Fact-checked by Grok 2 weeks ago

Zhili clique

The Zhili clique (直系; Zhíxì) was a dominant faction of the during China's (1916–1928), originating from officers loyal to the late Qing reformist and named after Zhili Province (modern ), which served as its power base. It rose to prominence by allying with the to decisively defeat the rival in the brief but intense of July 1920, thereby seizing control of the central government in and several northern provinces. Under leaders such as , who initially headed the clique until his death in 1919, followed by as formal chief and as its most capable field commander—known as the "Jade Marshal" for his strategic acumen and traditionalist ethos—the faction further consolidated power by winning the in 1922 against former allies who sought to challenge Beijing's authority. 's presidency in 1923, secured through notorious of parliamentarians at 5,000 silver dollars per vote, epitomized the clique's reliance on corruption amid nominal republican institutions, enabling temporary stabilization of northern but fueling public disillusionment. The clique's defining characteristics included a focus on and anti-communist stance under , who envisioned a unified under centralized Beiyang rule, yet internal frictions and overextension led to its rapid decline after betrayal by subordinate and defeat in the Second Zhili–Fengtian War of 1924, fragmenting its territories and ending its dominance over the capital. Despite brief achievements in suppressing rival and maintaining a facade of national governance, the Zhili clique exemplified the era's causal cycle of factional warfare driven by personal loyalties and resource control rather than ideological coherence, contributing to prolonged national disunity.

Formation and Early History

Origins in the Beiyang Army

The Zhili clique emerged from the Beiyang Army, Yuan Shikai's modernized military force that formed the backbone of northern China's power during the transition from the Qing dynasty to the Republic. Yuan, leveraging his position as viceroy of Zhili and Shandong provinces, began developing the army in Tianjin in the aftermath of the Qing defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), incorporating German-style training, rifles, and artillery to create a disciplined, professional unit distinct from traditional banner forces. By Yuan's presidency in 1912, the Beiyang Army had become the Republic's dominant military entity, loyal primarily to him rather than to republican ideals or regional interests. Yuan's death on June 6, 1916, triggered a fragmentation of the into rival factions vying for control of the central government in . , a close Yuan associate who commanded the army's First Army, consolidated influence through the , favoring aggressive expansion and alliances with . In opposition, senior Beiyang officers marginalized by Duan's favoritism—particularly in promotions and command assignments—rallied behind , another Yuan loyalist who had risen through the ranks as a divisional commander and suppressor of the 1913 Second Revolution. This group, based in Province (corresponding to modern ), formalized as the Zhili clique around 1916–1917, prioritizing control of the capital region and resistance to Duan's dominance. The clique's early cohesion derived from shared Beiyang heritage and geographic proximity, with Feng leveraging his vice-presidency () and acting presidency (–) to position Zhili forces strategically along transport lines to . Unlike the Anhui faction's reliance on personal networks from Province, the Zhili emphasized broader Beiyang traditions of centralized command, though internal tensions persisted among ambitious subordinates like , who controlled key divisions in , and , a tactical innovator commanding the elite Third Division. This structure enabled the clique to challenge Anhui hegemony, setting the stage for conflicts that defined the .

Rise under Feng Guozhang and Initial Alliances

The Zhili clique originated as a faction within the after Shikai's death on , , when control over Province (modern ) became a focal point for disaffected officers sidelined by the rising under Premier . These officers, many of whom had served under Yuan and shared regional ties to Zhili, began coalescing around , a veteran Beiyang commander born in Zhili Province in 1859, who had risen through the ranks by suppressing the 1913 "Second Revolution" against Yuan. Feng's leadership provided a counterweight to Duan's dominance in the government, though the clique initially lacked cohesive personal loyalties or a unified command structure, relying instead on shared resentment toward Anhui favoritism in appointments and resources. Feng's ascent solidified the clique's prominence when he assumed the role of on , 1917, following Li Yuanhong's resignation amid the failed Zhang Xun Restoration attempt to reinstate the Qing emperor. Serving until October 10, 1918, Feng maneuvered to balance civilian authority against military cliques, but his tenure highlighted the faction's precarious position, as Duan's Anhui group controlled key ministries and , including loans for ongoing conflicts. Under Feng, forces consolidated control over central provinces like and through subordinates such as , who commanded the elite Third Division, enabling the clique to project power southward while maintaining a foothold in the . This period marked the clique's shift from loose affiliation to a recognizable entity oriented toward Western diplomatic support, including overtures to and the for arms and financial backing to offset Japanese influence favoring Duan. Initial alliances under Feng emphasized opposition to Anhui hegemony rather than formal pacts, fostering ad hoc ties with non-aligned Beiyang elements and constitutionalists wary of Duan's . By , as Feng's health declined—he died on December 28, 1919—the had positioned itself as a proponent of parliamentary legitimacy, contrasting Duan's Anfu Club dominance, though internal divisions persisted without a singular ideological glue. These early dynamics laid groundwork for the Zhili's pivotal 1920 coalition with the against forces, but under Feng, the focus remained defensive consolidation amid Beijing's factional gridlock.

