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Permanent Structured Cooperation

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is a treaty-based framework within the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy that enables participating member states to voluntarily collaborate on the joint planning, development, investment, and deployment of defence capabilities, with the aim of enhancing operational readiness and addressing capability shortfalls.^[1] Envisioned in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon under Articles 42(6) and 46 of the Treaty on European Union, PESCO was formally established on 11 December 2017 by Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, initially involving 25 member states following the European Council's agreement in June 2017 amid post-2014 security threats including Russia's annexation of Crimea.^[2]^[3] As of May 2025, 26 of the 27 EU member states participate in PESCO—Denmark having joined in 2023—coordinating over 75 collaborative projects across domains such as military mobility, cyber rapid response teams, and networked logistics, which are reviewed annually and complemented by funding from the European Defence Fund and alignment via the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence.^[4]^[2] These initiatives have delivered tangible outputs, including prototypes for unmanned ground systems and enhanced training programs, contributing to a more coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities despite varying national commitments.^[5] PESCO's defining characteristics include its binding national implementation plans and emphasis on concrete deliverables over mere declarations, yet it has sparked controversies, particularly from NATO allies including the United States, who warn of risks such as resource diversion from alliance priorities, potential duplication of NATO structures, and discriminatory practices against non-EU partners that could erode transatlantic interoperability.^[6]^[7] Eastern European states like Poland have similarly expressed apprehensions that PESCO might dilute focus on collective defence under Article 5, prioritizing instead an illusory strategic autonomy that overlooks empirical dependencies on U.S.-led capabilities.^[8] While proponents highlight its role in filling gaps unaddressed by NATO—such as intra-EU mobility—critics argue that historical patterns of fragmented implementation undermine causal efficacy in building deployable forces, as evidenced by persistent underinvestment and interoperability challenges persisting into the 2020s.^[9]

Origins and Legal Framework

Treaty Basis in the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon, entering into force on 1 December 2009, established the legal foundation for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) within the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy through amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Article 42(6) TEU enables member states whose military capabilities meet higher criteria and which commit to doing so to establish PESCO, permitting a coalition of willing states to pursue enhanced defence cooperation without necessitating unanimity across all EU members. This provision facilitates qualified majority voting among participants for decisions on capability development and operational commitments, as detailed in Article 46 TEU and Protocol No. 10 annexed to the TEU.^[10]^[11]^[12] PESCO's treaty basis originated from assessments of capability deficiencies exposed in earlier EU defence initiatives, including the EU Battlegroups, which attained full operational capability in 2007 yet remained undeployed due to persistent shortfalls in readiness, financing, and national contributions. These gaps traced back to post-2003 capability reviews, such as the EU Headline Goal 2010, which empirically demonstrated Europe's inability to sustain rapid reaction forces amid fragmented national efforts and operational failures in CSDP missions like those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chad. The mechanism was designed to enforce stricter criteria for participation, compelling committed states to align investments and harmonize forces to rectify such empirically observed inadequacies.^[13]^[14] Underlying this framework was a recognition of causal factors in Europe's defence posture, particularly chronic underinvestment, with non-U.S. NATO European allies averaging 1.4% of GDP on defence spending by 2014—substantially below the 2% guideline endorsed at the NATO Wales Summit that year—and most EU states similarly deficient, resulting in mismatched capabilities and over-reliance on individual member contributions. PESCO thus embodied a first-principles approach to incentivize selective, high-commitment integration, bypassing veto-prone consensus to foster verifiable improvements in collective defence efficacy without imposing uniform obligations on less inclined states.^[15]^[16]

Pre-2017 Developments and Motivations

Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, following its military intervention in Ukraine, heightened security concerns across Europe and revealed the European Union's heavy reliance on NATO—predominantly U.S.-led—for collective defense capabilities, as the EU lacked independent rapid-response forces sufficient to deter or respond to such aggression without transatlantic support. This event underscored the limitations of prior EU defense efforts, including the 2004 Headline Goal, which aimed to enable the deployment of up to 50,000-60,000 troops with support elements within 60 days but fell short due to persistent capability gaps in strategic enablers like airlift, intelligence, and logistics, with many targets unmet even after revisions toward smaller battlegroups.^[17] Compounding these vulnerabilities were chronic underinvestment in defense, with EU member states' average military spending hovering at approximately 1.3% of GDP in 2016, well below the NATO 2% guideline, leading to fragmented national forces and duplicated procurement that hindered interoperability.^[18] U.S. leaders, including President Obama, publicly rebuked European allies as "free riders" for expecting American security guarantees while skimping on their own contributions, as evidenced by Obama's 2016 remarks expressing frustration over Europe's inadequate burden-sharing in crises like Libya, where allies failed to follow through despite initial enthusiasm.^[19] These criticisms amplified internal EU debates on achieving greater "strategic autonomy," defined as the capacity to act independently in security matters without perpetual dependence on external powers, driven by fears of diminishing U.S. commitment amid shifting American priorities toward Asia.^[20] In response, High Representative Federica Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy in June 2016, which identified hybrid threats—blending conventional, irregular, informational, and cyber elements—as a core challenge requiring enhanced capabilities, resilience, and cooperative defense mechanisms to address without overstating prospects for seamless EU unity amid divergent national interests. This document motivated subsequent pushes for structured cooperation by emphasizing the need to pool resources against immediate risks from state actors like Russia, while acknowledging the causal link between underinvestment and vulnerability, setting the stage for operationalizing dormant treaty provisions on defense integration.^[21]

