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Direct ascent

Direct ascent is a profile in which a launches directly from 's surface, travels to a target celestial body such as the , lands, and returns to using a single, massive vehicle without intermediate orbital assembly, parking orbits, or maneuvers. This approach was one of three primary options considered by NASA during the early planning of the Apollo program in the 1960s, alongside Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR) and Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR). Direct ascent required an enormous launch vehicle, such as the proposed Nova rocket with up to 40 million pounds of thrust, to propel a fully fueled lander and crew compartment directly to the lunar surface. Its conceptual simplicity—no need for complex docking or orbital refueling—made it appealing to some engineers, including early advocates at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, as it minimized risks associated with rendezvous operations. However, direct ascent faced significant drawbacks that ultimately led to its rejection. The required booster's immense size and power demanded unprecedented technological advancements and costs, estimated at billions more than alternative modes, rendering it unfeasible within the decade-long timeline set by President Kennedy's 1961 lunar landing goal. It also imposed tight weight margins on the spacecraft design, necessitating lighter components that were challenging to develop reliably with storable propellants for the return trip. In contrast, LOR allowed for a smaller rocket by separating the lander and using orbital rendezvous, which selected in 1962 as the optimal balance of feasibility, cost, and schedule. Despite not being used for manned lunar missions, direct ascent principles influenced unmanned probes. For instance, NASA's employed direct ascent trajectories for several landers, injecting them straight into translunar paths without an Earth to simplify the profile and reduce fuel needs. The method's legacy persists in discussions of future lunar architectures, though modern proposals favor hybrid approaches combining for efficiency.

Concept and Principles

Definition and Overview

Direct ascent is a mission profile in architecture designed for landings on airless planetary bodies, such as the , wherein a single launches directly from 's surface, travels to the target body, executes both and liftoff using the same , and returns to without orbital assembly, refueling, or procedures. This method prioritizes operational simplicity by avoiding the intricacies of multi-vehicle coordination, though it necessitates the complete mission hardware—including descent, ascent, and -return stages—in one launch. Key characteristics of direct ascent include the omission of any intermediate parking orbit, enabling an uninterrupted from to target surface, and its applicability to vacuum environments where no or is feasible. The approach demands a massively powerful to accommodate the full load for the outbound journey, lunar operations, and return, making it conceptually straightforward but engineering-intensive. The direct ascent concept originated in the as a direct and intuitive pathway to crewed lunar exploration, influenced by pioneering rocketry studies and early evaluations of lunar mission feasibility. Fundamental mission phases encompass launch from to initiate the trans-lunar trajectory, powered descent to the surface, surface activities, powered ascent to escape the gravitational well, and trans-Earth injection for the homeward leg. Unlike alternatives, this profile streamlines the flight sequence at the expense of requiring unprecedented booster capabilities.

Trajectory Mechanics

The direct ascent trajectory commences with a powerful launch from Earth's surface, achieving hyperbolic escape velocity to place the spacecraft on an unpowered trans-lunar path without intermediate orbital insertion. This initial burn propels the vehicle beyond Earth's sphere of influence at approximately 11.2 km/s relative to Earth, transitioning into a coast phase lasting about 3 days along a near-minimum energy Hohmann-like transfer orbit. During this coast, mid-course corrections—typically 1 to 4 small maneuvers using reaction control systems—refine the trajectory to compensate for launch dispersions, gravitational perturbations, and solar radiation pressure, ensuring perilune alignment for lunar capture. Upon nearing the Moon, the spacecraft follows a hyperbolic approach relative to the lunar body, initiating powered descent at an altitude of roughly 15 km to decelerate from orbital speeds exceeding 1.6 km/s. The overall for a round-trip direct ascent mission totals approximately 15-16 km/s, accounting for Earth launch to , trans-lunar transfer, lunar and ascent, and return to . This includes about 5.5-6 km/s specifically for the lunar landing and ascent phases, where the burn nullifies the entry (around 1 km/s relative to the Moon) plus the ~1.87 km/s equivalent for orbital deceleration and losses, totaling ~2.8 km/s; while the ascent provides ~2.5-2.8 km/s to achieve for trans-Earth injection. These requirements highlight the method's demand for massive loads, as the entire vehicle must perform all maneuvers without refueling or in orbit. is optimized using the applied to each stage: \Delta v = v_e \ln \left( \frac{m_0}{m_f} \right) where \Delta v is the change in velocity, v_e is the effective exhaust velocity (typically 3-4.5 km/s for chemical propellants), m_0 is the initial mass including propellant, and m_f is the final mass post-burn. Iterative application across stages minimizes the gross liftoff mass while achieving the cumulative delta-v. Propulsion systems for direct ascent emphasize high-thrust engines to counter Earth's deep gravity well during launch and to execute rapid maneuvers near the , where sustained acceleration mitigates gravity losses. Liquid-fueled engines, such as those with around 300-450 seconds, provide the thrust-to-weight ratios exceeding 1.2 for vertical ascent and descent phases. The 's environment precludes , necessitating full reliance on retro- for reduction during lunar approach; without atmospheric , the descent engine must supply nearly all the delta-v from excess speed to zero vertical at . Lunar landing in direct ascent utilizes retro-propulsion throughout the terminal phase, with the main throttling to maintain a controlled descent rate of 1-3 m/s at , often incorporating throttleable hypergolic propellants for precision. The same integrated lander structure supports ascent, enabling vertical liftoff via a dedicated upper-stage that ignites post-landing to achieve approximately 2.5-2.8 km/s for escape, directly injecting into a trans-Earth without orbital loitering. This unified vehicle design simplifies mechanics but amplifies mass sensitivities under the rocket equation.

