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Peace and Democracy Party

The Peace and Democracy Party (Turkish: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi; Kurdish: Partiya Aştî û Demokrasiyê, ) was a pro- in that operated from to as the successor to the (DTP), which had been shut down by Turkey's for alleged separatist activities. The party focused on advancing linguistic, cultural, and political rights through democratic means, including proposals for regional within a unitary Turkish state. Co-chaired by and Gültan Kışanak, the BDP emphasized non-violent resolution to the issue and participated in peace initiatives amid Turkey's long-running with Kurdish militants. In the 2011 general elections, the BDP secured approximately 6.6% of the vote through independent candidates aligned with the party, earning 29 seats in the Grand National Assembly, which bolstered its role as the primary parliamentary voice for Kurdish interests. The party's electoral strategy involved labor and peace alliances, reflecting efforts to broaden appeal beyond ethnic Kurds to left-leaning voters. However, the BDP faced significant controversies, including repeated accusations from Turkish authorities of serving as a political front for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group designated as terrorist by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union; these claims led to the imprisonment of numerous leaders and members on charges of aiding terrorism or propaganda. The party consistently rejected these allegations, asserting its commitment to parliamentary democracy and legal political advocacy, though such defenses did little to avert ongoing legal and security pressures. By 2014, amid evolving political dynamics, the BDP transitioned its activities into the newly formed Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), marking the end of its independent existence while perpetuating the pro-Kurdish movement's institutional continuity.

History

Formation and Predecessors

The Peace and Democracy Party (; Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi) was founded on 2 May 2008 in by a group of politicians and activists seeking to sustain pro- political advocacy amid Turkey's history of judicial closures targeting such organizations. This establishment reflected a strategic response to the recurring dissolution of predecessors under Article 68 of the Turkish Constitution, which prohibits parties from engaging in activities deemed supportive of separatism or armed organizations like the (). The BDP emerged parallel to the still-active (), formed in 2005 as a successor to the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), positioning itself as a contingency vehicle to preserve parliamentary and grassroots representation if further legal actions ensued. Preceding pro-Kurdish parties had faced systematic closures by the for alleged PKK affiliations, including the (HADEP), shut down in March 2003 after the later ruled the decision violated . HADEP itself had succeeded earlier entities like the Democracy Party (DEP), banned in 1994, illustrating a pattern where new formations repeatedly arose to circumvent bans and advocate for linguistic, cultural, and political rights denied under Turkey's unitary framework. DEHAP, established in 2002 following HADEP's travails, similarly emphasized and but dissolved into the DTP amid merger efforts to consolidate support before the 2007 elections. The BDP's creation coincided with escalated Turkish military campaigns against PKK militants in southeastern and cross-border incursions into , heightening tensions over Kurdish demands for education in and broader democratic reforms. This context underscored the party's role in channeling nonviolent political expression for constituencies, even as Turkish authorities viewed such groups with suspicion for potential PKK overlap, a dynamic that had prompted the preemptive organizational buildup.

Early Activities and Electoral Engagements (2008–2011)

The (BDP), following the December 2009 ban on its predecessor the (DTP), assumed control of pro- political activities and local administrations in southeastern , organizing protests against the closure that involved mass demonstrations in cities like and clashes with police. These events highlighted the party's role in mobilizing grassroots opposition to perceived restrictions on Kurdish political expression. In the 29 March 2009 local elections, pro-Kurdish candidates affiliated with the DTP—which the succeeded amid ongoing legal challenges to Kurdish parties—secured mayoral victories in five southeastern provinces, including , Batman, Hakkari, , and , along with numerous district municipalities, reflecting robust regional backing despite national electoral barriers and prior bans on similar lists. The built on this foundation by supporting the retention of these local gains post-DTP closure, navigating administrative transitions to maintain influence in Kurdish-majority areas. For the 12 June 2011 general elections, the circumvented Turkey's 10% national —intended to exclude smaller parties from parliamentary seats—by endorsing 61 candidates, primarily in southeastern districts. This approach yielded 36 successful outcomes, with the elected independents forming the BDP's parliamentary in the , marking a significant expansion of pro-Kurdish legislative presence.

