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Shatt al-Arab

The Shatt al-Arab is a river approximately 192 kilometers long formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers near Al-Qurnah in southern Iraq, flowing southeastward to empty into the Persian Gulf near Al-Faw.^[1]^[2] Its lower course delineates the border between Iraq and Iran, a demarcation rooted in historical treaties but frequently contested.^[3] The river holds critical strategic and economic value for both nations, serving as a primary waterway for maritime access to the Gulf and facilitating the export of oil from ports such as Basra in Iraq and Khorramshahr in Iran.^[4] Historically, control over the Shatt al-Arab has fueled territorial disputes, with Iran challenging Iraq's predominant administrative authority established under Ottoman-Persian agreements and reaffirmed in the 1937 treaty.^[5] Tensions escalated in the 1970s, leading to armed clashes in 1974–1975 that prompted the Algiers Agreement, which divided the waterway along the thalweg (deepest channel) line.^[6] Iraq abrogated this accord in 1980, citing navigation rights and security concerns, which contributed to the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), during which the river became a frontline zone with significant naval and aerial engagements.^[7]^[3] Post-war settlements largely restored the 1975 boundary, though intermittent disputes persist over navigation, water flow, and territorial claims, exacerbated by upstream damming and regional hydrological changes.^[8]

Naming and Terminology

Etymology and Usage

The name Shatt al-Arab derives from the Arabic phrase šaṭṭ al-ʿarab, literally translating to "stream of the Arabs" or "bank of the Arabs," where šaṭṭ denotes a riverbank, shore, or waterway channel, and al-ʿarab refers to the Arabs as an ethnic or regional group.^[9] This designation reflects the waterway's historical association with Arab populations along its course in southern Iraq, emerging prominently in Ottoman administrative records from the 16th century onward, when the river served as a boundary with Persian territories.^[9] In Persian, the waterway is known as Arvand Rūd, meaning "swift river," a term with roots in Middle Persian texts referring initially to the Tigris River, as seen in sources like the Dēnkard and Pahlavi versions of the Vendidad.^[10] Iranian usage of Arvand Rūd gained emphasis during the 20th century, particularly under the Pahlavi dynasty and after the 1979 revolution, as a means to assert pre-Arab historical continuity and challenge the ethnic implications of the Arabic name amid border disputes.^[11] Internationally and in most English-language geographical references, Shatt al-Arab predominates due to its alignment with Ottoman-era treaties defining the thalweg boundary, such as the 1847 Erzurum Treaty, though Iranian cartography and diplomacy consistently employ Arvand Rūd to underscore claims over eastern banks and navigation rights.^[9] The dual nomenclature underscores ongoing geopolitical sensitivities, with the Arabic term implying regional Arab primacy, while the Persian alternative evokes ancient Iranian hydrological nomenclature without ethnic qualifiers.^[11]

Disputed Designations

The Shatt al-Arab waterway is designated by Iraq using the Arabic name Shatt al-Arab, meaning "Arab Stream" or "River of the Arabs," which underscores claims of Arab predominance in the region and over the waterway itself.^[11] In opposition, Iran employs the Persian name Arvand Rud, translating to "Swift River," as a deliberate rejection of the Arab-centric terminology and to affirm Persian historical and cultural associations with the river system.^[11]^[10] This nomenclature dispute emerged prominently in the 20th century amid rising nationalism, with Iranian authorities reviving Arvand Rud—an ancient term attested in Middle Persian texts for the Tigris and related flows—to counter Iraqi assertions of exclusive control.^[10]^[12] Iranian officials have explicitly criticized Shatt al-Arab for implying undivided Iraqi sovereignty, tying the naming preference to broader sensitivities over border delineation and navigation rights along the shared channel.^[13] The contention reflects underlying territorial stakes, as Iraq historically viewed the waterway as internal territory up to the low-water mark on the Iranian shore under treaties like the 1937 agreement, while Iran advocated for the thalweg principle (deepest navigable channel) to secure equal access, a position formalized in the 1975 Algiers Accord before its 1980 abrogation by Iraq.^[11]^[12] Despite intermittent diplomatic recognitions of dual usage in international contexts, each side's insistence on its preferred designation has symbolized unresolved claims, exacerbating tensions during conflicts such as the 1974–1975 skirmishes and the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).^[13]^[12]