Leadership and Organization

Principal Leaders: Feng Guozhang, Cao Kun, and Wu Peifu

Feng Guozhang (1859–1919) served as the founding leader of the Zhili clique following the death of Yuan Shikai in June 1916, rallying disaffected Beiyang Army officers opposed to the dominance of Duan Qirui's Anhui clique. As acting president from October 1918 to October 1919, he positioned the clique to challenge Anhui influence while nominally upholding republican institutions. His death on December 12, 1919, from illness shifted leadership dynamics within the faction. Cao Kun (1862–1938) assumed formal leadership of the Zhili clique after Feng's passing, leveraging his seniority in the and alliances to consolidate control over northern territories including Zhili (modern ) province. He orchestrated the clique's political ascendancy, culminating in his election as president on October 10, 1923, after reportedly bribing over 600 parliamentarians with sums equivalent to 5,000–20,000 silver dollars each to secure 480 votes in the . This , while enabling temporary dominance of the Beijing government, eroded the clique's legitimacy and fueled internal fissures. Cao's tenure emphasized administrative control and financial maneuvers over military innovation, relying heavily on subordinates for battlefield successes. Wu Peifu (1874–1939), known as the "Jade Marshal" for his tactical acumen and classical education, emerged as the clique's preeminent military commander under , directing key victories such as the decisive defeat of forces at on July 14, 1920, and the repulsion of Fengtian incursions near in May–July 1922. Commanding up to 200,000 troops across , , and by 1922, Wu enforced strict discipline among his forces, prohibiting opium use and looting to maintain morale and effectiveness. Despite his subordinate role to Cao, Wu wielded authority over , advocating a vision of national unification under Beiyang principles while clashing with Cao's opportunistic politics, which contributed to the clique's cohesion until betrayals in 1924.

Military and Administrative Structure

The Zhili clique's military structure evolved from the Beiyang Army's divisional system, with core units centered on the 3rd Division under 's command, where initially served as a regimental commander in 1912 before rising to leadership. By the , emerged as the primary field commander, directing integrated forces comprising multiple divisions and allied contingents in key campaigns, reflecting a based on personal loyalties and operational merit rather than rigid institutional chains. Administratively, the clique operated through military governors (dujun) who held dual civil-military authority in controlled provinces, enabling localized resource extraction to fund armies amid weak central coordination. At its peak from 1920 to 1924, it dominated , , , , and provinces, with extensions into and , using these bases to influence the government. Fiscal policies emphasized regional taxation and land surcharges to sustain troops, forming a proto-fiscal-military state model that prioritized military maintenance over broader governance reforms. This structure, while effective for short-term dominance, proved vulnerable to internal divisions and external alliances.

Major Military Campaigns

Zhili-Anhui War (1920)

The Zhili-Anhui War erupted on July 12, 1920, as forces of the , led by and , clashed with the under near , marking the first major inter-clique conflict in the Beiyang era. The underlying causes stemmed from Duan's consolidation of power since 1917, including his suppression of parliamentary opposition and heavy reliance on Japanese loans and arms deals, such as the Nishihara Loans, which fueled resentment among rival who viewed his policies as compromising . A direct trigger was the dispute over control of the Beijing-Hankou railway police, escalating into open hostilities when Zhili troops under Wu Peifu's Third Division advanced on Anhui positions at Gaobeidian. Zhili forces, numbering around 60,000-70,000 including allied Fengtian clique troops under Zhang Zuolin, executed a rapid flanking maneuver at Zhuozhou on July 14, shattering Anhui defenses despite the latter's numerical superiority of approximately 80,000-100,000 men equipped with modern artillery from Japan. Wu Peifu's tactical acumen proved decisive, as his divisions overran key Anhui strongholds like Yangcun and Majiawan within days, prompting mass desertions and surrenders. The Fengtian intervention on July 17 further tilted the balance, capturing Tianjin and advancing on Beijing, where Duan's government collapsed by July 23. The war concluded swiftly with a Zhili-Fengtian , resulting in several thousand casualties for the coalition and over 35,000 troops killed, deserted, or surrendering, alongside the capture of 6,500 prisoners. resigned as president on July 24, fleeing as his fragmented, with many officers defecting to Zhili ranks. This outcome elevated the Zhili to dominance in the , installing as a key and temporarily allying with Fengtian, though underlying rivalries persisted. The conflict underscored the fragility of alliances and the role of personal loyalties and battlefield performance in determining control amid the Republic's decentralized military structure.