Role in Kurdish Peace Process (2012–2013)

The (BDP) served as a key intermediary in facilitating indirect negotiations between the Turkish government and the (PKK) during the early phase of the Kurdish peace process. In December , secret talks between Turkish intelligence officials and PKK representatives in laid groundwork, but BDP's involvement became public with authorized visits to PKK founder , imprisoned on İmralı Island since 1999. These visits enabled the relay of messages aimed at de-escalating the conflict, which had intensified with over 700 deaths in alone. The inaugural BDP delegation visit occurred on January 3, 2013, comprising parliamentarians including Ahmet Türk and Ayla Akat Ata, who met Öcalan to convey government overtures and receive initial responses on ending violence. Follow-up visits followed, including a second on February 14, 2013, and a third around March 18, 2013, during which Öcalan drafted letters outlining steps for PKK and BDP members, such as co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, transported these communications, bridging the gap between Ankara and PKK leadership. On March 21, 2013, coinciding with Nevruz celebrations, BDP deputies publicly read Öcalan's letter at a rally in Diyarbakır attended by tens of thousands, calling for the PKK to cease armed activities, withdraw fighters to northern Iraq, and pursue democratic means. The PKK endorsed this on the same day, declaring a unilateral ceasefire and halting operations, which BDP announced as a historic shift. Subsequently, BDP officials traveled to PKK bases in Iraq's Qandil Mountains and Europe to brief leaders like Murat Karayılan, securing alignment with Öcalan's directives. This mediation contributed to immediate de-escalation, with no major attacks recorded in the weeks following the announcement and a broader lull in hostilities through mid-2013 as withdrawal preparations began on May 8. Conflict-related fatalities, which exceeded 900 in the prior 18 months, dropped sharply in the ceasefire's early phase, reflecting temporary adherence by both sides.

Ideology and Political Positions

Core Ideological Foundations

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) espoused an ideology rooted in democratic confederalism, a paradigm developed by PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan during his imprisonment, which prioritizes decentralized, over centralized state authority. This approach, detailed in Öcalan's writings, envisions a non-statist system of communal assemblies fostering direct participation, communal economy, and liberation from capitalist and patriarchal hierarchies. BDP's party program reflected these tenets by advocating participatory democracy at the local level, where citizens engage in decision-making through empowered municipal structures, rejecting top-down governance in favor of pluralistic, transparent processes. Central to BDP's foundations were intertwined commitments to feminism, ecological sustainability, and socialist principles, positioning women's emancipation—termed "jineology" in Öcalan's framework—as foundational to democratic renewal and societal ecology. The party enforced a 40% gender quota in its organizational bodies and supported affirmative measures for equality, viewing gender liberation as integral to dismantling feudal and patriarchal remnants. Ecologically, it promoted sustainable resource use and opposed projects threatening biodiversity, aligning with Öcalan's synthesis of communalism and environmental stewardship as antidotes to industrial exploitation. BDP explicitly repudiated ethno-nationalist ideologies, critiquing Turkish state monoculturalism and Kurdish tribal-feudal structures alike as barriers to egalitarian multi-ethnic coexistence, in favor of confederal networks transcending ethnic boundaries through voluntary association and cultural pluralism. This stance extended to labor rights, emphasizing union freedoms, decent employment, and equitable wealth distribution to counter capitalist disparities, while anti-militarism underscored opposition to armed conflict resolution, prioritizing dialogue and demilitarization for societal peace. These positions facilitated ideological affinity with Turkish leftist movements, manifesting in shared advocacy for social justice beyond ethnic lines.

Views on Kurdish Rights and Autonomy

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) promoted democratic autonomy as a non-secessionist solution to Kurdish demands, envisioning decentralized local governance structures in Kurdish-populated regions to foster self-administration while remaining within Turkey's unitary framework. This approach, articulated in party platforms and by leaders such as co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, emphasized communal assemblies and enhanced municipal powers for cultural and political decision-making, drawing from 's writings but adapted to parliamentary advocacy. BDP municipalities, particularly in southeastern provinces where the party held sway after the 2009 local elections, implemented pilot initiatives like community councils to prototype this model, focusing on service delivery and dispute resolution at the grassroots level. Central to BDP's positions were demands for official recognition of Kurdish identity, including mother-tongue education from preschool through university levels and the legalization of -medium broadcasting and The party's outlined these as prerequisites for cultural preservation, arguing that assimilationist policies had exacerbated ethnic tensions, while proposing constitutional amendments for without territorial partition. efforts highlighted by BDP included devolving authority over education, health, and to regional assemblies, aiming to address disparities in Kurdish areas through participatory democracy rather than centralized state control. Public opinion surveys among Kurds in Turkey during BDP's active period revealed predominant support for democratic autonomy over independence, with studies indicating 60-70% favoring enhanced cultural and local rights within the state due to geographic dispersal and economic interdependence with Turkey. Turkish governments, however, dismissed these proposals as incompatible with national unity, interpreting democratic autonomy as a precursor to de facto separatism akin to PKK objectives, leading to legal scrutiny of BDP rhetoric.

