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Fire support base

A fire support base (FSB), also known as a firebase, is a temporary or semi-permanent military encampment designed to provide indirect artillery and mortar fire support to infantry units operating beyond the range of larger, fixed bases.^[1]^[2] These bases typically combine infantry, artillery batteries (such as 105mm or 155mm howitzers), and sometimes armored elements to deliver 360-degree defensive coverage and offensive firepower, enabling rapid response to threats and support for patrols up to 11,000–14,000 meters away.^[1]^[2] Fire support bases were a key tactical innovation during the Vietnam War (1961–1973), where they were extensively employed by U.S., Australian, and allied forces to adapt to the conflict's non-linear battlefield and dense jungle terrain.^[1]^[3] Their concept drew from 19th-century frontier forts but leveraged modern technologies like helicopters for resupply (e.g., UH-1 Hueys and CH-47 Chinooks) and radio communications for coordination.^[1]^[2] Established starting in 1965 alongside the escalation of U.S. troop commitments, over 8,000 such bases were built, though only a fraction operated simultaneously, with sizes ranging from small outposts (a company plus two guns) to larger installations housing a battalion and a full six-gun battery.^[1]^[2] In operation, fire support bases served multiple roles beyond direct infantry support, including harassment and interdiction fire to disrupt enemy movements, protection of convoys and neighboring positions, and as hubs for command, medical aid, and surveillance.^[2]^[3] Strategically sited on hilltops or near airstrips for optimal observation, they featured defensive perimeters with berms, barbed wire, trenches, and anti-personnel weapons like M42 Duster vehicles or beehive flechette rounds for close-quarters defense against assaults.^[2] Notable examples include Firebase Ripcord, which endured a major siege in 1970, and Australian bases like those on "the Horseshoe" near Nui Dat, operational from 1967 to 1971 and later transferred to South Vietnamese forces.^[1]^[3] While most enduring only days or weeks, some grew into semi-permanent fixtures, highlighting their adaptability in prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns.^[1]^[3]

Definition and Characteristics

Definition

A fire support base (FSB, also known as a firebase or FB) is a temporary, fortified military encampment designed primarily to deliver indirect fire support, such as artillery and mortars, to infantry operations in forward areas.^[4]^[1] These bases serve as tactical positions where support weapons systems are placed near suspected enemy locations or resupply corridors to enable rapid, coordinated fires for maneuver units operating beyond the range of larger, established installations.^[4]^[5] Unlike permanent bases, which provide long-term logistics, command, and sustainment functions, or forward operating bases (FOBs), which often integrate broader operational roles including aviation and intelligence hubs, FSBs emphasize short-term deployment lasting days to weeks, high mobility for quick establishment and relocation, and a singular focus on fire support to enhance infantry maneuver without extensive infrastructure.^[1]^[5] This design allows for 360-degree defensive perimeters and mutual fire support between nearby bases, prioritizing offensive and defensive artillery effects over prolonged occupation.^[1] The term "fire support base" originated in U.S. military doctrine during the mid-1960s, specifically within counterinsurgency tactics that highlighted artillery-centric operations to control contested terrain.^[5]^[6] It first appeared in practice in October 1965, when the U.S. First Cavalry Division established FSB Bill in Pleiku Province, evolving from earlier concepts like simple landing zones (LZs) to denote dedicated artillery positions.^[5]

