Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Landing operation

![U.S. troops landing on a Sicilian beach on the opening day of Operation Husky, July 10, 1943][float-right] A landing operation is a military expeditionary maneuver launched from the sea by an amphibious force to project combat power ashore against a hostile or potentially hostile coast, with the primary aim of seizing a lodgment for subsequent operations. It integrates naval, ground, and air elements to transport and support landing forces via specialized craft and ships, overcoming natural obstacles, enemy defenses, and logistical challenges inherent to the sea-to-shore transition. Central to landing operations are distinct phases: planning and embarkation to organize forces and resources; movement to the objective area under cover of naval and air forces; assault to neutralize beachhead threats through coordinated fires; and rapid buildup ashore to establish a secure base for inland advance. Success hinges on surprise, fire support from warships and aircraft to suppress fortifications, and efficient logistics to sustain the landing force amid vulnerabilities like exposure to enemy counterfire during debarkation. Historically, such operations have defined pivotal campaigns, as in the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, where over 160,000 troops established a beachhead despite Axis resistance, enabling the Italian campaign's outset. Despite advancements in anti-access/area-denial technologies like missiles and mines, which heighten risks to assembled shipping, joint doctrine maintains landing operations' viability for forced entry when airfields or ports are denied, emphasizing over-the-horizon tactics and distributed forces to mitigate threats. Key challenges include synchronizing multi-domain fires, managing tidal and weather effects on landings, and transitioning command from naval to ground control post-assault, underscoring the operation's complexity and reliance on rigorous rehearsals.

Definition and Fundamentals

Core Principles and Objectives

Landing operations seek to project combat power onto enemy-held territory, typically via sea or air, to seize initial objectives and create a secure lodgment for follow-on forces. Fundamental objectives include bypassing fortified defenses through , disrupting enemy rear areas, and establishing bases from which to conduct further maneuvers or deny the enemy strategic assets. In amphibious contexts, this entails gaining access to shorelines to project forces inland, while operations focus on vertical insertion to capture key terrain or distant from primary fronts. These aims prioritize rapid transition from transit to , minimizing exposure to defensive fires. Central principles governing landing operations emphasize to reduce opposition at the point of debarkation, achieved through , over-the-horizon approaches, and operational security measures that conceal intentions until the assault commences. Selection of landing sites favors areas with minimal fortifications or natural cover for defenders, informed by prior to identify vulnerabilities; direct assaults against heavily prepared positions are avoided unless no alternatives exist, as they risk high casualties and stalled momentum. Unity of effort demands integrated command structures linking transport elements (naval or air) with ground forces, ensuring seamless coordination from planning through execution. Fire support integration forms a , with naval gunfire, , or preparatory strikes neutralizing beach obstacles, artillery positions, and immediate threats to enable unhindered debarkation and initial advances. Speed in securing a or —typically through wide-front deployments that disperse enemy fire while concentrating assault elements—facilitates the buildup of combat power via prioritized , including selective unloading of critical supplies like and fuel. Tactical integrity preserves during transit and landing, while flexibility allows adaptation to enemy responses or terrain challenges. Protection against counterattacks and sustainment through co-responsible chains maintain operational tempo post-landing. In airborne assaults, principles extend these concepts via vertical envelopment, inserting forces behind enemy lines to exploit depth and achieve surprise against unprepared reserves, with objectives centered on seizing airfields, bridges, or command nodes to support ground link-up. Overall, success hinges on superiority in planning, organization, and execution, leveraging the mobility of sea or air transit to outmaneuver static defenses and transition to decisive ground operations.

Phases of Execution

The execution of a landing operation follows a structured sequence of phases designed to synchronize multi-domain forces, minimize vulnerabilities during transition from sea or air to land, and establish a secure foothold for subsequent operations. These phases, derived from established , emphasize parallel planning across , air superiority, , and troop movements to counter enemy defenses effectively. While specifics vary between amphibious and variants, core elements include preparation, transit, , and consolidation, with overlaps to maintain operational . In amphibious landing operations, the phases are formalized under the PERMA framework: Planning, Embarkation, Rehearsal, Movement, and Assault. The planning phase integrates intelligence on enemy dispositions, terrain analysis, and force allocation, often conducted jointly by naval and landing force commanders to define landing zones and timetables. Embarkation follows, involving the orderly loading of personnel, vehicles, and supplies onto ships according to debarkation priorities, ensuring combat-loaded units disembark first for immediate action. Rehearsals, conducted at sea or simulated sites, validate procedures such as wave formations and communications, reducing execution risks through iterative refinement. The movement phase transports forces to the objective area under cover of darkness or , positioning assault elements for the final ship-to-shore transit via or helicopters. The assault phase commences with pre-landing fires to suppress defenses, followed by the landing of initial to seize beachheads or ports, typically within hours of H-hour to exploit surprise. Post-assault consolidation involves linking up with elements if employed, expanding the lodgment, and transitioning from sea-based to shore-based sustainment, with forces advancing inland to link with overland allies or secure objectives. Airborne landing operations adapt these phases to aerial insertion, with planning encompassing drop zone selection and airlift sequencing, followed by marshalling of paratroopers and equipment at airfields. The air movement and assault phases feature low-level flights to evade detection, massed drops or air assaults to capture key terrain, and rapid on the ground amid high dispersion risks from wind or flak. Execution emphasizes immediate attack to disrupt enemy reserves, with or link-up phases critical for isolated units holding until relief arrives, often within 24-72 hours to mitigate from counterattacks. Across both types, doctrinal emphasis on flexibility allows phase compression in crises, though historical data shows failure rates exceed 20% without air and fire supremacy.

