Three Links
The Three Links refer to direct postal, transportation, and trade connections across the Taiwan Strait between the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.[1][2] These links were prohibited by the ROC government after its retreat to Taiwan in 1949 amid the Chinese Civil War, as part of a broader policy to isolate the Chinese Communist Party-controlled mainland.[3] Partial implementation began in 2001 through "mini-three links" allowing limited direct exchanges between Taiwan's outlying Kinmen and Matsu islands and adjacent PRC coastal areas in Fujian province, aimed at boosting local economies without broader political concessions.[4] Full direct links were established on December 15, 2008, under ROC President Ma Ying-jeou, inaugurating regular charter flights, sea shipping routes, and postal services, which expanded to scheduled operations and significantly increased cross-strait interactions.[5] The policy has driven economic integration, with bilateral trade reaching hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars annually and China remaining Taiwan's top trading partner, facilitating supply chain efficiencies in sectors like electronics but raising concerns over dependency and vulnerability to coercion.[6][7] Politically, the links represent a pragmatic détente amid unresolved sovereignty disputes, yet they have sparked debates in Taiwan about national security, with critics arguing they enable PRC influence operations and economic leverage, while proponents highlight mutual prosperity and people-to-people ties.[8] Despite heightened tensions under subsequent DPP administrations, the infrastructure persists, underscoring the enduring causal pull of geographic proximity and economic incentives over ideological barriers.[9]Conceptual Foundations
Definition and Core Components
The Three Links, also known as the "Three Direct Links" (Chinese: 三通; pinyin: sān tōng), constitute a framework for establishing direct postal, transportation, and commercial exchanges across the Taiwan Strait between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan).[10][3] This concept emerged as a proposed normalization of cross-strait interactions severed after the Chinese Civil War concluded in 1949, when the ROC government retreated to Taiwan and imposed bans on direct contacts to prevent PRC influence and maintain separation.[3] The links aim to facilitate unrestricted people-to-people, economic, and logistical flows without reliance on third-country intermediaries, such as Hong Kong or Japan, which had previously routed indirect exchanges.[1] The core components of the Three Links are explicitly defined as follows:- Direct Postal Services (通邮, tōng yóu): This enables seamless mail exchange between the PRC mainland and Taiwan, eliminating delays and inspections associated with indirect routing through foreign postal systems.[10][11]
- Direct Transportation (通航, tōng háng): Encompassing air and maritime routes, this component allows scheduled passenger and cargo flights as well as shipping directly between ports and airports on both sides, reducing transit times and costs compared to circuitous paths.[10][1]
- Direct Trade (通商, tōng shāng): This permits commercial transactions, including goods shipment and business dealings, without third-party involvement, fostering bilateral economic integration while addressing tariff and regulatory barriers.[10][3]
Origins and Initial Proposals
The suspension of direct postal, transportation, and trade links across the Taiwan Strait originated from the Chinese Civil War's conclusion, when the Republic of China (ROC) government relocated to Taiwan in December 1949 and implemented bans on such interactions to avoid legitimizing the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland.[1] These measures, formalized through ROC executive orders in the early 1950s, required all cross-strait exchanges to route indirectly via third countries or territories, such as Hong Kong or Japan, imposing significant logistical costs and delays estimated at up to 30% higher than direct routes by the 1970s.[2] This policy reflected the ROC's claim to represent all of China and its strategy to isolate the PRC diplomatically amid ongoing hostilities, including the Korean War and periodic Strait crises in 1954-1955 and 1958. The PRC first formally proposed resuming the "three direct links"—direct mail, sea and air transportation, and trade—as part of broader overtures for peaceful reunification shortly after initiating economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping. On January 1, 1979, following the PRC's establishment of diplomatic ties with the United States, Beijing announced readiness to negotiate these links without preconditions, framing them as practical steps to foster economic cooperation and reduce tensions.