Key Components

Fire support bases typically featured a circular perimeter defended by concertina wire, claymore mines, and trip flares to counter ground assaults, with bunkers constructed from sandbags, ammunition boxes, and steel culverts for overhead protection.^[7] Observation towers were positioned on high ground to enhance surveillance and fire direction, while helicopter landing zones (LZs) were integrated within the perimeter to facilitate rapid resupply, troop insertion, and medical evacuation by air.^[8] These elements formed a compact, defensible layout that prioritized mobility and quick setup, often conforming to the natural terrain to minimize construction time.^[7] The primary artillery assets included helicopter-transportable 105mm howitzers such as the M101A1 or M102, supplemented by heavier 155mm models like the M114A1 when conditions allowed, enabling effective fire support within ranges of up to 11-14 kilometers.^[7] Each howitzer was manned by a crew of 7-8 personnel trained in loading, aiming, and fire direction, organized into a standard six-gun battery with guns arranged in a star pattern around a central piece for illumination.^[7] Ammunition storage followed strict protocols, with basic loads of approximately 1,600 high-explosive rounds per 105mm battery stored in covered revetments to protect against shrapnel and ensure rapid access during sustained fire.^[7] Personnel typically comprised 100-200 troops, blending artillery specialists for gun operation and fire control with an infantry rifle company for perimeter security, alongside minimal support staff such as forward observers and radio operators to preserve operational mobility.^[7] U.S. advisers often integrated with local forces to coordinate efforts, emphasizing cross-training to handle both defensive and firing roles under combat conditions.^[7] Site selection emphasized elevated terrain to maximize observation and artillery coverage, ideally within 10-15 kilometers of friendly infantry routes while leveraging natural defensive features like ridgelines or clear fields of fire.^[8] Proximity to lines of communication, such as roads or waterways, was prioritized for logistical access, alongside assessments of soil stability for gun emplacements and avoidance of low-lying areas prone to flooding or enemy ambush.^[7] These criteria ensured the base could provide responsive fire support to maneuver units without compromising defensibility.^[8]

Tactical Role

Fire support bases (FSBs) primarily function to deliver suppressive, interdiction, and defensive fires, enabling ground forces to maneuver effectively by neutralizing enemy threats, disrupting their movements, and protecting friendly patrols and operations. These bases position artillery units to provide close and continuous fire support, using howitzers and other systems to engage targets that could otherwise hinder infantry advances or expose vulnerabilities. By massing indirect fires, FSBs contribute to combined arms operations, integrating with direct fires to shape the battlefield and deny the enemy freedom of action.^[9]^[10] Integration with infantry units occurs through coordinated efforts involving forward observers (FOs) embedded with maneuver elements, who relay target data to the fire support base for precise adjustments and rapid execution. Fire support officers (FSOs) and fire support teams (FISTs) facilitate this process, ensuring fires align with the commander's scheme of maneuver and respond to immediate needs, such as suppressing enemy positions during assaults. Response times for fire missions typically range from 2 to 5 minutes from call-for-fire to first round impact under trained conditions, allowing for quick suppressive barrages; this extends to specialized rounds like illumination for marking targets at night or smoke for obscuring enemy observation, which can be adjusted within similar timelines to support ongoing operations. Overlapping fire plans from multiple FSBs create extensive "fire support areas," enhancing coverage and responsiveness across the area of operations.^[9]^[11]^[10] The effective range of FSB artillery varies by caliber, generally spanning 10 to 30 kilometers—such as 11 km for 105mm howitzers, 14.6 km for 155mm, and up to 33 km for 175mm guns—allowing bases to interdict deep targets while supporting close-range defensive fires like final protective fires (FPF) covering linear fronts of 200 to 400 meters. This coverage is achieved through doctrinal emphasis on positioning bases for mutual support, ensuring seamless transitions between suppressive and interdiction roles without gaps in protection.^[10]^[9] Doctrinally, FSBs are rooted in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-20, Field Artillery Tactics, which outlines their role as key enablers for mobile operations, including airmobile insertions, by providing responsive, synchronized fires that amplify maneuver forces' combat power. This manual stresses continuous fire support planning based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), with coordinating measures like fire support coordination lines (FSCL) to integrate artillery into broader tactical schemes. FM 6-20-40 further details tactics for fire support at brigade level and below, reinforcing FSBs' function in delivering timely, massed effects to protect and empower ground maneuvers.^[9]

