Democratic Regions Party
The Democratic Regions Party (Turkish: Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi, DBP) is a pro-Kurdish political party in Turkey that primarily contests local elections in Kurdish-majority regions, functioning as the municipal-level affiliate of the national Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP).[1][2] Formed in 2014 through the renaming of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the DBP advocates for Kurdish cultural and political rights, democratic confederalism, and local autonomy within a framework emphasizing secularism and social democracy.[3][4] The party has achieved notable success in securing mayoral positions in southeastern Turkish municipalities, particularly following the 2014 local elections, where it capitalized on voter support for Kurdish representation amid ongoing tensions with the central government.[1][5] However, the DBP has faced persistent controversies, including repeated accusations and legal actions by Turkish authorities alleging organizational and financial ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a militant group designated as terrorist by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union; evidence cited in indictments includes municipal funding channeled to PKK affiliates and the employment of individuals linked to insurgent activities.[6][7][8] These allegations have led to the removal of DBP-affiliated mayors, arrests of party officials, and ongoing threats of party dissolution, highlighting the fraught intersection of Kurdish political activism and Turkey's counterterrorism policies.[1][9]History
Formation and Predecessors
The Democratic Regions Party (DBP) was established on July 11, 2014, through the rebranding of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which shifted its focus toward regional autonomy and local governance following the BDP's parliamentary delegation's integration into the newly founded Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) earlier that year.[3][10] This restructuring allowed the DBP to serve as a complementary local-level entity to the HDP's national orientation, emphasizing decentralized democratic structures in Kurdish-majority regions of southeastern Turkey. The change occurred amid heightened political tensions, including ongoing peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), though Turkish authorities have frequently alleged organizational ties between the DBP and the PKK, a designated terrorist group.[11] The BDP, DBP's direct predecessor, was founded on May 3, 2008, as a contingency measure in anticipation of the potential closure of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which faced legal challenges for purported PKK affiliations.[4][12] Upon the DTP's dissolution by Turkey's Constitutional Court on December 11, 2009—on grounds of actions against the state's indivisible unity—DTP lawmakers and officials transitioned to the BDP, enabling continuity of pro-Kurdish representation without interruption.[13] The BDP positioned itself as an advocate for Kurdish cultural rights, democratic confederalism, and resolution of the Kurdish issue through political means, drawing from PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan's ideological framework. The DBP's lineage extends further to a series of predecessor pro-Kurdish parties dating back to the 1990s, including the People's Labor Party (HEP, founded 1990 and closed 1993), Democracy Party (DEP, closed 1994), People's Democracy Party (HADEP, closed 2003), and Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), each shuttered by constitutional rulings for alleged separatist activities or PKK links.[13][12] These closures reflect a pattern in Turkish politics where over a dozen parties aligned with Kurdish interests have faced dissolution, prompting strategies like parallel national-local party structures to mitigate risks, as seen in the BDP-DBP-HDP model. This historical continuity underscores the DBP's role in sustaining organized Kurdish political expression despite recurrent legal pressures.[10]Rebranding from HDP and Legal Continuities
The Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) faced a closure case filed by Turkey's Chief Prosecutor at the Constitutional Court in March 2021, accusing it of organizational ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a designated terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.[8] To mitigate the risk of dissolution ahead of the May 2023 general elections, the HDP announced in late February 2023 that it would not field candidates and instead transfer its political activities to the Green Left Party (YSP), an allied entity established in 2019 with overlapping membership and ideological alignment.[14] The YSP, functioning as a legal vehicle for HDP's electoral participation, secured 8.8% of the national vote and 61 parliamentary seats in the 2023 elections, primarily from Kurdish-majority regions.[15] Following the elections, the YSP underwent rebranding in September 2023, adopting the name Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (Halkların Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi, or HEDEP) to emphasize themes of equality and democracy while maintaining continuity with pro-Kurdish advocacy.[16] In December 2023, Turkey's Constitutional Court rejected the HEDEP acronym due to its similarity to prior banned parties, prompting a change to DEM Parti (abbreviated from Demokratik Eşitlik ve Demokrasi Partisi in some contexts, though officially tied to the equality focus).