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Daniel McCann

Daniel McCann (30 November 1957 – 6 March 1988) was a volunteer in the (PIRA), a organization engaged in an armed campaign against British rule in during . A member of the PIRA's Brigade, McCann had prior convictions for possession of explosives and participated in operations targeting security forces, including the 1987 killing of two officers at docks. He was killed unarmed alongside fellow PIRA members and by (SAS) soldiers in during , an intelligence-led effort to thwart a suspected attack on a British military ceremony. The shootings, in which the trio posed no immediate detonable threat despite surveillance indicating active service, prompted the 1995 judgment in McCann and Others v. , which found a violation of the due to procedural deficiencies in planning and execution, though the UK maintained the action was necessary to avert mass casualties. McCann's death highlighted tensions within the PIRA over strategic shifts toward politics versus continued violence, as he reportedly opposed the Adams-McGuinness faction's direction and was reluctant about the high-risk mission.

Early Life

Family Background and Upbringing

Daniel McCann was born on 30 November 1957 in the Clonard area of West , , into a family with ties to . His early education took place at St Gall's Primary School in , followed by attendance at St Mary's Grammar School. McCann's upbringing occurred amid the intensifying violence of , a conflict that began in the late 1960s and profoundly shaped daily life in republican neighborhoods like Clonard, characterized by frequent clashes between nationalists and British security forces.

First Encounters with Conflict

McCann was born on 30 November 1957 in the Clonard area of West , a predominantly Catholic neighborhood within the Falls Road district that became a focal point of and civil unrest during the early stages of . The period from 1969 onward saw escalating clashes between nationalist communities and British security forces, including frequent riots, barricades, and confrontations amid demands for civil rights and opposition to perceived policies. Growing up in this environment, McCann, then a teenager attending St. Mary's , encountered the conflict directly through the pervasive atmosphere of unrest in his locality. In 1973, at the age of 15, McCann participated in rioting, resulting in his and for riotous behaviour. He received a six-month sentence, marking his initial direct involvement with the authorities amid the . This early incarceration exposed him to the penal system during a time when young nationalists in faced routine charges related to public order offenses in hotspots like the Falls and Clonard areas, often amid broader cycles of and retaliation. Upon release, these experiences contributed to his subsequent alignment with paramilitary activities, though formal recruitment into the Provisional IRA followed later that year.

IRA Involvement

Recruitment and Initial Activities

Daniel McCann enlisted in the () shortly after serving a six-month sentence for riotous behaviour, stemming from his first at age sixteen while still a schoolboy in West Belfast. Born on 30 November 1957 in the Clonard district—a republican enclave amid escalating in the early 1970s—McCann's recruitment aligned with patterns observed among youth in such areas, where exposure to rioting and deployments during events like radicalized many into ranks. As a new IRA volunteer in the Belfast Brigade, McCann's early activities focused on low-level support roles typical for recruits, including street patrols and intelligence gathering in response to loyalist and security force incursions, though specific operations from this period remain sparsely detailed in declassified records. By the late , his involvement escalated, leading to subsequent arrests linked to IRA plotting, marking his transition from novice to active operative amid the brigade's campaign of bombings and shootings in urban .

Imprisonments and Escapes

McCann was first imprisoned in 1973 at the age of 15 for riotous behavior, receiving a six-month sentence. Following his release, he joined the Provisional IRA later that year and became involved in paramilitary activities. He faced subsequent convictions, including a two-year sentence for possession of explosives, as documented in European Court of Human Rights records related to his later case. McCann was imprisoned on three additional occasions after 1973, with one period spanning from 1979 to 1981 during the IRA's campaign for political status in Northern Ireland's prisons. During this time, he participated in the in the Maze Prison's H-Blocks, where republican prisoners refused prison uniforms to assert , amid escalating tensions that culminated in hunger strikes. These imprisonments reflected his escalating role in operations, though specific charges for the 1979–1981 term are not detailed in available primary records beyond the broader context of explosives and related offenses. No verified accounts indicate successful escapes by McCann from custody.

Notable Bombings and Operations

McCann, as a senior operative in the Provisional IRA's Belfast Brigade, was linked by security forces to multiple lethal operations, primarily gun and rocket assaults targeting security personnel. These activities contributed to his reputation as a key figure in the IRA's campaign of assassinations during the mid-1980s. A prominent operation attributed to McCann occurred on 26 August 1987, when two gunmen entered the Liverpool Bar in 's docks area and fatally shot Detective Constables Michael Malone, aged 35, and Ernest Carson, aged 50, at close range. A third RUC officer and a civilian were also wounded in the , which sources identified McCann and as executing on behalf of the IRA. Security assessments held McCann responsible for involvement in at least 26 murders overall, encompassing strikes on fortified targets and targeted shootings, though specific details on additional bombings remain limited in beyond his prior conviction for explosives possession. These operations underscored the IRA's tactical shift toward precision killings of perceived high-value targets amid intensified counter-terrorism efforts.

