Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas

Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, also known as Operation , was a pivotal Iranian counteroffensive in the aimed at recapturing the southwestern city of , which Iraqi forces had seized early in their 1980 . Launched on 30 April 1982 by combined units of the Iranian regular , , and volunteer militias, the operation employed , amphibious assaults across the Karun River, and massed advances to envelop and overwhelm Iraqi defenders entrenched in the urban terrain. The offensive culminated in the liberation of on 24 May 1982 after intense house-to-house fighting, expelling the Iraqi 3rd and securing approximately 19,000 Iraqi prisoners of war while destroying or capturing hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces. This victory reversed much of Iraq's initial territorial gains in , boosted Iranian morale amid the post-revolutionary military purges, and compelled Saddam Hussein's regime to withdraw from most occupied Iranian soil, though at the cost of thousands of Iranian dead from relentless human-wave assaults against fortified positions. Strategically, it demonstrated the efficacy of Iran's mobilized irregular forces in overcoming a mechanized adversary through numerical superiority and ideological fervor, shifting the 's momentum toward prolonged Iranian incursions into while exposing the limitations of Iraq's conscript in defensive .

Background

Context within the Iran-Iraq War

The erupted on September 22, 1980, when Iraqi forces under launched a full-scale of , targeting the resource-rich amid border disputes and fears of Iranian revolutionary influence spreading to Iraq's Shia population. Iraqi troops advanced rapidly, besieging and capturing the key port city of on October 24, 1980, after 34 days of intense urban fighting that inflicted heavy casualties on both sides. Iraq's initial successes, bolstered by superior equipment and Iran's post-revolutionary military disarray—including purges of senior officers—allowed occupation of approximately 15,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory, but advances stalled at natural barriers like the River and the siege of Abadan. By late 1980 and into 1981, the conflict devolved into a grinding along fortified front lines, with Iraq shifting to defensive postures to consolidate gains while expending resources on static warfare against Iranian guerrilla actions and preliminary counterattacks. Iran's regular army, weakened by internal upheaval, increasingly integrated irregular forces such as the (IRGC) and volunteer militias, enabling human-wave tactics that offset Iraq's technological edges in armor and air power. Iraqi strained under extended supply lines and attrition, prompting Saddam to declare a in June 1981, which Iran rejected, viewing the war as a defensive against aggression. This phase of Iranian military reconstitution culminated in early 1982 with coordinated offensives that pierced Iraqi defenses; notably, Operation Fath ol-Mobin (Undeniable Victory) on March 22, 1982, involving over 100,000 Iranian troops, recaptured territories around Dezful and Shush, inflicting 20,000 Iraqi casualties and capturing thousands of prisoners. These successes exposed vulnerabilities in Iraq's overstretched positions in Khuzestan, where Khorramshahr remained a symbolic Iraqi stronghold, controlling access to the Persian Gulf and serving as a logistical hub. Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas emerged as the logical extension of this momentum, focusing on encircling and expelling Iraqi forces from Khorramshahr to restore Iranian sovereignty over occupied southwestern territories and potentially force Iraq to the negotiating table. The operation's context underscored Iraq's strategic miscalculation in expecting a swift victory, contrasted with Iran's resilient mobilization of ideological fervor and manpower to reverse territorial losses.

Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of Khuzestan

Iraq initiated its invasion of Iran's Khuzestan province on September 22, 1980, as the primary thrust of the broader assault that started the Iran-Iraq War, directing four of its six invading ground divisions toward the oil-rich region to sever Iranian access to the Shatt al-Arab waterway and secure strategic Gulf coastline expansion. Saddam Hussein's regime justified the offensive by claiming Khuzestan—referred to by Iraq as Arabistan—as historically Arab territory inhabited by an oppressed ethnic Arab minority, abrogating the 1975 Algiers Agreement that had delimited the border and portraying the incursion as a liberation from Persian dominance amid Iran's post-revolutionary chaos. However, underlying motives included seizing Khuzestan's vast petroleum reserves to bolster Iraq's economy and geopolitical leverage, exploiting Iran's military disarray following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, purges of senior officers, and U.S. embassy hostage crisis. Preceded by Iraqi air strikes on Iranian airfields and facilities, ground forces advanced rapidly across a broad front into Khuzestan, capitalizing on minimal initial resistance from disorganized Iranian units lacking unified command. By , Iraqi troops had pushed deeper into Iranian territory, capturing border settlements and enveloping key objectives. The Iraqi 3rd Armored Division thrust toward , the provincial capital, while infantry elements besieged and Abadan; Susangerd fell to Iraqi control within days, enabling further encirclement attempts. Despite these gains, Iraqi momentum stalled against determined defenses at and , where Iranian forces, bolstered by local militias, inflicted mounting casualties through in urban and marshy terrain. Khorramshahr endured a brutal month-long , with Iraqi forces bombarding the city and engaging in house-to-house fighting against Iranian regulars and volunteers; it capitulated on , 1980, after heavy losses on both sides, granting Iraq a vital and symbolic dubbed "Khunin" (City of Blood) due to the ferocity. Abadan's refineries remained under but unyielding, while mid-October advances targeted the province's , though logistical strains and Iranian counterattacks prevented full consolidation. By December 1980, Iraq controlled approximately 5,000 square kilometers of Khuzestan, including and pockets near the border, but failed to achieve decisive breakthroughs toward core fields or the province's heartland. Under , Iraqi authorities administered captured areas with intentions of or , installing provisional structures and appealing to Khuzestan's for support through propaganda emphasizing ethnic kinship, yet eliciting limited collaboration amid fears of reprisals and loyalty to . Iraqi forces faced persistent guerrilla harassment from Iranian and regular remnants, leading to fortified positions and resource diversion that eroded offensive capacity by early 1981. The strained Iraq's manpower and supplies, with estimates of thousands of Iraqi in the initial phase alone, while displacing hundreds of thousands of Iranian civilians and disrupting the region's and until Iranian offensives reclaimed most territories by mid-1982.