[17] This rebranding positioned DEM as the HDP's de facto successor, with the HDP formally handing over its organizational work to the new entity in 2023, allowing political continuity amid the unresolved closure proceedings against the HDP.[14] Legally, DEM operates as a distinct registered party, approved by electoral authorities, but exhibits strong continuities with the HDP through shared leadership, including co-chairs like Tuncer Bakırhan and Tülay Hatimoğulları, who held prior HDP roles, and retention of key figures such as Pervin Buldan.[18] The transition preserved HDP's voter base, policy platform on minority rights, and grassroots networks in southeastern Turkey, effectively bypassing potential HDP dissolution without formally merging entities, a strategy critics in Turkish official circles describe as evasion of anti-terrorism laws.[19] As of October 2025, the HDP closure case remains pending, with no convictions altering DEM's legal status, though ongoing investigations into PKK affiliations persist across both parties' memberships.[8]Key Events and Electoral Milestones (2015–2023)
In the wake of the collapse of the Kurdish peace process in mid-2015, following the June general elections and renewed clashes between Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Turkish government intensified operations against perceived PKK-linked entities, including the Democratic Regions Party (DBP). Numerous DBP officials faced arrests and investigations for alleged support of militant activities, contributing to a broader crackdown on pro-Kurdish local governance structures.[20] By the end of December 2016, authorities had dismissed 69 DBP municipal co-chairs, replacing them with government-appointed trustees amid the state of emergency declared after the July 2016 coup attempt, citing ties to terrorism and organizational links to the PKK, which Turkey designates as a terrorist group.[1] This pattern of trustee appointments escalated, with over 90 DBP-affiliated mayors removed post-2014 local elections by 2019, reflecting systematic intervention in Kurdish-majority municipalities to address security concerns.[21] The March 31, 2019, local elections marked a significant milestone, as DBP-aligned candidates, often in coordination with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), secured control of 65 municipalities in southeastern Turkey, demonstrating strong voter support in Kurdish regions despite ongoing pressures.[22] However, post-election, the Interior Ministry removed dozens of these elected officials on charges of PKK affiliation, reducing DBP/HDP-controlled municipalities to just six by October 2020 through successive trustee appointments.[22] [23] Throughout 2020–2023, DBP faced continued detentions of party executives and members, with reports of over 100 arrests in operations targeting alleged terrorist financing and propaganda, amid Turkey's cross-border operations against PKK bases. On November 30, 2019, Saliha Aydeniz was elected co-chair, signaling internal continuity despite external pressures. Electoral influence persisted indirectly through HDP alliances in the May 2023 general elections, where pro-Kurdish votes impacted outcomes in Kurdish areas, though DBP's local apparatus remained curtailed by trustee governance.[24]Developments Since 2023
In October 2023, the Green Left Party (YSP), acting as the parliamentary proxy for the proscribed Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), rebranded as the Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Parti) during its fourth grand congress on October 15, electing Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan as co-chairs.[14][25] This change aimed to mitigate risks from the ongoing Constitutional Court case seeking HDP's closure on grounds of alleged PKK ties, with DEM adopting a new acronym to further distance itself legally.[26] The party achieved significant gains in the March 31, 2024, local elections, securing victories in numerous southeastern municipalities, including Diyarbakır, Mardin, and initially Van, amid a nationwide opposition surge that saw the ruling AKP lose ground.[27][28] DEM won approximately 75 municipalities overall, consolidating control in Kurdish-majority areas despite past trustee appointments under anti-terrorism pretexts.[29] However, post-election, authorities removed several DEM mayors based on prior terrorism-related convictions, appointing government trustees to at least five such posts by November 2024, including in eastern cities like Hakkari and Şirnak, continuing a pattern criticized by opposition groups as undermining electoral outcomes.[30][31] Additional trustees were installed in early 2025, such as in Kağızman district, prompting unified protests from DEM and other opposition parties against what they termed electoral disenfranchisement.[32][33] By mid-2025, DEM engaged in discussions on Turkey's renewed Kurdish peace initiative, amid PKK announcements of a unilateral ceasefire on March 1, plans for rapid disarmament, and full militant withdrawal from Turkish territory to northern Iraq by October 26.[34][35][36] The party advocated for legislative steps to resolve the Kurdish issue peacefully, including parliamentary commissions, while facing internal debates on restructuring in light of the PKK's dissolution trajectory, though government sources tied these developments to prior anti-PKK operations rather than concessions.[37][38] Ongoing detentions of party members, numbering over 2,900 in 2023 alone, persisted into 2024-2025, often linked to alleged organizational ties to designated terrorist groups.[39]Ideology and Political Positions
Core Principles and Policy Stances
