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Great Sea Interconnector

The Great Sea Interconnector is a high-voltage direct current (HVDC) submarine electricity transmission project designed to interconnect the power grids of Greece (via Crete), Cyprus, and Israel through a 1,208-kilometer underwater cable, marking it as the world's longest and deepest subsea power link with depths reaching 3,000 meters.^[1]^[2] Initially focused on the Crete-Cyprus segment of 898 kilometers, the bidirectional link offers a transmission capacity of 1,000 megawatts, expandable to 2,000 megawatts, to facilitate energy exchange equivalent to powering over three million households.^[1]^[3] Formerly known as the EuroAsia Interconnector, the project—estimated at €1.9 billion—was rebranded in 2023 under the oversight of Greece's Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO), a special-purpose vehicle established to handle implementation and financing.^[1] Designated a Project of Common Interest by the European Union, it aims to terminate Cyprus's longstanding energy isolation by integrating it into the continental European grid, enhancing security of supply, promoting renewable energy exports from the Eastern Mediterranean, and yielding economic benefits including reduced electricity costs for Cypriot consumers projected at €8 billion over decades.^[2]^[1] Construction commenced in December 2023, with Nexans securing a €1.43 billion turnkey contract for the Greece-Cyprus cable section, following feasibility studies dating back to 2012 and EU funding allocations such as €657 million from the Connecting Europe Facility.^[3]^[1] Despite these advancements, the initiative encounters significant hurdles, including geopolitical strains in the Eastern Mediterranean, disputes over maritime boundaries, and domestic opposition in Cyprus citing excessive costs relative to the island's 1,400-megawatt grid capacity and risks of over-reliance on imported energy amid regional conflicts involving Israel.^[4]^[5] As of late 2025, while seabed surveys progressed in mid-2024, completion timelines remain uncertain, with earlier EU targets for 2025 appearing optimistic amid financing gaps and bilateral tensions between Greece and Cyprus over project leadership and equity shares.^[6]^[3]

Regional Energy Context

Cyprus's Energy Challenges

Cyprus relies entirely on imported heavy fuel oil and diesel for electricity generation, as the island lacks domestic fossil fuel resources and operates without interconnections to neighboring energy systems.^[7] ^[8] This dependence exposes the power sector to global oil price volatility, amplifying costs amid subsidies that strain public finances.^[9] Electricity prices in Cyprus rank among the EU's highest, driven by fuel import expenses; in the second half of 2024, household rates averaged €0.3251 per kWh, exceeding the EU average of €0.2872 per kWh, while non-household prices reached €0.2578 per kWh.^[10] ^[11] As the sole EU member state without grid links to other countries, Cyprus faces heightened blackout risks from isolated system constraints, evidenced by the 2012 island-wide outage from a power plant fault, 2023 disruptions tied to renewable integration overloads, and 2025 incidents from transformer failures and peak demand.^[12] ^[13] ^[14] ^[15] To address fuel vulnerabilities, Cyprus pursued a liquefied natural gas terminal at Vasilikos for cleaner imports and power station integration, but persistent delays from design flaws, unsafe materials, and construction setbacks have postponed operations beyond 2026, risking €67 million in EU funding recovery and underscoring scalability limits.^[16] ^[17] These hurdles sustain import reliance, constraining diversification despite initial progress on receiving infrastructure.^[18]

Greece's Grid Integration Role

Greece serves as the northern terminus for the Great Sea Interconnector, with the high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cable landing in Crete before linking to the mainland via the established Attica-Crete interconnection, thereby bridging isolated systems to the broader European grid. This configuration enables bidirectional electricity flows, enhancing system stability and allowing Crete to act as an intermediate hub for power exchange between Cyprus, Israel, and continental Europe. The Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) of Greece assumed the role of project promoter on October 6, 2023, overseeing integration into the national grid which is already interconnected with Balkan neighbors such as Bulgaria and Albania, facilitating access to the Continental Europe Synchronous Area.^[19]^[20] The Attica-Crete HVDC link, operational in trial phase as of May 2025 with full commercial service anticipated by September 2025, provides a technical precedent for the interconnector's subsea components, demonstrating Greece's capacity to manage long-distance underwater transmission. This 1,000 MW bipolar system spans 335 km, including 330 km submarine cable at depths up to 1,200 meters, utilizing ±500 kV voltage source converter (VSC) technology for efficient power transfer. By successfully implementing this connection, Greece mitigates perceived risks associated with the longer Cyprus-to-Crete segment, leveraging proven expertise in HVDC deployment to support the multi-terminal 1,000 MW initial capacity of the Great Sea project.^[21]^[22]^[23] HVDC technology in these interconnections minimizes transmission losses compared to alternating current (AC) systems, particularly over extended distances, with losses typically around 3-4% per 1,000 km versus higher AC dissipation, enabling more reliable integration of variable renewable sources into Greece's grid. This setup positions Crete as a strategic node for diversifying transmission routes, reducing reliance on Balkan overland dependencies and enhancing overall grid resilience through controlled power flows and black-start capabilities inherent to VSC-HVDC. Empirical outcomes from the Attica-Crete project, including halved CO2 emissions from reduced fossil fuel backups on Crete, underscore the logistical advantages of Greece's established infrastructure for the interconnector's northern integration.^[24]^[25]^[24]

Israel's Energy Export Capacity

Israel's electricity sector has increasingly relied on natural gas since major offshore discoveries in the Tamar (2009) and Leviathan (2010) fields, with natural gas comprising about 70% of total generation by 2024.^[26] This transition from imported fuels to domestic production has yielded surplus capacity, as Israel's gas output exceeded domestic consumption, enabling exports of approximately 10 billion cubic meters in 2022, representing revenues over NIS 1.5 billion.^[27] By 2024, exports to Egypt and Jordan accounted for nearly 50% of production, underscoring the feasibility of diverting excess gas toward electricity generation for international transmission.^[28] The Great Sea Interconnector's Stage 2 extension to Israel positions the country to export surplus electricity directly, leveraging gas-fired plants to produce power for bidirectional flow without the infrastructure costs of gas liquefaction or pipelines such as the EastMed project.^[1] This approach allows conversion of gas reserves into electricity at source, transmitted via high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cable, avoiding intermediary processing and enhancing efficiency for distant markets.^[3] The planned capacity reaches 2,000 MW in Stage 2, sufficient to supply electricity equivalent to powering three million households, thereby integrating Israel's grid with those of Cyprus and Greece for enhanced regional energy trade.^[3] This export potential bolsters Israel's economic leverage, as confirmed by ongoing commitments, including agreements in 2025 to advance the cable laying connecting Israel to Europe via Cyprus.^[29]

Hydrocarbon Foundations

Major Gas Field Discoveries

The discovery of significant natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly offshore Israel and Cyprus, has underpinned the rationale for electricity interconnectors like the Great Sea project by enabling gas-to-power conversion for regional exports. Israel's Leviathan field, discovered in 2010 by Noble Energy (now NewMed Energy), holds proven recoverable reserves of approximately 22 trillion cubic feet (TCF), with commercial production commencing on December 31, 2019, supplying domestic needs and enabling exports to Egypt and Jordan.^[30]^[31] The earlier Tamar field, discovered in 2009 off Israel's coast, contains around 10 TCF and entered production in 2013, further bolstering Israel's capacity to generate surplus electricity from local gas resources.^[32]^[33] Cyprus's Aphrodite field, identified in late 2011 in Block 12 by Noble Energy, is estimated to hold 3.5–4.5 TCF of recoverable gas, representing the island's first major offshore find but remaining undeveloped as of 2024 due to investment and geopolitical hurdles.^[34]^[35] Subsequent discoveries include Glaucus in Block 10, announced by ExxonMobil in 2019 with an estimated 3.7 TCF, confirmed by appraisal drilling in 2022, though production timelines remain uncertain amid ongoing exploration.^[36]^[37] Collectively, these fields contribute to over 70 TCF of discovered recoverable gas in the Levant Basin since 2009, with Israel's operational output directly supporting power generation that could feed into undersea cables for export to Europe via Greece, reducing reliance on imported fuels.^[38] Cyprus's reserves, while promising for local desalination and electricity, face delays that highlight the interconnector's potential role in monetizing stranded gas through cross-border transmission.^[39]