First Zhili-Fengtian War (1922)

The First Zhili-Fengtian War erupted in April 1922 as a conflict between the , led by and , and the under , primarily over control of the government following their joint victory against the in 1920. Political differences intensified when the formed a Triangle Alliance with remnants of the and Sun Yat-sen's southern government, aiming to undermine Zhili influence in the capital. The Zhili forces, numbering around 100,000 well-trained troops under 's tactical command, positioned themselves to defend against Fengtian incursions from the northeast. Hostilities commenced on April 29, 1922, when ordered a southern offensive toward , leveraging logistical support for his approximately 100,000-man army. countered effectively by framing the Fengtian advance as imperialism, rallying nationalistic sentiment and exploiting superior artillery and infantry coordination in key engagements along the -Tianjin corridor. By late May, forces had repelled the invaders, with decisive clashes forcing Fengtian troops into retreat beyond the Great Wall. The war concluded in June 1922, marking a swift triumph without extensive territorial devastation but solidifying 's reputation as a military strategist. The outcome expelled from the Beijing coalition government, granting the Zhili Clique dominance over central politics and enabling Cao Kun's maneuvers toward the presidency. Fengtian forces withdrew to , where Zhang declared regional autonomy, setting the stage for future confrontations while highlighting the fragility of warlord alliances predicated on personal ambitions rather than ideological cohesion. This victory temporarily stabilized Zhili control but exposed underlying tensions, including reliance on foreign powers and internal clique rivalries, which would contribute to subsequent instability.

Second Zhili-Fengtian War (1924) and Immediate Aftermath

The Second Zhili-Fengtian War commenced in September 1924, precipitated by the diversion of forces southward to support Jiangsu governor Qi Xieyuan's offensive in the , which began in late August over control of and adjacent territories. leader , commanding approximately 200,000 troops divided across multiple fronts, prioritized this southern campaign against Zhejiang-aligned forces, thereby exposing northern defenses around and to invasion from . head capitalized on this strategic lapse, mobilizing his forces—bolstered by Japanese logistical support and superior artillery production from industries—and launching a northern offensive on September 15 to challenge dominance over the government. Principal engagements unfolded in dual theaters: skirmishes and sieges along the Beijing-Tianjin rail line and at Shanhaiguan pass, where Zhili units faced encirclement by the advancing Fengtian army allied with opportunistic elements under . 's strategy emphasized rapid redeployments to counter the Fengtian thrust, but internal fractures undermined cohesion; notably, Zhili general , leading the 3rd Army near the capital, withheld full commitment amid growing disillusionment with 's leadership. The war concluded abruptly on October 23, 1924, when executed the Beijing Coup, detaining , dissolving the Zhili-controlled parliament, and telegraphing to enter the capital while also summoning as a counterbalance. This betrayal fragmented Zhili command, forcing to retreat southward to with remnants of his army, leaving northern positions untenable. In the immediate aftermath, the Zhili clique's grip on the Beijing government shattered, with Cao Kun compelled to resign and the presidency left vacant under Duan Qirui's provisional executive authority. A tenuous tripartite arrangement emerged among the (under Zhang), 's , and Yan Xishan's forces, but underlying rivalries—exacerbated by Soviet overtures to —destabilized the capital and eroded central fiscal resources, rendering the government bankrupt and ineffective. Wu Peifu's surviving divisions, isolated in and , suffered desertions and lost unified command, marking the onset of Zhili fragmentation and inviting subsequent coalitions against residual strongholds. This collapse not only expelled Zhili influence from but also intensified regional warlord autonomy, foreshadowing the of 1925.

Political Dominance

Control of the Beijing Government

Following the Zhili-Anhui War from July 14 to 23, 1920, in which the allied with the to defeat the led by , the Zhili faction seized control of the in . This victory displaced Anhui dominance, allowing Zhili leaders and to exert influence over President , who remained in office as a nominal head until 1922 while real authority rested with the military victors. The clique's armies secured key northern provinces, providing the leverage to appoint sympathetic officials and suppress rival factions within the . To eliminate Fengtian interference and achieve sole dominance, Wu Peifu's Zhili forces launched the First Zhili-Fengtian War in April 1922, culminating in a decisive victory by July that expelled Fengtian troops from the region. This success enabled the Zhili clique to monopolize control over the Beiyang government's institutions, including the presidency, premiership, and parliament, through direct military oversight and alliances with compliant . Wu Peifu, often termed the "Jade Marshal" for his strategic prowess, dictated policy from his base near , ensuring that cabinet appointments and legislative decisions aligned with Zhili interests. The apex of this control occurred in 1923 when , backed by Zhili military power, maneuvered his election as on October 10, deposing the incumbent and solidifying the faction's grip on the executive branch. Under Cao's presidency, the Beijing government functioned as an extension of Zhili authority, with revenues from customs and salt taxes funneled to sustain the clique's armies, while provincial governors paid nominal allegiance to maintain fragile unity. This period marked the height of Zhili political ascendancy, though internal frictions and external pressures foreshadowed its erosion by late 1924.