The Democratic Regions Party (DEM Parti) identifies its ideological foundation in democratic socialism, advocating for a pluralistic, participatory, and deliberative political framework aimed at establishing a libertarian, egalitarian, just, ecological, gender-equal, and solidarity-oriented society.[14] This vision prioritizes universal human rights, labor rights, social justice, and peace, while explicitly opposing militarism, war, and violence in all forms.[14] Central to its principles is the promotion of direct democracy and decentralized self-governance, including enhanced local autonomy to foster equal citizenship and resolve identity-based conflicts—such as those involving Kurds and Alevis—through dialogue rather than confrontation.[14] The party emphasizes women's liberation, rejecting patriarchal structures and male dominance, and integrates co-presidency models to ensure gender parity in leadership and decision-making.[14][40] Ecological commitments form a core pillar, with DEM Parti defending the rights of nature and all living beings against capitalist exploitation, industrialism, and neoliberal policies that prioritize profit over sustainability.[14] It extends protections to vulnerable groups, including youth, children, immigrants, and refugees, ensuring non-discriminatory access to public services and opposing systemic inequalities.[14] In policy terms, the party supports radical egalitarian reforms, including youth emancipation and anti-discrimination measures, while critiquing centralized state power in favor of grassroots empowerment.[14] These stances, articulated in its foundational documents following the party's rebranding on October 15, 2023, reflect a continuity from predecessor entities but are framed as a broader struggle for societal transformation beyond ethnic confines.[14]Relations with Kurdish Nationalism
The Democratic Regions Party (DBP) positions itself as a proponent of democratic autonomy for Kurdish-populated regions in southeastern Turkey, emphasizing cultural rights, mother-tongue education in Kurdish, and decentralized governance without advocating for secession or independence. This framework aligns with Abdullah Öcalan's concept of democratic confederalism, which envisions grassroots, non-statist self-governance across Kurdish areas in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, rejecting traditional nation-state models in favor of ecological, feminist, and communal structures. In a January 2025 congress declaration, DBP leaders underscored Öcalan's model of "democratic nation-democratic confederalism" as essential for Kurdish-Turkish coexistence and regional stability.[41][42] DBP's approach to Kurdish nationalism diverges from irredentist demands for a sovereign Kurdistan, instead prioritizing resolution of the "Kurdish question" through political means within Turkey's borders, including peace negotiations and democratic reforms. The party has opposed initiatives like the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, viewing them as counterproductive to regional stability and local autonomy efforts. As a local-level extension of the national pro-Kurdish movement—closely affiliated with the DEM Party (formerly HDP)—DBP coordinates on issues like ending the PKK-Turkey conflict via dialogue, though it officially condemns violence and supports disarmament in line with Öcalan's calls for democratic politics.[43][44][11] Turkish authorities, however, classify DBP as an organizational extension of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), the PKK-led umbrella structure designated a terrorist entity by Turkey, the EU, and the US, citing evidence such as municipal resources allegedly funneled to PKK fighters and public endorsements of militants by local officials. President Erdoğan has explicitly labeled DBP a "PKK branch" justifying interventions like the 2016 dismissal of over 90 DBP mayors under emergency powers, replaced by state trustees amid documented ties including wiretapped communications and seized materials linking officials to KCK directives. DBP denies these charges, framing them as politically motivated suppression of legitimate Kurdish representation, and has pursued legal challenges while maintaining its commitment to non-violent democratic struggle.[45][1][46] These tensions reflect broader causal dynamics in Turkish-Kurdish relations: DBP's ideological roots in PKK-associated thought provide a nationalist appeal to Kurdish voters seeking identity affirmation, yet empirical patterns of overlap—such as synchronized messaging during peace talks and shared personnel—fuel state crackdowns, perpetuating a cycle where political nationalism substitutes for but intersects with armed insurgency. Independent analyses note that while DBP garners strong local support (e.g., dominating 2014 municipal elections in Kurdish provinces), its effectiveness is hampered by closures of predecessors like BDP on similar PKK-link grounds, underscoring institutional barriers to Kurdish political expression.[11][47]Organizational Structure and Leadership
Internal Organization