Prelude

Iranian Strategic Planning and Mobilization

Following the success of in late March 1982, which expelled Iraqi forces from much of , Iranian military planners prioritized the recapture of , the strategically vital port city occupied by since October 1980, to complete the liberation of Iranian territory and restore national morale. The operation's planning emphasized encirclement tactics to isolate approximately 30,000 Iraqi defenders by severing their supply lines and retreat paths across the River, combining assaults with armored and air support to exploit Iraqi vulnerabilities in morale and logistics. Brigadier General , as overall ground forces commander, coordinated the integration of regular army units with (IRGC) elements, predicting Iraqi counterattacks and allocating resources for night-time pushes followed by daytime mechanized breakthroughs. Mobilization efforts drew heavily on Iran's manpower reserves, assembling around 70,000 troops by May 21, 1982, including paramilitary volunteers who provided massed for clearing minefields and breaching defenses through human-wave tactics. Key units included the 77th Infantry Division, with over 6,000 personnel airlifted from to Khuzestan on May 9 using aircraft for rapid deployment, alongside the 59th Zolfaqhar Mechanized Brigade. IRGC and forces, numbering in the tens of thousands, were mobilized through widespread recruitment drives emphasizing ideological commitment, enabling the operation to field 90 battalions, 43 armored battalions, and supporting and commando units. This hybrid force structure reflected Iran's shift toward leveraging population advantages over conventional equipment shortages, with preparatory movements beginning in late April along three axes: from the Bostan-Susangerd area, west of the River, and southwest of . Air and logistical preparations included deploying 200 tanks, 26 AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, and systems such as , , and SA-7 to contest Iraqi air superiority and protect ground advances. The planning phase incorporated on Iraqi fortifications, aiming for a multi-phased starting with diversionary attacks on April 29–30 to fix enemy positions before the main on May 22. This approach, while reliant on high-casualty , capitalized on Iraqi overextension and declining cohesion, setting conditions for the city's fall by May 24.

Iraqi Defensive Posture and Preparations

Iraqi forces occupying since October 1980 adopted a static defensive posture by early 1982, relying on entrenched positions to counter mounting Iranian counteroffensives in . The garrison primarily comprised elements of the Iraqi 3rd Infantry Division, including infantry brigades supported by artillery and armored units, augmented by People's Army conscripts. Total strength estimates varied between 15,000 and 20,000 personnel, with regular army troops forming the core and providing auxiliary manpower for holding urban and perimeter defenses. To fortify the city against assaults, Iraqi engineers constructed layered obstacles dubbed the "Wall of the Persians" by , consisting of three tiers of dense minefields, barbed wire entanglements, and concrete bunkers extending from urban strongpoints to approaches along the and waterway. These defenses incorporated anti-tank ditches, machine-gun nests, and pre-sighted artillery fire zones, with tanks and T-55/T- armored vehicles positioned for mutual support within the city grid and outskirts. Commanded by Brigadier General Juwad Shitnah, the forces emphasized holding key bridges and high ground to deny Iranian advances toward . Preparations intensified in April 1982 amid of Iranian buildups, including the repositioning of reserve units from rear areas and stockpiling and supplies for prolonged warfare. However, logistical strains from earlier setbacks, such as the Iranian recapture of territories near and Shush, limited reinforcements, leaving the increasingly reliant on fixed defenses rather than counterattacks. Iraqi high command prioritized conserving units elsewhere on the front, assigning lower-morale conscripts to the Khuzestan salient, which contributed to vulnerabilities in cohesion and rapid response capabilities.