Historical Development

Early Precursors

The concept of fire support bases has roots in ancient military practices where temporary fortifications integrated artillery for defensive and offensive support. In the Roman Empire, legions constructed castra—fortified marching camps—that incorporated ballistae, torsion-powered artillery capable of launching bolts or stones over 300 meters, to protect against assaults and support siege operations by suppressing enemy positions from elevated batteries within the camp perimeter.^[12] Each legion typically fielded 55 carroballistae, mobile cart-mounted versions operated by specialists, enabling rapid deployment in these semi-permanent encampments during campaigns.^[12] During 19th-century colonial conflicts, British forces adapted similar principles in mobile formations against irregular warfare. In the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, infantry adopted hollow square tactics, positioning field guns on all sides to deliver defensive fire against massed charges, as seen at the Battle of Ulundi where N/5, N/6, and 11/7 Batteries' 7- and 9-pounder guns repelled Zulu advances from ranges exceeding 2,000 meters using case shot and shrapnel.^[13] This arrangement allowed artillery to provide overlapping fire support while the square maintained mobility in open terrain, foreshadowing integrated fire bases in expeditionary settings.^[13] World War II marked a significant advancement with British Chindit operations in Burma, where long-range penetration groups established fortified strongholds deep behind Japanese lines to enable guerrilla-style raids. During Operation Thursday in March 1944, Chindit brigades airlifted into sites like Broadway and White City, deploying 25-pounder field guns and anti-aircraft artillery via gliders to defend against counterattacks and support column patrols disrupting enemy supply lines.^[14] These strongholds, equipped with airstrips for resupply, integrated ground artillery with close air support from No. 1 Air Commando units, sustaining operations that isolated Japanese divisions such as the 18th Division.^[14] In the Korean War, U.S. forces employed temporary artillery positions to bolster amphibious assaults amid fluid fronts. During the Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, Marines secured Wolmi-do island and rapidly emplaced 105mm howitzers from DUKW vehicles to provide fire support for landings at Red and Blue Beaches, helping suppress enemy positions including mortar sites and enabling advances toward Seoul.^[15] Though constrained by static lines later in the conflict, these setups highlighted the value of provisional bases for immediate firepower in maneuver warfare.^[15] The evolution from permanent forts to temporary bases reflected the demands of guerrilla warfare, where mobility trumped static defense to counter elusive foes. Historical precedents shifted toward lighter, relocatable fortifications to secure lines of communication and launch raids, as permanent structures proved vulnerable to infiltration in irregular campaigns.^[16] This conceptual change emphasized rapid establishment and dismantlement, prioritizing flexibility over endurance in environments requiring sustained offensive pressure.^[16]

Evolution During the Cold War

Following the Korean War, the U.S. Army pursued innovations in mobility to address limitations in traditional ground-based artillery emplacement, particularly through the integration of helicopters for rapid deployment of fire support units. Experiments in the 1950s at Fort Benning explored airmobile tactics, leveraging emerging rotorcraft like the UH-1 Huey, which entered service in 1959 and enabled the quick transport of troops, supplies, and light artillery into remote areas.^[17] These developments shifted fire support from static positions to dynamic, helicopter-supported operations, reducing vulnerability in counterinsurgency scenarios.^[18] Doctrinal formalization of the fire support base (FSB) concept occurred in the early 1960s, as the Army adapted lessons from French Indochina experiences, notably the 1954 defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which highlighted the risks of isolated, static bases vulnerable to siege. Influenced by these cautionary examples, the 1962 Howze Board—officially the Tactical Mobility Requirements Board—recommended reorganizing divisions around airmobile assets, including dedicated fire support elements for counterinsurgency, leading to the adoption of FSBs as temporary, defensible hubs in field manuals like FM 6-20 on artillery tactics.^[17] This marked a pivot toward integrated, mobile fire support to support dispersed infantry in nonlinear warfare.^[19] Technological advances further enabled FSB viability, with the lightweight M101A1 105mm howitzer, weighing approximately 2,200 pounds, becoming central due to its air-transportability by helicopters such as the CH-47 Chinook, which could lift the entire piece, crew, and ammunition in a single operation. Improved fire direction centers, incorporating slide-rule-based computational aids and radio networks, streamlined targeting and registration, cutting emplacement times from days to mere hours in favorable conditions.^[17] These enhancements prioritized speed and flexibility over heavy fortification, aligning with counterinsurgency needs.^[20] Training exercises in the early 1960s validated these concepts, with the activation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) at Fort Benning in February 1963 simulating FSB deployments in varied terrains, including jungle-like environments to prepare for potential Southeast Asian operations. Units practiced rapid artillery positioning using UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters, refining procedures for fire support coordination in dense vegetation.^[21]