Stances on Broader Issues

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) opposed Turkish military cross-border operations in northern Iraq, viewing them as counterproductive extensions of the state's repressive approach to the Kurdish conflict domestically, and advocated instead for diplomatic resolutions aligned with the ongoing peace process. In the context of party representatives criticized Ankara's policies toward Kurdish groups there as risking escalation of regional tensions without addressing root causes of instability, framing such interventions as part of a broader pattern of militarized foreign policy that undermined prospects for negotiation. The BDP supported Turkey's European Union accession negotiations, positing that EU membership criteria would compel structural reforms to enhance and minority protections, while condemning the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's slowing of the process as evidence of authoritarian consolidation. On economic matters, the party endorsed elements of the democratic autonomy framework, promoting cooperatives and localized development initiatives to foster self-reliance and alleviate poverty in economically marginalized southeastern provinces, drawing from communal economic models to counter centralized state policies.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Internal Organization

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) adhered to the standard hierarchical framework mandated by Turkish political party law, with a Central Executive Board (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu, MYK) serving as the primary decision-making body for national strategy, policy execution, and coordination of party activities. This board, elected by the Party Council (Parti Meclisi), oversaw internal regulations, membership approvals, and relations with affiliated structures. Provincial organizations (il örgütleri) formed the backbone of local operations, handling district-level mobilization, candidate selection, and community engagement, with a concentration in southeastern provinces like Diyarbakır and Van where Kurdish populations predominated. These branches facilitated direct voter outreach and were instrumental in electoral logistics, such as organizing rallies and information campaigns. The party incorporated specialized affiliates, including youth wings (Gençlik Kolları), to target demographic-specific recruitment and activism, fostering involvement among students and young professionals in urban centers. Internal processes emphasized participatory elements, such as consultations via local assemblies, which aimed to integrate grassroots input into decision-making and promote a model of bottom-up democracy relative to other Turkish parties.

Prominent Leaders and Figures

Selahattin Demirtaş, a trained human rights lawyer born in 1973, was elected co-chair of the (BDP) at its inaugural congress in Ankara in early 2010, serving in that role until the party's transition in 2014. He represented the Mardin province in the Grand National Assembly from 2007 and focused on parliamentary advocacy for minority rights during his BDP tenure. Gültan Kışanak, born in 1961 and a graduate of Ege University's journalism program, joined the BDP immediately after its 2008 founding and was elected co-chair alongside Demirtaş in 2010, holding the position until 2014. A former independent MP who had served with the Democratic Society Party (DTP), she emphasized grassroots mobilization and was reelected as an MP from Diyarbakır in the 2011 general elections under the BDP banner. Ahmet Türk, born in 1942 and a longstanding Kurdish activist elected as DTP co-chair in 2007, transitioned his influence to the BDP following the DTP's closure by Turkey's Constitutional Court in December 2009. As a former Mardin MP deprived of his seat in 2009, Türk remained a bridging figure between generational activists, advising on party strategy and public outreach while running as a BDP-aligned independent in subsequent elections.

Relationship with PKK and Terrorism Allegations

Historical Ties and Organizational Overlaps

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) maintained close organizational ties to the (PKK), characterized by shared personnel and functional overlaps in political mobilization. Reports from security analyses identified the BDP as a PKK-affiliated entity, with party rallies serving as platforms for explicit expressions of support for the PKK's armed activities. Former PKK militants integrated into BDP structures, enabling the party to channel resources and messaging aligned with the group's objectives, as documented in assessments of Kurdish insurgent support networks. Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK's founder and imprisoned leader, wielded direct influence over BDP operations through mediated communications. BDP delegations conducted multiple visits to Öcalan on İmralı Island, relaying his instructions to PKK commanders in Qandil, Iraq, including directives on ceasefires and withdrawals. On February 14, 2013, Öcalan issued a message via BDP intermediaries urging PKK ringleaders to abandon armed struggle in favor of democratic politics, a stance the party disseminated to its base. These ties manifested in joint public events, particularly Newroz celebrations organized by the BDP, which featured PKK flags, Öcalan imagery, and militant symbols as markers of solidarity. During the March 21, 2013, Newroz in Diyarbakır, a BDP-coordinated gathering of over one million attendees heard Öcalan's relayed call for PKK disarmament, blending party political advocacy with insurgent iconography. Such overlaps reinforced perceptions of the BDP as an extension of PKK urban operations. The PKK's status as a terrorist organization—designated by Turkey since its inception, by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997, and by the European Union on the common terrorist list since 2002—highlighted the implications of these connections. The BDP refrained from unequivocal condemnations of PKK violence, framing attacks as responses to state oppression rather than terrorism, which sustained operational alignment despite international proscriptions.