Link to Power Generation and Exports

The utilization of natural gas from Eastern Mediterranean fields, such as those offshore Israel and Cyprus, supports the interconnector's economic rationale through its conversion into electricity in high-efficiency combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants. These plants achieve thermal efficiencies of up to 60%, significantly surpassing the 30-40% efficiency of Cyprus's existing steam turbines operating on imported heavy fuel oil or gasoil.^[40] This process involves combusting gas in a gas turbine to generate electricity, with waste heat recovered to produce steam for a secondary steam turbine, thereby maximizing output per unit of fuel input.^[41] In Cyprus, transitioning to gas-fired generation via planned CCGT facilities like the Vasilikos and Mari plants would lower production costs by substituting cheaper, locally accessible or regionally imported gas for liquid fuels, which currently dominate the island's isolated grid and contribute to elevated wholesale prices.^[42] Gas-based generation reduces variable costs through lower fuel prices and higher efficiency, enabling Cyprus to curtail its dependence on volatile international oil markets while providing baseload power essential for grid stability, as intermittent renewables alone cannot reliably meet demand peaks.^[43] The interconnector facilitates monetization of this gas by enabling bidirectional electricity flows, allowing surplus low-cost power—generated from regional gas at marginal costs below European averages—to be exported northward to Greece and onward to continental markets. Israel's offshore fields, for instance, supply domestic CCGT plants with competitively priced gas, creating arbitrage opportunities as exported electricity commands premiums in energy-importing Europe amid supply constraints.^[44] This pathway unlocks value from otherwise stranded reserves by leveraging the interconnector's 1,000 MW initial capacity for multi-directional trade, prioritizing fossil gas for reliable baseload over less dispatchable options like hydrogen blending, which remains prospective and secondary to immediate viability.^[45]

Technical Infrastructure

Cable Design and Capacity

The Great Sea Interconnector comprises a high-voltage direct current (HVDC) subsea cable system spanning approximately 1,208 kilometers, including a 900-kilometer segment linking Crete to Cyprus and a roughly 308-kilometer extension from Cyprus to Israel.^[46] This bipolar HVDC configuration utilizes mass-impregnated cables rated at 525 kV, manufactured by Nexans, to achieve a total transmission capacity of up to 2,000 megawatts.^[3]^[47] Engineered for extreme marine conditions, the cables are buried at depths reaching 3,000 meters to protect against environmental hazards and seismic activity prevalent in the eastern Mediterranean.^[48] Voltage source converters (VSCs) integrated at converter stations enable precise control of active and reactive power, providing grid stabilization, frequency regulation, and black-start functionality essential for isolated systems like Cyprus's.^[49] The design incorporates cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) insulation advancements, supporting a projected operational lifespan exceeding 40 years under continuous high-load conditions.^[50] Bidirectional power flow facilitates flexible energy exchange, allowing surplus generation—such as from Israel's natural gas fields or Greece's renewables—to support deficits elsewhere, with fault redundancy ensured through dual-pole operation and empirical modeling derived from reconnaissance surveys of similar deep-water routes.^[51]^[52] Multi-terminal VSC-HVDC topology minimizes losses over the extended distance, with efficiency maintained above 95% through optimized conductor sizing and thermal management validated in prior Nexans HVDC projects.^[3]^[49]

Phased Implementation Plans

The Great Sea Interconnector's implementation proceeds in sequential stages, with Stage 1 focusing on the Crete-Cyprus connection to establish an initial 1,000 MW bidirectional high-voltage direct current (HVDC) link.^[53] This phase prioritizes integrating Cyprus, the last non-interconnected EU member state, into the wider European grid, allowing desynchronization from its isolated system and enhanced renewable energy incorporation.^[54] The link spans approximately 898 km, with converter stations at each terminus facilitating synchronization with national transmission networks.^[53] Stage 1 capacity is designed for expandability, serving as the foundation for subsequent enhancements while undergoing operational testing to ensure stability in the Mediterranean's variable conditions.^[55] Upon completion, this phase enables electricity flows that support Cyprus's energy security and reduce reliance on isolated generation.^[51] Stage 2 extends the interconnector to Israel, adding an additional 1,000 MW to achieve a total capacity of 2,000 MW through a further Cyprus-Israel segment.^[56] This expansion, planned after Stage 1 validation, incorporates additional converter stations in Israel and upgraded facilities in Cyprus to handle increased bidirectional flows and align with regional grid protocols.^[53] The phased approach ensures progressive scalability, with each stage building on prior infrastructure for fault-tolerant operations amid the region's tectonic challenges.^[57]

Economic and Financial Dimensions

Project Costs and Funding Mechanisms

The Great Sea Interconnector project, encompassing the initial Cyprus-to-Crete segment, has an estimated total cost of €1.9 billion.^[1]^[6] This figure covers the 898 km subsea high-voltage direct current (HVDC) link, including submarine cables, converter stations, and associated infrastructure. The full envisioned interconnection extending to Israel is projected to reach up to €2.5 billion, though construction remains focused on the Cyprus-Crete phase as of 2025.^[58] Cost breakdowns allocate approximately 60% to submarine cables and HVDC converters, 20% to installation and laying operations, with the remainder for permitting, engineering, and onshore facilities. In July 2023, Nexans secured a €1.43 billion contract for manufacturing and installing the 900 km submarine cables, marking the largest such award in the project's history and representing a significant portion of the cable-related expenditures.^[3] Additional financing includes loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB), though specific amounts for this project remain tied to ongoing reviews post-2025.^[59] Funding mechanisms combine public grants, national contributions, and private investment through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established by Greece's Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) in January 2024. The European Union provided €657 million via the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in January 2022, specifically for the Cyprus-Crete segment's first phase estimated at €1.57 billion. Cyprus commits over €200 million, funded through electricity tariffs and direct annual payments of €25 million for five years starting in 2024. Under the Cross-Border Cost Allocation agreement, Cyprus bears 63% of costs, with Greece covering 37% via equity and regulatory approvals for cost recovery. Israel participates through equity stakes in the extension phase, though funding details for that branch are pending further agreements.^[60]^[61]^[62]