Activation and Early Implementation

Notification and Launch in 2017

On 13 November 2017, defense ministers from 23 EU member states signed a joint notification addressed to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Council, expressing their intention to establish permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) under Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union.^[22] The notification highlighted the European Council's June 2017 agreement on launching PESCO to enhance defense capabilities amid external threats, including Russia's actions in Ukraine and uncertainties following the UK's Brexit referendum.^[23] The participating states committed to fulfilling the general implementing arrangements for PESCO and undertaking more binding commitments to improve military readiness and interoperability.^[23] Denmark opted out due to its treaty-based defense exemptions, Malta declined participation citing neutrality concerns, Ireland and Portugal initially abstained but signaled potential future involvement, and the UK was excluded as it prepared for Brexit negotiations.^[24] The notification occurred against a backdrop of U.S. President Donald Trump's post-election emphasis on European allies increasing defense contributions to NATO, following his November 2016 victory, which amplified calls for greater EU self-reliance given fragmented procurement—EU states maintained over 170 types of weapon systems compared to about 30 in the U.S.—despite collective defense spending reaching approximately €236 billion in 2017.^[25] This uneven commitment reflected voluntary participation, with larger states like France and Germany leading the push while smaller or neutral members showed varying enthusiasm.^[26] On 11 December 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315, formally establishing PESCO and listing 25 participating member states, as Ireland and Portugal acceded shortly after the notification.^[27] The decision incorporated the 20 binding commitments from the notification, including progressively increasing national defense investment to allocate at least 20% to major equipment and prioritizing collaborative capability development within the EU framework.^[28] These commitments aimed to address capability shortfalls identified in prior EU defense reviews, such as insufficient strategic enablers, while maintaining flexibility for non-participants to join later.^[28] The launch underscored PESCO's procedural activation as a mechanism for deepened but selective cooperation, without immediate project approvals, which followed in subsequent waves.^[1]

Initial Binding Commitments

Upon activation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on 11 December 2017, 25 EU member states adopted 20 binding commitments aimed at enhancing collective defense capabilities. These included pledges to regularly increase national defense spending, allocate at least 20% of defense budgets to equipment and research over the subsequent four years, and prioritize joint capability development to address identified shortfalls.^[29] Additional commitments mandated the establishment of national implementation plans, regular readiness assessments, and enhanced interoperability through collaborative training and procurement. Empirical data reveals limited causal impact from these initial pledges on national defense policies. For instance, while PESCO commitments encouraged alignment with NATO's 2% GDP defense spending guideline, only seven EU participating states—Estonia, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and one other—achieved this threshold by 2023, with the EU average remaining at 1.6% of GDP. Joint capability projects, such as the initial 17 defense initiatives launched in March 2018, showed progress in areas like cyber defense but faced delays due to varying national priorities and funding shortfalls. Early compliance issues stemmed from divergent interpretations of commitments, resulting in minimal gains in interoperability. Annual assessments by the High Representative highlighted uneven implementation, with some states submitting robust national plans while others provided vague outlines lacking enforceable timelines.^[30] Absent mechanisms for sanctions or expulsion, these pledges functioned primarily as signaling devices to demonstrate political intent rather than drivers of substantive capability enhancements, as evidenced by persistent fragmentation in European defense procurement and equipment standardization.^[31] This structural weakness underscored that external geopolitical pressures, such as Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, exerted greater influence on spending increases than PESCO's internal dynamics.^[32]

Objectives and Guiding Principles

Core Strategic Goals

PESCO's core strategic goals emphasize deepening defense cooperation among participating EU member states to enhance the bloc's overall security posture, as established under Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union and aligned with the 2016 EU Global Strategy. These objectives focus on increasing investment in capabilities, promoting joint development and procurement of defense equipment, and improving operational readiness through harmonized planning and training. By fostering interoperability and specialization, PESCO aims to enable more effective crisis management and rapid response to threats, including in hybrid, cyber, space, and high-intensity warfare domains, thereby addressing collective vulnerabilities that individual states cannot resolve unilaterally.^[33]^[34] A key aim is to rectify capability shortfalls outlined in the European Defence Agency's 2018 Capability Development Plan revision, which identifies priorities such as strategic enablers, force multipliers, and protection systems based on lessons from EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions and foresight analysis of evolving threats. This plan underscores the need for EU-specific assessments of risks—like regional instability and technological disruptions—while ensuring complementarity with NATO, prioritizing gaps in areas like logistics and intelligence that exceed national resources. Through binding commitments, PESCO seeks to reduce inefficiencies from fragmented national approaches, where diverse equipment standards, such as multiple incompatible tank variants across member states, drive up lifecycle costs estimated in billions of euros annually due to limited scale and interoperability challenges.^[35]^[23] These goals reflect a pragmatic recognition of causal dependencies in defense economics and operations: without coordinated investment, duplication persists, as evidenced by Europe's maintenance of over 15 distinct main battle tank types compared to more unified NATO standardization, inflating procurement by up to 20-30% per unit according to industry analyses. Yet, the framework's reliance on consensus-based decisions introduces inherent limits, as national opt-outs or vetoes can dilute collective momentum, potentially perpetuating the very fragmentation PESCO targets despite empirical evidence from prior initiatives showing modest gains in joint capabilities.^[36]^[37]