Accusations of Supporting Militant Activities

Turkish authorities, through operations targeting the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK)—described as the PKK's urban organizational arm—accused numerous BDP officials of providing logistical and material aid to PKK militants, including sheltering suspects and facilitating their movements. In April 2011, a high-profile trial in Diyarbakır involved 152 defendants, among them six elected BDP mayors, charged with aiding PKK activities such as propaganda, recruitment, and resource provision under anti-terrorism laws. Similarly, in August 2011, 12 BDP mayors faced prosecution for alleged conspiracy to support PKK operations, with prosecutors citing intercepted communications and witness testimonies of mayors refusing to hand over PKK-linked individuals to security forces. BDP leaders and members regularly participated in funerals for deceased PKK fighters, eulogizing them as "martyrs" in public statements and ceremonies, actions that Turkish officials contended amounted to rhetorical endorsement of militant violence. For instance, during January 2013 funerals in for three PKK-linked activists, BDP representatives joined crowds chanting pro-PKK slogans, amid accusations that such events boosted militant morale following a breakdown in cease-fire efforts. Prosecutors in KCK cases further alleged that these gatherings served as recruitment platforms, correlating with subsequent upticks in PKK attacks on security forces in southeastern Turkey during 2011-2012. Allegations of financial flows from BDP-affiliated municipalities to PKK structures emerged in Turkish Finance Ministry probes tied to KCK investigations, claiming diversion of funds for militant procurement and family support. In the 2011 mayoral trials, evidence presented included bank records purportedly showing transfers from municipal budgets to PKK-controlled entities, though defendants contested the links as legitimate . These claims formed part of broader indictments asserting systematic siphoning, with Turkish officials estimating millions of lira redirected annually from Kurdish-majority local governments under BDP control.

Perspectives from Turkish State and International Observers

The Turkish government has consistently characterized the (BDP) as the parliamentary extension of the (PKK), asserting that it serves to advance the militant group's agenda within legal political channels. This framing is supported by evidence from the KCK operations, a series of investigations launched in 2009 that uncovered wiretapped communications and confessions from detained individuals revealing coordinated activities between BDP members and PKK structures, including directives on electoral strategies and propaganda dissemination. In 2012, Prime Minister explicitly accused the BDP of maintaining organic ties to the PKK, refusing to condemn its violence, and representing the terrorist organization's irade (will) in the Grand National Assembly, thereby undermining national security efforts. International observers have echoed concerns about the BDP's alignment with the PKK, though with varying emphasis on security implications. In 2011, parliamentarians from the European Parliament's Socialist and Liberal groups issued a stern warning to the BDP to end its role as a PKK appendage, highlighting instances of overt coordination such as meetings between party officials and PKK militants that suggested dual loyalty incompatible with democratic norms. The United States, maintaining the PKK's designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997, has prioritized countering the group's transnational operations, noting in periodic reviews that its activities in southeastern Turkey—regions overlapping with BDP strongholds—pose ongoing threats to regional stability without directly endorsing or refuting Turkish claims of partisan complicity. Empirical data reinforces the Turkish state's observations on geographic overlap, with BDP electoral successes concentrated in PKK operational heartlands; for instance, in the 2011 general elections, the party secured over 40% of votes in provinces like and , areas marked by persistent PKK insurgent actions and cross-border incursions documented in security reports. This correlation underscores assessments that BDP mobilization often parallels heightened militant recruitment and logistics in the same southeastern zones, prioritizing state-derived intelligence over partisan denials.

