Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Community Development Block Grant

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) is an annual formula-based federal grant program established under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which allocates flexible funds to eligible states, metropolitan cities, urban counties, and insular areas to finance community development activities principally benefiting low- and moderate-income persons. The program's core national objectives include providing decent housing and a suitable living environment while expanding economic opportunities, with grantees required to ensure that at least 70% of funds over a one- to three-year period primarily serve such beneficiaries. Funds support diverse eligible activities, including housing rehabilitation, public facility improvements, public services, and economic development initiatives such as acquisition, demolition, and infrastructure enhancements. Enacted to consolidate eight prior categorical grant programs into a single , thereby granting local governments greater discretion in addressing and rural needs, CDBG allocations are determined by a statutory dual formula incorporating factors like , extent, housing , age of housing stock, and growth lag in nonmetropolitan areas. This structure has enabled over $5 trillion in total investments since inception, fostering partnerships between federal, state, and local entities to tackle and stimulate revitalization. However, the program's broad flexibility has drawn scrutiny for diluting focus on low-income targeting and complicating rigorous of outcomes. Empirical assessments reveal mixed results on effectiveness: some analyses indicate modest positive impacts on local home prices from housing-related expenditures and limited job creation from outlays, yet overall program-wide evidence of transformative causal effects remains sparse due to heterogeneous local implementations and gaps. Critics, including oversight reports, highlight instances of inadequate cost allocation, uneven benefit distribution, and vulnerability to funding reductions under structures, prompting repeated reform proposals amid debates over whether the program's diffuse mission justifies its persistence.

Origins and Legislative History

Establishment under New Federalism

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program originated as an element of President Richard Nixon's agenda, which emphasized devolving administrative authority and fiscal flexibility from to state and local governments to counteract the centralized approach of prior federal aid expansions. Announced in a 1971 address, proposed reorganizing federal grants by consolidating over 100 categorical programs—each with narrow eligibility rules, competitive applications, and stringent federal oversight—into six broad block grants, including one for community and . This restructuring aimed to eliminate duplicative , empower local officials to prioritize needs based on direct knowledge of community conditions, and foster accountability through voter oversight rather than federal mandates. Nixon's specific community development proposal targeted the inefficiencies of seven fragmented Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-administered categorical grants, such as , Model Cities, water and sewer facilities, neighborhood facilities, open-space land acquisition, and advances for public facilities, which collectively disbursed about $2.5 billion annually but required localities to navigate separate funding competitions and compliance regimes. By merging these into a single , the initiative sought to provide predictable, formula-based allocations directly to urban areas, allowing expenditures on rehabilitation, , , and public services tailored to local priorities, while retaining federal requirements to benefit low- and moderate-income residents. Congressional negotiations modified Nixon's original special revenue-sharing concept into a framework, preserving some and obligations but significantly broadening local compared to prior models. Following Nixon's 1974 resignation, the 93rd passed the Housing and Community Development Act (Public Law 93-383) on August 22, 1974, which President signed into law, formally authorizing the CDBG program under Title I with initial appropriations of $2.05 billion for 1975. Effective January 1, 1975, the program allocated funds via a weighted formula considering population, poverty levels, and housing overcrowding, distinguishing "entitlement" communities (cities over 50,000 and urban counties) from non-entitlement areas funded through states. This enactment realized New Federalism's devolutionary intent in urban policy, as CDBG endured as the sole surviving major from Nixon's vision amid broader resistance to , enabling over 1,200 localities to address , , and community facilities without prior categorical constraints.

Key Reauthorizations and Amendments

The Housing and Community Development Act of 1977 reauthorized the CDBG program and introduced a formula allocation system, incorporating both the original single formula and a new one emphasizing lag, age of housing, and to better direct funds toward distressed areas. This change aimed to address criticisms that the initial 1974 formula overly favored larger cities regardless of need, with the approach selecting the higher amount for each recipient to enhance targeting efficiency. In 1981, amendments to the Housing and Community Development Act established the state-administered CDBG component, allocating 20% of annual appropriations directly to states for distribution to non-entitlement communities (those with populations under ), while entitling communities retained the remaining 70% via formula grants (with holding 10% for territories and discretionary uses). This shift decentralized administration from to states, promoting flexibility for smaller localities and reducing federal oversight, though states were required to develop their own allocation formulas and planning processes compliant with national objectives. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 marked the program's last comprehensive reauthorization, extending authorities through fiscal year 1994 and incorporating refinements such as enhanced planning requirements, anti-displacement provisions, and eligibility expansions for certain economic development activities. Subsequent funding has relied on annual appropriations without formal reauthorization, leading to calls for modernization amid stagnant real-dollar allocations and evolving community needs. Notable post-1992 amendments include the 1994 addition of the Economic Development Initiative for competitive grants targeting severely distressed areas, and the 2022 Reauthorization Act, which integrated protections against housing discrimination based on or into CDBG nondiscrimination rules.

50th Anniversary and Recent Appropriations

In 2024, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program marked its 50th anniversary, originating from the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 signed into law by President on August 22, 1974. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development () commemorated the milestone on the same date, emphasizing the program's allocation of billions of dollars over five decades to support neighborhood revitalization, development, , and public facility improvements in thousands of communities nationwide. Organizations including the International Economic Development Council (IEDC) presented formal proclamations to , designating 2024 as a year to recognize CDBG's flexible funding model that has enabled local governments to address diverse community needs without excessive federal oversight. Numerous local and state entities hosted events to highlight CDBG's tangible impacts, such as Georgia's Department of Community Affairs noting sustained investments in underserved areas since 1974, and cities like , , and showcasing specific projects funded over the decades, including housing rehabilitation and infrastructure upgrades benefiting low- and moderate-income residents. The National Council of Development Associations (NCDA) issued a statement recognizing CDBG's role in fostering resilient communities, while analyses from HUD-affiliated publications reflected on its evolution amid shifting federal priorities, crediting the program's structure for its bipartisan longevity despite periodic debates over formula targeting and expenditure flexibility. Recent annual appropriations for the core CDBG program have stabilized at approximately $3.3 billion, distributed via formula grants to over 1,200 communities and states for non-entitlement areas, funding activities like public services, rehabilitation, and as of (FY) 2024. This level reflects minimal nominal growth from prior years, with real funding declining when adjusted for since the program's inception, as noted in congressional analyses attributing stagnation to broader federal budget constraints rather than diminished program efficacy. For FY2025, the Appropriations Committee advanced a Transportation, Housing and Urban Development (THUD) bill maintaining comparable HUD funding totals, including CDBG, amid advocacy from mayors and development councils to preserve the program's scope against proposed cuts in House versions. Separate supplemental appropriations for CDBG- (CDBG-DR) reached $12 billion in December 2024 under the Disaster Relief Supplemental Appropriations Act, targeted at 2023-2024 events like hurricanes and wildfires, demonstrating Congress's continued use of the mechanism for acute needs beyond routine allocations.

Program Objectives and Eligibility

National Objectives and Beneficiary Focus

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program establishes three national objectives that all funded activities—except for and certain administrative expenditures—must satisfy to ensure alignment with community development priorities. These objectives are: (1) principally benefiting low- and moderate-income persons; (2) aiding in the prevention or elimination of slums or ; and (3) addressing other needs with particular urgency due to serious and immediate threats to or . The primary emphasis remains on the first objective, requiring that at least 70 percent of CDBG funds expended in a grant year (or averaged over one-, two-, or three-year periods as selected by the grantee) be allocated to activities benefiting low- and moderate-income persons. Beneficiaries under the low- and moderate-income objective are defined as members of households with incomes at or below the Section 8 low-income limits established by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (), generally corresponding to 80 percent of area adjusted for family size. Activities qualify by demonstrating principal benefit through mechanisms such as area-wide improvements in predominantly low- and moderate-income neighborhoods (where at least 51 percent of residents meet the income threshold), direct services to limited clientele presumed or verified to be at least 51 percent low- and moderate-income, or rehabilitation of housing units occupied by such households. This focus ensures that CDBG resources target economic opportunity for lower-income populations, though non-low- and moderate-income activities are permitted up to 30 percent of funds to support broader community needs like removal or urgent threats, such as . The program's design reflects a intent to decentralize decision-making while prioritizing empirical need among vulnerable groups, with providing low- and moderate-income summary data updated annually via the to facilitate grantee and targeting. Non-compliance with these objectives can trigger sanctions, underscoring the regulatory of the focus.