Cao Kun's Presidency and Associated Policies

, leader of the Zhili clique, secured the presidency of the Republic of through widespread of the on October 5, 1923, receiving 480 out of 590 votes amid allegations of and . He reportedly distributed 5,000 silver dollars (or yuan) to each assembly member, totaling an estimated 3 million yuan, an act that severely undermined the legitimacy of the Beijing government and intensified public disillusionment with republican institutions. This "bribing presidency" exemplified the dominance over formal political processes, prioritizing clique interests over national governance. Inaugurated on October 10, 1923, Cao's first major act was the promulgation of the , which replaced the Provisional Constitution and established a strong granting the executive broad powers, including authority over war, peace, and appointments. Hastily drafted by the compromised , the document aimed to formalize control under a republican facade but failed to address underlying fragmentation, as real authority remained with military leaders like Cao and rather than civilian institutions. Cao's presidency, lasting until his ouster on November 2, 1924, produced few substantive policies beyond maintaining Zhili military hegemony in northern , with focused on suppressing rivals and extracting resources to fund clique operations rather than implementing reforms or . Efforts to stabilize the capital's administration were overshadowed by ongoing inter-clique tensions, culminating in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, which exposed the fragility of his rule and accelerated the clique's decline. The era reinforced perceptions of in Beiyang , contributing to broader calls for unification under alternative leadership.

Decline and Collapse

Internal Betrayals and the Beijing Coup (1924)

Amid the Second Zhili-Fengtian War, which erupted on September 15, 1924, internal fissures within the Zhili clique deepened as military pressures mounted against Fengtian forces led by Zhang Zuolin. Wu Peifu, the clique's preeminent general, focused on frontline operations near Shanhaiguan, leaving Beijing vulnerable and exposing underlying command rivalries. Feng Yuxiang, commander of the Zhili-aligned Third Army (later known as the ), harbored grievances against 's leadership style and the clique's reliance on bribery-tainted governance under President . On October 23, 1924, as Zhili troops faltered against Fengtian advances, Feng executed the Beijing Coup by ordering his forces—approximately one division and two brigades—to seize the capital, bypassing orders to reinforce . His troops surrounded government offices, arrested , and confined him under , effectively deposing the president who had assumed office in October 1923 via a bribed with silver dollars. Feng simultaneously dissolved the legislature, expelled the last Qing emperor from the on November 5, and telegraphed a unilateral to halt hostilities, though Wu rejected it and continued fighting until his retreat. This betrayal stemmed from Feng's opportunistic assessment that Zhili's defeat was imminent, compounded by personal ambitions and ideological differences; unlike Wu's Confucian , Feng espoused reforms influenced by his Christian affiliations and dissatisfaction with . The coup fragmented unity, as Feng negotiated a tenuous alliance with , allowing Fengtian forces to occupy by November 1924 while Wu regrouped southward. With roughly 200,000 troops dispersed or demoralized, the event precipitated the clique's loss of central authority, enabling Duan Qirui's and accelerating fragmentation. No other major commanders defected in tandem, underscoring Feng's isolated yet decisive action amid broader policy disagreements over fiscal centralization and .

Defeat in the Northern Expedition (1926-1928)

