Sufi Muhammad
Sufi Muhammad (c. 1927 – 11 July 2019) was a Pakistani Islamist cleric and militant leader who founded the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in 1992 to enforce strict Sharia law in Pakistan's Malakand Division and beyond.[1][2] Earlier affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami during the 1980s Afghan jihad against the Soviets, Muhammad broke away to form TNSM after perceiving insufficient commitment to Islamic governance from mainstream parties.[1] In late 2001, following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, he mobilized thousands of Pakistani volunteers to join Taliban forces against American and allied troops, framing the conflict as a defensive jihad.[3] His efforts contributed to the emergence of TNSM as a precursor to Taliban-style militancy in Swat Valley, where his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah later led the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan faction, earning Muhammad the designation "father of the Swat Taliban."[2][4] Released from detention in 2008 after years of imprisonment, Muhammad mediated a 2009 peace accord between the Pakistani government and Swat militants, which temporarily implemented Sharia courts but collapsed amid ongoing violence, leading to his rearrest on sedition charges for denouncing democracy and Pakistani sovereignty.[3][5] He remained incarcerated until granted bail in 2018 due to health issues, dying the following year from prolonged illness at age 92.[6][7]Early Life and Background
Birth, Family, and Education
Sufi Muhammad was born in 1933 in Maidan village, Lower Dir District, in what is now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan.[6] He belonged to a Sunni Pashtun family in the region.[8] Limited details are available regarding his immediate family origins, with no specific records of his parents or siblings publicly documented in reliable sources. Sufi Muhammad had two wives and fathered 13 sons and six daughters.[6] He pursued religious education at the Panjpir madrasa in Swabi, a Deobandi institution known for its strict curriculum, completing his studies there in 1959.[6] [3] No evidence indicates formal secular education beyond basic levels, as his path aligned early with clerical training.[6]Initial Religious and Political Affiliations
Sufi Muhammad, born in 1933 in the village of Maidan in Lower Dir district, received his primary religious education at Deobandi madrasas, including Darul Uloom Haqqania in Saidu Sharif, Swat, where he completed studies around 1959.[3] The Deobandi tradition, emphasizing strict adherence to Hanafi jurisprudence and reformist Sunni Islam, shaped his early clerical outlook, with additional training reported at Panj Pir madrasa in Swabi, a center associated with Deobandi scholars like the Panjpiri group.[6] These institutions instilled a focus on scriptural purity and opposition to un-Islamic practices, influencing his lifelong advocacy for sharia implementation.[3] Politically, Sufi Muhammad initially aligned with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan's prominent Islamist party founded by Abul A'la Maududi, during the 1970s.[3] [6] He actively participated in JI's activities in the Malakand region, including Dir and Swat districts, promoting Islamist mobilization amid Pakistan's post-1971 political shifts. However, he departed from JI around 1981, citing irreconcilable differences over the party's willingness to engage in electoral politics and democratic processes, which he viewed as compromising Islamic principles.[3] This split reflected his growing insistence on non-participatory, sharia-centric activism over mainstream political compromise.[9]Ideological Positions
Advocacy for Sharia Supremacy
Sufi Muhammad founded Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in 1994 explicitly to enforce Sharia law in Pakistan's Malakand Division, viewing it as the sole legitimate governance system superior to the country's secular legal framework.[1] The group's name translates to "Movement for the Implementation of Muhammad's Sharia," reflecting his conviction that Islamic law, derived from the Quran and Sunnah, must supplant all man-made statutes, including Pakistan's constitution.[10] From its inception, TNSM organized rallies and protests demanding the replacement of British-era laws and provincial codes with strict Sharia courts and hudud punishments, such as amputation for theft and stoning for adultery.[11] In the mid-1990s, Sufi Muhammad led blockades and sit-ins across Malakand districts, including Swat and Dir, to pressure authorities into abolishing what he termed "un-Islamic" laws, insisting that Sharia's supremacy required immediate judicial reforms without compromise.[12] These efforts culminated in partial government concessions, such as the 1994 Sharia Nizam in Malakand, but Sufi Muhammad rejected them as insufficient, arguing they diluted Sharia's authority by retaining federal oversight.[13] He repeatedly declared that true Islamic rule demands Sharia's unadulterated application, free from democratic or parliamentary interference, positioning it as divine mandate over human legislation.[14] Sufi Muhammad extended his advocacy beyond local enforcement, stating in 2009 that Sharia must govern all of Pakistan and ultimately the global caliphate, dismissing national sovereignty as subordinate to Islamic jurisprudence.[15] Following the Malakand Accord that year, which nominally restored Sharia in exchange for a ceasefire, he criticized the agreement for embedding Sharia within Pakistan's state structure rather than establishing its absolute primacy, vowing continued agitation until secular elements were eradicated.[16] His rhetoric emphasized Sharia's supremacy by equating resistance to it with apostasy, framing TNSM's mission as a religious obligation to impose it coercively if necessary.[17]Conception of Jihad and Anti-Western Stance