Cost-Benefit Evaluations and Critiques

A cost-benefit analysis conducted for the Great Sea Interconnector's Cyprus-Israel section, presented by the Greek transmission operator IPTO in July 2025 and prepared by Exergia and the National Technical University of Athens, projected positive net present value (NPV) outcomes primarily through energy cost reductions for Cyprus, estimated at over €300 million annually in electricity bill savings via interconnection-enabled imports and reduced reliance on isolated generation.^[63]^[64] The study assumed operational completion around 2030, incorporating low discount rates to favor long-term benefits from grid integration and potential exports, while modeling revenue streams from capacity auctions and arbitrage between low-cost Israeli gas-fired power and higher Cypriot or European prices.^[65] Critics, including Cypriot financial officials, have highlighted opaque modeling assumptions, such as the optimistic 2030 timeline amid ongoing delays and geopolitical risks, which could erode projected NPVs if commissioning slips to 2032 or later as indicated in recent reassessments.^[66]^[67] Low discount rates in the analysis—typically 2-4% in EU-aligned infrastructure evaluations—amplify future savings but undervalue immediate capital outlays and execution uncertainties, potentially overstating viability for ratepayers in Cyprus, where consumers would bear interconnection tariffs post-completion.^[68] Historical data on subsea HVDC projects reveal frequent cost overruns of 20-50%, driven by seabed complexities, supply chain disruptions, and regulatory hurdles, as seen in North Sea and Baltic interconnections; for the Great Sea Interconnector, such escalations from the €1.9 billion baseline could impose disproportionate burdens on Cypriot households via higher tariffs, especially if export revenues falter amid volatile natural gas prices.^[69]^[70] Audits and Cypriot government reviews have questioned the reliability of arbitrage-based payback, noting that sustained low Israeli gas prices—tied to Leviathan field output—may not materialize under global demand pressures, rendering the interconnector less competitive against Cyprus's viable LNG import alternatives like floating terminals.^[71]^[66] Basic economic reasoning underscores that interconnection benefits hinge on persistent price differentials; without them, the project's isolated NPV could turn negative, prioritizing empirical price forecasts over modeled optimism.^[72]

EU Policy Framework

Status as Project of Common Interest

The Great Sea Interconnector was designated a Project of Common Interest (PCI) by the European Union in the fourth PCI list published on 31 October 2019, with its status reaffirmed in the fifth list via Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/564 of 19 November 2021, reclassifying it under PCI 2.6.^[73]^[49] This designation under the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) framework grants procedural benefits, including accelerated permitting timelines, priority cross-border coordination, and access to dedicated funding streams such as the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). In January 2022, the European Commission allocated €657 million from the CEF specifically for the Greece-Cyprus cable segment, representing the largest single CEF energy grant at the time and underscoring the project's priority within EU infrastructure initiatives.^[74] The PCI status aligns the interconnector with TEN-E objectives to enhance cross-border electricity flows, including the EU target for member states to achieve at least 15% interconnection capacity by 2030, thereby facilitating Cyprus's integration from its current energy island status into the wider European grid.^[2] Project oversight is managed by the Great Sea Interconnector Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), a subsidiary established by Greece's Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO) in January 2024 to handle implementation, financing, and compliance reporting.^[75] EU mechanisms include periodic audits and progress monitoring to verify adherence to TEN-E criteria, though the framework imposes no binding veto on participating nations' decisions to pause or withdraw involvement.^[76]

Claimed Environmental and Security Rationales

The Great Sea Interconnector is promoted by the European Commission as facilitating the integration of renewable energy sources across Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, purportedly enabling a "significant reduction in CO₂ emissions" through optimized cross-border electricity flows that minimize curtailment of intermittent renewables.^[1] Project advocates, including the Greek transmission operator IPTO, assert this will enhance efficiency in utilizing variable solar and wind generation, displacing higher-emission local production in isolated systems like Cyprus'.^[1] However, such environmental rationales remain contingent on future renewable build-out and operational patterns; empirical assessments indicate initial benefits would likely stem from importing natural gas-fired electricity from Israel's Leviathan field-linked plants, which emit approximately 400-500 g CO₂/kWh compared to 800-1,000 g CO₂/kWh for Cyprus' heavy fuel oil and diesel generators, yielding verifiable displacement of oil imports but not a transition away from fossil fuels overall.^[2] Claims of annual CO₂ savings on the order of 1 million tons, as occasionally referenced in promotional materials, lack independent peer-reviewed validation and overstate impacts without accounting for transmission losses (estimated at 3-5% over 1,200 km) or potential reinforcement of gas dependency.^[64] On security grounds, the EU designates the project a Project of Common Interest to address Cyprus' energy isolation, connecting its grid to the continental European system for enhanced supply reliability and diversification amid global disruptions like the 2022 Russian gas curtailments to Europe.^[2] ^[4] This rationale posits bidirectional 2,000 MW capacity as a hedge against local fuel import vulnerabilities, with Cyprus—dependent on seaborne heavy fuel oil deliveries—gaining access to Israel's gas reserves and Greece's interconnections, theoretically stabilizing prices and availability during crises.^[19] Yet, causal analysis reveals limitations: subsea HVDC cables spanning contested Eastern Mediterranean waters introduce single-point failure risks from seismic activity, maintenance challenges, or deliberate interference, contrasting with more resilient national options like Cyprus' pursued LNG regasification terminals or decentralized solar-plus-storage, which avoid geographic over-reliance on a 1,200 km link prone to outages exceeding those of diversified local infrastructure.^[59] EU emphasis on interconnection overlooks these hazards, prioritizing supranational integration despite evidence from prior projects (e.g., Baltic Sea links) showing vulnerability to hybrid threats without commensurate resilience gains for small islands.^[77]

Development Timeline

Early Conceptualization and Agreements

The EuroAsia Interconnector project, later rebranded as the Great Sea Interconnector, was first publicly announced on January 23, 2012, in Nicosia by Nasos Ktorides, emphasizing Cyprus's potential role as an energy hub linking Europe and Asia via subsea electricity cables.^[1] This conceptualization arose amid growing interest in Eastern Mediterranean natural gas discoveries, such as Israel's Leviathan field confirmed in 2010, prompting discussions on regional energy infrastructure to integrate isolated grids like Cyprus's with continental Europe.^[51] Initial political backing materialized through the trilateral partnership established between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, formalized via a Memorandum of Understanding signed on August 8, 2013, in Nicosia, which encompassed energy cooperation including electricity interconnections.^[78] The first formal tripartite summit occurred on January 28, 2016, in Nicosia, where leaders reaffirmed commitment to the interconnector as a means to end Cyprus's energy isolation and enhance grid stability for all parties. In January 2016, the Italian research vessel Odin Finder conducted a reconnaissance survey to identify the optimal subsea route, addressing early concerns over Mediterranean depths exceeding 3,000 meters and strong currents.^[51] Feasibility studies progressed in 2017, with technical assessments confirming the viability of a high-voltage direct current (HVDC) system capable of transmitting up to 2,000 MW, despite challenges posed by the route's length—approximately 1,518 km—and seabed conditions; Cyprus granted environmental approval that year.^[51] Initial cost estimates for the project hovered around €1.5 billion, reflecting pre-construction projections for the core interconnection linking Hadera in Israel to Crete and Attica in Greece via Cyprus.^[67] The project's momentum accelerated with its inclusion in the European Union's Projects of Common Interest (PCI) lists, starting from the inaugural 2013 list during its pre-feasibility phase and reaffirmed in the 2019 fourth list, providing access to funding and regulatory support as a priority for European energy security.^[79]^[80] This status underscored the interconnector's role in bridging non-interconnected islands to the mainland grid, though skeptics noted persistent technical risks from extreme depths and seismic activity in the region.