Use in Major Conflicts

Vietnam War Applications

Fire support bases were extensively employed during the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973, with U.S. and allied forces establishing more than 8,000 such positions to facilitate artillery coverage across contested terrain. These bases formed a key element of the U.S. Army's "Search and Destroy" strategy, enabling maneuver units to conduct aggressive patrols while relying on the bases for responsive indirect fire support. In particular, they underpinned the airmobile operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, where helicopters transported infantry into remote areas, and FSBs provided protective fires extending up to 14 kilometers for 155mm howitzers, allowing for deeper penetration into enemy sanctuaries without fixed front lines.^[1]^[22] FSBs proved vital in major engagements, including the defense against the Tet Offensive in January 1968, when bases like those operated by the 1st Battalion, 21st Artillery delivered critical counter-battery fire and interdiction missions to blunt North Vietnamese Army (NVA) assaults on urban centers and military installations. During Operation Lam Son 719 in early 1971—an ARVN-led incursion into Laos supported by U.S. logistics and air power—several FSBs along the border, such as Ranger North and Fire Support Base 31, withstood fierce NVA sieges involving human-wave attacks and heavy bombardment, though many were eventually abandoned under pressure. A comparable ordeal occurred at Fire Support Base Ripcord in July 1970, where elements of the 101st Airborne Division endured a 23-day siege by two NVA divisions, firing thousands of artillery rounds in defense while suffering 75 killed before evacuation.^[23]^[24]^[25] Notable incidents underscored both the tactical integration and vulnerabilities of FSBs. On March 28, 1971, Viet Cong sappers infiltrated Fire Support Base Mary Ann in Quang Tin Province, launching a predawn assault with satchel charges and small arms that killed 30 U.S. soldiers and wounded 82, exposing lapses in perimeter security despite prior warnings. To enhance ground operations, FSBs were frequently coordinated with "pink teams"—paired helicopters comprising an OH-6 Cayuse scout for reconnaissance and an AH-1 Cobra gunship for immediate strikes—which located enemy positions and vectored base artillery or conducted hunter-killer missions, amplifying the bases' reach in fluid jungle warfare.^[26]^[27] The effectiveness of FSBs was evident in their fire volume and impact on U.S. casualties; much of the artillery fire from these mobile bases enabled on-call fires that suppressed enemy movements and protected infantry advances, thereby reducing exposure to close-quarters combat. No FSB was ever overrun by ground assault alone, a testament to layered defenses and rapid reinforcement, though the overall strategy's doctrinal roots in Cold War mobility concepts influenced their proliferation.^[28]^[1]

Post-Vietnam Deployments

Following the Vietnam War, fire support bases continued to play a role in U.S. and allied operations, adapting to asymmetric conflicts where they provided localized artillery coverage in remote or contested areas. In the War in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021, these bases, often termed firebases or combat outposts, supported counterinsurgency efforts against the Taliban by enabling rapid fire missions to interdict enemy movements and protect patrols. Firebase Anaconda in Uruzgan province exemplified this usage, serving as a forward position for mortar fire to back Special Forces raids and deny terrain to insurgents.^[29] In August 2007, Taliban fighters launched a multi-directional assault on the base using rockets and small arms, which coalition forces repelled, underscoring the bases' vulnerability yet critical defensive value in rugged terrain.^[30] Equipped with 120mm mortars, such installations delivered precision-guided rounds to support operations, including terrain denial missions that complemented Special Forces activities far from larger forward operating bases.^[31]^[32] In the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011, fire support bases were employed more temporarily during counterinsurgency phases, particularly the 2007 troop surge, to integrate artillery with emerging technologies for urban and rural security. Forward Operating Base Caldwell in Diyala province functioned in this capacity, hosting field artillery units that provided direct support to maneuver forces amid sectarian violence.^[33] During surge operations, these bases combined howitzer fire with unmanned aerial vehicle overwatch to target insurgent networks in populated areas, enhancing responsiveness while minimizing collateral damage.^[34] Earlier in the conflict, such as during the 2003 Battle of An-Nasiriyah, temporary fire support positions like Firebase Pokorney delivered critical mortar and artillery strikes to aid Marine advances across canals and urban zones. Allied forces also utilized similar concepts in post-Vietnam interventions. In East Timor during the 1999 International Force East Timor (INTERFET) operation, Australian troops established forward positions with mortar capabilities to secure key areas and deter militia violence, though full field artillery deployments were limited due to the peacekeeping mandate.^[35] In Somalia in 1993 under Operation Restore Hope, U.S. forces relied minimally on fire support bases owing to the dense urban setting of Mogadishu, favoring helicopter gunships and air strikes for close support during raids, as seen in the October Battle of Mogadishu.^[36] Over time, the role of fire support bases evolved with technological advances, showing reduced dependence on massed artillery in favor of precision-guided munitions that offered greater accuracy and reduced risk in populated zones.^[37] However, in challenging environments like Afghanistan's mountains, bases retained utility for sustained area denial and indirect fire, bridging gaps left by air-delivered precision strikes.^[38] This adaptation reflected broader shifts in military doctrine toward integrated, effects-based fire support in asymmetric warfare.^[17]

