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Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a in South-Central covering approximately 652,000 square kilometers, with a estimated at 43.8 million as of 2025. Its capital and largest city is , and since August 2021 it has been governed as the by the , a Sunni Islamist movement led by supreme leader , enforcing a strict interpretation of law as its legal and political framework. The nation borders to the east and south, to the west, , , and to the north, and to the far northeast, positioning it historically as a strategic crossroads for trade routes and military campaigns. Geographically dominated by the Hindu Kush mountain range, which influences its arid climate and isolates rural tribal communities, Afghanistan features diverse ethnic groups including (around 42%), (27%), (9%), and (9%), with —predominantly Sunni—serving as the unifying religious force amid longstanding tribal and sectarian divisions. Economically underdeveloped, with , including opium poppy cultivation, and mineral resources as key sectors, the country has faced chronic and reliance on foreign aid, exacerbated by decades of that have displaced millions and hindered infrastructure development. Throughout history, Afghanistan has resisted foreign domination, from ancient invasions by and the to 19th-century Anglo-Afghan Wars that preserved its sovereignty, the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation that fueled resistance with U.S. support, and the 2001 U.S.-led intervention following the 9/11 attacks that toppled the initial regime but ended in withdrawal amid prolonged insurgency. The 's 2021 return to power has restored relative internal security by curtailing factional warfare and ISIS-K threats in some regions, but it has triggered due to frozen assets, aid cuts, and banking isolation, alongside severe restrictions on women and girls' , , and public participation that constitute systematic gender-based oppression.

Etymology

Origins and historical usage

The name "Afghanistan" derives from "Afghan," the historical ethnonym for the Pashtun people, combined with the Persian suffix "-stān," denoting "land" or "place of." This construction signifies "land of the Afghans" or "place of the Pashtuns," reflecting the ethnic core of the region's identity. The earliest recorded mention of "Afghan" appears as "Abgân" in Sassanid Empire inscriptions from the 3rd century CE, attributed to Shapur I (r. 240–270 CE), who listed it among conquered peoples in eastern territories during campaigns against Kushan remnants. This usage predates Islamic-era references and applies specifically to tribal groups in what is now eastern Afghanistan and adjacent areas, without implying a unified polity. By the medieval period, the term evolved in Persianate texts to denote Pashtun-inhabited lands distinct from the broader region, which encompassed parts of modern , , and northeastern Afghanistan. In the , the memoirs of founder (1483–1530), "Afghanistan" explicitly refers to territories south of Kabulistan, highlighting Pashtun tribal confederacies engaged in conflicts with Timurid forces around 1507 CE. administrative records continued this usage, treating "Afghans" as a cohesive ethnic-military entity amid interactions with Central Asian and Indian polities. The name's adoption as a formal polity designation occurred with the Durrani Empire's founding in 1747 by (r. 1747–1772), who unified following Nader Shah's assassination and centralized authority in . This marked "Afghanistan" as the self-proclaimed realm of Pashtun dominance, extending from to the Indus, though internal tribal divisions persisted. Prior to this, the term lacked connotations of statehood, serving instead as a geographic-ethnic descriptor amid fragmented principalities.

History

Prehistory and ancient civilizations

Archaeological evidence indicates human presence in present-day Afghanistan from the era, with stone tools found in caves and along river terraces in northern and eastern regions, suggesting early adaptations to diverse terrains. By the period around 7000–5000 BCE, settlements emerged in the northern foothills, marking one of the early centers of incipient with evidence of transitional farming practices between and . These sites, including remains from northern Afghanistan, reflect rudimentary and settled communities predating widespread . The saw the development of the -Margiana Archaeological Complex (BMAC), flourishing from approximately 2300 to 1700 BCE across northern Afghanistan, southern Turkmenistan, and adjacent areas. This culture featured advanced urban centers with fortified mud-brick structures, irrigation systems, and artifacts like chlorite vessels and seals, indicating sophisticated craftsmanship and possible proto-urban trade networks. BMAC sites in Afghan , such as those near , show influences from Mesopotamian and Indus Valley styles, evidencing long-distance exchanges without direct textual records of or ethnicity. In the 6th century BCE, the incorporated much of modern Afghanistan as satrapies, including (southern regions around ), (northern plains), (Herat area), and (Sistan basin). These provinces contributed tribute, troops, and resources to the Persian administration under Darius I, with cuneiform inscriptions and administrative tablets from sites like attesting to integrated taxation and military obligations. Local populations, blending indigenous groups with Persian oversight, maintained semi-autonomous structures until Alexander the Great's invasion in 330 BCE, when his forces subdued and Sogdiana after campaigns against satrap , establishing Hellenistic outposts amid guerrilla resistance. The emerged around 256 BCE when satrap declared independence from the Seleucids, ruling and surrounding territories until circa 120 BCE. Centered in the fertile valley, it fostered urban development, as seen in , a fortified city with Greek-style gymnasia, theaters, and colonnaded streets, alongside eastern architectural elements, highlighting syncretic Hellenistic influences. Coinage from kings like depicted and , facilitating trade along proto-Silk Road routes. Nomadic incursions by (Sakas), eastern Iranian pastoralists, contributed to the kingdom's decline by the late 2nd century BCE, with their migrations from establishing control over eastern satrapies and introducing steppe warfare tactics. These groups settled in areas like Sakastan (Sistan), blending with local populations while issuing coins that echoed Greco-Bactrian styles. The , founded by confederates around the 1st century CE, dominated Afghanistan and adjacent regions until the 3rd century CE, serving as a pivotal nexus. Under rulers like I (circa 127–150 CE), it unified diverse territories from to northern , promoting trade in silk, spices, and gems through cities like and Begram, where hoards of and Chinese lacquer attest to extensive commerce. , featuring deities from Greek, Iranian, and Indian pantheons, and monumental art like Gandharan statues, exemplify cultural fusion without imposing a singular ethnic identity on the populace.

Islamic conquests and medieval eras

The Arab reached the territories of modern Afghanistan in the mid-7th century, following the defeat of the , with Umayyad forces capturing in 651 and advancing into and by 652. Balkh fell to Umayyad governor in 708–709 after prolonged resistance, marking a key step in subduing Buddhist and Zoroastrian centers in northern Afghanistan. The region, a stronghold of Hindu Shahi rulers, resisted until becoming a around 870 under Abbasid pressure, though full incorporation involved ongoing campaigns and local alliances rather than immediate submission. These incursions imposed taxes on non-Muslims and razed some idol temples, driving gradual conversions through economic coercion and military dominance, shifting polytheistic populations toward over generations. The Ghaznavid Empire, founded in 977 by the Turkic slave-soldier from Ghazna, consolidated Sunni Muslim rule across eastern and by enforcing orthodoxy against Ismaili and other sects. Under (r. 998–1030), the empire peaked with seventeen raids into northern from 1001 to 1026, targeting wealthy temples like Somnath in 1025 for plunder estimated at millions in and jewels, which funded Ghaznavid architecture and military while propagating rhetoric to legitimize expansion. These campaigns weakened Indian kingdoms but strained resources, contributing to territorial losses; the empire fragmented after 1186 when Ghorid forces under Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad captured Ghazna. The Ghorid Sultanate, emerging from the mountainous Ghur region in central Afghanistan around 1149 under Ala al-Din Husayn's sack of Ghazna, represented a local Pashtun-Tajik dynasty that overthrew Ghaznavid remnants by the 1170s. Mu'izz al-Din Muhammad (r. 1173–1206) extended control eastward, defeating the confederacy at Tarain in 1192 and establishing Muslim governors in , which laid groundwork for the despite Ghorid reliance on Turkic slaves for administration. The sultanate enforced Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence, suppressing Shia elements, but its overextension ended abruptly with Muhammad's assassination in 1206 and subsequent slave revolts. Genghis Khan's Mongol invasion of 1219–1221, triggered by Khwarezmshah Muhammad II's execution of Mongol envoys and merchants, devastated Afghan cities in retaliation, with forces sacking Bamiyan in 1221—where Genghis's favorite son was killed earlier—and slaughtering up to 1.6 million in alone per contemporary accounts. was razed to ruins, its irrigation systems destroyed, leading to urban depopulation estimated at 90% in affected areas and long-term agricultural collapse from severed qanats. This cataclysmic event, involving systematic massacres and pyramid-building from skulls as terror tactics, shattered centralized governance and facilitated over settled Islamicate society. The Timurids, under (Tamerlane), reconquered the region in the late 14th century, sacking in 1381 but later promoting reconstruction; [Shah Rukh](/page/Shah Rukh) (r. 1405–1447) established as capital, fostering a in Persianate arts, sciences, and architecture blending Turco-Mongol and Islamic elements. Under Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–1506), hosted scholars like Ali Sher Navai and miniaturists, producing illuminated manuscripts and madrasas that exemplified centralized with waqf-endowed institutions, influencing subsequent and Safavid models despite underlying reliance on tribal militias. This era's cultural efflorescence masked fragile succession, ending with Uzbek conquests by 1507.