Key Contracts and Construction Advances

In July 2023, EuroAsia Interconnector Ltd awarded Nexans a €1.43 billion turnkey contract for the submarine high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cable system connecting Crete to Cyprus, spanning approximately 900 km at depths up to 3,000 meters, marking the longest and deepest subsea power cables ever laid with a 2,000 MW bidirectional capacity.^[3]^[81] The contract encompasses design, manufacturing, installation, and commissioning, integrating voltage source converter (VSC) technology for multi-terminal operation.^[3] In October 2023, Greece's Independent Power Transmission Operator (IPTO, or ADMIE) acquired full ownership of the project from EuroAsia Interconnector Ltd for €48 million, redesignating IPTO as the project promoter to accelerate implementation amid prior delays.^[67] In January 2024, IPTO established Great Sea Interconnector S.A., a special purpose vehicle (SPV) dedicated to project execution, financing, and oversight of the Crete-Cyprus segment as the initial phase.^[75] Progress on marine surveys advanced through 2022-2023, with preparatory seabed route assessments supporting the Nexans contract's engineering phase, though full geophysical surveys remained pending detailed permitting in Greek and Cypriot exclusive economic zones (EEZs).^[82] In June 2023, Cyprus's Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA) issued an interconnection line owner license to EuroAsia Interconnector Ltd, facilitating regulatory alignment for cable laying in Cypriot waters.^[12] These steps synchronized with Greece's ongoing Crete-Attica HVDC interconnector upgrades, targeted for completion by mid-2025 to enable seamless integration.^[83] The European Commission had approved €657 million in grants under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) in January 2022 for the first phase, with initial disbursements supporting 2023 contract awards and preparatory works.^[60] This funding complemented Cyprus's €100 million allocation from its Recovery and Resilience Plan for interconnector development.^[2]

2024-2025 Delays and Reassessments

In March 2025, the Great Sea Interconnector project was officially placed on hold, with Greece's independent transmission system operator ADMIE temporarily suspending payments to Nexans for cable manufacturing amid mounting financial and regulatory challenges.^[84]^[85] This pause followed delays in securing necessary seabed survey licenses, rendering the original completion target of 2030 uncertain and prompting initial reassessments of the project's feasibility.^[86] In April 2025, Greece's National Security Council convened to deliberate on the project's future, evaluating strategic implications and potential adjustments to its scope.^[87] By June, ADMIE sought compensation exceeding €250 million from Cypriot authorities for survey delays, highlighting escalating cost disputes tied to licensing bottlenecks.^[86] July 2025 saw Cyprus stalling ministerial approval for funding mechanisms, with disputes centering on tariff structures and the island's capped annual contribution of €25 million from 2025 to 2030, as doubts mounted over long-term economic viability and risk allocation.^[88]^[89] In August, Nexans issued a statement clarifying its position in response to media reports questioning project viability, affirming no formal cancellation but noting dependency on resolved stakeholder agreements for resuming production.^[90] Ongoing reassessments through October 2025 have focused on narrowing the scope to a bilateral Greece-Cyprus link, exemplified by Cyprus's energy regulator transferring ownership and management licenses from promoter EuroAsia Interconnector to ADMIE on October 13, while the full trilateral extension to Israel remains in limbo amid persistent financial probes by the European Public Prosecutor's Office.^[91]^[92] These developments underscore heightened scrutiny of cost-benefit ratios, with no firm resumption timeline established.^[6]

Geopolitical Obstacles

Turkey's Territorial Claims and Actions

Turkey's naval forces intercepted and shadowed survey vessels conducting seabed reconnaissance for the Great Sea Interconnector in the Eastern Mediterranean during early 2025. In February 2025, a Turkish corvette monitored and harassed research ships, including the Gibraltar-flagged Ievoli, operating east of the Greek islands of Kasos and Karpathos in areas within Cyprus's and Greece's asserted exclusive economic zones (EEZs), prompting complaints from project operators about interference with technical surveys.^[93]^[94] This followed initial surveys planned for the same region, which Turkish officials deemed a violation of international law based on Ankara's continental shelf claims that exclude full EEZ generation by islands.^[94] Such actions extended into mid-2025, with Turkish warships continuing to track and challenge project-related vessels through August. On August 8, 2025, Turkey halted operations of the survey ship Fugro Gauss in waters it claims as part of its continental shelf, overlapping with Cypriot and Greek EEZ assertions, as the vessel conducted route assessments for undersea infrastructure crossing these zones; Ankara justified the intervention by citing unauthorized activity in disputed areas.^[95]^[96] Turkish authorities described the Great Sea Interconnector as "provocative unilateralism" that disregards Turkey's rights in the region, issuing statements that it would not permit initiatives bypassing its maritime interests.^[97]^[98] These interventions align with a historical pattern of obstructions tied to Turkey's non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus's EEZ, including similar naval deployments against EastMed gas pipeline surveys in Cypriot-claimed waters since 2019. In that case, Turkish warships escorted drillships and shadowed exploration vessels to assert overlapping claims derived from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, effectively delaying operations in contested blocks.^[99] Turkey has invoked its 2019 maritime memorandum of understanding with Libya's Government of National Accord to delineate zones extending into areas Greece and Cyprus view as their own, framing these as "grey zone" entitlements that justify presence and veto power over third-party projects.

Maritime Law Disputes and Regional Tensions

The legal framework for submarine power cables in the Eastern Mediterranean derives principally from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), ratified by Greece in 1995, Cyprus in 1988, and Israel in 2019. Articles 58(1) and 79(1) affirm the freedom of states to lay submarine cables within exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the continental shelf, without requiring prior consent from the coastal state, though subject to "due regard" for its rights, reasonable measures for route designation, and avoidance of interference with navigation or fisheries.^[100] ^[101] This regime, rooted in customary international law predating UNCLOS, prioritizes global connectivity over unilateral vetoes, with coastal states empowered only to regulate laying processes post-notification rather than prohibit projects outright.^[102] Turkey, which signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified it, explicitly rejects the convention's application in the semi-enclosed Mediterranean, contending that its equidistance-based delimitation principles unfairly favor island states like Greece and Cyprus at the expense of continental geography, and insisting on equitable bilateral negotiations instead.^[103] ^[99] In the absence of delimited maritime boundaries—particularly in the Aegean and Levantine Basin, where Turkey asserts overlapping continental shelf claims with Cyprus and Greece—the interconnector's route through purported Cypriot and Greek EEZs raises questions of compatibility with these assertions.^[104] While UNCLOS parties view cable laying as permissible absent agreed delimitations, provided routes respect provisional lines or median principles, non-parties like Turkey invoke customary equity to challenge such activities, creating interpretive friction without a binding adjudicatory mechanism involving all stakeholders.^[105] No established precedent under international law mandates consent from disputing non-parties for cables in undelimited zones, underscoring reliance on diplomatic forbearance over enforceable prohibitions.^[106] These disputes amplify regional instability by intertwining energy infrastructure with unresolved sovereignty claims, fostering zero-sum perceptions where the Greece-Cyprus-Israel trilateral—focused on hydrocarbon and electricity integration—clashes with Turkey's exclusion from shared resources, often framed through alliances like potential Turkey-Qatar energy ties.^[107] ^[108] The causal interplay risks inadvertent escalations, such as navigational hazards or resource competition, in flashpoints like the Aegean, yet empirically reveals enforcement voids: UNCLOS's dispute settlement provisions (e.g., ITLOS) bind only parties, leaving customary protections vulnerable to power asymmetries and unilateral assertions in contested waters.^[109] This dynamic highlights how legal ambiguities in semi-enclosed seas perpetuate tensions, prioritizing de facto stability over rigid application of treaty norms amid hydrocarbon-driven realignments.^[110]