National Implementation Requirements

Participating Member States in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are required to fulfill 20 binding commitments outlined in the Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1102, which harmonize national contributions to EU defense capabilities and aim to address fragmentation in spending and procurement. These commitments mandate progressive alignment of national defense planning with EU-level priorities, including the development of multi-year capability roadmaps that specify investments in priority domains such as mobility, surveillance, and combat capabilities.^[29] To ensure accountability, each participating Member State submits an annual National Implementation Plan (NIP) detailing concrete measures to meet these obligations, including timelines, resource allocations, and progress metrics on investment levels and capability delivery.^[29] The Council framework requires annual progress reports from the High Representative, assessing NIP compliance against indicators such as defense expenditure shares devoted to research and development (targeting a collective 20% benchmark), output in terms of deployable forces, and impact on identified shortfalls.^[38] Peer reviews, facilitated by the European Defence Agency (EDA), evaluate these plans biennially, incorporating empirical audits that highlight persistent gaps; for instance, EDA assessments have consistently noted deficiencies in strategic airlift capacity, with only limited progress in pooling transport assets despite commitments to enhance interoperability.^[39] Similarly, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities remain underdeveloped, as evidenced by EDA-coordinated studies revealing shortfalls in persistent aerial and electronic warfare platforms needed for joint operations.^[40] These mechanisms serve as safeguards against free-riding by enforcing verifiable contributions, yet empirical data on defense spending post-PESCO activation in 2017 indicates only gradual aggregate growth, with EU-level expenditures rising from approximately €200 billion in 2017 to €214 billion by 2021—a 6% increase—before sharper upticks following the 2022 Ukraine invasion.^[41] While commitments have prompted some reallocation toward collaborative procurement, EDA reviews show that national implementations have yielded marginal improvements in addressing capability voids, underscoring the causal link between uneven enforcement and sustained disparities in burden-sharing.^[42] Full compliance is targeted for 2025, with Council recommendations periodically urging laggards to accelerate investments.^[43]

Membership and Third-Country Involvement

Participating EU Member States

As of 2025, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) encompasses 26 of the European Union's 27 member states, excluding Malta, which has consistently declined participation citing its constitutional commitment to neutrality and non-alignment in military alliances.^[44] Malta's position stems from a policy of observing PESCO's development without compromising its non-militaristic stance, as articulated in national debates and EU notifications.^[45] Denmark became the 26th participant on May 23, 2023, via Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1015, following a June 2022 referendum where 66.9% of voters approved amending its longstanding defense opt-out under the Treaty on European Union.^[46]^[47] This shift enabled Denmark's alignment with PESCO's binding commitments on capability development, while initially limiting its role to observer status in select projects before full integration.^[1] Participation remains strictly voluntary, with no mechanisms for coerced inclusion, thereby upholding national sovereignty over defense decisions as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty's provisions for enhanced cooperation.^[5] Empirical data reveal uneven engagement levels among participants: France leads with involvement in 52 projects, followed closely by Italy at 51, reflecting their larger defense budgets and industrial capacities.^[48] In contrast, smaller southern states like Portugal and Greece exhibit lower participation rates, often limited to fewer than 20 projects each, while Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—show proportionally higher involvement, coordinating multiple initiatives amid regional security pressures from Russia's actions in Ukraine.^[48] These disparities underscore PESCO's flexible structure, where states select projects aligning with national priorities rather than uniform obligations.^[5]

Non-EU and Third-Country Participation

In November 2020, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision (CFSP) 2020/1639, establishing the general conditions for exceptional participation by third countries in individual PESCO projects. This framework requires invitees to demonstrate substantial added value, such as unique technological expertise, operational capabilities, or resources that directly advance project goals without undermining EU strategic autonomy; participation is assessed case-by-case, limited to specific projects, and excludes decision-making influence in PESCO's core governance.^[49] Canada, Norway, and the United States were the first third countries invited to join the Military Mobility project in May 2021, with formal participation starting in December 2021. This initiative focuses on streamlining cross-border troop and equipment movements, where the US provides specialized logistics and infrastructure knowledge to address EU deficiencies in rapid deployment, compensating for limited indigenous capabilities in heavy transport and regulatory harmonization. Despite occasional concerns over data-sharing protocols and intellectual property constraints in transatlantic defense collaborations, US involvement has enabled practical advancements, such as standardized permitting processes tested in multinational exercises.^[50] The United Kingdom was invited to participate in the Cyber Rapid Response Teams project, leveraging its cybersecurity assets for rapid incident response and threat intelligence sharing, though full integration depends on alignment with EU export controls post-Brexit. Switzerland, maintaining its neutrality policy, received invitations for both the Military Mobility project—approved by its Federal Council on August 21, 2024—and the Cyber Ranges Federation project on May 20, 2025, contributing advanced simulation technologies to federate national cyber training networks for realistic scenario-based exercises.^[51]^[52] Turkey has sought involvement, citing its NATO interoperability and regional operational experience, but as of October 2025, no formal project participations have been confirmed, reflecting ongoing evaluations of value addition amid geopolitical tensions. These inclusions underscore PESCO's pragmatic approach, acknowledging that EU member states' defense shortfalls in areas like cyber infrastructure and mobility necessitate external partnerships to achieve viable capability enhancements, rather than pursuing insular development that risks inefficacy.