Entitlement Communities versus State-Administered Areas

Entitlement communities under the (CDBG) program consist of metropolitan cities—defined as principal cities within Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with populations of 50,000 or more—and urban counties, which are counties with populations exceeding 200,000 excluding the populations of any included entitlement cities. These jurisdictions receive annual formula-based grants directly from the U.S. Department of and Urban Development (), enabling them to address needs such as , , and activities that align with the program's national objectives. In 2023, approximately 1,200 such entitlement grantees received the bulk of CDBG allocations, reflecting their focus on urban and suburban areas with significant population densities. State-administered areas encompass non- communities, including smaller cities, towns, counties, and rural localities outside the entitlement designations, which lack the population thresholds to qualify for direct funding. These areas receive CDBG funds indirectly through their respective states, which allocates via to support subgrants to eligible units of general . States are required to distribute at least 70% of their CDBG allocation to units with populations under , often prioritizing competitive grants for urgent needs like and improvements or in underserved regions. The program's funding mechanism divides annual appropriations such that roughly 70% flows directly to entitlement communities based on formula factors including population, poverty levels, and housing overcrowding, while the remaining 30% is allocated to states for non-entitlement areas. This split, formalized in 1981, ensures broader geographic coverage beyond major urban centers, with states receiving an average grant of about $18.8 million in FY2024 for redistribution. Entitlement grantees must expend at least 70% of funds over a 1-, 2-, or 3-year period on activities benefiting low- and moderate-income persons, a requirement mirrored in state programs to maintain program integrity. Key distinctions in administration arise from the direct versus intermediary funding paths: entitlement communities submit Consolidated Plans to HUD outlining priorities and receive funds without state intermediation, affording greater autonomy in project selection within regulatory bounds, whereas states administer their allocations through tailored programs, imposing additional eligibility criteria, application processes, and performance monitoring on subgrantees. States may retain up to 3% (or $100,000 plus 50% of excess costs) for administrative expenses, contrasting with entitlements' direct overhead allowances under 24 CFR Part 570. Both categories undergo HUD oversight, including annual performance reports and audits, but state programs often emphasize capacity-building for smaller localities lacking robust planning resources.

Certification and Planning Requirements

Entitlement communities receiving Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds must prepare and submit a Consolidated Plan to the U.S. Department of and Urban Development (), which serves as the primary document outlining community needs, strategies, and annual action plans for CDBG and related programs. The plan requires an assessment of and homeless needs, including estimates for low- and moderate-income households, a covering supply, , and conditions in minority or low-income areas, and a strategic plan prioritizing activities that benefit low- and moderate-income persons, such as and suitable living environments. Annual action plans detail specific CDBG-funded activities, resource allocations, and estimated low- and moderate-income beneficiaries, with submissions due by August 16 each year to avoid forfeiture of funds. Planning processes mandate robust citizen participation to ensure input, including a detailed participation plan that provides for low- and moderate-income involvement through at least two hearings annually, a 30-day comment period on the plan and substantial amendments, and consultations with agencies serving homeless persons or those with . States administering CDBG to non-entitlement areas follow similar Consolidated Plan requirements but emphasize their method of distributing funds to units of general , including criteria for selection and geographic priorities, while ensuring alignment with national objectives. Grantees must certify adherence to these planning elements, confirming the plan's consistency with CDBG goals of providing decent , suitable living environments, and economic opportunities primarily for low- and moderate-income persons. Certifications accompanying the Consolidated Plan include commitments to affirmatively further fair housing, minimize displacement, comply with civil rights laws, and ensure that at least 70 percent of CDBG funds expended over one, two, or three years benefit low- and moderate-income persons. Additional certifications cover compliance with anti-lobbying disclosures, Section 3 economic opportunities for low-income residents, and uniform relocation assistance, with reviewing submissions for completeness before approving fund release. Failure to meet these requirements can result in fund or withholding, as the certifications affirm the grantee's legal and programmatic . For consortia of communities, certifications extend to collective needs assessments and strategies, with individual member plans optional.

Funding Allocation Mechanism

Formula-Based Distribution

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program distributes federal funds annually through a statutory formula administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), targeting communities based on objective measures of need such as population, poverty levels, housing overcrowding, age of housing stock, and population growth lag. Approximately 70% of appropriated funds are allocated to entitlement communities—defined as principal cities in metropolitan statistical areas with populations exceeding 50,000, other cities over 50,000 residents, and qualifying urban counties—while the remaining 30% goes to states for distribution to non-entitlement areas. This split reflects congressional intent to prioritize urban areas with demonstrated development challenges while ensuring coverage for smaller localities via state administration. For entitlement grantees, computes allocations using two distinct formulas (A and B), selecting the higher yield for each jurisdiction to mitigate distortions from any single metric; calculations rely on U.S. Census Bureau data, updated decennially with phase-in periods to smooth transitions. Formula A weights factors as follows: 25% for total , 50% for the number of persons living in , and 25% for housing units with (defined as more than 1.01 persons per room). Formula B emphasizes housing stock conditions and stagnation, assigning 50% weight to pre-1940 housing units (as a for age and potential ), 30% to , and 20% to population growth lag—calculated as the shortfall in a metropolitan area's increase from 1960 relative to growth. These shares are determined relative to all areas nationwide, excluding the grantee itself to prevent self-inflation.
FormulaFactorWeightDescription
A25%Total residents in the jurisdiction.
A50%Number of persons below the federal poverty line.
A25%Households exceeding 1.01 persons per room.
BAge of Housing50%Units built before 1940.
B30%Number of persons below the federal poverty line.
BGrowth Lag20%Population growth shortfall since 1960 compared to national average.
State allocations follow analogous dual-formula mechanics applied to non-entitlement areas, with Formula A based on , , and , and Formula B incorporating age of , , and growth lag, again taking the higher result before pro-rata adjustments if totals exceed the 30% cap. Statutory hold-harmless provisions ensure no grantee receives less than 0.05% of total CDBG funds or experiences reductions exceeding certain thresholds, preserving stability for longstanding recipients. Following preliminary computations, HUD applies ratable reductions across all grantees if necessary to match congressional appropriations, with final notices issued annually—such as for 2025 on May 13. This process, unchanged in core structure since , uses lagged data to reflect enduring need rather than short-term fluctuations.

Factors Influencing Formula Allocations

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) formula allocations to communities—principally cities with exceeding 50,000 and qualifying counties—are calculated using the higher of two alternative formulas, Formula A or Formula B, applied to 70% of the annual appropriation, with the remainder distributed to states for non- areas. These formulas rely on U.S. Census Bureau data to measure shares of national or metropolitan-area totals for specific need indicators, weighted differently to approximate requirements. Formula A weights at 25%, extent of at 50%, and extent of overcrowded at 25%; the extent of combines the grantee's proportionate share of the total (weighted at 50%) with its rate relative to the national average (also weighted at 50%), while overcrowded counts units with over 1.01 persons per room. Formula B, by contrast, weights the greater of current or lag at 20%, extent of at 30%, and pre-1940 units at 50%; lag quantifies the difference between a jurisdiction's actual increase from 1960 to the latest decennial census and the increase it would have experienced under national average growth rates during that period. Final allocations incorporate adjustment mechanisms beyond the raw formula results, including a hold-harmless provision that limits any reduction to no more than 50% of the prior year's grant (adjusted for overall program funding changes) and reductions across all grantees if preliminary totals exceed the appropriation. A minimum allocation applies to smaller communities, ensuring they receive at least $45,000 or a formula-based floor, whichever is higher. These Census-derived factors, updated only decennially (most recently with 2020 data effective for fiscal year 2023 allocations), can lag contemporaneous conditions, as evidenced by a 2023 U.S. Department of and Urban Development () analysis finding that pre-1940 stock and 1960-based growth lag correlate weakly with current metrics of distress, concentration, or needs. Metropolitan-area aggregation further influences outcomes, as intra-metro shares determine individual or grants, potentially favoring larger or needier locales within shared statistical areas. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program's base formula funding, excluding supplemental appropriations for disasters or other earmarks, originated with $2.47 billion in nominal dollars for (FY) 1975. Appropriations peaked nominally at approximately $4.4 billion in FY2001, followed by a gradual decline to around $3.0 billion by FY2014. From FY2000 to FY2014, annual funding fluctuated within a range of $2.95 billion (FY2012 low) to $4.40 billion, reflecting congressional priorities amid competing budget demands. In recent years, base CDBG allocations have stabilized near $3.3 billion annually; distributed $3.3 billion in FY2024 to over 1,200 communities, states, and insular areas. This level marks no significant nominal increase from FY2023, consistent with patterns since the mid-2010s where appropriations have held steady despite rising costs. Adjusted for inflation, funding trends reveal substantial erosion: annual averages for base CDBG fell from $13.5 billion (in 2024 dollars) during 1975–1984 to $3.8 billion in 2015–2024. This real-term decline—exacerbated by a 91% rise in grantee numbers from 657 in FY1975 to 1,256 in FY2024—has reduced average per-grantee awards, from roughly $4.2 million in the program's early years to $2.7 million recently. Total base appropriations since FY1975 exceed $178 billion nominally but equate to diminished amid expanding eligibility and fixed formula factors.