Amphibious Landing Operations

Historical Evolution

Amphibious landing operations evolved from rudimentary naval raids into formalized doctrine in the early , driven by the need to project power across oceans against fortified positions. In the United States, pioneered modern concepts following the Spanish-American War of 1898, where initial amphibious assaults highlighted coordination challenges between naval and ground forces. By the 1920s, Major Earl "Pete" Ellis advocated for island-seizing operations in the Pacific against potential Japanese threats, emphasizing advanced and joint training to overcome failures like in 1915. This foresight culminated in the U.S. Navy's Tentative Landing Operations Manual of 1934, which outlined phases of ship-to-shore movement, , and establishment, later formalized as Landing Operations Doctrine in 1938. World War II marked the practical testing and refinement of amphibious doctrine on a massive scale. The in August 1942 served as the first major U.S. test, where 11,000 Marines landed using early , but logistical issues like boat pile-ups exposed gaps in offloading and command structures. Adaptations followed, incorporating specialized vessels like the Higgins boat—over 20,000 produced by 1944—and integrated air-naval gunfire support, enabling operations such as the Sicily invasion on July 10, 1943, with 160,000 troops ashore in days. Peak applications included the on June 6, 1944, deploying 156,000 Allied troops across five beaches, and Pacific island-hopping, where doctrines varied: U.S. Marines favored frontal assaults, while General targeted weak points, reducing average operational pauses to 18 days despite high casualties, as at with 30% losses. Post-World War II evolution incorporated technological advances and maneuver-focused strategies amid nuclear constraints. The Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, exemplified doctrinal success, with 13,000 U.N. troops exploiting tidal approaches to outflank North Korean forces, achieving a one-day pause before advancing to . The 1950s-1960s introduced helicopters for vertical assault, as in (1965), enabling sea-based resupply and bypassing beach defenses, though in limited overall efficacy. By the late , concepts like Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) emerged, advocating extended fronts up to 200 nautical miles wide using advanced platforms such as the MV-22 , prioritizing speed and firepower integration over massed beachheads to counter anti-ship threats observed in the of 1982.

Tactical Components and Logistics

Amphibious landing operations rely on coordinated tactical components to transition forces from sea to shore, beginning with the assault echelon (AE) comprising initial elements equipped for 15 days of sustainment. The ship-to-shore movement phase involves such as LCACs capable of 35+ knots and LCU-1600s for heavy vehicles, controlled initially by a central officer and primary officers per sector. Fire support integrates naval surface fire from designated ships—one per in direct support—offensive air support via tactical air centers, and subsequent ground-based , coordinated through supporting arms coordination centers to suppress enemy defenses. Tactical integrity is preserved by maintaining during waves, transitioning from centralized naval to decentralized execution ashore, enabling ship-to-objective maneuvers that bypass contested beaches for inland objectives. Logistics in amphibious operations demand precise embarkation planning, loading troops and supplies in combat configuration on amphibious ships like LHAs and LPDs, followed by debarkation schedules that prioritize assault needs. The landing force support party establishes initial beach support areas for offloading, , and salvage, facilitating throughput while vulnerable to enemy fire and environmental factors like . Sustainment shifts from sea-based platforms—using modular systems like inland petroleum distribution—to shore-based areas, with assault follow-on echelons offloaded by D+5 for larger forces like Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Challenges include limited landing craft cycles (e.g., 3-4 trips per day for LCACs), over-the-horizon distances straining transit times (4-6 hours for LCUs at 30-50 nautical miles), and enemy threats to buildup, necessitating rehearsals and prepositioned stocks for resilience. Historical adaptations, such as post-Guadalcanal improvements in offloading coordination, underscore the need for integrated Navy-Marine planning to mitigate chaos from supply pile-ups and command gaps.

Key Examples and Outcomes

Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily commencing on July 10, 1943, exemplified a successful large-scale amphibious assault, with over 150,000 troops deployed ashore via more than 3,000 ships and supported by 4,000 aircraft. The operation secured the island within 38 days, inflicting approximately 167,000 Axis casualties while incurring 31,158 Allied losses, thereby paving the way for the Italian mainland campaign and contributing to the fall of Benito Mussolini's regime. This outcome underscored the critical role of combined arms superiority in overcoming initial beach defenses and sustaining inland advances. In contrast, the on June 6, 1944, during , achieved strategic success despite severe initial costs, with over 4,000 Allied personnel killed on D-Day amid intense German fortifications and weather challenges. The establishment of a lodgment enabled the liberation of , but total campaign casualties exceeded 200,000 Allied troops, highlighting vulnerabilities in contested environments without complete air dominance. The Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, represented a tactical triumph through surprise and bold execution, as forces under General secured key objectives with only 222 casualties, including 22 fatalities, against over 1,350 North Korean losses. This maneuver reversed North Korean advances, facilitating the recapture of and altering the Korean War's momentum, though subsequent operations escalated overall costs to around 600 UN killed and 2,750 wounded by the city's liberation. The Gallipoli campaign's amphibious landings beginning April 25, 1915, illustrated profound operational failure, as Allied forces encountered entrenched defenses, logistical breakdowns, and inadequate planning, resulting in a protracted and eventual evacuation by 1916. Poor and compounded issues like supply shortages and terrain disadvantages, yielding over 250,000 Allied casualties without achieving the objective of knocking the out of , thus demonstrating the perils of underestimating defender preparedness. These cases reveal that amphibious successes hinge on , overwhelming , and rapid exploitation, while failures often stem from fortified shores, supply vulnerabilities, and insufficient , informing doctrinal emphases on and coordination.

Airborne Landing Operations

Historical Development

The concept of airborne landing operations emerged in the , with the conducting the first large-scale parachute troop exercises in , involving thousands of paratroopers dropped to simulate assaults on objectives behind enemy lines, which demonstrated the tactical potential for vertical envelopment despite logistical challenges like equipment scatter and vulnerability to ground fire. Inspired by these developments, formed the in 1936, initially as elite shock troops, and employed them in combat for the first time during the invasion of the on May 10, 1940, where approximately 9,000 paratroopers seized vital bridges and airfields to facilitate rapid ground advances, achieving initial but suffering heavy casualties from determined defenders. This operation marked the debut of as a strategic tool for disrupting rear areas and accelerating tactics, though subsequent use in the in May 1941— involving over 22,000 German airborne troops—highlighted risks, with around 4,000 killed or missing due to Allied resistance and inadequate resupply, prompting Hitler to restrict large-scale drops thereafter. In the United States, airborne operations developed reactively following German successes; the first experimental paratrooper jump occurred on August 16, 1940, at , Georgia, when Private Aubrey Eberhardt became the inaugural U.S. Army parachutist, initiating training that expanded rapidly after . The U.S. Army's inaugural combat airborne assault took place during on November 8, 1942, with the 2nd Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment dropping near Oran, Algeria, to secure airfields and disrupt Vichy French forces, though navigational errors scattered troops and limited effectiveness, underscoring early doctrinal shortcomings in drop accuracy and unit cohesion. Doctrinal evolution accelerated with the formation of dedicated airborne divisions, such as the 82nd and 101st, emphasizing combined paratroop and glider landings to seize key terrain for follow-on ground forces, as refined in exercises that integrated airlift capabilities from the nascent U.S. Army Air Forces. World War II saw airborne operations scale to divisional levels, with Allied forces adapting German precedents; the U.S. and British executed their largest drops during the Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944, deploying over 23,000 paratroopers from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions to secure causeways and bridges inland from Utah and Omaha beaches, achieving objectives despite 60% scatter rates from flak and pilot inexperience, which causal analysis attributes to causal factors like low-altitude jumps for surprise versus risks of enemy fire. Operation Market Garden in September 1944 further tested limits, as British 1st Airborne and U.S. 82nd and 101st Divisions—totaling around 35,000 troops—attempted to capture Rhine bridges, but failed due to overextended supply lines, German counterattacks, and underestimation of enemy reserves, resulting in 17,000 Allied casualties and revealing airborne forces' dependence on rapid ground linkage. The final major U.S. airborne operation, Varsity on March 24, 1945, involved 17,000 paratroopers and gliders crossing the Rhine to seize bridgeheads, succeeding with lower casualties (around 2,000) due to daylight drops, improved pathfinders, and overwhelming air superiority, encapsulating matured tactics that prioritized massed delivery and immediate exploitation. Postwar assessments, drawing from empirical data on scatter, casualties, and objective seizure rates, confirmed airborne operations' value for initial shock but emphasized causal vulnerabilities to weather, anti-air defenses, and isolation without prompt reinforcement.