Prospective Outcomes and Risks

Energy Security and Economic Gains

The Great Sea Interconnector, with an initial capacity of 1,000 MW expandable to 2,000 MW, will integrate Cyprus's isolated grid into the European network, thereby ending the island's longstanding energy isolation and enhancing supply security through bidirectional electricity flows.^[2]^[1] This connection will enable Cyprus to import power during peak demand or shortages, reducing reliance on costly local fuel oil and diesel generation, which currently drives some of the highest electricity prices in the EU.^[111] Economic analyses project annual savings of approximately €300 million on Cyprus's electricity bills by facilitating access to lower-cost wholesale markets and optimizing generation.^[112] Regionally, the project leverages Israel's abundant natural gas reserves, such as those from the Leviathan field, to generate and export stable baseload electricity, mitigating price volatility exacerbated by events like the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war energy disruptions.^[77] The interconnector's multi-terminal design allows efficient power exchange among Israel, Cyprus, and Greece's Crete grid, fostering market integration and enabling Cyprus to export surplus renewable energy during off-peak periods, potentially yielding net economic gains through trade.^[111] On a broader scale, the 2,000 MW capacity equates to the average electricity needs of over 3 million households, contributing to EU-wide diversification away from Russian imports by opening southern Mediterranean routes for reliable supply.^[3] As a designated EU Project of Common Interest, it aligns with goals for secure, affordable energy, with the European Commission noting its role in reducing dependency on volatile external sources post-2022.^[2]^[77]

Geopolitical, Financial, and Operational Hazards

The Great Sea Interconnector's subsea route traverses contested maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean, heightening geopolitical hazards from potential sabotage by state actors, as evidenced by Turkey's territorial claims asserting the cable encroaches on its continental shelf.^[113] A U.S. law firm analysis in December 2024 flagged elevated risks of Turkish interference, including deliberate cable severance, drawing parallels to documented incidents of regional infrastructure disruption.^[114] Subsea power cables generally exhibit vulnerabilities to intentional damage, with state-backed operations requiring specialized vessels and sonar for location but capable of inflicting outages lasting weeks amid repair backlogs.^[115]^[116] Recent precedents, such as Baltic Sea cable cuts attributed to hybrid threats, underscore how contested waters amplify such risks without robust multilateral deterrence.^[117] Financially, the project faces overrun potentials exceeding initial €1.9 billion estimates for the Greece-Cyprus segment alone, with Cyprus bearing disproportionate exposure in a small economy reliant on uncertain electricity exports.^[118]^[61] Cyprus Finance Minister Makis Keravnos warned in September 2025 of funding risks, citing opaque total costs and viability doubts amid fluctuating energy markets that could render exports unprofitable if prices crash.^[66] An independent study in December 2024 identified inadequate profitability for Cypriot investors under promoter terms, potentially saddling taxpayers with billions in guarantees or sunk costs if demand falters.^[119] Geopolitical delays have already escalated pre-construction expenses, with Cyprus obligated to cover €25 million in 2025 for prior Greek outlays, compounding fiscal strain without assured returns.^[120] Operationally, the cable's path through seismically active Mediterranean faults poses rupture threats, as Cyprus lies in a high-hazard zone with historical events like the 1896-2018 catalog documenting frequent tremors capable of displacing undersea infrastructure.^[121] Probabilistic assessments confirm elevated seismic probabilities, where undersea quakes or slumps account for up to 10% of global cable faults, demanding costly burial and monitoring unproven at the project's 1,000+ km depth extremes.^[116]^[122] Partial implementation risks grid desynchronization, as asynchronous HVDC links could cascade failures across Cyprus's isolated system, while annual maintenance—encompassing inspections and repairs in hazardous depths—imposes ongoing multimillion-euro burdens without specified offsets in project economics.^[123]