Execution of the Operation

Initial Phases and Encirclement

Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas commenced on the night of April 29–30, 1982, as Iranian forces, comprising regular army units such as the 77th Khorasan Division and 92nd Armored Division alongside Pasdaran and militia, launched coordinated assaults along three primary axes: from Bostan toward Susangerd, along the west banks of the Karun River, and southwest of . These initial maneuvers aimed to disrupt Iraqi defenses, secure flanking positions, and position Iranian troops for the encirclement of , where the Iraqi 3rd Division was entrenched. Nighttime infantry assaults supported by tanks cleared key areas, including advances toward Shalamcheh via helicopter insertions of the 55th Airborne Brigade, while daytime operations featured armored pushes to exploit breakthroughs. By early May, Iranian forces had captured Fakkeh and isolated Iraqi positions north of , severing northern supply routes and compelling Iraqi troops to rely on precarious lines from . In these preliminary engagements, suffered approximately 10,000 troops captured and 100 tanks destroyed by May 3, reflecting the momentum gained by Iran's numerical superiority of around 70,000 personnel amassed near the city by mid-May. To complete the encirclement, Iranian commanders focused on bridging the Karun River east of , initiating crossings on –21 that linked northern advances with southern thrusts, effectively trapping the Iraqi and cutting off reinforcements. Supported by air superiority, including AH-1 Cobra gunships and missile defenses, these actions neutralized Iraqi artillery and armor, setting the conditions for the direct assault on the city. The encirclement phase, spanning late April to May 22, recaptured over 2,000 square kilometers of territory and demoralized Iraqi forces, whose defensive posture crumbled under sustained pressure.

Assault on Khorramshahr

The assault on commenced on the night of May 23, 1982, following the encirclement of Iraqi forces in the city during Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas. Iranian commanders, including of the 77th Division, coordinated assaults supported by and armored personnel carriers, leveraging darkness to infiltrate Iraqi positions. Daytime advances involved the 59th Zolfaqhar Brigade and Pasdaran () units pushing forward with artillery barrages and AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships targeting Iraqi armor, while F-4 Phantom and F-5 Tiger jets provided to suppress defenses. Iraqi defenses centered on the fortified "Wall of the Persians," a network of minefields, earthworks, and barriers manned by approximately 35,000 troops from the 6th and 12th Armored Divisions, supplemented by entrenched and anti-tank weapons. Supplies reached the garrison via the Arvand Rud () waterway until Iranian efforts, including airstrikes on bridges and vessels, disrupted . Iraqi counterattacks, such as those attempted on May 3-4, failed to relieve pressure, and by mid-May, morale had eroded, with some units abandoning positions before the main Iranian push. The relied on static defenses and heavy machine guns, inflicting significant losses through prepared ambushes in urban terrain. Intense street-by-street fighting ensued from May 24 onward, with Iranian forces—bolstered by the 92nd Armored Division and 55th Airborne Brigade—overrunning two defensive lines in the Pol-e Now and Shalamcheh areas. Tactics emphasized infantry waves to overwhelm fortifications, though this approach, while effective in breaching lines, resulted in high Iranian casualties amid Iraqi fire from elevated positions and minefields. By May 25, the city was fully liberated, with the Iraqi garrison surrendering en masse; estimates indicate 19,000 to 22,000 Iraqi prisoners captured, alongside losses of over 100 tanks and two helicopters in the immediate phase. Iranian casualties for the broader operation exceeded 6,000 killed and 24,000 wounded, reflecting the attritional nature of the urban assault against dug-in opponents. Iranian state-affiliated accounts emphasize coordinated combined-arms success, but independent analyses highlight the role of numerical superiority and Iraqi demoralization in tipping the balance.

Breakthrough and Liberation

Following the encirclement of Iraqi forces in by May 21, 1982, Iranian commanders initiated the breakthrough phase with intensified artillery barrages and air strikes targeting Iraqi positions. Approximately 70,000 Iranian troops, including elements of the 77th Division, 59th Zolfaqhar Brigade, and Pasdaran irregulars, positioned for the assault. On the night of May 23, Iranian forces launched an all-out assault, overrunning Iraqi defensive lines in the Pol-e Now and Shalamcheh regions. This breakthrough exploited the isolation of the 35,000-strong Iraqi garrison, which had fortified the city with extensive defenses including minefields, earthworks dubbed the "Wall of the Persians," and anti-personnel obstacles along the waterway. Iraqi troops, facing supply shortages and low morale after prior defeats such as the loss of the 6th Armored Division, offered limited resistance as Iranian units advanced street-by-street into the urban core. By May 24, Iranian forces had secured control of , prompting mass surrenders among Iraqi defenders; estimates indicate 22,000 to 35,000 Iraqi soldiers became prisoners of war, with remaining elements possibly evacuating prior to full . The operation's success in liberating the city after 578 days of marked a pivotal Iranian victory, though at the cost of over 6,000 Iranian fatalities and 24,000 wounded in the broader assault phases.