Neutrality and Opt-Out Considerations

Ireland, Austria, and Sweden, as EU member states maintaining policies of military neutrality or non-alignment, participate in PESCO but impose self-selected restrictions aligned with their constitutional or traditional stances against military alliances.^[53] These states prioritize involvement in non-offensive capability projects, such as cyber security, disaster response, maritime surveillance upgrades, and military mobility enhancements, while avoiding commitments that could imply collective combat operations or automatic defense obligations.^[53] For instance, Austria focuses on collaborative efforts like cyber training with Greece and transport logistics, reflecting its constitutional prohibition on participation in military alliances and its limited combat-ready forces.^[53] Similarly, Ireland engages as a lead or observer in projects emphasizing surveillance and cyber threats, subject to its "triple lock" mechanism requiring UN, government, and parliamentary approval for any overseas deployments, which precludes funding or support for lethal force initiatives.^[53] Sweden, having shifted to a policy of non-alignment in 2009, contributes to six projects and observes eleven others, but maintains reservations against mechanisms implying strategic autonomy detached from transatlantic ties.^[53] Malta stands as the sole EU member state with a full opt-out from PESCO, invoking Article 1(3) of its 1974 constitution, which enshrines perpetual neutrality and non-alignment in military alliances.^[41] This provision, reinforced in Malta's EU accession treaty, permits selective engagement in non-military Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions but bars structured defense integration that could compromise impartiality.^[41] Denmark previously held an exemption under the 1992 Edinburgh Agreement, which excluded it from EU defense decisions and actions, preventing initial PESCO participation until a June 1, 2022, referendum approved revocation of the opt-out, enabling formal accession as the 26th member on May 23, 2023.^[1] These neutrality policies and opt-outs impose causal constraints on PESCO's operational coherence, as participating neutral states' aversion to combat-oriented capabilities—such as integrated battlegroups or offensive enablers—limits the framework's ability to achieve uniform high-end interoperability across all members.^[53] Empirical assessments indicate that such selective engagement fragments mutual defense solidarity under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, with neutral states' minimal combat contributions potentially undermining collective readiness in scenarios requiring rapid, alliance-like responses.^[53] This dynamic highlights inherent tensions between inclusive voluntary frameworks and the binding commitments intended to address capability gaps, as evidenced by the exclusion of Malta and Denmark's delayed entry reducing initial project momentum.^[53]^[1]

Governance and Operational Mechanisms

Decision-Making and Council Role

The Council of the European Union acts as the primary institutional body overseeing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with the establishment of PESCO itself adopted via qualified majority voting under Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union to facilitate initiation among willing member states without requiring full consensus across all EU members. Once established, however, key operational decisions, including the approval of specific capability projects, are taken by unanimity among the participating member states only, excluding non-participants from veto power but still necessitating agreement within the involved group to advance initiatives.^[54] The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy plays a central coordinating role, supported by the European Defence Agency (EDA), which contributes to assessments of national implementation plans and acts as a secretariat alongside the European External Action Service for monitoring compliance with binding commitments.^[55] Annually, the High Representative submits a report to the Council evaluating progress, including whether participating states fulfill their national plans, enabling the Council to conduct reviews and potentially recommend adjustments or reinforcements to commitments.^[29] This framework prioritizes flexibility by confining decision-making to subsets of member states, theoretically reducing paralysis from broader EU vetoes, yet empirical evidence indicates that the persistent unanimity requirement among participants has contributed to delays in project initiation and scaling, as consensus-building amid divergent national priorities—such as varying defense budgets and strategic outlooks—has empirically constrained operational tempo.^[48]^[56]

Funding, Oversight, and Accountability

Funding for Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) derives primarily from national defence budgets of participating EU member states, which bear the core responsibility for implementing projects and fulfilling binding commitments, including pledges to allocate at least 20% of defence expenditures to equipment and research by 2020, with ongoing targets for 2% of GDP in overall defence spending.^[57] No dedicated EU budget exists exclusively for PESCO; instead, supplementary resources come from broader EU instruments, notably the European Defence Fund (EDF), which provides €7.953 billion in grants from 2021 to 2027 for defence research and capabilities, with co-financing rates up to 100% for eligible activities and bonuses of up to 20% for PESCO-linked projects to incentivize collaboration.^[58] ^[59] This reliance on national funding, augmented by EDF incentives, reflects PESCO's intergovernmental nature but exposes implementation to disparities in member states' fiscal priorities and capacities. Oversight of PESCO operates through the Council of the EU, which conducts annual assessments of progress on the 20 initial binding commitments via scorecard methodologies established in 2018, evaluating national implementation plans (NIPs) submitted by participating states on criteria such as capability development, spending targets, and interoperability enhancements.^[60] These scorecards, produced by the PESCO Secretariat and High Representative, track compliance qualitatively and quantitatively but impose no formal penalties for shortfalls, such as project termination or participant exclusion, limiting enforcement to political recommendations and peer pressure.^[61] Accountability mechanisms thus remain soft, correlating with empirical evidence of incomplete delivery: by late 2023, of the 68 active PESCO projects across multiple waves, the majority lingered in planning or development phases due to funding shortfalls, coordination delays, and uneven national contributions, with only a fraction achieving operational readiness.^[62] ^[8] This pattern persists into 2025, where just 7 of over 66 projects have reached completion despite launches since 2018, underscoring how the absence of binding sanctions fosters selective engagement and perpetuates capability gaps over rigorous fulfillment.^[48] Such outcomes align with causal dynamics where voluntary frameworks without coercive accountability yield suboptimal collective action, as states prioritize domestic needs absent tangible repercussions for underperformance.^[63]