References

[1]
IPTO - | Great Sea Interconnector
The Great Sea Interconnector will provide a green, reliable, and bidirectional subsea connection between Greece Cyprus at first and Israel at a later stage..
[2]
Ending energy isolation - Project of Common Interest "EuroAsia ...
The Cypriot Recovery and Resilience Plan provides a tangible contribution of EUR 100 million to building a cross-border electricity interconnector.
[3]
Nexans wins record-breaking contract for the Great Sea Interconnector
The interconnector will deliver up to 2,000 MW of energy to Europe and will be the largest interconnector project in history, supplying over 3 million homes ...
[4]
Greece-Cyprus-Israel subsea power link faces major obstacles - DW
Sep 17, 2025 · The Great Sea Interconnector subsea electric cable project seeks to connect Greece, Cyprus and Israel. But will it ever be completed?
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The case against the €2 billion sea cable | Cyprus Mail
Jul 31, 2025 · Things are worse than just the cost since the size of the project, 2000MW exceeds the capacity of the Cyprus grid, which is1400MW. There is ...
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Uncertain future of Greece-Cyprus Great Sea Interconnector project
Sep 9, 2025 · Greece and Cyprus find themselves at odds when it comes to Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), their big project for a subsea electricity cable.
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Navigating the Evolution of Cyprus' Electricity Landscape - MDPI
For decades, heavy fuel oil and diesel were the dominant fuels used in power generation, reflecting the lack of indigenous fossil fuel resources and the absence ...
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[PDF] Cyprus Ac - Economy and Finance - European Union
May 24, 2023 · Cyprus relies on imported energy in the form of heavy fuel oil for electricity production, generating significant costs related to the ...
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Renewable energy technology integration for the island of Cyprus
Oct 15, 2017 · At present, thermal power generation in Cyprus relies on heavy fuel oil (HFO) and to a lesser extent diesel. Both fuels are imported, which ...
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Household electricity prices in the EU stable in 2024
May 6, 2025 · In the second half of 2024, average electricity prices for households in the EU remained largely stable, with a slight decrease to €28.72 per 100 kWh from €28. ...
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Eurostat electricity price 2024. News - Advanced Energy Technology
May 14, 2025 · In the second half of 2024, electricity prices for non-household consumers were highest in Cyprus (€0.2578 per kWh) and Ireland (€0.2552 per kWh) ...<|separator|>
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[PDF] National Report - CEER
Jan 1, 2024 · Cyprus is the only non-interconnected EU Member State. With proper planning and the creation of appropriate electricity grid interconnections ...
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Entire island of Cyprus suffers blackout - Renewable Energy World
Apr 4, 2012 · According to reports, nearly the entire island nation of Cyprus is in a blackout following a problem with a local power plant that caused a wider grid outage.Missing: incidents | Show results with:incidents
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RES failure causes blackout in Cyprus | eKathimerini.com
Mar 20, 2023 · Saturday's 15-minute power outage across Cyprus was linked to problems caused by the increased use of renewable energy sources, particularly photovoltaic ...Missing: incidents | Show results with:incidents
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Power outages caused by transformer failure - Cyprus Mail
Aug 12, 2025 · A fault at the Karvounas transmission substation caused widespread power cuts in mountainous areas of Limassol and Nicosia on Monday evening ...
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Vasilikos LNG terminal project faces further delays over design flaws
Sep 14, 2025 · Cyprus's stalled liquefied natural gas terminal project at Vasilikos faces further significant delays after the new project manager identified ...
[17]
Cyprus faces €67 million EU clawback as LNG terminal woes deepen
Sep 25, 2025 · Brussels has sent a stark warning to Nicosia, demanding the repayment of €67 million in EU funding linked to the unfinished liquefied ...
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[PDF] CYPRUS Cyprus FSRU | EBRD
Jun 24, 2025 · Natural gas will initially be directed towards power generation, connecting with the Vasilikos power station which currently produces more than ...<|separator|>
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IPTO is the new project promoter of the Greece-Cyprus-Israel ...
Oct 6, 2023 · EuroAsia Interconnector is a 2,000-MW multi-terminal interconnection which connects the national electricity grids of Israel, Cyprus and Greece ...
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The Technology Behind Interconnecting Greek Islands' Power Grids
Mar 8, 2022 · It had the electricity interconnections with neighboring countries in the Balkans, and Italy. But the markets were not integrated, and the ...
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Greece now interconnected with Crete via 1 GW transmission line
May 29, 2025 · A 1 GW direct current (DC) transmission line linking mainland Greece to Crete has entered trial operation, with full commercial service expected by September.
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Attica-Crete HVDC Interconnector Project, Greece - NS Energy
Jun 24, 2020 · The Attica-Crete high-voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnection project involves bipolar submarine cable systems over a distance of 335km to interconnect ...
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ARIADNE ATTICA CRETE INTERCONNECTION
The project includes the implementation of a bipolar High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) link with a rated capacity of 1000 MW, rated voltage /±500 kV and a ...
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Siemens HVDC power bridge will connect Crete with mainland Greece
Attica-Crete interconnection will ensure a more secure power supply and increase integration of renewable energy; HVDC project will reduce half a million ...
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Investigating the long-term benefits of EU electricity highways
It is concluded that HVDC results in low power losses, great stability, and better power flow control which is impossible in the case of an HVAC transmission ...
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Export - energy-sea.gov.il
It is estimated that in 2022, total exports of natural gas will approach 10 BCM, generating revenues exceeding NIS 1.5 billion ($440 million) for the Israeli ...
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Israel starts export of 'surplus' gas to both Egypt, Jordan: ministry
Jun 20, 2025 · Israeli gas exports to Egypt and Jordan rose by 13.3% year over year to 13.2 Bcm, accounting for some 49% of Israeli gas production last year, ...
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Minister of Energy and Infrastructure Eli Cohen signed, together with ...
Dec 25, 2024 · The ministers agreed to sign a contract, in 2025, to lay the submarine power cable that will connect Israel to Greece and from there to Europe.
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Leviathan Natural Gas Field - NewMed Energy
Production of natural gas from Leviathan began on December 31, 2019, on time and on budget, and since has become a cornerstone of gas supply in Israel, Egypt ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
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Leviathan Gas Field, Mediterranean Sea, Israel - Offshore Technology
Oct 11, 2023 · Drilling of the Leviathan-2 well started in March 2011 by the Pride North America rig. The drilling operations, however, had to be stopped after ...Missing: date | Show results with:date
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Tamar Natural Gas Field - Offshore Technology
Jun 7, 2024 · The Tamar field is a natural gas discovery located within exploration permit 309 in Israel. It was discovered in January 2009.Missing: Tamara | Show results with:Tamara
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Natural Gas Discoveries and Israel's Energy Security
May 25, 2020 · Tamar and Leviathan, two large and prolific fields discovered in 2009 and 2010, respectively, boosted Israel's energy supply.
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Aphrodite Gas Field, Eastern Mediterranean Sea, Cyprus - NS Energy
Apr 4, 2020 · Discovered in 2011, the deep-water gas field is estimated to hold up to 4.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of recoverable gas reserves. Recommended ...
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Chevron-led consortium to submit updated plan for Aphrodite gas field
Aug 27, 2024 · Discovered in 2011, the Aphrodite gas field is Cyprus' first offshore find and is estimated to contain around 3.5 trillion cubic feet of gas.
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ExxonMobil makes natural gas discovery offshore Cyprus
Feb 28, 2019 · Glaucus-1 well encounters a gas-bearing reservoir of approximately 436 feet (133 meters) · Well is located in offshore Block 10 southwest of ...
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Exxon Mobil finds natural gas reservoir offshore Cyprus ... - Reuters
Jul 7, 2025 · The Glaucus-2 appraisal well, completed in March 2022, confirmed the existence of a high-quality gas-bearing reservoir. Cyprus has found ...
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[PDF] An Emerging Natural Gas Hub in the Eastern Mediterranean
Since 2009, roughly 70 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas resources have been discovered in the eastern Mediterranean off the coasts of ... The recent gas ...
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Oil and Natural Gas In the Eastern Mediterranean Region - EIA
Sep 3, 2025 · Natural gas production grew significantly in the Eastern Mediterranean after major offshore discoveries in Egypt and Israel began commercial ...
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The use of sustainable combined cycle technologies in Cyprus
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Siemens Energy's gas turbine technology to support cleaner, more ...
Mar 9, 2021 · First private gas-fired combined cycle power plant on Cyprus; More than 50% CO 2 emissions reduction thanks to switch from heavy fuel oil to ...Missing: savings | Show results with:savings
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Natural gas in Cyprus: The need for consolidated planning