Forces and Command

Iranian Commanders and Units

The Iranian offensive in Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas involved coordinated elements from the regular Iranian Army (Artesh), the (IRGC), and volunteer militias, totaling around 70,000 personnel focused on encircling and assaulting Iraqi positions around . The IRGC provided the bulk of assault units, emphasizing human-wave tactics supported by limited armor and , while Army units contributed mechanized and support for breakthroughs. Hassan Bagheri, a key IRGC operations officer, served as deputy commander of the headquarters and played a central role in planning the multi-phase encirclement and phases from late to May 1982. His strategic oversight helped integrate irregular forces with regular units for the final push into the city on May 23-24. Mohammad Bagheri, another IRGC commander, directed tactical elements during the operation's execution, leveraging prior experience from earlier offensives. Hossein Kharrazi commanded the IRGC's 14th Division, which conducted assaults on Iraqi flanks and supported the liberation of key urban districts. Principal IRGC units included the 5th Division, responsible for northern encirclement efforts, and the 7th Vali-e-Asr , which led advances under Abdol-Mohammad Raoofi-Nezhad. Army contributions featured the 21st Hamzeh Division for securing liberated areas and elements of the 92nd Armored Division for limited tank support against Iraqi defenses. forces, numbering in the tens of thousands, augmented assaults with volunteer , often absorbing heavy casualties to overrun fortified positions. Coordination occurred through headquarters like and Quds, reflecting the improvised nature of Iranian command amid ongoing reorganization post-revolution.

Iraqi Commanders and Units

The Iraqi defense of during Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas fell under the III Corps, commanded by al-Qadhi, who bore responsibility for the southern sector facing Iranian counteroffensives. The corps encompassed mechanized and armored units tasked with holding key positions along the River and within the urban area. Following the Iranian breakthrough on May 23-24, 1982, al-Qadhi was executed by order of for the failure to retain the city. Brigadier General Juwad Shitnah led the 3rd Armoured Division, a primary component of the garrison, which included battalions and support elements entrenched in fortified positions around the city and its approaches. Shitnah's division had participated in the initial occupation and remained committed to the defense, employing and armored counterattacks against Iranian advances. Captured during the retreat, Shitnah was subsequently executed alongside al-Qadhi, reflecting Saddam's purges of perceived incompetent officers. Colonel Ahmad Zeidan commanded local Iraqi forces, including artillery units of the 3rd Division, directing bombardment and defensive fires until his death in a minefield while attempting to withdraw on May 24, 1982. Higher-level oversight came from figures like , who coordinated southern operations but did not directly command the battle. The garrison totaled around 22,000 personnel, comprising regular army troops and paramilitary elements, many of whom surrendered en masse as Iranian forces encircled the city, leading to the capture of approximately 19,000 Iraqis.

Casualties, Equipment Losses, and Tactical Analysis

Iranian forces incurred heavy casualties during Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, with official estimates citing around 6,000 killed and 24,000 wounded, primarily from intense urban combat and human-wave infantry assaults against fortified Iraqi positions in . Independent historical analysis aligns closely, noting over 6,000 Iranian combatants killed and at least 24,000 wounded, reflecting the operation's reliance on massed volunteer forces charging Iraqi defenses with limited armored support. Iraqi casualties were substantial but subject to conflicting reports, with Iranian military accounts claiming approximately 6,000 killed, thousands more wounded, and up to 19,000 captured during the encirclement and fall of . These figures, drawn from Iranian operational records, likely overstate Iraqi fatalities while underemphasizing Iranian losses, as is common in state-sponsored narratives from that emphasize enemy routs to bolster domestic morale; cross-verification with declassified analyses remains limited due to restricted access to Ba'athist archives. Equipment losses favored Iran decisively through captures rather than destruction. Iraqi forces abandoned or surrendered an estimated 250 tanks, 300 armored personnel carriers, and 100 artillery pieces, which Iranian troops repurposed for later offensives, exacerbating Iraq's materiel shortages amid supply strains from prolonged occupation. Iranian equipment attrition was lower in quantitative terms but qualitatively severe, with hundreds of tanks damaged or lost to Iraqi anti-tank fire and mines during breakthrough attempts, though exact tallies are obscured by the integration of revolutionary guards' irregular units lacking standardized reporting. Tactically, the operation showcased Iran's shift from disorganized counterattacks to coordinated and , with feints drawing Iraqi reserves northward while main thrusts from the east and south isolated Khorramshahr's on May 23–24, 1982. Iraqi defenses, anchored in static fortifications optimized for repulsion rather than , crumbled under numerical inferiority in —despite superior armor and —compounded by eroding morale and Saddam Hussein's premature order for partial , which fragmented command cohesion. Iran's success hinged on ideological mobilization of irregulars overwhelming prepared lines through sheer volume, a costly but causally effective approach against an adversary fatigued by 19 months of urban siege, though it exposed vulnerabilities in mechanized integration that plagued subsequent Iranian offensives. This victory validated over direct assault in principle but underscored the human toll of forgoing fire superiority, as Iranian advances prioritized speed and capture over minimization.