[1] This initiative built on Ye Jianying's September 30, 1979, Nine-Point Proposal, which emphasized ending military confrontation, promoting mutual visits, and expanding exchanges in economy, culture, and technology to pave the way for unification under "one country, two systems."[13] PRC officials, including Deng, reiterated the offer in subsequent years, such as Deng's 1981 statement prioritizing links over immediate political talks, aiming to leverage Taiwan's export-oriented economy against the mainland's growing industrial base.[14] In response, ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo announced the "Three Principles Policy" (commonly known as the Three Noes) on April 10, 1979, committing to no official contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise with the PRC to safeguard Taiwan's de facto independence and democratic development.[15] This stance, maintained until Chiang's death in 1988, rejected direct links as a potential vector for PRC political influence and unification propaganda, prioritizing indirect "mini-links" experiments later in the 1980s for humanitarian visits while preserving sovereignty concerns.[16] Despite occasional PRC concessions, such as allowing Taiwan-flagged ships limited access in 1987, the initial proposals stalled, with both sides citing the absence of mutual recognition as the core impasse—PRC viewing links as internal affairs, ROC as requiring parity in negotiations.[1]Historical Evolution
Pre-Direct Link Period and Indirect Arrangements
Following the Chinese Civil War and the retreat of the Republic of China (ROC) government to Taiwan in December 1949, the ROC authorities imposed a comprehensive ban on direct postal, transportation, and trade links with mainland China under Kuomintang rule. This suspension aimed to isolate the Communist regime economically and militarily, preventing resource flows that could bolster the People's Republic of China (PRC) war effort or enable infiltration.[3] In January 1979, shortly after the PRC's "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" issued by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC's National People's Congress proposed resuming the Three Links—direct mail, trade, and shipping—as a means to foster cross-strait reconciliation short of immediate political unification. The ROC rejected direct links, adhering to a policy of minimal contact to safeguard de facto independence amid mutual non-recognition and periodic military tensions. However, the PRC unilaterally established ordinary and registered postal services to Taiwan that year, enabling mail dispatch without mandatory third-party routing, though volumes remained limited due to Taiwan's restrictions on acceptance.[1][15] Indirect trade emerged despite the bans, driven by economic complementarities: Taiwan's export-oriented industries sought mainland markets for intermediate goods, while the PRC's reforms under Deng attracted Taiwanese capital via proxies. Transactions routed through intermediaries like Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore, with goods relabeled to obscure origins. By 1980, indirect trade totaled around $200 million in Taiwanese exports to the mainland, with two-way exchanges reaching $330 million—all unofficial and subject to smuggling risks and higher logistics costs from transshipment.[17][18] Shipping and air links operated exclusively indirectly, with vessels and flights stopping at third-country ports or airports, adding 20-50% to transport expenses and extending transit times by days or weeks. No direct maritime or aviation routes existed, enforcing physical separation that aligned with Taiwan's security doctrine under martial law (1949-1987), which viewed direct access as a vector for espionage or economic coercion. These arrangements, while inefficient, laid groundwork for later expansion as market pressures eroded strict enforcement, with indirect trade comprising a growing share of both economies by the mid-1980s.[19]Preparatory Liberalizations (1987-2007)
In November 1987, the Republic of China (ROC) government on Taiwan lifted a 38-year ban on Taiwanese residents visiting relatives on the mainland, marking the initial step toward easing cross-strait restrictions after the Chinese Civil War. This policy change, announced by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, was framed as a humanitarian measure to facilitate family reunions amid mounting public pressure following the end of martial law in July 1987. Over the subsequent months, more than 400,000 Taiwanese traveled to the mainland, fostering indirect economic contacts and highlighting the impracticality of prolonged isolation.