Introduction of natural gas in electricity will reduce generation costs in Cyprus. Without natural gas, renewable energy increases but CO2 emissions increase ...Missing: savings | Show results with:savings
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Natural Gas Integration In Cyprus' Electricity Generation
Sep 30, 2025 · Reduced fuel and emissions costs, coupled with improved plant efficiency, underpin the projected savings. Additional benefits include ...
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[PDF] EuroAsia Interconnector: “electricity highway” to Israeli war crimes
The EuroAsia Interconnector is projected to link electricity grids in Israel, Cyprus and Greece via the world's longest submarine power cable. Crucially, the ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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The role of EuroAsia Interconnector in transforming Cypriot and ...
Jul 27, 2023 · The EuroAsia Interconnector, a groundbreaking energy infrastructure project, is poised to revolutionize the electricity markets of Cyprus and Israel.<|separator|>
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Installation Crete Cyprus cable starts Great Sea Interconnector
Dec 25, 2023 · The Great Sea Interconnector is seen with 1 GW in capacity and a possibility to double it. The current phase is estimated at EUR 1.57 ...
[47]
EuroAsia Interconnector (Cyprus to Crete) Interconnector | 4C Offshore
EuroAsia Interconnector (Cyprus to Crete) is connected from Cyprus to Greece, with a capacity of 2000MW.
[48]
Cyprus Backs Multi-Billion 'Great Sea Interconnector'
Sep 17, 2024 · On completion, it will be the longest, at 1,240 km, and deepest, at 3,000 metres, high voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnector in the world ...Missing: capacity | Show results with:capacity
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TYNDP 2024 Project Collection
The Great Sea Interconnector is a 1000 MW project connecting Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, ending Cyprus's energy isolation and ensuring supply security.
[50]
Subsea interconnections for cross-border power - Nexans
Jun 10, 2024 · This 2-gigawatt giant is set to become the world's longest and deepest high-voltage direct current (HVDC) subsea cable. Measuring 900 kilometers ...
[51]
EuroAsia Interconnector Project, Greece-Cyprus-Israel - NS Energy
Jun 14, 2019 · Estimated to cost €3.5bn ($3.9bn), the first stage development of the interconnection project will have a transmission capacity of 1GW, which is ...Missing: 2 | Show results with:2
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'World's longest and deepest' €2.4 billion subsea green electricity ...
Sep 23, 2024 · A multi-billion-euro underwater high voltage direct current (HVDC) interconnector project, envisioned to link Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, will connect ...
[53]
| Great Sea Interconnector
### Summary of Great Sea Interconnector
[54]
Great Sea Interconnector | IPTO
### Summary of Great Sea Interconnector Implementation Phases
[55]
70566-2018 - Planning - TED
In Stage 1, the HVDC Interconnector is designed for a transmission capacity of 1.000 MW at ±400 kV or more. The 4 converter stations, 1 at each location, ...
[56]
EuroAsia Interconnector secures record-breaking contract - Knews
Jul 19, 2023 · The interconnector is projected to deliver up to 2,000 MW of energy at Stage 2, making it the largest submarine electricity interconnector ever ...<|separator|>
[57]
Cost-Benefit Analysis Study for EuroAsia Interconnector - CESI
EuroAsia Interconnector is a European Project of Common Interest (PCI) aimed at linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece with a 2000 MW 400/500 kV HVDC sub-sea ...
[58]
Works begin on world's longest undersea cable – EuroAsia ...
Oct 17, 2022 · The first phase is for a capacity of 1 GW, which is set to be increased to 2 GW. The undersea link will be 1,208 kilometers long, with another ...Missing: stage
[59]
Great sea connections: Financing the Eastern Mediterranean's ...
Jun 17, 2025 · The Great Sea Interconnector, which is under construction, is expected to be operational by 2030 with a capacity of up to 2 GW, while the GREGY ...<|separator|>
[60]
Commission participates in launch of EuroAsia Electricity ...
Oct 14, 2022 · The EuroAsia Interconnector will reinforce the security of energy supply for Cyprus and Crete, integrating their energy systems with the ...
[61]
Cyprus backs multi-billion electric cable link from Europe to Mideast
Sep 17, 2024 · Cyprus would contribute towards the cost of the project with 25 million euros annually over a five-year period, Papanastasiou said. The amount ...
[62]
Funding uncertainty threatens Great Sea Interconnector
Jul 9, 2025 · Under the Cross-Border Cost Allocation (CBCA) agreement, Cyprus is responsible for 63 percent of project costs, and Greece 37 percent. For 2025 ...
[63]
Progress on the Great Sea Interconnector: study confirms benefits ...
Jul 2, 2025 · The Greek operator has presented a cost-benefit study for the second branch of the Greece–Cyprus–Israel interconnection.Missing: length | Show results with:length
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Study confirms economic sustainability, says EuroAsia project ...
Aug 15, 2023 · ... 300 million annually. This practically means reduced electricity ... cyprus energyeuroasia connectorEuroAsia Interconnector. Share ...
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https://www.admie.gr/en/kentro-typoy/nea/cost-benefit-study-gsi-cyprus-israel-section-was-presented-regulatory-authorities
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Keravnos warns of risks in funding of GSI - Cyprus Mail
Sep 29, 2025 · It is risky to allocate funds for the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) project, Finance Minister Makis Keravnos warned on Monday, citing ...
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https://en.politis.com.cy/politics/964811/euroasia-interconnector-a-decade-long-energy-vision-now-caught-in-uncertainty
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[PDF] Cyprus: 2025 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; and Staff ...
The Great Sea Interconnector project is yet to get a final approval. A cost-benefit analysis associated with such a project should take a long-term ...
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Years of Delays, Billions in Overruns: The Dismal History of Big ...
Nov 28, 2021 · The nation's most ambitious engineering projects are mired in postponements and skyrocketing costs. Delivering $1.2 trillion in new infrastructure will be ...<|separator|>
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Great Sea Interconnector: Από την «ενεργειακή γέφυρα - IBNA
Oct 5, 2025 · At the heart of the matter lies the question: “who bears the risk?” Athens is unwilling to shoulder delays and cost overruns unilaterally, which ...
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Study reveals pros and cons of Great Sea Interconnector - Knews
Jul 11, 2024 · Study reveals pros and cons of Great Sea Interconnector. Power bills to drop, but construction costs will start soon.
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FM: Great Sea Interconnector future depends on economic viability ...
Sep 5, 2025 · The future of the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a project intended to link the grids of Greece, Cyprus, and potentially Israel, ...
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Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/564 of 19 November ...
PCIs should be listed per strategic trans-European energy infrastructure priorities in the order laid down in Annex I to Regulation (EU) No 347/2013. (7). PCIs ...
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EU invests over € 1 billion in energy infrastructure in support of the ...
Jan 26, 2022 · The largest amount of funding will go to the EuroAsia interconnector project (€ 657 million) to support the first electricity interconnection ...Missing: total cost
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Great Sea Interconnector | IPTO - ΑΔΜΗΕ
Great Sea Interconnector is a Special Purpose Vehicle of IPTO, established in January 2024, as the implementing and financing entity of the Crete - Cyprus - ...
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Parliamentary question | E-000454/2025(ASW) - European Parliament
May 14, 2025 · The Great Sea Interconnector (formerly known as 'EuroAsia Interconnector') is recognised as a project of common interest (PCI) of the EU in the field of energy.
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Von der Leyen: EuroAsia Interconnector to help free EU from energy ...
Jun 21, 2022 · The EuroAsia Interconnector electricity link, connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece, will help reduce the European Union's energy dependence on Russia.Missing: benefits | Show results with:benefits
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(PDF) The trilateral partnership between Greece, Cyprus & Israel
Nov 6, 2022 · The trilateral partnership between Greece, Cyprus and Israel began on August 8th, 2013 in Nicosia, with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
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[PDF] EN - EN - EUR-Lex - European Union
Feb 25, 2015 · The future interconnection called the Euroasia Interconnector, currently in the pre- feasibility phase, was included in the first Union PCI list ...<|separator|>
[80]
EuroAsia Interconnector remains on the PCI list | 4C Offshore News
Jun 12, 2019 · The European Commission has released its Enhanced Surveillance Report for Greece which acknowledges that the EuroAsia ... 300 million to be ...
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Nexans shares rise on 1.43 billion euro contract for EuroAsia ...
Jul 19, 2023 · The EU-funded interconnector will deliver up to 2,000 MW of energy to Europe and be the largest interconnector project in history, supplying ...Missing: total grant
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The Great Sea Interconnector: A Pioneering but Challenging Energy ...
Mar 31, 2025 · The idea for the Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection, later expanded to include Israel, dates back 14 years.Missing: stages | Show results with:stages<|control11|><|separator|>
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Attica-Crete leg of Mediterranean super grid due mid 2025
Apr 20, 2024 · The MoU was signed in a bid to bring TAQA and Cyprus into IPTO's Great Sea Interconnector. Separately, Greece's Ministry of the Environment ...
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Greece-Cyprus energy link put on ice - eKathimerini.com
Mar 7, 2025 · The Greece-Cyprus electrical interconnection project (Great Sea Interconnector-2GSI) has been officially placed on hold due to escalating geopolitical ...<|control11|><|separator|>