Historical Development

Early Proposals

Early concepts for lunar missions involving elements of direct ascent emerged in the early amid growing interest in space exploration, though pure direct ascent without Earth orbit assembly developed later. , then working for the U.S. Army, outlined influential ideas in a series of articles published in magazine starting in March 1952. The October 1952 issues described a multi-ship lunar expedition assembled in Earth orbit using ferry rockets (Earth Orbit Rendezvous), with the ships then flying directly to the lunar surface using winged landing craft capable of gliding and taking off from the . This vision, illustrated by artist , emphasized massive spacecraft with clustered engines for high thrust, capturing public imagination and influencing subsequent U.S. space planning, including the transition to pure direct ascent concepts. Throughout the 1950s, U.S. military branches advanced these ideas through unmanned probe studies that laid groundwork for crewed direct ascent. The U.S. Army's Project Orbiter, proposed by von Braun's team at the in 1954, aimed to launch a using a modified missile as the first stage, with upper stages derived from technology; while focused on , it evolved into concepts for lunar flyby and impact probes by , demonstrating the feasibility of multi-stage rocketry for deep space. Similarly, the U.S. Air Force explored lunar reconnaissance under Project Able, contracting von Braun's group in to develop probes for lunar and landing using Atlas-Able boosters, which informed later crewed designs by highlighting propulsion needs for direct trajectories. Parallel Soviet efforts in the 1950s also explored direct ascent for lunar probes and manned missions. These efforts transitioned from unmanned reconnaissance to manned ambitions, with the Army's 1959 Project Horizon proposing a lunar outpost via direct ascent vehicles carrying 10-20 personnel and supplies in initial flights. Pure direct ascent designs in these proposals centered on multi-stage boosters with clustered engines to achieve the immense thrust required for direct lunar injection. By 1958, von Braun's Army team conceptualized vehicles like the Juno V (precursor to Saturn), featuring a first stage with eight clustered engines for over 1 million pounds of thrust, scalable to support lunar payloads. Advanced iterations such as the Nova rocket incorporated eight F-1 engines in the first stage, each producing 1.5 million pounds of thrust, enabling a gross liftoff weight exceeding 5,000 tons and an estimated payload of approximately 50 tons to the lunar surface for landing and return operations. The Air Force's contemporaneous LUNEX plan (1958-1961) proposed a three-stage launcher with a solid-propellant first stage and liquid upper stages, using throttleable engines for precise lunar descent, targeting a 21-person base but prioritizing single-launch simplicity. These late-1950s concepts carried forward into NASA's pre-Apollo studies in the early , where direct ascent was evaluated for its single-launch efficiency despite the engineering scale required. Von Braun's team at the refined Nova-like designs in 1961-1962 reports, emphasizing their potential to deliver large landers without complex , though ultimately sidelined for lighter alternatives. This foundational work shaped the feasibility assessments that informed the Apollo program's mode selection debates.