Operational Tactics and Challenges

Establishment Procedures

The establishment of a fire support base begins with a meticulous planning phase to ensure operational effectiveness and security. This involves aerial reconnaissance using helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft to identify potential sites, followed by ground-based site surveys to evaluate terrain features such as elevation, cover, and proximity to lines of communication. Infantry units then conduct security sweeps to clear the area of enemy presence and confirm the site's defensibility.^[8]^[10] Once the site is selected, emplacement proceeds rapidly to minimize exposure. A security force, typically a platoon-sized infantry element accompanied by combat engineers, is inserted first via helicopter to secure the perimeter. Artillery pieces, such as 105mm howitzers numbering 4 to 6, are then airlifted into position, often requiring 2 to 4 hours for unloading and setup. Engineers dig gun pits for stability and protection, while concertina wire is strung around the perimeter to establish initial barriers. These steps integrate key components like artillery batteries and defensive fortifications to enable immediate fire support capability.^[8]^[10] The overall timeline for establishing a functional fire support base typically spans 24 to 48 hours, allowing for full operational readiness including ammunition storage and communication setup. Logistics are critical, with daily resupply conducted primarily via CH-47 Chinook helicopters capable of transporting 2 to 3 tons of ammunition and other essentials to sustain the base's firepower. This aerial method ensures flexibility in remote or contested areas.^[8]^[10] Command and control during establishment are led by a battery commander, usually a major or captain, who coordinates all activities on site. This officer maintains radio links to division-level fire support coordinators for real-time integration with broader maneuver operations, ensuring synchronized fires and resource allocation.^[8]^[10]

Defensive Measures and Vulnerabilities

Fire support bases employed a range of defensive setups to counter the persistent threats posed by enemy forces in contested environments like Vietnam. Perimeter defenses typically included concertina wire, claymore mines, and trip flares to detect and deter infiltrators, while bunkers and overhead cover provided protection against shrapnel and indirect fire.^[10] Night patrols, often extending to a 1,000-meter radius, were conducted to monitor approaches and disrupt potential enemy movements, supplemented by observation towers for elevated surveillance.^[10] Early warning systems integrated ground surveillance radar, such as the AN/PPS-5, alongside seismic sensors to identify approaching threats in low-visibility conditions. These measures aimed to create overlapping fields of fire, with artillery pieces positioned for 360-degree coverage using beehive rounds loaded with flechettes for close-range defense.^[1] Despite these fortifications, fire support bases faced significant vulnerabilities stemming from their small size and temporary nature, which resulted in high perimeter-to-troop ratios and limited manpower for sustained defense. Typically manned by a company-sized infantry element alongside artillery crews—totaling around 100-200 personnel—these bases were prime targets for surprise attacks, as their compact footprints left dead spaces and strained perimeter security. Common threats included sapper assaults by elite enemy units using satchel charges to breach perimeters, indirect fire from mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles that could saturate the base before ground attacks, and human wave assaults intended to overrun positions through sheer numbers.^[10] For instance, during the attack on Fire Support Base Illingworth in April 1970, North Vietnamese sappers exploited the base's undermanned status following a heavy bombardment, attempting a coordinated assault that highlighted the risks of operating as a lure for enemy forces.^[39] To mitigate these threats, commanders implemented proactive strategies such as the "mad minute," a preemptive barrage of rapid artillery and small-arms fire at suspected enemy positions to disrupt concentrations and maintain initiative. Rapid reinforcement by air cavalry units, including attack helicopters like Cobra gunships, provided critical close air support to break up assaults and interdict reinforcements, often arriving within minutes to bolster defenses.^[39] Bases were rotated every 7-14 days to avoid predictability and reduce the risk of enemy reconnaissance or siege, with quick abandonment tactics allowing relocation while denying attackers a prolonged engagement.^[10] These approaches, combined with harassment and interdiction fires, helped offset vulnerabilities, though surprise sapper penetrations still led to disproportionate casualties relative to base size, as seen in operations where isolated positions suffered heavy losses before external support could arrive.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