Operational Mechanics and Risks

Airborne landing operations involve the vertical envelopment of enemy positions through the delivery of combat forces via parachute, glider, or helicopter insertion to seize key objectives deep in hostile territory. The execution follows a structured sequence beginning with the marshaling phase, where units assemble at departure airfields, conduct final equipment checks, and load onto transport aircraft such as C-130 Hercules or C-17 Globemaster III, ensuring paratroopers are rigged with static-line parachutes for mass tactical drops. During the air movement phase, aircraft fly at low altitudes—typically 500 to 1,500 feet above ground level—to minimize detection, navigating to drop zones (DZs) or landing zones (LZs) using visual references, GPS, or inertial systems, with pathfinders often inserted first to mark sites with lights or signals. The assault landing phase commences with the green light signal for exit, where troops deploy in "sticks" of 10-20 paratroopers per pass, free-falling briefly before canopy deployment, aiming for controlled descents of 3-5 minutes depending on altitude and wind. Post-landing, forces execute rapid assembly by rallying on pre-designated points or leaders, forming combat teams to assault objectives before enemy reinforcement, with resupply via airdrops of ammunition, fuel, and heavy equipment using parachutes or low-velocity containers. Coordination relies on precise timing, with aircraft formations employing serials—groups of 30-40 planes—for simultaneous delivery over multiple DZs to achieve mass, supported by electronic warfare to jam enemy radars and fighter escorts to counter interceptors. Drop accuracy is enhanced by techniques like the Computed Air Release Point (CARP) system, which calculates release based on wind drift and aircraft speed, though mass drops prioritize volume over precision to overwhelm defenses. In modern adaptations, joint fires from artillery or air strikes precede the drop to suppress anti-aircraft threats, while helicopters enable helicopter assault (air assault) variants for shorter-range, terrain-hugging insertions with slung loads for vehicles. Operational risks are inherent due to the operation's dependence on air superiority and vulnerability during transit. Aircraft face severe threats from surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft , necessitating prior (SEAD), yet residual threats can inflict heavy losses; for instance, failure to neutralize SAMs elevates risks in peer conflicts with integrated air defenses. dispersion from wind gusts exceeding 13 knots or errors can scatter units over miles, complicating assembly and exposing isolated elements to capture or , with historical analyses noting up to 50% of drops deviating significantly from planned zones. Landing injuries occur in 1-5% of jumps, primarily from improper parachute landing falls (PLFs), entanglements, or hard impacts on uneven , exacerbated by night operations, heavy loads (up to 100 pounds per trooper), high winds, or elevated temperatures affecting canopy performance. Post-landing, forces endure isolation without immediate ground link-up, relying on limited organic supplies vulnerable to enemy , with risks of rapid counterattacks overwhelming under-equipped paratroopers lacking anti-tank weapons or armor until arrives, often within 24-72 hours. Environmental factors like , , or moonless nights amplify errors, while human factors—such as from rigging or exit hesitation—contribute to mishaps during aircraft departure, where collisions or premature ejections have caused fatalities. Overall, airborne operations demand meticulous planning and favorable conditions, as deviations cascade into compounded vulnerabilities, with empirical data from indicating casualty rates 2-3 times higher than ground assaults due to these unmitigated hazards.

Major Instances and Assessments

The German airborne invasion of , known as Operation Mercury, commenced on May 20, 1941, involving roughly 22,000 paratroopers and glider-borne troops from the XI Fliegerkorps dropped in waves to seize airfields and ports from defenders. Despite initial heavy casualties from ground fire—estimated at over 4,000 German dead or missing by the operation's end—the assault succeeded in capturing the island within 11 days, marking the first strategic airborne conquest in . However, the disproportionate losses relative to the tactical scale prompted German high command, including Hitler, to curtail large-scale paratroop employment thereafter, viewing it as unsustainable against alerted foes. In the Normandy campaign of , American airborne forces executed the war's largest night parachute drop on June 6, 1944, deploying approximately 13,400 paratroopers from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions behind and Omaha beaches. Cloud cover, flak damage, and errors caused widespread dispersion, with units landing up to 20 miles off target, yet the drops effectively sowed confusion among German reserves, secured key causeways, and prevented reinforcements from reaching the coast, at a cost of around 2,500 casualties. British and Canadian glider-borne troops similarly captured bridges like , enabling the inland advance despite navigational and coordination shortfalls. Operation Market Garden, launched September 17, 1944, assembled the largest Allied airborne force of the war—over 34,000 troops from U.S. 82nd and 101st, British 1st, and Polish 1st Airborne Divisions—to secure bridges across Dutch rivers for a ground thrust into Germany's . American elements captured their objectives, including Nijmegen Bridge after fierce fighting, but the British at encountered unexpectedly robust SS Panzer resistance, inadequate resupply due to weather and flak, and delayed XXX Corps link-up along a vulnerable single road, resulting in the operation's failure and approximately 17,000 Allied casualties, including 8,000 from the 1st Airborne. Operation Varsity on March 24, 1945, supported the Allied Rhine crossing with 17,000 paratroopers and glider troops from the U.S. 17th and British 6th Airborne Divisions, dropped in daylight under heavy air cover to seize Diersfordt Forest and Hamminkeln heights. Benefiting from precise navigation, massed fighter suppression of flak, and rapid ground link-up, the assault cleared objectives within hours, inflicting 1,000 German casualties while suffering 2,000 Allied losses—predominantly from gliders—facilitating the subsequent advance into northern Germany as the war's most tactically efficient large airborne effort. Post-World War II, major airborne operations diminished in scale, with examples including the Turkish drop of 3,000 paratroopers during the 1974 intervention to secure airfields amid , achieving objectives with minimal opposition due to surprise and limited enemy air defenses. Smaller U.S.-led actions, such as the 1983 invasion involving 7,000 troops with airborne elements seizing Point Salines airfield, underscored viability in low-threat scenarios but avoided WWII-style divisional masses. Assessments reveal airborne landings excel in achieving surprise and vertical maneuver to bypass defenses, as evidenced by Crete's airfield captures and Normandy's disruption of counterattacks, yet empirical outcomes highlight inherent frailties: initial light armament leaves forces vulnerable to rapid enemy response, as in Arnhem's isolation; anti-aircraft fire and weather exacerbate scatter, inflating casualties beyond 20% in dispersed drops; and strategic overreach without assured air dominance or swift reinforcement often yields pyrrhic results or outright failure, per analyses of 20th-century operations. Large-scale executions post-1945 have been eschewed in peer conflicts due to these risks, favoring doctrinal emphasis on smaller, precision-enabled insertions integrated with air and ground fires, informed by data showing independent airborne divisions rarely sustain gains against mechanized foes without immediate heavy support.