Apollo Program Evaluation

In the early phases of the Apollo program, NASA conducted extensive mode studies from 1961 to 1962 to determine the optimal approach for achieving a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade. Direct ascent, designated as Mode A, was initially established as the baseline mission profile, envisioning a single massive launch vehicle that would propel the entire spacecraft directly from Earth to the lunar surface for landing and return. This method required a super-heavy launch vehicle such as the proposed Nova rocket, which was designed to produce approximately 10 to 12 million pounds of thrust at liftoff, or alternatively the Saturn C-8 configuration, a scaled-up variant of the Saturn family with similar capabilities. Key evaluation criteria centered on payload capacity, development feasibility, and alignment with existing launch infrastructure. Direct ascent demanded delivering roughly 200 tons of hardware to the lunar surface, including the fully fueled lander, crew compartment, and return propulsion systems, to accommodate the round-trip mission requirements. In contrast, the rocket, selected as the program's primary launcher, was limited to about 7.5 million pounds of and could only support significantly lighter payloads for lunar missions under alternative profiles. These mass constraints highlighted the impracticality of direct ascent given the and pressures following President Kennedy's 1961 commitment to land on the . The decision process culminated in mid-1962, with , director of 's , endorsing (Mode I) over direct ascent during internal deliberations on June 7. On July 11, 1962, Administrator formally announced the selection of as the Apollo mission mode, citing its advantages in cost, schedule, and risk reduction based on von Braun's recommendation and broader agency analysis. This choice effectively rejected direct ascent due to its excessive demands on launch vehicle development. Although not adopted for the primary mission architecture, elements of direct ascent concepts influenced subsequent Apollo hardware design, particularly in the development of the lunar module's ascent stage, which incorporated propulsion and structural principles derived from early direct ascent lander studies to enable liftoff from the . However, the overall program proceeded under the framework, leveraging the without pursuing the larger or vehicles.

Comparison to Alternatives

Earth Orbit Rendezvous

Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR) is a mission architecture for lunar flights in which multiple s deliver components of the , including tanks and propulsion stages, to for into a single vehicle prior to the maneuver. In contrast to the single-launch approach of direct ascent, EOR for an Apollo-scale mission would have required 7 to 10 launches using smaller rockets such as the to place the necessary elements into orbit, followed by a series of , , and transfer operations to integrate the stack. This method leverages modular to overcome limitations of individual capacity while distributing the propulsion requirements across several vehicles. Historically, EOR was proposed as Mode II during the early planning in the early , favored initially by engineers at NASA's for its potential to accelerate development by relying on more readily available launch vehicles rather than waiting for larger ones like the . However, it introduced significant complexity in orbital operations, including precise sequencing and fluid transfer in microgravity, which raised concerns about reliability and timeline risks compared to simpler alternatives. Technically, the process would begin with launches into a parking orbit at approximately 200 km altitude, allowing time for ground-based tracking and corrections before docking maneuvers. The overall delta-v budget for the mission remains comparable to direct ascent but is apportioned across the initial Earth orbit insertions (about 9.5 km/s per launch) and the consolidated trans-lunar burn, reducing the performance demands on any single vehicle. Key precursor demonstrations came from NASA's Project Gemini, where missions such as Gemini VIII achieved the first orbital docking in 1966, validating the guidance, control, and crew procedures essential for EOR assembly.