[20][21][22] The travel liberalization indirectly spurred trade growth, as Taiwanese businesses leveraged third-country intermediaries like Hong Kong for commerce with the mainland. Taiwan's exports to the mainland, routed indirectly, expanded from approximately US$1.2 billion in 1987 to US$19.4 billion by 1995, driven by investments in sectors such as electronics and plastics. In January 1990, the ROC promulgated "Measures on Indirect Investment and Technical Cooperation with the Mainland," permitting limited capital outflows through overseas subsidiaries, which by the early 1990s had channeled substantial Taiwanese funds into mainland manufacturing. These arrangements maintained political separation while enabling economic interdependence, with cross-strait indirect trade reaching significant volumes despite official prohibitions on direct exchanges.[23][24] Further preparatory steps included selective allowances for transportation and postal services. In May 1995, Taiwan authorized foreign-flagged vessels to conduct transshipment between its ports and mainland facilities, reducing logistical costs for indirect shipping. Postal exchanges remained routed through Hong Kong or other intermediaries, supporting the rising volume of personal and commercial mail. These measures reflected Taiwan's cautious approach, balancing economic pragmatism against sovereignty concerns, as articulated by successive administrations wary of mainland political influence. By the mid-2000s, cumulative Taiwanese investment on the mainland exceeded US$100 billion via indirect channels, underscoring the scale of de facto integration.[25][26] A milestone in aviation came during the 2005 Lunar New Year holiday, when temporary direct charter flights operated between Taiwan and select mainland cities for the first time since 1949, involving eight airlines and carrying over 13,000 passengers across 78 flights from January 29 to February 20. These non-scheduled, holiday-only services bypassed third-country stops, testing infrastructure and protocols but excluding general passengers to limit political symbolism. They presaged fuller liberalization, demonstrating feasibility amid growing business demands, though Taiwan imposed restrictions like no flights to politically sensitive mainland cities. This period's reforms, initiated under KMT rule and continued under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from 2000, prioritized controlled engagement over comprehensive direct links, which remained barred until 2008.[27][28]Full Direct Implementation (2008-2010)
Following the election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of the Republic of China on March 22, 2008, and his inauguration on May 20, 2008, Taiwan pursued a policy of engaging mainland China on economic issues while maintaining political separation.[29] This shift facilitated the resumption of institutionalized cross-strait talks between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), dormant since 1999.[30] On June 12, 2008, SEF and ARATS signed the first agreement since the thaw, establishing regular charter flights between Taiwan and select mainland cities on weekends and Chinese holidays, limited to eight mainland and three Taiwanese airlines operating 36 round-trip flights weekly.[29] These direct passenger and cargo charter flights commenced on July 4, 2008, marking the initial step toward fuller aviation connectivity and reducing transit times compared to prior indirect routes via third countries.[29] The second round of talks occurred in Taipei from November 3-4, 2008, resulting in four agreements: expansion of direct air transport to 108 weekly passenger flights and 60 monthly cargo flights across 21 mainland and five Taiwanese cities; initiation of direct sea transport between 15 pairs of ports (five Taiwanese and ten mainland); establishment of direct postal services; and a framework for agricultural quarantine.[31] These pacts were ratified swiftly, with full implementation launching on December 15, 2008, ending the 59-year prohibition on direct links imposed since 1949.[32] Inaugural direct flights included Shenzhen Airlines arriving at Taipei's Songshan Airport at 8:45 a.m., alongside Taiwanese carriers like TransAsia Airways.[33] Direct shipping services began concurrently, with 63 cargo vessels (33 Taiwanese, 30 mainland) operationalized, slashing transit times from up to three weeks via Hong Kong or Japan to approximately four days.[34] Postal exchanges were routed directly through designated facilities, bypassing intermediaries and enabling faster mail delivery.[33] By 2009, these links stabilized, with flight volumes adhering to quotas and shipping routes expanding trade flows, though restrictions persisted on sensitive political or military cargo.[29] Through 2010, the direct links operated without major disruptions, supporting increased cross-strait economic activity under the Ma administration's framework, which emphasized mutual non-denial of sovereignty while prioritizing practical exchanges.[30] Quotas for flights and shipping were monitored jointly, with data indicating steady utilization rates that laid groundwork for subsequent trade agreements like the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.[35] Implementation faced no significant technical hurdles, though Taiwan imposed caps on mainland visitors and investments to manage inflows.[36]Adjustments and Continuations (2011-Present)