Geography

Formation and Course

The Shatt al-Arab forms at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers near Al-Qurnah in southern Iraq, where the two major waterways merge after traversing the Mesopotamian plain.^[14] This junction marks the river's origin, with the combined flow creating a single channel that drains the extensive basin of the Tigris-Euphrates system.^[15] Geologically, the formation reflects the sedimentary deposition in the Mesopotamian foredeep, influenced by the Zagros fold belt's tectonic activity.^[15] From Al-Qurnah, the Shatt al-Arab extends approximately 200 kilometers southeastward, passing through the city of Basra in Iraq before reaching the Persian Gulf at Al-Faw.^[14] Along its course, it receives additional inflow from the Karun River, originating in Iran, which joins near the Iraqi-Iranian border and contributes significantly to the river's volume, particularly during seasonal floods.^[1] The river's path largely delineates the international boundary between Iraq and Iran, characterized by meandering channels, marshes, and tidal influences that extend upstream due to the Gulf's proximity.^[16] Sedimentation from these tributaries results in ongoing deltaic progradation, extending the outlet into the Gulf over time.^[17]

Physical Features and Hydrology

The Shatt al-Arab forms at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers near Al-Qurnah in southern Iraq, extending approximately 192 kilometers southeastward to its outlet in the Persian Gulf.^[1] ^[9] The channel's width increases downstream from 250–300 meters at the origin to about 700 meters near Basra and up to 800 meters at the mouth, with water depths varying between 8.5 and 24 meters to support navigation.^[18] ^[19] The waterway receives additional inflow from the Karun River, which joins from Iran near Khorramshahr, contributing to its estuarine character amid the surrounding Mesopotamian marshes and deltaic plains. Hydrologically, the Shatt al-Arab exhibits highly variable discharge rates, with historical long-term means estimated at 1,966–2,340 cubic meters per second, though upstream dams on the Tigris and Euphrates have reduced flows to as low as 724 cubic meters per second in drier periods like 1994–1995.^[15] ^[1] ^[20] As a tidal estuary, it experiences a mixed semidiurnal regime, with tidal ranges increasing from 0.36 meters at Hartha to 2.90 meters at Fao and spring tide excursions extending up to 16 kilometers inland.^[21] ^[22] Reduced freshwater flow exacerbates salinity intrusion from the gulf, while sedimentation rates average 1 millimeter per year in lower reaches and 10 millimeters in marshes, driven by silt deposition as velocity diminishes.^[23]

Historical Development

Ancient and Pre-Modern Significance

The confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, forming the basis of the modern Shatt al-Arab, underpinned the agricultural and economic foundations of ancient Mesopotamian civilizations. During the Sumerian period (c. 4500–1900 BCE), irrigation systems drawing from the rivers' alluvial plains enabled surplus grain production on the fertile lowlands, supporting the emergence of urban centers like Ur and Uruk near the Euphrates delta.^[24] These waterways provided essential transport routes, facilitating trade in goods such as barley, textiles, and metals between inland settlements and Gulf ports, including contacts with Dilmun (Bahrain).^[24] Sedimentation and shifting courses, including multiple ancient outlets like the Bahmanshir, characterized the estuary's hydrology, with the primary channel extending southward over millennia due to delta progradation.^[25] In the Akkadian, Babylonian, and Assyrian eras (c. 2334–539 BCE and 2025–609 BCE), the lower river system's navigable stretches and canal networks—such as the Īsā and Ṣarṣar—integrated irrigation agriculture with regional commerce, sustaining empires through enhanced water management and flood control.^[24] The Euphrates served as the primary irrigation source for Babylonian farming, while the Tigris supported Assyrian rain-fed cultivation upstream, with the combined flow enabling maritime access to the Persian Gulf for exporting surpluses.^[24] This connectivity fostered economic interdependence, though prone to silting that required periodic dredging even in antiquity.^[9] During the medieval Islamic period, the Shatt al-Arab solidified as a commercial lifeline for Basra, channeling trade from the Persian Gulf to inland Mesopotamia via canals linking to the Karun River.^[9] The Buyid ruler ʿAżod-al-Dawla commissioned the dredging of the Haffar canal in the 10th century CE to counter siltation and improve navigation for merchant vessels.^[9] Venetian explorer Gasparo Balbi observed in 1580 that the waterway, referred to as the "Bahrain river," handled coastal traffic and supported larger ships bound for India, underscoring its role in Eurasian commerce despite navigational hazards from shifting bars.^[9] In the early modern era preceding formalized 19th-century boundaries, Arab tribes like the Banu Kaʿb asserted control over the Shatt al-Arab's estuary by the mid-18th century, levying tolls and conducting piracy that impeded trade flows.^[9] Notable disruptions included their blockade during the Zand siege of Basra (1775–1776) and clashes with the British East India Company (1767–1768), highlighting the waterway's strategic value for regional power projection.^[9] The Ottoman-Persian Treaty of Zohab (1639) delineated an initial demarcation along the river's edge from its Gulf entry northward, reflecting ongoing territorial contentions over navigation rights.^[9]