Early modern dynasties

The , led by Pashtun tribesmen, arose in 1709 when orchestrated a revolt against Safavid Persian governance in , executing the governor Gurgin Khan and securing local autonomy by April of that year. Under Mirwais's son , the Hotaks expanded aggressively, defeating Safavid forces at the in 1722 and besieging , which fell after six months, allowing Mahmud to claim the Persian throne and briefly control much of . However, internal divisions, including Mahmud's mental instability and tribal dissent among , eroded Hotak authority; by 1729, Nader Shah Qoli of the Afsharids repelled them at and Mehmandust, confining Hotak rule to until Nader's full reconquest in 1738. This collapse highlighted Pashtun tribal fragmentation, with Ghilji cohesion fracturing under the pressures of overextension and rivalries with other groups like the Abdalis. Following Nader Shah's assassination in 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali, a leader of the Abdali (later ) Pashtun who had served in Nader's campaigns, convened a loya jirga in in June, where tribal elders elected him sovereign, marking the foundation of the with as initial capital. Ahmad Shah consolidated Pashtun support through strategic alliances and military prowess, reclaiming and while extending control over regions including by 1750, though tribal loyalties remained conditional and prone to defection amid entrenched rivalries between Durrani elites and warriors. To the east, he launched nine invasions into Mughal India between 1748 and 1767, capturing and in 1752, sacking in 1757 while nominally upholding Mughal , and decisively defeating the Marathas at the Third in 1761 with an army of approximately 60,000, thereby establishing Pashtun over eastern territories. These conquests relied on loose tribal levies, underscoring the empire's confederative nature rather than centralized administration, as Pashtun segments prioritized segmental lineage interests over unified state-building. Ahmad Shah's death in 1772 initiated a period of dynastic instability, with his son Timur Shah relocating the capital to in 1773 and facing persistent succession disputes that fragmented authority among over two dozen sons. Timur's successor Zaman Shah (r. 1793–1800) contended with internal revolts and external incursions, including Persian advances under reclaiming Khorasan territories like by 1796, while Sikh forces under seized in 1818 after repeated Afghan defeats. By the early , these pressures—compounded by Pashtun tribal enmities such as tarburwali (cousin ) and Ghilji-Durrani —led to territorial contractions, with the empire devolving into semi-autonomous principalities amid chronic civil strife and the inability to enforce cohesion beyond short-term campaigns. This empirical pattern of fragmentation, rooted in decentralized tribal structures, repeatedly undermined Pashtun unification efforts despite intermittent empire-building successes.

19th-century emirates and British incursions

Following the fragmentation of the , of the clan established control over in 1826, founding an that encompassed much of modern Afghanistan by consolidating power amid rival tribal and external pressures from , Sikh, and influences. As until 1839 and again from 1843 to 1863, he navigated Afghanistan's role as a geopolitical buffer between expanding and British spheres, seeking alliances while resisting direct subjugation, though internal divisions and terrain-limited logistics hindered full centralization. British concerns over Russian encroachment prompted the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1839, when East India Company forces, totaling around 39,000 troops and auxiliaries, invaded to depose Dost Mohammad and install the pro-British Shah Shuja. Initial successes included the capture of key cities like Ghazni and Kabul by mid-1839, but sustained Afghan guerrilla resistance, exacerbated by harsh mountainous terrain and supply line vulnerabilities, fueled resentment against the occupation. An uprising in Kabul on November 2, 1841, led to the massacre of British residents; on January 6, 1842, a retreating column of approximately 4,500 combat troops and 12,000 civilians departed Kabul for Jalalabad, only to be annihilated by tribal fighters in the passes, with sole European survivor William Brydon reaching safety on January 13. British reprisal forces under George Pollock recaptured Kabul in September 1842, razing parts of the city before a full withdrawal, restoring Dost Mohammad and underscoring the futility of conquest against local agency and geography. Succession struggles after Dost Mohammad's death in 1863 weakened the emirate, culminating in the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878–1880, triggered by Emir Sher Ali Khan's rejection of British diplomatic overtures amid perceived Russian advances. British invasions from multiple fronts overwhelmed Afghan regulars at battles like Peiwar Kotal (December 1878) and Ali Masjid (November 1878), leading to Sher Ali's flight and death in 1879; the British then backed , a claimant exiled in Russian territories, who ascended as in 1880 after defeating rival at in September. , receiving British subsidies and arms totaling over £1 million annually by the 1890s, centralized authority through brutal suppression of revolts, forging a more unified state while ceding foreign policy control to in exchange for recognition and protection against external threats. In 1893, Abdur Rahman negotiated the Durand Line agreement with British envoy Mortimer Durand, delineating a that bisected Pashtun tribal territories, allocating roughly 40% of Pashtun lands to British India and igniting enduring irredentist claims by fragmenting networks and economies without tribal consultation. This arbitrary demarcation, spanning about 2,640 kilometers through rugged mountains and deserts, prioritized imperial buffer strategies over ethnic realities, sowing seeds for future cross-border militancy. The Third Anglo-Afghan War erupted on May 3, 1919, when Emir Amanullah Khan, seeking to reclaim foreign policy autonomy post-World War I, ordered invasions into British India across the North-West Frontier, exploiting tribal unrest and British overextension. Afghan forces achieved initial penetrations, such as at Bagh Springs, but British air and ground counteroffensives, including RAF bombings—the first combat use of aircraft in the region—repelled advances by July, with key victories at Thal (May 11) and Dakka. An armistice on August 8, 1919, formalized by the Rawalpindi Treaty, ended British subsidies and veto over Afghan diplomacy, granting de facto independence while affirming the Durand Line, though terrain-fueled guerrilla tactics had again demonstrated invasion's high costs.

20th-century monarchy and republic

Mohammed Zahir Shah ascended to the throne of Afghanistan on November 8, 1933, following the assassination of his father, Nadir Shah, and ruled as king until his deposition in 1973. His reign saw gradual modernization efforts, including infrastructure projects like the Helmand Valley Authority for irrigation and agriculture, which aimed to boost cotton production and rural development, though implementation was hampered by technical challenges and corruption. The 1964 constitution established a with a bicameral , introducing limited democratic elements such as elections and , but real power remained concentrated in the royal family and urban Pashtun elites, exacerbating tribal disenfranchisement. Despite these reforms, Afghanistan's economy under Zahir Shah persisted in feudal patterns, with over 90% of the population engaged in and land ownership dominated by a small class of khans and tribal leaders, leading to widespread and illiteracy rates exceeding 80% in rural areas. permeated the bureaucracy, fueled by patronage networks that prioritized loyalty over merit, while modernization initiatives largely bypassed tribal structures rooted in codes and Islamic norms, fostering resentment among rural majorities who viewed urban-centric policies as cultural imposition. On July 17, 1973, Zahir Shah's cousin, Lieutenant General Mohammed Daoud Khan, orchestrated a bloodless coup while the king was abroad, proclaiming a and assuming the with promises to address and accelerate . Daoud's regime pursued secular reforms, including expanded and industrialization, increasingly reliant on Soviet economic and , which deepened urban-rural divides by favoring Kabul's technocrats over provincial tribes. The republic's fragility culminated in the on April 27-28, 1978, when the (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist group, overthrew and killed Daoud, installing as leader. The PDPA's faction enacted radical decrees, including land redistribution that confiscated estates from traditional owners without compensation, compulsory literacy campaigns promoting , and women's emancipation policies that clashed with conservative Islamic practices, igniting rural uprisings as farmers and mullahs perceived these as assaults on property rights and faith. These impositions, driven by urban intellectuals disconnected from the 85% rural population's tribal and religious worldview, rapidly eroded the regime's legitimacy, as evidenced by widespread revolts in provinces like and Kunar, where Marxist ideology's materialist denial of Islamic causality alienated allies and unified disparate factions against the state.

Soviet invasion and resistance

The invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, deploying and ground forces to overthrow and install as leader of the (PDPA), a communist regime facing widespread internal rebellions and desertions. Soviet troop numbers peaked at approximately 100,000 by the mid-1980s, supporting PDPA efforts to suppress Islamist and tribal insurgencies through urban sieges, aerial bombings, and scorched-earth tactics in rural areas. The intervention stemmed from Moscow's aim to preserve a strategic amid fears of PDPA collapse, but it ignited a protracted guerrilla war characterized by the insurgents' intimate knowledge of terrain and hit-and-run ambushes. Afghan mujahideen fighters, organized into disparate ethnic and ideological factions, mounted fierce resistance motivated by religious opposition to atheistic communism and defense of traditional autonomy against centralizing reforms like land redistribution. External support proved decisive: the U.S. CIA's funneled over $3 billion in arms and training via Pakistan's (ISI), which operated border training camps for up to 80,000 fighters annually. matched U.S. funding dollar-for-dollar, framing aid as against Soviet infidels, while drawing thousands of foreign Arab volunteers—including precursors to —who bolstered morale and logistics despite comprising a small fraction of combatants. The introduction of U.S.-supplied man-portable air-defense systems in 1986 dramatically shifted the conflict's dynamics, enabling mujahideen to down over 270 Soviet aircraft and helicopters, eroding Moscow's air superiority and forcing reliance on costly low-altitude operations. This technological edge, combined with sustained guerrilla attrition—inflicting roughly 15,000 Soviet fatalities—compelled negotiations, culminating in the Geneva Accords signed on April 14, 1988, which outlined a phased Soviet withdrawal beginning May 15 and completing February 15, 1989. The exacted a staggering toll, with estimates of 1 to 2 million Afghan deaths from , bombings, mines, and famine-induced affecting over 5 million refugees, underscoring the invasion's role as primary aggressor in a rooted in Soviet expansionism rather than mere dynamics. Soviet forces withdrew without securing PDPA viability or neutralizing networks, leaving a militarized society primed for further instability.

Civil war and Taliban emergence

Following the Soviet military withdrawal in February 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Mohammad Najibullah's government in April 1992, Afghanistan fragmented into as rival factions competed for dominance. Key groups included the Tajik-led under and , the Pashtun Hezb-e Islami under , the Uzbek Junbish-i Milli under , and the Shia Hezb-e Wahdat representing , leading to fragmented alliances and betrayals. Intense , particularly the bombardment of from 1992 to 1996, killed an estimated 50,000 civilians, displaced hundreds of thousands, and reduced much of the capital to rubble through indiscriminate rocket attacks and factional atrocities including summary executions and rapes. The power vacuum enabled warlords to impose predatory rule, with checkpoints extorting travelers, forced conscription, and sexual violence against women becoming rampant, eroding public trust in the mujahideen who had previously united against Soviet occupation. In this context, the Taliban movement arose in 1994 in Kandahar province, founded by Mullah Mohammed Omar, a former mujahideen fighter, drawing recruits primarily from Pashtun youth educated in Deobandi madrassas in Pakistan. The group's initial appeal rested on internal Afghan dynamics: Pashtun ethnic grievances against non-Pashtun dominance in Kabul, widespread disgust at warlord corruption, and a fervent commitment to purifying society through unadulterated Sharia law, positioning the Taliban as restorers of moral and physical security rather than mere proxies. Advancing methodically with promises of safe passage and justice, the seized in late 1994, then expanded northward, capturing on , , and executing Najibullah after parading him publicly. By 1998, they controlled about 90% of Afghan territory, leaving pockets in the north to the —a of Massoud's forces and allies—while declaring the . Their governance imposed punishments such as amputations for theft and stonings for adultery, alongside edicts banning television, music, and women's public employment, which correlated with sharp declines in highway robbery and local disorder as armed enforcers patrolled roads and enforced curfews. This stability, however, facilitated hosting ; from , operated training camps under protection, with the regime rejecting U.S. demands, as documented in the attributing the sanctuary to ideological affinity and strategic leverage.