Influence on Military Doctrine

The experiences with fire support bases (FSBs) during the Vietnam War significantly shaped U.S. military doctrine in the post-Vietnam era, particularly by highlighting the need for integrated firepower within maneuver-oriented strategies. In the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, Operations, which formalized the AirLand Battle doctrine, FSB concepts were adapted as models for providing responsive artillery support in fluid, combined-arms operations against a conventional threat. This doctrine emphasized synchronizing ground maneuver with deep strikes and close fires, drawing from Vietnam's lessons on using FSBs to enable infantry operations while underscoring the limitations of static positioning. Joint publications, such as those evolving from the 1970s, further incorporated FSB-derived principles of decentralized fire support to enhance operational tempo and survivability in high-intensity conflicts.^[40] Key lessons from FSB employment drove a doctrinal shift toward dispersed, mobile fires, reducing reliance on large, vulnerable fixed bases. Vietnam operations revealed that concentrated FSBs often became predictable targets for enemy sappers and indirect fire, prompting the U.S. Army to prioritize agility in the AirLand Battle framework, where artillery units operated in smaller, more survivable configurations integrated with aviation and armor. This evolution was codified in FM 6-20, Fire Support in the AirLand Battle (1988), which advocated for flexible positioning to support nonlinear maneuvers rather than the "fire base psychosis" of operating solely within artillery range. The emphasis on mobility addressed Vietnam-era critiques of attrition-focused tactics that tethered forces to bases, fostering a more proactive approach in subsequent doctrines like FM 3-0, Operations (2001).^[40]^[10] The FSB model also influenced allied militaries, notably Australian forces. NATO doctrines indirectly reflected these concepts through shared U.S. experiences in joint exercises, evolving FSB principles into forward operating bases that balanced fire support with rapid deployment in multinational settings. However, post-Vietnam analyses critiqued the over-reliance on FSBs for creating static vulnerabilities, as detailed in Andrew F. Krepinevich's The Army and Vietnam (1986), which argued that such positions contributed to operational predictability and higher casualties against adaptive insurgents. U.S. Army studies from the late 1970s, including those at the Command and General Staff College, echoed these concerns, advocating for doctrinal reforms to mitigate risks in future conflicts.^[40]^[41]