Collaborative Projects and Capability Development

Project Waves and Categorization

Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects have been introduced in successive waves since its operational launch in 2018, with the first wave comprising 17 initiatives approved by the Council of the European Union on 6 March 2018. These early projects primarily targeted foundational enablers, such as military mobility and logistics harmonization, to address immediate interoperability shortfalls among participating member states.^[64] Subsequent waves expanded the portfolio: the second wave added 17 projects in 2019, the third introduced 19 in 2020, the fourth launched 14 in 2021, and the fifth approved 11 in 2023, cumulatively building toward enhanced capability development across multiple domains. The sixth and final wave of the initial PESCO phase, endorsed on 27 May 2025, incorporated 11 additional projects, elevating the overall total to 83 collaborative efforts spanning land, maritime, air, space, cyber, training, and joint enabling categories.^[4] ^[65] Project categorization aligns with seven primary military domains—air systems, cyber and C4ISR, enabling and joint, land formations and systems, maritime, space, and training facilities—to ensure comprehensive coverage of operational needs and promote cross-domain synergies.^[66] Approval hinges on rigorous criteria, including demonstrable alignment with EU-level capability gap assessments derived from strategic reviews like the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), emphasis on multi-domain applicability, involvement of multiple participating member states (typically at least four to seven), and potential for scalability and interoperability gains, as evaluated by the PESCO Secretariat and recommended by the High Representative to the Council for unanimous endorsement among participants.^[10] ^[67] The chronological progression reflects adaptive prioritization: initial waves (2018–2019) concentrated on low-to-medium intensity enablers like strategic transport and medical support to build foundational cohesion, whereas later iterations from 2021 onward increasingly incorporated high-end warfighting elements, such as electronic warfare convergence and air/missile defense systems, partly in response to heightened threat perceptions following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.^[68] By mid-2025, more than 60 projects remained actively operational, with timelines varying by initiative to achieve milestones like initial operational capability.^[66]

Key Domains and Selected Initiatives

PESCO projects span multiple military domains, including land, maritime, air, space, cyber, and enabling capabilities such as training and logistics, with the aim of addressing identified gaps through collaborative development and enhanced interoperability among participating member states (pMS).^[66] As of 2024, over 80 projects have been initiated across these areas, focusing on critical enablers like force protection, surveillance, and advanced technologies, though implementation varies with many still in development phases due to coordination challenges and resource allocation differences among pMS.^[68] While proponents highlight synergies in capability building, such as shared standards for rapid deployment, empirical progress reports indicate bottlenecks, including delays in achieving full operational capability (FOC), with only two projects—EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core and European Medical Command—confirmed at FOC by late 2024 amid a portfolio exceeding 80 initiatives.^[69] Military Mobility, launched in 2018 and led by the Netherlands with 24 EU states plus third-country participants including the UK, US, Canada, and Norway, facilitates swift cross-border troop and equipment movement by harmonizing infrastructure, regulations, and procedures, directly supporting NATO interoperability goals.^[70] This enabling project addresses logistical gaps exposed in exercises, enabling faster reinforcement in high-threat scenarios, though full implementation requires ongoing national adaptations like infrastructure upgrades, with progress tied to the EU's Action Plan on Military Mobility extended to 2026.^[71] In the cyber domain, the Cyber Rapid Response Teams (CRRT) project, initiated in 2018 under Lithuanian leadership with 12 pMS by November 2024, deploys multidisciplinary teams to assist in incident response, vulnerability assessments, and resilience enhancement for EU partners and missions, as demonstrated in supporting Moldova's 2024 elections against cyber threats.^[72] The initiative fosters mutual assistance protocols and tool-sharing, aiming to build a collective cyber defense posture, yet faces challenges in standardizing response doctrines across diverse national capabilities.^[73] The European Medical Command (EMC), a Germany-led effort launched in 2018 involving 18 pMS, achieved FOC status, providing a centralized hub to coordinate multinational medical support, including common operational pictures and resource allocation for EU missions or crises like pandemics.^[74] This joint enabling project enhances deployable medical assets' interoperability, with applications in both military and humanitarian contexts, though scalability depends on sustained contributions from smaller pMS.^[75] Emerging domains in the 2025 sixth wave include electronic warfare (EW) and quantum technologies; the Joint European Electromagnetic Warfare Convergence Initiative (JEEWCI) seeks to align EW doctrines and systems for spectrum dominance, while Finland-led quantum projects target defense applications in positioning, surveillance, and missile defense, reflecting ambitions to integrate cutting-edge tech amid capability shortfalls.^[76] These initiatives promise force multipliers but encounter hurdles in technological maturity and equitable burden-sharing, with progress reports noting reliance on further R&D investment.^[68]

Assessed Outcomes and Capability Gaps

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) has generated over 80 projects since 2017, yet assessments indicate limited transformative impact on EU defense capabilities, with persistent fragmentation due to national priorities overriding collaborative efficiencies.^[77] The 2025 progress report notes that of 66 active projects, nearly half have entered execution phases, but overall delivery remains incremental, with only select initiatives approaching full operational capability by late 2025.^[68] Independent analyses highlight that this progress has not yielded significant force multiplication effects, as interoperability gains are constrained by disparate national procurement cycles and reluctance to pool sovereign assets.^[48] Capability gaps endure in critical strategic enablers, such as air-to-air refueling and strategic airlift, where European reliance on non-EU partners persists despite PESCO efforts.^[78] The 2023 EU Capability Development Priorities identified 22 areas requiring enhancement, including eight under strategic enablers, underscoring shortfalls in networked logistics and sustainment that individual member states cannot address unilaterally.^[79] Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 prompted acceleration in niche areas like munitions production through aligned initiatives, but it simultaneously exposed high-end deficiencies, including insufficient enablers for sustained peer-level operations, as EU forces demonstrated dependency on external air and sealift support.^[41] The November 2023-launched strategic review, concluded in 2024, emphasized adapting PESCO beyond 2025 to prioritize gap-closing, yet empirical outcomes reveal that national silos—evident in uneven project participation and funding commitments—hinder scalable capabilities, falling short of initial ambitions for autonomous EU-level force projection.^[61] This assessment aligns with critiques that while PESCO fosters dialogue, it has not overcome entrenched barriers to joint acquisition, resulting in marginal rather than multiplicative enhancements to collective defense posture.^[48]