Modern Adaptations and Challenges

Technological and Doctrinal Shifts

Advancements in ship-to-shore connectors, such as the (LCAC) and the , have enabled over-the-horizon amphibious operations, reducing exposure to coastal defenses by allowing forces to launch from standoff distances beyond traditional shore bombardment ranges. Unmanned systems, including drones for and unmanned underwater vehicles for mine countermeasures, have been integrated to support pre-landing shaping operations, minimizing human risk in contested littorals. For airborne assaults, aircraft like the V-22 facilitate rapid insertion with greater range and speed compared to conventional helicopters, while precision-guided munitions and satellite-linked targeting enhance strike capabilities during descent. The proliferation of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range precision missiles and integrated air defenses, has rendered massed beach landings empirically vulnerable, as demonstrated in simulations and analyses of peer conflicts where amphibious ships face high attrition rates from shore-based fires. In response, U.S. Marine Corps doctrine has shifted from centralized, division-scale assaults to distributed, smaller-unit operations under concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE), emphasizing stand-in forces that seize key maritime terrain incrementally rather than decisive landings. Airborne doctrine has similarly evolved toward joint all-domain integration, prioritizing air assault with helicopters and drones for vertical envelopment in hybrid threats, moving away from large-scale paratroop drops due to detectability by modern radars and satellites. These shifts reflect causal adaptations to technological realities: precision sensors and hypersonic threats compress decision timelines, necessitating decentralized command structures over rigid hierarchies, as rigid formations invite targeting in electronically contested environments. Empirical assessments, such as studies on contested amphibious scenarios, underscore that doctrinal flexibility—coupled with resilient communications and autonomous systems—improves viability against A2/AD, though vulnerabilities persist without air and superiority. Integration of for real-time targeting further supports this, enabling dynamic adjustments in landing zones based on live threat data rather than pre-planned axes.

Integration with Other Forces

Modern landing operations emphasize joint integration to leverage complementary capabilities across naval, air, ground, , cyber, and space domains, enabling smaller, more agile assault forces to operate effectively in contested environments. U.S. Joint Publication 3-02 outlines amphibious operations as involving the projection of naval power ashore through coordinated transport, landing, and sustainment, with explicit requirements for synchronizing air support for suppression of enemy defenses and during the assault phase. This integration extends to elements, where paratroop drops or air assaults seize inland objectives to support beachhead expansion, as seen in doctrinal provisions for combined airborne-amphibious actions in coastal zones. Pre-assault shaping relies heavily on air and forces (SOF) to degrade enemy capabilities; for example, U.S. doctrine mandates counterair and roles in amphibious scenarios, including strikes against coastal defenses to create windows for landings. SOF units often conduct advance force operations, such as or raids, to secure landing zones or disrupt command nodes, with amphibious ready groups (ARGs) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) designed for seamless employment including these elements. Naval assets provide initial fires via missiles and guns, transitioning to joint precision-guided munitions from distributed platforms, while cyber and space forces enable real-time awareness and to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats. Ground force integration focuses on incorporating armored and mechanized units post-landing to sustain momentum; however, U.S. Marine Corps and Army analyses highlight eroding expertise in embedding , such as amphibious combat vehicles and tanks, into assaults, necessitating renewed training to avoid over-reliance on lighter forces vulnerable to peer adversaries. Recent multinational exercises underscore operationalization: In 2024, U.S., allied naval, air, and Marine forces executed amphibious raids integrating tactical sea control, aerial insertions, and ground maneuvers for validation. Similarly, drills in 2025 emphasized communication systems for unified command in amphibious assaults, involving and SOF to simulate multi-domain convergence against simulated high-threat littoral defenses. These efforts align with broader multi-domain operations concepts, where landing forces function as maneuver elements within a force maritime component command, drawing on networked fires and from across services.

Criticisms and Empirical Viability

Modern landing operations, encompassing both amphibious and assaults, face significant criticisms regarding their vulnerability in contested environments dominated by precision-guided munitions, integrated air defenses, and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems. Amphibious assaults, in particular, expose naval forces to long-range anti-ship missiles, coastal mines, and hypersonic threats during the ship-to-shore movement, rendering traditional landings akin to high-risk maneuvers against fortified positions. insertions compound these issues with the inherent fragility of parachuted or air-dropped troops, who arrive lightly equipped and isolated until resupply, making them susceptible to rapid counterattacks by mobile enemy forces equipped with man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) and drones. Critics argue that the doctrinal emphasis on forced-entry landings persists despite of escalating costs, as seen in simulations and where attrition rates for assaulting forces exceed 50% against peer adversaries. Logistical and sustainment challenges further undermine viability, as landing operations demand precise coordination of air, sea, and ground assets over extended littorals, often under degraded communications and conditions. In amphibious contexts, the reliance on vulnerable amphibious assault ships—such as the U.S. Navy's Wasp-class—creates a "bullseye" for enemy targeting, with studies indicating that over-the-horizon maneuvers fail to sufficiently mitigate detection by satellite and radar networks. operations similarly suffer from high non-combat attrition, including malfunctions and environmental factors, with U.S. Army data from 2004–2014 showing injury rates of 2–6 per 1,000 jumps, escalating in combat due to enemy fire. These factors have prompted debates within military institutions about divesting from legacy amphibious-centric structures, such as the U.S. Marine Corps' expeditionary focus, in favor of distributed, expeditionary advanced base operations that avoid massed landings altogether. Empirically, post-Cold War landing operations have demonstrated viability primarily in permissive or low-threat scenarios, where opposition lacked robust defenses. The 1989 U.S. airborne insertion during Operation Just Cause in secured key objectives with minimal losses, leveraging surprise against a disorganized foe, while small-scale amphibious raids in (1992–1993) enabled rapid power projection without sustained contestation. However, contested examples reveal stark limitations: Russia's 2022 airborne assault on near failed to hold the site despite initial seizure, resulting in heavy casualties from Ukrainian counterattacks and abandonment within days, highlighting the risks of operating without air superiority. Large-scale amphibious efforts, absent since the 1982 —where British forces succeeded against a weakly defended but incurred disproportionate shipping losses—have not been replicated against near-peer defenses, with analyses concluding that modern A2/AD environments reduce success probabilities below 20% without prior suppression of enemy defenses. Overall assessments from think tanks underscore that while niche roles in crisis response persist, the empirical track record post-1991—dominated by unopposed or hybrid operations in (2003) and —does not validate scalability against integrated threats like those posed by in the . Wargames conducted by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in 2016 projected U.S. amphibious forces suffering near-total attrition in simulated Taiwan scenarios due to missile barrages, prompting doctrinal shifts toward standoff capabilities rather than direct landings. Airborne forces fare similarly, with historical failure rates in contested drops (e.g., 1944's , echoed in modern critiques) exceeding 30% for divisional-scale efforts, rendering them empirically viable only for - to company-level raids supported by . These data-driven critiques emphasize causal factors like technological asymmetry and defensive depth, suggesting that without breakthroughs in , unmanned systems, and hypersonic countermeasures, landing operations risk obsolescence in high-end conflicts.