The , led primarily by after the 1924 Beijing Coup, retained control over key territories in and provinces south of the River, with Wu commanding approximately 200,000 troops plagued by low morale, supply shortages, and internal corruption. These forces relied on conscripted peasants with minimal training and outdated equipment, contrasting sharply with the 's (NRA) more disciplined units bolstered by Soviet advisors, modern tactics, and ideological mobilization. Wu's strategic position deteriorated further in March 1926 when his ally Zhao Hengti resigned as governor, allowing to seize power and align with the (KMT), facilitating the NRA's initial entry without resistance. The Northern Expedition commenced on July 9, 1926, as Chiang Kai-shek's NRA, numbering around 100,000, launched from Guangdong into Hunan, capturing Changsha on July 11 amid local defections and minimal opposition from Zhili garrisons. The NRA's advance accelerated through August, seizing Jiujiang on August 18 after breakthroughs by elite units like Ye Ting's Independent Regiment at critical rail junctions, exploiting Zhili troops' reluctance to fight due to unpaid wages and fears of communist agitation among peasants. Wu Peifu concentrated defenses around Wuhan (Hankou, Hanyang, and Wuchang), but his lines collapsed under coordinated NRA assaults; he abandoned the cities on September 6, 1926, with full capture achieved by October 10 as thousands of Zhili soldiers deserted or surrendered, their artillery and supplies largely intact but unused due to command breakdowns. Retreating northward across the , Wu's remnants—reduced to scattered bands totaling fewer than 50,000 effective fighters—failed to regroup effectively, hampered by factional betrayals and lack of alliances with northern like Zhang Zuolin's , who prioritized their own defenses. In 1927, Wu attempted counteroffensives in , briefly recapturing in June with Feng Yuxiang's temporary aid, but these efforts faltered against the NRA's superior logistics and numerical reinforcements, leading to further routs by September. By early 1928, as the NRA pushed toward , Zhili forces disintegrated entirely, with surviving officers defecting to the KMT or dispersing into banditry; Wu retired to , marking the clique's total dissolution as the only major faction eradicated by the Expedition's conclusion on , 1928. This outcome stemmed causally from the Zhili's overreliance on coercive recruitment without ideological cohesion, versus the NRA's hybrid of military professionalism and , which eroded legitimacy through and local uprisings.

Controversies and Criticisms

Corruption, Bribery, and Governance Failures

The most notorious instance of corruption within the Zhili clique occurred during the 1923 presidential election, when leader Cao Kun secured the presidency through systematic bribery of parliament members. Cao distributed substantial funds to legislators to obtain the required votes, resulting in his election on October 10, 1923, despite opposition from figures like Sun Yat-sen, who declared it illegitimate. This "bribery presidency" exemplified the clique's prioritization of personal power over institutional integrity, eroding public trust in the Beijing government and fostering perceptions of moral decay among warlord factions. Bribery extended beyond the election, permeating administrative practices as clique members favored financial inducements to maintain alliances and control resources, contrasting with the more disciplined approach of co-leader . Such practices exacerbated fiscal strain, with military expenditures dominating budgets while civilian governance suffered neglect. The clique's control of central finances enabled elite enrichment but contributed to widespread inefficiency, as officials engaged in self-interested dealings rather than policy implementation. Governance failures were evident in the inadequate response to crises like the 1920-1921 , which affected province under clique influence. Official relief efforts, coordinated through the government, proved insufficient due to and logistical breakdowns, leaving native initiatives to fill gaps amid harvest failures post-Zhili-Anhui War. This highlighted systemic shortcomings in resource allocation and administrative capacity, as priorities favored military consolidation over famine mitigation or development. Overall, these patterns of and neglect intensified political fragmentation, undermining the clique's legitimacy and paving the way for its decline.

Military Conduct and Atrocities

The Zhili clique's armies, particularly under the command of , earned a reputation for superior discipline and tactical proficiency amid the Warlord Era's chaos, distinguishing them from less restrained factions like the . Foreign military observers during the First Zhili-Fengtian War (April–July 1922) noted that Wu's forces exhibited better training, cohesion, and coordination, contributing to decisive victories such as the capture of Junliangcheng on May 17, 1922, with minimal reports of indiscipline. This emphasis on order stemmed from Wu's personal enforcement of military codes, including summary executions for or , which helped secure local acquiescence in controlled territories like and . In contrast to the Anhui clique's governance of (1918–1920), where Governor Zhang Jingyao's forces implemented a policy of arbitrary taxation, mass arrests, rapes, and killings—earning the moniker "burn, kill, rape, and rob" (sha, sha, lu, jian)—Zhili troops under Wu avoided such systematic predations after ousting Zhang in the Zhili-Anhui War (July 1920). Wu's 3rd Division advanced into by late July 1920, prioritizing restoration of railroads and suppression of over exploitation, with reports indicating fewer civilian reprisals as commanders sought to portray the clique as restorers of stability. Scholarly analyses attribute this restraint to Wu's Confucian-influenced and strategic calculus, as unchecked atrocities alienated populations and fueled anti-warlord sentiment exploited by rivals. Despite this relative discipline, Zhili military operations were not devoid of collateral harm inherent to the era's conflicts. Artillery barrages and positional warfare in the Second Zhili-Fengtian War (September–November 1924) caused civilian deaths in suburbs and along the Jingfeng railway, with retreating Zhili units from Wu's southern front engaging in sporadic pillaging of villages near as supply lines collapsed by October 1924. However, historical records, including contemporary diplomatic dispatches, document no large-scale massacres or organized by Zhili forces comparable to those under Fengtian or commanders, underscoring the clique's operational focus on professional soldiery over terror as policy. This pattern held until the clique's fragmentation post-1924, when subordinate units fragmented into less controlled militias during the (1926–1928).