Legal Challenges and Prosecutions

KCK Operations and Mass Trials

The KCK operations, initiated by Turkish authorities in April 2009, comprised a series of security raids targeting the (KCK), which the Turkish government designated as the 's parallel civilian and urban organizational structure operating within legal entities like the . These operations, spanning through 2012, resulted in the detention of over 7,700 executives, employees, and affiliates, with approximately 3,900 individuals formally arrested under Turkey's anti-terrorism laws, primarily Article 314 of the prohibiting membership in armed organizations. Among those detained were numerous elected officials, including mayors and parliamentary deputies, accused of facilitating KCK/ coordination through political activities. Mass trials stemming from these operations were centralized in Diyarbakır, where special assize courts prosecuted hundreds of defendants for alleged KCK membership and related offenses. In the principal Diyarbakır KCK trial involving 153 suspects—including six BDP mayors—convictions were secured largely on digital evidence such as intercepted communications and wiretap recordings purportedly demonstrating hierarchical links to PKK command structures. Sentences typically ranged from several years to over two decades for organizational membership, with courts emphasizing the KCK's role in embedding PKK directives into civilian spheres like local governance and advocacy. The Turkish Court of Cassation, as the Supreme Court of Appeals, reviewed and upheld numerous KCK-related convictions, affirming lower court findings on the evidentiary basis of digital intercepts and the classification of KCK activities as extensions of PKK operations under anti-terror legislation. This appellate validation extended to cases involving BDP-linked defendants, solidifying sentences without overturning the core organizational membership charges during the 2009–2012 period.

Individual Cases Against Members

One prominent case involved Hatip Dicle, a senior BDP member and parliamentary candidate, who was convicted by the Ankara 11th High Criminal Court in 2010 for disseminating propaganda in support of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based on statements made in 2009. His appeal was rejected in June 2011, resulting in a prison sentence that barred him from assuming his Diyarbakır seat after winning in the June 12, 2011, general election; the Supreme Election Board reassigned the seat to the runner-up from the ruling Justice and Development Party. This decision contributed to a partial boycott of parliament by BDP-affiliated lawmakers, exacerbating operational disruptions within the party. Dicle faced additional charges in October 2011 for content in his book and a speech at a 2007 conference, potentially carrying up to 10 years' imprisonment under anti-terrorism laws. Selahattin Demirtaş, BDP co-chair at the time, was convicted in a separate proceeding for propaganda favoring an illegal organization, stemming from public statements interpreted by prosecutors as endorsing PKK activities; the sentence was issued prior to the party's 2011 electoral gains. Such rulings frequently targeted speeches advocating Kurdish cultural and political rights, which Turkish courts deemed as promoting , leading to fines or suspended terms that nonetheless damaged party cohesion. These individual prosecutions, often upheld on appeal, created temporary leadership vacuums, as key figures like Dicle were sidelined, forcing the BDP to rely on interim executives and complicating coordination amid ongoing legal scrutiny from 2011 to 2013. Sebahat Tuncel, a BDP MP, faced judicial proceedings in April 2010 initiated by the Ankara 11th High Criminal Court over alleged propaganda in her political activities, reflecting a pattern of targeted cases against elected representatives that hindered the party's legislative engagement. While some convictions resulted in acquittals upon retrial—such as Dicle's 2012 exoneration in Erzurum—the initial outcomes imposed restrictions on mobility and decision-making, amplifying internal strains during critical periods like post-election organization.

Constitutional Court Proceedings

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) operated under persistent threats of closure pursuant to Article 68 of the , which authorizes the dissolution of parties deemed centers of activities violating the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation. The 2009 closure of its predecessor, the (DTP), on December 11, established a binding precedent, as the Constitutional Court ruled the DTP had organic links to the (PKK) and promoted separatism through statements and actions. In response, BDP leaders moderated their public discourse, emphasizing democratic rights and cultural demands over explicit autonomy claims, to evade classification as a separatist focus. Although complaints and preliminary probes into alleged separatist propaganda surfaced, including during the 2013 initiation of government-PKK peace talks facilitated by BDP intermediaries, no formal closure indictment was accepted by the Constitutional Court prior to the party's 2014 merger into the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). The 2010 constitutional referendum amendments raised procedural hurdles, mandating parliamentary review for closure requests and allowing partial sanctions like state aid suspension for lesser violations, thereby demanding rigorous proof of centralized anti-unity intent. Evidentiary standards played a decisive role in forestalling proceedings, requiring demonstrable to separatism beyond isolated statements—criteria unmet by BDP materials, which prioritized parliamentary advocacy and local governance over militant endorsements. This restraint preserved the party's functionality through the 2011 and 2014 elections, distinguishing it from prior pro-Kurdish entities shuttered for insufficiently substantiated but analogous allegations.