Strategic Implications

Advantages in Asymmetric Conflicts

In asymmetric conflicts, where a conventionally superior force confronts non-state actors or weakly armed adversaries lacking naval capabilities or robust coastal defenses, amphibious landing operations enable without reliance on vulnerable overland routes or permissive airfields. These operations leverage sea-based mobility to insert forces directly into contested littoral zones, bypassing inland strongholds and disrupting enemy sanctuaries that or militias may control on land. For instance, the ability to loiter allows commanders to synchronize landings with intelligence-driven strikes, maintaining operational while minimizing exposure to guerrilla ambushes. A key advantage lies in the flexibility and small-footprint nature of amphibious forces, which can execute raids, seizures, or limited interventions with reduced logistical footprints compared to sustained ground campaigns. Sea-based logistics provide inherent sustainment, shielding supply lines from interdiction by non-state actors who typically cannot contest maritime domains effectively. This was evident in operations against irregular forces in riverine and coastal environments during the , where U.S. amphibious units supported rapid troop insertions and extractions, adapting to fluid insurgent tactics without establishing large forward bases. Such capabilities deter escalation by non-state groups, as the persistent offshore threat of landings compels adversaries to disperse resources across extensive coastlines, diluting their defensive focus. Furthermore, amphibious operations facilitate crisis response and deterrence in hybrid threats involving non-state actors, offering precision strikes and maneuver options that exploit the littoral as a maneuver space. Against entities like terrorist networks or militias with limited anti-access capabilities, landings enable the superior force to achieve local superiority rapidly, as seen in doctrinal assessments emphasizing their role in stimulating enemy responses for targeted engagements. This contrasts with symmetric peer conflicts, where anti-ship threats dominate; in asymmetric scenarios, the absence of advanced missiles or submarines amplifies the strategic leverage of naval forces, allowing sustained presence that integrates with air and for compounded effects. Empirical analyses affirm that these operations remain viable for containing irregular threats, provided they align with limited objectives rather than occupation.

Limitations in Peer Competitions

In peer competitions, amphibious landing operations confront formidable obstacles due to adversaries' (A2/AD) capabilities, including long-range precision-guided missiles, integrated air defenses, submarines, and minefields, which render traditional massed assaults highly vulnerable and often untenable. These systems enable defenders to target amphibious ships and from standoff distances, exploiting the slow transit times—often hours-long for ship-to-shore movement—and limited maneuverability of assault forces. Historical precedents like the D-Day landings succeeded under conditions of established air and naval superiority, which peer adversaries can contest or deny through layered defenses, as evidenced by post-World War II analyses showing no successful peer-level contested landings without such dominance. Wargaming exercises underscore these constraints; for instance, CSIS simulations of a amphibious invasion of in 2026, run 24 times, consistently resulted in the failure of Chinese forces to seize and hold the island, with their invasion fleet suffering devastating losses from Taiwanese and U.S. counterstrikes, despite assumptions of initial surprise. The exercises highlighted the prohibitive costs of projecting power across contested littorals, where amphibious shipping becomes a concentrated target for hypersonic and ballistic missiles, leading to rapid attrition rates that outpace reinforcement capabilities. Similarly, assessments of U.S. operations against peer threats emphasize the infeasibility of large-scale beach assaults without prior neutralization of A2/AD networks, which demand unattainable levels of fires suppression and sustainment under fire. Logistical vulnerabilities compound tactical risks, as establishing and maintaining a lodgment ashore requires unhindered resupply lines that peer competitors can with submarines, drones, and asymmetric tactics, eroding the operational needed for exploitation. Doctrinal adaptations, such as distributed operations or smaller-scale raids, acknowledge these limits by de-emphasizing frontal in favor of standoff engagement, yet empirical modeling indicates that core challenges—high attrition of enablers like assault ships and assets—persist without decisive superiority. Consequently, peer-level landing operations shift toward enabling functions like of advance bases rather than decisive maneuvers, reflecting a broader recognition that massed amphibious invites unsustainable losses against symmetrically capable foes.