Legacy and Historiography

Long-Term Impact on Chinese Fragmentation and Nationalism

The downfall of the Zhili clique, culminating in its decisive defeat during the National Revolutionary Army's Northern Expedition from July 1926 to June 1928, accelerated the dismantling of Beiyang-era warlord structures and enabled the Kuomintang (KMT) to establish the Nanjing government, nominally unifying China by late 1928. Yet this victory proved illusory for eradicating fragmentation, as surviving warlord remnants retained de facto regional control, perpetuating a patchwork of loyalties that undermined central directives and fueled intermittent revolts through the 1930s and into the Second Sino-Japanese War. Zhili rule from 1920 to 1924, despite temporary dominance over and central provinces, intensified national disunity through reliance on personalistic alliances and military rather than institutional , mirroring the Warlord Era's broader pattern of over 10 million casualties from internecine conflicts and economic dislocation. This era of unchecked provincial autonomy eroded public faith in republican federalism, highlighting warlordism's incompatibility with cohesive statehood and amplifying calls for a unified to counter both internal anarchy and external encroachments, such as Japanese territorial demands. The clique's legacy reinforced a causal link between fragmentation and the imperative for militarized centralism, shaping post-1928 governance where KMT leader integrated subdued into a hierarchical system while prioritizing loyalty over parliamentary ideals. This dynamic prefigured the Chinese Communist Party's post-1949 consolidation, where narratives of vanquishing division justified expansive and territorial integration to forestall renewed . , galvanized by the era's humiliations, evolved into a tool for regime legitimacy, framing unification as redemption from Zhili-style toward a , indivisible .

Scholarly Debates and Reassessments

Traditional , shaped by Nationalist and Communist narratives, has depicted the Zhili clique as a prime example of fragmentation, emphasizing under Cao Kun's 1923 —secured via bribes totaling over 20 million to 600 parliamentarians—and military adventurism that prolonged China's disunity after the . Scholars like Li Jiannong (1930) and Tao Juyin (1957) amplified perceptions of disorder, portraying cliques like Zhili as feudal relics obstructing modernization and unification, a view reinforced in academia to justify revolutionary teleology. Reassessments since the late challenge this by highlighting the clique's internal discipline and Wu Peifu's role as a modern militarist. Odoric Y.K. Wou's analysis of Wu's career (–) underscores his emphasis on military efficiency, expanding forces to 250,000 troops by 1924 through structured hierarchies and Confucian-infused that prioritized over plunder, contrasting with caricatures of as mere bandits. Wu's victories, such as the July 1920 Zhili-Anhui War defeating Duan Qirui's 80,000-man army in nine days, temporarily stabilized central authority in , fostering brief administrative continuity rather than pure chaos. Debates persist on the clique's ideological orientation and legacy. While Wu advocated and public governance, aligning with intellectuals for "good government," critics argue his and resistance to undermined broader reforms. Recent works reassess governance, including Zhili's, as blending traditional moral stewardship with pragmatic modernization—evident in bases like Province, modernized by 1901 under —revealing long-term investments in infrastructure and education that complicated narratives of uniform decay. These revisions caution against biases exaggerating turmoil, advocating empirical focus on local agency and elite adaptations amid instability.