Gibraltar Operation

Mission Planning and Intent

The (IRA) deployed an consisting of Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell, and Sean Savage to with the objective of detonating a against . The aimed to target a ceremonial event featuring the Royal Anglian Regiment band during the Ceremony of the Keys, scheduled for March 8, 1988, at the territory's main parade ground, with the intent to inflict mass casualties on uniformed soldiers and disrupt British governance in the overseas territory. Planning for the mission originated from Southern Command and involved prior trips across the Spain-Gibraltar border to identify optimal parking sites for the explosive-laden and routes. The acquired a white in Spain, which was loaded with approximately 140 pounds of plastic explosive, a , and a radio-controlled firing mechanism intended for remote activation once the unit had crossed back into Spain. McCann, as a senior operative with experience in bombings, coordinated logistics, including the synchronization of the team's movements to avoid detection during the planting phase. The unit convened at on March 4, 1988, before proceeding to the border, reflecting a deliberate timeline to position the device undetected ahead of the target ceremony. This no-warning attack aligned with the IRA's broader strategy of high-impact bombings against military symbols of British authority, as evidenced by the unit's possession of operational explosives confirmed post-incident by forensic examination. British intelligence, informed by intercepted communications and , anticipated the plot's execution on March 6, prompting preemptive countermeasures.

Arrival and Surveillance

On 4 March 1988, surveillance operations identified Daniel McCann, Sean Savage, and Mairead Farrell arriving separately at in southern , where they briefly met before initial tracking was lost. Spanish authorities, in coordination with British intelligence, re-established monitoring as the trio traveled toward the border, suspecting them of planning a bombing targeting a band parade scheduled for 8 March in 's assembly area. Elements of the British (SAS), including surveillance teams, had been prepositioned in prior to 4 March to support the operation, drawing on prior intelligence about IRA activity in the region. By 6 March, enhanced cross-border surveillance confirmed the group's movements. Sean Savage crossed into first at approximately 12:45 CET, driving a white Spanish-registered , which he parked in the Landport car park adjacent to the parade assembly area, approximately 500 yards from the Governor's residence; the vehicle was later assessed as containing 400-500 pounds of explosives without an immediate detonator. McCann and Farrell followed on foot, entering via the crossing around 14:30, appearing unarmed and dressed in light clothing consistent with the mild weather. Undercover British and police, augmented by operatives in plain clothes, maintained close visual on the three as they conducted what was interpreted as a final of the target site, with McCann and Farrell observed walking together while trailed at a distance after securing the vehicle. Radio communications between surveillance units reported no visible weapons or radio detonators on the suspects, though operational protocols emphasized the IRA's history of using dead-man switches and time-delay fuses, heightening threat assessments. The monitoring relied on joint Spanish-British intelligence-sharing, which had flagged the 5's suspicious parking and the group's prior associations with bomb-making operations.

SAS Engagement and Deaths

On 6 March 1988, members of the British () shot dead three () members—Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell, and Sean Savage—in Gibraltar's civilian area during an interception operation. had tracked the trio after they parked a vehicle suspected of containing a , and as they proceeded on foot through the , personnel moved to confront them. Sean Savage separated from McCann and Farrell, running southward into an alleyway where two soldiers pursued and fired multiple rounds, killing him. Simultaneously, two other members approached McCann and Farrell on a nearby street, shooting them repeatedly at close range and causing their immediate deaths. A total of 27 bullets were discharged across the engagements, with all three targets struck in the head and body, including shots to the back. McCann (aged 30), Farrell (31), and Savage (24) died from multiple gunshot wounds at the scene; post-shooting examinations confirmed they were unarmed and carried no detonation device at the time. The operation, codenamed Flavius, aimed to neutralize a perceived imminent ahead of a planned attack on British personnel.