Empirical Lessons and Adaptations

Empirical evidence from amphibious operations underscores the critical need for sustained naval gunfire support during assault phases to suppress beach defenses, as demonstrated by the high casualties at on November 20-23, 1943, where premature lifting of fire left troops exposed to entrenched Japanese positions, resulting in over 1,000 U.S. Marine deaths. In contrast, the on June 6, 1944, benefited from extensive pre-assault bombardment and deception operations that fixed German reserves away from the invasion beaches, though strong currents displaced and obstacles caused significant delays on , contributing to approximately 2,400 U.S. casualties there alone. These operations revealed that inadequate beach reconnaissance and tidal considerations—such as reefs at or cliffs at —could amplify risks, with only partial mitigation through specialized like the LCVP, which enabled first-wave tank deployments but proved vulnerable to mines and . The Korean War's Inchon landing on September 15, 1950, validated the value of surprise in flanking maneuvers against overextended enemy lines, recapturing within two weeks and reversing North Korean advances, yet it highlighted logistical vulnerabilities in tidal extremes and limited , where operational-level overcame tactical shortfalls through rapid follow-on echelons. Post-operation analyses emphasized that amphibious assaults succeed empirically when achieving localized superiority, but failures in air-naval or sustainment—evident in Inchon's narrow margins—could lead to stalled advances, as seen in subsequent interventions. Adaptations following these experiences shifted doctrine toward vertical envelopment, incorporating helicopters for over-the-horizon insertions by the 1960s, as in Vietnam's Operation Starlite in 1965, which reduced reliance on contested beaches and enabled inland maneuvers bypassing fixed defenses. The introduction of air-cushion landing craft (LCAC) in the 1980s further enhanced speed and over-the-beach logistics, allowing forces to offload 60-75 tons at 40 knots over varied terrain, addressing WWII-era craft limitations exposed at Sicily and Normandy. In peer competitions, modern U.S. Marine Corps adaptations under Force Design initiatives prioritize distributed, expeditionary basing to counter anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats like hypersonic missiles, empirically drawing from historical data showing only 14% success rate for amphibious operations without air superiority. These evolve toward smaller, mobile units integrating unmanned systems for reconnaissance and fires, mitigating the massed vulnerabilities observed in 20th-century landings where concentrated shipping drew devastating counterfire.