Lunar Orbit Rendezvous

Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) is a mission architecture in which a single places a composite into , from which a small, dedicated detaches to perform surface operations before ascending to with the orbiting command module for the return to . This method involves three astronauts traveling together to the Moon, with two descending in the lander while the third remains in the command module as a ferry vehicle. The approach was selected for the to optimize mass and performance, allowing the use of the rather than a much larger rocket required for direct ascent. A key difference from direct ascent lies in the dramatic reduction of mass that must be landed on and lifted off the lunar surface, estimated at approximately 70% less Earth-launched mass overall, with the lunar excursion module weighing about 15 tons compared to over 200 tons for the in direct ascent proposals. By leaving the bulk of the —the command and service module—in , LOR avoids the need to land and propel the entire return vehicle from the surface, yielding significant delta-v savings through efficient staging. This mass efficiency enabled the , with its capability of around 48 metric tons, to support the mission without requiring the development of a super-heavy Nova-class launcher. Historically, LOR was successfully implemented starting with on July 20, 1969, when astronauts and used the to land in the Sea of Tranquility, followed by ascent and rendezvous with in the . The technique was employed in all subsequent crewed lunar landings through in December 1972, demonstrating reliable performance across six missions. These successes validated the delta-v advantages, as the full Apollo stack was never required to perform lunar landing and ascent maneuvers, minimizing propulsion demands. Technically, the process begins with lunar orbit insertion into a low at approximately 100 altitude, achieved via a braking burn of the service propulsion system upon arrival at the . After separation, the descends to the surface using its , conducts operations, and then ascends using a separate ascent stage to rejoin the command module in a two-ship sequence. The typically involves the ascent stage performing a series of burns—such as terminal phase initiation and braking—to close the gap, guided by onboard , computer programs, and manual piloting for , often completed within 1-3.5 hours depending on the method ( or coelliptic). This orbital ferry role of the command module ensured safe return after undocking from the spent ascent stage.

Implementation Efforts

United States Attempts

In response to President John F. Kennedy's May 1961 directive for a manned lunar landing by the end of the decade, committed to developing the capability for such a mission, initially favoring direct ascent as the baseline approach while evaluating alternatives; this mode remained the fallback option until was selected in July 1962. The launch vehicle was conceived as a massive clustered rocket for direct ascent missions, incorporating up to eight F-1 engines in its first stage, with development and ground testing of the F-1 engine beginning in the early at facilities like NASA's . Although full vehicle assembly never occurred, the F-1's successful static firings—demonstrating over 1.5 million pounds of thrust per engine—provided foundational data for heavy-lift propulsion before the Nova program was canceled in late 1962 following the shift to . This engine heritage later influenced the (SLS), where modernized variants like the F-1B were considered for advanced configurations to enable large-payload lunar missions. Unmanned efforts in the 1960s served as precursors by demonstrating translunar trajectories, though lacking ascent stages. The , managed by NASA's , launched nine spacecraft between 1961 and 1965 using trajectories involving a brief parking orbit followed by injection onto hyperbolic paths toward the , achieving flybys and controlled impacts to transmit close-up imagery and data on the lunar surface—essential for validating approach mechanics despite early mission failures. Complementing this, the executed five successful soft landings from 1966 to 1968 via rockets; while used direct injection without a parking orbit, the other successful missions (Surveyors 3, 5, 6, and 7) employed parking orbit trajectories, confirming bearing strength and landing site suitability with instruments like cameras and strain gauges, thereby reducing risks for manned descent profiles. Post-Apollo, NASA explored direct ascent elements in conceptual studies during the 1970s Space Shuttle development phase, focusing on cargo delivery to support potential lunar bases without crewed flights; these included Shuttle-derived heavy-lift configurations for uncrewed landers, but none advanced to hardware due to shifting priorities toward low Earth orbit operations.