Sufi Muhammad, rooted in Deobandi tradition, conceived of jihad primarily as a defensive religious obligation to protect Muslim lands and enforce Sharia law against non-Islamic incursions and governance.[18][19] He participated in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet invasion during the 1980s, supporting Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami faction with manpower and resources, viewing it as a legitimate struggle to expel infidel occupiers. This experience shaped his belief that jihad becomes fard al-ayn—an individual duty for all able Muslims—when dar al-Islam faces external threats, extending beyond mere territorial defense to the restoration of Islamic sovereignty.[3] In the post-9/11 era, Sufi Muhammad applied this framework to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, issuing a fatwa in October 2001 declaring holy war against American forces as obligatory for Muslims, framing the conflict as a defense of the Taliban regime and Islamic rule against crusader aggression.[20][3] He mobilized approximately 10,000 volunteers from Pakistan's tribal areas to cross into Afghanistan, equipping them minimally and directing them to fight alongside Taliban forces, though most were quickly routed or captured due to lack of coordination.[21] His Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) integrated jihad into its core demand for total Sharia implementation, encompassing judicial, political, economic, and martial dimensions to supplant secular systems.[21] Sufi Muhammad's anti-Western stance portrayed the United States and its allies as existential enemies of Islam, akin to historical crusaders seeking to eradicate Sharia through military occupation and support for apostate regimes like Pakistan's post-9/11 government.[15] He denounced democratic participation and Western-backed elections as kufr, arguing they contradicted divine sovereignty and obligated Muslims to reject them in favor of caliphate-style rule.[15] This position extended to critiquing insurgencies like those in Kashmir, where he deemed jihad non-mandatory absent explicit Sharia enforcement goals, prioritizing ideological purity over nationalist aims.[22] His rhetoric consistently elevated armed struggle (jihad bil-saif) over negotiation with Western-influenced states, reflecting Deobandi emphasis on global Muslim defense against perceived cultural and military imperialism.[23]Rejection of Democracy and Secular Governance
Sufi Muhammad consistently denounced democracy as an infidel-imposed system fundamentally at odds with Islamic principles, arguing that it usurped divine sovereignty by allowing humans to legislate. In a February 2009 interview with Deutsche Presse-Agentur prior to the Malakand Accord, he stated, "From the very beginning, I have viewed democracy as a system imposed on us by the infidels. Islam does not allow democracy or elections."[15] He further elaborated in public addresses, such as a rally in Mingora, Swat, where he declared, "We hate democracy" and affirmed that "Islam does not permit democracy or election," positioning electoral processes as incompatible with Sharia's mandate for governance under God's law alone.[15] Central to his critique was the notion that democratic mechanisms, including constitutions and voting, enable sinful human lawmaking over divine revelation. Sufi Muhammad asserted that "democracy and the constitution are un-Islamic" because they contradict Sharia, with "democracy allow[ing] humans to make laws, which is a sin," rendering it a form of kufr (unbelief).[24] In a Pakistani television interview around May 2009, he rejected democracy as the creation of infidels, questioning, "How can people who do not even know their creator be expected to make laws?" and deeming Pakistan's superior courts un-Islamic for entertaining appeals against Sharia decisions.[25] He specifically criticized equal voting rights in democracy for failing to distinguish between the pious and the corrupt, viewing it as an egalitarian error that diluted religious authority. Sufi Muhammad advocated Sharia as the exclusive governance model, praising the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996–2001) as a "complete Islamic state" and ideal for Muslim nations, while rejecting hybrid systems like the NWFP government's Darul Qaza courts as tainted by democratic elements.[15][26] Following the Swat peace deal in 2009, his Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) explicitly proclaimed democracy and Sharia incompatible, insisting on pure Islamic rule without secular concessions.[26] This stance extended to a vision of global Islamic dominance, as he proclaimed at the Mingora rally, "We want the occupation of Islam in the entire world."[15]Establishment of TNSM
Founding and Organizational Structure
Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) was founded in 1992 by Sufi Muhammad, a Sunni cleric who resigned from his position within Jamaat-e-Islami to pursue stricter enforcement of Sharia law.[21] The group's primary objective was the imposition of Islamic law across Pakistan, with initial focus on the Malakand Division and surrounding tribal areas.[21] Emerging from earlier informal religious activism tracing back to the 1970s, TNSM formalized amid local discontent with Pakistan's judicial system.[27] In November 1994, following a Pakistani Supreme Court ruling affirming judicial authority in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, TNSM escalated to an armed insurgency in Malakand, temporarily seizing control of government functions in Swat Valley and attracting up to 25,000 supporters.[10][27] This campaign marked the organization's shift from protests to militant operations, establishing parallel Sharia courts and administrative systems.[10] Under Sufi Muhammad's leadership from its inception until 2009, TNSM developed a bureaucratic structure post-1994 insurgency, centered on an executive body as the primary policy-making entity.[10][21] This body incorporated former servicemen and retired military officers, reflecting ties to ex-military elements for operational capacity.[21] Headquarters were based in Maidan, near Bajaur Agency in the North-West Frontier Province.[21] The group operated through a network of madrasas and local preachers, emphasizing grassroots mobilization among lower socioeconomic classes via religious appeals and rapid justice delivery.[10]
TNSM's early hierarchy was centered on Sufi Muhammad as supreme leader, with deputies handling regional agitation and enforcement; it lacked a rigid military chain of command initially, relying instead on charismatic authority and tribal alliances for cohesion.[21] Over time, this evolved to include specialized roles for propaganda and conflict, foreshadowing later integrations with broader jihadist networks.[27]