Electoral Performance and Achievements

Key Election Results

In the 2011 Turkish general election held on June 12, the (BDP) bypassed the 10% national threshold by endorsing 61 independent candidates under the banner. These candidates secured 36 seats in the 550-member , reflecting concentrated support in Kurdish-majority southeastern provinces where turnout and vote shares were significantly higher than national averages. The party's local election performance underscored its regional dominance. In the March 30, 2014, local elections, BDP candidates won 102 municipalities, primarily districts in the southeast, up from prior holdings and demonstrating effective mobilization through alliances with local leftist groups to consolidate Kurdish voter bases.
Election TypeDateNational Vote ShareKey OutcomesRegional Emphasis
General (independents)June 12, 2011~6.57% (collective for bloc)36 parliamentary seatsDominant in 10+ southeastern provinces, often >40% locally
LocalMarch 30, 20144.23%102 municipalities wonControl in >90 southeastern districts, boosting pro-Kurdish governance in Kurdish areas

Local Governance and Policy Impacts

In the 2009 local elections, the BDP secured control of 99 municipalities across southeastern Turkey, including Diyarbakır's metropolitan area and its districts, enabling implementation of localized policies focused on cultural preservation, social services, and urban infrastructure. Under mayors like Osman Baydemir in Diyarbakır, municipal budgets prioritized community-oriented projects despite financial limitations, with personnel costs often exceeding 60% of allocations in districts like Bağlar. These efforts yielded measurable gains in and , though uneven across resource-strapped areas. Cultural investments emphasized Kurdish heritage and arts, fostering community engagement in districts such as Kayapınar and Sur. The Greater Diyarbakır Municipality established the in 2011 for music education and the for language events, while Kayapınar opened the 5,500 m² in 2010, hosting festivals like Filmamed in 2012. Sur's served 116 children and youth through theater programs starting in 2011. These initiatives, funded partly through local revenues and EU/World Bank grants, increased green spaces from 0.5 to 0.8 m² per capita citywide by 2014 and supported tourism via restorations like city walls. Waste management saw incremental improvements, with sanitation drives in Yenişehir reducing litter in dense areas and Bağlar's canalization efforts lowering typhoid incidence to 1% by the late 2000s, building on post-1999 infrastructure upgrades that curbed epidemics through awareness campaigns. Tensions over central government tax distributions hampered operations, as Diyarbakır officials reported deliberate underfunding that exacerbated inherited debts and limited cash aid, prompting reliance on high local taxes in wealthier districts like Kayapınar, which remained debt-free. Participatory budgeting via neighborhood assemblies mitigated some shortfalls but highlighted disparities, with poorer areas like Sur delaying projects until 2012. These fiscal strains contributed to probes under , foreshadowing trustee interventions in select BDP-held posts by 2014, though widespread replacements occurred later under successor parties. BDP municipalities advanced women's roles through mandatory quotas—requiring at least 40% female candidates and co-mayoral systems pairing male and female leaders—and targeted programs. In Sur, five KADEM support centers opened from 2010-2013 for counseling and cooperatives, while Bağlar's Jiyan Women’s Labor Bazaar in 2012 enabled economic outlets, employing women in roles like drivers. These raised female workforce participation to around 4% in Bağlar by 2009, with centers like DİKASUM providing shelters and training, reflecting the party's ideological commitment to gender parity amid broader regional conservatism. Outcomes included enhanced local decision-making input, though sustained impact depended on ongoing funding.