Administration and Implementation

Role of HUD and Local Grantees

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program federally, allocating funds annually through a statutory formula to approximately 1,200 entitlement communities—defined as principal cities of metropolitan statistical areas with populations exceeding 50,000 and qualifying urban counties—and to the 50 states for distribution to non-entitlement areas. HUD establishes program regulations under Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, as amended, including requirements for grantees to meet one of three national objectives: principally benefiting low- and moderate-income persons, aiding in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight, or addressing urgent community development needs. The department provides technical assistance, issues guidance on eligible activities, and conducts limited monitoring to ensure compliance, though primary oversight relies on grantee self-certification and periodic audits. Local grantees, including entitlement communities and state governments, hold primary responsibility for program implementation, exercising discretion in selecting and executing activities within HUD-prescribed categories such as housing rehabilitation, public facilities improvements, and economic development initiatives. Entitlement grantees must prepare an annual Action Plan as part of the Consolidated Planning process, detailing proposed uses of funds aligned with community needs assessments, and certify adherence to civil rights laws, fair housing goals, and the requirement that at least 70% of funds benefit low- and moderate-income persons over a consecutive one-, two-, or three-year period. States, administering funds for non-entitlement localities, similarly develop statewide plans and subgrant to eligible units of general local government, ensuring projects meet national objectives while managing procurement, environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act, and financial reporting to HUD. Grantees bear the legal and financial for all CDBG-funded projects, including conducting citizen participation processes to solicit input on priorities, maintaining detailed records for audits, and repaying funds if found in noncompliance during HUD reviews or Office of Inspector General investigations. HUD's role emphasizes enabling local flexibility—intended to reduce —while enforcing baseline standards, though critics note that decentralized administration can lead to varying effectiveness across grantees due to differences in local capacity and priorities. For instance, grantees must affirmatively further fair housing by overcoming impediments identified in their Analysis of Impediments, with HUD retaining authority to withhold future allocations for repeated violations.

Eligible Activities and Expenditure Categories

CDBG funds support a variety of activities outlined in 24 CFR Part 570, Subpart C, provided they align with one of the program's national objectives, such as benefiting low- and moderate-income persons, preventing or eliminating slums or , or addressing urgent needs. Eligible expenditures encompass acquisition of , public facility improvements, housing rehabilitation, initiatives, and public services, among others. Key expenditure categories include:
  • Acquisition: Funds may be used to purchase , including buildings, , or , for uses such as public facilities or housing development, or to acquire interests in property like easements.
  • Public Facilities and Improvements: Eligible costs cover the , , or of , such as water and sewer facilities, streets, parks, or senior centers, particularly in areas meeting national objectives.
  • Housing-Related Activities: of privately and publicly owned residential structures is permitted, including , upgrades, and modifications; new is allowed under limited circumstances, such as for certain or homeownership assistance for low-income buyers.
  • Economic Development: Assistance to for-profit businesses or nonprofits for job creation, such as loans, grants, or infrastructure improvements like site preparation, with requirements for public benefit standards and low/modest job retention.
  • Public Services: Provision of services benefiting low- and moderate-income residents, including , job training, , or recreation programs, is capped at no more than 15% of the grant amount plus program income received in prior years.
  • Clearance and Demolition: Removal of blighted structures, site clearance, and , often tied to anti-blight objectives.
  • Planning and Administration: Up to 20% of funds may cover planning activities like comprehensive plans or environmental reviews, and administrative costs such as staff salaries or audits.
Additional specialized activities, such as relocation payments, technical assistance to community-based organizations, or interim assistance for deteriorating areas, are also eligible under specific conditions. All expenditures must adhere to cost principles and environmental review requirements, with grantees responsible for ensuring activities do not subsidize prohibited uses like general government expenses.

Compliance, Reporting, and Oversight

Grantees of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program are required to comply with federal regulations outlined in 24 CFR Part 570, which mandates adherence to standards, environmental reviews under the (NEPA), civil rights laws including fair housing provisions, and labor standards such as Davis-Bacon wage requirements for certain activities. Compliance begins with certifications submitted as part of the Consolidated Planning process, where communities and states affirm that activities meet objectives of benefiting low- and moderate-income persons, preventing slums, or aiding urgent community needs, while ensuring no duplication of benefits and proper systems. to maintain records documenting these elements can result in findings of noncompliance during audits. Reporting obligations center on the Integrated Disbursement and Information System (IDIS), where grantees track expenditures, beneficiary data, and performance metrics, submitting updates to demonstrate alignment with grant agreements and formula-based allocations. Annual performance reports detail accomplishments against planned activities, including financial summaries and progress toward national objectives, with states required to review and report on non-entitlement areas. Grantees must also file Federal Financial Reports (SF-425) quarterly and annually, reconciling draws with actual outlays to comply with rules under 2 CFR 200.305, though audits have identified inconsistencies in these submissions affecting HUD's financial oversight. Subrecipients, often local nonprofits or contractors, face parallel requirements imposed by prime grantees, including progress reports on milestones and financial accountability to prevent waste. Oversight is primarily administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ()'s Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD), which conducts risk assessments, monitoring reviews, and technical assistance to ensure programmatic and fiscal integrity. The HUD Office of (OIG) performs s, such as evaluations of subrecipient controls and program income handling, revealing gaps like inadequate reconciliation of funds that heighten risks of improper use. Grantees must monitor subrecipients through site visits, desk reviews, and corrective action plans, with HUD empowered to impose sanctions including fund suspensions for persistent violations. Despite these mechanisms, OIG reports have noted opportunities for enhanced HUD tracking of financial data to bolster accountability across the program's decentralized structure.

Empirical Assessments of Impact

Economic and Housing Outcomes from Studies

Empirical studies employing quasi-experimental designs have identified modest positive economic impacts from CDBG , particularly in job . A 2024 analysis using a difference-in-differences approach on a 2012 allocation shock found that communities receiving increased CDBG grants experienced a 7.2% rise in jobs over eight years, equivalent to approximately 960 net jobs at a cost of $21,667 per job in total public spending. Similarly, an evaluation of over 40,000 CDBG investments in low-income tracts, combining synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods with LEHD job data from 2000–2016, estimated that high-intensity treatments (around $600,000 per tract) generated a 13% increase in jobs (about 140 jobs) over 10 years, primarily benefiting low-income workers, at a public spending cost of roughly $25,000 per job after accounting for a of 3.16. These effects were most pronounced for activities like business assistance and commercial construction, though spillovers were limited beyond adjacent tracts. On activity, indicates CDBG supports growth in density and proxies, with one across U.S. cities linking substantial investments to improvements in counts and job numbers, though primarily through correlations with expenditures rather than direct causation. However, broader or income reductions remain unproven, as program flexibility complicates isolating effects from local conditions or other factors. Housing outcomes show localized property value gains from targeted CDBG investments. An adjusted analysis of data spanning 1994–2021 in Jersey City, Los Angeles County, and Washington, D.C., revealed home price increases of 5% to 19% relative to counterfactuals within 2,000 feet of projects, with effects persisting over time but varying by investment scale and local context. rehabilitation activities, a common CDBG use, have been associated with property value appreciation in urban neighborhoods, though nonlinear thresholds apply—minimal impacts occur below $145,000 (in dollars) over five years. These findings align with earlier evidence of neighborhood stabilization but do not extend to widespread housing stock improvements or prevention. Assessments of overall program impact, including a 2012 GAO , emphasize mixed results and gaps: while specific interventions like yield benefits, the lack of uniform metrics and controls hinders conclusions on net economic or efficacy, with some studies showing negligible effects on rates from public services spending. Causal attribution remains challenging due to grantee discretion and confounding variables, underscoring the need for more rigorous, longitudinal evaluations.