Following the full implementation of direct trade, transportation, and postal links in 2008-2010, cross-Strait economic exchanges under President Ma Ying-jeou's administration saw incremental expansions through 2016. Direct passenger flights increased to 616 per week by 2013, accommodating growing tourism and business travel, while cargo shipping and mail services operated without interruption.[37] Trade volumes surged, with Taiwan's exports to the mainland reaching a peak of $91.105 billion in 2011, driven by electronics and machinery sectors.[38] These developments reflected mutual economic incentives overriding political frictions, as mainland ports handled increasing Taiwanese vessel calls under flag-of-convenience arrangements to bypass residual restrictions.[39] The election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016 introduced adjustments amid heightened political tensions, as Beijing suspended official inter-party communications and pressured for adherence to the 1992 Consensus, which Tsai's Democratic Progressive Party rejected. Taiwan responded by tightening controls on mainland tourism—banning group tours in 2019—and Chinese investments in sensitive sectors, yet direct cargo flights, shipping, and postal services persisted uninterrupted to sustain supply chains, particularly for semiconductors.[40] Passenger flights declined from pre-2016 levels due to reduced tourist inflows, dropping to around 200-300 weekly by the late 2010s, though cargo links expanded to support bilateral trade that reached over $300 billion annually by 2022 despite diversification efforts like Taiwan's New Southbound Policy.[41] The COVID-19 pandemic prompted temporary suspensions, including mini-Three Links between outlying islands like Kinmen and mainland ports from February 2020, but these resumed post-2022 with enhanced biosecurity protocols.[42] Under President Lai Ching-te from 2024, links have continued amid escalated military rhetoric from Beijing, including new unilateral air routes near Kinmen in 2024, which Taiwan criticized for lacking consultation and encroaching on its airspace.[9] Taiwan approved an increase to 209 weekly passenger flights in March 2023 as a goodwill gesture, prioritizing economic stability over full severance, while mainland authorities promoted integration via Fujian Province initiatives, recording $11.86 billion in regional trade with Taiwan through November 2024.[43][44] Empirical data underscores interdependence: Taiwan's exports to the mainland comprised roughly 40% of its total by the early 2020s, with no evidence of Beijing enacting threatened full cuts to the links, likely due to reciprocal reliance on Taiwanese technology exports.[45] Postal exchanges have remained routine, facilitating e-commerce growth without reported disruptions.[46]Economic Dimensions
Trade Expansion and Quantitative Growth
The establishment of direct trade links as part of the Three Links policy in December 2008, allowing regular cargo shipping between designated ports in Taiwan and mainland China, markedly accelerated the quantitative expansion of bilateral commerce by eliminating reliance on indirect third-country routes, which previously added 20-30% to logistics costs and extended transit times by days or weeks. This shift lowered barriers for perishable goods, just-in-time manufacturing components, and high-volume shipments, directly contributing to post-implementation growth amid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis. Empirical data from Taiwan's authorities indicate that cross-strait trade, already rising due to prior indirect liberalization, experienced compounded annual increases averaging 5-7% in the ensuing years, driven by enhanced supply chain integration in electronics and machinery sectors.[47] Quantitative metrics underscore this trajectory: bilateral trade volume stood at US$130.2 billion in 2007, prior to direct links, comprising 27.9% of Taiwan's total foreign trade.[48] By 2014, it had expanded to US$198 billion, reflecting the policy's facilitation of deeper economic interdependence.[49] Volumes peaked in the mid-2010s before stabilizing amid trade diversification efforts and external shocks, reaching US$150.5 billion in 2018 and US$165.97 billion in 2023, consistently accounting for 20-25% of Taiwan's overall foreign trade.[50][51] These figures, drawn from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council and customs data, highlight China's role as Taiwan's dominant trading partner, with exports to the mainland—primarily semiconductors, machinery, and chemicals—driving surpluses exceeding US$100 billion annually in peak years.[52]| Year | Trade Volume (US$ billion) | Share of Taiwan's Total Trade (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 2007 | 130.2 | 27.9 |
| 2014 | 198 | ~22 |
| 2018 | 150.5 | ~20 |
| 2023 | 165.97 | ~22 |