Criticisms and Controversies

Claims of Undermining National Unity

Turkish nationalists, including leaders from the , have accused the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) of undermining Turkey's national unity by promoting Kurdish ethnic identity in ways that challenge the unitary Turkish state structure enshrined in the constitution. MHP leader specifically criticized BDP's involvement in constitutional reform discussions as advancing separatist policies that prioritize ethnic divisions over national cohesion. These claims center on BDP's party platforms and rhetoric, which rejected assimilation into a singular "Turkish" identity and instead advocated for recognition of distinct ethnic affiliations, conflicting with Article 66 of the that binds all citizens to the Turkish state as "Turks." A key example cited by critics is BDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş's 2011 statement that the term "Turkish nation" had ceased to function as an inclusive concept, interpreting it as a direct repudiation of the foundational national narrative established by the Republic. Nationalists argued this stance encouraged dual loyalties, with party documents calling for revisions to oaths, anthems, and symbols to accommodate Kurdish specificity, thereby eroding the symbols of unified statehood. In practice, BDP deputies boycotted the 2011 parliamentary swearing-in ceremony, refusing to recite the oath of allegiance to protest the exclusion of jailed colleagues, an action decried as symbolic rejection of parliamentary loyalty to the Turkish Republic. Critics further linked BDP's ethnic-focused mobilization in southeastern strongholds to heightened PKK recruitment, asserting that the party's emphasis on Kurdish particularism fostered environments conducive to militant affiliation by framing Turkish institutions as oppressors of subnational identities. Turkish security assessments during BDP's prominence noted elevated insurgent activities in regions where the party garnered over 50% of votes in local elections, such as and , correlating ethnic political rhetoric with sustained PKK operational capacity. These accusations portray BDP's platforms as causally contributing to fragmented loyalties, prioritizing communal solidarity over the indivisible unity mandated by Article 3 of the constitution.

Involvement in Violence and Separatism

In December 2009, following the Turkish Constitutional Court's ban on the Democratic Society Party (DTP) on , widespread protests organized by pro-Kurdish groups, including members transitioning to the newly established Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) as its successor, escalated into riots across southeastern cities such as Diyarbakır and Şırnak. Clashes between demonstrators and security forces resulted in at least two deaths, with reports of arson, stone-throwing, and Molotov cocktail attacks contributing to dozens of injuries and property damage in over 20 locations. In October 2014, demonstrations called by BDP and emerging Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) leaders, including co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, protesting Turkey's limited intervention against ISIS forces besieging the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani, devolved into coordinated riots involving over 30 provinces. The unrest, which began on October 6 and peaked by October 8, led to at least 37 confirmed deaths—primarily from inter-communal clashes, shootings, and arson—along with the destruction of hundreds of vehicles and buildings in cities like Diyarbakır, where 10 fatalities occurred amid reports of targeted attacks on non-Kurdish neighborhoods. Data from conflict monitoring indicates temporal correlations between BDP-led mobilizations and spikes in PKK-linked violence during the pre-ceasefire period; for instance, PKK attacks intensified in 2011–2012 amid BDP campaigns for Kurdish rights, with over 200 security personnel killed in ambushes and bombings in southeastern Turkey, coinciding with party-orchestrated hunger strikes and rallies demanding prisoner releases and autonomy reforms. BDP delegations' facilitation of communications between imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the group's Qandil base in 2013, prior to the formal ceasefire, underscored ongoing operational ties, even as violence persisted with tactics including roadside IEDs and guerrilla raids.

Responses from the Party and Supporters

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) rejected allegations of and baseless attempts to delegitimize legitimate advocacy for Kurdish cultural and political rights within a unitary Turkish state. Party officials maintained that their activities focused on democratic reforms, such as expanded language rights and local autonomy, rather than territorial division, and described KCK trials as fabricated pretexts for mass arrests targeting elected representatives. In defending against terrorism charges, BDP leaders like co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş argued that the PKK's armed struggle arose as a direct consequence of decades of state policies denying Kurdish identity, including bans on Kurdish-language education and media until reforms in the 2000s, positioning the party as a non-violent mediator for resolving the conflict through negotiation rather than endorsing violence. Demirtaş specifically characterized his public statements supporting peace talks as protected political speech, not propaganda, amid prosecutions that included over 150 defendants in the main by 2010. Supporters within the BDP echoed Human Rights Watch assessments that KCK proceedings violated fair trial standards, citing issues like evidence based on coerced confessions, denial of Kurdish-language defense, and excessive exceeding legal limits, with some defendants held for up to two years without verdict by 2011. BDP politicians, including those in Mardin trials, labeled KCK prisoners as "hostages" of political repression, protesting courtroom restrictions on expression and calling for their release as a prerequisite for democratic progress. European Green and leftist groups backed these rebuttals by highlighting the trials' role in eroding opposition pluralism, urging Turkey to uphold minority rights under European conventions and framing BDP's platform as essential for integrating Kurdish demands into mainstream politics without separatism. Such defenses often invoked the party's electoral gains, like securing 36 parliamentary seats in 2011 despite a 10% threshold, as evidence of grassroots legitimacy rather than subversive intent.