Job Creation and Community Development Metrics

Grantees administering CDBG funds report performance metrics on job creation and retention primarily for economic development activities, such as business assistance and commercial , through HUD's Integrated Disbursement and (IDIS). These reports include the total number of businesses assisted and created or retained, with an emphasis on those benefiting low- and moderate-income individuals. However, HUD does not systematically collect or aggregate job data for other eligible activities, including , facilities improvements, or services, limiting comprehensive assessment of employment impacts across the program's $3.3 billion annual allocations. Aggregate self-reported data from grantees indicate substantial job support, though attribution to CDBG is complicated by confounding local economic factors and the inclusion of potentially temporary or speculative "retained" jobs. For instance, a 2025 compilation by the National Community Development Association (NCDA), drawing from grantee submissions since 2005, attributes 581,495 created or retained to CDBG through FY2024, with examples including 200 full-time positions from a company expansion in one locality, 103 of which served low-income workers. Empirical analyses attempting yield more modest estimates; a 2024 study published by HUD's Office of Policy Development and , employing difference-in-differences methodology on a 2012 funding allocation shock (data spanning 2002–2019), estimated CDBG increased local job counts by 7.2% over eight years for recipient areas relative to non-recipients, equating to roughly 960 per typical grantee at a cost of $21,667 per job based on Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics data. This study noted preliminary evidence of induced public spending increases (28%) but highlighted limitations like assumed parallel trends and potential from broader labor market shifts. Earlier from 1994–1999 across 17 cities found significant positive associations between CDBG spending and neighborhood job counts (regression coefficients of 0.60 to 0.77, p<0.05 in declining or stagnant areas), though effects were inconsistent across tract types and relied on proxies like business listings rather than direct . Community development metrics extend beyond employment to encompass housing, infrastructure, and service delivery outcomes, tracked via grantee reports on beneficiaries served and units improved, with a statutory focus on low- and moderate-income populations. In FY2024, CDBG expenditures included $453 million for single-family housing rehabilitation, contributing to 1.265 million such households assisted cumulatively since FY2005, alongside broader housing support reaching 2.1 million households total. Public services funding aided over 7 million individuals that year, including $36 million for employment training and $15 million for food assistance serving 2.9 million households. Infrastructure investments totaled $430 million for water and sewer upgrades, $293 million for streets, $103 million for sidewalks, and $185 million for parks, with cumulative projects since FY2005 benefiting 59 million people through enhanced facilities. These outputs align with CDBG's flexible design but face evaluation challenges, as GAO assessments note difficulties in isolating program effects from private investments or unrelated trends, with pre-2012 studies confirming contributions to neighborhood stabilization without quantifying net causal impacts.
Study/SourceKey MetricEstimatePeriod/Notes
HUD Cityscape (2024)Jobs increase7.2% over 8 years; $21,667 per jobDiD on 2012 shock; 960 jobs/grantee; preliminary, assumes parallel trends
Urban Institute (2011)Jobs in targeted tractsCoefficients 0.60–0.77 (p<0.05)1994–1999; positive in declining areas, inconsistent overall
NCDA AggregateJobs created/retained581,495 totalFY2005–2024; self-reported, economic dev focus
NCDA FY2024Housing rehab households (cumulative)1.265 million single-familySelf-reported; part of 2.1M total assisted

Limitations in Evaluating Program Effectiveness

Evaluating the effectiveness of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program is complicated by its inherent flexibility, which permits grantees to allocate funds across a broad spectrum of activities such as housing rehabilitation, , and initiatives tailored to local priorities. This hinders the aggregation of comparable outcome data, as diverse expenditure patterns defy standardization and national-level synthesis, a challenge echoed in assessments of similar block grants where variability in local implementation obscures attributable impacts. Consequently, systematic reviews often rely on disparate metrics, limiting the ability to draw robust conclusions about program-wide efficacy. Data limitations further impede rigorous analysis, with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Integrated Disbursement and (IDIS) plagued by inaccuracies, incomplete reporting, and reliance on self-submitted grantee lacking . For instance, approximately 30% of CDBG activities omit precise geographic addresses, reducing the pool of analyzable projects and complicating spatial matching to outcomes like or property values. These issues, compounded by measurement errors in beneficiary locations and outputs, have been flagged by the (GAO) as barriers to credible performance tracking, particularly for neighborhood-level effects that require granular, longitudinal datasets often unavailable or unreliable. Causal attribution poses additional hurdles, as isolating CDBG's incremental contributions from confounding local economic trends, state-level policies, or concurrent federal programs demands sophisticated counterfactuals rarely feasible at scale. Empirical studies employing methods like synthetic controls acknowledge biases from unobserved tract differences and endogenous treatment timing, where funding decisions correlate with pre-existing conditions, potentially inflating or understating effects on metrics such as job creation. The program's small-scale investments—median annual outlays around $50,000 per tract—further strain statistical power for detecting impacts amid noise from broader market dynamics, while long gestation periods for outcomes exacerbate selection and problems in non-experimental designs. These constraints collectively undermine confidence in evaluative claims, as correlational evidence dominates over experimental or quasi-experimental rigor, and grantee resource limitations curtail detailed longitudinal tracking. analyses highlight that without enhanced data protocols and common performance indicators, assessments risk overstating benefits or overlooking inefficiencies, perpetuating debates over the program's value despite its $3.5 billion annual scale.

Criticisms and Controversies

Inefficiency, Waste, and Lack of Accountability

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program has faced criticism for inefficiency and waste stemming from its structure, which affords grantees substantial flexibility in fund allocation but often results in inadequate monitoring and misuse of resources. (GAO) analyses have highlighted persistent challenges in federal grants management, including CDBG, where decentralized administration leads to inconsistent and difficulties in tracking outcomes. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued multiple audits documenting grantee failures to adhere to program requirements, such as improper expenditure documentation and subrecipient oversight deficiencies. Specific instances of waste include the City of , which, according to a 2017 HUD OIG audit, expended $163,555 in ineligible costs on general government expenses and left over $7.9 million in expenditures unsupported by adequate records. The audit further identified $428,373 at risk of questionable use due to failures in ensuring activities met national objectives and in monitoring subrecipients, attributing these lapses to insufficient internal controls and disregard for HUD guidelines. Comparable deficiencies have been reported in other localities, such as , where grantees inadequately documented activities, and , which faltered in contract administration. Fraudulent misuse exacerbates waste, as evidenced by a 2013 civil where a secured over $1.6 million in fraudulent reimbursements from CDBG and related federal funds, including nearly $1 million from sources, for unsubstantiated expenses; the case settled under the . In CDBG (CDBG-DR) allocations, identified heightened risks, including potential duplicative benefits to over 500 households totaling more than $1 million alongside FEMA aid, approvals for 197 ineligible high-income households (some exceeding $330,000 annually), and payments for invalid or vacant addresses. These issues arise partly from incomplete data collection—such as missing occupancy or ownership details in over half of reviewed cases—undermining eligibility verification and detection. Lack of accountability is compounded by limited federal oversight mechanisms, with HUD OIG recommending enhanced monitoring for direct assistance activities and GAO urging standardized data guidance to better assess eligibility and contractor networks. Critics, including policy analysts at the Heritage Foundation, contend that such systemic weaknesses justify program elimination, citing annual wasteful expenditures equivalent to $3.3 billion in flexible but untargeted funding. Congressional hearings have echoed these concerns, noting HUD's historical failure to track CDBG spending adequately, which enables diversion to non-priority uses like administrative overhead or unrelated local projects. While grantees are subject to single audits under the Uniform Guidance, the block grant's emphasis on local discretion often prioritizes expediency over rigorous verification, perpetuating inefficiencies.