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Interconnector payment suspension 'understandable', minister says
Mar 7, 2025 · Greece's dependent transmission system operator Admie's decision to temporarily suspend payments to French technology company Nexans for the ...
[86]
Greece's IPTO Seeks Pay for Delays to €1.9 Billion Subsea Cable
Jun 13, 2025 · Greek grid operator IPTO SA is seeking compensation for delays in getting licenses for seabed surveys needed to complete the €1.9 billion Great ...
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Greece's National Security Council Meets to Discuss Great Sea ...
Apr 16, 2025 · Greece's National Security Council convened today to deliberate on the future of the Great Sea Interconnector, a critical electricity interconnection project.Missing: review | Show results with:review
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Cyprus stalls on Great Sea Interconnector amid financial disputes ...
Jul 17, 2025 · The Great Sea Interconnector, previously known as the EuroAsia Interconnector ... A cost-benefit study by Exergia and the National Technical ...
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Our View: Doubts grow over sea interconnector project - Cyprus Mail
Jul 18, 2025 · The controversy surrounding the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) project, which will connect the power grids of Greece and Cyprus with undersea cable, has ...Missing: disputes | Show results with:disputes
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Nexans Statement Regarding the Great Sea Interconnector Project
Aug 1, 2025 · Paris, August 1st, 2025 – In response to recent press articles concerning the Great Sea Interconnector project, Nexans would like to clarify the ...
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Key progress toward Greece-Cyprus power linkup | eKathimerini.com
Oct 13, 2025 · The CERA decisions essentially transfer the responsibility and legal possession of the interconnection from EuroAsia Interconnector to ADMIE.
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Europe Probes Second Cyprus-Linked EU-Funded Energy Project
Sep 12, 2025 · The European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) has launched an investigation into a second Cyprus-linked energy-focused infrastructure project ...
[93]
Reports: Annoyance With Turkish 'Shadowing' of Research Ship
Feb 3, 2025 · A lone Turkish corvette monitoring two maritime vessels, including the Ievoli, conducting research for the GSI project.
[94]
Greece-Cyprus Undersea Electric Connector Roils Waters in Turkey
Apr 7, 2025 · The surveys, planned to take place east of Kasos and Karpathos are considered by Turkish officials as “a clear violation of international law ...
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Ankara blocks research on cable route - eKathimerini.com
Aug 8, 2025 · Turkey's decision to halt survey work on an international undersea cable project was widely seen as a pointed message to multiple recipients ...
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Turkey Stops Survey Ship for Cable to France Through Cyprus ...
Aug 8, 2025 · Turkey Stops Survey Ship for Cable to France Through Cyprus, Greece. August 8, 2025. By TNH Staff. bookmark. twitter · facebook · pinterest.
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Turkey says it won't allow projects that disregard its rights in EastMed
Aug 7, 2025 · “The country does not permit any projects or initiatives – such as the Great Sea Interconnector Project – that disregard its rights or bypass ...<|separator|>
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Turkey Challenges Greece and Cyprus by Blocking Key Projects in ...
Aug 14, 2025 · Turkey is intensifying its efforts to obstruct key infrastructure projects that involve Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean.
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Water is Thicker Than Gas: Turkey, UNCLOS, and the Eastern ...
Oct 14, 2025 · Since it does not recognize Cyprus, Turkey claims an extended EEZ ... Turkey made efforts to undermine EastMed Pipeline plans by using ...
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Libya (GNA)–Turkey maritime deal - Wikipedia
Turkey and the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya signed a maritime boundary treaty in November 2019, in order to establish an exclusive economic ...Missing: grey Interconnector
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[PDF] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf. 1. All States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf, in ...Missing: Mediterranean | Show results with:Mediterranean
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Submarine Cables - International Framework - NOAA
Within a coastal State's EEZ, UNCLOS guarantees to all States, subject to the relevant provisions of UNCLOS, freedom to lay submarine cables, as well as other ...
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[PDF] Submarine Cables and the UNCLOS | Global Ocean Forum
Mar 25, 2016 · “Functioning as the backbone of the international telecommunications system, submarine cables are a fundamental component of the critical global.
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Turkey accuses Greece of violating its jurisdiction with its maritime ...
Apr 17, 2025 · Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS and argues that islands should not have full rights to maritime zones, including EEZs. This is especially ...
[105]
Maritime Spatial Planning : Opportunity for Greek-Turkish dialogue ...
Apr 24, 2025 · Turkey, not a UNCLOS signatory, disputes Greece's plan but lacks formal MSP or international court backing. While tensions persist, Greece's ...
[106]
Resolving International Disputes Arising from Activities Relating to ...
Jul 29, 2022 · This article focuses itself on these situations where a cable finds itself in disputed maritime areas.
[107]
[PDF] Marine Jurisdictional Problems for Submarine Cables Kent Bressie
▫ Claims that submarine cables are “installations and structures” in EEZ ... ▫ Yet many disputed maritime claims arise from disputes over land territory.
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Two practical proposals to solve eastern Mediterranean energy and ...
Oct 10, 2020 · Without having addressed Turkey's exclusion from eastern Mediterranean gas development or the basic maritime boundary disputes at the root of ...
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Power Plays in the Eastern Mediterranean And the Decline of US ...
Nov 7, 2024 · This article examines the US responses to gas exploration and other disputes in the eastern Mediterranean, including the Greek-Turkish divide over Cyprus.
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[PDF] Gaps in Accountability for Submarine Cable Protection
ABSTRACT. INTRODUCTION. I. IS THERE CIVIL JURISDICTION TO PROTECT CABLES IN THE EEZ AND. BEYOND? UNDER-EXPLORED CONSIDERATIONS.<|separator|>
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International law doesn't adequately protect undersea cables. That ...
Jan 25, 2024 · When undersea cables are cut or damaged, the laws that determine who is responsible for sabotage vary depending on where the cables are laid.
[112]
Significant Benefits for Cyprus from Construction of the EuroAsia ...
Jul 25, 2023 · Also, the EuroAsia Interconnector: - will provide a continuous two-way flow of energy, development of RES and reduction of CO2 emissions. - ...
[113]
Is the EuroAsia Interconnector still alive? - PV Magazine
Oct 20, 2023 · The EuroAsia cable is set to have a 2 GW capacity, lay in the Mediterranean Sea at a maximum depth of about 2,700 meters and run for about 1,500 ...Missing: stage | Show results with:stage
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[PDF] turkey's eastern mediterranean policy a geopolitical assessment | seta
Turkey declared the agreement between Greece and Egypt null and void, and sent seismic search vessels to the overlapping areas over which Greece claimed.
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U.S. law firm raises doubts over Cyprus power cable viability due to ...
Dec 18, 2024 · A US law firm has raised serious concerns about the feasibility of the planned electricity interconnector between Cyprus and Crete.
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Undersea Cables Are Vulnerable to Sabotage—but This Takes Skill ...
Jul 8, 2025 · Undersea cable sabotage requires locating cables, which is difficult due to their drifting, burial, and the need for high-resolution sonar ...
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Submarine Cable Security at Risk Amid Geopolitical Tensions &amp
Jul 17, 2025 · Explore the rising threats to global submarine cable networks amid escalating geopolitical tensions, sabotage incidents, and limited repair ...
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The Rising Threat: Underwater Cable Sabotage in the Baltic Sea
The growing reliance on subsea cables increases the risk of economic disruption and national security breaches, making it imperative for enhancing detection and ...
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Great Sea Interconnector running out of time: Two EU countries ...
Sep 19, 2024 · Greece and Cyprus are getting ready to hold talks, which are seen as a last shot to sort out the issues surrounding an interconnection project.
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Interconnector: Study finds significant financial risk for Cyprus
Dec 17, 2024 · The study highlights that IPTO's terms for Cyprus's investment in GSI are financially inadequate, offering limited profitability while burdening investors.
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Great Sea Interconnector - Energypress.eu
The stalled Great Sea Interconnector, a project intended to link the electrical grids of Greece, Cyprus, and potentially Israel, could reach the highest level ...Missing: stage | Show results with:stage<|separator|>
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(PDF) Seismic risk assessment as part of the National Risk ...
Seismic risk assessment for Cyprus at national scale is based on event-based probabilistic seismic risk analysis and eventual selection of seismic scenarios ...
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[PDF] Report Submarine Cables Expert Group Mapping risks stress tests
Oct 6, 2025 · Underwater natural events (such as seismic activity, slumping, undersea volcanoes or bottom currents) on a cable's route can lead to damage ...
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[PDF] Security threats to undersea communications cables and infrastructure
First, cable rupture can be the outcome of natural disasters like seaquakes and other seismic activity, tsunamis, and underwater currents during storms. Further ...