Investigations and Controversies

Gibraltar Inquest

The inquest into the deaths of Daniel McCann, Sean , and Mairead Farrell opened on 6 1988 before 's coroner, , and an 11-member jury, examining the circumstances of their fatal shootings by undercover British (SAS) soldiers on 6 March 1988. Proceedings lasted several weeks, featuring testimonies from police, forensic experts, and anonymous SAS personnel identified as Soldiers A through G, who described the operation as a preemptive response to an anticipated (IRA) bombing targeting a ceremony. The SAS evidence asserted that the trio posed an immediate threat, with Savage observed parking a containing 140 pounds of explosive near the target site earlier that day, and all three allegedly making gestures interpreted as reaching for a radio-controlled at the moment of engagement. Forensic testimony confirmed the absence of firearms on the victims' bodies at the time of death, though a dismantled detonator was later recovered from Savage's clothing and explosive residue linked to the parked Renault 5, supporting claims of a planned car bomb attack. Pathological evidence indicated McCann was shot multiple times in the head and body while standing near Farrell, with ballistic analysis attributing the shots to SAS 9mm pistols fired without prior warning, as soldiers testified that any delay risked detonation given the suspects' suspected possession of a trigger device. Gibraltar authorities presented surveillance logs showing the three had entered the territory separately using false identities—McCann via ferry from Tangier—and were tracked as an IRA active service unit based on prior intelligence from Spanish and British sources. Families of the deceased, represented by lawyers including Michael Mansfield QC, challenged the SAS accounts, alleging procedural unfairness such as the anonymity of witnesses and restricted access to certain evidence, but the coroner ruled the soldiers' identities protected for operational security. After over six hours of deliberation on 30 September 1988, the jury returned a 9-2 majority verdict of lawful killing for all three deaths, concluding the actions were justified under and prevention of imminent terrorist harm, despite no direct evidence of weapons in hand. The verdict aligned with British government positions, prompting relief from officials including Sir , who described it as vindicating the ' intelligence-driven intervention. Critics, including representatives and some legal observers, contested the findings as influenced by the inquest's location under British jurisdiction and evidentiary constraints, though no successful appeal overturned the coroner's determinations at the time.

European Court of Human Rights Case

The relatives of Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell, and Sean Savage lodged an application with the (ECtHR) on 12 April 1991, alleging violations of Articles 2 (), 13 (right to an effective remedy), and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the arising from the killings on 6 March 1988 in . The applicants contended that the operation by British (SAS) personnel constituted an unlawful use of lethal force, as the deceased were unarmed at the time of the shootings and no attempt had been made to them, despite prior indicating they posed no immediate threat. The government maintained that the SAS soldiers had acted lawfully under Article 2, paragraph 2, in and to prevent an imminent terrorist attack, based on intelligence that the three were transporting a intended for detonation in . In its judgment delivered on 27 September 1995, the ECtHR, by a majority of 10 votes to 9, found a substantive violation of Article 2, ruling that the planning and conduct of failed to ensure that lethal force was resorted to only as a measure of last resort. The Court accepted that the soldiers honestly believed the suspects were about to detonate a , justifying their perception of an immediate , but emphasized that the authorities' overall strategy—allowing the suspects to enter with the vehicle unchecked and forgoing arrest opportunities—did not adequately balance the against the . It noted specific shortcomings, including the lack of coordination to intercept the at the Spanish border and the failure to reassess intelligence in , which rendered the operation foreseeably lethal without sufficient safeguards. No violation was found under Article 2's procedural limb, as the subsequent provided adequate , nor under Articles 13 or 14. The Court awarded the applicants £38,700 in respect of costs and expenses incurred in proceedings, but dismissed claims for non-pecuniary damages, recognizing the complex security context while prioritizing the Convention's strict standards for deprivations of life by state agents. The decision drew dissenting opinions from nine judges, who argued that the operation's exigencies in countering an active bombing plot justified the force used, given the suspects' prior involvement in and the high risk of casualties. This ruling set a for scrutinizing state anti-terrorism operations under Article 2, requiring proactive measures to exhaust non-lethal alternatives even in high-threat scenarios.

Allegations of Shoot-to-Kill Policy

Following the shootings on March 6, 1988, allegations surfaced that British security forces, including the , adhered to a shoot-to-kill policy in operations against members, prioritizing lethal force over opportunities despite extended of the suspects. Critics, including the victims' families and Irish republican groups, argued that Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell, and Sean Savage could have been apprehended alive, as they were unarmed at the time of death, separated from the parked containing approximately 500 pounds of explosive (without an on-site ), and under observation for several days prior to the engagement. These claims were amplified by the documentary , broadcast on April 28, 1988, which included eyewitness testimonies alleging the suspects raised their hands in before being fired upon without verbal challenge, suggesting no imminent threat justified the pre-emptive shots. The , in its 1995 judgment in McCann and Others v. , lent partial credence to such concerns by ruling 10-7 that the operation violated Article 2 of the , as the planning failed to minimize recourse to lethal force despite indicating the detonator was likely transported separately (later recovered in ). The noted flaws in the assessment of feasibility, including the decision to forgo challenges earlier in the when risks were lower, though it accepted the soldiers' honest belief in an immediate detonation threat based on permitting shots to neutralize perceived bombers. described the killings as an unlawful extra-judicial execution, citing the absence of weapons on the victims and the lack of attempt to incapacitate rather than kill. Declassified documents from 2025 revealed officials considered withholding about the bomb's prior parking (reducing immediacy of threat), which further fueled perceptions of a policy favoring elimination of high-value operatives abroad to avoid capture and . British authorities rejected the shoot-to-kill characterization, maintaining that the acted lawfully under operational protocols where suspects believed to possess or access a posed an instantaneous lethal risk to civilians and forces in the densely populated area. The inquest in returned verdicts of lawful killing, with the jury accepting evidence that the suspects' movements—such as Savage approaching the car and Farrell and McCann turning toward soldiers—were interpreted as preparatory to , necessitating rapid headshots to ensure neutralization. Government inquiries, including the 1989 Windlesham-Rampton report on the documentary, upheld the soldiers' accounts while criticizing portrayal but found no systemic policy of , attributing the outcome to the high-stakes context of preventing a no-warning attack timed for a . These allegations echoed broader accusations of shoot-to-kill practices by forces in , though Gibraltar's extraterritorial nature and the suspects' active status—McCann as a known bomb-maker—distinguished it as a counter-terrorism interception rather than routine policing.