Targeting and Equity Concerns

Critics of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program argue that its allocation fails to effectively target funds toward areas of greatest need, including low-income populations. A by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development () analyzed the 's performance using a community needs index derived from 20 variables, such as poverty rates, housing overcrowding, and . The study found that the 's ability to distribute funds proportional to need has steadily declined since the , with significant disparities emerging: high-need communities often receive allocations exceeding their needs index, while some low-need areas secure disproportionate shares due to outdated hold-harmless provisions and population-based s that favor larger jurisdictions over smaller, distressed ones. At the local level, the program's flexibility in expenditure decisions exacerbates targeting inefficiencies, as grantees are required to ensure only 70% of funds principally benefit low- and moderate-income (LMI) persons, leaving 30% for broader community activities that may not prioritize . Empirical analyses indicate that LMI neighborhoods are not consistently the primary recipients; for instance, a of spending patterns revealed that councils often allocate resources based on political districts rather than LMI concentration, with funds supporting public facilities or in higher-income zones. This misalignment stems from local priorities favoring visible infrastructure over direct alleviation, leading to criticisms that CDBG subsidizes networks instead of addressing concentrated disadvantage. Equity concerns also highlight rural-urban imbalances, as 70% of funds go to communities—typically areas with populations over 50,000—irrespective of levels, while states administer the remaining 30% for non-entitlements, often underserving remote low-income rural pockets. Critics, including policy analysts, contend this structure disadvantages smaller, high-need rural jurisdictions, where per capita needs may exceed those in cities but formulaic thresholds limit access. Such patterns raise questions about the program's fidelity to its statutory goal of aiding distressed communities, with evidence suggesting that without tighter need-based targeting, CDBG perpetuates inequities by diffusing resources across less urgent priorities.

Ideological Debates on Federal versus Local Control

The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, established by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, emerged from President Richard Nixon's advocacy for and block grants to consolidate fragmented categorical programs, thereby granting local governments greater flexibility in addressing community needs without prescriptive federal directives. This design reflected a Republican-led push toward , aiming to devolve decision-making authority to states and localities, which proponents argued would enhance efficiency by leveraging local knowledge of priorities and reducing bureaucratic layers. However, the program's retention of federal requirements—such as beneficiary consultations, low- and moderate-income targeting (at least 70% of funds), and nondiscrimination mandates—has fueled ongoing ideological tensions between advocates of centralized oversight and those favoring maximal local autonomy. Conservatives and libertarians, drawing from principles of and , contend that even ostensibly flexible block grants like CDBG perpetuate unnecessary federal entanglement, distorting local incentives and fostering dependency on rather than self-reliant governance. Organizations such as the have criticized CDBG for its vague objectives, which enable misuse for non-essential projects like parks or administrative overhead, rather than strictly aiding the poor, arguing that full or program elimination would compel localities to align spending with voter preferences through property taxes or bonds, thereby restoring fiscal . Similarly, analyses highlight how federal formula allocations—based on , , and housing —disincentivize local reform, as jurisdictions receive funds irrespective of performance, leading to networks and inefficient outcomes that a pure local funding model would mitigate via market-like discipline. These views prioritize causal mechanisms where proximity to decision-making improves , echoing historical arguments against centralized planning's knowledge limitations. In contrast, supporters of involvement, often aligned with or interventionist ideologies, maintain that national oversight is essential to counteract local , ensuring funds advance broader equity goals and prevent discriminatory exclusion of vulnerable populations. For instance, policy proposals within Democratic circles have sought to impose additional conditions on CDBG recipients, such as documenting land-use policies to expose exclusionary that disadvantages low-income or minority groups, positing that without such strings, affluent suburbs could hoard grants for cosmetic improvements while neglecting . This perspective underscores a in supremacy for enforcing civil and redistributive justice, viewing flexibility as insufficiently robust against local biases or , as evidenced by historical patterns where unrestrained municipal discretion favored entrenched interests over systemic needs. Critics of this stance, however, note that such arguments often emanate from institutions predisposed to expansive roles, potentially overlooking empirical instances where mandates have inflated costs—estimated at up to 10-20% of grants—without commensurate benefits in . The debate encapsulates broader disputes, with advocates arguing they strike a balance by curtailing while preserving minimal national standards, yet fiscal conservatives counter that any inherently undermines sovereignty and invites political capture at both levels. Over five decades, these positions have manifested in repeated reform battles, including Republican efforts in the 2017-2021 to cap or consolidate CDBG amid concerns, contrasted by bipartisan coalitions defending the for its adaptability to diverse locales. Ultimately, resolution hinges on unresolved questions of whether federal aggregation enables scale efficiencies or merely amplifies , with evidence from program evaluations suggesting mixed results that ideological priors often interpret selectively.

Proposed Reforms and Alternatives

Historical Reform Efforts

In 1977, amended the Housing and Community Development Act to introduce a second allocation for CDBG funds, designed to prioritize jurisdictions with greater needs such as higher rates, overcrowded , and aging , thereby addressing criticisms that the original single overly favored larger cities regardless of need. The most substantial historical reform came in via the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which created the CDBG state program for non- areas (typically smaller communities). This transferred administrative responsibility from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development directly to state governments, reducing federal involvement and embodying President Reagan's agenda to enhance state flexibility while cutting administrative costs. The change allocated 30% of CDBG appropriations to states for distribution, with the remaining 70% continuing to entitlement communities via . Broader Reagan-era efforts sought to consolidate dozens of categorical grants into larger "mega-block grants" to further devolve authority and streamline federal spending, though CDBG was not merged into these and retained its standalone status amid ongoing debates over local accountability. The program received its last formal reauthorization in 1992 with incremental adjustments to performance standards and reporting, but lacked comprehensive overhaul thereafter, reflecting congressional reluctance to impose stricter federal controls despite persistent critiques of fund diversion and measurable impact deficits.

Contemporary Proposals for Cuts or Elimination

The administration's fiscal year 2026 (FY 2026) discretionary budget request, released on May 2, 2025, proposes the complete elimination of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program as part of a broader $163 billion reduction in domestic non-defense spending. This would terminate the program's annual allocation of approximately $3.3 billion in formula grants to over 1,200 state and local governments, redirecting resources away from activities such as housing rehabilitation, infrastructure improvements, and initiatives. The proposal aligns with prior -era budgets, including those for FY 2018 through FY 2021, which similarly sought to phase out CDBG due to assessments of limited measurable impacts relative to costs and preferences for devolving responsibilities to states and localities. The FY 2026 blueprint frames the elimination within a $ billion cut to the Department of Housing and Urban overall, emphasizing fiscal restraint by consolidating or terminating programs deemed duplicative or ineffective, while increasing defense allocations by shifting $119.3 billion from non-defense categories. Proponents of such cuts, including administration officials, argue that CDBG's flexible formula-based distribution lacks sufficient accountability and performance metrics, often funding projects with marginal returns on investment compared to private-sector alternatives or targeted programs. Congressional Republicans have echoed elements of this approach in related proposals, such as the Congressional Office's 2024 option to reduce for certain and local grants—including categories—by 25% in 2026 and 50% thereafter, though not exclusively targeting CDBG. In response, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and advocacy groups have opposed the elimination, contending it would exacerbate deficits in small and rural communities reliant on CDBG for leveraging investments at ratios up to $5 per dollar. However, by July 2025, appropriations legislation rejected the full elimination, maintaining CDBG funding at enacted levels while advancing other reductions, indicating partial congressional resistance to wholesale termination. Alternative reform ideas from some Republicans, such as enhancing CDBG flexibility for supply incentives without cuts, have surfaced but remain distinct from elimination proposals. As of October 2025, the FY 2026 budget remains under negotiation, with the proposed CDBG elimination facing implementation hurdles amid priorities.