Immediate Aftermath and Strategic Consequences

Territorial Gains and Iraqi Withdrawal

Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas culminated in the recapture of on May 24, 1982, expelling Iraqi forces from the city's environs after 578 days of occupation. Iranian troops, employing coordinated assaults by regular army units and Revolutionary Guards, broke through Iraqi defenses along the Karun River and encircled the garrison, leading to the surrender of approximately 19,000 Iraqi soldiers from the 3rd Division. This victory restored Iranian control over key positions in western , including areas from Ahvaz-Susangerd to the waterway. The territorial gains from the operation totaled roughly 2,077 square miles (5,380 square kilometers) of previously occupied Iranian land in Khuzestan, with Iraqi units retreating to positions along the pre-war international . These advances eliminated the last major Iraqi foothold in the , shifting the front line decisively in Iran's favor and restoring sovereignty over strategically vital oil-rich terrain. In response to the collapse of its southern defenses, Iraq initiated a phased withdrawal from all captured Iranian territory. On June 10, 1982, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council signaled readiness for an unconditional ceasefire and full retreat to the 1975 border. President Saddam Hussein formalized the order on June 20, with forces completing the pullback by June 29, thereby ending the occupation phase of the conflict but prompting Iranian pursuit into Iraqi territory.

Decision to Prolong the War

Following the successful conclusion of Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas on May 24, 1982, which resulted in the liberation of and the expulsion of Iraqi forces from most occupied Iranian territory, Iraq announced a unilateral withdrawal to pre-war borders and proposed a , including offers of compensation for war damages. Iranian military commanders, including those from the (IRGC), urged acceptance of the overture, citing the restoration of territorial integrity and the exhaustion of Iranian forces after two years of defensive operations. However, overruled these recommendations, prioritizing ideological goals such as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, punishment for Iraq's initial , and the export of Iran's to Iraq's Shi'ite population. This decision crystallized in internal debates within Iran's leadership during June 1982, where clerical hardliners argued that ending the war prematurely would legitimize Saddam's rule and fail to exact full retribution for estimated damages exceeding $100 billion and over 200,000 Iranian deaths by mid-1982. Khomeini framed continuation as a religious , invoking concepts of to mobilize volunteers and framing the conflict as a defense against "godless" aggression, despite Iraq's overtures aligning with UN Security Council Resolution 479 (1980) and subsequent calls for de-escalation. rejected UN Security Council Resolution 514 on July 12, 1982, which demanded an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal, opting instead to launch on July 13, 1982, marking the first major Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory near . The prolongation stemmed from a causal chain of revolutionary zeal overriding pragmatic assessments: Khomeini's consolidation of power post-1979 Revolution relied on portraying the war as existential, fostering domestic unity against perceived internal threats like monarchist remnants, while underestimating Iraq's fortified defenses and international support. This choice shifted the war's dynamics from defense to , entailing human wave tactics that amplified —estimated at an additional 400,000 Iranian deaths through 1988—without achieving in . Later reflections by IRGC veterans, such as former commander , highlighted regrets over ignoring military advice, attributing the extension to overconfidence in revolutionary fervor rather than sustainable logistics or strategy. Iran's insistence on unconditional Iraqi surrender prolonged stalemate until acceptance of UN Resolution 598 in July 1988, after battlefield setbacks and economic strain validated earlier warnings.

Legacy and Assessments

Iranian Perspective and Commemoration

In the Iranian narrative, Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas represents a pivotal divine intervention and demonstration of national resilience during the Iran-Iraq War, often described as the "Epic of Khorramshahr" for recapturing the strategically vital city after 578 days of Iraqi occupation on May 24, 1982. Iranian leaders, including Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, attributed the victory to God's direct role, with Khomeini stating that "God the Almighty liberated Khorramshahr" despite opposition from global powers supporting Iraq. This perspective frames the operation as a turning point that shifted momentum from Iraqi advances to Iranian counteroffensives, symbolizing revolutionary spirit, heroism, and unity against an "imposed war." The operation's success is credited to coordinated efforts by the (IRGC), volunteers, and regular army units, overcoming numerical disadvantages through human-wave tactics and fervent ideological motivation, though at the cost of approximately 6,000 Iranian fatalities and thousands wounded. Iranian accounts emphasize the recapture's psychological boost, restoring national morale after early war setbacks and enabling subsequent offensives into , while portraying Iraqi forces as aggressors backed by foreign powers. Annually on May 24, commemorates the liberation as a national event, with ceremonies, speeches, and media coverage highlighting its role in fostering resistance and . Events often feature reenactments, veteran tributes, and official statements reinforcing themes of and divine favor, as seen in the 43rd observances in 2025 that underscored the event's enduring legacy in Iranian . These commemorations integrate the operation into broader ideology, serving as a reminder of the costs of the war—estimated at significant human and material losses—and the imperative of vigilance against external threats.