Soviet Union Programs

The Soviet Union's pursuit of a crewed lunar landing in the 1960s was driven by Sergei Korolev, chief designer of OKB-1, who envisioned a single-launch mission to outpace the United States in the Space Race, initially focusing on heavy-lift capabilities for direct lunar access before adapting to lunar orbit rendezvous strategies. Korolev's death in 1966 left the program under Vasily Mishin, contributing to delays and ultimate failure, as the Soviets prioritized competing with Apollo through the N1-L3 system rather than fully developing alternative direct ascent concepts. A key precursor to crewed efforts was the uncrewed mission, launched on January 31, 1966, which achieved the world's first on the on February 3, 1966, in the region using a involving an Earth parking orbit and mid-course corrections, transmitting panoramic images and proving the lunar surface could support a without sinking into dust. This semi-direct path validated propulsion and descent technologies essential for future lunar missions, though it remained robotic and uncrewed. The primary Soviet lunar landing architecture under Korolev centered on the N1 rocket and LK lander within the L3 program, designed in the early 1960s for a single-launch lunar orbit rendezvous approach, launching the entire stack into low Earth orbit for subsequent translunar injection without Earth orbit assembly, incorporating elements of direct ascent efficiency in its booster design. The N1's first stage featured 30 NK-15 engines clustered for high thrust, aiming to deliver up to 95 metric tons to low Earth orbit or the L3 complex—including the LK one-person lander—for lunar surface operations lasting up to ten days. However, the program encountered catastrophic failures: the first N1 launch on February 21, 1969, exploded seconds after liftoff due to engine issues; a second attempt on July 3, 1969, destroyed the launch pad in a massive fireball; the third on June 27, 1971, failed early in flight; and the fourth on November 23, 1972, lost control shortly after ascent, with all tests unmanned and no recovery of lunar objectives. These setbacks, compounded by technical complexities in the clustered engine system, prevented any crewed flights, leading to the program's cancellation in 1976. In parallel, rival designer Vladimir Chelomei at OKB-52 proposed a pure direct ascent alternative with the UR-700 rocket and LK-700 lander in 1962, bypassing all orbital rendezvous by launching a fully integrated 50-ton lunar payload directly to the surface using a 76-meter-tall booster with nine RD-270 engines on the first stage (each producing 6,400 kN thrust) fueled by N2O4/UDMH, followed by additional stages for translunar injection and descent. This design aimed for a straightforward Moon landing without docking maneuvers, capable of supporting a three-person crew for extended surface exploration, but it received no full-scale funding amid bureaucratic rivalries and was terminated in 1968 in favor of Korolev's N1 priority. Despite these efforts, the Soviet Union achieved no crewed lunar landings, with direct ascent concepts like the UR-700 remaining unrealized due to resource allocation toward the flawed N1-LK path.

Advantages and Challenges

Technical Benefits

Direct ascent provides a conceptually simple for lunar missions, relying on a single, fully integrated to travel from , land on the , and return, without the complexities of in-orbit assembly or multiple launches. This approach streamlines vehicle design and development by eliminating the need for separate orbital modules or staging systems tailored for operations. The method enhances operational reliability through zero docking maneuvers, in contrast to the one required in (LOR) and multiple (up to several) in Earth orbit (EOR) modes, thereby reducing potential failure points associated with precision orbital insertions, relative navigation, and mechanical interfaces. By avoiding these elements, direct ascent minimizes risks from orbital assembly errors or propulsion anomalies during , allowing for a more straightforward mission profile with continuous ground tracking throughout the powered phases. A direct path also limits cumulative exposure to the Van Allen radiation belts compared to extended orbital loitering in alternative architectures. For unmanned missions, direct ascent proves particularly scalable and suitable for robotic exploration, as demonstrated by the U.S. Surveyor program's successful soft landings via direct descent trajectories that bypassed lunar orbit insertion for simplicity and reduced propulsion demands. This enables efficient sample collection and return without the added complexity of autonomous , making it ideal for early precursor probes focused on site reconnaissance or basic lander operations. In theoretical terms, direct ascent can offer mass efficiency advantages for missions employing very large launch vehicles, as it circumvents the small additional delta-v requirements (on the order of 50-100 m/s) for rendezvous maneuvers, allowing more payload mass to be allocated to mission objectives rather than orbital transfer systems. Early proposals in the 1950s and 1960s, such as those from Wernher von Braun, highlighted this potential for heavy-lift configurations like the Nova rocket.

Key Limitations

Direct ascent faced significant technical hurdles primarily due to the enormous scale required for the launch vehicle, which exceeded the technological and infrastructural capabilities of the 1960s. The baseline Nova rocket design demanded a liftoff thrust of approximately 12 million pounds (53 MN), more than 1.5 times that of the Saturn V's 7.5 million pounds (33 MN), necessitating extensive research and development for engines, structures, and launch facilities that were not feasible within the Apollo timeline. A major inefficiency stemmed from the mass penalty associated with and ascending the full vehicle stack, where the descent stage and associated hardware became dead weight during the lunar ascent, substantially increasing requirements compared to approaches. This configuration also resulted in higher gravity losses during ascent, as the heavier, less optimized vehicle experienced prolonged low-thrust-to-weight ratios in the Moon's , further compounding fuel consumption. Development risks were amplified by the reliance on a single, massively complex vehicle for the entire mission, creating a critical without the redundancy offered by multi-launch methods; additionally, the first stage alone required around 9,000 metric tons of propellant, such as /, heightening handling, storage, and reliability challenges. The approach's prohibitive cost and extended timeline ultimately sealed its rejection, with estimates placing Nova development at roughly double the $10 billion allocated for the and infrastructure, demanding resources that would have delayed the program beyond President Kennedy's 1960s deadline.