Ottoman-Persian Boundary Treaties

The Treaty of Zuhab, signed on May 17, 1639, between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, delineated the general eastern frontier by dividing the Persian plateau from the Ottoman Mesopotamian plain, providing a foundational but vague framework for boundaries extending toward the Shatt al-Arab without specifying the waterway's course or thalweg.^[26] This truce, rooted in Islamic sulh principles, was not intended as a permanent delineation and required periodic reaffirmation, as seen in the Treaty of Kurda on January 26, 1746, which restated the Zuhab borders amid ongoing territorial frictions but omitted detailed provisions for the Shatt al-Arab.^[26] The First Treaty of Erzurum, ratified on July 28, 1823, following the Ottoman-Persian War of 1821–1823, reaffirmed earlier borders and introduced buffer zones along the frontier but addressed the Shatt al-Arab only indirectly through general navigation and territorial principles.^[26] Escalating disputes over Persian encroachments near the waterway prompted the Second Treaty of Erzurum, signed on May 31, 1847, which offered the earliest explicit boundary for the Shatt al-Arab: sovereignty over the eastern bank, the port of Muhammara (modern Khorramshahr), and islands such as Khizr was assigned to Persia, while the western bank and riverbed fell under Ottoman control, with an explanatory note affirming Ottoman dominion over the entire waterway.^[27]^[26] Persian vessels received rights to free navigation from the Shatt al-Arab's mouth to the upstream frontier junction without hindrance or tolls, balancing Ottoman sovereignty with Persian access needs.^[28]^[27] Ambiguities persisted, particularly around island ownership and channel demarcation, fueling late Ottoman-era tensions. The Tehran Protocol of December 21, 1911, referred unresolved demarcation to arbitration at The Hague, building on the 1847 treaty.^[26] The Constantinople Protocol of November 4, 1913, clarified these by reasserting Ottoman sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab's full length to the sea, including the riverbed and most islands, while ceding specific eastern anchorages like those at Khorramshahr to Persia; the thalweg—defined as the deepest navigable channel—served as the boundary in narrow segments adjacent to Persian holdings to facilitate access.^[29]^[26] A supplementary 1914 delimitation commission agreement refined territorial limits per prior pacts, employing surveys to map the waterway's banks and channels.^[26] These treaties collectively entrenched Ottoman dominance over the Shatt al-Arab's navigation and bed, with Persian concessions limited to shoreline enclaves and transit rights, though interpretive disputes over sovereignty and the thalweg foreshadowed 20th-century conflicts.^[26]