References

  1. [1]
    Republican Period Warlord Cliques (www.chinaknowledge.de)
    The Zhili Clique had created an alliance with the Fengtian Clique 奉系 and was able to defeat Duan Qirui's armies, his Anhui Clique dissolved, and their ...
  2. [2]
    New Great War Episode: Chinese Warlord Era - The Zhili–Anhui War
    Apr 30, 2021 · The Zhili clique centered on Beiyang national army officers Cao Kun and Wu Peifu, and dominated several provinces in east-central China. Wu ...
  3. [3]
    The Warlord Era - Alpha History
    Feb 15, 2025 · In 1920, the Zhili and Anhui cliques fought a brief but bloody war over Beijing, the Zhili warlords emerging victorious.
  4. [4]
    3.94 Fall and Rise of China: Meet the Northern Warlords
    Apr 8, 2024 · Yuan Shikai built up the strongest army in China, the Beiyang Army that outlasted him. Many of Yuan Shikai's officers would become Warlords and ...
  5. [5]
    (5) An Era of Warlordism and Chaos - The Splendid Chinese Culture
    Feng Guozhang, the original leader of the Zhili clique, died in 1919. Cao obtained the post of president via bribery in 1923.
  6. [6]
    Successors to the Western Front, Pt. 2: The Second Zhili-Fengtian War
    Jul 4, 2025 · Cao in turn relied on one man above all for that strength: Wu Peifu, the Jade Marshal. Wu had engineered the Zhili victories over the Anhui and ...
  7. [7]
    3.103 Fall and Rise of China: First Zhili–Fengtian War
    Jun 10, 2024 · The Zhili and Fengtian cliques banded together to defeat the Anhui clique, now Duan Qirui went into a bit of a self exile and most of his ...Missing: achievements | Show results with:achievements<|control11|><|separator|>
  8. [8]
    Yuan Shikai: the first warlord - Alpha History
    Mar 10, 2018 · In late January 1912, Beiyang Army officers demanded the emperor's abdication, almost certainly at Shikai's instruction. After a fortnight of ...Missing: establishment | Show results with:establishment
  9. [9]
    Civilian and Military Power (China) - 1914-1918 Online
    Oct 8, 2014 · ... cliques: the Anfu clique under Duan Qirui, and the Zhili clique under Feng Guozhang (1859-1919). Both cliques were contending to gain power ...Missing: initial | Show results with:initial
  10. [10]
    Defining Warlords: Chinese Warlordism in Comparative Analysis
    In October 1923, Cao Kun, who succeeded Feng as the Zhili faction head bribed the National Assembly to elect him as President. One year later, the troops of ...
  11. [11]
    A Tale of Two Warlords: Republican China During the 1920s
    ... cliques. Feng joined the Zhili Clique, whose star was Wu Peifu, the “Jade Marshal.” A master tactician, Wu was that rare warlord with a classical education.
  12. [12]
    (吴佩孚) (1874 – 1939), China - Wu Peifu - Generals.dk
    1911-XX-XX, Commanding Officer 3rd Regiment, 3rd Division, Imperial Army ; 1912-XX-XX, Commanding Officer 3rd Artillery Regiment, 3rd Division, Beiyang Army.
  13. [13]
    Centralized Regionalism: The rise of regional fiscal-military states in ...
    Mar 24, 2020 · The Zhili clique occupied five provinces (Zhili, Jiangsu, Henan, Hubei, and Jiangxi as well as Suiyuan and Ningxia).
  14. [14]
    Zhili–Anhui War | Historical Atlas of Asia Pacific (23 July 1920)
    The Zhili-Anhui War started in 1920 when the Zhili and Fengtian cliques allied to overthrow the Anhui clique, who had dominated since 1917.
  15. [15]
    First Chinese Warlord War (Zhili–Anhui War)
    Aug 3, 2014 · According to the Wikipedia article Zhili-Fengtian coalition suffered Several thousand casualties while 35,500 in the Anhui army were killed or ...
  16. [16]
    Comprehensive Guide to the Chinese Warlord Era - ResearchGate
    delve into the notable warlords of the Zhili Clique: Wu Peifu and Feng Yuxiang. The First Zhili-Fengtian War. Tensions from the 1920 Zhili-Anhui War bled into ...
  17. [17]
    [PDF] The Developmental Chronicles of China's Northeast - UNITesi
    Feb 15, 2025 · ... 1922 was composed of 100,000 men and almost tripled that number ... Zhili-Fengtian War. This time Zhang Zuolin won the war and managed ...
  18. [18]
    [PDF] 北洋派系戰爭Wars among the Beiyang Cliques
    The First Zhili-Fengtian War took place in April to May 1922. On 29 April, Zhang Zuolin, the commander-in-chief of the Fengtian clique, launched a southern ...
  19. [19]
    [PDF] China at War – From Ancient times to the Modern Day - British battles
    1922. First Zhili-. Fengtian War. Zhili and Fengtian cliques for control of Beijing. Page 24. 1924. Second Zhili-. Fengtian War a conflict between the Japanese ...
  20. [20]
    [PDF] CHAPTER 7 THE ILLUSION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
    In April 1922 the 1st Zhili-Fengtian War was fought. Wu Peifu of the Jilin militia defeated Zhang Zuolin of the Fengtian militia; Zhang fled to. Manchuria.
  21. [21]
    [PDF] China's turning point, 1924-1925