Legacy and Modern Applications

Influence on Space Exploration

The consideration of direct ascent as a primary mission mode during the initial Apollo program planning phases profoundly shaped the development of heavy-lift launch vehicles, driving the creation of the Saturn V rocket to accommodate the massive payloads necessary for lunar operations, even as Lunar Orbit Rendezvous was ultimately adopted. Propulsion concepts for lunar surface takeoff explored in direct ascent studies directly informed the ascent stage of the Lunar Module, which utilized a hypergolic engine for reliable, throttleable lift-off from the Moon, enabling the historic Apollo landings. The F-1 engines that powered the Saturn V's first stage, originally sized for direct ascent-scale demands, led to revival efforts including the development and testing of an F-1B variant by NASA in 2013, though it was not selected for integration into the Space Launch System. Following Apollo, direct ascent principles influenced post-2000s exploration architectures, including the Constellation program's evaluation of hybrid approaches that emphasized single-launch heavy-lift capabilities, as seen in alternative proposals like DIRECT 2.0, which repurposed Space Shuttle-derived hardware for enhanced lunar payload delivery without extensive orbital assembly. These ideas extended to international robotic efforts, where China's missions adopted Apollo-inspired ascent vehicle designs for sample-return operations; for instance, the Chang'e-5 probe's ascender module, which lifted lunar into orbit for and return, echoed the Lunar Module's autonomous and systems. On a broader scale, the drive toward direct ascent accelerated rocket scaling advancements, positioning the as a pivotal benchmark that demonstrated the feasibility of multi-million-pound-thrust stages and cryogenic at unprecedented volumes, laying groundwork for subsequent super-heavy . Wernher von Braun's advocacy for direct ascent, rooted in his 1950s publications like the series and , bridged imaginative interstellar travel narratives with practical engineering, transforming speculative lunar voyages into tangible technological pursuits. While no unadulterated direct ascent crewed missions materialized owing to the efficiency of techniques, core tenets of controlled vertical propulsion and persist in modern reusable systems, notably SpaceX's , whose first-stage vertical landings rely on retro-propulsive guidance algorithms refined from early lunar ascent simulations to achieve pinpoint Earth recoveries.

Contemporary Relevance

In the Artemis program, NASA's Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion spacecraft primarily employ lunar orbit rendezvous (LOR) to deliver crew to lunar orbit, from where human landing systems descend to the surface. However, direct ascent elements are integrated into the lander descent phases, such as Blue Origin's Blue Moon Mark 2, selected for the Artemis V mission no earlier than 2030, which performs a vertical descent directly from low lunar orbit to the surface without intermediate staging. This approach leverages propulsion for precise, uncrewed or crewed touchdowns, enhancing reliability for south polar explorations planned in the late 2020s. SpaceX's , designated as the (HLS) for , adopts a semi-direct profile hybridized with Earth orbit refueling (EOR), where multiple tanker flights replenish propellant in before the vehicle proceeds directly . This enables lunar orbital insertion and surface descent without lunar-surface refueling, with uncrewed Earth orbital test flights in 2025 demonstrating reentry capabilities critical for lunar operations, and orbital refueling demonstrations targeted for 2026. As of November 2025, no lunar tests have been conducted, with delayed to at least 2027, validating the hybrid efficiency for scalable lunar access in ongoing development. International efforts highlight direct ascent's utility in unmanned missions, as seen in China's Chang'e-6 probe, which in 2024 executed a direct trajectory from to , enabling far-side landing, sample collection, and ascent back to orbit for return to on June 25, 2024. Similarly, India's achieved the first vertical landing near the on August 23, 2023, using a direct descent from with throttleable engines for hazard avoidance, marking a milestone in precision autonomous landings. Looking ahead, reusable direct ascent profiles hold potential for commercial lunar bases by minimizing orbital complexity and enabling frequent cargo delivery, though challenges persist with methane-liquid oxygen engines entering operational testing in 2025, such as China's YF-209, which must achieve high and rapid turnaround to support efficient, multi-mission architectures. These advancements could reduce costs for sustained lunar presence, aligning with NASA's and private ventures targeting base infrastructure by the early .

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