Criticisms and Alternative Viewpoints

Some military analysts have criticized Iranian tactics during Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas for relying heavily on massed infantry assaults, often characterized as "human wave" attacks involving poorly equipped volunteers and Pasdaran fighters charging fortified Iraqi positions with limited armored or artillery support. This approach, while achieving the objective of recapturing on May 24, 1982, resulted in significant Iranian casualties—estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 killed—due to coordination issues between units and forces, as well as exposure to Iraqi defensive fire and minefields. Such methods echoed I-style frontal assaults, prioritizing ideological fervor over , and highlighted broader deficiencies in Iranian command structures and following the revolution's of experienced officers. From an Iraqi perspective, as recounted by former Iraqi generals, the loss of stemmed less from Iranian tactical breakthroughs and more from Saddam Hussein's orders for a phased to avoid and preserve elite units for defensive lines along the border. Iraqi accounts emphasize that their forces inflicted disproportionate losses on Iranian attackers through prepared defenses, including artillery and air support, before executing a controlled retreat that prevented total annihilation—contrasting Iranian narratives of a decisive . This view posits the operation's success as facilitated by Iraqi strategic decisions amid deteriorating morale and supply lines, rather than overwhelming Iranian superiority, with internal repercussions including the execution of the III commander for perceived failures in holding the city. Western assessments, such as those in Pierre Razoux's analysis, underscore that while the operation marked a turning point by restoring Iranian momentum, its high human cost—exacerbated by the deployment of minimally trained in urban combat—underscored inefficiencies in Iran's post-revolutionary , including fragmented command and inadequate , which prolonged engagements unnecessarily. These critiques note that Iraqi forces, despite being on the defensive, captured or destroyed substantial Iranian equipment, suggesting the was pyrrhic in terms of Iran's irreplaceable manpower losses relative to recoverable territorial gains. Iranian official commemorations often omit these tactical shortcomings, focusing instead on symbolic liberation, which some observers attribute to state-controlled minimizing operational flaws to sustain legitimacy.