U.S.-led overthrow and nation-building attempts

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the launched on October 7, 2001, targeting and the regime harboring them. partnered with the , an anti- militia, while airstrikes supported ground advances, leading to the fall of on November 13, 2001, and the collapse of control by mid-December 2001. This rapid overthrow dismantled the central authority but left a in a fragmented tribal society. The Bonn Agreement, signed on December 5, 2001, under UN auspices, established an interim Afghan administration led by as head of the interim government. This framework culminated in the 2004 constitution, which created a centralized presidential emphasizing unitary governance and modeled on Western systems. However, the constitution's heavy centralization clashed with Afghanistan's decentralized tribal structures and preferences for local dispute resolution and Sharia-based justice, fostering governance inefficiencies and in . U.S.-led efforts from 2002 onward aimed to build democratic institutions, , and , with total U.S. costs for the Afghanistan war estimated at $2.26 trillion through 2021, including military operations, reconstruction, and veteran care. Despite this investment, persistent eroded gains, as U.S. strategies overlooked entrenched networks and failed to align with local power dynamics. permeated the Karzai (2001–2014) and Ghani (2014–2021) governments, with SIGAR documenting how elite-level graft alienated the population and bolstered narratives of moral superiority. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), built with over $80 billion in U.S. aid, suffered chronic high rates, with the Afghan army replacing about one-third of its 170,000 soldiers in 2015 alone due to desertions, casualties, and low reenlistment. ANSF strength declined by roughly 10% to under 300,000 by 2018 amid these losses. "Green-on-blue" attacks, where Afghan forces or infiltrators turned on troops, resulted in at least 157 coalition deaths from 102 documented incidents since 2007. production, suppressed under the 2000–2001 Taliban ban to historic lows, surged post-intervention, with Afghanistan accounting for over 90% of global supply by the mid-2000s as cultivation expanded in insecure areas, undermining counternarcotics efforts. These empirical shortcomings—exacerbated by ignoring tribal alliances and Islamic legal traditions—rendered centralized unsustainable against and societal resistance.

Taliban resurgence and 2021 reconquest

Following the drawdown of U.S. surge forces initiated under President Obama, which began in 2011 after the addition of approximately 30,000 troops announced in December 2009, the Taliban expanded its territorial influence throughout the 2010s. By 2018, assessments indicated the Taliban maintained influence over or contested roughly 50% of Afghanistan's districts, with government control limited to about 54% and the insurgents holding 12% outright, amid widespread corruption and ineffective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) performance that eroded morale and operational capacity. This resurgence was facilitated by persistent insurgent attacks, safe havens in Pakistan, and the Afghan government's legitimacy deficits, including disputed elections and systemic graft under President Ashraf Ghani's administration, which prioritized centralization over tribal and provincial cohesion. The February 29, 2020, Doha Agreement between the and the committed to a full U.S. troop withdrawal by May 1, 2021, contingent on Taliban reductions in violence and initiation of intra-Afghan talks, but lacked robust enforcement mechanisms and excluded the Ghani government, undermining its authority while Taliban offensives continued unabated. Under President Biden, the timeline was extended to August-September 2021, yet the abrupt U.S. departure from on July 2, 2021—without prior notification to Afghan partners—severed critical air support, logistics, and intelligence for the ANSF, accelerating desertions and collapses across provincial capitals. SIGAR evaluations later attributed the ANSF's rapid disintegration to a combination of overreliance on U.S. enablers, internal divisions, low from unpaid salaries and , and the psychological impact of the Doha deal's perceived abandonment, rather than solely combat inferiority. The 's 2021 spring offensive overwhelmed ANSF defenses, capturing over half of provincial capitals by early August, with U.S. intelligence assessments predicting 's potential fall in 30 to 90 days proving overly optimistic as the speed of collapse caught evacuees and officials unprepared. On August 15, 2021, President Ghani fled the country amid reports of cash-laden suitcases, prompting minimal resistance as forces entered unopposed, marking the reconquest of the capital. During the ensuing chaotic evacuation from , an ISIS-K suicide bombing on August 26 killed 13 U.S. service members and nearly 170 Afghans, underscoring vulnerabilities in the hasty withdrawal logistics despite prior warnings of such threats. Prior efforts, as critiqued in SIGAR reports, had fostered dependency and illusory stability through unchecked aid flows that fueled , contributing to the regime's fragility independent of the final withdrawal decisions. ![Taliban Humvee in Kabul, August 2021](./assets/Taliban_Humvee_in_Kabul%252C_August_2021_%28cropped%29%29[center]

Taliban rule since 2021

The Taliban established the on August 15, 2021, following their capture of , with Haibatullah Akhundzada serving as supreme leader and issuing decrees that centralize authority without provisions for elections or representative institutions. Akhundzada's rule has emphasized consolidation of power through religious edicts, maintaining an interim government structure that prioritizes loyalty to Taliban ideology over formal state-building mechanisms. Under Taliban governance, overall conflict-related violence has significantly decreased compared to the pre-2021 civil war era, with the cessation of large-scale factional fighting contributing to relative stability in many regions. However, the (ISIS-K) has persisted as a primary internal threat, conducting bombings and attacks including the August 26, 2021, Kabul airport suicide bombing that killed over 170 and 13 U.S. servicemembers, as well as inspiring the in by operatives linked to Afghan-based ISIS-K networks. reports indicate that maintains operational sanctuaries in Afghanistan, with Taliban tolerance enabling senior leaders to reside and train under protection. Afghanistan's economy experienced an initial contraction post-takeover due to frozen international reserves and aid suspension, but recorded a modest GDP growth of 2.5% in 2024 amid ongoing fragility and deflationary pressures from weak demand. This limited expansion occurs against a backdrop of non-recognition by most states—though Russia granted formal diplomatic recognition in July 2025—exacerbating aid dependency and banking restrictions that hinder trade and investment. A humanitarian crisis persists, with 23.7 million people—over half the population—requiring assistance in 2024 due to food insecurity, displacement, and economic collapse. Taliban edicts have systematically curtailed women's public participation, including a ban on girls' imposed in September 2021 affecting 2.2 million by 2025, alongside prohibitions on attendance, most , and training enacted in December 2024. Over 50 specific directives by 2023 targeted women, enforcing dress codes, mobility limits, and voice restrictions in public, escalating under Akhundzada's centralized authority and contributing to gender apartheid characterizations by observers. These policies, justified by the Taliban as compliance, have deepened and by excluding half the population from and workforce contributions.

Geography

Topography and regional divisions

Afghanistan spans 652,230 square kilometers of predominantly rugged , rendering it one of the most mountainous globally, with over 75 percent of its land dominated by high-elevation ranges that impede centralized control and enable insurgent mobility through narrow passes and remote valleys. The Hindu Kush, extending approximately 800 kilometers from the in the northeast to central Afghanistan, forms the primary topographic backbone, with peaks exceeding 7,000 meters, including at 7,492 meters, creating steep escarpments and deep gorges that historically fragment authority and provide defensible sanctuaries for armed groups. This range's alignment fosters physical isolation between northern lowlands and southern highlands, channeling conflicts along predictable axes like eastern border corridors where porous ridges facilitate cross-border incursions. The country is entirely landlocked, hemmed by to the east and south, to the west, , , and to the north, and a narrow sliver to the northeast, exacerbating logistical vulnerabilities in a where barriers limit overland access and amplify the strategic value of air routes or limited highways. At the Pamir-Hindu Kush junction in northeastern Afghanistan, tectonic convergence drives intense seismic activity, with subduction of the beneath generating frequent deep-focus earthquakes up to 200 kilometers depth, contributing to geological instability that underscores the region's vulnerability to natural disruptions amid human conflicts. Counterbalancing the highlands are arid intermontane basins, such as the valley in the southwest, a closed endorheic system spanning southern Afghanistan where seasonal flooding supports limited irrigated amid otherwise desolate plains, though overexploitation has strained reserves critical for sustaining sparse centers. These basins contrast with the elevated central plateaus and northern foothills, delineating regional physiographic zones: the southern and eastern sectors feature extension of the Hindu Kush into arid ridges bordering Pakistan's tribal areas, forming natural conduits for unregulated movement, while northern peripheries transition to flatter, sediment-filled depressions that historically enabled but remain severed from the core by meridional ridgelines. Such divisions, rooted in Miocene-era uplift and , perpetuate a conducive to balkanized power dynamics, as valleys and passes dictate viable invasion or resistance pathways rather than unified .

