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS - Atlantic Council
With respect to the People's Republic of China in the Western Pacific, the US Navy must be able to pursue large- scale sea control and power projection ...
[50]
Submarines Reign Supreme | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
U.S. submarines are the most capable platforms for achieving sea control, projecting power, and attaining dominance in the surface, subsurface, and even command ...
[51]
The shield of the fleet: The Aegis Combat System and its vital role in ...
Jun 23, 2025 · “The Aegis fleet serves as the front-end defense for the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers, enabling them to project power safely,” Fronzo said.
[52]
[PDF] Overview of Platforms and Combat Systems - Johns Hopkins APL
Jun 15, 2020 · Aegis destroyers and cruisers can also defeat attacks from aircraft and cruise missiles. Aegis is capable of extended-range engagements of.
[53]
[PDF] A DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY
Create a single Authoritative Data Environment for Navy personnel systems to permit the use of cutting-edge machine learning and data analytics by the end of ...
[54]
A New Era of Naval Warfare: Hypersonics and Its Impact - NSTXL
Nov 26, 2024 · The U.S. Navy's Push for Hypersonic Supremacy ... The U.S. Navy is at the forefront of hypersonic weapon development, with several key initiatives ...
[55]
NUWC: Maintaining Mastery of the Sea at All Depths
Jan 8, 2025 · The Submarine Forces are focusing on the technology areas of UUVs, subsea seabed warfare, AM, AI/ML, and cross-domain C2 to remain ready and ...
[56]
Getting Sea Control Right | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
While sea control is an offensive objective, sea denial is invariably a defensive objective at the strategic level and is the principal objective of the weaker ...
[57]
Maritime Warfare and the Importance of Sea Control
Sea control operations are potentially wide-ranging and include the destruction of enemy naval forces, the suppression of enemy maritime commerce, the ...Implementation/how To... · Sea Control · Sea Denial
[58]
Going to War With China? Dust Off Corbett! - U.S. Naval Institute
Dust Off Corbett! To win future battles in the Pacific, the Navy must let go of the concept of sea control and embrace a strategy of sea denial. By Daniel E ...
[59]
The Nature of Sea Control and Sea Denial
Sep 12, 2018 · Basically, there are two different schemes, deterrence and compellence, to achieve sea denial.
[60]
[PDF] Sea Control: Feasible, Acceptable, Suitable, or Simply Imperative
May 21, 2020 · modern sea control theorists believe that Mahan and Corbett's ... environment to defeat adversarial sea denial and support friendly sea control.
[61]
[PDF] Navy Planning - NET
For naval planners it is critical to understand that sea control is rarely complete, permanent, and absolute.
[62]
The Deadly Future of Littoral Sea Control - U.S. Naval Institute
A ship's vulnerability to ASCMs is disproportionate to her staying power. The probability of a ship being detected and hit by an ASCM is increased by her radar ...<|separator|>
[63]
Work and Roughead Talk Fleet Protection - USNI News
May 7, 2013 · As the carrier battle group pushes into A2/AD networks in the littorals, the threat from submarines increases exponentially. Extremely quiet ...
[64]
Naval Logistics in Contested Environments - RAND
Mar 6, 2024 · Issues in the industrial base capacity would also prevent the Navy from surging to meet demand. Funding mechanisms complicate buying to meet ...
[65]
Don't Sweep Minesweepers Under the Rug: America's Critical Naval ...
May 20, 2025 · Strategically-placed sea mines could become the Achilles' heel of US naval operations. China, Russia, and Iran each have acquired high numbers of these cost- ...
[66]
Op-Ed: US Navy's Networks Aren't Ready for a Contested Comms ...
Oct 5, 2025 · The need for interoperability in naval operations has never been more critical. However, these operations will increasingly be forced to occur ...
[67]
USVs Are Key in the Counter–A2/AD Fight - U.S. Naval Institute
In order to breach A2AD, the USV needs heavier armament and lots of reloads, such as APKWS, small missiles, CVLWTs, CKEM/LOSAT, or grenade launchers. The ...
[68]
[PDF] Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play ... - RAND
Aug 29, 2016 · The Growing Chinese A2/AD Threat and Blue A2/AD Strategies ... additional firepower to anti-ship capabilities from Japan's surface fleet,.