Territorial Disputes

Legal and Historical Claims

Iraq's historical claims to sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab derive from the Ottoman Empire's longstanding control of the Basra region, including the waterway, as inherited by the Kingdom of Iraq upon independence in 1932. The 1639 Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia delineated a border that placed most of the Shatt under Ottoman administration, with Persia acknowledging Ottoman dominance in Mesopotamia while retaining limited access rights.^[30] Subsequent Ottoman-Persian conflicts reinforced this, as Ottoman forces repeatedly secured the eastern bank and navigation control, culminating in the 1847 Treaty of Erzurum, which fixed the boundary along the Iranian shoreline for the majority of the waterway's length, granting Persia only freedom of navigation without territorial rights.^[3] Iraq interprets these as establishing the Shatt as a national river under exclusive Iraqi jurisdiction, with Iran's usage limited to treaty-based usufruct, consistent with Ottoman-era protocols that prioritized the thalweg (deepest channel) only at the river's mouth near the Persian Gulf confluence.^[31] Iran's counterclaims emphasize Persian historical presence in Khuzestan province adjacent to the eastern bank and invoke the thalweg principle under modern international law for boundary delimitation on shared rivers, arguing that the waterway's formation by rivers originating in both territories necessitates an equitable median-line division rather than unilateral sovereignty. Iran contends that Ottoman treaties, such as the 1847 Erzurum and 1913 boundary protocol, were imposed under duress or ambiguously worded, failing to extinguish inherent Persian rights to equal co-riparian access, and cites pre-Ottoman eras where Persian polities exercised influence over Arvand Rud (Iran's designation).^[32] Legally, Iran has rejected Iraq's "national river" designation, asserting violations of customary rules on international watercourses that favor joint administration for navigation, fisheries, and security, as evidenced by Iran's post-1937 protests against Iraqi tolls and port restrictions.^[28] The 1937 Treaty between Iraq and Iran ostensibly reaffirmed the eastern-bank boundary from prior Ottoman accords but included thalweg application near Basra, which Iraq views as a limited concession preserving overall sovereignty, while Iran regards it as inconsistent and superseded by evolving norms.^[3] This tension escalated in the 1975 Algiers Agreement, where Iraq temporarily accepted the full thalweg line in exchange for Iran's cessation of support for Iraqi Kurdish insurgents, only for Iraq to denounce it in September 1980 as coerced and revert to 1937 terms, framing the accord as non-binding under international law due to bad faith inducement.^[33] Iran's legal stance post-abrogation emphasized the agreement's validity as a ratified treaty reflecting equitable principles, underscoring the waterway's dual riparian character over Iraq's unilateral historical assertions.

Key Treaties: 1639–1975

The Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin (also known as the Treaty of Zuhab), signed on May 17, 1639, between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia, established the initial framework for the Ottoman-Persian border, including the Shatt al-Arab region, by generally placing the boundary along the Zagros Mountains eastward but leaving riverine specifics ambiguous; it affirmed Ottoman sovereignty over the waterway while granting Persia certain navigational access, though enforcement remained contested due to vague demarcation.^[32]^[30]^[34] Subsequent boundary disputes prompted the Second Treaty of Erzurum, ratified on May 31, 1847, which clarified the Shatt al-Arab's status by delineating the land border's intersection with the river and stipulating that the Ottoman-Persian frontier followed the low-water line along the eastern (Persian) bank, except at specific confluences; it explicitly granted Persian vessels free navigation rights from the river's mouth to the border's contact point without hindrance, while affirming Ottoman control over the waterway's eastern bank and islands.^[27]^[3] The Protocol of Constantinople, signed on November 4, 1913, between the Ottoman Empire and Persia, refined the Erzurum delineations through a boundary commission, adjusting the Shatt al-Arab's eastern bank line at key points like the Khanaqin oil fields and affirming the low-water mark principle, with provisions for joint surveys to resolve navigational channels; this protocol aimed to prevent encroachments but was disrupted by World War I and subsequent territorial changes.^[29]^[35] Following Iraq's independence, the 1937 Iraq-Iran Boundary Treaty, signed on July 4, 1937, reaffirmed the low-water mark on the Iranian side as the border for most of the Shatt al-Arab, with exceptions for Iranian sovereignty over islands opposite Abadan and Khorramshahr to secure port access; a accompanying protocol opened the waterway to equal merchant and warship navigation for both parties, required a joint conservancy convention (never fully implemented), and prioritized the deepest navigable channel (thalweg) for demarcation where applicable.^[6]^[5]^[36] The Algiers Agreement, signed on March 6, 1975, between Iraq and Iran, fundamentally altered prior arrangements by shifting the Shatt al-Arab boundary to the thalweg line throughout the waterway, granting equal navigational rights and joint responsibility for dredging and maintenance; it resolved immediate clashes from 1974–1975 but sowed seeds for future repudiation, as Iraq viewed it as a temporary concession amid internal pressures.^[37]^[38]

Major Conflicts

Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)

The abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which had delineated the Iran-Iraq border along the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab waterway granting Iran navigational rights up to its eastern bank except at Abadan, served as a key pretext for Iraq's initiation of hostilities. On September 17, 1980, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared the full length of the Shatt al-Arab under Iraqi sovereignty, rejecting the agreement and citing Iran's alleged violations and revolutionary threats as justification. This move followed months of escalating border incidents, including 193 clashes between June and September 1980, amid Iraq's ambitions to secure unfettered access to the Persian Gulf for its oil exports and to annex Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan province.^[38]^[39] Iraq launched its full-scale invasion on September 22, 1980, with ground forces crossing the Shatt al-Arab to seize strategic points near Khorramshahr and Abadan, aiming to control the waterway's mouth and disrupt Iranian oil shipments from the Abadan refinery. Iraqi troops advanced rapidly, capturing Khorramshahr by October 24, 1980, after intense urban combat that inflicted heavy casualties, but Iranian defenders mounted fierce resistance along the Shatt's banks, using the marshy terrain and riverine fortifications to slow the advance. The waterway became a primary theater of attrition, with Iraqi artillery and amphibious assaults clashing against Iranian Revolutionary Guard units; estimates indicate approximately 53,000 Iranian deaths in Shatt al-Arab battles alone during the war's early phases. Iraq's initial successes secured de facto control over much of the Shatt, enabling naval patrols to blockade Iranian vessels, though Iranian speedboats and mines contested access.^[40]^[41] As Iranian counteroffensives gained momentum from 1982, including the recapture of Khorramshahr in May, fighting shifted but persisted along the Shatt, where both sides employed naval mines, gunboats, and air strikes to deny the other waterway dominance. Iraq's strategy emphasized air power to target Iranian shipping, compensating for its weaker surface navy, while Iran conducted cross-river raids and ambushes. The conflict's naval dimension escalated into the Tanker War by 1984, with Iraq declaring a 1,126-kilometer exclusion zone from the Shatt's mouth and launching over 150 attacks on Iranian tankers to cripple Tehran's economy; Iran retaliated against neutral shipping, particularly Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels supporting Iraq, leading to international naval interventions. This phase disrupted global oil flows, with attacks concentrated near the Shatt's approaches, where Iraqi Mirage jets struck from bases in southern Iraq.^[42]^[43]^[44] The war concluded with a United Nations-brokered ceasefire on August 20, 1988, under Resolution 598, after Iraq's chemical weapon-assisted offensives and Iran's faltering economy forced a stalemate; Iraq retained military superiority over the Shatt al-Arab, though formal border demarcation reverted to the 1975 thalweg line in subsequent talks, leaving navigational rights contested amid postwar debris and silting. Total casualties in Shatt-related operations contributed to the war's estimated 500,000 to 1 million deaths, underscoring the waterway's role as a chokepoint for both nations' strategic and economic survival.^[45]^[40]

Gulf Wars and Post-2003 Instability

During the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the Shatt al-Arab waterway was largely impassable due to wrecks and debris accumulated from the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War, rendering it unusable for significant Iraqi naval maneuvers or logistics while coalition forces focused on Gulf maritime operations. Iraq proposed sharing sovereignty over the waterway with Iran in exchange for neutrality or support against the U.S.-led coalition, but Iran declined, maintaining its 1975 Algiers Agreement claims without direct intervention.^[45]^[46] In the 2003 Iraq War, coalition special operations units cleared mines, sunken vessels, and obstacles from the Shatt al-Arab's northern approaches to secure maritime access for amphibious and logistics support into southern Iraq. British forces, leading the theater, captured Basra—adjacent to the waterway's Iraqi bank—on April 6, 2003, after intense urban fighting against Fedayeen Saddam irregulars, thereby gaining control of key oil export terminals at the port of Umm Qasr linked to the Shatt al-Arab. Human rights monitors documented civilian impacts along the waterway's banks in May 2003, amid ongoing skirmishes.^[47]^[48] Post-2003, Iraq's sectarian instability and weak central governance allowed Iran to expand influence over the Shatt al-Arab corridor via proxy Shia militias in Basra province, facilitating arms smuggling and economic leverage without formal territorial changes. No bilateral boundary treaty has superseded the contested 1975 thalweg line, leaving demarcation ambiguous and prone to friction. Iran's upstream damming of tributaries reduced freshwater inflows by up to 50% in some years, intensifying salinity intrusion that hampered Iraqi navigation, agriculture, and port operations in the waterway.^[32]^[49]^[50] Incidents underscored persistent tensions: in June 2004, Iranian forces detained eight British personnel conducting patrols in disputed sections of the waterway, releasing them after three days amid diplomatic protests. Iraq affirmed unresolved border disputes, including Shatt al-Arab control, as late as March 2009. Iranian-backed groups dominated Basra's security by 2007–2008, exploiting insurgency vacuums to control customs and smuggling routes along the banks, contributing to local corruption and militia violence that displaced over 10,000 residents in southern port areas by 2010.^[51]^[52]^[50]