Interoperability with NATO and Transatlantic Alliances

Complementary Framework Claims

Official EU documentation establishing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) explicitly frames it as complementary to NATO, envisioning a "coherent full spectrum force package" that aligns with but does not duplicate Alliance structures.^[23] This positioning draws from broader EU-NATO declarations emphasizing mutually reinforcing roles, particularly in areas beyond NATO's Article 5 collective defense, such as crisis management and stabilization operations.^[80] Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, where NATO identified priorities like hybrid threats and cyber defense—predominantly non-Article 5 domains—EU initiatives like PESCO were presented as enhancing these through capability-building that "supports" NATO without supplanting it.^[81] PESCO projects are officially aligned with NATO's Defence Planning Process, with reports indicating that 38 of 46 initiatives as of recent assessments directly correspond to Alliance priorities, including hybrid warfare countermeasures and rapid deployment logistics.^[82] For instance, PESCO efforts on hybrid threats, such as information-sharing platforms and resilience training, mirror NATO's focus on multi-domain challenges, with joint exercises cited as evidence of synergy.^[83] EU-NATO joint declarations reinforce this narrative, highlighting coordinated progress in hybrid domains since 2016, where PESCO contributes specialized EU assets to bolster NATO's southern and eastern flank stability projections.^[84] Yet, empirical analysis of institutional outputs reveals parallel structures that challenge the exclusivity of supportive complementarity. In cyber defense, NATO maintains the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) for doctrinal development and exercises, while the EU operates distinct entities like the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and dedicated PESCO cyber projects, resulting in overlapping training modules and threat assessment frameworks without full integration.^[85] ^[86] These duplications, observed in areas like hybrid threat vector analysis, suggest that while official rhetoric prioritizes NATO augmentation, PESCO's expansion fosters autonomous EU capacities, potentially diverting resources from Alliance-specific enhancements.^[87] Such developments align with EU strategic autonomy goals articulated in foundational texts, raising questions about the causal primacy of complementarity over independent operational redundancy.^[85]

Actual Overlaps and Duplication Risks

PESCO initiatives in capability development, such as those in land systems and formations under its second wave of projects launched in 2019, exhibit overlaps with NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which focuses on accelerating dual-use technologies including ground-based systems for enhanced mobility and logistics. These parallel efforts risk diverting resources from unified standards, as both frameworks pursue interoperability in contested environments without fully integrated procurement pipelines.^[88] Pre-PESCO fragmentation in EU defense procurement already imposed annual costs estimated at €25-100 billion due to duplicated national programs and incompatible equipment, undermining economies of scale that NATO's collective frameworks partially mitigate through standardized acquisition.^[89] While PESCO aims to consolidate such efforts via joint projects, its selective participation model—excluding non-EU NATO members like the US and UK—creates redundant R&D streams, as evidenced by overlapping priorities in cyber defense and enabling technologies where PESCO projects mirror NATO's innovation hubs without subsuming them.^[90] Minor synergies exist, such as PESCO's Military Mobility project facilitating NATO troop deployments, yet net duplication persists in capability gaps like high-readiness forces, where parallel EU mechanisms add bureaucratic layers without proportional gains.^[83] In the context of post-2022 Ukraine support, NATO achieved high readiness for over 300,000 troops by June 2024 through streamlined allied commitments, contrasting with PESCO's marginal role limited to long-term enablers like training and logistics prototypes rather than direct surge capacity.^[91] EU multilateral aid channels, including those aligned with PESCO goals, demonstrated slower operationalization compared to NATO's rapid activation of enhanced forward presence battlegroups, highlighting inefficiencies from divided command structures and procurement delays in delivering timely matériel.^[92] Defense economics analyses underscore that such redundancies exacerbate opportunity costs, as fragmented spending dilutes the focus on NATO's proven deterrence architecture despite rhetorical complementarity.^[93]

Criticisms, Challenges, and Empirical Shortfalls

Strategic and Operational Ineffectiveness

PESCO's strategic objectives, including enhanced capability development and rapid response mechanisms, have been undermined by persistent failures to meet quantitative targets and operational timelines, with no effective enforcement provisions. Although EU member states' aggregate defence expenditure rose to 1.9% of GDP in 2024 from 1.6% in 2023, projections for 2025 indicate only 2.1%, reflecting uneven national commitments rather than uniform achievement of the 2% benchmark emphasized in related frameworks.^[94] ^[95] Individual states such as Luxembourg plan to reach 2% only by 2030, while others like Malta maintain minimal allocations, highlighting the absence of sanctions or penalties within PESCO for non-compliance, which dilutes binding commitments under Article 46 of the Treaty on European Union.^[96] Operational ineffectiveness is evident in project implementation delays, driven by inadequate funding and fragmented industrial participation across waves of initiatives. As of 2025, many PESCO projects exhibit shortfalls rooted in member states' inconsistent resource allocation, resulting in postponed milestones for capabilities like airlift and cyber defence systems, despite initial operational targets set for earlier delivery.^[68] ^[8] These delays stem from structural reliance on voluntary contributions without mandatory surge provisions, rendering a significant portion of outputs non-deployable in high-intensity scenarios, as assessments reveal gaps in full-spectrum readiness for peer conflicts.^[97] The Russian invasion of Ukraine served as a practical test of PESCO's operational viability, where contributions were limited to auxiliary logistics rather than scalable combat enablers. While select projects supported transport corridors and materiel coordination, broader audits underscore failures in delivering expeditionary surge capacities, such as integrated air defence or rapid reinforcement modules, amid persistent ammunition and mobility bottlenecks exposed by frontline demands.^[98] ^[62] Proponents maintain that PESCO fosters deepened interoperability and shared R&D ties among participants, incrementally building resilience against hybrid threats.^[33] Critics, however, contend that its bureaucratic layering—encompassing extensive coordination without streamlined decision-making—yields marginal deterrence enhancements relative to standalone national efforts, as most initiatives would likely proceed independently absent the framework's overhead.^[99] ^[100]