The Democratic Regions Party (DBP) employs a co-chair system for its leadership, mandating one male and one female co-chair to ensure gender parity and collective decision-making, a practice inherited from predecessor parties in the pro-Kurdish movement. This dual leadership is elected at regular party congresses, with the most recent co-chairs, Keskin Bayındır and Çiğdem Kılıçgün Uçar, serving as of mid-2025.[48][49] The co-chairs oversee central operations but emphasize decentralized authority, aligning with the party's focus on local autonomy and participatory structures.[50] At the central level, the party operates through a Parti Meclisi (Party Council), which convenes periodically—such as in Amed (Diyarbakır) on April 13, 2025—to deliberate on strategic issues, organizational mobilization, and responses to political developments. Local branches maintain significant independence, with provincial (il) and district (ilçe) organizations conducting their own ordinary and extraordinary congresses to select leaders and advance grassroots initiatives; for instance, the Iğdır provincial organization held its first extraordinary congress on August 24, 2024, under the slogan "Organized society towards free living."[51][52] This federated model supports the DBP's emphasis on regional self-management, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas, though it has faced government interventions, including arrests of local co-chairs.[8] The party's statutes promote internal democracy via multi-level congresses, including ordinary gatherings like the 7th Ordinary Congress referenced in organizational announcements, where delegates from branches elect executives and approve policy directions. Recent efforts, including conferences in Ankara and Amed, have focused on expanding membership and adapting to legal pressures, prioritizing "equal representation" and component-based input from allied groups.[53][54] This structure aims to foster broad participation but operates within Turkey's restrictive political environment, where pro-Kurdish parties routinely navigate closure threats and trustee appointments in municipalities.Prominent Figures
The Democratic Regions Party (DBP) operates under a co-chairperson system, featuring one male and one female leader to promote gender parity, a structure common in pro-Kurdish political organizations in Turkey.[55] This leadership model emphasizes collective decision-making and representation of diverse constituencies within the party's focus on local democratic governance.[56] The current co-chairs are Çiğdem Kılıçgün Uçar and Keskin Bayındır, elected at the party's 6th Extraordinary Congress on November 12, 2023.[57] Uçar has been active in advocating for local autonomy and peace initiatives, including calls for dialogue on the Kurdish issue during public addresses in 2024 and 2025.[58] [59] Bayındır, who previously served as co-chair alongside Saliha Aydeniz from 2019 to 2023, has focused on national unity and resistance narratives in party congresses, while facing detention in 2022 amid operations targeting party members.[60] [61] [62] Prior co-chairs include Saliha Aydeniz, who led from late 2019 and was re-elected in earlier congresses before transitioning roles; she has been involved in parliamentary activities as a DEM Party MP.[60] Other notable figures in the party's executive include deputy co-chairs such as Murat Kılıç and Narin Gezgör, who support central executive board operations.[55] Local leaders, often serving as co-mayors in southeastern municipalities, have been prominent in DBP's grassroots efforts, though many have faced replacement by government-appointed trustees since 2016, affecting figures like those in Hakkari and Mersin districts.[63]Electoral Performance
National Elections
The Democratic Regions Party (DBP), established in July 2014 as a primarily local-oriented entity within Turkey's pro-Kurdish political spectrum, has not independently contested national parliamentary elections. Instead, it has aligned with sister organizations such as the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and later electoral vehicles like the Green Left Party (Yeşil Sol Partisi, YSP) to facilitate national representation, providing organizational support, endorsement of candidates, and integration of its leadership into allied lists.[64][8] This strategic deference stems from DBP's foundational emphasis on regional autonomy and municipal governance, allowing the HDP-led bloc to handle nationwide campaigns amid Turkey's 10% electoral threshold and legal pressures on Kurdish-aligned parties. In practice, DBP co-chairs and members have appeared as candidates on HDP or YSP slates, channeling the party's grassroots mobilization—particularly in southeastern provinces—toward bolstering the alliance's vote share. For instance, during the June 7, 2015, general election, DBP-backed HDP efforts contributed to the alliance securing 80 seats with 13.12% of the national vote, marking a peak in pro-Kurdish parliamentary presence before subsequent crackdowns.[5][65] Subsequent elections reflected volatility tied to conflict dynamics and government actions. The HDP, with DBP support, won 59 seats (10.76% vote) in the snap November 1, 2015, poll amid renewed PKK clashes, then 67 seats (11.70%) in June 24, 2018, despite co-chair detentions. By the May 14, 2023, election, facing HDP's closure proceedings, the alliance shifted to YSP candidacy; DBP co-chairs Saliha Aydeniz and Keskin Bayındır were listed under YSP, which garnered 5.7 million votes (8.82%) for 61 seats, concentrated in Kurdish-majority areas.[66][67] This outcome underscored DBP's indirect but pivotal role in sustaining Kurdish electoral leverage, though seat totals declined amid opposition fragmentation and AKP dominance.[68]| Election Date | Allied Party | Votes (%) | Seats Won | Notes on DBP Involvement |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| June 7, 2015 | HDP | 13.12 | 80 | Organizational endorsement in southeast[65] |
| November 1, 2015 | HDP | 10.76 | 59 | Sustained regional mobilization despite unrest[65] |
| June 24, 2018 | HDP | 11.70 | 67 | Leader nominations amid legal pressures[69] |
| May 14, 2023 | YSP | 8.82 | 61 | Co-chairs as candidates; HDP closure workaround[66][67] |