Adaptations in Contemporary Warfare

In the 21st-century conflicts, fire support bases (FSBs) have incorporated advanced technological integrations, such as GPS-guided munitions and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), to enhance precision and reduce collateral damage while replacing or supplementing traditional artillery roles. For instance, during operations in Syria in the 2010s, U.S. forces established FSBs like Um Jurius in northern Iraq, near the Syrian border, to provide artillery support targeting ISIS positions across the frontier, utilizing howitzers directed by forward spotters and digital targeting systems for accurate strikes.^[42] UAVs have become integral for reconnaissance and real-time targeting in these setups, enabling rapid adjustments to fire missions in dynamic environments like the Syrian desert.^[43] Hybrid forms of FSBs emerged prominently in counter-ISIS campaigns from 2014 to 2019, blending special operations forces with high-mobility rocket systems like the M142 HIMARS for precision, long-range strikes. These bases, such as Firebase Bell in Iraq, supported ground advances by integrating HIMARS launches that extended fire support up to 300 kilometers, targeting ISIS command nodes and supply lines in both Iraq and Syria without requiring large permanent footprints.^[44] This approach allowed for agile, expeditionary operations, combining human intelligence from special operators with rocket artillery to disrupt enemy movements effectively.^[45] Under the U.S. Army's Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine in the 2020s, FSBs are adapted for peer-level conflicts by overlaying cyber and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to counter anti-access/area denial threats and synchronize effects across domains. Theater armies employ Multi-Domain Task Forces to integrate FSB fires with nonlethal effects like EW jamming and cyber disruptions, enhancing targeting resilience against adversary sensors and ensuring dominance in contested electromagnetic environments.^[46] Globally, analogous adaptations appear in other conflicts; Russian forces in Ukraine since 2022 have utilized fortified fire support positions, employing artillery and armor in static roles for sustained indirect fire, often protected by thermal camouflage and integrated with UAVs for counterbattery operations.^[43] Similarly, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza have adapted fire support through forward positions in urban settings, leveraging organic tactical UAVs and precision-guided munitions for close-range strikes within 200 meters of friendly forces, minimizing fratricide while controlling dense terrain via brigade-level fire coordination.^[47]

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[PDF] The Unknown Road Ahead 1
Operation Iraqi Freedom III, Fob Caldwell, Iraq 06/20/2004 – 11/03/2005. 05 ... Forward Operating Base Caldwell, the 30 th. Infantry Brigade soldiers ...
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Army marks 10th anniversary of troop surge in Iraq | Article
Apr 27, 2017 · Ten years ago this month, the fourth of five "surge" brigades arrived in Iraq as part of a new strategy to quell sectarian violence and bring a measure of ...
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Deploying and sustaining INTERFET in East Timor in 1999
Oct 8, 2021 · The army did not deploy tanks, field artillery or anti-aircraft artillery, and did not have to call on air or naval fire support. Even ...
[36]
Battle of Mogadishu - Army University Press
Feb 14, 2022 · On Oct. 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger headed to the center of Mogadishu, Somalia, to capture rebel leaders using a combination of air and land assets.
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[PDF] The Evolution of Precision Strike - CSBA
This observation suggested that conventional precision munitions could, in many cases, be substituted for nuclear ones, thereby achieving the required levels of ...
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Veteran fires last round as Army transforms Field Artillery | Article
Sep 19, 2025 · With a steady pull of the lanyard on an M777A2 howitzer, Vietnam veteran and retired U.S. Army Capt. Paige Lanier helped close the book on more ...
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FSB Illingworth Attack: Courage Against Staggering Odds
It was 02:17, April 1, 1970. Every man on the fire base, about 220 of them, had been woken up in anticipation of an attack. Conrad had demanded that every ...
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[PDF] The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76
evacuating the fire support base before the enemy had time to prepare an attack against it. Most fire bases contained 105mm howitzers which were effective ...
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https://press.jhu.edu/books/title/2484/army-and-vietnam
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From Deep In The Iraqi Desert, A New U.S. Fire Base Targets ISIS In ...
Jul 4, 2018 · The Um Jurius fire base is near Syria's border and Sinjar mountain, where minority Yazidis fled to escape an ISIS genocide in 2014.<|control11|><|separator|>
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Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of ...
May 19, 2023 · Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to ...
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https://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/09/12/us-turns-to-truck-mounted-rockets-for-operations-in-mosul-raqqa
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Joint Operations Command-Iraq Briefing - centcom
Dec 11, 2018 · They discovered and destroyed hundreds of IEDs, arrested dozens of ISIS fighters, and destroyed hideouts and tunnels where ISIS fighters plotted ...
[46]
Theater Armies: Complex Yet Indispensable to Multidomain ...
Nevertheless, their complex mission is indispensable to Army support to joint force campaigns through multidomain operations (MDO). ... fire support, base defense ...
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[PDF] Tactical Lessons from Israel Defense Forces Operations in Gaza, 2023
Jul 3, 2024 · The Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) operations in Gaza, beginning in October 2023, provide valuable lessons for the conduct of urban operations. ...