Block Grant Design Lessons and Broader Implications

The design of the (CDBG), enacted in to consolidate seven categorical programs into a flexible funding mechanism, demonstrated that can streamline administration by reducing bureaucratic layers and empowering governments to prioritize needs, as evidenced by efficiencies in grant processing and broader eligible activities like rehabilitation and public services. However, this flexibility has often resulted in funds supporting non-essential projects, such as promotion or administrative overhead exceeding 20% in some jurisdictions, rather than concentrating on low-income communities, underscoring a core lesson that broad mandates without stringent national targeting criteria dilute intended antipoverty impacts. Empirical evaluations, including those facing methodological hurdles like confounding factors, reveal inconsistent outcomes, with only modest improvements in quality and neighborhood stability in targeted areas, highlighting the need for designs to incorporate mandatory metrics and competitive elements to enhance accountability and outcomes. A further lesson from CDBG's formula-based allocation, which distributes over $3 billion annually primarily by and metrics, is that entitlement-style entrenches local dependencies while permitting , as seen in post-disaster reallocations that prioritize recovery over prevention, potentially exacerbating fiscal inefficiencies without built-in sunset provisions or reevaluations. Historical analyses of pre-1981 block grants, including CDBG precursors, indicate success in serving populations when paired with federal oversight, but warn against over-decentralization that invites political favoritism over evidence-based decisions. Reforms proposed over decades, such as tightening eligible activities or integrating data-driven assessments, emphasize that effective architecture requires balancing local discretion with federal guardrails like audited reporting and outcome-linked to mitigate waste, estimated in audits to reach 10-15% through mismanagement in some programs. Broader implications of CDBG's experience extend to debates, illustrating how block grants advance "" principles by devolving authority—reducing federal micro-management while fostering innovation, as locals adapted funds to regional contexts like in the 1970s—but at the risk of uneven equity and accountability absent robust interstate compacts or federal minimum standards. This model has influenced subsequent programs, such as in Medicaid waivers, revealing that while block grants curb categorical grant proliferation (which ballooned federal strings pre-1974), they demand causal monitoring to verify local multipliers on economic activity, often found lacking in CDBG's case where job creation claims rely on self-reported data prone to overestimation. Ultimately, CDBG underscores a first-principles caution for policymakers: decentralized funding amplifies local knowledge but necessitates verifiable metrics to align incentives with national goals, informing alternatives like performance-based grants that could replace static block structures for greater fiscal discipline.