Climate patterns and environmental challenges

Afghanistan possesses a dominated by arid to semi-arid conditions, with extreme seasonal temperature fluctuations: winter lows frequently drop to -20°C in highland areas like the Hindu Kush, while summer highs surpass 50°C in the southwestern . Annual averages around 300 mm, concentrated in winter snowfall at elevations above 1,800 meters and irregular spring rains, resulting in prolonged dry periods across 80% of the landmass. These patterns foster and landscapes, limiting reliable surface water to major river basins such as the and Helmand. Precipitation variability exacerbates vulnerability to , which have intensified in recent decades; the multi-year from 2021 to 2024, classified as one of the worst in 30 years, affected over 11 million people by disrupting and , with agricultural drought peaking from mid-March to annually. This scarcity drives resource competition and internal , as reduced and depleted pastures force rural populations toward urban centers. Environmental degradation compounds climatic stresses through widespread , with nearly 70% of original forest cover lost since the 1950s due to fuelwood extraction, , and conflict-fueled neglect. by livestock—estimated at levels exceeding sustainable in many provinces—and wartime land abandonment have accelerated , rendering over 80% of susceptible to degradation and reducing fertility by promoting salinization and dust storms. These processes diminish water retention, heighten flood risks during rare heavy rains, and perpetuate a cycle of scarcity that underlies from degraded rural areas. Transboundary water disputes further strain supplies, as Afghanistan's upstream position on rivers like the Helmand (shared with ) and Kunar (flowing to ) leads to allocation conflicts; Iran has accused Afghanistan of reduced flows violating 1973 treaty terms, while Pakistan faces threats from proposed dams on Afghan tributaries amid border tensions. Climate change amplifies these challenges, with IPCC assessments highlighting accelerated glacial melt in high-mountain regions, where nearly 14% of glacier area vanished between 1990 and 2015 due to rising temperatures, initially boosting seasonal runoff but risking long-term shortages and glacial lake outburst floods that exacerbate food insecurity for dependent downstream communities.

Biodiversity and resource distribution

Afghanistan's biodiversity encompasses a range of endemic and adapted to its rugged mountains and arid steppes, including ( uncia), which inhabits high-altitude northeastern ranges where surveys have identified stable populations despite ongoing threats. The ( ammon polii), a of , is similarly confined to eastern mountainous habitats above 3,000 meters, with habitat suitability assessments highlighting transboundary conservation needs across the . Avifauna is diverse, with approximately 472 to 510 bird species recorded, including and migratory waterfowl, though populations have declined due to widespread from and . Mineral resources are distributed unevenly across geological provinces, with significant copper deposits at in southeast of , estimated at 11.3 million metric tons of high-grade ore, alongside reserves exceeding 2.2 billion tonnes primarily in central and northern regions. Lithium prospects, potentially among the world's largest, occur in pegmatites in eastern provinces like Nuristan and Kunar, while fields are concentrated in the northern basin, and gemstones such as and emeralds are sourced from southern and eastern areas. These resources represent substantial untapped potential, valued in estimates up to $1 trillion, but extraction remains limited by insecurity and infrastructure deficits. Conservation efforts are undermined by pervasive , which targets species like snow leopards and for pelts and horns, exacerbating declines in already fragmented habitats. Decades of conflict have left ecosystems polluted by , heavy metals from munitions, and residues, contaminating soil and water in former battle zones and hindering ecological recovery. Such disruptions, compounded by weak enforcement under successive regimes, prevent systematic protection of hotspots and delay assessment of resource viability, perpetuating a cycle of amid political instability.

Government and Politics

Theocratic structure under Taliban

The Taliban administers Afghanistan as an , vesting supreme authority in a single leader who embodies religious and political command, drawing from Deobandi Hanafi rather than elective or constitutional mechanisms. has served as () since 2016, exercising unilateral control over military, judicial, and executive decisions without institutional checks. His edicts, issued sporadically via spokesmen, function as law, supplanting any prior constitutional framework following the August 2021 takeover. The Rahbari Shura, or Leadership Council, comprises around 26 senior clerics and commanders advising Akhundzada, but its role remains consultative and subordinate, with the leader centralizing power post-2021 by bypassing consensus on key rulings. This council nominally oversees ministries and provinces, yet Akhundzada's direct interventions—such as reshuffling officials—underscore hierarchical command over collective deliberation. Governance eschews elections entirely; provincial governors and district chiefs are appointed by Akhundzada or his deputies, ensuring ideological alignment among Taliban loyalists, with over 40 such appointments announced by November 2021 to consolidate control. Traditional tribal assemblies, or jirgas, operate at local levels for but are integrated subordinately, subject to by religious edicts rather than holding autonomous authority. This structure contrasts with the 2004 Islamic Republic's , which featured a , parliamentary elections, and decentralized appointments but eroded due to systemic graft—exemplified by , aid diversion, and that fueled recruitment and the government's 2021 collapse. The 's model prioritizes vetting for piety and oaths, yielding perceptions of reduced in initial assessments, though opacity limits empirical verification beyond anecdotal purges of prior officials.

Implementation of Sharia law

Following the Taliban's reconquest of Afghanistan in August 2021, the regime has pursued a rigorous enforcement of its interpretation of law, emphasizing punishments derived from classical Islamic for crimes such as and . In November 2022, supreme leader issued a mandating judges to apply all aspects of , explicitly including amputations for , stonings for (), and public floggings. While full-scale amputations and stonings have not been systematically documented as widespread by mid-2025, public floggings as hadd punishments have occurred, such as an 80-lash sentence in in December 2024 for false accusation of , signaling a return to penalties for moral and property offenses. These measures serve as tools for , deterring through visible deterrence, though enforcement varies by province and local commanders, reflecting the regime's decentralized authority structure. The Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, revived in September 2021, oversees moral policing through vice squads that patrol streets to enforce dress codes, grooming standards, and behavioral norms. Men face detention for insufficient beard length—defined as fist-width—or "Western" hairstyles, with over 280 security personnel dismissed in August 2024 for non-compliance, alongside arrests of barbers during Ramadan 2025. Women are compelled to fully cover faces in public under codified rules finalized in August 2024, with squads empowered to intervene against perceived violations like music listening or hookah smoking. This apparatus crushes individual autonomy in favor of ideological conformity, prioritizing regime stability over personal freedoms, as patrols extend to mosques to ensure prayer attendance. By January 2023, the had issued over 80 edicts, with more than half targeting women's public conduct and media operations, including bans on female media voices and unapproved reporting. documented intensified restrictions on journalists by 2025, including arbitrary detentions, aligning with broader Sharia-derived controls on expression deemed immoral or subversive. Sharia's prohibition on intoxicants prompted a 2022 poppy cultivation ban, yielding a 95-99% reduction in acreage by 2023-2024 per UNODC monitoring, though local involvement in residual trade persists into 2025, undermining long-term eradication. These implementations have correlated with diminished large-scale violence, fostering a coercive stability that suppresses opposition but entrenches authoritarian control without addressing underlying governance deficits.

Provincial administration and tribal influences

Afghanistan is administratively divided into 34 provinces, each headed by a governor () appointed directly by the Taliban's supreme leader in to ensure loyalty to the central theocratic . These walis oversee provincial councils and coordinate with district-level officials, but their is constrained by directives from the Islamic Emirate's leadership, emphasizing implementation over local autonomy. Provinces are further subdivided into approximately 425 districts as of 2023, following the Taliban's creation of 27 additional districts in 12 provinces to refine local control and . District administration often involves qazi (judges) who apply rulings, supplemented by vice and virtue enforcers, though enforcement varies by terrain and population density. Tribal structures exert significant influence on provincial governance, particularly in rural Pashtun-majority areas where —the unwritten Pashtun tribal code emphasizing (hospitality/asylum), (revenge), and (honor)—intersects with Taliban edicts to facilitate dispute resolution and social order. Tribal maliks (elders or leaders) traditionally mediate conflicts through jirgas (assemblies), a practice the Taliban has co-opted rather than supplanted, enabling pacts with local powerbrokers that prioritize customary norms over rigid central fiat. This decentralization stems from causal realities of Afghanistan's rugged and weak state penetration, where tribal loyalties provide informal enforcement mechanisms absent in urban settings; for instance, rural districts exhibit higher compliance with Taliban dress and movement codes due to malik-mediated consensus, contrasting with urban alienation in cities like where resistance to perceived cultural impositions fosters noncompliance. Data from Taliban-controlled areas indicate uneven sharia application: rural provinces report near-total adherence to bans on music and female public employment (over 90% in surveys of Pashtun villages), driven by tribal integration, while urban centers see sporadic defiance and underground economies evading vice patrols. This rural-tribal alignment has stabilized provincial peripheries against insurgency but perpetuates hybrid governance, where maliks retain veto power in land and water disputes, often overriding wali directives if they conflict with Pashtunwali honor codes. Such dynamics underscore the limits of Kabul's centralization efforts, as tribal influences causal to Taliban resilience during their insurgency continue to shape post-2021 administration.

Foreign policy and international isolation

As of October 2025, the regime in Afghanistan lacks formal from the or most major powers, with becoming the first country to grant recognition on July 3, 2025, primarily to advance its regional influence and counter Western isolation efforts. This isolation stems from the 's failure to meet key commitments under the 2020 , including preventing Afghanistan from serving as a base for transnational terrorist groups and establishing an inclusive , as highlighted in UN Security Council reports documenting ongoing ties to and restrictions on political participation. Despite rhetorical adherence to pledges on countering groups like ISIS-K, from UN monitoring shows limited progress in dismantling safe havens for affiliated networks, prioritizing regime survival over full compliance. Pragmatic engagement with neighboring states has driven Taliban foreign policy, focusing on economic access and security cooperation rather than ideological alignment. has pursued limited involvement through projects and mining investments, such as copper and lithium deposits, without formal recognition, viewing the regime as a stabilizing buffer against extremism but wary of reputational risks from concerns. , post-recognition, has deepened ties via diplomatic visits and trade discussions, aiming to leverage Afghanistan for influence in and as a counterweight to ISIS-K threats. Pakistan maintains operational proximity due to shared borders and historical support but faces strains from the Taliban's sheltering of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan militants; relations deteriorated further with Pakistan's mass expulsion of over 844,000 undocumented between September 2023 and February 2025, citing security threats, which prompted Taliban protests and border closures. India, traditionally cautious due to Pakistan's influence, shifted toward de facto engagement by announcing the reopening of its embassy on October 10, 2025, and exchanging diplomats, motivated by concerns over regional stability and covert aid channels previously used for humanitarian support. This outreach reflects survival imperatives, as the balances anti-Western invective—rooted in grievances over the 2021 U.S. withdrawal—with practical anti-ISIS-K operations, including arrests and clashes that have suppressed the group's domestic attacks since 2022, to attract investment and avert sanctions. Such tactics underscore causal priorities: economic desperation and border security outweigh ideological purity, though persistent presence undermines broader credibility.