Economic Burdens and Free-Riding Incentives

Despite post-2022 increases driven by the Ukraine conflict, the European Union's average defense expenditure reached approximately 1.5% of GDP in 2024, with projections for modest growth to around 1.7% in 2025 amid uneven national commitments. ^[101] Variations persist, with eastern members like Poland and the Baltic states exceeding 2.5-3% of GDP, while larger economies such as Germany approached 2% only after 2024 fiscal exemptions, and southern states like Italy and Spain remained below 1.5%.^[102] ^[103] PESCO's funding mechanism relies predominantly on national budgets, with joint European contributions limited to instruments like the European Defence Fund (EDF), totaling €7.95 billion for 2021-2027—a negligible share relative to aggregate EU defense outlays exceeding €350 billion annually.^[104] This minimal pooling sustains free-riding dynamics, as lower-spending participants access alliance-wide benefits, including NATO interoperability, without equivalent fiscal burdens, effectively leveraging higher contributors and U.S. defense expenditures that constitute over 60% of NATO's total.^[102] Economic analyses highlight how such incentives discourage proportional investment, fostering dependency on external guarantors and eroding collective capability development.^[105] Preferential procurement policies under PESCO and related frameworks prioritize intra-EU suppliers, erecting barriers to non-European firms and exacerbating costs through market fragmentation and reduced competition. Studies estimate these preferences impose unit cost premiums of 20-30% for select equipment, attributable to duplicated production lines, small-batch manufacturing, and shielded inefficiencies in national industries. ^[106] By rewarding protectionism over open competition, this approach amplifies fiscal strains on contributor states, perpetuating a cycle where low-effort members underwrite minimal shares while benefiting from subsidized access to enhanced capabilities.^[107]

Political Debates on EU Autonomy vs. NATO Reliance

The political debates surrounding Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) center on tensions between advocates of enhanced EU strategic autonomy and those prioritizing reliance on NATO's transatlantic framework. Proponents, particularly in France, argue that PESCO enables the EU to develop independent capabilities, reducing dependence on external powers amid perceived US unreliability. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly framed strategic autonomy as essential for Europe's survival, positioning PESCO as a mechanism to foster a common European defense identity separate from NATO dominance.^[108] ^[109] This view emphasizes supranational integration to address gaps in crisis response, such as non-Article 5 operations, where EU tools could complement rather than duplicate NATO.^[110] Opposition, led by Eastern European states like Poland and the Baltic countries, stresses NATO's primacy for collective defense against immediate threats, particularly from Russia, viewing PESCO autonomy rhetoric as a risk to alliance cohesion. Polish discourse on strategic autonomy remains marginal, with focus instead on bolstering NATO's eastern flank through increased US engagement.^[111] ^[112] These nations advocate inclusive PESCO projects that align with NATO standards to avoid fragmentation, cautioning that EU-centric efforts could undermine the Article 5 guarantee reliant on US contributions.^[113] US officials have echoed these concerns, warning in 2018 that PESCO and related funds risked decoupling Europe from NATO by fostering duplication rather than burden-sharing.^[7] ^[114] Empirical data underscores the causal realities of this dependence: US defense spending reached approximately $916 billion in 2023, exceeding the combined expenditures of all European NATO allies by a factor of about three, including critical enablers like nuclear deterrence and global intelligence that no EU framework currently replicates.^[115] European public opinion largely aligns with NATO primacy, with surveys showing favorable views of the alliance at 81% across member states in 2025 and majorities in polled nations preferring preservation of NATO amid any European responsibility for defense.^[116] In France, support for NATO membership dips to 55%, reflecting autonomy preferences, while Eastern Europeans exhibit near-universal endorsement, highlighting intra-EU divides.^[117] Autonomy advocates often overlook these asymmetries, as EU initiatives like PESCO have yet to demonstrate scalable capabilities independent of transatlantic assets.^[8]

Recent Developments Post-Ukraine Invasion

Strategic Reviews and Adjustments (2023-2025)

In November 2023, the Council of the European Union launched a strategic review of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to assess its progress, enhance its effectiveness, and adapt to the evolving geopolitical context, including lessons from Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. The review aimed to align PESCO more closely with the EU Strategic Compass and broader defence initiatives, emphasizing the need for deeper cooperation amid high-intensity threats demonstrated by the conflict.^[33] On 19 November 2024, the Council approved conclusions from the review, reaffirming PESCO's central role in fostering defence collaboration among participating member states and recommending updates to its 20 binding commitments.^[61] These updates prioritize increased defence spending, targeted capability development, and enhanced armament cooperation to address strategic gaps, including those pertinent to high-intensity warfare.^[118] The conclusions also stress integrating Ukraine into EU defence efforts, in line with security commitments established on 27 June 2024, to bolster resilience against ongoing threats.^[119] Adjustments post-review have included a pivot toward joint production and procurement mechanisms to support deterrence and peer-level capabilities, with several PESCO projects—such as the European Secure Software-defined Radio and the Counter Battery System—incorporating Ukraine-derived insights on ammunition and missile systems for scalable wartime application.^[66] However, implementation has proceeded slowly due to bureaucratic validation processes averaging nine months from proposal to approval, inadequate financial planning, and practical timeline shortfalls, resulting in delays across multiple initiatives despite calls for stricter deadlines.^[48] ^[64] By early 2025, while seven projects had reached completion and others neared closure, varying progress and unresolved commitment revisions underscored persistent challenges in translating review recommendations into operational tempo commensurate with high-threat environments.^[8]