References

  1. [1]
    Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program - HUD
    Missing: based | Show results with:based
  2. [2]
    [PDF] The Community Development Block Grant at 50 - HUD User
    Nov 18, 2024 · When CDBG was created in 1974 with the consolidation of eight programs, it initially set aside 90 percent of funds for entitlement cities that ...
  3. [3]
    [PDF] Taking Stock of the Community Development Block Grant
    Apr 6, 2017 · CDBG was created over four decades ago with the Housing and Community Development Act of. 1974. It was, in many ways, archetypal of efforts to ...
  4. [4]
    [PDF] Neighborhood Home Price Impacts of Community Development ...
    Since its passage in 1974, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program has provided billions of dollars in capital investment to local communities ...
  5. [5]
    [PDF] Examining the Local Economic Impacts of the Community ...
    Nov 18, 2024 · This article provides preliminary evidence on the job impacts of the Community Development Block. Grant (CDBG) program.
  6. [6]
    Views on Proposed Revisions to the Regulations Governing ... - GAO
    Reviews of CDBG programs suggest that program benefits have been reasonably well targeted to lower income persons. However, GAO has identified several problems ...Missing: controversies criticisms
  7. [7]
    History Shows That Block-Granting Low-Income Programs Leads to ...
    Jul 29, 2025 · And because block grants give state and local governments broad flexibility over implementation, block granting reduces accountability.
  8. [8]
    Nixon's New Federalism 45 Years Later - Brookings Institution
    Aug 11, 2014 · His revenue sharing proposal had to be dramatically increased before passing in Congress. The Community Development Block Grant initiative was ...
  9. [9]
    Block Grants | Center for the Study of Federalism
    General Revenue Sharing was enacted in 1972, and block grants for job training and community development followed in 1973 and 1974. The next wave of block ...
  10. [10]
    Community Development Block Grants
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, initially authorized by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, was one of the centerpieces ...
  11. [11]
    Federalism and Flexibility: Fifty Years of Community Development ...
    CDBG would prove to be the only durable element of the Nixon Administration's grand vision for a New Federalism. Nixon himself would resign on August 9 ...
  12. [12]
    S.3066 - Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
    Authorizes the Secretary to make grants to the States to assist them in developing State plans with respect to mobile home construction and safety requirements.
  13. [13]
    [PDF] CDBG Formula Targeting to Community Development Need
    Congress enacted legislation in 1977 (Housing and Community Development Act of 1977) that created a dual formula that would target funds to both places with ...
  14. [14]
    Community Development Block Grants: Funding and Allocation ...
    Mar 24, 2021 · As originally enacted in 1974, CDBG's authorizing legislation established a single, weighted formula for the allocation of funds to ...
  15. [15]
    [PDF] CDBG Policies and Procedures Manual
    Amendments to the HCDA in 1981 permitted states to administer the CDBG program for small cities, beginning in 1982. In West Virginia, the program is ...<|separator|>
  16. [16]
    [PDF] Community Development Fund 2015-01-29 - HUD Archives
    Jan 29, 2015 · seq.), the CDBG program's primary objective is to develop viable urban and rural communities, by expanding economic opportunities and improving ...
  17. [17]
    U.S.C. Title 42 - THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE - GovInfo
    Effective Date of 1992 Amendment. Pub. L. 102–550, §2, Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 3681, provided that: “The provisions ...
  18. [18]
    Congressmembers seek to reauthorize HUD programs - RESPA News
    Apr 14, 2025 · The HOME and CDBG programs have not been reauthorized by Congress since 1992. Flood and Cleaver are seeking public input on the initiative ...
  19. [19]
    COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANTS - HUD Archives
    The CDBG program provides flexible funding for communities across the Nation to develop and implement community and economic development strategies that ...
  20. [20]
    CDBG Laws and Regulations - HUD Exchange
    The HCD Act departed from this model by creating the CDBG Program. CDBG merged seven categorical programs into a block of flexible community development funds ...
  21. [21]
    Celebrating 50 years of Community Development Block Grants ...
    Aug 22, 2024 · TODAY we mark the 50th anniversary of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program! Let's take a moment to reflect on the impact ...
  22. [22]
    IEDC Presented HUD with Proclamation in Support of the CDBG ...
    Jun 4, 2024 · The proclamation was presented yesterday, June 3, at the CDBG 50th Anniversary Kickoff event at HUD's headquarters in the Brooke-Mondale ...
  23. [23]
    DCA Celebrates 50 Years of Community Development Block Grant ...
    Oct 15, 2024 · 2024 marks 50 years of Community Development Block Grants and its investment of resources into the Georgia communities who have needed it the ...
  24. [24]
    Community Development Block Grants: Making a ... - Boston.gov
    Mar 4, 2025 · In 2024, the Office of Workforce Development (OWD) joined 1200 communities across the country to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the ...
  25. [25]
    Toledo Celebrates 50 Years of Impact with Community Development ...
    Aug 23, 2024 · The City of Toledo and its partners celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program during an event ...
  26. [26]
    [PDF] Recognizing the Community Development Block Grant Program on ...
    Aug 22, 2024 · Recognizing the Community Development Block Grant Program on its 50th Anniversary. Washington, DC –. The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) ...
  27. [27]
    Nation's Mayors Urge Protection of Community Development Block ...
    Jul 14, 2025 · CDBG brings $3.3 Billion in federal funding to support infrastructure, housing construction, and public safety for Americans living in over ...
  28. [28]
    Community Development Block Grant - Congress.gov
    Sep 19, 2024 · When adjusted for inflation, CDBG funding levels have declined since the 1970s. A summary of trends in CDBG grantee participation and program ...
  29. [29]
    Senate Appropriations Committee Approves FY 2025 THUD Bill ...
    Aug 29, 2024 · The FY 2025 THUD bill provides $98.7 billion in net appropriations, representing about $160 million (0.16%) less than FY 2024 and $8.34 billion (8.4%) more ...Public Housing Fund · Community Planning And... · Homeless And Supportive...<|separator|>
  30. [30]
    Allocations for Community Development Block Grant Disaster ...
    Jan 16, 2025 · This Allocation Announcement Notice identifies grant requirements for these funds, including requirements in HUD's CDBG-DR Universal Notice (“ ...
  31. [31]
    24 CFR 570.208 -- Criteria for national objectives. - eCFR
    The following criteria shall be used to determine whether a CDBG-assisted activity complies with one or more of the national objectives as required under § 570 ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] CDBG Chapter 3: National Objectives - HUD Exchange
    ✓ CDBG Guide to National Objectives and Eligible Activities for. Entitlement ... moderate income beneficiaries, but it further ensures that the CDBG program will ...
  33. [33]
    State CDBG Program Eligibility Requirements - HUD Exchange
    Over a 1, 2, or 3-year period, as selected by the grantee, not less than 70 percent of CDBG funds must be used for activities that benefit low- and moderate- ...Missing: focus | Show results with:focus
  34. [34]
    24 CFR Part 570 -- Community Development Block Grants - eCFR
    24 CFR Part 570 describes policies for Community Development Block Grants, including entitlement, nonentitlement, special purpose, and urban development grants ...Missing: reauthorizations | Show results with:reauthorizations
  35. [35]
    CDBG Low- and Moderate-Income Data - HUD Exchange
    [Certain exception grantees may qualify activities as area-benefit with fewer LMI persons than 51 percent.] National Objectives and Eligibility Guide for CDBG ...
  36. [36]
    [PDF] community development block grant program - HUD User
    regulations concerning the removal of architectural barriers, it also amended them to revise the term used for this purpose. The regulations now use the.
  37. [37]
    Community Development Block Grants: Funding and Allocation ...
    Mar 24, 2021 · health and safety of residents. Approximately 70% of CDBG program funds are distributed to entitlement communities, defined as (1) principal
  38. [38]
    Community Development Block Grant Grantee Areas
    This dataset denotes the boundaries of CDBG Entitlement Communities and State Administered Non-Entitlement CDBG grantees.
  39. [39]
    Assistance Listings Community Development Block Grants/State's ...
    Of the 50 grants allocated to states under the State CDBG program in FY 2024, the average (mean) grant amount is $18,776,274. Grant amounts range from ...
  40. [40]
    CDBG Entitlement Program Eligibility Requirements - HUD Exchange
    Over a 1, 2, or 3-year period, as selected by the grantee, not less than 70 percent of CDBG funds must be used for activities that benefit low- and moderate- ...
  41. [41]
    CDBG Entitlement Program - HUD Exchange
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Entitlement Program provides grants to entitled cities and counties to develop viable urban communities.
  42. [42]
    Subpart C—Local Governments; Contents of Consolidated Plan
    The jurisdiction must submit a certification that the housing activities to be undertaken with CDBG ... planning requirements. [90 FR 11023, Mar. 3, 2025] ...
  43. [43]
  44. [44]
  45. [45]
  46. [46]
  47. [47]
  48. [48]
  49. [49]
  50. [50]
    [PDF] An Evaluation of the CDBG Formula's Targeting to Community ...
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program provides approximately $3.5 billion in flexible grants annually to cities, states, and counties to support ...
  51. [51]
    [PDF] CDBG Formula and Appropriation Process - HUD Exchange
    The first explains how and when CDBG funds are allocated to grantees; the second explains why CDBG grant amounts can vary over time. Choose which of the ...
  52. [52]
    CPD Formula Allocations for FY 2025 Released
    May 16, 2025 · On May 13, HUD released formula allocation amounts approved for the Office of Community Planning and Development's (CPD) formula programs for fiscal year (FY) ...Missing: details | Show results with:details
  53. [53]
    [PDF] CED-77-2 Why the Formula for Allocating Community Development ...
    The CDBG formula was designed to allocate funds on the basis of communities' needs according to the communities' population, poverty, and overcrowded housing.
  54. [54]
    Chapter 1: CDBG Program Overview
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was authorized in 1974 via Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA).
  55. [55]
    An Evaluation of the CDBG Formula's Targeting to Community ...
    Feb 13, 2024 · An equitable formula under the CDBG program would distribute funds proportional to an area's community development needs as implied by the ...
  56. [56]
    [PDF] Community Development Block Grants: Recent Funding History
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, administered by the Department of. Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was first authorized by Title I of ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  57. [57]
    [PDF] Trends in CDBG Program Funding and Grantee Participation
    Sep 19, 2024 · In FY2024, HUD allocated roughly $3.3 billion in CDBG funds in nominal dollars to entitlement, state, and insular area grantees. In nominal ...
  58. [58]
    CDBG: Community Development Block Grant Programs
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program supports community development activities to build stronger and more resilient communities.CDBG Laws and Regulations · CDBG Entitlement · And Moderate-Income DataMissing: key | Show results with:key<|separator|>
  59. [59]
    24 CFR Part 570 Subpart C -- Eligible Activities - eCFR
    CDBG funds may be used for the construction of housing assisted under section 17 of the United States Housing Act of 1937. (n) Homeownership assistance. CDBG ...
  60. [60]
    [PDF] CDBG Guide to National Objectives and Eligibile Activities Chapter 2
    CDBG funds can be used for activities like acquisition of real property, public facilities, public services, and housing construction.
  61. [61]
  62. [62]
  63. [63]
  64. [64]
    [PDF] CDBG-MIT-Financial-Management-Grant-Compliance-Certification ...
    Each Grantee must have financial management systems, including records documenting compliance with. Federal statutes, regulations, and the terms and conditions ...
  65. [65]
    [PDF] Playing by the Rules: Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements
    Accurate recordkeeping for reporting compliance is crucial for the successful management of your CDBG-funded activities. It is essential for tracking your ...