Security apparatus and internal control

![Taliban security forces in Kabul](./assets/Taliban_Humvee_in_Kabul%252C_August_2021_cropped The 's security apparatus, primarily composed of its fighters and auxiliary forces, has established a monopoly on following the August 2021 takeover, with estimates placing the total number of personnel at approximately 100,000 to 150,000, including core , provincial , and operatives. These forces absorbed elements of the former (ANSF), as the Taliban issued calls for recruitment and integration of ex-soldiers into their ranks, though many former ANSF members remain in hiding due to fears of reprisals. Initially lacking an operational despite capturing equipment from the collapsed ANSF, the Taliban has relied on ground-based capabilities, with unconfirmed reports of interest in acquiring air defense systems from to defenses. Internal control is enforced through an extensive network of checkpoints on major roadways and operations modeled on the 's pre-takeover shadow structures, which have effectively quelled independent warlords and tribal militias by co-opting or neutralizing them. The proclaimed a general for former officials and ANSF personnel upon seizing power on August 15, 2021, urging surrender and reintegration, yet documentation records over 200 targeted killings of ex-troops and officials between August 2021 and mid-2023, indicating selective enforcement against perceived threats. Empirical data shows a marked decline in improvised explosive device (IED) incidents and rural ambushes post-takeover, with overall conflict-related civilian casualties dropping dramatically after the cessation of large-scale ANDSF- fighting, as reported by UNAMA. However, urban areas have seen sporadic unrest, including suppressed protests in cities like and , managed through rapid deployments of security units to maintain order without escalating to widespread . This shift reflects the Taliban's prioritization of ground-level surveillance and rapid response over sustained aerial capabilities, consolidating authority amid persistent low-level dissent.

Security and Terrorism

Persistent insurgencies and ISIS-K threats

The (ISIS-K), an affiliate of the seeking to establish a transcending national boundaries, has persisted as the principal insurgent adversary to the since the latter's August 2021 takeover of Afghanistan. Unlike the , which prioritizes local Pashtun-centric governance under a narrower interpretation of , ISIS-K denounces the as apostates for compromising with non-jihadist elements and failing to wage perpetual global war against perceived enemies including Shia Muslims, Western powers, and rival Sunni groups. This intra-jihadist rivalry manifests in targeted bombings and clashes, with ISIS-K leveraging suicide operations and small-unit tactics in eastern provinces like Nangarhar and Kunar, where it maintains core operational cells. ISIS-K's lethality was starkly evident in the August 26, 2021, suicide bombings outside Kabul's International Airport, which killed 13 U.S. service members, approximately 169 Afghan civilians, and injured hundreds more during the chaotic U.S. withdrawal. The group has sustained such mass-casualty attacks domestically, including a September 2, 2024, suicide bombing in Kabul's Daud Khan Military Hospital that killed at least six and wounded dozens, targeting personnel and medical staff. Its transnational ambitions were underscored by the March 22, 2024, assault on Moscow's Crocus City Hall, where gunmen affiliated with ISIS-K killed 145 people; U.S. intelligence and the group's own claim linked the perpetrators—primarily Tajik nationals—to ISIS-K's Afghan-based networks, highlighting the affiliate's capacity to export violence beyond despite border controls. As of 2024, ISIS-K commands an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 fighters, bolstered by foreign recruits from and local disenfranchised youth radicalized via propaganda decrying pragmatism. The has responded with aggressive counteroperations, including the April 2023 killing of the ISIS-K cell leader responsible for the 2021 airport bombing and subsequent arrests of hundreds of suspected members in 2023 raids across and eastern regions. However, ideological convergence—both groups draw from Deobandi-influenced Salafism, sharing anti-Shia and anti-Western animus—limits the Taliban's incentives for , as evidenced by occasional prisoner exchanges and incomplete territorial sweeps that allow ISIS-K to regenerate in remote areas. These confrontations inflict hundreds of casualties yearly, with UN monitoring indicating over 200 deaths from ISIS-K-linked violence in Afghanistan in 2023 alone, alongside Taliban losses in ambushes and strikes. Such attrition strains the Taliban's under-resourced , estimated at 100,000-150,000 personnel lacking advanced , compelling reliance on tribal militias and diverting focus from economic stabilization to perpetual low-level warfare that perpetuates without decisive resolution.

Al-Qaeda and transnational jihadist networks

The has maintained deep ties with since the , providing sanctuary that enabled the group's global operations, including the planning of the September 11, 2001, attacks from Afghan soil. These bonds persisted after the 's 2021 takeover, as evidenced by the presence of leader in a safe house in , where he was killed by a U.S. Hellfire missile drone strike on July 31, 2022. This event contradicted the 's commitments under the February 2020 Doha Agreement, in which they pledged to prevent and other terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to threaten the , its allies, or other countries. Shared ideological foundations in Deobandi —a strict originating from 19th-century Indian seminaries—have sustained mutual tolerance between the and , overriding public disavowals of operational alliances. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports from 2024 detail 's expansion of training facilities in at least five locations across and Takhar provinces, accommodating up to 10-15 foreign fighters each for weapons, explosives, and ideological instruction. These camps, often disguised as madrasas, facilitate recruitment and capacity-building for transnational operations, with core leadership retaining influence over affiliates despite leadership losses. Afghanistan serves as a hub for broader jihadist networks, notably providing safe haven to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has relocated thousands of fighters across the border since 2021 and conducted over 1,500 attacks in in 2023 alone. UN assessments describe the -TTP relationship as "close," with the Afghan regime supplying logistics, funding, and protection in exchange for ideological alignment and occasional military support against rivals like ISIS-K. This dynamic exemplifies the causal risks of hosting ideologically congruent groups, mirroring the precedent where sheltering of enabled external plotting that directly threatened distant targets. While direct post-2021 plots exported to remain limited in public reporting, the reconstituted safe havens heighten vulnerabilities for renewed transnational attacks, as noted in analyses of 's resilient global command structure.

Counterterrorism efforts and safe havens

The has undertaken operations against the (ISKP), its primary domestic rival, including raids and arrests of operatives. U.S. government reports indicate that the publicly announced detentions and killings of ISKP members responsible for attacks, with at least 36 raids documented between late 2021 and mid-2023. In 2023, forces arrested several high-profile ISKP figures, contributing to a temporary reduction in some attack frequencies, though independent assessments highlight limitations in intelligence-sharing and defensive measures that allow ISKP to regroup. Despite these efforts, ISKP claimed responsibility for a September 3, , suicide bombing in targeting Taliban prosecution offices, killing at least one and injuring dozens, demonstrating the group's ongoing operational capacity. Afghanistan under Taliban rule has served as a safe haven for al-Qaeda, despite the group's 2020 Doha Agreement pledge to prevent terrorist use of Afghan territory against the U.S. or allies. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's residency in a Taliban-controlled in —confirmed by his killing in a U.S. strike on July 31, 2022—provided direct evidence of such harboring, with no Taliban accountability for facilitating his presence. U.S. intelligence evaluations through 2024 describe al-Qaeda as maintaining a low-profile in , with camps and reconstitution, though the network has not orchestrated major external attacks from there in recent years. The Taliban's tolerance of al-Qaeda contrasts with its anti-ISKP actions, reflecting ideological alignment rather than comprehensive enforcement. Counterterrorism analysts critique the Taliban's approach as selectively enforced, prioritizing elimination of ideological competitors like ISKP while shielding historical allies such as and affiliated networks. This selective posture, evident in the absence of disruptions to al-Qaeda's Afghan operations post-Zawahiri, undermines broader threat mitigation and sustains transnational risks, per assessments from institutions tracking jihadist dynamics. U.S. over-the-horizon capabilities, including the 2022 strike, have compensated for Taliban inaction but rely on persistent intelligence access amid reduced on-ground presence. Regional engagements, such as limited anti-terrorism discussions with neighbors, have yielded minimal verifiable cooperation against cross-border groups.

Economy

Macroeconomic overview and contraction

Afghanistan's economy, prior to the Taliban's takeover in August , had a (GDP) of approximately $20 billion in 2020, heavily reliant on foreign aid that constituted about 40 percent of GDP and funded over half of public expenditures. Following the , the economy experienced a severe , with GDP shrinking by around 20 percent in alone due to the abrupt halt in international aid inflows, freezing of $9.4 billion in central bank reserves by the and allies, and that restricted access to global financial systems. This downturn compounded existing vulnerabilities, including the prior collapse of the banking sector marked by liquidity shortages and public distrust, leading to widespread reliance on informal networks for transactions amid frozen formal banking operations. The cumulative reached approximately 27 percent across and , driven primarily by the cessation of donor funding—previously averaging around $4 billion annually—which forced a shift toward domestic but triggered a that stifled and . surged above 10 percent in subsequent years, exacerbated by supply disruptions, currency depreciation of the afghani, and import dependencies, though informal cross-border trade via mitigated some formal banking paralysis. By 2024, with a estimated at over 43 million, GDP showed modest recovery with 2.5 percent growth, reflecting stabilization through efforts to boost customs revenues and reduce expenditures, yet output remained depressed far below pre-2021 levels due to ongoing and aid reductions to about $1 billion annually in non-humanitarian forms. This partial rebound underscores causal links to policy-induced rather than inherent structural reforms, as the economy's persists without reintegration into global .