References

  1. [1]
    Decoding Iran's Politics: The IRGC and the Iran-Iraq War (Part 1)
    Jun 4, 2019 · Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas, during which the city of Khorramshahr in southwestern Iran was liberated, was the country's biggest victory during ...
  2. [2]
  3. [3]
    This Day In Iraqi History - May 24 Iran's Op Beit ... - MUSINGS ON IRAQ
    May 24, 2025 · ... Beit al-Moqaddas pushed Iraqis back to border in Basra Iran-Iraq War ... 1982 Iran's Op Beit al-Moqaddas ended Took Khorramshahr in south ...
  4. [4]
    Khorramshahr Liberation: A Turning Point in Iran-Iraq War
    May 24, 2025 · Khorramshahr Liberation: A Turning Point in Iran-Iraq War. On May 24, 1982, Iranian armed forces liberated the city of Khorramshahr in a ...
  5. [5]
  6. [6]
    The Liberation of Khorramshahr May 24-25 1982 - Dr. Kaveh Farrokh
    This article provides a brief synopsis of the operations of the Iranian military leading to the liberation of the city of Khorramshahr from Iraqi occupation ...
  7. [7]
    [PDF] The Iran-Iraq War (Chapter 5: Phase Two: Iran Liberates Its Territory ...
    Nevertheless,. Iraq's failure to take Abadan and the virtual stalemate in the war after November, 1981, left Iraq with few clear alternatives. It was ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  8. [8]
    1981–1982: Stalemate (Chapter 5) - The Iran–Iraq War
    Sep 5, 2014 · In his decision to invade Iran in September 1980, Saddam Hussein failed to understand his army's limited capabilities and tried to do too many ...
  9. [9]
  10. [10]
    [PDF] Iran-Iraq War Timeline* - Wilson Center
    Sep 1, 1982 · 24 March 1982- Iranian forces launch a massive attack against Iraqi held territory led by an Iranian armored division just transferred in ...
  11. [11]
    [PDF] Iranian Operational Decision Making - DTIC
    and Iraq during the war. In May 1982, the Iranians liberated the port city of Khorramshahr, which had been held by Iraqi forces since October 1980. This was re ...
  12. [12]
    [PDF] Phase Three: Iran Attempts To Conquer Iraq: June, 1982
    Mar 2, 1984 · By this point in the war, Iranian divisions had between 12,000. Page 2. and 15,000 men each, depending on the amount of Pasdaran and Baseej that ...
  13. [13]
    [PDF] An Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War - DTIC
    To capture Khuzestan (with its Arab population) so that Iraq could present Iran's new leadership with a situation that would force a political settlement for ...
  14. [14]
    The Oil Thief of Baghdad: Understanding Saddam's Motives for ...
    This article argues that Iraqi president Saddam Husayn's primary motive for invading Iran in 1980 was to seize the oil of Khuzestan Province.Missing: justification | Show results with:justification
  15. [15]
    [PDF] THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR: MILITARY PERFORMANCE AND ... - CIA
    The initial tactical objective-to occupy disputed border territories-was accomplished within the first few days of the war, and Iran has no prospect of ...
  16. [16]
    [PDF] Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran - BYU
    over destabilizing the Ba'thist regime was not a motivation for Saddam's invasion. Their strongest argument was that, by the time Saddam invaded Iran, the ...
  17. [17]
    CHRONOLOGY OF THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
    May 25, 1982 · Sept. 4, 1980 - Iraq says war starts with Iranian artillery attack on Iraqi border town of Khanaqin, 90 miles northeast of Baghdad. Sept. 17, ...
  18. [18]
    Chronology of Persian Gulf War 1980 - UPI Archives
    Aug 8, 1988 · Oct. 24 -- Iraqi forces occupy Khorramshahr, a major Iranian port on Shatt al Arab river, and lay siege to Abadan after more than four weeks of ...
  19. [19]
    IRAQ vii. IRAN-IRAQ WAR - Encyclopaedia Iranica
    In September 1981, the period of stalemate came to an end when the Iranians launched a series of successful offensives. The first one drove the Iraqi army back ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] Guarding History - Joint Chiefs of Staff
    This study focuses on the official history collection program by the Islamic. Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) during the Iran-Iraq War. From the.Missing: "military | Show results with:"military
  21. [21]
    Not Just Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur War: Why the Iran-Iraq ...
    Oct 9, 2025 · The model produced early operational returns—Khorramshahr's liberation in 1982, the seizure of Majnoon Island in 1984, and deep lodgments ...
  22. [22]
    43 years on: The epic liberation of Khorramshahr that turned the tide ...
    May 24, 2025 · On May 24, 1982, Iranian forces reclaimed the strategic port city of Khorramshahr after more than 500 days of Iraqi occupation.
  23. [23]
    New Borders, Old Enemies, The Iran-Iraq War
    From March 22 to May 24, Iraq relinquished 3,400 square miles of captured territory, at a loss of 40,000 dead, 25,000 captured, 200 tanks, and several hundred ...
  24. [24]
    Iran-Iraq: Bloody Tomorrows | Proceedings - U.S. Naval Institute
    Iranian resistance stiffened markedly as Iraqi forces closed around the key cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr. Iraqi troops entered the outskirts of Abadan ...
  25. [25]
    On May 24, 1982, Iranian armed forces liberated the city of ...
    May 31, 2025 · Iraqi forces, under Saddam Hussein, captured Khorramshahr on October 26, 1980, early in the Iran- Iraq War, following a brutal 34-day battle ...
  26. [26]
    Khorramshahr: The Liberation that defined a nation - Tehran Times
    May 23, 2025 · The Iranian forces first pounded the positions of the Iraqi occupying forces in Khorramshahr with artillery and then launched an all-out assault ...
  27. [27]
    Battle of Khorramshahr (1982) | Military Wiki - Fandom
    The successful retaking of the city was part of Iran's Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas. It is perceived as a turning point in the war; and the liberation of the city ...