  66. [66]
    [PDF] Appendix E: IDIS Report Catalog - HUD Archives
    Pages 7 and 8 display CDBG beneficiaries by race/ethnicity categories and CDBG beneficiaries by income category. Page 9 and 10 display HOME disbursements ...
  67. [67]
    CDBG Reports, Program Data, and Income Limits - HUD Exchange
    This page provides reports, program data, and income limits related to the following Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Programs.
  68. [68]
    CDBG Grantee Federal Financial Reporting - HUD OIG
    CDBG Grantee Federal Financial Reporting. CDBG Grantee Federal Financial ... compliance with cash management requirements (2 CFR 200.305b) and to ...
  69. [69]
    [PDF] CDBG Subrecipient Oversight Guidebook: Monitoring Strategies and ...
    To ensure that required records are maintained to demonstrate compliance with applicable regulations. Managing CDBG: Subrecipient Oversight | Chapter 5-15. Page ...
  70. [70]
    [PDF] Final CPD Risk Notice_CLEAN_FINAL 2022-02-09 - HUD
    Feb 9, 2022 · During the last three fiscal years, the grantee has experienced turnover in at least one key position within its grant administration, AND the ...
  71. [71]
    HUD's Oversight of CDBG-DR Grantees' Use of Program Income
    Opportunities existed for HUD to improve its oversight of program income funds to reduce risks related to the reporting, reconciling, and spending of program ...
  72. [72]
    [PDF] Managing Subrecipients of CDBG Grantees - HUD User
    In fact, as federal officials monitor CDBG grantees to determine whether their programs are in compliance, subrecipient management is one of the most actively ...<|separator|>
  73. [73]
    Financial Information Collected from CDBG ... - Oversight.gov
    ... (CDBG) Entitlement program ... compliance with cash management requirements and ... HUD's financial statements in accordance with Federal financial reporting ...
  74. [74]
    [PDF] Evidence from the Community Development Block Grant
    Nov 18, 2020 · This suggests that the CDBG is relatively cost-effective compared to other programs that have been studied, including cash incentives for firms ...
  75. [75]
    [PDF] The Impact of CDBG Spending on Urban Neighborhoods
    1.7 - "Neighborhoods with substantial levels of CDBG investment will show improvements in such dimensions as household income, employment, business activity,.
  76. [76]
    HUD Has Identified Performance Measures for Its Block Grant ...
    Information on the overall effectiveness (or impact) of the CDBG and HOME programs is limited. According to HUD officials, the agency has faced challenges ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  77. [77]
    The Home Price Impacts of CDBG-Funded Investments
    The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program has been one of the largest federal programs supporting lower-income communities, yet there have been ...Missing: effectiveness | Show results with:effectiveness
  78. [78]
    [PDF] IMPACT AND FUNDING NEED - A Report of the CDBG Coalition
    The remaining funding is split between local jurisdictions (entitlement communities) (70 percent) and states (30 percent). Entitlement grantees are metropolitan.
  79. [79]
    [PDF] CDBG Impact Report - National Community Development Association
    The CDBG program preserves affordable housing by helping seniors and other low-income ... The impact of the CDBG program extends far beyond individual homes.Missing: evaluation peer<|separator|>
  80. [80]
    Improving Outcome Accountability of Block Grants: Lessons Learned ...
    The flexibility federal block grants provide recipients poses challenges for evaluation. These challenges include aggregating data on wide-ranging ...
  81. [81]
    [PDF] GAO-23-106797, Grants Management: Observations on Challenges ...
    May 2, 2023 · What GAO Found. GAO has identified challenges on federal grants management in its work spanning several decades, including in the following ...
  82. [82]
    The City of Fresno, CA, Did Not Administer Its Community ... - HUD OIG
    We audited the City of Fresno's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. We selected the City based on prior findings identified by the U.S..Missing: misuse | Show results with:misuse
  83. [83]
    The City of Albuquerque, NM, Did Not Administer Its Community ...
    The City did not always properly administer and adequately document its CDBG program activities in accordance with HUD requirements.Missing: misuse | Show results with:misuse
  84. [84]
    The City of West Palm Beach, FL, Did Not Properly Administer Its ...
    The City failed to properly administer its CDBG program in accordance with HUD requirements. Specifically, the City was deficient in (1) contract administration ...
  85. [85]
    Final Civil Action – Fraudulent Expenses Paid from Community ...
    A contractor fraudulently received and reimbursed expenses from CDBG funds. The contractor agreed to pay over $1.6 million, with nearly $1 million from HUD ...Missing: examples | Show results with:examples
  86. [86]
    [PDF] GAO-23-104382, Disaster Recovery: HUD Should Develop Data ...
    Aug 17, 2023 · The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 created the. CDBG program to develop viable urban communities by providing decent housing and ...
  87. [87]
    HUD Can Improve Its Oversight of Community Development Block ...
    Our audit objective was to determine whether HUD had adequate oversight of Community Development Block Grant direct home-ownership assistance activities.<|control11|><|separator|>
  88. [88]
    10 Ways Heritage's Budget Plan Cuts Unfair Handouts and Waste
    May 30, 2019 · 10 Ways Heritage's Budget Plan Cuts Unfair Handouts and Waste ; Eliminate the Community Development Block Grant. Savings: $3.3 billion. ; Reform ...Missing: criticism | Show results with:criticism
  89. [89]
    Subcommittee Examines Waste, Fraud, Abuse in HUD Spending ...
    Sep 10, 2013 · “Over the years, HUD has failed to adequately account for how taxpayer funds are being spent in the CDBG program, leading to wasteful spending ...Missing: examples | Show results with:examples
  90. [90]
    [PDF] Block Grants Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions - GAO
    Sep 1, 1995 · The single audit assesses the financial integrity and internal control of the entities receiving block grant funds and implementing programs.Missing: inefficiency criticisms
  91. [91]
    Where Does the Bucket Leak? Sending Money to the Poor via the ...
    In this article, we examine the distribution of CDBG funds relative to the share of LMI people at the council-district and neighborhood levels.
  92. [92]
    Anti-Poverty Community Development Block Grants Are a Total Failure
    Nov 30, 2017 · Local officials quickly betrayed the CDBG's ostensible antipoverty mission, using the grants to supply patronage jobs and set up nonprofits run ...
  93. [93]
    The Future of Community Development Block Grants
    Apr 14, 2023 · Many recipients that rely on CDBG funding maintain exclusionary land use and zoning practices that limit the development of affordable housing.
  94. [94]
    CDBG: A Ripe Target for DOGE | Cato at Liberty Blog
    Dec 5, 2024 · There are a variety of issues with CDBG, including a broad, ambiguous mission and funding ill-targeted to low-income people. Policymakers ...Missing: controversies | Show results with:controversies
  95. [95]
    [PDF] Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies - Congress.gov
    Nov 4, 2022 · Block grant critics argue that block grants can undermine the achievement of national objectives and can be used as a “backdoor” means to reduce ...
  96. [96]
    Let's Kill the CDBG - City Journal
    Dec 6, 2017 · Worse, the CDBG has created a local patronage racket, funding politically connected nonprofits that do little to spur economic development. And ...
  97. [97]
    [PDF] Block Grants - Urban Institute
    Republican control. In 1971, President Nixon proposed consolidating 129 different programs into six block grants. A Democratic Congress rejected Nixon's ...<|separator|>
  98. [98]
    Restoring Responsible Government by Cutting Federal Aid to the ...
    May 20, 2019 · Cutting federal aid would reduce federal budget deficits, but more importantly it would improve the performance of federal, state, and local governments.
  99. [99]
    [PDF] Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies - Congress.gov
    Nov 4, 2022 · Block grant advocates argue that block grants increase government efficiency and program effectiveness by redistributing power and ...
  100. [100]
    Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Federalism ...
    For the Federal-State and Federal-Local block grants, beginning on October 1, 1983, a recipient could take 20 percent of the money from the program and spend it ...
  101. [101]
    FY 2026 Trump Budget Blueprint Proposes $163 Billion in Domestic ...
    May 16, 2025 · The blueprint proposes eliminating the CDBG program, which provides $3.3 billion in formula grants to more than 1,200 state and local ...
  102. [102]
    President Trump Releases “Skinny” Budget Request ...
    May 2, 2025 · The “skinny” budget also proposes eliminating the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program and the HOME Investment Partnerships Program.
  103. [103]
    President Trump's FY2026 Budget: Overview of Changes to Federal ...
    Jun 11, 2025 · Community Development (-$4.7B)​​ Eliminates several community development programs, including: The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) HOME ...
  104. [104]
    House Bill Maintains CDBG, Slashes Funding for Zoning Reform
    Jul 18, 2025 · Maintains funding for CDBG at current levels and rejects the state block grant approach. · Rejects a proposed shuffling of homelessness programs ...Missing: conservative involvement
  105. [105]
    What's in Trump's 2026 budget proposal? - USAFacts
    Jun 26, 2025 · The 2026 proposed budget would shift $119.3B from non-defense programs to defense programs. Base discretionary funding by type, 2025 enacted and ...
  106. [106]
    Reduce Funding for Certain Grants to State and Local Governments
    Dec 12, 2024 · This option would reduce new funding for the following grants by 25 percent in 2026 and by 50 percent after 2026.
  107. [107]
    Mayors Urge Congress to Reject Proposed Cuts to Hollow Out ...
    May 2, 2025 · In particular, it calls for fully eliminating the Community Development Block Grant Program and the HOME Investment Partnership Program. In ...
  108. [108]
    [PDF] Proposed Elimination of CDBG and HOME Programs in Trump ...
    May 7, 2025 · Grantees reported that CDBG investments leveraged an average of $5.02 for every $1.00 of CDBG grant funding during 2022. Page 2. – amplifying ...Missing: cut 2020-2025
  109. [109]
    Congressman Sam Liccardo Introduces Bill to Reform Federal ...
    Sep 3, 2025 · “This targeted legislation would give communities across the state the flexibility to use CDBG dollars to directly address housing supply needs.
  110. [110]
    Trump Administration Releases Full FY 2026 Budget with ...
    Jun 2, 2025 · The proposed grant program would also place a two-year cap on rental assistance for able bodied adults and would eliminate funding for self- ...
  111. [111]
    [PDF] Practitioner Perspective on Community Development Block Grants ...
    Nov 18, 2024 · CDBG's 50-year history is a testament to the power of federal-local partnerships in advancing community development goals. While celebrating ...
  112. [112]
    Assessing and Improving the Community Development Block Grant
    Apr 13, 2017 · With greater guidance from HUD, rather than elimination, the true effects of CDBG can become apparent. In reviewing CDBG, the program's ...
  113. [113]
    Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs)
    Jun 21, 2022 · There is some evidence that Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) improve housing quality, housing stability, and neighborhood quality in ...
  114. [114]
    [PDF] IPE-82-8 Lessons Learned From Past Block Grants
    Sep 23, 1982 · Block grant programs enacted before 1981 have successfully targeted services to people designated as economically disad- vantaged. The Congress ...<|separator|>
  115. [115]
    Community Development Block Grants at 40: Time for a Makeover
    This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, the federal government's largest program providing ...
  116. [116]
    [PDF] Block Grants, Entitlements and Federalism
    Dec 6, 1995 · The popular press is currently filled with articles in which words like. "block grant," "entitlement," "federalism," and "devolution" figure.
  117. [117]
    Block Grants and Federalism: Decentralizing Decisions
    This paper, the first a series of papers on federalism and block grants, examines some of the constitutional issues surround ing federalism and national finan ...Missing: implications | Show results with:implications
  118. [118]
    We need to know more about block grant programs to improve them
    Apr 13, 2017 · The program's inherent flexibility raises concerns that local allocations of CDBG funding do not adequately target low-income people's needs.Missing: failure | Show results with:failure<|control11|><|separator|>