Agricultural sector and opium economy

Agriculture remains the backbone of Afghanistan's economy, employing about 45% of the total workforce in 2023. The sector is predominantly subsistence-oriented, with as the dominant crop, cultivated on both irrigated and rainfed lands to meet needs; annual wheat production fluctuates between 4-5 million tons depending on and inputs. Other key crops include , , for grains, and fruits such as grapes, pomegranates, apricots, and melons, which support limited exports and local markets but suffer from poor and post-harvest losses exceeding 30%. Recurrent droughts, particularly severe in 2021-2023, have reduced yields by up to 20-40% in rainfed areas, compounding reliance on fragile systems covering only 40% of . Opium poppy has long overshadowed legitimate , with historically accounting for over 80% of global illicit supply, much of which is processed into . In 2022, production peaked at 6,200 metric tons, generating an estimated $1.4 billion in farm-gate income for cultivators amid post-conflict economic collapse. The authorities enacted a nationwide in April 2022—exempting that year's harvest but enforcing eradication thereafter—resulting in a 95% drop in area to 10,800 hectares and output to 333 tons in 2023, a level unseen since the early 2000s. This echoes the 2000-2001 under prior rule, which slashed production from 4,600 tons to 185 tons through coercive measures, demonstrating that strict enforcement can rapidly suppress output despite stockpiles buffering global markets short-term. Such bans debunk persistent myths that eradication inevitably fails without farmer consent or alternatives; data show compliance under threat of penalties, with southern provinces—traditional hubs—seeing over 99% eradication in surveyed areas by . However, opium's appeal stems causally from acute (affecting 80% of farmers), food , and state weakness that undermines , , and for or fruits, rendering poppy's high returns (up to 10 times alternatives) a rational hedge against and . Weak exacerbates this, as warlord-era taxes and historically shielded , while post-ban shifts to expanded arable use by 194,000 hectares in but yielded insufficient replacement without seeds, fertilizers, or roads. Production edged up 30% to 433 tons in , signaling potential rebound risks absent sustained enforcement and , though levels remain 93% below 2022 peaks.

Mining, energy, and untapped resources

Afghanistan holds substantial untapped mineral deposits, including , , rare earth elements such as and , and other commodities like and , with USGS and other estimates placing the potential economic value between $1 trillion and $3 trillion depending on feasibility and global prices. These reserves, concentrated in remote and insecure provinces, remain largely unexploited due to persistent conflict, inadequate , and high costs that exceed current incentives for many investors. The Mes Aynak copper deposit in Logar Province, containing an estimated 11 million metric tons of copper ore valued at up to $102 billion, exemplifies these challenges; awarded to China's Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) in a $3 billion deal in November 2008, development stalled amid Taliban attacks, archaeological preservation of ancient Buddhist sites, and disputes over power supply and royalties. Groundbreaking occurred in July 2024 under Taliban oversight, with limited site preparation advancing by mid-2025, but full operations remain uncertain given ongoing security risks and MCC's historical hesitancy. In August 2023, the Taliban administration signed mining contracts totaling over $6.5 billion with firms from , , and local entities for various deposits, including rare earths and , as part of efforts to attract non-Western amid U.S. and allied sanctions that deter broader participation. These deals, however, have yielded minimal production due to allegations, weak , and Taliban demands for upfront payments that strain partners like Chinese state-owned enterprises already facing reputational risks from association with the regime. The energy sector suffers from acute shortages, with domestic hydroelectric capacity—concentrated in rivers like the Helmand and —generating only about 300 megawatts reliably, far below demand, exacerbated by , poor maintenance, and underinvestment leading to widespread blackouts averaging 12-20 hours daily in as of 2025. Coal reserves, estimated at over 400 million tons in northern basins, remain underdeveloped due to transportation bottlenecks and security threats, forcing reliance on costly imports from and that were partially suspended in 2023 over unpaid debts. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline, designed to deliver 33 billion cubic meters annually through 1,800 kilometers including 800 in Afghanistan, has encountered repeated delays since inception in the 1990s, primarily from insurgent sabotage risks and funding shortfalls, with only 14 kilometers laid in Herat Province by April 2025 despite renewed Turkmen commitments. Taliban initiatives to secure Chinese involvement in energy exploration, including oil blocks in the Amu Darya basin, faltered by mid-2025 when a $540 million contract with Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas was terminated over alleged breaches, underscoring barriers from regime opacity and international isolation.

Infrastructure, trade, and aid reliance

Afghanistan's road network spans approximately 35,000 kilometers, with only about half paved as of recent assessments, though much of it suffers from poor maintenance, damage, and seasonal disruptions due to the rugged terrain and lack of investment since 2021. Rail infrastructure is minimal, totaling under 30 kilometers of operational track, primarily the Khaf-Herat line connecting to , which handled 60,000 tons of cargo in the year ending April 2025; ambitious projects like the proposed Trans-Afghan Railway remain in planning stages without significant progress. has emerged as the dominant air transport hub post-2021, handling most international flights under oversight, though operations are constrained by sanctions, limited airlines, and occasional security threats. Trade volumes reflect acute imbalances, with exports valued at roughly $1.7 billion in —dominated by fruits and nuts (around $590 million), carpets, and wool—far outpaced by imports exceeding $10.8 billion, yielding a of over $9 billion and underscoring on foreign like , machinery, and . Primary routes traverse Pakistan's border crossings, such as and , which facilitate the bulk of overland but face frequent closures from disputes and smuggling crackdowns; access to via the exists but is underdeveloped, with minimal direct volume due to logistical barriers. Humanitarian aid constitutes a critical lifeline, with 23.7 million people—over half the —requiring support in amid food insecurity and , backed by a $3.06 billion UN-coordinated that has received only partial funding. However, delivery is hampered by interference, including documented cases of , taxation, and redirection of resources to regime affiliates and favored ethnic groups, as detailed in U.S. oversight reports; implementing partners have reported payments totaling at least $10.9 million under duress to avoid disruptions. This diversion dynamic, enabled by the regime's control over local distribution, undermines aid efficacy and perpetuates reliance without fostering self-sufficiency.

Demographics

Population size and growth trends

Afghanistan's population is estimated at 43.8 million as of 2025 by the , reflecting projections that account for high birth rates offset by mortality and net out-migration. However, the Afghan government's National Statistics and Information Authority reported a lower figure of 36.4 million for the same year, attributing the difference to unverified returns, internal displacements, and challenges in collection amid ongoing instability. No comprehensive national has been conducted since 1979 due to protracted conflicts, leading to reliance on extrapolations from partial surveys and international models, which often diverge based on assumptions about undocumented movements. The rate stood at approximately 2.8% annually in , driven primarily by a of 4.84 children per woman recorded in 2023, one of the highest globally. This sustains a pronounced youth bulge, with about 63% of the under 25 years old as of , creating demographic pressures for and services while amplifying vulnerability to economic shocks. Historical warfare, including the Soviet invasion, , and the 2001-2021 international intervention, has intermittently elevated mortality and , temporarily curbing growth, though fertility has remained elevated due to cultural norms favoring large families and limited access to contraception. The 2021 Taliban resurgence triggered acute outflows, with at least 1.6 million Afghans fleeing to neighboring countries by mid-2022, contributing to a net in some estimates before partial returns and forced repatriations reversed the trend by 2024-2025. remains low at around 27% of the total in 2023, with rural areas predominant due to agrarian lifestyles and conflict-induced avoidance of cities. , the capital, hosts an estimated 6.1 million residents in its province as of 2025 per official data, exacerbating resource strains on , , and amid rapid, unmanaged influxes from rural provinces and returnees.

Ethnic groups and linguistic diversity

Afghanistan's population is ethnically diverse, with constituting the largest group at approximately 42% according to multiple estimates derived from surveys and historical data, though figures range from 40% to 50% due to the absence of a comprehensive since 1979. follow at around 27%, at 9%, and at 9%, with smaller groups including (3%), Baloch (2%), and Aimak (4%), alongside others such as Nuristani, Pashai, and Gujar making up the remainder. These proportions reflect concentrations: predominantly in the south and east, in urban centers and the northeast, in central highlands, and in the north. The lack of a recent national —disrupted by decades of conflict and political instability—relies on extrapolations from partial surveys, household data, and ethnographic studies, leading to debates over accuracy; for instance, some analyses suggest Tajik and Hazara shares may be understated due to Pashtun self-identification in southern regions. Pashtun dominance has historically fueled ethnic tensions, as their numerical and control of key political and structures often marginalize other groups, contributing to cycles of and .
Ethnic GroupEstimated PercentagePrimary Regions
Pashtun42%South, East
Tajik27%North, Urban
Hazara9%Central Highlands
Uzbek9%North
Others13%Varied
Linguistically, Afghanistan recognizes and (Afghan Persian) as official languages under the 2004 constitution, with serving as the spoken by about 77% of the population and by 48%, often with bilingual overlap in mixed areas. This duality underscores ethnic divides, as aligns with Pashtun identity while predominates among , , and . Beyond these, the country hosts significant diversity with over 30 languages, including (spoken by northern Turkic groups), , Balochi, and Nuristani dialects, reflecting Turkic, Iranian, and isolate linguistic families. Within the Pashtun population, tribal confederacies like the and Ghilzai exert profound political influence, with historical rivalries shaping governance: tribes, associated with state-building elites since 's 1747 empire foundation, have often held ruling positions, while Ghilzai groups, more rural and resistant to central authority, provide insurgent manpower and have dominated movements like the . This intra-Pashtun dynamic amplifies broader ethnic tensions, as Ghilzai expansionism in the 18th-19th centuries involved southward migrations assimilating or displacing local populations, embedding tribal loyalties that persist in modern power struggles.