References

  1. [1]
    [PDF] JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations - Defense Innovation Marketplace
    Jul 18, 2014 · JP 3-02 provides joint doctrine to plan, conduct, and assess amphibious operations, governing US Armed Forces activities in joint operations.
  2. [2]
    Landing Operations Doctrine, USN, FTP-167
    It is a sound principle in the conduct of landing operations to avoid landing against strongly organized positions unless such action is the only means of ...
  3. [3]
    None
    ### Summary of Introduction to Amphibious Operations
  4. [4]
    FM3-90 Appendix C Airborne and Air Assault Operations
    Airborne and air assault operations are types of entry operations that use a vertical envelopment to insert a force into an area of operations (AO).
  5. [5]
    Amphibious Operations - The Planning Phase
    Aug 22, 2017 · The frontage of the landing must be great enough to cause dispersion of the enemy's defensive fires, and to permit landing the maximum number of ...Missing: core | Show results with:core
  6. [6]
    D-Day Doctrine: Six Elements for a Successful Landing | New Orleans
    May 28, 2024 · Lasty communication and logistics provide key links for the assault force. Modern military operations require the ability to communicate with ...
  7. [7]
    FM 90-26 Chptr 2 Airborne Planning - GlobalSecurity.org
    Commanders plan for all phases of an airborne operation at the same time since all phases are interrelated. This reduces the total planning time. A ...
  8. [8]
    Chapter VI-1 Amphibious Doctrine in World War II 1 - Ibiblio
    The steps leading to a successful landing operation included an approach, deployment, and assault by the landing force following an adequate preparatory ...
  9. [9]
    Amphibious Doctrine's Evolution in the Pacific | Proceedings
    Despite years of testing, amphibious doctrine was still in its infancy and had never been proven in combat. However, the Japanese attack on 7 December brought ...<|separator|>
  10. [10]
    Amphibious Warfare: From the Colonial Period to World War II
    May 16, 2025 · A story 150 years in the making: the history of amphibious warfare in the United States. Months before America declared her independence.
  11. [11]
    [PDF] A Historical Assessment of Amphibious Operations From 1941 to the ...
    The Tokyo Press Club had termed the landing, “Operation Common. Page 76. 72. Knowledge.” Mao Zedong had even predicted the exact location of the amphibious ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations - DTIC
    Sep 19, 2001 · Tactical integrity of landing elements is maintained insofar as ... component to perform specialized functions required in military operations.
  13. [13]
    Operation Husky: The Allied Invasion of Sicily
    Jul 12, 2017 · For the next three days it involved more than 3,000 ships landing over 150,000 ground troops, covered by more than 4,000 aircraft. They were ...Missing: outcomes | Show results with:outcomes
  14. [14]
    World War II - European-African-Middle Eastern Theater Campaigns
    Axis losses in the campaign were around 167,000 killed, wounded, and captured, including some 10,000 German casualties. Allied losses were 31,158. Italy. Allied ...
  15. [15]
    D-Day casualties: Stories behind the numbers | CWGC
    May 29, 2024 · Allied deaths on D-Day totalled over 4,000 during Operation Overlord. So many died on D-Day or became casualties in Normandy because of the ...
  16. [16]
    H-054-1: Inchon Landing and Naval Action in the Korean War ...
    Sep 23, 2020 · In the two days following the Inchon landing, the Marines suffered 222 casualties, including 22 killed, two missing, and two died of wounds. ...
  17. [17]
    Korean War - History - Inchon Landing (Operation Chromite)
    Sep 16, 2025 · The toll rose to 600 killed, 2,750 wounded, and 65 missing during the fight to liberate Seoul. UN forces killed 14,000 North Korean soldiers and ...
  18. [18]
    What went wrong at Gallipoli? - Imperial War Museums
    After naval attempts to force the Dardanelles strait had failed the amphibious landings fared even worse. Fierce Ottoman opposition stopped the Allies in their ...
  19. [19]
    Gallipoli: 5 reasons why the First World War campaign was a failure
    Apr 9, 2021 · What happened at Gallipoli? · The Gallipoli campaign was poorly conceived · The British Army wasn't ready · Inferior leadership · The Turks were ...Missing: amphibious | Show results with:amphibious
  20. [20]
    ARMY AIRBORNE HISTORY - The Parachute Regimental Association
    Oct 19, 2024 · The widely accepted version of parachute assault history is that the Soviet Union's Red Army pioneered mass drops of parachute infantrymen in the 1930s.Missing: evolution | Show results with:evolution
  21. [21]
    Airborne Forces - A brief history of their creation and development
    Apr 27, 2017 · The first ever major use of airborne forces took place during the invasion of the Netherlands which commenced on 10 May 1940 with paratroopers capturing ...
  22. [22]
    Airborne Operations During World War II - HistoryNet
    Jun 12, 2006 · The German plan for the assault split the airborne forces in half: the first drop coming against the airfield at Maleme on the western end of ...
  23. [23]
    The jump that changed US warfare history | Article - Army.mil
    Aug 15, 2025 · Paratroopers today learn their craft in the Basic Airborne Course at Fort Benning, Georgia, where Soldiers leapt into history 85 years ago. On ...Missing: origins evolution
  24. [24]
    Operation VARSITY: The Last Airborne Deployment of World War II
    The Army's first foray into airborne warfare came with Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, on 8 November 1942, when the 2d Battalion, 509th Parachute ...
  25. [25]
    Evolution of the Army Airborne - Warfare History Network
    Inspired by the success of German and Russian parachute troop operations, the US Army committed to an airborne force that gained lasting fame in World War II.
  26. [26]
    [PDF] Airlift and Airborne Operations in World War II
    In 1918, the Signal Corps sup- plied airplanes and pilots to inaugurate the first U.S. airmail service, an operation expected to help train pilots and boost ...
  27. [27]
    Historical Study of Some World War II Airborne Operations - DTIC
    During World War II airborne operations were employed on both sides in a variety of situations and with varying degrees of success.
  28. [28]
    [PDF] The Development of Airfield Seizure Operations in the United States ...
    Joint forcible entry by rapid seizure of an airfield to provide a base of operations for follow-on opera- tions has historical precedent in Soviet and German.
  29. [29]
    [PDF] FM 3-99 - GlobalSecurity.org
    Mar 6, 2015 · PART ONE AIRBORNE OPERATIONS. Chapter 2 ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT ..............................................................2-1.Missing: mechanics | Show results with:mechanics
  30. [30]
    [PDF] AIRBORNE OPERATIONS - BITS
    well as to administrative air movements. 2. Principles a. Basic principles which apply in loading aircraft for assault operations are : ( 1 ) Unit ...
  31. [31]
    [PDF] *TC 3-21.220 (TC 3-21.220/MCWP 3-15.7/ AFMAN 11-420/NAVSEA ...
    Oct 24, 2018 · ... Airborne operations. Chapter 1. Overview. The purpose of Airborne training is to qualify personnel in the use of the parachute as a means of ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] THE AIRBORNE DIVISION - BITS
    The concepts of organization and employment presented in this manual represent current doctrine for the conduct of airborne oper- ations and establish goals for ...
  33. [33]
    [PDF] afman11-231.pdf - Air Force
    Nov 18, 2020 · This manual prescribes standard methods for the Computed Air Release Point (CARP) system, which aircrew use to compute air release point data ...
  34. [34]
    [PDF] The Army's Airborne Assault Forces—A Critical Component ... - DTIC
    Nov 2, 2022 · Of the four-primary means of JFEO infiltration, airborne assault carries several advantages over air-assault, amphibious assault, and air-land.
  35. [35]
    [PDF] Airborne Is Relevant - Fort Benning
    Sep 4, 2024 · Commanders planning airborne assaults must suppress enemy air defense.25 The challenge of eliminating the threat of SAMs is daunting. The risk.Missing: analysis | Show results with:analysis
  36. [36]
    Risk Factors for Injuries During Military Static-Line Airborne Operations
    Risk factors for static-line parachuting injuries included night jumps, jumps with extra equipment, higher wind speeds, higher air temperatures.
  37. [37]
    Airborne Operations - Army Safety
    Airborne operations have their own unique hazards and risks. Mishaps can occur while exiting the aircraft and/or during descent, but more often injuries are ...Missing: phases | Show results with:phases
  38. [38]
    [PDF] U.S. Military Parachute Injuries - Defense Centers for Public Health
    High Altitude Low Operations (HALO) and specialized helicopter jump duties present the highest risk for injuries. Improper technique: Parachuter error and ...
  39. [39]
    [PDF] Historical Study of Some World War II Airborne Operations - DTIC
    Jun 6, 2025 · All airborne assaults in -;orld :.ar II did not succeed to e uniforml degree from anrt of the possible points of vie w. Like a1l militarxr ...
  40. [40]
    Battle of Crete: It Began with Germany's Airborne Invasion ...
    Jun 12, 2006 · Battle of Crete: It Began with Germany's Airborne Invasion—Operation Mercury. German air superiority eventually drove the Royal Navy from the ...<|separator|>
  41. [41]
    The Airborne Invasion of Normandy | New Orleans
    Jun 6, 2024 · The Airborne Invasion of Normandy. On June 5, 13,400 American paratroopers boarded C-47 aircraft for the largest airborne operation in history.
  42. [42]
    Operation Market Garden: The American Airborne's Audacious Role
    Sep 17, 2020 · Although the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions achieved their Operation Market Garden objectives, the Allies failed to cross the Rhine.
  43. [43]
    What were the most successful airborne operations in military history?