Expanded Projects and Third-Country Engagements

In May 2025, the Council of the European Union approved the sixth and final wave of the initial phase of PESCO projects, adding 11 new collaborative initiatives focused on critical capabilities such as air and missile defense systems, electronic warfare doctrines, quantum technologies for secure communications, and other enablers like training facilities.^[4]^[68] These projects, spanning domains including land, air, maritime, and cyber, aim to address gaps exposed by ongoing geopolitical tensions, particularly Russia's invasion of Ukraine, by enhancing interoperability and rapid deployment.^[120] However, implementation has encountered persistent integration challenges, including varying national commitments and technical standardization issues, limiting their immediate operational transformation as noted in contemporaneous assessments.^[8] Switzerland's participation expanded in 2025 with approval on May 20 to join the Cyber Ranges Federations project, which develops federated platforms for advanced cyber training and simulation across participating states.^[52] This builds on Switzerland's earlier entry into the Military Mobility project, approved by its Federal Council in August 2024 and formalized in January 2025, which standardizes cross-border troop and equipment movements.^[51]^[70] These additions reflect selective third-country involvement to bolster enablers without full EU membership, yet they underscore hurdles in aligning neutral states' policies with PESCO's collective goals. Third-country engagements remained anchored in key enabler projects, with the United States, Norway, and Canada maintaining sustained participation in Military Mobility since their invitations in 2021, contributing expertise in logistics and infrastructure. By late 2025, PESCO encompassed a total of 83 projects across operational domains, demonstrating incremental growth in response to security imperatives but facing empirical constraints in delivering unified capabilities due to fragmented implementation and dependency on national funding.^[121]^[66]

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May 7, 2025 · Defence spending increased by over 30 % in real terms from 2021 to 2024. Additional spending of more than €100 billion is projected in real ...
[104]
Other EU defence initiatives and programmes | EEAS
Oct 3, 2025 · EDIP is a Regulation proposed by the Commission, through which the EU aims to provide €1.5 billion from the EU budget in the form of grants by ...
[105]
The governance and funding of European rearmament - Bruegel
Current PESCO projects include military mobility and networks of logistics hubs. Canada, Norway and the US participate in the military mobility project and the ...
[106]
Bye Buy European? A Liberal Take on European Preferences in EU ...
Jul 24, 2024 · This article analyses the EU's initiatives to strengthen its defence industrial base and considers the added value and possible caveats of 'Buy ...
[107]
Building European Defense Capabilities for a More Uncertain World
Mar 4, 2025 · European nations face significant challenges in coordinating their defense strategies, both within NATO and at the regional level. A complex web ...
[108]
French President Macron Calls For European 'Strategic Autonomy'
Feb 8, 2021 · French President Emmanuel Macron is pushing Europeans to embrace “strategic autonomy” as the best way to revitalize NATO and address global challenges.
[109]
For the Sake of Autonomy: France's Defence Agenda for Europe - IRIS
Apr 7, 2022 · At the political level, France promoted its vision of “a shared strategic autonomy” by pushing an ambitious European Defence Fund (EDF), an ...
[110]
[PDF] Independence play: Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy
As ECFR's survey shows, many member states see strategic autonomy as a French concept. They view. Paris as the main proponent of ESA – partly because European ...
[111]
Annex 3 Poland and the European strategic autonomy debate - jstor
The Polish debate on European strategic autonomy has thus been limited from the outset, with the government and the public concentrating on strengthening NATO ...
[112]
Poland and the Baltic States: A Preference for a Renewed West
Jan 8, 2021 · Poland and the Baltic states have developed a cautious stance towards the idea of achieving European strategic autonomy or sovereignty by the European Union.
[113]
European Defence – Debates in and about Poland and France
Feb 27, 2019 · For Poland, it is of fundamental strategic importance to avoid duplicating EU and NATO structures and that PESCO remains inclusive and binding ...
[114]
[PDF] European Strategic Autonomy in Defence - RAND
Defence (CARD), and the European Defence Fund (EDF), along with the Permanent Structured. Cooperation (PESCO) framework for a subset of EU member states eager ...
[115]
NATO Defense Spending Tracker - Atlantic Council
Jun 20, 2025 · Twenty-three NATO members now spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense—nearly four times the number (six) that did in 2021.
[116]
Views of NATO in 13 member states - Pew Research Center
Jun 23, 2025 · This year, 81% see NATO positively, down from 88% in 2024. Adults in Germany (+9 points) and Canada (+6) see NATO more favorably than in 2024.
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https://yougov.co.uk/international/articles/53219-european-political-monthly-europeans-on-defence-and-nato
[118]
Council of the European Union approves PESCO Strategic Review
Nov 26, 2024 · Initiated in November 2023, the review seeks to bolster PESCO's effectiveness, aligning it with evolving geopolitical realities beyond 2025. The ...Missing: assessed outcomes<|separator|>
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[PDF] Council Conclusions on the PESCO Strategic Review - Data
Nov 18, 2024 · The Council underlines the importance of bringing Ukraine closer to EU defence initiatives, in line with the joint security commitments between ...
[120]
PESCO's Sixth Wave and Europe's Strategic Bet on Disruptive ...
May 31, 2025 · The sixth wave of PESCO projects, formally launched by the Council of the European Union on 27 May 2025, marks a significant advancement in the ...
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EU agrees 11 more PESCO projects, looks to next phase
From 2018 to 2025, PESCO has generated a total of 83 collaborative projects spanning the five operational domains of land, maritime, air, space, and cyber.