Dissolution and Succession

Merger with Peoples' Democratic Party

The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) pursued a strategic merger with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) following its performance in the March 30, 2014, local elections, where it secured strong results in Kurdish-majority regions but faced ongoing barriers to national parliamentary representation. On July 11, 2014, at its third ordinary congress in Ankara, the BDP voted to dissolve its national structures and integrate them into the HDP, simultaneously rebranding the remaining entity as the to handle municipal and local-level activities. This move absorbed the BDP's organizational framework into the HDP, allowing the latter to inherit the former's grassroots networks in southeastern Turkey. The merger was driven by the need to surpass Turkey's 10% national electoral threshold, which had repeatedly confined pro-Kurdish parties like the to independent candidacies or alliances that diluted their vote share. BDP leaders, including co-chairperson , argued that aligning under the 's umbrella—a platform emphasizing broader left-wing issues such as labor rights, gender equality, environmentalism, and minority protections—would expand appeal beyond ethnic Kurds to urban liberals, socialists, and other demographics, potentially enabling direct parliamentary entry without threshold evasion tactics. This shift reframed the pro-Kurdish movement as a multi-ethnic democratic alliance, contrasting the BDP's prior perception as regionally confined. As part of the integration, all 36 BDP members of parliament resigned their party membership in late April 2014 and formally joined the HDP on April 28, transferring the BDP's entire legislative bloc to the new entity ahead of the November 2015 general elections. This seamless handover preserved continuity in parliamentary advocacy for Kurdish rights and peace negotiations with the PKK, while HDP leadership assumed control over national strategy and resources.

Post-Merger Developments and Legacy

The successors to the BDP, primarily the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and later the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), inherited a pattern of legal vulnerabilities stemming from alleged organizational links to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. In March 2021, Turkey's chief prosecutor filed an 834-page indictment at the Constitutional Court seeking the HDP's dissolution, accusing it of acting as a PKK extension through propaganda, funding, and cadre overlap, which echoed prior closures of pro-Kurdish parties like the BDP's predecessor, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), in 2009. The case remained pending through 2023, prompting interim measures such as the court's January 2023 suspension of HDP state treasury aid—equivalent to millions of Turkish lira annually—based on claims of terrorist financing, though the block was partially lifted in March 2023 after appeals. To mitigate ban risks ahead of the May 2023 elections, pro-Kurdish politicians shifted operations to the allied Green Left Party (YSP), which secured 8.8% of the vote and 61 seats, effectively continuing BDP-HDP electoral machinery. The YSP rebranded as the DEM Party in November 2023, positioning itself as the HDP's legal and political heir amid ongoing closure threats; by April 2024, Turkish Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç warned that DEM could face similar proceedings if evidence of PKK ties emerged, highlighting the inherited precariousness of these formations. DEM retained influence with 57 seats in parliament as of late 2024, but endured parallel pressures including mass trials of former HDP figures, such as the Kobani case convicting 24 defendants to over 100 years each for alleged incitement during 2014 protests linked to ISIS sieges of Kurdish towns. The BDP's post-merger trajectory intersected with de-escalation efforts in 2025, as DEM-affiliated delegations engaged in İmralı Island visits and consultations tied to leader Abdullah Öcalan's February 27 call for the group's dissolution and renunciation of violence, framing it as a path to democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue. Öcalan's directive, issued from prison after reported state-mediated talks, prompted a congress in May announcing disbandment after 40 years of insurgency that killed over 40,000, with full fighter withdrawal from Turkey to northern Iraq confirmed by October 26. DEM's role in these channels, including visits to jailed ex-HDP leaders like Selahattin Demirtaş, underscored BDP's enduring framework for negotiating Kurdish representation, though critics attributed the 's pivot to military pressures rather than party advocacy alone. The BDP's legacy manifests in successors' electoral adaptability—merging localized Kurdish mobilization with broader leftist coalitions to surmount Turkey's 10% threshold, as seen in HDP's 2015 breakthrough—but is tempered by recurrent terrorism imputations that fueled closures, arrests of over 10,000 affiliates since 2015, and eroded public trust amid PKK violence. This duality reflects causal ties between party rhetoric endorsing Öcalan's "democratic confederalism" and PKK operations, per prosecutorial evidence of shared personnel and logistics, limiting normalization despite tactical innovations. The 2025 PKK wind-down offers potential vindication for dialogue-oriented strategies inherited from BDP, yet unresolved court cases against DEM signal persistent institutional skepticism toward such entities' independence from armed separatism.