Urban-rural divides and migration patterns

Approximately 73% of Afghanistan's population resides in rural areas, where predominates and rates exceed 70%, compared to centers offering limited access to services amid . Rural households rely heavily on rain-fed farming and , vulnerable to droughts and , while areas like concentrate administrative functions and aid-dependent economies, widening disparities in and education. From 2001 to 2021, rural-to-urban accelerated, with Kabul's population swelling due to rural insecurity and economic opportunities tied to international , raising the urban share from under 20% to about 25%. This influx strained urban resources but fostered a nascent ; however, the Taliban's 2021 takeover reversed trends through and renewed violence, prompting reverse and internal as rural areas absorbed returnees amid cuts. Urban population slowed to around 3% annually post-2021, reflecting reduced pull factors like and security. Internal displacement has intensified divides, with an estimated 3.2 million IDPs as of 2024, many fleeing or from rural provinces to urban peripheries, though restrictions limit sustained urban settlement. Cumulative new displacements reached 748,000 in 2021 alone, driven by the offensive, contributing to 4.2 million conflict-related IDPs by late 2024 and straining rural subsistence systems upon partial returns. These movements, often seasonal or conflict-induced, exacerbate food insecurity in host rural communities, where 75% of IDPs originate. Cross-border returns from and , accelerated by deportations since 2023, have flooded rural areas with over 4 million by mid-2025, including 1.5 million from in 2025 alone, overwhelming limited and . These forced repatriations, totaling 2.6 million from both neighbors by September 2025, primarily target undocumented migrants and reverse prior labor outflows, but returnees face and skill mismatches in agrarian economies. Rural reintegration fails due to governance failures, perpetuating cycles of and secondary . A pronounced brain drain since August 2021 has depleted urban skilled labor, with hundreds of thousands of educated youth and professionals—doctors, engineers, academics—emigrating to , , and neighbors, driven by Taliban bans on and professional restrictions. This exodus, part of a 3.6 million wave, creates causal skill shortages in urban sectors like healthcare and , hindering recovery and amplifying rural-urban knowledge gaps. Estimates suggest over 1 million skilled workers fled by 2023, with ongoing outflows eroding institutional capacity and long-term development prospects.

Religious composition and sectarian dynamics

Afghanistan's is overwhelmingly Muslim, with more than 99 percent identifying as such according to multiple estimates. The vast majority adhere to of the , comprising 84.7 to 89.7 percent of the total, while Shia Muslims, predominantly Twelver Shiites concentrated among the Hazara ethnic minority, constitute 10 to 15 percent. Non-Muslim adherents, including small numbers of , , , and others, represent less than 0.3 percent, and proselytization by non-Islamic faiths is effectively prohibited under Taliban rule, reflecting orthodox prohibitions on and conversion from . The regime enforces a rigid Sunni Hanafi derived from Deobandi traditions, which originated in 19th-century seminaries emphasizing scriptural literalism and to non-Islamic influences; this permeates madrassas, many funded and staffed by Pakistani Deobandi networks that trained cadres. Elements of have also filtered through Saudi-financed , amplifying puritanical tendencies, though Deobandi Hanafism remains dominant. Sufi orders, historically influential in spirituality through shrine veneration and mystical practices, have declined sharply under governance, which deems such rituals as innovations () deviating from core ; recent decrees, including a ban on Sufi-themed media broadcasts, further marginalize these traditions. Sectarian tensions primarily manifest between the Sunni Taliban and Shia communities, exacerbated by attacks from the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a Salafi-jihadist group that views Shiism as heretical and has targeted Hazara gatherings, mosques, and schools. ISKP bombings and shootings have killed hundreds of Hazaras since the Taliban's 2021 takeover, including a September 2024 assault in Daikundi province claiming 14 lives. The Taliban, prioritizing Sunni doctrinal unity, has suppressed ISKP operations through military campaigns while extending limited protections to Shia areas, though underlying frictions persist due to historical Pashtun-Sunni dominance and Hazara marginalization. This orthodoxy shapes governance, with religious edicts from clerical councils enforcing uniform Sunni practices and curtailing sectarian deviations to maintain regime stability.

Society and Human Rights

Gender policies and women's subjugation

Since August 2021, the Taliban have issued decrees systematically restricting women's public participation, including bans on secondary education for girls beyond grade 6, implemented on September 17, 2021, affecting over 1 million girls, and an indefinite prohibition on female university attendance starting December 20, 2022. These measures reversed prior advancements, where female enrollment in secondary and higher education had risen significantly under the previous government, with girls comprising nearly 40% of primary school students by 2020. Employment restrictions escalated in 2023, barring women from most jobs, NGOs, and sectors like banking and , leaving only limited roles in and under strict conditions. Travel rules mandate a male () for women journeying over 72 kilometers, enforced since December 2021, severely limiting access to services and exacerbating isolation. Of 80 Taliban edicts documented through January 2023, 54 explicitly targeted women and girls, covering dress, speech, and mobility. These policies have contributed to a healthcare , with women's restricted mobility and workforce participation reducing access to maternal services; Afghanistan's maternal , already among the world's highest at 620 per 100,000 live births pre-2021, has worsened due to closures and shortages, with reports of a dying every two hours in as of 2025. experts and have characterized the regime as "gender apartheid," a systematic denying women basic , urging its as a crime against humanity. The defend these edicts as enforcement of (Islamic law), claiming they safeguard women's piety and honor by confining them to domestic roles, rejecting Western critiques as cultural imposition. Empirical outcomes, however, include economic losses estimated at least $500 million annually from denied alone, underscoring causal links between restrictions and deepened humanitarian needs.

Treatment of minorities and dissent

The Shia Hazara ethnic minority, comprising approximately 10-15% of Afghanistan's population, has faced systematic targeting through bombings and shootings since the Taliban's 2021 takeover, with the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claiming responsibility for numerous assaults on Hazara mosques, schools, and neighborhoods. In September 2024, ISKP militants killed 14 Hazara men in Daikundi province, highlighting persistent vulnerabilities despite Taliban security claims. Taliban authorities have restricted Hazara access to government services, infrastructure, and aid, channeling resources preferentially to Pashtun-dominated areas and diverting humanitarian assistance for their own use, exacerbating ethnic disparities. Dissent against Taliban rule is suppressed through extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions, contradicting the group's August 2021 amnesty pledge for former government officials and security personnel. United Nations documentation records at least 346 such assassinations between August 2021 and mid-2025, including targeted executions of ex-soldiers and civil servants who surrendered or complied with surrender orders. By August 2023, over 200 former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces members had been killed, often in revenge operations by Taliban intelligence units. While Taliban spokespersons assert enforcement of the amnesty to promote national unity, independent reports from multiple monitoring bodies indicate widespread non-compliance, with detainees subjected to torture and enforced disappearances for perceived opposition. Journalists and media workers expressing critical views face routine arrests, with the reporting over 250 detentions since 2021, including at least seven in July 2025 alone for alleged propaganda. Afghanistan's press freedom ranking has plummeted to among the world's lowest under rule, with documenting the closure of at least 12 outlets in 2024 and escalating that prohibits investigative reporting on failures. officials dismiss such figures as exaggerated, claiming arrests target criminal acts rather than expression, yet from detained reporters describes systematic to enforce a singular pro-regime .

Health crises and humanitarian needs

Afghanistan's health indicators reflect persistent crises exacerbated by decades of conflict, following the 2021 Taliban takeover, and restrictive policies limiting access to care. at birth stood at approximately 66 years in recent estimates, with healthy life expectancy lagging at around 50 years due to high burdens of preventable diseases and . remains elevated at about 42-50 deaths per 1,000 live births, driven by inadequate maternal care, poor , and undernutrition, though projections suggest a gradual decline absent major disruptions. These metrics lag far behind regional averages, with causal factors including disrupted supply chains from wartime destruction and Taliban edicts confining women—who comprise most community health workers—from training or employment in medical roles. Food insecurity affects roughly 12.4 million people acutely as of 2024, with over 2 million facing emergency levels of , compounded by , reduced agricultural output, and frozen international banking assets post-2021. rates are dire, particularly among children, where stunting impacts nearly half under five, linking directly to impaired and higher disease susceptibility—outcomes rooted in caloric deficits rather than mere , as inflows have not translated to equitable distribution amid oversight. Humanitarian needs encompass 22.9-23.7 million individuals in 2024-2025, representing over half the , for basic survival support like , , and , with aid dependency critiqued for effectively subsidizing the regime by offsetting governance failures and enabling resource diversion to fighters. Taliban policies have intensified health gaps, particularly for women and girls barred from clinics without male guardians and facing edicts against female , leading to shortages of providers for female patients and higher maternal mortality from unassisted births. Polio eradication efforts have stalled, with the Taliban suspending house-to-house vaccinations in 2024 amid suspicions of foreign agendas, risking resurgence in a with historical endemic and cross-border to . Gaps in and management persist, with only 52% of facilities offering services due to funding shortfalls and Taliban interference, as U.S. cuts in 2025 threaten treatment continuity for multidrug-resistant strains prevalent in conflict zones. Overall, these crises stem from policy-induced isolation of half the from systems, rather than resource paucity alone, as evidenced by volumes exceeding pre-2021 levels yet yielding suboptimal outcomes.

Education restrictions and literacy rates

Afghanistan's adult rate stood at 37% in 2021, with stark gender disparities: 22.6% for women and 52.1% for men as of 2022 estimates. These figures reflect limited progress from prior decades, hampered by conflict and rural isolation, but post-2021 policies have exacerbated declines by curtailing access and shifting curricula toward religious instruction, with no comprehensive national surveys available to quantify the full extent due to restricted data collection. Since seizing power in August 2021, the Taliban imposed a ban on for girls in September 2021, affecting an estimated 1.4 to 2.2 million girls who remain excluded as of 2025, representing over 80% of school-age girls beyond in many areas. In December 2022, the Taliban extended restrictions to , indefinitely barring women from universities, citing the need for an "Islamic environment" while allowing male attendance. for girls persists unevenly, often under segregated conditions, but the cumulative effect has idled millions of learners, with critics arguing it fosters a "" by severing pathways to skills and economic participation, while Taliban officials frame the measures as protective moral education aligned with interpretations to prevent cultural corruption. Boys' education has been prioritized, with access maintained through state schools and a surge in madrasas—religious seminaries whose numbers quadrupled under Taliban rule by 2024—but quality has deteriorated amid teacher shortages, , and curriculum reforms emphasizing studies over secular subjects like , , and . The has converted dozens of secular institutions into madrasas, integrating jihadist elements and ideological training, which proponents view as essential for instilling discipline and faith, though analysts warn it risks entrenching and undermining broader by deprioritizing foundational reading and skills. Overall, an estimated 3.7 million children—60% girls—remain out of school, signaling systemic collapse that causally erodes and perpetuates cycles, with female exclusion disproportionately stifling long-term societal gains.