    ' The central government's commander in chief was China's ablest general, Wu Peifu, a classically educated soldier whose military brilliance had won him the ...
  22. [22]
    https://brill.com/display/book/9789004340848/B9789004340848_005.pdf
  23. [23]
    [PDF] The 18 March Incident of 1926 Revisited - University of Cambridge
    In 1924, the Zhili Clique, which had controlled the central government in Beijing since 1922, was about to launch its final push to unify the country. Stood ...
  24. [24]
    Tsao Kun Wins the Presidency of China By ... - The New York Times
    Marshal Tsao Kun elected Pres; great amount of bribery.Missing: Cao | Show results with:Cao
  25. [25]
    https://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/Articles/Details?Guid=cc5b2445-62b6-4d6f-87ce-bf4efacba28e
  26. [26]
    [PDF] 11.pdf - AustLII
    In order to maintain war lord control, the nominal President Cao Kun, the last of the Beiyang warlords, proclaimed in 1923 the Constitution of the Republic of.
  27. [27]
    Beijing Coup | Historical Atlas of Asia Pacific (23 October 1924)
    By 1924, the Zhili clique seemed poised to reunify China under its rule. However it was not to be. In a surprise move in October, the warlord Feng Yuxiang ...
  28. [28]
    Wu Peifu - X-Boorman - ENP China
    Because he could not stem the advance of the Northern Expedition in southern Hupeh, he fell back to defend the Wuhan cities. On 6 September 1926 he abandoned ...
  29. [29]
    (1) The Northern Expedition | Academy of Chinese Studies
    The NRA first attacked Wu Peifu's troops in the middle reaches of the Yangtze River (長江). In July 1926, the NRA captured Changsha, the capital of Hunan. In ...
  30. [30]
    Episode 40: The Northern Expedition Begins: Attempts at Merging ...
    Oct 1, 2020 · In contrast, soldiers from the warlord Wu Peifu's forces who lagged behind in their retreat were beaten by the locals and called 'thieves.' So ...
  31. [31]
    The Northern Expedition - Modern Chinese History
    ... defeating the warlord forces of the Zhili clique. The victorious union workers occupied and governed urban Shanghai except for the international settlements ...
  32. [32]
    [PDF] Second Northern Expedition - 1928
    Wu Peifu did not see Cao Kun till two days later, and Cao Kun rebuked Wu Peifu for various blunders that led Zhi-xi faction to the frustrations and defeats. Cao ...<|separator|>
  33. [33]
    [PDF] A Tale of Two Warlords - Association for Asian Studies
    Feng joined the. Zhili Clique, whose star was Wu Peifu, the “Jade Marshal.” A master tacti- cian, Wu was that rare warlord with a classical education. Zhang ...
  34. [34]
    North China Famine Revisited: Unsung Native Relief in the Warlord ...
    Aug 14, 2012 · ... failures) in the northern provinces of Zhili and Shanxi.Footnote ... Early in the crisis, in December 1920, Beijing's Government Relief ...<|separator|>
  35. [35]
    North China famine, 1920-21 | DisasterHistory.org
    The failure of harvests across the North in 1920 also came in the immediate wake of the Zhili-Anhui war that July, which saw the troops of three political ...
  36. [36]
    Warlord Era - Brill Reference Works
    The result was the political fragmentation of the nation among these competing "warlords." ... Chinese politics after 1927 was a legacy of the warlord period.Missing: impact | Show results with:impact<|separator|>
  37. [37]
    The Chinese Warlord Era (1916-1928): Fragmentation, Militarism ...
    Oct 28, 2023 · Bribery and corruption were rampant. They paid lip service to the Republic's government while viciously competing for dominance. Warlords ...Missing: examples | Show results with:examples
  38. [38]
    Mutiny in Hunan: Writing and Rewriting the “Warlord Era” in Early ...
    This dissertation examines a 1920 mutiny in Pingjiang County, Hunan Province, as a way of challenging the dominant narrative of the early republican period ...
  39. [39]
    Militarism in modern China : the career of Wu P'ei-Fu, 1916-39
    Apr 28, 2023 · Militarism in modern China : the career of Wu P'ei-Fu, 1916-39 ; Publication date: 1978 ; Topics: Wu, Peifu, 1874-1939, Generals -- China -- ...
  40. [40]
    Militarism in Modern China: The Career of Wu P'ei-Fu, 1916-39
    Wu's defeat in Hupeh was due, to a large extent, to the failure of Sun Ch'uan ... Northern Expedition against Wu. Chiang marched with his Nationalist ...Missing: timeline | Show results with:timeline
  41. [41]
    [PDF] King's Research Portal
    As the Zhili Clique and the Fengtian Clique constituted a bipolar power structure after the war, no policy in Beijing could be made without the approval of ...
  42. [42]
    [PDF] The Misconceptions and Realities of Republican-Era Warlord ...
    May 18, 2020 · The main modernized army, Beiyang (“great ocean”) army, is based in Zhili Province (modern day Hebei) led by imperial general Yuan Shi-kai (袁 ...