Maritime Access and Infrastructure

The Shatt al-Arab waterway enables maritime access to key Iraqi ports in southern Iraq, including Basra and upstream facilities, but persistent sedimentation necessitates continuous dredging to maintain navigable depths. North Umm Qasr's docks are dredged to a depth of 12 meters, accommodating most commercial vessels, while the Shatt al-Arab channel requires regular maintenance to support back-and-forth navigation for trade and oil exports.^[53] Umm Qasr Port, Iraq's primary deep-water facility located on the al-Faw Peninsula, reduces dependence on the Shatt al-Arab by providing direct Gulf access, with pilotage commencing at the waterway's entrance and channels designed for wide, deep vessel transit.^[54]^[55] Khor Al-Zubair Port offers supplementary deep-water berthing on the western side, supporting Iraq's export-oriented shipping needs near the Iranian border.^[56] Basra Port, situated directly on the Shatt al-Arab's western bank, functions as a multi-purpose terminal for general cargo, oil products, and containers, though its shallower drafts limit larger ship access compared to offshore alternatives.^[56] Emerging infrastructure includes the Al-Faw Grand Port at the Shatt al-Arab estuary, where five container berths were constructed by Daewoo E&C, with docks inaugurated in November 2024 to handle increased Gulf trade volumes.^[57]^[58] A 2.4-kilometer immersed tunnel beneath the waterway is under development to connect Al-Faw to Umm Qasr and international highways, enhancing multimodal logistics.^[59] Bilateral efforts to improve access culminated in a June 2019 agreement between Iran and Iraq for joint dredging, addressing decades of neglect that had impeded navigation; this cooperation aims to sustain the channel for shared economic interests, including access to Iranian ports like Bandar Imam Khomeini near the mouth.^[60]^[61] Multibeam surveys have supported maintenance of a 400-meter-wide navigation channel from the outer bar, with historical dredging efforts targeting bars to achieve minimum depths of around 6.4 meters over obstacles.^[62]^[63]

Strategic Importance for Oil and Trade

The Shatt al-Arab provides Iraq with its exclusive navigable access to the Persian Gulf, serving as the conduit for nearly all seaborne crude oil exports from the country's southern terminals. In 2024, Iraq shipped over 3.2 million barrels per day of crude oil solely from facilities in the waterway's estuary, including the Basra Oil Terminal (BOT) and Khor al-Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT).^[64] The BOT, a primary export hub, operates at a capacity of about 3.4 million barrels per day as of mid-2024, handling grades like Basra Medium and Heavy from nearby fields that account for the majority of national production.^[64] This dependence renders the waterway indispensable to Iraq's economy, where oil exports generate the preponderance of government revenues and foreign exchange, with southern Basra province fields dominating output at over 90% of total crude.^[64] Control or disruption of navigation through the Shatt al-Arab could thus precipitate acute economic vulnerabilities, as alternative export routes like pipelines to neighboring countries handle only marginal volumes compared to Gulf shipments.^[65] Ongoing infrastructure expansions, such as new sealines, aim to enhance capacity by up to 2.7 million barrels per day to accommodate rising production.^[64] For Iran, the Shatt al-Arab supports ancillary oil-related activities via eastern-bank facilities like the Abadan refinery and Khorramshahr port, though the country's principal crude exports bypass the waterway in favor of direct Gulf terminals such as Kharg Island.^[66] Non-oil trade through the shared channel includes general cargo at Basra-area ports, which historically routed about two-thirds of Iraq's non-petroleum seaborne imports and exports, underscoring the waterway's broader commercial role despite oil's preeminence.^[67] The mutual reliance on unimpeded passage highlights its geopolitical leverage in regional energy security and commerce.^[68]