Aftermath and Legacy

Funeral and Republican Commemoration

The remains of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage, and were repatriated to following their deaths in and buried together in the republican plot at , , on 16 March 1988. The joint IRA-organized funeral drew over 10,000 attendees, including a through republican areas of with military-style honors such as an IRA color party and volleys of gunfire over the coffins. Family members, including McCann's wife, publicly appealed for a peaceful service amid heightened tensions. The ceremony underscored solidarity, with mourners viewing the three as active service members targeted in a disputed operation, though British authorities maintained they posed an imminent . During the burial, loyalist paramilitary Michael Stone infiltrated the crowd and launched an attack with pistols and grenades, killing three civilians—John Murray, Thomas McErlean, and IRA member Caoimhín Mac Brádaigh—and injuring over 50 others before being subdued. In Irish republican commemoration, McCann, Savage, and Farrell are annually honored as victims of British assassination, with events at featuring wreath-layings, speeches, and unveilings of memorials such as murals depicting their deaths. For example, the 30th anniversary in 2018 included gatherings emphasizing their status as unarmed volunteers executed by forces, a narrative promoted by Sinn Féin-aligned groups despite official inquiries finding the shootings lawful under rules. These observances reinforce their legacy within lore as symbols of resistance, often linked to subsequent violence in March 1988, including the deaths of three armed members at the funerals of Stone's victims.

Broader Impact on Counter-Terrorism Debates

The operation, in which Daniel McCann and two other (IRA) members were killed by (SAS) troops on March 6, 1988, exemplified tensions in counter-terrorism between pre-emptive action and adherence to international standards. Suspected of sites for a attack on military personnel during a commemorating the IRA bombing of the Grand Hotel in Brighton, the trio's elimination without prior arrest attempt raised questions about the of lethal force when intelligence indicated an imminent but unconfirmed threat. Critics, including advocates, argued it reflected a broader pattern in UK operations against IRA paramilitaries, prioritizing neutralization over capture despite the suspects' unarmed status at the moment of engagement, while defenders emphasized the high-risk environment of , where IRA units had conducted over 1,800 bombings by 1988, often without warning. The 1995 (ECtHR) judgment in McCann and Others v. marked a pivotal moment, ruling that the operation violated Article 2 of the by failing to plan for non-lethal alternatives, such as arrest after the suspects parked their vehicle and appeared to abandon the plot. The Court accepted the soldiers' good-faith belief in an immediate threat but faulted higher authorities for not allowing time to verify if the car contained a viable or if the suspects were escaping, establishing a that states must demonstrate exhaustive efforts to minimize lethal force in anti-terrorist operations. This decision influenced subsequent ECtHR jurisprudence, requiring detailed operational planning to balance security imperatives against the , as seen in later cases involving police responses to armed threats. In policy terms, the incident fueled parliamentary and public scrutiny of alleged "shoot-to-kill" practices within special forces, with inquiries revealing that rules of engagement permitted firing on suspects believed to pose an immediate danger, but without explicit mandates for wounding shots over fatal ones. It prompted internal reviews of handling and cross-border coordination, as Gibraltar's status under sovereignty complicated arrest logistics with , contributing to debates on whether jurisdictional hurdles justified lethal pre-emption. Internationally, the case underscored causal challenges in counter-terrorism: unreliable or incomplete —here, assumptions of armed suspects despite showing otherwise—can escalate to irreversible outcomes, informing post-Cold War discussions on in asymmetric conflicts. Longer-term, the operation's legacy persists in critiques of state-sanctioned killings versus judicial processes, paralleling arguments in modern drone strikes or targeted operations where suspects evade capture. While the government maintained the action thwarted a credible attack—evidenced by the suspects' affiliations and McCann's prior involvement in the 1985 Narrow Water ambush that killed 18 British soldiers—it highlighted systemic risks of over-reliance on without robust oversight, influencing European standards for accountability in prevention.

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