    Jan 27, 2025 · The Turkish Army landings on Cyprus in 1974 were highly successful as well as being the last combat parachute drops ever made. Turkiye, a ...
  44. [44]
    [PDF] WHEN FAILURE tHRIVES - Army University Press
    Jun 9, 2015 · Combinations of the above factors transformed most large-scale airborne operations into either costly failures or, at best, pyrrhic successes.
  45. [45]
    [PDF] Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal - General Staff
    REASONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE. In assessing the successes and failures of German airborne opera- tions the following missions are taken into consideration ...
  46. [46]
    Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations - Marine Corps Association
    Aug 7, 2019 · OTH amphibious operations are launched beyond visual and radar range, usually over 25 miles, to achieve tactical advantage and counter threats.
  47. [47]
    New amphibious landing tactics and technology - Marine Corps Times
    Mar 23, 2017 · The Marine Corps will test drones, unmanned submarines and remote-control vehicles.<|separator|>
  48. [48]
    [PDF] Doctrine, Technology, and War - Air University
    This paper aims at illuminating some of the more basic relationships between doctrine, technology, and war. The approach will be to use selected historical ...Missing: assault | Show results with:assault
  49. [49]
    A2/AD: The New Death Knell for Amphibious Operations?
    Pessimists say the anti-access and area-denial threat will spell the end of amphibious operations. But Marines like a challenge.
  50. [50]
    [PDF] Amphibious Operations in Contested Environments - RAND
    May 18, 2017 · However, it is true that A2/AD challenges complicate the ability to assemble and move big formations of armed personnel and move them at ...
  51. [51]
    [PDF] Naval Amphibious Capability in the 21st Century
    Its purpose was to assess the challenges and opportunities for amphibious operations within the context of 21st century naval and joint warfighting. The ACWG ...
  52. [52]
    HOW TO TRANSFORM THE ARMY FOR DRONE WARFARE
    Jan 9, 2025 · The Army organizes to adopt and integrate technology for drone warfare should accomplish three things. First, it should put capabilities into operational units ...
  53. [53]
    Full article: D-Day and the Future of Amphibious Operations
    Jul 30, 2024 · Fresh technologies, satellite surveillance, sensors and guided missiles, as well as mines and sub-surface systems, have taken what in the past ...
  54. [54]
    The Challenge of Dis-Integrating A2/AD Zone - NDU Press
    Mar 31, 2020 · Emerging technologies in the fields of network, artificial intelligence, and space are shifting the balance back to defense, making these zones more dangerous.Missing: amphibious | Show results with:amphibious
  55. [55]
    Airborne, Special-Purpose Forces, and Amphibious Operations
    Sep 28, 2023 · After the landing, the landing force commander is solely responsible for conducting the operation, until linkup with ground maneuver forces.Missing: definition | Show results with:definition<|separator|>
  56. [56]
    [PDF] COUNTERSEA OPERATIONS - Air Force Doctrine
    Sep 20, 2023 · Amphibious operations may require USAF forces to perform functions such as counterair, counterland [both AI and close air support (CAS)], ...
  57. [57]
    Information at the Water's Edge: Amphibious Command and Control ...
    Jun 28, 2019 · Victory in modern amphibious operations will rely on joint air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace convergence across common doctrine and systems.
  58. [58]
    The Marine Corps and Army Must Integrate Armor in Amphibious Ops
    Yet, the services are losing their expertise in integrating mobile protected firepower (MPF) into amphibious assaults, and the joint force will be weaker for it ...
  59. [59]
    Combined, joint forces complete amphibious raid during RIMPAC ...
    Aug 14, 2024 · The combined joint amphibious raid demonstrated interoperability during the tactical phase and served as the culminating event for the landing force in RIMPAC ...
  60. [60]
    Marine Corps, NATO Allies Brush Up on Amphibious Assault ...
    Jul 18, 2025 · We're working together as one integrated team to make operations like this happen.” It is important for NATO nations to run drills together ...
  61. [61]
    U.S., Allies Rehearse Simultaneous Amphibious Landings
    Aug 4, 2025 · The drills, Shultz said, included planning and execution efforts, as well as military operations at sea, in the air, space, cyber and ashore.
  62. [62]
    The Problems Facing United States Marine Corps Amphibious ...
    An amphibious assault is launched from the sea by an [amphibious force], embarked in ships or crafts, to land the [landing force] and establish it on a hostile ...
  63. [63]
    What makes airborne operations so risky in modern warfare ... - Quora
    Mar 24, 2025 · Operational Risks · Airborne Units · Warfare · Military Operations ... failed Market Garden, and by the USSR in the failed Vyazma operation.Is the use of airborne troops considered outdated in modern warfare?What are the advantages and disadvantages of using airborne ...More results from www.quora.com
  64. [64]
    Marines Need to Move beyond Their Amphibious-Assault Past - FDD
    Jun 15, 2023 · The United States Marine Corps has been locked into an amphibious-assault strategy as its raison d'etre for far too long and needs to move on.
  65. [65]
    Reimagining and Modernizing U.S. Airborne Forces for the 21st ...
    Apr 20, 2016 · Amphibious assault is limited to the littorals, while helicopter air assault operations have range limitations. Even the Marine V-22 Osprey, ...
  66. [66]
    Advancing Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an Era of ...
    Nov 15, 2016 · Bryan Clark and Jesse Sloman's study examines the changing environment for amphibious operations, new operating concepts needed to be effective in the emerging ...Missing: viability | Show results with:viability
  67. [67]
    A Bridge Too Far: The Decline of Conventional Parachuting - Part 1 »
    Feb 26, 2019 · “The threshold of risk acceptance in modern society is significantly lower; casualties make headlines. ... failure in political risk terms.”.
  68. [68]
    What Can We Learn about Amphibious Warfare from a Conflict That ...
    Apr 22, 2022 · Despite the naysayers, amphibious operations aren't dead, and remain a key strategic and operational capability for major militaries around the world.
  69. [69]
    Versatility in the Age of Uncertainty | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
    Nov 25, 2010 · The inherent flexibility of a seaborne force to loiter offshore for extended periods enhances the effectiveness of other instruments of power.
  70. [70]
    Waterborne Assault: A Constant in Both Irregular and Conventional ...
    Apr 8, 2025 · In this article, I use the Indochina-Vietnam case to highlight historical waterborne operations in irregular war then describe some 21 st century cases.
  71. [71]
    Warfighting from Ship to Shore and Beyond: Why Amphibious ...
    Mar 18, 2024 · those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces,” with the implication ...
  72. [72]
    [PDF] Long range Amphibious Operations - DTIC
    Landing vehicles also will face great risk from precision-guided weapons, given their slow speed and hours-long transit time. Mines and obstacles also could ...
  73. [73]
    The First Battle of the Next War: Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of ...
    Jan 9, 2023 · CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a ...Missing: landing | Show results with:landing
  74. [74]
    [PDF] The First Battle of the Next War
    What would happen if China attempted an amphibious invasion of Taiwan? CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times.
  75. [75]
    Amphibious Assault is Over | Royal United Services Institute - RUSI
    Jan 21, 2019 · The cost of having an amphibious MIV is range on land, which limits the capacity for USMC formations to exploit an unopposed landing or perform ...Missing: competition | Show results with:competition
  76. [76]
    Frustrated Cargo: The U.S. Army's Limitations in Projecting Force ...
    Feb 10, 2020 · The Army functionally has no amphibious doctrine. It last published an amphibious operation manual in 1966 and has since discontinued its use.
  77. [77]
    Contested Littorals Require a Larger, More Capable U.S. ...
    Oct 17, 2017 · For more than seventy-five years, amphibious assaults against hostile shores have had a successful record ... (A2/AD) threat, these landings were ...<|separator|>
  78. [78]
    Gunfire Support Lessons Learned in World War II - U.S. Naval Institute
    Tarawa taught us that during their assault landing the troops must be protected by a continuing curtain of fire protection. We also learned there that there can ...
  79. [79]
    10 Facts About D-Day You Need To Know | Imperial War Museums
    D-Day - 6 June 1944 - was the largest amphibious invasion in the history of warfare. The statistics of D-Day, codenamed Operation Overlord, are staggering.
  80. [80]
    Operational Logistics: Lessons from the Inchon Landing. - DTIC
    This analysis leads to several operational lessons learned that, as resources become more scarce, become even more critical. These lessons should be kept in the ...
  81. [81]
    Inchon—The Analysis Of A Gamble | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
    Thus the story of Inchon landing is the story of the Pacific War repeated. It used no new tactics, developed no new doctrine, introduced no new weapons. Inchon ...
  82. [82]
    [PDF] Operational Logistics: Lessons from the Inchon Landing.
    Nov 8, 1996 · An analysis of Chromite reveals that logistical efforts at the operational level were more successful, and helped U.N. forces overcome failures ...
  83. [83]
    Amphibious Assault Will Remain a 'Corps' Competency | Proceedings
    The challenges of modern amphibious warfare are real, and whether the benefits ascribed to historical, amphibiously adept great powers remain relevant is a ...