Culture

Architectural heritage and Islamic influences

Afghanistan's architectural heritage reflects patronage by successive Muslim dynasties, particularly from the Ghurid era onward, blending Persianate styles with local adaptations in brickwork, domes, and minarets. The Minaret of Jam, constructed in 1194 CE by Ghurid Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad, stands as a pinnacle of early Islamic engineering in the region, reaching 65 meters in height with intricate turquoise tile inscriptions in Kufic script quoting the Quran. This structure, located in remote Ghor Province, exemplifies Ghurid patronage of monumental Islamic architecture to assert religious and imperial authority, featuring geometric patterns and calligraphy that influenced subsequent Central Asian designs. Later periods saw Timurid and influences shape mosques and complexes, especially in urban centers like and . In , the , commissioned in the early 15th century by Queen under Timurid ruler , incorporated large iwans, bulbous domes, and extensive tilework drawing from Persian and Seljuk traditions, serving as madrasas and prayer halls. 's mosques, such as those echoing aesthetics under rulers in the 18th century, adopted gardens and red sandstone facades, as seen in remnants tied to Babur's era, reflecting cross-regional patronage by Sunni elites to propagate Islamic orthodoxy. Islamic and conflict have severely impacted this heritage, with the regime's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001—two 6th-century CE statues (55m and 38m tall) carved into cliffs—exemplifying doctrinal opposition to figurative pre-Islamic art under Mullah Omar's edict against . Decades of warfare, from Soviet invasion to civil conflicts and post-2001 instability, devastated numerous sites through shelling, looting, and neglect, with archaeological reports documenting irreparable losses at locations like Ai Khanum and widespread structural collapses. Since the Taliban's 2021 return to power, official rhetoric has shifted toward preservation, including reopening the National Museum in December 2021 and pledges to protect sites like , yet satellite imagery reveals ongoing bulldozing for at ancient settlements, underscoring tensions between stated policy and enforcement amid resource scarcity. This duality highlights how patterns under Islamist rule prioritize Islamic monuments while pre-Islamic relics face variable threats from both and practical disregard.

Literature, arts, and oral traditions

Afghanistan's literary tradition draws heavily from the Persianate cultural sphere, with roots tracing to medieval Sufi mysticism and classical poetry composed in . Jalal al-Din , the 13th-century poet and mystic revered for works like the , was born in 1207 in , then a center of Persian scholarship on the eastern edge of the Persian Empire. His birthplace underscores Afghanistan's historical role in fostering Persian literary giants, though later migrated westward amid Mongol invasions. This legacy persisted through centuries of dynastic patronage, blending Islamic themes with local motifs in epic narratives and ghazals. In the , poets like Khalilullah Khalili exemplified continuity with classical forms while addressing modern upheavals. Born in 1907 or 1908 in , Khalili produced quatrains and historical verse in , earning acclaim as Afghanistan's preeminent poet of his era before his death in exile in 1987. His works, influenced by Sufi traditions, critiqued foreign interventions, reflecting a resilient literary voice amid political turmoil. Pashto literature complemented this, with tribal poets preserving genealogies and valor through ghazals and epics recited in oral form. Oral traditions remain vital, particularly among Pashtun communities, where landay—anonymous 22-syllable couplets—capture raw emotions of love, loss, and resistance, often composed and sung by women despite social constraints. These folk poems, rooted in pre-Islamic tribal codes, transmit history and social commentary without formal authorship, evading literacy barriers in rural areas. Tribal epics, such as those echoing Shahnameh motifs of heroic lineages, further sustain collective memory through dastan storytelling by elders, blending myth with verifiable clan events to reinforce identity amid fragmented governance. Visual arts in Afghanistan historically emphasized non-figural forms like and geometric patterns, influenced by Islamic prohibitions on , though Persianate miniatures occasionally depicted courtly scenes pre-modern eras. Post-2001 liberalization spurred a brief resurgence in contemporary and , fostering galleries in that explored war's scars. Since the Taliban's 2021 return, however, such expressions face severe curbs: human figuration is banned as un-Islamic, compelling artists to self-censor or destroy works, with many fleeing . Literary freedoms expanded pre-2021, enabling publications on diverse themes, but rule has reversed this through systematic . In 2024, authorities confiscated over 50,000 books in alone deemed ideologically deviant, alongside campaigns in provinces like Jawzjan to seize "un-Islamic" texts imported or stored privately. By 2025, university curricula banned 140 titles by female authors among 679 reviewed texts, prioritizing male-authored works aligned with strict interpretations. These measures, enforced by morality committees, echo 1990s destructions but extend to oral repertoires, as reciters risk reprisal for "heretical" content, eroding the Persianate heritage's pluralistic strands.

Music, media, and censorship

Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, they imposed strict prohibitions on , viewing it as contrary to Islamic principles and a source of moral corruption that could mislead youth and undermine societal order. Enforcement by the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice included public burnings of instruments, such as guitars, harmoniums, drums, amplifiers, and speakers in on July 30, 2023. By August 2024, Taliban officials reported destroying over 21,000 musical instruments nationwide as part of "reforms" to eliminate immoral content, with similar incidents continuing into , including the incineration of nearly 100 items in in May. These actions extend a prior 1996-2001 ban, forcing both professional musicians and amateurs to cease activities under threat of severe punishment, including death. Radio and television broadcasting has become predominantly state-controlled, limited to religious programming, Taliban-approved news, and content aligned with their interpretation of . The Taliban now operate approximately 15 major television and radio stations, alongside newspapers and digital platforms, using them to propagate their narrative while suppressing dissent. An 11-point media guidance issued post-2021 explicitly bans coverage deemed contrary to or Afghan traditions, resulting in to avoid closure or reprisals. The media landscape contracted sharply, with 43% of outlets ceasing operations within three months of the takeover, and at least 50% shuttered by due to economic pressures, directives, and direct shutdowns. Around 470 outlets remained active as of 2025, but only under compliance with draconian rules, including "reforms" claiming to purify 90% of broadcast and print content. Thousands of journalists lost jobs, with over 80% of women in the field forced out or into hiding, and hundreds fleeing the country amid arbitrary detentions, , and threats. Critics argue this constitutes cultural , eroding Afghanistan's diverse artistic at the of civilizations, while spokesmen frame it as essential for preserving moral purity and preventing Western-influenced decadence.

Cuisine, festivals, and social customs

Afghan cuisine centers on hearty, rice-based dishes influenced by Central Asian and Persian traditions, with staples including Kabuli palaw, a of steamed rice layered with tender or , caramelized carrots, raisins, and pistachios, often flavored with and . Kebabs, such as —a spiced patty of minced beef or mixed with onions, tomatoes, and coriander, grilled flat—form another cornerstone, typically served with bread, , and salads. Other common fare includes mantu (steamed dumplings filled with spiced meat and topped with and lentils) and flatbreads like bolani stuffed with potatoes or greens, alongside dairy products such as qurut (dried balls) and endless pots of , reflecting resource scarcity and in a landlocked, arid environment. Festivals in Afghanistan primarily revolve around Islamic observances like and , marked by prayers, family gatherings, and feasting on and sweets, but traditional pre-Islamic events face suppression under rule. , the Persian New Year celebrated on the around March 21, involves picnics, kite-flying, and haft-mew tables symbolizing renewal, drawing from Zoroastrian roots and observed by , , and despite its non-Islamic origins. Since the 's 2021 takeover, public Nowruz festivities have been curtailed, with authorities banning flag-hoisting ceremonies—such as Kabul's traditional raising of a multi-colored —and deeming the holiday "forbidden" for promoting pagan fire rituals, leading to private, muted observances amid fears of enforcement. In March 2025, forces blocked annual rituals in the capital, continuing a pattern of restricting cultural expressions viewed as conflicting with strict interpretations. Social customs emphasize tribal codes like , particularly melmastia (hospitality), which mandates lavish treatment of guests—regardless of enmity—through offerings of tea, meals, and protection, often at great personal cost, as a core marker of honor in Pashtun-dominated society. Gender segregation remains rigidly enforced, with unrelated men and women prohibited from mingling in public or homes, a norm amplified under edicts since August 2021 that confine women to separate spaces, limit their visibility, and require male guardians for outings, rooted in interpretations of Islamic modesty but resulting in near-total . Meals and gatherings typically divide by sex, with women preparing food in secluded areas, underscoring patriarchal structures where male authority prevails in interpersonal dynamics.

Sports and national identity

Buzkashi, Afghanistan's , entails teams of horsemen vying to seize and transport a decapitated or carcass across a field to a designated marker, demanding exceptional prowess, strength, and endurance. Originating centuries ago among nomadic tribes in the northern steppes, it symbolizes raw masculinity and tribal valor, with matches often drawing thousands and featuring prizes worth thousands of dollars in modern iterations. Despite its violent nature and regional variations—such as the more regulated kokpar in the north versus freer forms elsewhere— persists as a cultural ritual reinforcing communal bonds during winter gatherings. Cricket has emerged as a modern unifier, with the national team achieving breakthroughs like advancing to the Super 12 stage of the 2021 , where victories over and , alongside a competitive showing against , ignited widespread euphoria amid economic hardship and isolation. The sport's appeal spans ethnic groups, countering fragmentation by channeling youth energy into shared triumphs, though its roots trace partly to Pashtun refugee communities in . Post-2021 Taliban rule has curtailed international access yet sustained domestic leagues, fostering tentative national cohesion. In , athlete earned Afghanistan's inaugural Olympic medals—bronze in the men's 58 kg category at Beijing 2008 and another in the 68 kg event at London 2012—highlighting individual resilience amid conflict. These feats, supported by training in exile, briefly elevated sports as emblems of perseverance before restrictions intensified. Since the Taliban's August 2021 resurgence, decrees have barred women and girls from all athletic activities, citing incompatibility with Islamic norms, effectively erasing female participation and prior gains in sports like and . Collectively, evokes codes of honor and horsemanship pride among dominant ethnic groups, while cricket's team successes transcend tribal lines to instill rare collective optimism, though pervasive instability limits broader integrative potential.

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