Environmental and Ecological Concerns

Water Management and Flow Reduction

The flow of the Shatt al-Arab has declined sharply due to upstream water management focused on dam construction for irrigation, hydropower, and flood control, with unilateral decisions by riparian states overriding basin-wide coordination. Historical annual discharge at Fao station averaged 1,189 m³/s during 1977–1978, contributing to a total inflow of about 37.45 km³/year from the Tigris, Euphrates, Karun, and Karkheh rivers; by 2017–2018, this had fallen to 58 m³/s (1.83 km³/year from the Tigris alone), a reduction exceeding 95%.^[69] The river's potential mean annual flow of 73.6 billion cubic meters (BCM), derived from combined tributaries, remains unrealized amid these practices.^[1] Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), initiated in the 1980s and featuring dams like Atatürk (completed 1992) and Ilısu (operational phases from 2018), controls roughly 45% of the Euphrates' resources and has cut downstream flows into Syria and Iraq by 30–55%, with current reductions already at 40% before full project completion.^[70] ^[71] ^[72] Reservoir filling prioritizes seasonal irrigation releases, minimizing winter-spring inflows critical for the Shatt al-Arab's volume. In Iran, dams on transboundary tributaries—such as Dez (1962, 3.34 BCM capacity) and Karkheh (2001, 4.7 BCM capacity) on the Karkheh, and multiple Karun basin structures—have diverted waters historically contributing up to 30 BCM annually, reducing Karun discharge from 25.7 BCM pre-1963 to 20.5 BCM thereafter.^[1] ^[73] These account for about 40% of the Shatt al-Arab's Iraqi-segment inflow, amplifying deficits during dry periods.^[74] Iraq's management, including agricultural diversions and incomplete infrastructure like proposed regulators at Ras al-Bisha, addresses symptoms rather than upstream causes, as inflows from Turkey and Iran dictate baseline volumes.^[75] Absent enforceable treaties—despite ad hoc bilateral talks—these practices sustain chronic underflow, with Euphrates and Tigris contributions halved since the 1970s due to combined storage exceeding 100 BCM across the basin.^[1] ^[76]

Pollution, Salinity, and Biodiversity Loss

The Shatt al-Arab River faces severe pollution from multiple anthropogenic sources, including industrial effluents from oil refineries, petrochemical plants, power stations, and paper mills, as well as untreated sewage and solid waste dumping, particularly around Basra.^[77] ^[78] Heavy metal concentrations in river sediments, such as cadmium, lead, and zinc, exceed background levels due to these inputs, with spatio-temporal analyses showing highest pollution near urban and industrial zones.^[18] Water quality assessments indicate elevated levels of total dissolved solids (TDS) and biochemical oxygen demand (BOD), rendering portions of the river unsuitable for aquatic life and human use.^[79] Agricultural runoff further exacerbates nutrient loading, contributing to eutrophication.^[80] Salinity in the Shatt al-Arab has risen sharply due to reduced freshwater inflows from upstream dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers—primarily managed by Turkey and Iran—allowing greater seawater intrusion from the Persian Gulf.^[81] ^[82] In 2018, salinity levels increased over fivefold in Basra, with TDS rising from approximately 1,000 mg/L to more than 5,000 mg/L, triggering a public health crisis that hospitalized thousands due to contaminated drinking water.^[83] By 2023, groundwater salinity in adjacent areas like Al-Fao reached levels impacting soil fertility, forcing farmers to abandon date palm orchards as salt accumulation degraded arable land.^[84] ^[85] These changes stem from diminished river discharge, dropping to historic lows of under 100 cubic meters per second in dry seasons, inverting the natural estuarine gradient.^[86] Biodiversity loss in the Shatt al-Arab is directly linked to pollution and hypersalinity, which disrupt aquatic ecosystems and food webs. Histopathological studies of fish species, such as Barbus sharpeyi, reveal gill and liver damage from heavy metals and hydrocarbons, correlating with population declines.^[77] Fish diversity indices have fluctuated markedly from 2021 to 2022, with species richness dropping in hypersaline zones due to osmotic stress and habitat alteration.^[87] Submerged aquatic vegetation, vital for habitat, shows reduced density and coverage amid salinity spikes, while estuarine salinity shifts have indirectly affected Gulf marine mammals by altering nutrient plumes and prey availability.^[88] ^[89] Overall, organic pollution indices indicate moderate to high degradation, with phytoplankton and benthic communities exhibiting reduced biomass.^[90]