  28. [28]
    The Bagheri Brothers: One in Operations, One in Intelligence
    Apr 12, 2019 · Later, he served as Deputy Commander of the IRGC's Nasr Command Center during Operations Fath-al-Mobin and Beit al-Moqdas.
  29. [29]
    Martyr Hassan Bagheri believed that "we can"
    Feb 3, 2018 · It can be said that Hassan was the sacred defense motahari Bagheri. That is, the same role that the Islamic revolution was a martyr motahhari, ...
  30. [30]
    [PDF] Top Commanders of Isfahan in Iran-Iraq War
    His troops participated in the operations. Fath- ol- Mobin and Beit- ol- Moqaddas (which liberated. Khorramshahr).In Operation Val- al- Fajr 8, his troops ...
  31. [31]
    Operation Beit al-Moqaddas and Liberation of Khorramshahr
    May 28, 2025 · During Operation Beit al-Moqaddas, the 27th Brigade was still receiving support from the West. We maintained contact with individuals who had ...Missing: ol- breakthrough details
  32. [32]
    [PDF] An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War - DTIC
    Iraqi command changes • saddam's response to failure and executions •. 1980–1982 losses and army expansions • developments of Iranian and Iraqi forces.
  33. [33]
    [PDF] SADDAM'S GENERALS - Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War - GovInfo
    Intense battles took place between Iraqi and Iranian Special Forces. Our forces possessed seven artillery battalions with missile launchers. The Republican ...<|separator|>
  34. [34]
    Iranian Forces Liberate Khorramshahr After 19 Months of Iraqi ...
    May 24, 2025 · Iranian Forces Liberate Khorramshahr After 19 Months of Iraqi Occupation in Pivotal 1982 Operation ... Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi invasion ...
  35. [35]
    The Iran-Iraq War (1) The Battle For Khuzestan, September 1980 ...
    According to Iranian sources, 19,414 Iraqi troops were captured during Operation Beit ol-Moqaddas. (Tom Cooper Collection) also anticipated, the attack ...
  36. [36]
    The Function of I.R.I.A.A in Opration Beit-Ol-Moqaddas
    According to military experts, Operation Beit-ol-Moqaddas was the largest and most successful operation of the Islamic Republic of Iran's armed forces during ...Missing: strategic | Show results with:strategic<|separator|>
  37. [37]
    Iran-Iraq War (1979-88) - MUSINGS ON IRAQ
    May 24 Iran's Op Beit al-Moqaddas ended Took Khorramshahr Iraqi forces pushed back to. border in Khuzistan Regained 2,077 sq mi of Iranian territory Iraq ...
  38. [38]
    The Iraqi army completed its withdrawal today from all... - UPI Archives
    Jun 29, 1982 · Iraqi President Saddam Hussein ordered the pullback June 20, after his forces suffered major setbacks in the fighting, saying Moslem troops must ...
  39. [39]
    IRAQ WITHDRAWING IN WAR WITH IRAN - The New York Times
    Jun 21, 1982 · President Saddam Hussein of Iraq said today that Iraqi troops had begun withdrawing from Iranian territory to the Iraqi border and would complete their ...Missing: Khorramshahr liberation date
  40. [40]
    Iran-Iraq War | Causes, Summary, Casualties, Chemical Weapons ...
    1982–87: Iranian offensive, stalemate, and the Tanker War​​ In May 1982 Iranian forces recaptured Khorramshahr. Iraq voluntarily withdrew its forces from all ...
  41. [41]
    The Iran-Iraq War | UANI
    ... Iranian – predominantly IRGC – forces recaptured the country's most important port, Khorramshahr in May 1982. More small victories ensued, and shortly ...
  42. [42]
    The War over the War | American Enterprise Institute - AEI
    Sep 30, 2010 · Continuation of the war after Khorramshahr. On May 24, 1982 Iran liberated the city of Khorramshahr ending the Iraqi occupation of the city.
  43. [43]
    God liberated and freed Khorramshahr, Imam Khomeini highlighted
    In a historic message, Imam Khomeini said that It was God the Almighty who liberated the Iranian border city despite agression of all world powers who were then ...<|control11|><|separator|>
  44. [44]
    Khorramshahr liberation: An exemplary display of Iranian heroism ...
    May 24, 2023 · The victory in Khorramshahr is commemorated every year as a turning point of the imposed war and a symbol of Iranian heroism and national unity.
  45. [45]
    The epic liberation of Khorramshahr that turned the tide of imposed ...
    May 24, 2025 · The Beit ol-Moqaddas operation secured a decisive victory but came at a steep price—6,000 Iranian lives lost and thousands wounded. An ...
  46. [46]
    Iran marks anniversary of Epic of Khorramshahr - Mehr News Agency
    May 24, 2025 · On May 24, 1982, Iranian armed forces liberated the city of Khorramshahr in a large-scale operation code-named Beit al-Moqaddas from the foreign-backed ...Missing: perspective | Show results with:perspective
  47. [47]
  48. [48]
    [PDF] The Iran-Iraq War (Chapter 3: The Strengths And Weaknesses ...
    • Like Iran, however, Iraq faced major disadvantages. These not only helped ... These problems shaped much of the behavior of Iranian and Iraqi military.
  49. [49]
    [PDF] Iranian Operational Decision Making - CNA Corporation
    commanders are likely to be relatively flexible and demonstrate some initiative in combat. • Coordination problems will continue to plague Iran's armed forces, ...
  50. [50]
    [PDF] An Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq War - NDU Press
    the battle of Khorramshahr (october 6–24, 1980) proved to be a violent and bloody affair in which each side suffered around 7,000 casualties. eventually Iraqi ...
  51. [51]
    The Iran-Iraq War on JSTOR
    It included tragic slaughter of child soldiers, use of chemical weapons, striking of civilian shipping, and destruction of cities. Pierre Razoux offers an ...
  52. [52]
    'The Iran-Iraq War,' by Pierre Razoux - The New York Times
    Dec 29, 2015 · The war between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Ruhollah Khomeini's Iran ended 27 years ago, before most of today's Iraqis and Iranians were alive.Missing: Operation Jerusalem<|control11|><|separator|>