[69]
China's Anti-Access/Area-Denial Strategy
Feb 9, 2023 · The impact of naval and aerial threats could be reduced ... Therefore, raising awareness of the threat posed by the A2/AD system ...
[70]
[PDF] Russian Anti Access/Area Denial in the Maritime Domain - DTIC
The submarines will be a threat to shipping not only in the Black Sea, but in the Mediterranean as well. This would bolster. Russian efforts in Syria. General ...<|separator|>
[71]
How effective is China's A2/AD in the South China Sea - 9DashLine
Jun 9, 2020 · Anti Area Access Denial (A2/AD) is a maritime strategy designed to deny an adversary's naval forces freedom of movement in a battle space.
[72]
Sinking Feeling – How Vulnerable are Modern Warships to Anti ...
Mar 8, 2023 · ... naval platforms – vessels are at risk in an age of proliferating missile threats. However, they are far from sitting ducks. The complexity ...
[73]
3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A) - Missile Threat - CSIS
The proliferation of this capability within the new Russian Navy is profoundly changing its ability to deter, threaten or destroy adversary targets. It can be ...Missing: Black | Show results with:Black
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https://www.twz.com/sea/venezuelas-supersonic-anti-ship-missiles-are-a-real-threat-to-american-warships
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Fighting DMO, Pt. 2: Anti-Ship Firepower and the Major Limits of the ...
Feb 27, 2023 · The short range of this missile draws the U.S. Navy's most expensive and least risk ... Carlo Kopp, “Evolving Naval Anti-Ship Weapons Threat,” ...
[76]
The Navy Isn't Prepared To Face The Growing Diesel Submarine ...
Nov 3, 2021 · A veteran submarine hunter explains how the proliferation of ever more capable diesel-electric submarines is a major problem for the US Navy.
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https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russias-black-hole-kilo-class-submarine-has-a-message-for-the-u-s-navy/
[78]
Submarines Will Reign in a War with China - U.S. Naval Institute
The future of undersea warfare is likely to be a major determinant of the long-term military balance between China and the United States.
[79]
The Path to a Bigger Submarine Fleet Includes Diesels | Proceedings
Diesels are not meant to compete with nuclear submarines; this is an “and” approach, and the outcome should not be considered zero sum. To preserve undersea ...
[80]
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History - Project Gutenberg
... command of the sea and the favor of the population. The second son of the King of Spain was proclaimed king under the title of Carlos III., and the Bourbon ...<|separator|>
[81]
Classic Works on Sea Power Have Enduring Value | Proceedings
Mines, torpedoes, submarines, small surface craft, and coastal artillery batteries did make for a powerful antiaccess/area-denial strategy. The Royal Navy could ...
[82]
The Offensive Navy Since World War II: How Big and Why, A Brief ...
At the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy enjoyed absolute naval supremacy. No other nation had a navy that could seriously challenge it, and no other ...
[83]
Corbett's Maritime Strategy Theories and the United States Since 1945
Mar 20, 2025 · The overall naval balance provides indirect means—the more a state possesses latent command at sea, the more secure its trade routes are in ...<|separator|>
[84]
A Tale of Two Hegemons: The Anglo-American Roots of the Postwar ...
Dec 21, 2017 · But America and Japan were rising fast. Postwar Britain, conscious of its evaporating hegemony, was unable to match their naval spending.
[85]
Battle of the Atlantic - Naval History and Heritage Command
Jan 12, 2021 · The ultimate cost of victory in this vast area of operations was sobering: Between 1939 and 1945, 3,500 Allied merchant ships (14.5 million ...
[86]
The Pacific Strategy, 1941-1944 | The National WWII Museum
They aimed to destroy the US carrier fleet in a victory so decisive that the United States would negotiate for peace. With its battleship fleet crippled in ...
[87]
Review of From Mahan to Corbett? - 笹川平和財団
He believed that one of the two goals of naval operations was to obtain or dispute the command of the sea and the other was to exercise such control of ...
[88]
Mahan, Corbett, and the Foundations of Naval Strategic Thought
To Corbett, battle was but a means to an end while Mahan saw battle as the very linchpin to securing command of the sea. That Britain possessed that command ...<|separator|>
[89]
Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era: Lessons from the ...
Feb 10, 2020 · In the face of extant and emerging A2/AD systems that could seriously undermine U.S. control of the seas, Pentagon leaders should step up their ...