Current Status and Future Prospects

Bilateral Relations and Cooperation

Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, Iraq-Iran relations shifted from outright hostility to tentative cooperation, facilitated by Iraq's weakened position and Iran's growing regional influence, allowing for diplomatic initiatives on border demarcation including the Shatt al-Arab. In March 2009, the governments established joint technical teams to map their 1,200-kilometer shared border, with a focus on resolving ambiguities in the waterway's delineation stemming from prior treaties.^[91] Iraq soon voiced reservations, affirming persistent differences over the exact boundary line, particularly near key ports like Basra and Abadan.^[52] A notable advancement came on March 11, 2019, during Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's state visit to Baghdad, when both nations endorsed a joint statement reaffirming the 1975 Algiers Agreement's thalweg principle for the Shatt al-Arab boundary—placing the line along the river's deepest navigable channel, with exceptions for Iranian concessions in the eastern bank near the estuary.^[92] This pact included commitments to collaborative dredging and channel expansion to improve navigation and trade access, addressing siltation that had hampered maritime traffic since the Iran-Iraq War.^[92] Iraqi critics, however, raised alarms over perceived risks to national sovereignty, fearing the arrangement could cede effective control of vital stretches—up to 2 kilometers in some estimates—to Iran amid its political leverage in Baghdad.^[92] Joint border commissions and navigation protocols have since aimed at operational normalization, such as safety measures for shipping and cross-river trade, but these have been hampered by Iraq's internal instability, Iranian upstream dam constructions affecting flow, and lingering distrust from wartime atrocities.^[8] No binding demarcation treaty has been ratified post-1988, leaving the waterway as a symbol of unresolved grievances.^[32] As of 2024, tensions resurfaced during Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's engagements with Iraqi leaders, where the Shatt al-Arab dispute featured alongside issues like water allocation and Iranian strikes into Iraqi territory, indicating fragile progress despite economic interdependence in oil exports via the shared estuary.^[93]^[8]

Ongoing Challenges and Potential Resolutions

The Shatt al-Arab continues to face acute hydrological challenges, primarily driven by reduced freshwater inflows from the Tigris and Euphrates, compounded by upstream damming in Turkey and Iran, prolonged droughts, and climate variability. Salinity levels in the waterway have surged to nearly 40,000 total dissolved solids (TDS) as of 2025, primarily due to Persian Gulf seawater intrusion amid diminished river volumes, rendering much of the water unfit for drinking, irrigation, or aquatic life.^[94] ^[95] This has resulted in the extinction or severe decline of 26–30 marine species in Basra governorate, alongside broader ecological degradation from pollution sources including oil spills, untreated sewage, and agricultural runoff.^[94] Geopolitical tensions persist, with Iraq attributing heightened salinity partly to Iranian actions, such as port expansions and water diversions that allegedly encroach on Iraqi navigational rights and exacerbate flow imbalances.^[96] Claims of territorial erosion include an approximate 2-kilometer loss of Iraqi-controlled Shatt al-Arab shoreline to Iran since 2003, fueling accusations of de facto annexation through infrastructure development.^[92] These issues symbolize enduring historical grievances from pre-1975 disputes and the Iran-Iraq War, serving as a latent flashpoint despite normalized bilateral ties post-Saddam Hussein.^[97] Domestic factors in Iraq, including corruption and inefficient water governance, further amplify vulnerabilities, hindering effective response to transboundary pressures.^[94] Potential resolutions hinge on reinforced bilateral mechanisms and multilateral engagement. The September 2025 21-point cooperation agreement between Iraq and Iran emphasizes economic and political collaboration, providing a framework that could incorporate joint waterway monitoring or water-sharing protocols to address salinity and navigation.^[98] Complementary security memoranda, such as the August 2025 Iraqi-Iranian border MoU, reaffirm commitments to prior pacts like the 1975 Algiers Agreement, potentially enabling demilitarized zones and coordinated dredging to restore navigability.^[99] Broader diplomacy, including trilateral negotiations with Turkey under frameworks like the 1987 protocol on Euphrates-Tigris flows, could mandate minimum discharge quotas to counteract upstream retention, estimated to reduce Iraqi inflows by up to 50% during dry periods.^[95] Iraqi investments in desalination plants and upstream reservoirs, paired with enforcement against illegal abstractions, would complement these efforts, though sustained political will remains critical to avert escalation.^[94]

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[99]
Iran, Iraq sign 21-point cooperation agreement covering economy ...
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